

C 114-H03322-43-P015168

The American Political Science Review

43

BOARD OF EDITORS

Hugh L. Elsbree, Managing Editor,
Library of Congress

Henry W. Ehrmann,
University of Colorado

V. O. Key, Jr., Associate Editor,
Harvard University

Harvey C. Mansfield,
Ohio State University

James L. McCamy, Associate Editor,
University of Wisconsin


C. Herman Pritchett,
University of Chicago

Taylor Cole,
Duke University

Francis O. Wilcox,
Washington, D. C.

391
005

VOLUME XLVII
1953



GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

P 15/88

Copyright, 1953, by
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

CONTENTS

NUMBER 1—MARCH, 1953

Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism. <i>Francis W. Coker</i>	1
The American Idea of International Interest. <i>Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos</i>	28
Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-1951. <i>Warren E. Miller</i>	45
The Implementation of the Italian Constitution. <i>John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile</i>	61
The Politics of Management Improvement in the States. <i>Karl A. Bosworth</i>	84
The Hoover Commission's Personnel Recommendations—A Progress Report. <i>Harold H. Leich</i>	100
Constitutional Law in 1951-1952. <i>David Fellman</i>	126
Short Articles and Notes	
Notes on the Theory of Political Opinion Formation. <i>Avery Leiserson</i>	171
The Government Sector of the American Economy. <i>Elmer B. Staats</i>	178
Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East. <i>Halford L. Hoskins</i>	188
The Japanese General Election of 1952. <i>Paul S. Dull</i>	199
Book Reviews, Notes, and Bibliography. <i>Emmette S. Redford (ed.)</i>	205
News and Notes. <i>Albert Lee Sturm (ed.)</i>	273

NUMBER 2—JUNE, 1953

Libertarian Motivations on the Vinson Court. <i>C. Herman Pritchett</i>	321
The Two-Party System in British Politics. <i>Leslie Lipson</i>	337
Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952. <i>Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller</i>	359
The Region of Isolationism. <i>Ralph H. Smuckler</i>	386
Agrarian Syndicalism in Postwar France. <i>Gordon Wright</i>	402
An American View of European Union. <i>Arthur N. Holcombe</i>	417
Political Factors in U. S. International Financial Cooperation, 1945-1950. <i>Jack N. Behrman</i>	431
Nature over Art: No More Local Finance. <i>Rowland Egger</i>	461
State Administration of Natural Resources in the West. <i>Vincent Ostrom</i>	478
Technical Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia. <i>Lynton K. Caldwell</i>	494
The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics. <i>Majid Khadduri</i>	511
Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio. <i>V. O. Key, Jr.</i>	525
British By-Elections, 1952. <i>Richard M. Scammon</i>	533
Book Reviews, Notes, and Bibliography. <i>Emmette S. Redford (ed.)</i>	537
News and Notes. <i>Albert Lee Sturm (ed.)</i>	609

NUMBER 3—SEPTEMBER, 1953

Research in Comparative Politics	
Report of the Inter-University Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council	641
Comments on the Seminar Report	658
The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation. <i>Joseph G. La Palombara</i>	676
The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System. <i>Reed L. Frischknecht</i>	704
Some Reflections of a Law Professor about Instruction and Research in Public Administration. <i>Kenneth Culp Davis</i>	728
Collective Security Reexamined. <i>Kenneth W. Thompson</i>	753
The Law of Oligarchy. <i>C. W. Cassinelli</i>	773

The Legislative Council Movement in the United States, 1933-1953. <i>Harold W. Davey</i>	785
Short Papers	
Increasing the Number of Americans Potentially Available for Foreign Assignments. <i>Walter H. C. Laves</i>	798
The Independent Voter in 1952: A Study of Pittsfield, Massachusetts. <i>Philip K. Hastings</i>	805
Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science in American Universities. <i>Francis B. Rourke (comp.)</i>	811
Book Reviews, Notes, and Bibliography. <i>Emmette S. Redford (ed.)</i>	843
Publications on Australia Useful to a Political Scientist: A Selective Survey. <i>Louise Overacker</i>	844
News and Notes. <i>Albert L. Sturm (ed.)</i>	931

NUMBER 4—DECEMBER, 1953

On the Study of Government. <i>Pendleton Herring</i>	961
The United Nations and the Political Scientist. <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i>	975
The German Social Democratic Party and the International Situation. <i>Henry L. Bretton</i>	980
<u>The British Commonwealth: A Symposium</u>	
The British Commonwealth of Nations. <i>H. Duncan Hall</i>	997
The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth. <i>K. C. Wheare</i>	1018
Nationalism and Democracy in the British Commonwealth: Some General Trends. <i>Alexander Brady</i>	1029
Neutralization and the Balance of Power. <i>Fred Greene</i>	1041
The Developing Field of International Legal Studies. <i>David F. Cavers</i>	1053
The Political Theory Implicit in Social Casework Theory. <i>Alan Keith-Lucas</i>	1073
Reason and Power in Benjamin Franklin's Political Thought. <i>Gerald Stourzh</i>	1092
Purposes, Procedures, and Outcomes of the Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations. <i>Paul T. David</i>	1116
A Note on Treaty Ratification. <i>Carl Marcy</i>	1130
Book Reviews, Notes, and Bibliography. <i>Emmette S. Redford (ed.)</i>	1134
A Selective Survey of Literature on Tibet. <i>Beátrice D. Miller</i>	1135
News and Notes. <i>Albert L. Sturm (ed.)</i>	1214
Forty-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Transactions of the Council and Annual Business Meetings.....	1215
The Constitution of The American Political Science Association, 1953.....	1221
Special Announcements.....	1236
Index to Volume XLVII. <i>Emma Rhyne Patterson</i>	1239

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President

RALPH J. BUNCHE
United Nations

President-Elect

CHARLES MCKINLEY
Reed College

Vice-Presidents

TAYLOR COLE
Duke University

J. A. C. GRANT
University of California
(Los Angeles)

CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON
State College of Washington

Secretary

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
The Ohio State University

Treasurer

EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD
Cornell University

Executive Director

JOHN GANGE
1785 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Managing Editor

American Political Science Review
HUGH L. ELSBREN
Library of Congress

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officio*

WALTER H. BENNETT
University of Alabama
HUGH A. BONE
University of Washington
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University
DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin
VICTOR JONES
Wesleyan University
JACK W. PELTASON
University of Illinois
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
University of Texas
CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

MANNING J. DAUER
University of Florida
EARL LATHAM
Amherst College
ARNAUD LEAVELLE
Stanford University
DAYTON D. MCKEAN
University of Colorado
J. ROLAND PENNOCK
Swarthmore College
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of Chicago
WALLACE S. SAYRE
College of the City of New York
DWIGHT WALDO
University of California (Berkeley)

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNRO SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSON
LEO S. ROWE

WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM
CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL

CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING

New Editions of standard Political Science texts

Gettell's HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

2nd EDITION

By LAWRENCE C. WANLASS

This revision of a standard text in its field traces the development of political thought from its earliest beginnings to the present. Five chapters have been completely rewritten, five partially rewritten, and five substantially revised. The scope of the book covers the nature of political thought, ancient political thought, medieval political thought, the beginnings of modern political thought, modern liberal theory, the growth of fascism, and the development of communism. Most sections dealing with principal figures in political philosophy have been enlarged. Less attention is paid to 19th century thought, making room for a full consideration of democratic socialism, fascism, and communism. Up-to-date bibliographies appear at the ends of the chapters.

Large Royal 8vo—About 416 pp.—To be published in January

Sait's AMERICAN PARTIES and ELECTIONS

5th EDITION

By HOWARD R. PENNIMAN

This standard text for college courses in American political parties has been revised and brought up to date to include recent data and present-day methods. Notable among the features of the Fifth Edition are a timely and important new chapter on the nature, history, and organization of the Communist party in the United States, and a new chapter on the influence of pressure groups on our legislative processes. The chapter on Negro suffrage has been brought in line with recent developments, and the discussions of the boss, the political machine, and the use of radio and television in politics contribute important new material to the literature of political science.

As before, this text offers an unusually detailed, complete, and up-to-date coverage of the American party system. Its presentation is interesting, realistic, and scholarly.

Large Royal Octavo

574 pp.

Illustrated

\$5.00

Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

35 West 32nd Street

New York 1, N. Y.

UNIVERSITY PRESS

CONSTITUTIONS, ELECTORAL LAWS, TREATIES OF STATES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Edited by Helen Miller Davis

Indispensable source of primary material for students of this region.

\$7.50

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS: Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast 1842-1845

by John King Fairbank

Pioneer monograph of Sino-Foreign relations based on Chinese as well as foreign sources.

2 volumes, each \$7.50

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

CHARLES A. BEARD: An Appraisal

Edited by Howard K. Beale

Essays by Harold Laski, Max Lerner, Luther Gulick, George Soule, Walton Hamilton, and others.

\$4.50

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY PRESS

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY

THE STATES AND THE NATION

by Leonard D. White

Study of present, past, and possible future relations between the state and federal governments.

\$2.75

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA

1953 ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS

Edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift

A compact, analytical, and critical survey of United Nations activities by leading members of the world organization.

\$4.50

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK

THE DIPLOMATS, 1919-1939

Edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert

"Best informed, most authoritative and most provocative treatment of diplomatic history presently available for period indicated." *Langer, N.Y. Times Book Review*

\$9.00

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

WOODROW WILSON AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND

by Louis Gerson

An analysis of Wilson's role as the champion of the new Poland in 1919.

\$4.00

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW HAVEN 7, CONNECTICUT

PUBLISHING



BOOKS FROM CHICAGO

Natural Right and History

By *LEO STRAUSS*. An examination of one of the most controversial and significant issues in contemporary political and social philosophy. \$5.00

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes

By *LEO STRAUSS*. Now available for the first time in many years, this is the best and most thorough analysis of Hobbes. \$4.00

Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law

By *JOHN WILD*. The author takes issue with the critics who point to *The Republic* as the first tract of fascism. \$5.50

At your bookstore, or from

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.

Recently Published

AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT

FOURTH EDITION

by *W. BROOKE GRAVES*, Chief, Government Section Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; Adjunct Professor of Political Science, The American University

Complete revision and resetting of the most authoritative text in this field has brought all material up to date. The book reports and analyzes significant recent developments in the forward movement of the states since World War II. 960pp. \$6.25

"... This is clearly an outstanding textbook. Dr. Graves covers the subject thoroughly, yet interestingly. His treatment is certainly authoritative. Dr. Graves brings to the revision of this important text qualifications unequalled by any other student of American State Government, and this is reflected on almost every page of the fourth edition. . . ."

Professor John H. Ferguson, Pennsylvania State College

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY

Sales Offices: NEW YORK 14 CHICAGO 16 SAN FRANCISCO 5 ATLANTA 3

DALLAS 1

Home Office: BOSTON 16

Winner of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation Award

CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE

The American State and the Conscientious Objector: 1940-1947

By MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, University of Minnesota, and
PHILIP E. JACOB, University of Pennsylvania

"[The authors] have compiled a mass of information in an area where data are difficult to come by. They have organized it intelligently, written it up clearly and interestingly, and have analyzed it very perceptively."

—*Stanford Law Review* \$6.50

A volume in the series, Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty



124 ROBERTS PLACE, ITHACA, N.Y.

CORNELL STUDIES IN CIVIL LIBERTY

(Other available volumes in the series are listed below)

THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM. By Eleanor Bontecou, the New York Bar. 1953. \$5.00

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. By Robert K. Carr, Dartmouth College. 1953. \$6.50

THE STATES AND SUBVERSION. Edited by Walter Gellhorn, Columbia University. 1952. \$5.00

UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: *The Work of the Canwell Committee*. By Vern Countryman, Yale University. 1951. \$5.00

LOYALTY AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION: *A Survey of Activity by the New York State Legislature, 1919-1949*. By Lawrence H. Chamberlain, Columbia University. 1951. \$4.00


THE TENNEY COMMITTEE: *Legislative Investigation of Subversive Activities in California*. By Edward L. Barrett, Jr., University of California. 1951. \$5.00

SECURITY, LOYALTY, AND SCIENCE. By Walter Gellhorn, Columbia University. 1950. \$3.00

and two volumes on civil rights

FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: *Quest for a Sword*. By Robert K. Carr, Dartmouth College. 1947. \$3.00

CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION. By Milton R. Konvitz, Cornell University. 1953. \$3.50



PRACTICAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The ICMA Municipal Management Series

Eight up-to-date texts that treat public affairs from the standpoint of the chief administrator. Written by men of broad management experience, they stress techniques and best administrative practice. They are broad in scope and widely used in the college classroom as well as in municipal in-service training.

The Technique of Municipal Administration.	601 pp., Third Edition, 1947
Municipal Personnel Administration.	435 pp., Fifth Edition, 1950
Municipal Finance Administration.	491 pp., Fourth Edition, 1949
Local Planning Administration.	337 pp., Second Edition, 1948
Municipal Fire Administration.	498 pp., Fifth Edition, 1950
Municipal Public Works Administration.	458 pp., Fourth Edition, 1950
Municipal Recreation Administration.	516 pp., Third Edition, 1948
Municipal Police Administration.	468 pp., Third Edition, 1950

"My experience with the ICMA manuals in group training for municipal officials and in graduate courses at the University has demonstrated that the texts are authoritative, comprehensive, and stimulating. They train administrators and students how to think about municipal problems and how to solve them."—ARTHUR W. BROMAGE, *Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.*

Here are a few of the many educational institutions that have adopted these texts:

Columbia University	University of Denver	University of California
University of Kansas	University of Michigan	University of Pennsylvania
Syracuse University	New York University	Wayne University

*Single copies \$7.50. Discounts on classroom orders.
Order copies on 10-day approval.*

THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION

1313 East 60th Street

Chicago 37, Illinois



Announcing . . .

Review and Reflection

A HALF-CENTURY OF LABOR RELATIONS

BY CY CHING

The highlights of developments in the most dynamic era of industrial relations are portrayed by an active participant in this entire half century of evolution.

This is a book which can be of unique usefulness as a supplementary text for students of industrial relations and labor legislation.

Cy Ching, worker, industrial relations director, Director of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, presents an interesting and informative account of progress in labor-management affairs during the past fifty years. His book is an intimate, impartial story of growth from unmitigated antagonism to today's enlightened attitudes toward labor-management problems. It is rich in concrete illustrations of prejudices and adjustments in striving for accord.

From a wisdom born of a lifetime of effort in molding sensible attitudes toward common purposes, and in reviewing the stresses and strains of eventful impacts and solutions, Cy Ching has developed a volume of important value to any student of labor relations.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

1. The Rude Awakening
2. Human Relations
3. Facing the Problem
4. The Pendulum Swings
5. War Dictates the Rules
6. Taft-Hartley and Mediation
7. Preventive Mediation
8. Controls without Control

CHAPTER

9. What is a National Emergency?
10. Problems in National Emergencies
11. False Security
12. Industry-Wide Bargaining
13. Reaching the Employee
14. Resistance to Change
15. Ground Rules
16. Washington Reflections
17. What's Ahead?

204 pages

Price \$3.95

B. C. FORBES & SONS Publishing Co., Inc.

80 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y. •

New!

*Ready
early in 1954*

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT— DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

By Charles E. Merriam and Robert E. Merriam

In a democracy government is everybody's business and here is the book that makes this clear. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT presents the problems of government in such a way that the student realizes the importance of government and sees how he is a participant.

This new and teachable text is designed as an introductory course. Its content is selective, rather than encyclopedic. Its style is informal and inspiring.

Using a practical approach, this book proceeds from the dynamics of politics in action to the nature of constitutionalism. The authors give the student the benefit of their personal political experience in units on state and local government. A thorough discussion of our national government, the U.S. in world affairs, and various aspects of democracy make up the concluding units.

Ginn and Company

Home Office: BOSTON

Sales Offices: NEW YORK 11 CHICAGO 16 ATLANTA 3 DALLAS 1
COLUMBUS 16 SAN FRANCISCO 3 TORONTO 5

Now in its second printing—

PUBLIC OPINION and PROPAGANDA

by FREDERICK C. IRION, *University of New Mexico*

Sound workmanship

"In over-all view, Irion's *Public Opinion and Propaganda* is a major contribution to the literature in this field."—*International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research* (Summer, 1951).

"In the words of the author, the purpose of this book is to present 'a comprehensive statement of what is known about public opinion and to discuss the possibilities for increased knowledge concerning it.' It is the over-all judgment of this reviewer that Irion succeeds in both these objectives. . . ."—*Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1950).

and creative approach

"For some reason the use of culture as a frame of reference, an approach first developed by anthropologists and then widely adopted by sociologists and psychologists, has never been generally utilized by political scientists despite their long familiarity with that procedure. I hope that the cultural approach to the subject, as used here, will provide a broader and more satisfying understanding of public opinion and propaganda than has been available heretofore."—From the Preface of *Public Opinion and Propaganda*.

spell success

University of Alabama—Arizona State College (Tempe)—University of Arkansas—Los Angeles City College—Occidental College—George Pepperdine College—San Diego State College—San Francisco State College—Westmont College—Whittier College—University of Colorado—University of Bridgeport—Yale University—The American University—George Washington University—Stetson University—Atlanta University—Illinois Wesleyan University—Loyola University (Illinois)—Roosevelt College—Northern Illinois State Teachers College—Knox College—Bradley University—Hanover College—Valparaiso University—Bethany College (Kansas)—Tulane University—University of Maine—Colby College—Washington College—University of Maryland—Boston University—Suffolk University—American International College—Western Michigan College—Bethel College (Minnesota)—Millisaps College—University of Kansas City—Montana State University—University of New Hampshire—Upeala College—Rutgers University—Princeton University—College of St. Joseph—University of New Mexico—New Mexico Highlands University—Bard College—Brooklyn College—St. John's University (New York)—Adelphi College—Colgate University—Hofstra College—Cornell University—New Paltz (New York) State Teachers College—The College of the City of New York—Hunter College—New York University—Utica College of Syracuse University—Duke University—University of Cincinnati—Western Reserve University—Ohio State University—University of Dayton—Miami University—Wittenberg College—Wilmington College (Ohio)—Antioch College—Oklahoma A. & M. College—University of Tulsa—University of Oregon—Pacific University—University of Portland—Willamette University—Gettysburg College—Bucknell University—Temple University—Pennsylvania State College—Wilkes College—University of South Carolina—Texas Christian University—Weber College—Washington and Lee University—Western Washington College of Education—State College of Washington—University of Washington—Wing Education Center—Whitman College—Bockley College—Milton College.

1950 • xvi + 782 pages • \$5.00

Examination copies on request

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY • 432 Fourth Avenue • New York 16, New York

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

By Daniel Wit. A fresh, functional approach to comparative government. "Very original and long-overdue in its organization by principal problems of government."—Frank Munk, *Reed College*. \$4.75

MAN AND MODERN SOCIETY

By Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., and Kenneth W. Thompson. A well-organized and stimulating group of selections by eminent social thinkers. "... essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the social, economic, and political problems of the modern world."—Dr. T. C. Bryan, *North Georgia College*. \$5.25

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By William Anderson and Edward W. Weldner. Fourth edition, 1953. A complete re-orientation with special emphasis on the operational characteristics of our national government. "An excellent text . . . well-written, helpfully illustrated, and with adequate coverage of the subject."—Mark Mohler, *Skidmore College*. \$6.50

THE PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE POLITICIAN

By A. N. Christensen and E. M. Kirkpatrick. A treasury of the foremost writings on the practical aspects of government administrations, this new, brief edition contains the 40 best of the original readings and 16 new selections. Paper only, \$2.90

CONGRESS AT WORK

By Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel. The dynamic inside story of our highest legislative body and how it operates, depicted in actual case histories. "... alive, illuminating, informative."—James A. Burns, *Williams College*. \$4.10

A COLLEGE TEXT IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By Harold R. Bruce. An exceptionally well-organized presentation of the national government, written in a highly readable style. "... a splendid job, excellently written and eminently sound."—Valentine Jobst, III, *University of Illinois*. \$5.75

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

By Charles Fairman. Presents 36 fundamental Constitutional decisions, together with a penetrating analysis of their significance. \$3.00

Supplement, 1952, .30

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

383 Madison Avenue, New York 17

International Relations

NORMAN D. PALMER

HOWARD C. PERKINS

University of Pennsylvania

... Here is an admirable volume which explains clearly, fully and objectively this "world community in transition." It should enable the reader to grasp intelligently the multifold problems that face him as he opens his morning newspaper.

As the authors say in their preface, they aimed at a book "with balance," i.e., with "a proper attention to principles, to historical background, to international organization and to recent developments;" a book that "would have simplicity of organization and clarity of presentation." They have achieved their aim with signal success. One might almost say that they have rolled half a dozen short books into one well ordered, large volume.

The first 400 pages, by way of background for readers without much formal training in history and international politics, analyze effectively, with plenty of definitions, the nature of the state, nationalism and sovereignty, the bases of national power, and such instruments of policy as diplomacy, war, propaganda and collective security.

The next 200 pages give a remarkably precise and fairminded condensation of the causes of World War I, the treaties of 1919, and the deteriorating international relations which culminated in the Second World War. Next comes a consideration of "Conflict and Change" since 1945—in Europe, Asia, and in global economic problems.

This is then spelt out in greater detail in excellent chapters on the foreign policy and national interest of Russia, Britain, the United States, France and some other countries. Finally three chapters on "The Resumption of the Great Experiment"—perhaps the best in the book—give a very clear and impressive picture of the organization and manifold activities of the United Nations.

The authors have quoted freely from the writings of others so that the reader becomes familiar with many of the best authorities and the titles of their works which are wisely woven into the text instead of being relegated to footnotes. These quotations often represent opposing views. . . .

In general as hard-headed realists, they caution against relying too much on any one solution or panacea. They are not unduly pessimistic or optimistic. They do not foresee dire catastrophe or speedy improvement and progress, but observe: "He who has read history cannot avoid the conclusion that the rule of slow but uneven change will prevail in international relations." The many diagrammatic charts, maps and suggestive cartoons add greatly to the easy understanding of the subject. . . .

SIDNEY B. FAY

Harvard University

Review in *Current History*, October, 1953

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

Combined and Enlarged

A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS

NATIONAL, STATE and LOCAL GOVERNMENT

by WILFRED E. BINKLEY, *Ohio Northern University*
and MALCOLM C. MOOS, *The Johns Hopkins University*

CONTENTS

One: The National Government

I. Foundations of American Government	19
II. Citizenship: Rights and Privileges	105
III. Institutions of Popular Control	149
IV. The Presidency	301
V. The Federal Administration	343
VI. The National Legislature	417
VII. The Federal Judiciary	499
VIII. Major Federal Functions	531

Two: The State and Local Governments

IX. State Government	791
X. Local Government	943
Supplementary Reading	1051

6 $\frac{3}{8}$ x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, cloth, \$6.00 text

Examination copies on request

Alfred A. Knopf, *Publisher*

501 Madison Avenue

College Department

New York 22



New and Different

EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

edited by TAYLOR COLE, *Duke University*

This new text in Comparative Government has all the advantages of a collaborative work by eminent specialists, most of whom have lived and traveled widely in the regions of which they speak. The known caliber of the authors testifies to the intrinsic quality of this work.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	<i>by</i> Julian Towster
The People's Democracies of Eastern Europe	<i>by</i> C. E. Black
Germany	<i>by</i> Sigmund Neumann
Italy	<i>by</i> Renzo Sereno
Great Britain and the Commonwealth	<i>by</i> Taylor Cole, David Deener, and Alexander Brady
France	<i>by</i> Gordon Wright

6 $\frac{3}{8}$ x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, cloth, 699 pages, \$6.00 text

Examination copies on request

ALFRED A. KNOFF, Publisher

501 Madison Avenue College Department New York 22



New

**The
Legislative
Process
in
Congress**

by GEORGE B. GALLOWAY
Senior Specialist, Legislative Reference Service
Library of Congress

"Sober, informative, authoritative. Indispensable to students of legislation."

Roy V. Peel, *University of Utah*

"The best text in its field. It is thorough, scholarly, and especially well adapted to good use in the classroom."

Paul S. Jacobsen, *Colgate University*

"An excellent college text—comprehensive, systematic, authentic, and stimulating."

A. N. Holcombe, *Harvard University*

October, 1953 • 689 pages • 5½ x 8½ • \$6.00

An Outstanding Revision

**Modern
World
Politics**

[Third Edition]

by THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI

Consultant, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

"The outstanding book in the field of International Affairs!"

D. H. Reed, *Eastern New Mexico University*

"A superior book . . . sound, analytical political science."

James L. Busey, *University of Colorado*

"Well-organized, informative, and provocative."

Eli E. Nobleman, *American University*

August, 1953 • 660 pages • 152 maps and charts
6¾ x 9¾ • \$6.50

Supplement: Appendixes, Questions and Topics,
Bibliography • 62 pages • \$.50

Coming in January

**A PRIMER OF
STATISTICS FOR
POLITICAL
SCIENTISTS**

by V. O. KEY, JR., *Harvard University*

Frequency Distributions and Their Description—
Simple Time Series—Interrelationships of Time
Series—Simple Correlation—Multiple Relationships
—Inferences from Quantitative Data.

January, 1954 • 209 pages • 38 figures • 5½ x 8½
\$2.50

**AMERICAN
STATE
LEGISLATURES**

The Committee on American Legislatures
of the

American Political Science Association

Belle Zeller, *Brooklyn College*, Chairman

January, 1954 • 304 pages (est.) • 5½ x 8½
\$3.00 (probable)

Thomas Y. Crowell Company • 432 Fourth Ave., New York 16, N.Y.

new government texts from **Macmillan**

Frederic A. Ogg & Harold Zink

MODERN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Revised Edition

The political backgrounds and basic problems of Britain, the USSR, France, Germany, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, and Japan form the basis of this study. The book compares the elements of the various governments with one another and especially with corresponding elements in the government of the United States.

In revising the original edition, Professor Zink has included the latest developments in present-day political organization and operation.

Published August, 1953

1016 pp.

\$6.25

Melvin Anshen & Francis D. Wormuth

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY

For courses in government regulation of business, this new text presents a broad survey and critical analysis of national, state, and local programs by which government comes into contact with economic life. Descriptions of public policy and case reports illustrate the interaction of government and business.

To be published May, 1954

William Bennett Munro & Morley Ayearst

GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE

Fourth Edition

This classic in the field has now been rewritten to include six chapters on the USSR, and complete coverages of the governments of Britain, France, and Japan under its new constitution. "The Lesser Governments" chapter treats Switzerland, The Scandinavian Kingdom, and the Iberian Dictatorships.

To be published May, 1954

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

Important McGraw-Hill Books

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. New second edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, Pennsylvania State College and DEAN E. McHENRY, University of California at Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. Ready in March.

Here is a brief text for the general course on American Government treating federal, state and local government. The new edition—largely rewritten—is up to date, easy to read, and more extensively and effectively illustrated than previously.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

By JOHN H. FERGUSON and DEAN E. McHENRY. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. Third editions.

The American System of Government, 1056 pages, \$6.00, is an exceptional text for political science courses covering national, state, and local government. In this edition organization remains the same while style is more vivid and stimulating. Beginning with a general discussion of political ideas and institutions from colonial, revolutionary, and confederate periods, the text goes on to a discussion of Constitution, essentials of national government and national powers and functions. The chapters on local and state governments embrace constitutions and charters, legislative bodies, executives, and selected functions.

The American Federal Government, 902 pages, \$5.50, is an abridgment of *The American System of Government* including only sections and chapters covering the national scene.

STURGIS STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE

By ALICE F. STURGIS. 280 pages, \$3.00.

In this thoroughly modern handbook of parliamentary procedure, the author has produced a handbook that is unquestionably the best of its kind today. It is excellently organized, simply written, best arranged for easy reference, and up to date. Applicable to any meeting, large or small, formal or informal, it emphasizes simple, courteous, and democratic methods of running meetings.

LEARNING PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE

By ALICE F. STURGIS. 358 pages, \$4.00 (text edition available)

Of interest to political scientists and sociologists, as well as those in the speech field, this new volume provides an excellent instrument for teaching procedure. The methods presented are based, naturally, on the system presented in the author's successful work, *Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure*. Here is a fine text in the subject, well presented, readable, and stimulating throughout.

—Send for copies on approval

McGRAW - HILL BOOK COMPANY, Inc.

330 West 42nd Street

New York 36, N. Y.

International Studies . . .

Russia and Eastern Europe

Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism, by Waldemar Gurian, \$3.25.

Professor Gurian gives a clear and cogent treatment of Bolshevism, revealing its basic features as a social and political religion. The essence of modern Communism is seen as an historical-social force that influences, and is influenced by, historical-social developments.

"... It is especially valuable because it illuminates so fully the basic factors which drive the Soviet regime to control and direct all aspects of life, and it traces the origins of the messianic mission self-imposed on Soviet leaders. It is an essential study for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Ideology."—Philip E. Mosely, Professor of International Relations, Russian Institute, Columbia University.

Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology, by Hans Kohn, \$6.25.

This is the first book in English to present a comprehensive survey and analysis of Slav nationalism, from its beginning after the Napoleonic Wars to its climax in and after World War II. The generally overlooked sources into which the book delves will help the English-reading public gain a better understanding of the complex relationship between Russia and Europe and among the Slav nations themselves.

Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary Between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, by Stephen D. Kertesz, \$4.75.

The story of the totalitarian conquest of Hungary by the Nazi and Red regimes is graphically told by a man who served in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry during the war and post-war years. Because Dr. Kertesz is both an actor in what he relates and a political scientist capable of analyzing the situation, this book makes an important contribution to contemporary history.

Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics, edited by Waldemar Gurian, \$3.75.

Into this book has been gathered the fruits of a symposium on Soviet Imperialism; included are outstanding figures in the field of political science in this country. N. Timasheff of Fordham, Michael Pap of Notre Dame, W. Weintraub of Harvard, R. Pipes of Harvard, F. Barghoorn of Yale, and Ling Nai-jui discuss from various points of view, the questions: Who is the Enemy—Russian Imperialism or Soviet Communism? What are the relations between the aggressive tactics of the U.S.S.R. and traditional Russian policy? Should the United States encourage national liberation movements among non-Russian groups in the Soviet Union or should it limit itself to the fight against Soviet Communism?

At Your Bookstore

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

Notre Dame, Indiana

New Books of interest from OXFORD

The Rebirth of Austria

By RICHARD HISCOCKS

This first comprehensive account of post-war Austria describes the re-creation of the Republic after its absorption by Nazi Germany in 1938, and recounts the revival of its political, economic and cultural life from 1945 until the spring of 1953. **\$3.50**

Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951

By MAX BELOFF

An outstanding writer on Soviet foreign policy examines the Yalta Agreement and its implications, surveying Russia's entry into the Japanese war and relationships with Red China, as well as the origins of the Korean war and its diplomatic history up to the 1951 truce talks. **\$4.00**

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Volume III: 1933-1941

The final volume of these selected documents covers the period from the end of the first five-year plan and Hitler's accession up to the German invasion of Russia, casting new light on the Nazi non-aggression pact and the conciliation of Japan. Selected and edited by *Jane Degras*. **\$8.50**

Oliver Cromwell

By Sir CHARLES FIRTH

A just and balanced account of Cromwell's life that has, in the half-century since it was first published, become recognized as a standard work, soundly informative and of literary merit. *World's Classics No. 536.*
Double Volume. **\$2.00**

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 114 Fifth Avenue, N.Y. 11

Publishers of Fine Books for nearly Five Centuries



Princeton



UNIVERSITY
PRESS

The China Tangle

THE AMERICAN EFFORT IN CHINA FROM PEARL HARBOR TO
THE MARSHALL MISSION

By HERBERT FEIS. "A calm and careful history of the American effort and policy in China has been greatly needed. Most fortunately, such a chronicle is now offered by Herbert Feis, a meticulous scholar, experienced in action, with a gift of disinterested, impersonal statement."—*N.Y. Times Book Review*. "His careful and dispassionate marshaling of the facts begins to bring the whole picture into focus. This is a book that cannot fail to fascinate anyone with a real interest in China and its bearing on future policies."—*N.Y. Herald Tribune Book Review*.

456 pages. Maps. \$6.00

The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy

By ROBERT PAUL BROWDER. When Litvinov arrived in Washington in 1933 after the sixteen years of diplomatic silence between his country and the U.S., he carried with him his commission as official representative to the U.S., dated 1918 and signed by Lenin and Chicherin, as evidence of the long-standing desire of the Soviet Union for recognition. This is an absorbing narrative of the events which led up to this dramatic arrival, heralded with such high hopes and good will, and of the collapse into discord and disillusionment which followed.

356 pages. \$5.00

Czechoslovakia in European History

By S. HARRISON THOMSON. This revised edition of the book the *Saturday Review* called "the most comprehensive short work on Czechoslovakia in our language" contains a new chapter on the Czech Reformation and one on the period from 1939 to 1948. The chapter on Munich has been rewritten in the light of new German documents. "The high praise given to the book on its first appearance ten years ago is as well deserved today."—*New Republic*.

Illustrated, \$7.50

Order from your bookstore

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

outstanding government texts

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT in THEORY and PRACTICE

By Carr, Morrison, Bernstein & Snyder. This highly praised treatment of the national government may also be used as an introduction to political science. It includes extended treatments of congressional investigations, civil liberties, and foreign relations. 1094 pp., \$5.50

STATE and LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By Joseph E. McLean. This recently published supplement represents an expansion of AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. It presents state and local government with stress on intergovernmental relations and current trends and problems. 192 pp. When used with the text: \$.50. When purchased separately: \$1.85.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By Dimock & Dimock. An introductory text with a practical approach, this book presents the subject systematically with stress on principles. Summaries of case studies are provided throughout. 531 pp., \$5.00

and supplementary readings

KNEIER & FOX:

**Readings in
Municipal Government
and Administration**

486 pp., \$3.90

NIGRO:

**Public Administration:
Readings and
Documents**

493 pp., \$4.50

FELLMAN:

**Readings in
American National
Government**

Revised Edition. 399 pp., \$2.75

LANCASTER & BRECKENRIDGE:

**Readings in
American State
Government**

347 pp., \$2.50

COMBINED EDITION OF THE ABOVE: *Readings in American National and State Government* by Fellman, Lancaster & Breckenridge. 781 pp., \$3.75

RINEHART & COMPANY

232 madison avenue

new york 16, n.y.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, *University of Southern California;*
and R. Vance Probsthus, *Michigan State College*

NEW, 3RD EDITION offers a realistic appraisal of public administration in America and the role it plays in a democratic society. Fully relates formal organization and the routines of public administration to informal organization and the functioning of administrators. Accenting the human side of organization and management, it sheds light on

the nature of group action, individual motivation, and leadership. Throughout, public administration is viewed as part of a larger social process which includes legislatures, pressure groups, and the separation of powers. Full discussion of the philosophy and goals of public administration. 626 pages. \$6

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Rinehart John Swenson, *New York University*

THOROUGH, up-to-date study of the growth, nature, and control of administrative action in the United States. Emphasizing the various forms of administration and the means of their enforcement, the book analyzes the development of the administrative process and shows

the need for formalizing administrative action into a coherent body of law supervised by special courts of limited jurisdiction. Consideration given to the review of administrative action by the regular courts, and the role of Congress in controlling administration. 376 pages. \$6

FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edited by Ossip K. Flechtelm, Colby College; with 7 Contributing Authorities

AN INTRODUCTORY textbook integrating the entire field of political science. Stressing the historical, philosophical, psychological, and anthropological elements of government and politics, the book surveys, compares, and evaluates the ideas and practices of all major na-

tions. Throughout, principles and problems rather than institutions and theories are highlighted and illustrated with specific examples. Each area of the subject is analyzed by a specialist adding authority and breadth of coverage. 584 pages. \$5.50

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Lawmaking in the United States

Harvey Walker, *Ohio State University*

DESIGNED for courses in legislation and the legislative process, this comprehensive book describes and evaluates the machinery set up in the United States for determining and declaring the will of the people. Considers the legislator,

the party, the pressure group, and the inventor of political techniques on all levels of government. Covers the legislative functions of the executive and the judiciary. Includes suggested assignments, bibliography. 482 pages. \$5.50

JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

A Study in American Legal Theory

Fred V. Coahill, Jr., *Yale University*

ANALYZES modern theories of judicial legislative power, and examines arguments for modifying the lawmaking function of judges, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. Discusses these decisions in terms of their possible effect upon social legislation,

civil liberties. The author presents a balanced survey of legal thought over the past 200 years, illustrating the shift from a rigid, literal interpretation to a dynamic, realistic application of the law. Incorporates the views of leading thinkers. \$4

YALE books

IDEAS AND WEAPONS

by I. B. HOLLEY, JR.

A study of World War I experience with air power, exploring the relationships of scientific and technological innovations, the introduction of new weapons, and the development of doctrines governing their strategic and tactical use. \$3.75

WOODROW WILSON AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND

by LOUIS GERSON

An analysis of Wilson's part in the re-creation of Poland in 1919, contributing to the knowledge of his foreign policy and the techniques of a specialized pressure group. Based on unpublished manuscript material, chiefly the Woodrow Wilson papers in Washington, and the Edward M. House collections at Yale. \$4.00

THE REFUGEE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

by JACQUES VERNANT

A survey of the past and present circumstances among refugees of the free world outside the Iron Curtain, reporting on the legal, material, and moral situation in 39 countries. It is primarily concerned with the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and also studies the International Refugee Organization, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, UNRRA, and other groups. \$6.00

INCOME STABILIZATION IN A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY

edited by MAX F. MILLIKAN

Fifteen leading economists, political scientists, and professors of law contribute their views to this symposium on the politics and economics of high employment without inflation to focus attention on some of the conflicts involved and to show the political and historic contexts of economic principles. \$5.00

at your bookseller

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Haven, Connecticut

Just Published

The Dynamics of Soviet Society

*By W. W. ROSTOW, in collaboration with Alfred Levin, and with the assistance of others at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In an effort to contribute a firmer basis to the making of American foreign policy, and as a social science venture, the Center has produced this analytic synthesis of modern Russian studies. The book reviews the pattern of change in the Soviet past: its higher politics, foreign policy, ideology, economic life, social structure, and culture. It assesses the attitudes towards the regime of all the major groupings in Soviet society, and indicates the meaning of these attitudes for the future. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* provides the closest possible scrutiny of Soviet life today. WILLIAM L. LANGER, Harvard University, calls it "one of the few books on Soviet Russia that really explains what has been happening there."*

Trade edition, \$3.95; Text edition, \$2.95

W. W. NORTON AND COMPANY "BOOKS THAT LIVE"

101 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N.Y.

COMPLETE OR PARTIAL SETS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE PURCHASE

We have available for universities, libraries, political science departments, research agencies and similar institutions a limited number of sets of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, starting with the February issue of 1911 (Vol. V, No. 1).

Single copies of back issues are also available for organizations wishing to complete their sets.

For Price of Your Missing Issues

Please Write To

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1785 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.

Washington 6, D. C.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By JACOB VINER, *Princeton University*

"In these lectures we see Viner, the critic, who dispels one dogma after another with precision, clarity and sound reason . . . these lectures should be of great value to any social scientist interested in international issues."—*The Journal of Political Economy*. \$2.75

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BAKUNIN

Edited by G. P. MAXIMOFF

This is the most substantial collection of the writings of Marx's great historical enemy ever published in the English language. For the first time it permits the students of political theory and the nineteenth century easy access to a comprehensive statement in his own words, of the founder of the anarchist movement. \$6.00

CLASS, STATUS AND POWER

Edited by REINHARD BENDIX, *University of California* and
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, *Columbia University*

The first source book in social stratification to be published. The 63 chapters selected from the writings of political scientists, economists, sociologists, historians and biologists (Kinsey) discuss such problems as WHO HAS THE POWER, SOCIAL STATUS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, THE APPEAL OF COMMUNISM IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS, WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, CHILDREN OF THE NEW DEAL, JOBS AND OCCUPATIONS. Nearly 500,000 words and many charts, tables and graphs to illustrate the chapters. Just published. \$7.50

And selected from the back list, books of permanent interest

Reader in Bureaucracy edited by Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan C. Selvin \$5.00

Reader in Public Opinion and Communication edited by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz \$5.50

The Politics of Agriculture by Charles M. Hardin \$4.00

Persecution and the Art of Writing by Leo Strauss \$4.00

PUBLISHED BY THE FREE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS

Complete catalogue on request.

The American Political Science Review



VOL. XLVII

MARCH, 1953

NO. 1

SOME PRESENT-DAY CRITICS OF LIBERALISM

FRANCIS W. COKER

Yale University

I. INTRODUCTION

"Liberalism" is a late modern word, appearing first (along with "conservatism," "socialism," and "communism") in the early nineteenth century. Its basic ideas are old. The particular freedoms called for have changed as the denials of freedom have changed. The demands have been for liberation from oppressive political rule or intolerant ecclesiastical authority; or from a status of slavery or serfdom; from restraints embodied in laws and customs that hamper the rise of new productive forces, or from limitations on equal opportunity resulting from narrow concentrations of private economic power; from limitations on voting rights and from interferences with freedom of religion, speech, and association. The constant concern has been with pleas for deliverance from restraints which, although perhaps widely regarded at a given time as a normal part of life, have come to be regarded, by some in the community, as unnatural and intolerable.

The founding of such pleas on ideas about man's natural traits also follows a long tradition. It is "the rational principle within us," said Aristotle, that distinguishes man from "the animals," who "do not apprehend reason, but simply obey their instincts." "Language," Aristotle continued, is the sign of this special human faculty; for the distinctive function of language is to express, not "feelings of pain and pleasure"—animals have that faculty—but "perceptions of good and evil, the just and the unjust, and other similar qualities." Again (according to Aristotle): although man is the least self-sufficient being—meant by his nature to live in close association with other men in an organized political community—he is, in the rightly organized community, subject only to the commands of persons who rule under "the laws," which are "sovereign over personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons."¹ It is in this ancient Greek idea

¹ *Politics*, Ernest Barker trans. (Oxford, 1946), Bk. I, Chs. ii and v; Bk. III, Ch. xi; Bk. IV, Ch. iv.

of "freedom under the law" that some historians of ideas have located the origin of "western liberalism," and it is chiefly in this sense that liberalism has been called "the tradition of the West."²

Later examples of such ideas about freedom and reason are familiar, in both religious and secular literature: St. Paul exhorting his readers to heed "the inner law," in man's "mind," "written in the hearts of men"; early Christian jurists maintaining that it is man's nature to be free, so that restraints should be regarded as temporary expedients to correct deviations from normal human behavior; officials of a powerful medieval church intervening to protect citizens from arbitrary political rulers; various secular and ecclesiastical writers, from Cicero on, holding that rulers and people are equally bound by the dictates of right reason; writers of the Renaissance (a rebirth of early Christian as well as of ancient pagan ideas) and the Enlightenment, holding that men can achieve significant values on earth if they set their minds and hearts on releasing themselves from the handicaps of outmoded institutions and an adverse environment; and the later modern phrasing of these beliefs—holding that man, by virtue of his nature, has inalienable rights and that we can best discover truth about man and society through free inquiry and the dialectic of free discussion, or (more concretely) that the "civil liberties" (such as are set forth in modern "bills of rights") must be maintained as essential means for realizing man's highest intellectual, moral, and spiritual values and for reaching viable decisions in a democracy. Such ideas, it has been widely held, have provided approaches towards solving the never fully solvable problem considered in ancient, medieval, and modern political discussions: how to maintain a united community directed by strong and efficient government, without producing incompetent, incomplete citizens. or personalities?

Such ideas do not, of course, make up the whole of the tradition of the West. There have always been advocates of the opposite, or complementary, values of order, stability, and consensus. These values also have been associated with ideas about the nature and destiny of man: with conceptions, that is, of man as a being who attains fulfillment of his nature chiefly by playing his assigned, directed, part in maintaining the existence and well-being of some group (e.g., a nation, class, or "community") in which alone he can find his own existence maintained

² For general descriptions and appraisals of traditional liberal ideas, see Frederick Watkins, *The Political Tradition of the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); Lionel Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination* (New York, 1950); Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thought* (New York, 1950), esp. pp. 373-550; John J. Saunders, *The Age of Revolution; the Rise and Decline of Liberalism in Europe since 1815* (New York, 1949); Eduard Heimann, *Freedom and Order* (New York, 1947), Chs. 1, 8, 10, 12; John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York, 1950), pp. 84-367 and *passim*.

and explained. Man's chief right or duty, in the extremer forms of such a doctrine, is to "conform," accepting as his own the common or general opinion or will of his group.

When the modern liberal has challenged the reasonableness or justice of particular orders made by official spokesmen for a ruling group, he has sometimes been rebuked as an advocate of disorder or disunity; or if he has appealed for the restoration of earlier freedoms, he has been rebuffed as one vainly trying to revive outmoded ideas. When, in a community with a democratic form of government, he challenges the justice or practicality of a particular decision of the official political majority, he is represented as rejecting the principle of majority rule; and when his reasoning in behalf of freedom runs counter to the reasoning of spokesmen for a particular religion, he is sometimes charged with exalting reason above faith.

The present-day criticisms of liberalism are varied (often mutually contradictory) and they issue from various sources. Some identical criticisms are made by groups that are frequently regarded as sharply opposed to one another in their ideas about man and society and the ways of governing a community. Thus fascists and communists are alike in describing liberals as deluded idealists or incompetent intellectuals. Spokesmen for these groups are emphatic and sweeping in their rejections. Both reject the idea that private citizens can have rights against political rulers. Both disparage free, "objective," inquiry as a means for discovering truth about either the physical world or about man and society; and both regard freedom of discussion as useless for arriving at any viable consensus in the political community. Said Oswald Spengler: the liberal's concern for individual or minority rights and freedoms leads only to "blindness," "cowardice," and "spiritual indiscipline;" he described the modern liberal as either "bourgeois" or "plebian" and said he meant both of those words to be understood as "terms of abuse." Lenin said that freedom of criticism usually amounts to "freedom from every thought-out theory," and he called the liberal an "arm-chair fool."³

There are a wide variety of criticisms offered by writers who are somewhat more moderate in their disparagement and who operate more clearly within the general limits of our western tradition. Some of these criticisms appear as items in general appraisals of the modern western mind; others appear in a systematic consideration of liberalism as the most characteristic feature of the modern mind. Some of these writers are friendly critics, offering warnings against what they regard as the

³ Oswald Spengler, *The Hour of Decision* (New York, 1934, translated from the German by Charles Francis Atkins), pp. 14, 109, 119; Nicolai Lenin, *What Is to Be Done* (London and New York, 1929), and *Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade* (London, 1929).

liberal's exaggerated statement and application of his liberal negations and affirmations. Others regard the present-day political liberal as essentially wrong: wrong in advocating the wrong policies, because he concerns himself with matters that have no essential relation to the major problems of political life; or wrong in resting his policies on insecure moral and spiritual foundations, with wrong ideas about man's natural needs, motivations, and capacities, and about man's ultimate spiritual dimensions. In each of these groups, a wide variety of attitudes is displayed towards modern liberalism and the modern liberal, as indicated by the variety of descriptive terms they employ. Liberalism, they say, has become an essentially "negative," "neutral," "middle-of-the-road," "stereotyped," "mechanical," doctrine; or it is a "dogmatic," "pretentious," "aggressive," positively "dangerous," doctrine. The liberal, they say, is "a-moral," "secular," "religiously indifferent," "anti-religious;" or he is too much the "perfectionist,"—"self-righteous" and "priggish" in his appraisal of political policies. Thus also the liberal is variously identified by these critics as distinctively "sentimental," "idealistic," "romantic," "utopian," "intellectual," "academic," and "nineteenth-century." Some of the critics—conceding that there were once virtues in the characteristic liberal doctrines (suitable for the period in which they appeared), yet regarding those doctrines as no longer useful or safe—offer the consolation that liberalism, having done its essential negative, destructive work, is now destined to "disappear."

This paper will deal with two groups of critics of liberalism, considered as a set of ideas about the rights of man in a political community.⁴ The two groups have sharply opposed ideas as to just how the liberal is wrong in such matters, and also as to the intellectual and moral levels upon which a discussion of such matters can be profitably conducted. Professors Willmoore Kendall and J. Austin Ranney believe that the liberal wrongly interjects moral considerations into a political discussion; and that he is thereby specifically wrong in regarding individuals and minorities as having inviolable rights in a democracy. Reinhold Niebuhr, T. S. Eliot, and Professors John H. Hallowell and Sebastian

⁴ On liberalism as a doctrine of human rights, see: Carl L. Becker, *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life* (New York, 1945); Robert M. MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard* (New York, 1950); J. Roland Pennock, *Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950); Denis W. Brogan, *The Free State, Some Considerations on Its Practical Value* (New York, 1945); Bertrand Russell, *Authority and the Individual* (New York, 1949); UNESCO ed., *Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations; A Symposium* (London, 1949); David Fellman, "What is Liberalism?", *Prairie Schooner* (Fall, 1945), pp. 204-18. See also Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York, 1950), esp. Chs. 2 and 7.

De Grazia regard the liberal as wrong in leaving moral (and theological) considerations out of his political discussion; or that he is wrong specifically in trusting to an assumed natural reasonableness and ingenuity and spontaneous goodness in man as the adequate foundation upon which to construct a policy for making human rights secure in the political community.

II. THE "MAJORITY-RULE DEMOCRATS"

Professor Kendall objects to the liberal's advocacy of "rights" in a political community—of freedoms, that is, which are natural to man, and which, accordingly, citizens ought to demand and rulers ought to acknowledge and protect.⁵ Such a discussion, he contends, irrationally mixes moral with political ideas, violating "the frontier that divides political theory from ethics." Political theory, as Mr. Kendall defines it, is "value free." Advocating the values of free speech, religious freedom and fair-law enforcement, belongs only to other disciplines, such as "ethics and theology." Political theory deals with the efficiency of means for the realization of political ends, not with the consistency of such ends or means with man's more basic values or preferences. It is concerned with "the method by which political decisions are to be made," not with the reasonableness, justice, or morality of the decisions.

Mr. Kendall objects particularly to the liberal's attempt to combine a discussion of the rights of individuals or minorities (other than the right to take part in making political decisions) with a discussion of democracy. "Democracy," properly understood, is the name for a form of government. It means government by "the people"; and this means, in practice, government by a "majority of the electorate," since unanimity among voters is never attainable. Thus, Mr. Kendall continues, a democrat may properly be called a "majoritarian." "The majoritarian is the man who finds the majority principle more congenial to his values than any other, but the finding on this is, or should be, value free." "The problem a democratic community faces is, as it seems to us, merely that of deciding in what persons amongst us our democratic values require us to lodge its power." Discussing "the merits of the majority's (i.e., the community's) setting aside the traditional civil liberties has no more

⁵ Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule* (Urbana, 1940), and "Prolegomena to any Future Work on Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 694-713 (Nov., 1950), written in reply to an article by Herbert McCloskey, "The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule" in the same journal, Vol. 11, pp. 637-54 (Nov., 1949) criticizing Kendall's views; J. Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: a Commentary," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, Vol. 45, pp. 488-99 (June, 1951); J. Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "Democracy: Confusion and Agreement," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 4, pp. 430-39 (Sept., 1951). The quotations from Kendall alone are from the "Prolegomena" article, except where otherwise indicated.

place in a discussion of the majority principle than a thesis regarding the merits of an economy's producing dum-dum bullets would have in a discussion of the pricing system."

Thus "democracy," in this majoritarian political theory, means "absolute," "unlimited," majority rule. If there are limits on a majority's rule, some other group, "outside" the majority, has to define the limits and the methods of applying them, and you then have rule by a minority. "In a democracy the last word must be with the majority." The American people, declares Professor Ranney, have in vain wanted both "majority rule and inviolable rights." We can't have both: we have to decide "whether democracy to us means majority rule or minority rights"; minority rights "means" minority rule. In a democracy, Professors Ranney and Kendall jointly declare, "no political decisions should be made by any body smaller than fifty per cent plus one of all its members." "The only restraint upon popular majorities consonant with democracy is such a sense of self-restraint as those majorities happen to possess."

To make the government of the United States the sort of democracy described by Professors Kendall and Ranney would require radical changes in our constitutional system. Professor Ranney lists the following necessary changes: abolishing staggered national elections, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, and Senate filibusters. Further changes would have to be made, it would seem, if the majority is never to be restrained by a minority. Thus to make Congress—and the presidency also, if we are to have more than one agency representing the majority—more nearly the representative of a bare majority, we would have to do away with all special majorities, change the present apportionment of the vote for President, and provide for a nationally defined suffrage and a national policing of the elections; and then, in order to give unlimited governing power to these bare-majority representatives, we would have to abolish, or let majorities in Congress or in popular referenda abolish or ignore, all the constitutional guarantees against governmental interferences with the traditional civil liberties.

This argument for unlimited majority rule is aimed particularly at the "judicial veto" as it operates in the enforcement of the constitutional guarantees. You don't have democracy, Kendall says, if you have a supreme court "armed with a bill of rights that forbids the majority to do certain things." "No form of government," Ranney and Kendall jointly declare, "in which the popular majority is checked by some other agency (such, for example, as a court exercising the power of judicial veto of legislative acts), external and not responsible to the majority, has any legitimate title whatever to the label of 'democratic'." Although

in a given democratic community there may be certain traditional, commonly assumed and accepted, standards generally followed in appraisals of the rightness of majority decisions, it is still, in a genuine democracy, only a bare majority that decides what the standards mean, in their political applications, and when and how they are to be applied, or when and how they are to be changed or abandoned.⁶

The foregoing indicates the reasoning of the majoritarian in excluding from political theory all discussion of rights in a democratic community, except the right of "political" equality—i.e., the right of every voter to participate equally in the community's decision-making process. Yet Kendall admits into his theory most of the specific freedoms which the liberal treats as rights. He agrees that certain freedoms are necessary as means for obtaining majority decisions. A majority-rule system must have the proper "institutions" for forming majority decisions, with "guarantees" that use of the institutions will be available to all who are to be counted in the process of arriving at a majority decision: "Since the majority-rule democrats do not believe that the people can be counted upon to produce a majority will except where certain conditions are satisfied, they insist upon institutions calculated to facilitate the emergence of such a will (popular education, ventilation of public issues before the widest possible audience and with fullest guarantees that all points of view will find expression, such freedom of organization for political parties as will assure a maximum of competition between them for majority support, etc.)."⁷ A majority puts an end to majority rule if it prevents existing minorities from growing into new majorities.

Here the majority-rule democrat may appear to be adopting liberal political ideas. But this is only an appearance. Admitting the right or necessity, in a democracy, for a free exchange of views and for freedom of assembly and organization, is not injecting moral or liberal ideas or "values" into political theory. For such freedoms, in the majoritarian's theory, are only means, not ends; you can't have democracy without them, but they are not essential rights; and an existing majority can, through the proper democratic procedures, decide to destroy them, thus exercising its unlimited power by deciding to end majority rule; or it may unwittingly make decisions that bring about that result. Democracy, in Mr. Kendall's words, can "commit suicide." It is in this way

⁶ For a discriminating criticism of our system of judicial review as it operates in the protection of civil liberties, see: Henry Steele Commager, *Majority Rule and Minority Rights* (New York, 1943); Fred V. Cahill, *Judicial Legislation* (New York, 1952); Earl Latham, "Theory of the Judicial Concept of Freedom of Speech," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 637-51 (Nov., 1950).

⁷ *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule*, p. 129.

that the majority-rule democrat keeps himself "intellectually" safe on the political side of the barrier he has erected between his politics and his ethics, holds on to his dogma that democracy means unlimited majority rule, and sticks to his judgment that liberals talk non-sense when they talk about inalienable rights of individuals or minorities under a democratic form of government.

Comment on the majoritarians. It seems proper to insist that in a political discussion the word "democracy" should be used to identify a form of government—a location of "highest" decision-making authority—and not as the name for some humane governmental policy. The former has been the prevailing meaning of the word since the Greeks started, in the fifth century, B.C., talking about the desirable results that might be achieved by placing political decisions in the hands of "the people." A government in which a few rule in the interest of the many may be called a good government, but not, in a proper political vocabulary, a democracy. It also seems proper to say that democracy means "majority rule" since that is as near as we ever get to rule by all the people. It may be agreed also that democracy means "unlimited" majority rule, in one sense of the word "unlimited" as it is used in political discussions. The most ardent advocate of "inviolable" and "inalienable" rights of individuals and minorities understands that a ruling group can violate these rights; and he knows that in any government there is some formally designated person or group of persons possessing an authoritative "last word." Even in states in which the ordinary governing bodies rule legally only within limits set forth in a written constitution, there are other constitutionally designated bodies that can legally abolish those limits. In this familiar meaning of unlimited ruling power Professor Ranney is correct in saying that if the American people want democracy they can not have inviolable rights—i.e., rights that the finally deciding "majority" may not legally violate. That majority can legally deprive any individual or group of life, liberty, and property by any means it chooses, and make the deprivations effective to the full extent of whatever coercive or persuasive powers it possesses.

It may be agreed, finally, that political theory is not altogether theory about "values." As a special technical discipline, political theory can be said to consist of objective, "value-free," descriptions and explanations of observed regularities in the relations among political events; or of deductions from postulated premises about political behavior, or of generalizations based on a rational weighing of the best available evidences in this field. That sort of political theory (or political science) can be useful in appraising governmental forms and activities in terms of their efficiency in realizing stated preferences concerning the

location and scope of governmental power. These preferences may be derived from various sorts of basic values and modified by various experiences in the pursuit of the values. A political theorist of this sort is not obligated to look into the meaning of the values. If he offers only to give advice to a community whose values (whatever they may be) lead it to want a government organized and operated in conformity with the wishes (whatever they may be) of a relatively large number of the members of the community, he may properly confine his efforts to pointing out the ways whereby such a people—given their particular capacities and habits and the limitations of their particular environment—are most likely to get that sort of government. It thus seems proper to say that political theory of this sort or to this extent is (or ought to be) "value-free."

To agree to the foregoing definitions—of democracy as "majority rule," of a majority's "power" as, in an important aspect, "absolute," and of political theory as, in some aspects, "value-free,"—is not, however, to agree that this excludes from a rational political discussion all consideration of the values that appear to determine a preference for a democratic form of government, or all consideration of the desirability of establishing judicially applicable limitations upon the powers of the ordinary policy-declaring bodies in a democracy. The meaning of a preference for a democratic form of government is rarely fully indicated by a specification of the number or qualifications of the people who are to take part in making the final decisions. There are different kinds of majority rule, and a desire for one kind does not commit anybody to a desire for another kind. Plato and Aristotle (discussing democracy as a form of government) set forth what they regarded as the essential differences between a "pure" democracy, in which the majority rules in the interest of all the people and in accord with traditional customs or unwritten laws of the community, and a "corrupt" democracy, in which the majority rules in its own interest and without regard for those higher obligations.⁸ Similar evaluations appear in many of the later classical statements of political theory. Thus ideas on majority rule are combined with ideas on inalienable rights in the theoretical systems of both Locke and Jefferson.⁹

James Bryce and Ernest Barker also (both cited by Ranney and Kendall as writers who properly treat democracy as a form of government) have these "mixed" ideas about democracy. Each specifies the

⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. III, Chs. iv, vi, xi; Bk. IV, Chs. i, iv, xi, xiv; Bk. V, Ch. ix. Plato, *The Laws*, IV, 715.

⁹ For Locke, see the *Second Treatise of Government*, secs. 16, 22, 49, 87, 88, 95-99, 116, 131, 134-42, 222. For Jefferson, see the Declaration of Independence, his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1789), and his first *Inaugural Address* (1801).*

ends that majority rule must serve if it is to fit his conception of a rational preference for a democratic form of government. Bryce explained that by "democracy" he meant rule by a majority that safeguards "independence of thought," and a "free play of the intellect," permits the expression of "unpopular opinions," and bears with opposition "because it has faith in the victory of truth." "Not less than any other form of government," said Bryce, "does democracy need to cherish Individual Liberty."¹⁰ Said Barker: A democracy that "rests merely on the will of numbers rests merely on force. If we keep the name and the idea of democracy, we must find some other basis. . . . It is not the majority, as a majority, that matters. It is each human being, as such." The "essence" of democracy, Barker continued, "what matters," is a majority that seeks "full development of personality and individuality," tolerates "differences in doctrine," encourages "discussion of competing ideas," and intervenes in the life of the individual "with a restrained and cautious hand."¹¹

Most systematic discussions of democracy (as a form of government) consider the desirable limitations on majority rule. Most of the present-day democracies have written constitutions containing provisions designed to restrain the powers of bare, temporary, majorities: orders and prohibitions intended (in Bryce's words) to operate as "mitigations of the faults to which democracy is liable." "The annals of democratic governments consist largely of an account of the various expedients resorted to for this purpose," said Bryce. He discussed, in this connection, the familiar expedients of indirect election, upper legislative chambers, over-lapping terms, and "checks and balances" (including judicial review) in the distribution of governing powers.¹²

Why should a community, having a general preference for majority rule, be debarred from choosing the means it considers most useful in making majority decisions more generally acceptable and effective? The American Congress seems traditionally committed to the belief that a "judicial veto" is a useful means to this end. At various times, Congress has been urged to enact or initiate measures designed to destroy or limit the judicial veto. In rejecting or ignoring such proposals, Congress may be reflecting some sort of a persistent popular opinion that legislative decisions will be more willingly and intelligently observed if we retain this safeguard; a belief that with the veto—as it operates in retarding, warning, yet not finally frustrating, a popular will—we are more likely to have the sort of community best fitted for long-run majority rule.

¹⁰ *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), Vol. 1, p. 59; Vol. 2, pp. 121, 521.

¹¹ *Reflections on Government* (Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 26, 175, 196.

¹² *Modern Democracies*, Vol. 2, Ch. 64 and pp. 393-95.

Bryce (describing our judiciary as "in fact and in name an independent branch of the government side by side with the Executive and the Legislature") said that he regarded our use of judicial review, in placing certain matters "out of reach of legislative or executive action," as one of our most significant contributions to the "practical art" of democratic government. The American people, he said, had "resolved to put certain rules out of the reach of temporary impulses springing from passion or caprice, and to make these rules the permanent expression of their calm thought and deliberate purpose. It is a recognition of the truth that majorities are not always right, and need to be protected against themselves by being obliged to recur, at moments of haste or excitement, to maxims they had adopted at times of cool reflection."¹³ Other commentators, here and abroad, have described this feature of our system as a successful experiment in the limitation of governmental power in a democracy.

In insisting on rights the liberal does not mean that rulers cannot violate rights; he means, frankly, that rulers ought not to violate rights. The liberal recognizes the necessity of having somewhere in the governmental structure a "last-saying" authority. As a democrat he recognizes the necessity of placing that authority in the hands of a relatively large number of the sane adult citizens. He acknowledges the citizen's moral and rational obligation to obey governmental commands which his conscience and reason may condemn as violations of rights. The liberal is not a philosophical anarchist; he does not advocate either active or passive resistance to law enforcement. He understands that majorities as well as minorities have rights. None of this, however, commits him to the conclusion that if you want majority rule you can reasonably attach importance to the protection of rights only insofar as the exercise of such rights operates as a means for the formation of majority decisions. And none of this commits the liberal democrat to Professor Kendall's apparent belief that if you criticize any political opinion held by the majority you are presuming to substitute your own "values and lights for those of the people" (or "the majority of the people"), and thereby renouncing any consistent belief in democracy as a form of government.

Discussion of the proper scope of governmental action—of matters to be controlled and matters to be left free from control—has usually been regarded as a proper part of political theory, no less important than the question as to who should rule. Ideas about powers to be exercised and freedoms to be respected by a ruling majority have rarely been

¹³ *Modern Democracies*, Vol. 2, pp. 11, 27, 84; and see Cyril John Radcliffe, *The Problem of Power* (London, 1952), pp. 61-64, 85-87.

sharply separated from ideas about the ethical status of majority rule. Ancient, medieval, and modern political theorists have attempted to explain the values implicit in the political preferences of a people and to show how far and in what ways they can be reconciled with one another. Values may lead to a desire for both majority rule and inviolable rights, with guarantees that majority rule will not be used to destroy other freedoms we value. We give up the full achievement of some preferences, in part, in order not to thwart the achievement of other preferences. Thus a "value-free" political theory is likely to be of limited utility for a people strongly influenced by values. Rule by a majority that undertakes to rule without understanding the values that influence the attitudes of substantial minorities is likely to become impotent majority rule. Minorities as well as majorities exercise power in a democracy. Thus, said Bryce (still discussing democracy as a form of government): "Every people that has tried to govern itself has recognized the necessity for precautions against the errors it may commit, be they injurious to the interests of the State as a whole or in the disregard of those natural or primordial rights which belong to individual citizens."¹⁴

The liberal insists that these rights should not be disregarded. He believes that rights to religious freedom, freedom of speech, and fair trials should be acknowledged and protected by his government, even at the cost of accepting what the Greeks called "counter-devices" in a governmental system. It seems to him strange to say that people who want majority rule cannot regard as inviolable the freedoms that make majority rule possible and durable; and strange to say that people cannot reasonably desire both democracy and the conditions that make democracy desirable.

III. THE RELIGIOUS CRITICS

With the critics now to be considered, disparagement of liberalism forms part of a general lamentation over the moral and spiritual degeneration of modern society. In their specific criticisms, some of these critics approve main items in the liberal program for political action, while rejecting liberalism as a political philosophy; others reject both the philosophy and the program. The common idea in these criticisms is that liberals are wrong or ineffective in their political policy because they have not understood the nature of the evils with which political action deals. Conceiving man as by nature reasonable, magnanimous, and cooperative, the liberals have believed that existing injustices, discomforts, and insecurities in the political community can be corrected by benevolently motivated, rationally devised, institutional reforms.

¹⁴ *Modern Democracies*, Vol. 2, pp. 390-91.

They fail to realize that our misdeeds and mistakes, in public as in private life, are natural and persistent manifestations of man's innate sinfulness and irrationality.

Perhaps the lengthiest and most emphatic criticism of liberalism, on religious grounds, is to be found in the works of a theologian most sympathetic with liberal aims. Reinhold Niebuhr—a progressive, humanitarian, internationally-minded theologian—has set forth, in several books, his ideas as to why the liberal's schemes for bringing freedom, justice, comfort and peace into the world, have achieved so little. Organize and plan, the liberal says, in his pleas to good and reasonable men: redistribute wealth; educate the masses; use our vast material resources and technical knowledge in eliminating disease and raising the standard of living for everyone; abolish tyrannies and set up democratic governments everywhere; reduce armaments and establish world tribunals for the peaceful and impartial settlement of international disputes. Such hopes, Niebuhr says, are vain. Good plans are futile unless they are undertaken by men wise enough to understand the depth of man's unwisdom and with a moral enlightenment that enables them to realize the strength and pervasiveness of human sinfulness. These views are best summarized in the following quotations from two of Niebuhr's books:

The utopian illusions and sentimental aberrations of modern liberal culture are really all derived from the basic error of negating the fact of original sin. This error . . . continually betrays modern man to equate the goodness of men with the virtue of their various schemes for social justice and international peace. . . . Obviously there are varying degrees of sin and guilt and some men and nations are more guilty than others of disobedience to the heavenly vision. Also there are specific evils in history, arising from the specific maladjustments in social and political organization. But these evils can be dealt with most adequately if men do not give themselves to the illusion that some particular organization of society might be found in which men would no longer stand in contradiction to the law of their being.¹⁵

The assumption of rationalists in the past centuries has been that either education or the equalization of economic interests would finally fashion the mind into a perfect instrument of universal and absolute knowledge, and would ultimately destroy social friction by eliminating the partial perspectives which prompt men to assess social issues in conflicting terms. But this assumption fails to recognize that the most intelligent and disinterested person can never escape his fate as a child of nature and finitude. . . . Thus even the most refined spiritual achievements of humans can never result in an unqualified synthesis of human hopes and aspirations. At some point they will always accentuate social conflict by making men more stubborn in the defense of their interests, under the illusion that their interests represent universal values.¹⁶

¹⁵ *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 2 vols. (New York, 1941-43), Vol. 1, p. 273. See also *Reflections on the End of an Era* (New York, 1934); *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York, 1935), pp. 140-50, 171-79; *Children of Light and Children of Darkness* (New York, 1944).

¹⁶ *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York, 1940), p. 156.

Niebuhr has recently illustrated these views, about man and his history, in a special study of the ironies of our American experience. We have demonstrated in a special way, he believes, an irrational faith in reason and a moral blindness to man's inherent immorality. The Puritan and Calvinist settlers believed they were creating "a new heaven and a new earth." The Constitutional Fathers, and we, their heirs, have continued to trust in our superior virtues and talents in making new beginnings in a corrupt world. Here then are some of the ironies in our actual achievement: a nation of greatest productive efficiency, we are involved in a global controversy threatening wholesale destruction; disparaging materialism, we have been its most expert practitioners; having achieved a high state of economic security at home, we are involved in unprecedented global insecurity; having made ourselves the world's most powerful nation, we are yet forced to accommodate our most fateful decisions to the demands or needs of other nations. "A nation with an inordinate degree of political power is doubly tempted to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities, if it is informed by an idealism which does not understand the limits of man's wisdom and volition in history."¹⁷

Niebuhr repeats these views in several of his books. Man, he says, "cannot rise to a simple triumph over historical fate." Our natural will to survive becomes a constant search for security, which in turn is transmuted into a competition for power and superiority. Sin, ignominy, and misery are our lot on earth. Yet this fervent pessimism by no means leads Niebuhr into any advocacy of negativism or passivism in his attitudes towards political action. For man, Niebuhr explains, is a complex being: a part of "nature" and involved in its limitations, yet also outside nature, and able to understand and appraise and in some measure transcend those limitations. Goodness and dignity are, in some measure, our lot. Sinful in his "original" nature, man can yet seek to become righteous; he faces the never realizable yet never escapable command to "be perfect." To qualify himself for making a better among the imperfect choices, he must first put himself in the proper moral and spiritual state. He must recover the traditional Christian virtues of acknowledging and repenting of one's sins. And he must try to understand the complexities of human history—"the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historical configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all virtue."

Thus repentance, rebirth, and a search for understanding are key words in Niebuhr's moral commandments. But so also is realism. The

¹⁷ *The Irony of American History* (New York, 1952), p. 143.

Christian must be practical; ready to choose the less over the more imperfect choices available to him at any given time. Indeed Niebuhr's criticisms do not actually separate him from liberals in the efforts to achieve justice and peace and make human rights secure. He agrees that citizens have fateful decisions to make; political reforms to be striven for actively and courageously. Thus the fault of liberals appears to be (in Niebuhr's diagnosis), not that they have rejected moral criteria, but that they have failed to qualify themselves, spiritually and intellectually, for a genuine application of moral criteria. The liberal's illusions about the possible scope of moral achievement at any given time often result in net losses for morality.

T. S. Eliot's criticisms of liberalism appear in several of his essays and short books. Like Niebuhr he believes that the typical defects of modern society are to be found in an exaggerated faith in human "reason" and "perfectibility" and in the lack of a religion or of any other sort of basic belief.¹⁸ Our ordinary political distinctions today, between the democratic and the totalitarian countries, rest, Eliot believes, on nothing very significant. Indeed the totalitarian countries might be said to be more democratic than the democracies, since their policies may reflect a clearer popular will. The democracies and the dictatorships are alike, however, in their essential secularism. In a few of the western countries (Spain, Portugal, and Ireland) religion retains a slight hold. For the rest, the real division is between the pagan countries (communist and fascist) and the neutral countries (e.g., the United States, France, the British dominions, and possibly England). The pagan peoples have at least the virtues of not pretending to be religious and yet of having some sort of positive beliefs, however shallow and inconsistent. The neutral countries have no philosophy of any sort; to call them "Christian" is "an abuse of terms"; for they are Christian only in the sense that "no one is penalized for the formal profession of Christianity."

Both democracy and liberalism are, Eliot believes, typical manifestations of the degeneration of the modern West. He has little that is specific to say about democracy, and regards the word as now devoid of concrete definition; it means too many things to mean anything. "If anybody ever attacked democracy, I might discover what the word meant." Liberalism, Eliot agrees, once meant something concrete and valuable. In early modern times the beliefs we associate with that term

¹⁸ T. S. Eliot, "Religion and Literature" and "Catholicism and International Order," in his *Essays, Ancient and Modern* (New York, 1938). The following account of Eliot's specific criticisms is based chiefly on *The Idea of a Christian Society* (New York, 1940), Ch. 1.

supplied a useful negative element in the prevailing ideology and policy, counteracting old abuses by actively opposing an active, coercive intolerance at a time when the disputants were in essential agreement in their general religious and moral ideals. Present-day liberalism, Eliot believes, serves no present-day needs. It has, like democracy, become a spineless creed, lacking any beliefs strong enough to stand up against the diabolic faiths of racism, class war, and the selfish imperialisms of capitalism and revolutionary socialism. Or if either democracy or liberalism can be said to have a religion, it is the religion of materialism, "the worship of profit." "Democratic liberal society, assembled around nothing more permanent than a congeries of banks, insurance companies, and industries," has no belief in anything more essential than "compound interest and the maintenance of dividends." The cure for this modern disease of the West cannot be found in good intentions and secular institutional changes. There must be a change in beliefs, or a change from non-belief to belief. "If you will not have God you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin."

The western world, then, Eliot believes, can be saved only by religion; and only by the right religion, which is (for the West) Christianity.¹⁹ And, like any other religion, Christianity must be authoritatively set forth and actively propagated, under political auspices. The liberal idea that religion is "a matter of mere private belief and that Christians should be able to accommodate themselves to any world that treats them good-naturedly, is becoming less and less tenable": the Christian God is "a jealous God." The restoration of Christianity requires the restoration of Christian institutions. A Christian society must be founded on a Christian political philosophy; and it must be organized in such a way as to promote a wide understanding and acceptance of the Christian hierarchy of values. This does not require the adoption of any one of the traditional "forms of government." The form of the government of a Christian society may be a monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, or a "corporative state" of the sort described in encyclicals of Pope Pius XI. "To identify any particular form of government with Christianity" is to confound "the permanent with the transitory, the absolute with the contingent."

Eliot's scheme for a Christian organization of society consists of "The Christian State," "The Community of Christians," and "The Christian Community," and an established Christian Church. By a "Christian

¹⁹ The following summary of Eliot's ideas on the structure and functions of a Christian society is based chiefly on *The Idea of a Christian Society*, pp. 23 ff. See also his *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (London, 1948), pp. 13-20, 28-34, Chs. 4-5, and pp. 122-24; *For Lancelot Andrewes: Essays on Style and Order* (London, 1928), Ch. 8.

State," Eliot means "the government" (in the ordinary sense of the word): the "rulers" (directors of policy) and the whole personnel engaged in the work of legislation, administration, and law enforcement. The rulers do not have to be believing Christians: they may be infidels in their private beliefs, but they must govern as Christians, conforming to "the temper and traditions" of a Christian people; they may "frequently perform un-Christian acts," but must "never attempt to defend their actions on Christian principles." By a "Community of Christians" Eliot means an elite gathered from among clerics, teachers, and intellectually and morally superior laymen; the function of this group will be to help bring Christian principles into education, public policy, and the private economy. The "Christian Community" is the general body of citizens in whom the Christian faith has been ingrained; for this group—"the masses"—Christianity will be essentially a matter of unconscious habit, with ordinary people conforming as a matter of course to established religious observances and traditional patterns of Christian behavior. The form of an established Christian Church, and its relation to the state, might vary in different Christian countries; but everywhere its function would be to speak with "final authority" in the interpreting matters of faith and morals.

Eliot recognizes the difficulties in the way of establishing his Christian society anywhere. Actual tendencies in social behavior—exaggeration of the profit motive, exploitation of labor, and an unfair distribution of wealth—are, he believes, carrying society in the opposite direction. Few will dispute that "a great deal of the machinery of modern life is merely a sanction for un-Christian aims." Although Eliot in such passages indicates a humane interpretation of Christian economic principles, he by no means identifies this with any vision of a social democracy. There is a frequently recurring idea, in his various works, that an efficient, responsible Christian society must be made up of "classes"—each with its special traditions and culture and its special contributions to make to the total culture of that society; and each, accordingly, with class and local as well as general, national, loyalties—all subordinate to the stabilizing force of Christian traditions of belief and behavior.

By the "idea" of a Christian society, Eliot has no notion of a society that ever was or ever would be; he was, he explained, using the word "idea" in its classical sense of "the conception of a thing which is given by the knowledge of its ultimate aim." The Christian social goal may, he feared, seem undesirable to most of the present-day intelligentsia, perhaps "intolerable" to "the liberal mind." Neutral societies may persist indefinitely. But, he believes, "if the present-day peoples are to develop any positive culture of their own"—in other words, if they are

to have any culture at all—they “must proceed in the direction of a pagan or of a Christian society.” In either event, he believes, liberalism has spent its force, played out its historic role. Its distinctive attitudes and beliefs “belong to an age of free exploitation which has disappeared; and our danger now is that the term may come to signify for us only the disorder the fruits of which we inherit, and not the permanent value of the negative element.” Whether religion or paganism prevails, liberalism, Eliot believes, is “destined to disappear.”

Professor Hallowell finds confirmation for his own views on the futility, or the positive evils, inherent in modern liberalism, in the writings of various representatives of “Protestant Neo-Orthodoxy,” chiefly Niebuhr. He restates, with emphasis, the view that liberalism’s basic defect is its ignorance or repudiation of the essential Christian doctrine of original sin.²⁰ He attributes to traditional liberalism the extreme view that, since man has natural inclinations to deal reasonably and amicably with his fellows, progress is “automatic,” “inevitable,” and “irreversible.” And then, through a special application of the familiar argument that extreme affirmations lead to extreme contradictions, he assigns to present-day liberals a large share of responsibility for the irrationality and violence of the mid-twentieth-century totalitarian regimes. Overconfidence in man’s reasonableness and goodness becomes an exaltation of will over reason, which leads to the triumph of evil over good; trust in the strength of the normal man’s natural desire for freedom ensures the victory of the abnormal, power-seeking man.

Professor Hallowell cites two sorts of examples of this fateful transition from liberalism to totalitarianism: the legal theory of some German jurists, setting forth their explanations of “positive” law (as distinguished from natural law and moral law); and some public statements by prominent men who, in the mid-nineteen-thirties, spoke in praise, defense, or extenuation of Hitler’s acts.

The legal positivist defines “law” (the law of a state, that is, which is what the jurists are talking about) as consisting of commands issuing, directly or indirectly, from the “sovereign” in a state—that is, from the person or body or bodies of persons formally designated as having final authority to make the laws to be enforced by the government of that state. The dangerous fallacy in this legal doctrine, Hallowell says, is that it treats as law every formally proper command issuing from such a source, however unreasonable or unjust the command may be. Thus the

²⁰ Professor Hallowell’s views on the moral and practical defects of modern liberalism and his proposed reforms are set forth in his *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York, 1950); see especially pp. 558–70, 612–24, 662–73.

legal positivist, typical representative or product of the modern liberal mind, ignores, or leads others to ignore, all distinctions between good and evil, reason and unreason. The legal positivists thereby, Hallowell declares, "teach that might makes right."²¹

The defenders of "Hitler's terror," cited by Hallowell as examples of liberalism's baneful influence, are James W. Gerard, Hans Rothfels, and Winston Churchill. Gerard said that Hitler unified the German people, improved the education of German youth, rid the country of communism, curbed parliamentary government (a form of government not suitable for Germans) and created a "Spartan state"; Gerard described these achievements as "all good." The burden of Rothfels' defense or apology was that anyone was "pharisaic" and "self-righteous" in passing judgment on Germany's "mistakes" without having experienced the hardships the Germans had suffered. Churchill, praising Hitler's "courage" and "perseverance," said he had always hoped that if England were ever defeated in a war, the English people would "find a Hitler to lead us back to our rightful position among the nations."²²

Professor Hallowell believes that our political ideas should be founded in the spiritual and moral principles revealed generally in the Greek-Hebraic-Christian tradition. He finds those principles set forth best by St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, and he follows Niebuhr in urging liberals to acknowledge their sins and proclaim their repentance. He summarizes his own version of essential Christian principles, upon which our political beliefs and policies should be based, as follows, in the last sentence of his book:

Only if we are concerned about the salvation of our souls shall we be of much use in saving the world, only if our eyes are focussed on the Kingdom of God shall we see with clearer vision what needs to be done here and now, only if we surrender our wills, as completely as men can to the will of God, will we be enabled by the power of God to make the self-sacrifice which the salvation of the world demands—in short, only by aiming above the world shall we succeed in mastering the world.

Hallowell had explained that he did not mean to exclude consideration of necessary reforms in the structure of our economic and political life. He means rather that no institutional reforms are likely to achieve anything of essential value unless they are undertaken with the perspective and principles provided by Christianity. We cannot obtain peace, security and happiness in this world unless we seek "first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness."

Professor Hallowell's somewhat more specific statement of the proper principles upon which to found a Christian social order consists chiefly

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 613.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 614-15.

of quotations from the late William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury. Temple summarized his basic principles as follows: Man is not "wholly" ruled by reason, and we cannot remove social injustices merely by reforming our social institutions; yet "civic action" is necessary in the social application of moral principles; recognition of the need for "social fellowship" must be reconciled with a respect for the worth of every person, "absolutely independent of all usefulness to society"; and society must be organized in such a way as to give to every individual "the widest extension of personal responsibility."²³ These views, approved by Hallowell, do not seem essentially different from the views of the liberals criticized by Hallowell.

Professor De Grazia regards "toleration" and "the absence of community" as the characteristic maladies of modern civilization. Under the final triumph of the "notion of the Individual," which "has agitated the Western world since the deaths of Alexander and Aristotle," we have lost all sense of the need for "common belief systems" and the "religious and political bonds" that create a community and hold it together.²⁴ We have now sunk to that condition in which people feel united with their fellows only in "war and crisis"; for only in such tragic situations do most of the people gain a "feeling of community." To make this feeling a normal part of life we must restore the political community to its rightful place and function. We must shift the center of our political interests from "individuals and classes and their mutual antagonisms" to the people united in "the Great Community"—"the state," which "embraces all other communities." This community must be sustained by a body of common values, with "moral authority," and by a recognition of "the close psychological connection and mutual support of religious and political ideologies." The state is "the highest secular association because like its counterpart, the religious community, it exists to protect man from his greatest fear—isolation."

De Grazia assails modern liberalism for its advocacy of toleration, which he describes as the enemy of morality as well as of community.²⁵ He lists, as representatives of this immoral doctrine of tolerance, outstanding names in the Anglo-American liberal tradition—from Milton,

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 689-91, quoting from William Temple, *Christianity and the Social Order* (London, 1942).

²⁴ Professor De Grazia's eloquent pleas for the restoration of the idea of community are set forth at length in his *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie* (Chicago, 1948). See especially his preface and pp. 176-90.

²⁵ De Grazia's ideas on the evils of toleration and his proposed cure are emphatically set forth in an address on "Toleration and Forgiveness: the Ability to Judge Good from Evil," in *Vital Speeches*, Vol. 16, pp. 149-53 (Dec. 15, 1949).

Roger Williams, and Locke to J. S. Mill. He regards Mill as the worst of the lot, since Mill (De Grazia says) advocated complete tolerance of every kind of thought and pursuit. De Grazia calls tolerance a "radical immoral force" and (borrowing a name from Martin Luther) "a sly whore." Tolerance, he continues, "working silently," has "turned the tolerator into a twilight man and the tolerated into a pale disbeliever," reducing "communal moral standards to a burnt-out hulk." He believes that Mill's ideas foster a "forced variety"; and he states his own belief that "it is always better to be right than to be different."

De Grazia's alternative to tolerance is not intolerance (which he regards as, like tolerance, a "counterfeit"), but "forgiveness," which he defines as "the promise and act of receiving the errant person back into the community." The "right to forgive" must be the special prerogative of "those who have the authority to lead, to guide, to watch over the community." The rest of the community should demonstrate their disapproval of bad ideas and pursuits by communicating their "moral disfavor" through "ridicule, rebuff, irony, contempt, avoidance, cold silence," and other "bloodless forms of moral expression."

Comment on the religious critics. Mill did not (the present writer believes) belittle the value of consensus. He said: "As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase; and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested." He did warn against an over-emphasis on consensus and against the dangers in governmental coercion as a means of securing agreement. And he did put a high value on individuality and originality. There will always, he said, be the need for persons who can "discover new truths . . . and set the example of more enlightened conduct and better taste and sense in human life. This cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices." And Mill did not advocate toleration of every sort of speech or action. Like De Grazia, he preferred bloodless forms of opposing the speech and action he considered immoral or unreasonable. For "moral vices" and "irrational behavior," he advocated such methods as "remonstrating," "reasoning," "persuading," "entreaty," and (in words strikingly similar to De Grazia's) such forms of "moral retribution" as "reprobation," "expression of distaste," "avoidance," "contempt," and (in extreme cases) "abhorrence."²⁸ Since Mill advocated free discussion as an essen-

²⁸ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Modern Library ed.), pp. 47, 83, 91, 102.

P/5/68

tial means of discovering truth and securing clear agreement and strong convictions about what is true and right, he would (it would seem) readily accept De Grazia's aphorism that it is better to be right than to be different; as De Grazia would probably agree that it is better to be right than to be alike, and better to be different than to be wrong.

It is difficult to see why either the theorizing of the legal positivists or the praises of Hitler sung by some misguided commentators should be taken as indicative of typical liberal views or as typical products of liberal doctrine. Some legal positivists have been liberal in their general political theory, some have not. There is nothing in the positivist's theory of law (of the sort of law he is talking about) that should make it difficult for him to distinguish bad laws from good laws, and jurists of that school have not hesitated to make the distinction. Certainly, on the one hand, a Christian can recognize his obligation to obey the laws of a state, even those laws embodying commands which seem to him essentially immoral. No state could exist in a Christian community whose Christian citizens acted on the assumption that they were obligated to obey only those laws which their Christian consciences approved. And certainly, on the other hand, there is nothing in the positivist's definition and discussion of law that implies any unusual limitation on the right of a citizen to express his moral condemnation of a law, or any unusual limitation on his right to disobey or resist rulers who rule unrighteously.

It is difficult also to see why liberals should be blamed for the misguided utterances of Messrs. Gerard, Churchill, and Rothfels. Mr. Churchill seemed (to the present writer and to other ordinary liberals) wrong in his praise of Hitler, and wrong ten years earlier in his more emphatic praise of Mussolini; and Archbishop Temple (whom Hallowell commends for basing his political views on secure Christian foundations) seemed wrong in his pleas for cooperation with the Nazi regime and wrong in his warm commendation of Mr. Chamberlain's pact with Hitler.²⁷ The most charitable excuse for such utterances is that the speakers were badly informed as to Hitler's designs. If they had listened to warnings from the liberals they might have been more promptly alert to the signs of Mussolini's and Hitler's terrorism.

Professor Hallowell, in his various charges against the liberals, applies some of his specific criticisms to special sorts of liberals. Thus, he says, "bourgeois" liberals "consider only the material individual"; "extreme" liberalism "denies the existence of divine authority and thus in effect makes every man a law unto himself"; "some" liberals hold "that free-

²⁷ *London Times*, May 24, 1935, p. 17, and October 5, 1938, p. 9.

dom of speech is unlimited"; and "degenerate" liberalism is "congenial to the rise of tyranny." Yet in many other passages Hallowell appears to regard his extreme characterizations as properly applicable to liberals generally. Thus, he declares, "It was the liberals who taught that might makes right."²⁸

It can be said of any doctrine that it has its degenerate forms. What Hallowell says of some degenerate liberals can be said of some degenerate Christians. There is utility in pointing out the differences between the pure and the perverted forms of a doctrine. But it is difficult to see wherein there is any more justification for saying that liberals teach that might makes right than for saying that Christians teach that illiberal, un-Christian, doctrine.

Literary critics who claim T. S. Eliot as a special teacher and guide have differing opinions as to what Eliot means, or as to how far he intends to speak clearly, or whether his meanings are merely "too subtle for the intellect." Other readers should, therefore, be cautious in stating their own opinions. To some readers Eliot's description of a Christian society and a Christian life seems (in some passages) over-intellectual; too unemotional; preoccupied with structure and ritual, and ignoring experience; callous in its attitudes towards the ordinary lives of ordinary individuals. In some passages he is explicit in ranking thought above feeling, "truth" above experience, Christian "observances" above Christian conduct or a Christian spirit. "The spirit killeth," he says in one place, "but the letter giveth life."²⁹ Here, and in some other places, he appears deliberately supercilious in his comments on equality, tolerance, popular education, and any sort of merely humane public policy. His conception of "sin" as some sort of mystical entity, independent of human behavior, seems to make him indifferent to such secular qualities as kindness, honesty, and diligence. "What is worst," Eliot says, "is to advocate Christianity not because it is true, but because it might be beneficial." His Christian ideal would be realized in "a community of men and women not individually better than they are now, except for the capital difference of holding to the Christian faith."³⁰

Yet in other passages there are (or appear to be) valid admonitions to liberals and democrats; as in his warnings against both a "slovenly," irresponsible, individuality, and the superficiality and short-sightedness in many of our attempts at economic equalization and mass education. In some passages also Eliot shows great respect for individuality and "the rights of personal life." He points out the various economic and

²⁸ *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, pp. 326, 613, 614, 678.

²⁹ *For Lancelot Andrewes*, Ch. 5 and at p. 89.

³⁰ *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 61.

social pressures that "steadily diminish the concrete reality of the individual." He opposes any "censorship," political or moral, of art and literature. Although he would provide for public support of the Christian religion, he recognizes the vagueness and irresponsibility in the use of the term "Christian." Many who call themselves Christian, do not, he says, understand or try to understand what the word means. Some who "vigorously repudiate Christianity are more Christian than many who maintain it." And although he would withhold any sort of positive encouragement of dissenters and sceptics, he would let them argue at will. Moreover, he says (somewhat surprisingly), "The Spirit descends in different ways" and "perhaps there will always be individuals who, with great gifts of value to mankind, and the sensibility which such gifts imply, will remain blind, indifferent, or even hostile. That must not disqualify them from exercising the talents they have been given."²¹

Thus Eliot warns against any sort of "totalitarian" democracy, with its insistence on "conformity without respect to the needs of the individual." He is no advocate of the sort of unlimited political authority insisted on by some of the critics of liberalism.

Niebuhr's belief that "nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in our lifetime" seems as much of an exaggeration, and as much of a contradiction of Christian doctrine, as the belief, attributed to liberals, that man can successfully act independently of his history, his environment, and the limitations of his own nature. Liberals have not imagined that man is solely a reasoning creature or always sound in his reasoning or right in his moral judgments; and they do not believe that we can ever find perfect solutions or always achieve partial solutions. They do believe that we can learn something from our failures and from our partial successes, in efforts to remove some of the economic, political, and psychological obstacles to partial successes. They see no good reason why such attitudes should be called "fantastic" or rejected as the useless products of eighteenth-century "enlightenment," "nineteenth-century rationalism," and the "pretentious social science" of the twentieth century.²²

Niebuhr and the liberals he criticizes do not, however, seem very far apart, in their positions on public policy. They should not object to his warnings against self-righteousness in appraising their intentions and against over-optimism in their expectations. In some passages he seems to be urging a sort of mystic pessimism that might lead to despair of any sort of action. But he does urge action. When fortified by a proper understanding of our imperfections, we should act, vigorously, realistically;

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

²² *The Irony of American History*, pp. 25, 43, 45, 63, 80.

we should not wait until we are at some never reachable vantage point of guiltlessness. Niebuhr recognizes fully the powerful part we have to play in preserving our civilization from communism, fascism, and our own selfish nationalism and inept liberalism. We must resist Russia's "demonry" as well as our own vanities and frailties.³³ Niebuhr stands with other liberals in urging vigorous action at home in support of religious freedom, free speech, fair law-enforcement, equal protection of the laws, and greater equality of economic opportunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Liberalism needs criticism. A liberal may have exaggerated notions of man's capacity and disposition to think and act justly and intelligently. Optimism may obscure the need for creative thought and imagination. Tolerance may degenerate into indifference and irresponsibility. Confidence in institutional reforms may divert attention from reforms of the mind and spirit. The problem of maintaining intellectual and moral freedom and vigor is not merely a matter of bills of rights and checks and balances. Liberalism, which began with strong moral convictions, has no less need for them now, and moral convictions about rights imply moral convictions about obligations. As the right to property is conditioned by an obligation not to use property exploitatively, so the right to speak is conditioned by the obligation to speak honestly and fairly. "There are no costless rights."³⁴ Liberals should also recognize that in their openmindedness they may have exaggerated notions of the possibilities of freedom and variety. They may underrate the individual's need for participation with others in a community in which there is some basic intellectual consensus and some common devotion to common causes. Philosophers and scientists have reminded us that an individual is the sort of person he is not solely by virtue of his natural endowment and his physical environment, but also by virtue of the sort of conventional relationships in which he finds himself. The standards of conduct and opinions which these conventions express go far towards determining his character and achievement.

The views of some of the critics seem extreme; there are anti-liberal as well as liberal "stereotypes." Few of the criticisms require the liberal to abandon essential ideas in his political theory. He has no reason to object to the characterization of his theory as "mixed" and "middle-of-the-road." It is a Christian doctrine that man is a creature of "competing" dispositions and faculties and that good and evil are "curiously intertwined" in human history.³⁵ Anthropologists tell us that man is

³³ *Ibid.*, Ch. 6 and p. 174.

³⁴ William E. Hocking, *What Man Can Make of Man* (New York and London, 1942), pp. 49-50.

³⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, pp. 157-58.

subordinate to his society, yet in essential ways independent of it. Political philosophers have shown how governments exercising unlimited power become incompetent and impotent governments.

The liberal does not ignore the pervasiveness and stubbornness of evil in human history. The fact that he may be an earnest advocate of secular reforms is no sign that he feels sure that his reforms will be adopted or that if adopted they will fully or finally solve any problem. It seems an exaggeration to say that there ever was a typically "liberal" belief in "inevitable," "automatic," and "irreversible" progress. In traditional liberal as in traditional Christian political doctrine, the chief reason for the existence of government is found in the need to prevent men from dealing unreasonably or unjustly with one another. Yet it is no contradiction of these beliefs to believe also that normal men know (in Locke's words) that they "should not destroy one another" or "harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." And not all Christian theologians make a virtue of exalting doubt and despair above faith and hope. Even Niebuhr agrees that man "is not involved in guilt merely by asserting his creative faculties."³⁶

In all societies, we are told by anthropologists, conformity and dependence are combined with individuality and independence. Societies, Professor Ralph Linton says, "work as wholes"; the interests of each individual are subordinate to those of the group; a "community of ideas . . . values . . . habits" holds the group together. "It is this psychological and emotional unity, the *esprit de corps*, which ensures common emotional reactions and makes the individual willing to sacrifice his own interests to those of the whole and to do the things which need to be done even when there is no one watching him." Yet also "No matter how thoroughly the persons who compose a society may have been trained, they remain individuals, distinct psychological entities," who "retain the capacity for independent thought, feelings, and action"; and these "alternatives," in thought, feeling, and action tend to become more "plentiful" and "varied" in the evolution from primitive to civilized societies. "All life in society is a compromise between the needs of the individual and the needs of the group, and it has the indefiniteness and instability of all compromise situations."³⁷

There are special difficulties in the compromises that have to be made between the need of a government for power and the need of the citizen for freedom. "The *via media*," T. S. Eliot says, "is of all ways the most

³⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, p. 156.

³⁷ Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, London, 1936), pp. 5, 15-16, 23-25, 36; *The Study of Man* (New York, London, 1945), pp. 91-96, 273-74. For similar views by a religious writer, see William Temple, *Christianity and the State* (London, 1928), pp. 99, 101-2, 108, 124-25.

difficult to follow. It requires discipline and self-control, both imagination and a hold on reality. In a period of debility like our own, few men have the energy to follow the middle way in government."³⁸ Whatever utility there may be in the bare logic of the argument that there can be no sensible combination of majority rule with limitations on majority rule—i.e., you either have unlimited rule by bare majorities or you do not have a democratic form of government—attempts at the combination are made in countries having governments called democratic, according to the proper definition of that word. Professor Latham discusses the lack of "logic" and "precision" in the opinions of our Supreme Court in applying to acts of Congress the Constitutional command that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of speech"; and he believes we "win no real victories in the courts" in such matters. He proposes, as a better way to protect our liberties, that we instruct our legislators "in the limitations upon their powers" and that we vote out of office the "rascals" who violate the limitations. This seems certainly better than instructing our legislators, or the people who elect them, that their powers are not limited and that individuals who denounce the rascals show thereby their misunderstanding of the nature of democracy. The liberal believes that there is moral and political wisdom in the constitutional declarations naming "rights" and "freedoms" that "shall not be violated" and "shall be preserved," and that majorities do not necessarily act irrationally in setting up devices against "absolute" and "unlimited" majority rule. He is in agreement with Latham in the belief that "In the struggle to preserve civil liberty, no protection, however slight, should be discarded."³⁹

The liberal, of the sort considered in this paper, believes in inviolable rights—in freedoms inviolable in the sense that men ought to possess them, not only as means for the realization of other values, but as values in themselves. He regards the rights as natural to man, as a being distinguished from other animals by his faculties of reason, speech, a sense of justice, and a capacity for independent thought and action. He believes that the rights are inalienable in a political community in the sense that a citizen will not disclaim them if he is to retain his character as a citizen; and inalienable in the sense that the community will not take them away if it is to retain its character as a political community. He believes that order and agreement are goods that may be sought extravagantly, by means that confuse or destroy the sort of consensus upon which the security and strength of a democracy depend.

³⁸ T. S. Eliot, *For Lancelot Andrewes* (1928), p. 42.

³⁹ Earl Latham, in article cited in note 6, above; and see generally Arthur Holcombe, "Natural Limits to the Power of Numerical Majorities" and "The Paramount Principle of the Political Mean" in his *Our More Perfect Union* (New York, 1950), pp. 23-36 and 400-7.

THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST

THOMAS I. COOK AND MALCOLM MOOS

The Johns Hopkins University

I

Disenchantment with moral abstractions as the hallmarks of enlightened foreign policy has recently revived infatuation with the slogans of "national interest," "power politics," and "balance of power." Until the eve of World War II, these ideas had been recessive—at times moribund—for at least half a generation. Naïve belief in the efficacy of professions of good will, reliance on weak instruments for effectuating simply noble intentions in the complex realms of policy and practice, and contentment with lofty exhortations, had too often become the directives of policy unconcerned with the harshness of politics or the intricate give-and-take of sustained diplomacy.

Since the Republic's inception, statesmen have proclaimed national interest as the firmament on which our foreign policy rests. To that concept they have repeatedly referred as a guide and rationale for action in foreign affairs. Over the years the concept of national interest has been endowed with a varied and changing content. Therefore, interpretation has been a matter of historical, rather than etymological, enquiry. Certainly, a single dictionary definition will not do. Nevertheless, while dominant meanings at different moments and a long-term trend in the development of meaning are alike discoverable, or imputable, the actual meaning in our own day rests largely on the setting of current controversies. A particular concept of the national interest, therefore, is not "automatically" warranted and acceptable by appeal to tradition and great names, any more than by formal definition.

That national interest is a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of, the national interest. To do so would reveal at once internal contradiction, logically and psychologically.

The problem, therefore, is to discover what, at the given moment or through a meaningful period of time, the national interest is. Indeed, a major difficulty is to define the relevant time-span in the life of the nation whose interest is to be assessed, and to decide on appropriate policy accordingly.

At the one extreme, the advocate of case-by-case decision, emphatic that the hands of the policy-maker and the negotiator must not be tied by specific but lasting commitments or by long-term policies, will argue that flexibility also best serves the long-range national interest. To him, that interest, first defined by an enlightened judgment of what will in each case profit the collective whole, is the product of a series of such decisions made on the basis of information at the moment available or attainable. Insurance of continuity and needful consistency in policy come from the partial identification with the national life and the inherent participation and sharing in it, by those who in each case do

the assessing. To define a national interest beyond the ever-operative processes of politics and policy is to limit effectiveness in the pronouncement and pursuit of objectives. It is therefore deleterious to the real national interest.

On the other side stand those who, however much they agree on the need for accommodation and on the importance of utilizing perceived opportunity, still feel that coherence in foreign policy is the prime requisite. In their view, policy must be the consequence of a principled formulation of national interest. For such defined principle, though it often appears as a self-denying ordinance of dubious value, in truth furthers the sustained national interest. On the one hand it provides anchorage and creates confidence at home; on the other it ensures predictability abroad, and gives clear warning to other powers as to what this nation regards as vital.

These two concepts of national interest in relation to time, the one stressing immediate expediency and flexibility, the other a defining of principle based on long-term trend and desired projection, are exclusive when taken as absolutes. But they are not beyond reconciliation when themselves viewed as factors and perceptions to be weighted by statesmen in their endeavor to assess the nation's interest.

Yet behind these concepts lurk more profound divergencies. One extreme viewpoint regards the nation as a real being with an independent life of its own. Its development and full realization are held to be the generic purpose of history, and the imposed and necessary duty of the true statesman. The nation, according to this thesis, is an organic being, engaged in a struggle for life, for strength, for the conquest of hampering limitations, for predominance. Its objectives are first to endure and then to expand. The position takes many forms, is expressed in varied terminology, and has different implications as to inclusiveness or exclusiveness. Yet it results, almost of necessity, in the conviction that there is a real and lasting national interest independent of and apart from the interests of the persons who at any moment constitute the nation. To that interest they must, where necessary, be sacrificed. Indeed, their real obligation is to sacrifice themselves voluntarily; or to conceive the whole purpose of their existence as service to, and absorption in, the greater being, the nation, which alone is properly the bearer of interests.

On this view, the nation's interest is survival and strength. Its chief and primary instrument is force. It is independent, self-centered, and concerned with other nations only externally, in the sense that they are regrettable, yet inescapable, constraints on its pursuit of that interest. There is no community of nations, and there cannot be. Yet, because other nations exist, there are international relations, as there must be foreign policy, which indeed on this definition of national interest becomes the highest concern of the statesman. His objects are to ensure the permanence and maximize the power of the nation. That principle makes any action which supports it, whether by the seizure of immediate advantage or the adoption of coherent and predictable policy, equally correct.

In such a setting the national interest is a clear datum. It is not something

springing from institutions and interests within the nation, whose relative importance and value is to be assessed and re-assessed, and whose concerns may transcend purely national considerations and cross national boundaries. Yet, manifestly, a nation is not a talking organism; and in practice such viewpoints tend to the identification of nation with state, and state with rulers or government. Hence the national interest becomes defined as what those in power declare it to be; just as their efficacy in gaining and retaining power rests upon their skill in overcoming or reconciling particular and assessable interests by the use and sale of the very myth of a transcendent national interest.

Reaction against this position, among peoples where tradition has intimately related nation and state, has often followed in the wake of democratization. In such instances the tendency has been to regard the state as instrumental and to insist that the national interest which it serves must proceed out of the conscious interests and the free loyalties of its citizens. Yet the centrality of the state, so general a fact of European life, has meant that though the state may be reduced to instrumentality in doctrine and constitutional law, it has remained the locus and expression of a national interest under which specific interests are to be subsumed and subordinated.

On this thesis, national interest was, and is, an affair of statesmanship, to be defined and implemented by statesmen, and to be discovered and given a simple and unified content by purely political arts and processes. The formulation of such interest, and the statesman's task, were no doubt helped by an inheritance of traditional policies, not to mention stereotypes for their popularization and continuance. Politics might be constitutionalized and concepts of a superior national being or of the national interest as the will of rulers rejected. But national interest involved a continuity of principles, relationships, and objectives. That very continuity at once permitted needful flexibility in short-term operations and prevented incoherence through mere opportunism. Men were no doubt persons and the pluralism of group life was a reality. But centralization and citizenship were primary. And, by being largely unquestioned conditions of self and of associations, they jointly encouraged harsh definition of national interest and an acceptance of its paramountcy, just as they limited and directed debate over its content and established beyond dispute the proper organs and persons for its implementation.

II

The American experience has been very different. From the colonial beginnings, and certainly long before the Revolution, many of our leaders were critical of monarchy. Indeed, by Puritan doctrine itself they were antimonarchical, whatever their dependence on the throne for the very bases of their legal existence and their territorial rights. The experience of colonial life in thirteen colonies carved from a wilderness was inimical to centralization, as to a dominantly political loyalty to the state; and later colonial experience with the mother country reenforced these tendencies. The Revolution itself completed the work

and fixed an underlying pattern. Henceforth the defining of national interest in terms of the state, whether monarchical or the heir of monarchy, was made lastingly difficult.

Yet, as noted above, the idea of national interest was developed early in these United States, and has remained a touchstone for the measuring of policy. The reasons are easy to divine. The Founding Fathers were both revolutionaries and self-made heirs of the doctrine that statesmanship was the highest, and appropriate, calling of the natural or aristocratic leaders of society. That view had developed out of the Whig Revolution, in which landed and commercial leaders inherited, by default and as the culmination of a revolutionary movement, the major and essential functions once the prerogatives of Divine Right monarchy. As successful revolutionaries, our Founding Fathers were driven to organize public power as they sought lasting safety for their creation. Separating themselves from the country whose legal possession they had been, they were forced to proclaim that, whatever the peculiarities of this country, it was a nation-state belonging to the system of states developed by and in Europe from the Peace of Westphalia on. The new nation so conceived had a claim to status, interests, and policies which it was the task of its statesmen to implement and define. Moreover, as revolutionaries and republicans welding a whole out of separate colonies, they were driven to use the concepts of a nation, a national people, and a national interest for organizing purposes, internal not less than international. It is well to remember that the United States, prior to the French Revolution, was the first country to stress the modern concepts of nationality and national independence, though it happily and long avoided the European corollary, nationalism.

The social and geographical facts of American life, coupled with distrust of distant political authority and function, did not prevent our early statesmen from developing a concept of national interest interpreted by a government endowed with exclusive authority in foreign affairs. But these facts did inhibit any tendency on the part of ordinary men to esteem their loyalty and nationality as primarily political and oriented towards the federal government. Men as citizens might meet their legal obligations thereto, and might bear arms in furtherance of the nation's policies, though until after the Civil War they performed the latter duty with little enthusiasm. Even in our own day military service remains for most a regrettable, though real, necessity which, in the name of national interest, interferes with the normal pursuit of individual interests, ideally held to constitute in their sum the more appropriate long-term interest of the nation. We also note that the now almost irrelevant right of the citizen to bear arms, though conceived as being in the national interest because it provided a reservoir of men trained in the use of arms, was in truth doubly anti-statist. It rested on fear of professional armies, as well as unwillingness to rely on them. For they were usually the instruments of governments which identified national interest with their own conceptions of public power and prestige. It rested, secondly, on a popular sense that a citizen body accustomed to use

arms was a wholesome check on a possible official temptation to act oppressively, and to equate official ambitions and convictions with the interests of the people constituting the nation.

In general, Americans have rejected the idea of a nation as a real super-being, endowed with independent life and interests, as they have escaped the European concept of the state. Certainly the view that men should be sacrificed to the one or the other, or to the two in combination, is repulsive to Americans; as is the conviction that public authorities are the primary factors in the formulation of concepts of national interest. There have, it is true, been nationalistic movements in the United States. But, apart from their striking differences from European movements, due in part to the absence of equally powerful neighbors, they have generally been short-lived, and have seldom aroused widespread enthusiasm. Thus the first major movement of this sort after the Constitutional period, severely criticized by transcendentalists and by interests differently oriented in geography and commerce, ended with the deepening of sectional conflict and the defection of Calhoun. The nationalism of the Civil War period and after, though it made a genuine impress on constitutional concepts of the nature of the Union, failed to popularize alien ideas of sovereignty and nation-state. In part this was true because the very forces supporting the Union were anti-statist, individualistic, and voluntaristic. Even the later impact of German ideas in the creation of American academic political and social science failed utterly to convert us to the European doctrines of state and nation, since their proponents were driven by outer circumstances and inner conviction to a defense of liberty, of property, and of enterprise beyond the purview of government or state.

The American regards his government as instrumental. But he does not, like the European who shares this view, propound a simple monistic view of national interest by making the state his central symbol of loyalty and identification. Like Europeans he reverences the symbols of the collective public order, such as the flag. Yet loyalty to his nation, though real and deep, is little related to the panoplies of public life. And the occasions when he does thrill to the acts of statesmen, because they embody the sense and reveal the majesty of his nation, are rare.

Rather, American loyalty tends to center around institutions, from the family outward; around sections and scenery and ways of life; around personal freedom and enterprise; and around neighborliness. These interests may be loosely summed up as the much-vaunted American way of life which, for all its varieties of connotation and despite all abuses committed and selfish interests defended in its name, symbolizes a central core of experience, emotion, and attachment. It is not a statist concept; it is not identified with government; and, though it includes our political mores, it is not, in feeling, political. Yet it indicates the fundamental concerns which it is the national interest to protect and promote.

Foreign policies proclaimed or pursued by statesmen are judged to be in the

national interest when devoted to such protection and furtherance. Hence, glory and aggrandizement of the nation-state are not, for Americans, synonymous with national interest. Moreover, because that interest is societal, not political, it is possible to conceive of the state purely instrumentally and, simultaneously, to admit that final, as well as instrumental, satisfactions can come from identification with and sharing in the national interest. This sharing in the national interest may be enjoyed without men being driven to glorify a super-being whose claim is sacrifice, whose usual ultimate instrument is force, and whose chief impact upon its own members is external and impersonal. The point may be made negatively by noting the relative difficulty in this country (as against England and parts of Europe) of associating the basic emotional elements of local attachment—the particular sights and sounds and smells so dear to the poet—with a devotion to political institutions and to sacrifice in furtherance of national policies, whether achieved by means of propaganda or by free and unconscious linkage on the part of individuals.

This peculiar conception of the American self is a product of a long-lived individualism, of local community, of the open horizons associated with the frontier, of the vast range in place and in ways of living of the American adventure. Such pluralistic diversity renders old-world concepts of national interest, with their stress upon power politics and balance of power, meaningless and inapplicable to the American situation.

Admittedly the American concept is more imprecise than these, and it therefore necessitates continuous redefinition and re-compounding. This fact, when combined with the inherent unpredictabilities of our political-governmental system, especially as it relates to foreign affairs, creates difficulties for our own and for foreign statesmen, as well as for the analyst who looks for patterns and formulas. Yet, in the modern world of conscious, awakened and aspiring peoples it has one great potential advantage: the tying of national interest to a fluid way of life. True, it may result in exclusive selfishness from an endeavor to preserve the privileges of that life, products of a combination of favorable circumstances and creative energies. But it offers some hope that America's root concern, its ultimate concept of the national interest, may be the spreading and sharing, with due adaptation and without intolerance, of its societal blessings. We may thereby avoid a narrow and resented search for the magnificence of imperial power, always at last a snare, a delusion, and a pointless sacrifice of persons.

In any event, this American idea, which provides a basis for avoiding a naive utopianism unrelated to the particularities of interest and attachment and a power politics whose course is lasting statism on the one hand and tensions beyond peaceful solution on the other, seems to hold superior promise in a world where world conquest and serene isolation are equally delusive aspirations. Thus in the present bi-polar world, the alternatives offered to lesser powers are acceptance of a totalitarian statism or alliance with a coherent yet pluralistic societalism.

III

In the realm of international economic relations, however, it is signally difficult to obtain coherence in national policy without lapsing into statism, and while avoiding the dangers of commitment through irresponsible individual venturings. American governmental responsibility for the defense of the nation's interest without means to control the conditions which shaped its contours was the central problem to which Charles A. Beard addressed himself in his *The Idea of National Interest*. Indeed, the difficulty of achieving a satisfactory solution may have been one of the reasons for his ultimate and peculiar brand of isolationism. He sought, but did not find, a modern equivalent of the earlier Hamiltonian realistic concern with national interest. In Hamilton's day, that interest was to be secured by the protection of American industries, at the time infant, or barely conceived. But the long-term consequence of the Hamiltonian system, combined with the impact of the teachings of Adam Smith and his heirs, has conspired to bring about a purely selfish and isolationist economic individualism internally, and support of a free trade competitive individualism externally, as the development of the Open Door policy attested. In combination, the two created the bases of material prosperity, promoted a release of American energies in enterprise, and provided an extraordinary industrial (as well as agricultural) foundation for American world power.

But the accompanying evils created Beard's prime problem, still far from solved. It was necessary to find an equivalent for Hamiltonianism in the realm of exports, as against imports. Such an accomplishment required governmental interference in a field where the tradition of national interest was one of free enterprising, by individual or corporation, regardless of state considerations. Earlier, such activity had profited the nation. But under the new circumstances, as Beard perceived, some exports might not do so, since they could radically change the power relations of other nations to the United States, as well as kill American foreign markets for consumer goods. Thereby they would both decrease our own internal consumption and lessen the volume of employment. In general terms, Beard's solution was a moral equivalent to Hamiltonianism in the export field. Its essence was to be a governmentally-directed and even governmentally-planned system of exporting goods and capital, carefully devised to protect economic welfare at home. Simultaneously, it was designed to encourage, discourage, and direct, insofar as the United States was able, the economic development of other countries to the extent that they depended on us for capital, for consumer goods, or for markets. The object was to further our own national interest, conceived as stable and secure power.

That teaching, again, was a radical revamping, tailored to suit the conditions of the modern world, of Fichte's doctrine of *The Closed Trade State*. Fichte had recognized the difficulty of promoting the material and cultural well-being of a people when the productive and distributive bases of their economy were subject to random and unpredictable calculations. Aware of these uncertainties, which were increased by the whims of traders and enterprisers and by the actions and reactions of foreign citizens and governments, Fichte had argued the

need for a completely enclosed system of national economic life under state control. The benefits of trade must be exchanged for the blessings of planning, stability, and security. The objective of his design was long-term individual welfare even more than national power. Economic isolationism was the one sure means to prosperity and peace, and so to the real conditions for the development of persons. His was a system of avoiding shocks by minimizing variables.

Such a project, though it would have involved some immediate self-sacrifice, might conceivably have been practicable at the dawn of industrialism; while gains in social justice and in avoidance of mass misery might well have compensated for losses of wealth or of power. Even so, unless the scheme had become the common policy of nations, the one adopting it would in all probability have suffered from insecurity by generating inadequate power, in the sense of potentially available force, as compared to other nations. When Beard wrote, in any event, industrialism was well developed, world trade a long-standing fact. His search therefore aspired to a nationally controlled trade in a world of international economic relations. Dependence on others for various materials, as well as some dependence on foreign markets, made an absolute economic isolationism undesirable, if not impossible. Thus national calculations aimed at adjusting variations in the economic conditions and policies of other peoples became an inevitable factor in policy. The essence of such policy was predictive planning of foreign trade and investment for the protection and furtherance of national economic and political power. It was the latter that was proclaimed as the national interest, defined as exclusive and over-riding, but also by its very statement not truly isolationist.

Beard's formulation of the problem showed a profound insight. Actually the inter-war years revealed a radical contradiction. Economists and economic conferences professedly sought decreased national restrictions on multilateral trade. But tariffs and other forms of state interference with free international enterprise continuously increased. The free trade ideal, to be achieved by the mere abdication of governments in that sphere, was an irrelevance and an impossibility in a world organized under national sovereignties, however interdependent. It was doubly so, given the general development of state social welfare policies and the restoration (and exaggeration) of the primacy of the political. National interests, not less than international interest, did dictate planning and control, under the auspices of major collective units of international economic relations. It was impossible politically to leave their protection and advancement to free, yet national and politically-minded, legal persons, on the supposition of an unaided hidden hand and the doctrine of comparative advantage.

Nevertheless, Beard's solution was a hazardous one from the viewpoint of internal institutions. As subsequent events increasingly proved, it was an impractical solution. For America had to promote its interest in a world where it possessed leadership and the obligations of leadership. Yet it had to compete with a vastly different, and highly aggressive, ideology under conditions where

its professed policy, as implemented in practice, became an article for export, and not for home consumption only.

As a Republican devoted to the early American conviction of the importance of statesmanship and the centrality of statecraft, Beard was in no sense alarmed at the necessity, implicit in his doctrine, of a large area of control over the direction of enterprise, where such enterprise might affect the national destiny. Certainly he was not to be numbered amongst those members of the party who defend as primary the right to absence of governmental intervention in their quest for profit and power. He had a profound sense of the American ethical tradition, as he had a yet more profound American national pride. These rendered the aspirations of acquisitiveness secondary and subordinate. Yet he did not squarely confront the statist implications of the course which he advocated. Rather, he accepted, too readily, the view that political and governmental control or limitation of selfish interests would give proper primacy to the national interest (defined as national power) without destroying that liberty of personal and community life which he likewise held dear.

IV

Unfortunately, however, prevalent definitions of national interest, though they combine the insights of Beard and Hans Morgenthau, are in their realism less than realistic. The search for power, and for escape from the delusions of moralizers who believe that the enunciation of fine universal principles is enough, is an insufficient basis for foreign policy in the contemporary world. No matter what the particularities of peoples, there is a shared desire for economic betterment, just as there is a shared aspiration towards increased opportunities for persons to develop and fulfill themselves, however great is the current willingness to forego, or the current incapacity to enjoy, Western freedom. The practicable alternative means to such material betterment are freedom within the constitutional social welfare state or planned industrial development under dictatorship inspired by communist ideology. For better or worse, the United States and Russia are the respective symbols, and the effective leaders and sources, of these ways of social organization; as they are the alternate roads to achievement of the desired objective. Under such circumstances, the consequence of realistic national interest is failure abroad; while at home it leads to the ultimate enthronement of the organic nation-state, with statism as its present-day corollary.

Yet the supreme difficulty Beard confronted, the impossibility of adequate national statesmanship for America as a world power under conditions of private judgment and action in the international economic realm, is not met by noting the inadequacies of his own solution or the related, and greater, inadequacies of a more narrowly political and statist realism. Nor is a neatly compacted answer available. It may be in order, however, to suggest the context for an answer, and thereby to help direct attention to the need for further enquiry and for institutional innovation and development.

The major new perspective on international relations and foreign policy dur-

ing the last twenty years—a perspective which Beard himself helped to create—is the recognition of the essential unity or wholeness of politics. Foreign affairs have ceased to be exclusively or dominantly a matter of formal political diplomacy, as they have ceased to be shrouded from the eyes of the vulgar. Strictly speaking, there are no longer foreign affairs, wrote Salvador de Madariaga in a discerning tract of 1937, there are only “world affairs.”* For the relations between nations have become a central concern, and a dominating condition, in men’s planning of their lives and the conduct of their business. Again, this development was a necessary consequence of modern intercommunication and of contemporary technology. It was pushed farther by the conflicts of ideology of the period, and the aspirations they betokened. It has been accelerated by wars and threats of wars; though the recent atom and hydrogen bombs have created an over-emphasis on international relations as the first, and often unique, criterion of a nation’s conduct of life.

The consequence of this trend has been an unfortunate drive, of which this country now feels the full impact, towards nation-statism: constitutional democracy tends to abandon its own vision, and to become a totalitarianism without dictatorship. It does so, moreover, under conditions where the survival and minimal security of citizens, of cities, of the earth and what men have created thereon, is the over-riding consideration. Thus other nations, rather than pests or human waste of resources, comprise the immediate danger. Having moved from a condition where others were external and often unimportant, we have gone to the opposite extreme, where involvement with others and the hostile policies of others become the highest, and highly resented, determinant of our own doings and way of life. In some sense, indeed, the extremes meet: foreign affairs as national policy divorced from daily life, and foreign affairs as the essence of daily life, alike tend towards a statist conception of national interest, and a power realism unrelated to moral considerations and to a genuine doctrine of a nation’s international interest. But in the United States, unlike Europe, owing to the chance of geography and the need and opportunity for internal development, the involvement of citizens through foreign policy was formerly casual and occasional: in the main, the concept of national interest was internal and societal, and demands of the state through government rare. Today, on the other hand, such involvement is continuous, nerve-racking, and destructive of the societal nation. The American enterprise is forced, despite resistance and resentment, towards the integral unity of the nation-state under conditions where war is total, and the outbreak of hostilities is always just around the corner.

Nevertheless, the conception of policy and politics, international and national, as one whole of interdependent parts offers a theoretical framework whereby to escape extremisms which lead to glorification of power, governmental power politics, and the imposition of the myth of the nation-state in the name of realism. Conceptualized broadly, it promises a basis for preserving and refining the essential concept of societal nationality to fit modern conditions,

* *Theory and Practice in International Relations* (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 105.

with the state as the instrumentality, an approach bedded in the American tradition. Additionally it offers an operational technique for furthering American interests and ideas as world power consonantly with that tradition, with the wider Western and Christian tradition, and with the over-riding criterion of universal ethical principle. At the same time it provides grounds for the avoidance of utopian doctrines of absolute and, of necessity, content-less moralities. Such doctrines offer no substitute for policy, yet create the delusion that they are themselves by mere enunciation adequate policy. Hence they beget the reaction to hard-boiled realism, which we have shown to be contemporaneously unrealistic.

V

Clues to the philosophical principles which insist that the state is purely instrumental, yet inevitably positive and concerned with the protection and preservation of social welfare in its whole unified range of activities, are not hard to discover within the course of American democratic thought. The individualism which leads to release and effective utilization of men's energies and the institutional pluralism which is so vital a core of American life are hymned in the poetry and prose of Walt Whitman, who intuits their ethical laws and their grounding in native mores, as in the folkways later dear to Sumner. Their philosophical underpinning is to be found in Peirce's and in James' Pragmatism, as these are developed by John Dewey, whose Instrumentalism insists on the diverse democratic public as the ultimate source, and the proper beneficiary, of the nation's interest. Long before these men, however, Tocqueville, in what remains the greatest analysis of the American way of life, stressed its fundamentally societal and sociological character, as against the European state.

Nevertheless, these emphases do not provide adequate grounds for compounding in proper relation the social, political, and governmental, which must be done if public authority is to properly serve the nation's total, and internationally-oriented, interest, as formulated by and for the going American social order. Here the clues, in philosophy and political philosophy, are to be found especially in the teachings of three men: Josiah Royce and, among contemporaries, W. Y. Elliott and Robert MacIver. The first provided an Idealism related to the pluralism and energy of American life, in his doctrine of loyalties which, expanded, permitted a political expression of the people and a statesmanship consequent thereon, yet which avoided, by reason of the over-riding and unifying doctrine of loyalty to loyalty, at once the compromises of narrow expediency and the threats of monistic statism. For that doctrine transcended, yet embraced, the purely *political* concept of allegiance and obligation.

Elliott, in attacking the modern teaching of political pluralism as at once socially disruptive and to some degree intellectually irrationalist, was quite aware of the dangers and difficulties of the orthodox doctrine of the sovereign state, and even more aware of the anti-intellectualism and inhumanity of organicist corporative concepts of nation and national destiny. Consequently he tried, under the rubric of co-organism, at once to acknowledge the necessity of final political decision as basis for action and to insist on the reality of vital and

participating groups and interests in the society, whose diverse drives must be included and harmonized as far as possible in the process of statecraft. He desired to avoid a mere tug of forces without clear outcome in policy or practice. He desired not less to avoid the evils of statism, and the sacrifice of men to the myth of the state.

MacIver is an ardent defender of human liberty and foe of totalitarianism. He is aware of the omnipresence and the necessity of government, and of its inevitable wide range of functions if it is to serve our needs today. Yet, aware of the dangers of abuse of power and of indignities done to men in the name of the state, he has defended the state's high claim and function even as he has insisted that it be an instrument of a more ultimate, more vital, though less precisely definable, social whole.

These ideas, germane to American experience, inspired by the more generic traditions of Western thought, and relevant to the great problems which have confronted men in modern industrial society, clearly provide the bases for a hitherto undeveloped synthesis which will reveal the creative leadership in the American conception and practice of man in society. At home, such a synthesis will provide an adequate rationale for the avoidance of statism and narrowed national interest as a basis for foreign policy, will allow the adequate and appropriate synthesis of governmental integrative function with societal national interest; and additionally will further and underwrite the unification of politics internal and external. Such an outlook will result in a national concept of American international interest which can further and protect the American way of life. Likewise, by its appeal to universal principles of human dignity, embodied in its own practice, it can make an appeal to others. Thereby it may promote real American interest by its manifest relation to their needs and aspirations. Specifically, such a theory will provide grounds on which to combat narrowing and ungenerous isolationism and the isolationist imperialism (if we may dare the paradox) which is so ready an outcome of those so-called realistic teachings of national interest designed to avoid the supposed pitfalls of moral principle as a basis of policy. For it is our contention that the extremes which meet, and have a common root, are not, as Professor Morgenthau would persuade us, isolationism and utopianism, but isolationism and that doctrine of national interest rooted in power politics as selfish national calculation and balance of power, of which he is the most forceful contemporary exponent in this country. At the same time, such a theory avoids also the dangers of that moralistic utopianism which Morgenthau and others rightfully condemn. For it stresses the life of American society, still particular though deeply rich and varied. It accepts man's limitation by time and place. It refuses to accept the monistic ultimates which, when they do not glorify the state, yet promise perfectibility of men on earth.

VI

The issue of institutional implementation remains. That issue is how to get expression of, and consideration for, the insights and interests at large in American society at the points of governmental policy-making and specific decision.

Stated otherwise, it is how to get formulated as a coherent whole the societal concept of the nation's generalized interest. No less compelling in importance is how to avoid a purely government-inspired formulation, executive and administrative—a concept put forth as the United States' national interest, and in due course turned into a statist line in the name of unity, effectiveness, prestige, and power.

At the outset, it is important to emphasize here, more than elsewhere, that perpetual vigilance remains the price of liberty. But the pre-condition of vigilance is the clear perception of the tradition, of its vitalizing force, and of its usefulness. Thereby we may combat in ourselves, in our politics, and in our government, that lack of confidence which goes ill together with American power. Americans can escape the degradation consequent on cynical or hard-boiled realism, which is in truth the degradation of democratic dogma, only by perception of their larger heritage and aspiration. They must reject in the name of their living past an attitude of cowed timidity which in its blustering poorly simulates national strength.

At the political level of party politics and the legislative way of life, Americans should therefore reject the dogma and unwisely self-imposed constraint of the touted bipartisan foreign policy, sometimes questioned as to its reality, occasionally indicated on grounds of partisan expediency, but too little challenged as to its ethical goodness. Such a policy is no doubt requisite in times of collective emergency, of clear and present danger to the national whole. It is also appropriate, if defined as intelligent and enlightened abstention from irresponsible partisanship, as loyal support of necessary financial and material means to implement particular policies at the moment in effect, and not in the short run to be changed. The concomitant of such support, however, does not involve abandoning criticism of those policies or unwillingness to suggest and struggle for the adoption of constructive alternatives. Beyond emergency and magnanimous loyalty, bipartisanship becomes a failure to transmit and transform into dynamically fluctuating policy the major elements which collectively constitute the societal national interest; and so it is abdication of a major brokerage function of the party system. For, whatever the ceremonials of formal partisan voting, the total processes of legislation and of executive-legislative relations are not such as to have as their normal end-products laws or policies which represent a strict majority view and majoritarian attitude, with the minority utterly at loggerheads, excluded from consideration, and outragedly rejecting *in toto* the actual decisions made. Fortunately, American constitutionalism goes deeper than formal checks and balances, judicial review, or guaranteed rights. To abandon party planks, party alignments, and party debate in the realm of foreign affairs is in truth to lose the advantage of dynamic and organic continuity in policy, to achieve at best a static and uncreative unity, to forego the confidence which comes from vital debate, and to sacrifice the enlightened national feeling to what is at root a statist line. For the vital center is only vital when it is emergent from the interplay of diverse interests which voluntarily, and perhaps unconsciously, share an over-riding common

concern. Imposed as political duty, and by the eschewing of free debate, that center is in fact devitalized, as it is in its consequences deleterious. Moreover, on the thesis here proclaimed that foreign and domestic policy are facets of one whole, partisanship in the one and bipartisanship in the other constitute on their face a ludicrous position, impossible to maintain for long. If it could be maintained, moreover, it could be executed only at the price of a pointless and harmful incoherence in total policy.

Bipartisanship constitutes in essence an internal appeasement which, in its lack of courage and conviction, can be more harmful than external appeasement. It does so whether it involves the following of administration policies by the minority party or that curious developing brand of "me too-ism" on the part of the majority, of the executive, or of the relevant administrative departments under the executive, evidenced in the endorsing and proclaiming of allegiance to opposition doctrines of national interest and preachments of policy. In the realm of policy, moreover, it begets an extreme oscillation between appeasement and aggressiveness in our dealings with other nations. Nor is this result accidental. For bipartisanship, which developed out of crisis and constitutes a superb democratic equivalent to emergency power and to dictatorship, has encouraged emergency thinking and the conviction of insecurity, and has helped to make them a constant in our lives. In consequence it has contributed to the prolongation of emergency and to the failure to diminish international tensions. For its artificial consensus has, in the name of realism and loyalty, prevented that healthful enquiry and that ability to dissent without becoming suspect.

Bipartisanship helps to create and to strengthen stereotypes which inhibit thought and breed violent emotion. Inevitably it becomes the handmaid of a dogma of utopian catastrophism. Such catastrophism is inimical to effective policy. Moreover, as a substitute for the proper conduct of diplomacy, it is as unsatisfactory as the utopianism of pure and practically undefiled moral aspiration. A return to the normalcy of partisanship in all spheres of politics is a basic need, then, for the effective pursuit of America's international interest. Such a return might also decrease the excessive compensatory strafing over domestic policy and so, by moderation, aid the creation of a real vital center.

At the level of execution and administration, where functional representation and group consultation so peculiarly belong, institutional innovation is especially requisite to avoid the statist concept of national interest. The objective must be to render viable and to harmonize, in a coherent and dynamic pattern of policy, the diverse elements which in their sum comprise the national interest of the American social order. Roughly, what is needed is an equivalent to Calhoun's doctrine of the concurrent majority, divorced from the sectional basis and the narrowed concept of interests of that suggestive teaching. Essentially, the task is to bring into the formulation and execution of day-by-day policy, with due regard to security considerations, the economic, social, and cultural interests first clearly seen as parts of our political order by A. F. Bentley. In this context certain existing organizations which function in our domestic af-

fairs, largely as a result of our present world position and our defense activities, may be relevant by loose, but suggestive, analogy. As an example, local draft boards operating our selective service system might be cited. Local agencies not composed of experts, these bodies of volunteers express the sense and judgment of their communities in the light of determined national needs and under general instructions and specific restraints. Different again, but also loosely relevant, are the War Labor Boards, national and regional, of the Second World War, and the recent Wage Stabilization Boards, with their tri-partite memberships. These brought into decision-making and policy discussion representatives of the two interests, labor and industry, most specifically affected, and of the public-at-large.

Elsewhere, but directly related to foreign policy, the State Department has a special section whose function it is to encourage and inform private organizations devoted to the better understanding of UNESCO and of the American role therein. Here, indeed, the relationship is different, and in form one-way, while the function itself is promotional and informational, not policy-making or administrative. Yet in practice such interchange tends to become one of mutual influence. Even where the intent may be to popularize official attitudes, the outcome is to aid expression of citizen views and to further the conscious spread of concepts of the international interest of the national society. Again, while the widespread practice of using private experts as consultants on policy is very different in intention and impact from functional participation in administration, it tends towards similar consequences. The same applies to the use of qualified private persons on the Voice of America program. In truth, we already possess, however rudimentary in form and inadequate in quantity, some of the practices and operational techniques most suited to attain the dominance of a societal, rather than a statist, concept of national interest.

The remaining problems are, therefore, to broaden and systematize consultation and participation and to create a recognized and institutionalized share in responsibility on the part of the citizen and his representatives. Curiously enough, a return to partisanship in our own international politics and a systematic development of consultation and participation in the development and execution of policy by those affected can actually aid the solution of one set of real problems. Thus some moderates in the name of effective diplomacy seek a return to the realism of the old European balance of power system, even though they are in no way enamored of the doctrine of amoral national interest. These critics have seen a connection between a moralizing utopianism which has often degenerated in practice into a "holier than thou" attitude on the part of America, and the false democratization of politics through the appeal and organization of mass media. Such media, dependent on lowest common denominator appeals, enthrone the simplest moralities and indignations. And in the sphere of foreign relations they induce pressure on diplomats and diplomatic conferences, to the frequent detriment of the nation's international interest.

The indictment is largely warranted; and it is psychologically easy, especially for those who have a decent awareness of history, to contrast the present with

the past. By a simple, yet logically not necessary association, they relate secret diplomacy by trained diplomats, the balance of power system, and fairly stable peace achieved through unexciting adjustments made without publicity, and consequently without hurt prestige and lost face. They contrast such a climate of action with the present-day conduct of international relations, whether between individual nations or in the collective conferences of the UN, under klieg lights; and the constant tension, indignation, crisis, and conflict which are consequent on a necessity to be absolutely right. Too readily forgotten is the fact that, though the techniques of an earlier diplomacy had much to commend them, the search for open covenants rested precisely on the ground that commitments made in secret by an élite affected the fortunes and the future of citizens whose felt interests as the nation were unconsulted. The system was in truth conducive to the political idea of national interest, and is peculiarly antithetical to the societal concept of international interest, the new and slowly evolved American contribution by example to a better world order. What is more, as politics became democratized, while policy remained untouched by the peoples' hands, there developed a dichotomy between internal and international affairs. For the sake both of internal and international well-being, it is today vital to bring about a new integration, whereby policy becomes one whole.

VII

A return to times past is no solution. The problem is to determine the areas, and define the techniques, for the conduct of calm and unobserved diplomacy by responsible statesmen. In this setting the primary area for open debate and for the general formation and expression of public opinion is the sphere of principle and overall policy. The dominant mass opinion, it should be noted, is not an expression of a societal national interest, but tends towards a power and statist line, at least under conditions of bi-partisan policy. The result is a democratic totalitarian dogma rather than a genuine vital center. Yet the danger involved in secrecy, in absence of publicity, is precisely a statist concept of national interest made and defined by the élites responsible for the day-by-day conduct of affairs. Whether despite or because of intelligent understanding of other peoples, and skill in dealing with them, such élites, unless properly checked, may develop a professional interest which they identify with the national interest on the basis of their rectitude and expertness in its service. It is at this very point that the idea of relating the layman to the processes of policy administration is so significant. For in that role he becomes an informed critic of the unpublicized conduct of detailed negotiations and an insurance against abuse or confusion of different concepts of interest. Simultaneously, he becomes a broker between government and public, and a source of enlightenment which can help diminish the facile dogmas induced and sustained by mass media. Finally the alert layman aids the politician in bridging the gap and diminishing the tension between misguided yet—to the political leader—imperative mass demands and responses and the difficult requirements of our international interest.

Looking at its main contours, American leadership from Bretton Woods to the Korean crisis has at root embodied a recognition that the interests of these United States are essentially international or corporate, not exclusive and nationalistic. It has revealed a consonance between the American antistatist tradition of freedom and statesmanship on behalf of the societal nation, and the aspirations of other peoples to overcome want and to gain political security as conditions for the release of human energies and the enjoyment of human culture. It has demonstrated that today a realistic concept of national interest must rest upon a genuine morality, in theory and practice, of respect for the finite particularity of peoples. It has perceived that peoples share a common humanity. In a transitional stage from old nationalism to new world order, they strive uncertainly, tentatively, adaptively, and yet determinedly, to create institutions and mechanisms for the furtherance within diversity of that humanity. It has proclaimed, however uncertainly, that in such a world the United States, creator of new patterns for the more effective realization of ancient human insights, and possessor of power for leadership, must interpret its national interest as international interest, in a situation where practical success and moral obligation are consonant and interdependent.

This article is dedicated to the more effective pursuit of such objectives. Whether it is better to abandon the concept of national interest because of its unfortunate connotations of exclusiveness, and its availability as a rationalization to forces of timidity which look backwards and oppose interest to morality; or whether it is possible to win the symbol and transform its connotations is, perhaps, uncertain. To believe, however, that, as a strategy, it is desirable to identify the term "national interest," as its leading proponents tend to do, with a search for power and security divorced from moral considerations is, we submit, an unacceptable premise for an enlightened, successful American policy. To reverse this trend, and to orient the concept of national interest toward a genuine morality seems, indeed, a matter of transcendent importance. American national interest must be re-defined as its international interest, under which are compounded the particular and the universal, power and ethics, the realism of idealism. For today security and sharing are interdependent, and the freedom and fulfillment of persons, the central promise of industrial civilization, depends on both.

PARTY PREFERENCE AND ATTITUDES ON POLITICAL ISSUES: 1948-1951

WARREN E. MILLER
University of Michigan

The widespread interest in understanding the political behavior of the American electorate has been served by a number of different methodological approaches. One of the most widely known and used is the analysis of *aggregate voting statistics* along the lines indicated by the work of Louis Bean. Major problems susceptible to study through aggregate behavioral measures include those related to the consequences of urbanization, population migration, drastic economic crisis or long-term change, or important international developments. Trends in voting behavior and regional differences in voting fall within this type of analysis, with census tract information and political sub-division voting statistics providing much of the relevant data for investigation.

A different approach to the study of political behavior is provided by the analysis of *data on individuals*, information pertaining to the behavior of identifiable persons. This approach allows flexibility in the ultimate units of analysis. The use of data on individuals not only provides such gross information as the percentages of people forming large groups (Democrats and Republicans, well-informed and poorly-informed) in the population, but it also provides information about various characteristics of these groups within the population. And the criteria by which social or political groups are defined need not be restricted to political boundaries. Data are also available pertaining to intra-group changes which may cancel out or otherwise go unnoticed if the level of analysis is confined to the study of aggregate statistics. Inasmuch as our interest is in understanding (as well as predicting) political behavior, these more subtle shifts are the source of important information about individuals and individual differences.

The development of probability sampling and the refinement and application of sensitive interviewing techniques make it possible to gather data on individuals from which valid generalizations may be made for entire populations or sub-groups within populations. The richness of data about individual attitudes and personal characteristics is enhanced by our ability to employ complex analysis designs which allow us to exercise necessary controls in our search for crucial interrelationships.

Much of the better known work in this area has been concerned with sociological or, more narrowly, personal-social data. A great many characteristics such as age, income, education, religious affiliation, occupation, information level, and population class have been studied as variables related to various aspects of political attitude and behavior.

One of the most forceful studies of sociological factors and their relationship to political participation and party preference has been published as *The People's Choice*. The key to the orientation of this study (actually two

studies, since the second edition of the book reports on both the Erie County study of 1940 and a national sample study of 1944) is provided by the authors' statement that "Social characteristics determine political preference."¹ A careful study of the Erie County research and a recent analysis of similar data gathered by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center suggest, however, that, although social characteristics were used to explain party preference in Erie County, the generalized usefulness of such explanation is limited.² Manipulation of sociological materials has not produced successful predictions of whether or not individuals will vote. Moreover, such techniques for prediction as were devised by the directors of the Erie County study failed in the SRC study to predict the party preference of some 40 per cent of those respondents who did vote.³

The discussion which follows concerns a study which shifts the focus from sociological to social-psychological variables. The use of sociological variables in the study of political behavior must not only be refined, but it must be complemented by the use of some of the other variables which can be expected to play a role in the development of politically relevant attitudes and behavior. Activity such as voting must eventually be studied in the fullest context of all relevant sociological and psychological factors. We shall here be concerned with but one more aspect of this total context: some relationships between attitudes on political issues and expressions of preference for political parties.⁴

Two national surveys conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center provided the data which we shall examine. The first of these was conducted in two parts; the first part preceded the national elections of 1948, and the second part followed immediately after the elections with a re-interview of the original respondents.⁵ The second study was a study of national political and economic issues, conducted in June, 1951.⁶ Both studies contained requisite information in two areas: a) past and current political party preference of the respondents, and b) respondents' attitudes on policies of the national government.

I

The data concerning political preference in these two studies provided two indicators of party preference. In classifying people as party preferers, each

¹ P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1949), p. 27.

² Morris Janowitz and Warren E. Miller, "The Index of Political Predisposition in the 1948 Election," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 710-27 (Nov., 1952).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The data used here are from the series of studies conducted by the Public Affairs Program of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. For a somewhat different treatment of some of the same data, see George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 601-23 (Winter, 1951-52).

⁵ A. Campbell and R. L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor, 1952).

⁶ Survey Research Center, "Public Reactions to American Foreign Policy" (July, 1951).

individual was described in terms of both a past and current party preference. Consequently, instead of speaking of Democrats or Republicans or Independents or Non-voters (the four basic categories of preference with which we shall be concerned), we shall, throughout the first part of this discussion, refer to Democrat-Republicans (people who were Democratic in 1948 but Republican in 1951) or Non-voting Independents (Non-voters in 1948 who in 1951 still did not express a definite major party preference) or to the 14 other similar groups.⁷ Information provided by the 1951 attitude study defined the 16 groups in terms of their responses to two questions: 1) "In the last presidential election about half the people voted and half did not. Did you vote?" (If yes) "For whom did you vote?" 2) "If a presidential election was held today, do you think you would vote Democratic, Republican or for some other party?" The answers to question 1 were grouped to form four categories of people: a) those who had voted Democratic, b) those who had voted Republican, c) those who had voted for a minority party, and d) those who had not voted. The answers to question 2 were also grouped to form four categories: the Democratic, Republican, and Independent (plus a few minor party) preferers and the potential Non-voters. Each respondent was thus classified twice, and his party preference was defined as a combination of these classifications, thus producing Republican-Democrats, Non-voting-Independents, Democrat-Democrats, etc. (In each instance, the first of the labels refers to the respondent's 1948 vote, the second refers to his party preference in June, 1951.)

A central problem of the research was to trace the correspondence between party preference and political attitudes. Before doing this, however, it was necessary to develop a summarizing measure of political attitudes. The attitudes to be used were chosen from the same 1951 study of American foreign policy. In that study the following six questions were asked:

1. "In general are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the United States has been acting towards other countries?"
2. "Do you think our troubles with other countries are mainly our own fault or not?"
3. "Do you think the people running our affairs with other countries have done a pretty good job or do you think that some other people could have done better?"
4. "Do you think the United States should send troops to help protect Europe against Communism?"
5. "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea last summer or should we have stayed out?"
6. "In the disagreements between President Truman and General MacArthur about how to carry on the war in Korea, who do you think was most nearly right?"

The assumption in ordering attitudes on these items was that responses to this battery or any similar battery of questions about national policies would provide an "index of support for the national administration." This index would be a device by which groups of individuals could be ordered; it would be

⁷ For the second study which we shall discuss (see below), the time of the "past" and "current" party preferences is changed to "usual voting behavior" and "vote in 1948," and the same two-fold description of preference is used.

TABLE I
PARTY PREFERENCE GROUPS ORDERED BY INDEX OF SUPPORT FOR
ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

	1948 Vote	1951 Preference	Index of Support for the Administration $\left(\frac{\text{Number of Pro Responses}}{\text{Number of Pro} + \text{Con Responses}} \right)$
No — D			69
D — D			66
R — D*			66*
D — I			60
D — No			56
No — No			55
I — No*			51*
R — No*			51*
No — I			50
I — I*			44*
R — I			43
D — R			40
I — R*			36*
R — R			35
No — R			34
I — D*			22*

* Groups with a very small number of members, creating N's of less than 15 and providing presumptively unreliable indications of group attitudes.

based on the relative amount of support or opposition which members of each group indicated for each separate policy item.³ An index of support for the

³ Three means of determining "relative support for the national administration" were tried: 1) the absolute difference between the percentage of the group membership which indicated support for the policy and the percentage of the group membership which indicated opposition, 2) an average rank ordering of the groups derived from combining the rank order of the groups in terms of the percentage supporting an issue within each group

national administration was constructed by summing the responses for each group of party affiliates on all six national policy issues. The percentage of pro-administration support in each group was then computed by dividing the sum of the pro-administration responses on the six issues by the sum of both pro and con responses.

Each group of party preferrers thus received a score based on its attitudinal responses in support of the administration policies and expressed as a per cent of the total number of its attitudinal responses. Following the logic dictated by this concern with only the relationship between the attitudinal commitments and party preference, the "Don't Know" or "Not Ascertained" responses (the responses involving no reported attitudinal commitment) were not used in this scoring procedure.

Table I indicates the first findings when the 16 party preference groups were ordered on the continuum of administration support with respect to the six policy issues enumerated above.

The symmetrical pattern produced by this ordering was one of the most interesting features of the rank order. Also of interest was the apparent demonstration of the efficacy of grouping individuals by party preference in order to bring together people who are homogeneous with respect to political attitudes.

The ordering of the groups of party preferrers by responses to the attitudinal items provided support for one of our most crucial hypotheses. The assumption was made that combining responses to six issues on national policy (issues on which a pro-administration and anti-administration point of view could apparently be distinguished) would provide a pro- to anti-administration continuum. The ordering of groups of party preferrers was interpreted as evidence of a positive relationship between attitudinal commitment and political behavior. To be sure, the precise nature of the relationship was at this point no clearer than was the meaning of the symmetrical array. However, the symmetry of the array reflected a particular structure of types of party preference; and the attitude scores of the groups composing the array suggested that the structure was related to political ideology or attitude structures.

From this it may be deduced that expressions of attitudes on issues of national governmental policy should possibly be considered not merely as attitudinal expressions *per se*, but also as politically partisan acts. If some common factor of political significance had not existed in the six items used in the test, the relationship between party preference and attitude as illustrated by the symmetrical array of party preferrers would not have existed.⁹

with the inverse rank of the groups in terms of the percentage of each group opposing an issue, and 3) the ratio of the number of group supporters to the total number of the group who took a stand on the issue (which could also be expressed as the ratio of the percentage who supported the issue to the total percentage who took a stand on the issue). Inasmuch as we were concerned only with those members in each defined group of party preference who actually expressed attitudes on the relevant policy items, method 3 was used throughout.

⁹ The possibility that the particular combination of the six available issues was accidentally responsible for the neatness of the array was examined. Various combinations of

The array positions of these groups of party preferrers could not be readily explained by the available data relating to the personal-social characteristics of individuals. That is, the distributions of age, income, education, occupation, level of interest, information level, religious preference and place of residence (described by five categories on a rural-urban continuum) did not vary among the groups in the manner which would be necessary for those characteristics to be the factors underlying the array. The symmetry of the array cannot be accounted for by any of the above variables.

A possible partial exception to this generalization was found in the age distribution of the ND and NR groups. In these groups, a relatively large number of members were in the 21-24 age group. These were undoubtedly mostly young citizens who could not vote in 1948, but who were taking an active interest in politics in 1951. The young people did not, however, provide the attitudinal responses which placed the entire ND and NR groups in the extreme positions. As a matter of fact, the elimination of the 21-24 age group from the ND and NR groups in the 1951 study resulted in increasing the uniqueness of the attitudinal positions of the remaining ND's and NR's. With the young respondents removed, the ND score rose from 69 to 71, and the NR score correspondingly dropped from 34 to 32 (see Table I).

A review of the political character of some of the 16 groups suggested, however, that the array provides a basis for considering some of the possible relationships between attitude formation and party preference. Two major hypotheses about the relationship between party identification and attitudes on foreign policy have been outlined elsewhere by Belknap and Campbell.¹⁰ Inasmuch as party identification was determined by Belknap and Campbell by statements of party preference in response to question 2 in the 1951 attitude study, above, these hypotheses are relevant to the data under examination. One of the hypotheses holds that "the party serves . . . as a means of instrumenting a point of view regarding foreign policy which [has been] arrived at as a result of a variety of internal needs and external influences (including party activities)." The other proposes that "the party serves . . . as a reference point to which [people] look, consciously or otherwise, for [a guide to] their [own] position on foreign policy questions."¹¹

In accord with the first hypothesis, people who currently approve the various actions of the United States in international affairs will express this approval

three or more issues were tested and all of them produced about the same distribution of groups. Some variations were observed in the central portion of the distribution, but it could be assumed that such variance was a product of the decreased reliability which resulted from decreasing the number of issues included in the index. The consistency with which any group of three or more issues produced the same array of political groups can, in fact, be exploited to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach to the analysis of both intra- and inter-political party shifts.

¹⁰ Cited above, n. 4.

¹¹ Belknap and Campbell give major attention to the second of these hypotheses. Their discussion proceeds from the same general body of data which is under consideration here, i.e., data from the Survey Research Center, June, 1951 survey of the adult population.

of policy by support of the administration and of the Democratic party; those who oppose American foreign policy will indicate their opposition by active support of a party which also expresses opposition to the same policy, in many instances the Republican party. Conversely, the second hypothesis suggests that once a person has become a Democrat, whether through psychological identification or as a formal member or informal supporter, he will subsequently adopt the Democratic position on political issues, including issues involving foreign policy. The supporter of the Republican party will, in turn, acquire attitudes expressing opposition to the foreign policy program of the Democratic party and administration.

It is to be expected that neither of these hypotheses can serve alone as an adequate explanation of the relationship between attitude and party preference. Rather, we can expect that various types of political change, in attitude or party preference, will be variously related to one or the other of these major theses about political activity.

For example, the hypothesis that support of a party is dependent upon the congruence of attitudes of the supporter and policies of the party may be suggested as an explanation for the array positions of the DR and RD groups of party preferers. To apply the hypothesis, the nature of the change in party preference among the members of these two groups must be deduced, in part, from information not provided by the June, 1951 survey. Of major importance is the fact that since 1948 there has been a change in the leadership of the Republican party. There has also been a diminution of the bi-partisan character of American foreign policy and an accentuation of party differences on foreign policy. Thus, it may be that some of those Democratic voters of 1948 who were not in favor of the policy acts undertaken with bi-partisan support, and some of those Republicans of 1948 who *were* strong supporters of those same policy actions have since been faced with a change in the political stage upon which they must play. The Democratic voters have been presented with an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with foreign policy, and they now prefer the Republican party because a leading faction of that party promises policy more in line with their own long-standing attitudes. The Republican voters, in turn, have been forced to switch to the Democratic party to establish allegiance, once more, with a party whose foreign policy is acceptable to them.

The data do not provide direct verification that this explanation does, in fact, apply to a majority of the members of the DR and RD groups. It could be argued, for example, that a random distribution of the 1948 voters could be expected to produce as many party changers as non-changing regulars (assuming that all 1948 Democrats and Republicans chose, at random, to prefer either the Democratic or Republican party in 1951). Some of the party changers who were isolated in this study may have been only those people for whom random, unknown factors were relevant to party preference. A much more precise thesis has been advanced which holds that party switchers are politically uninvolved and uninterested.¹² Consequently, they are given to changing party preference

¹² See *The People's Choice*, p. xviii.

rather capriciously. However, both of these explanations of party switching fail to account for the relative positions of the DR's and RD's in the total array. Attitudinally, these groups are almost as extreme as the regular party members, the DD's and RR's. Had the DR's and RD's been relatively neutral in their attitudes on foreign policy, either the "random distribution" thesis or the "uninvolved and uninterested" explanation might have seemed adequate to account for the change in party preference. The clarity of both groups' attitudinal positions suggests, however, that, for a preponderance of these people, party did serve as an instrumentality, a means of expression, for attitudes on foreign policy.

The discovery that the DD's and RR's occupied extreme positions in the array was not unexpected. These two groups can probably be accurately described as composed, by and large, of reliable "party regulars." Individuals whose involvement in politics is minimal might be expected to avoid admitting either having voted for the losing party in the last election or preferring the party currently (at the time of the survey) under severe, even violent criticism. The RR's did not disassociate themselves from the unsuccessful party of 1948, and the DD's did not disassociate themselves from the party suffering attack from many quarters on many issues. We do not know whether the DD's and RR's wavered or shifted between November, 1948 and June, 1951, but after two major political events, the presidential election and the dismissal of MacArthur, member of both groups apparently maintained a consistent party preference.

DD and RR party preferrers were, moreover, quite homogeneous attitudinally and provided strong support for the foreign policies of their respective parties. Also, it should be recalled that foreign policy was not an overt political issue during the 1948 election campaign. Consequently, although we know nothing of these people's party preference prior to 1948, we can assume that choice of party in that year was not necessarily motivated by attitudes on foreign policy issues. As Belknap and Campbell point out, the highly partisan character of foreign policy in 1951 was unmistakable, and, as Table I indicates, the attitudes of the DD and RR members on foreign policy clearly reflect the newly established partisan positions. Thus, it may in turn be suggested that party served as a guide to, or a source of, attitudes on foreign policy for a preponderance of DD's and RR's.

For the groups not yet discussed, we must be less specific in our speculations about their possible relation to the hypotheses. In support of the "party as an instrumentality" hypothesis, perhaps the most that could be concluded about the ND's and NR's would be as follows: A combination of internal and external changes between 1948 and 1951 resulted in making support of a political party appropriate for the expression of newly salient attitudes on political affairs. A newly perceived importance of foreign policy could, of course, produce an enthusiasm and fervor which would be manifested in a high proportion of party-oriented attitudes. Recently acquired attitudes on politically partisan issues may have pushed the members of the ND and NR groups over the "threshold" of political participation. Choosing parties as vehicles for desired participation

could be expected to follow. There are, however, equally valid reasons for assuming that the "party as a source" hypothesis is involved in explaining the ND and NR array positions. In the first place, *operationalizing* party identification by using only voting or voting intention as evidence of identification is unduly restricting. Although there has been but little study of the phenomenon of party identification, it may be assumed that voting is only one of many possible expressions of identification. At this point in the development of political behavior theory, even "avoidable" non-voting should not be interpreted as an absence of party identification. Despite their non-voting of 1948, ND's and NR's may yet be as strongly identified with their parties as are the DD's and RR's. In the second place, no information is available concerning the reasons for the ND and NR non-vote in 1948. Illness, bad weather, inability to meet residence or other legal voting requirements or a host of less common factors may have prevented voting. By intent and desire, the ND's and NR's may have been Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in 1948 who were not able to vote.¹⁸ There is little reason, on the basis of the examined data, to emphasize the greater applicability of either major hypothesis in explaining the ND and NR relationships.

The DI and RI groups may well be people for whom candidates are more important than either attitudes on issues or identification with party. They are predominantly "Independents," in 1951, who professed to base their hypothetical voting behavior on choice among candidates. They do not share the enthusiasm of their fellow party members of 1948 (particularly the DD's and RR's) for the respective party positions on foreign policy. At this point in time they had not wholeheartedly adopted their parties' positions. But, neither did they seem to be searching for a party to express extreme attitudes; the primacy of a candidate in their choosing of a party does not suggest party implementation of an attitudinal position.

The data considered here and in the Belknap and Campbell article are not inclusive enough, however, to rule out the possibility that a still different combination of the two hypotheses can accommodate the somewhat conflicting conclusions which may be drawn from the two discussions. A most obvious gap in the data to which we have referred stems from the absence of information about attitudes related to domestic policies. Although foreign policy attitudes were clearly related to party preference, the relationship may be a function of a third major variable, namely, attitudes on domestic policy. With this possibility in mind, it can be suggested that attitudes toward such issues as taxation, economic controls, communism in government, administrative corruption, or the welfare state may be the factors responsible for changing or solidifying party preference. There is much impressionistic evidence which suggests that such issues are much more immediately relevant to most voters, are much

¹⁸ Although ND and NR scores on support for the administration in 1951 did tend to be more extreme than the scores of the DD's and RR's, the differences were not of a magnitude sufficient to preclude the possibility that sampling error or some other fortuitous factors produced them.

better known through wider personal contact with taxation and controls or through publicity given to communism and corruption, and may thus play the major role in determining party preference.

The absence of data on the June, 1951 respondents' attitudes toward domestic policies and on respondents' evaluations of the relative importance of domestic and foreign policy issues forestalls immediate investigation of this possibility. If, however, domestic policy is, in fact, more important to the American voter than foreign policy, we might conclude as follows: a) Increased relevancy and saliency of domestic policies have, in recent months, resulted in major attitudinal changes. b) Attitudinal changes related to domestic policies have produced marked changes in party preference. c) Changes in party leadership and the international situation have, at the same time, accentuated party differences on foreign policy. d) Following the domestic policy-inspired changes in party preference, attitudes on foreign policy have been acquired by the new party members.

This argument, however, seems much more appropriate as an explanation of the DR and RD switches or the ND and NR activation than as an explanation of the differential attitudinal positions occupied by the total range of party preferring groups. In fact, to infer that the observed ordering of the sixteen groups of party preferrers on attitudes toward foreign affairs was basically an ordering on attitudes toward domestic affairs is to infer a clear-cut relationship between these attitudes which is seldom demonstrable.

In summary, the data examined in this study and in the Belknap and Campbell study strongly suggest that important relationships exist between party preference and attitudes on political issues. The findings from the present study, in particular, accommodate the hypothesis that the party serves as an instrumentality for points of view regarding political issues which have been arrived at as a result of a variety of internal needs and external influences. The data examined here do not provide other than inferential evidence that strength of party preference, or party identification, is directly related to strength or clarity of attitudinal predisposition; moreover, there is basis for only the most general speculation concerning the dependence or independence of party preference on political attitudes. Some portions of the above discussion, and the tabular presentation throughout the study, draw attention to the possible dependence of party identification on political attitudes. Nevertheless, relationships which might be expected to follow from the hypothesis that party serves to guide people in forming political attitudes were also found to exist in the present study. It may be suggested that whatever conflict there is between the two hypotheses and the two interpretations of the data can be resolved in at least two ways: 1) under varying conditions and circumstances, political attitudes and party identification may be of differential importance to people, and 2) different attitudinal areas (such as those relating to domestic policy or to foreign policy) may, at different times, be of differential importance to people. Further exploration of the relation between voting behavior and in-

tention and party identification, and the gathering of more complete information on respondents' political histories are also of paramount importance.

II

At this point a replication of this analysis was essential. Therefore, before attempting to verify some of the more refined meanings which might be attributed to the major findings, the next step involved exploring similar data from a completely different research project, the study of the 1948 election which was mentioned earlier. Again, six questions on national policy matters were utilized to provide the measure of pro- or anti-administration attitude. These questions were:

1. "Do you think rent control should be kept on or should it be dropped?"
2. "Some people think the government ought to do something to control prices and others say that government controls just make matters worse. How do you feel about that?"
3. "Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Act?" (If yes) "What do you think ought to be done about it?"
4. "In general are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the United States has been acting toward other countries?"
5. "Some people think that since the war the United States has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?"
6. "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way our country has been acting toward Russia?"

The questions relevant to party preference were concerned with "usual" voting behavior and voting behavior in 1948. The classification of the November, 1948 respondents was made on the basis of their responses to the two questions: 1) "If you have voted in a presidential election before this one have you usually voted Democratic or Republican?" and, 2) "In this election, about half the people voted and half of them didn't. Did you vote? Whom did you vote for?" The responses to question 1 were grouped to form four categories of people: a) those who usually voted Democratic, b) those who usually voted Republican, c) those who had voted for more than one party or for a minority party and d) those who had not voted before. Since the study was concerned with major party voting behavior, all respondents in category c were described as Independents.

The second phase of the investigation was thus conducted with a completely different sample (although still one representing the adult, non-institutional American population), responding to five different issues (only the question on satisfaction with American foreign policy was asked in both studies), at a time clearly removed from the study first described, 1948 instead of 1951. The same methods were used for constructing the index of support for the administration, and the same general method of defining party preference in terms of both an historically past and a more contemporary expression of political preference was followed. The gross findings are depicted in Table II.

The balanced pattern of pairs of Democratic and Republican preferrers was

TABLE II

Usual Vote	Vote in 1948	Index of Support of the Administration $\left(\frac{\text{Number of Pro Responses}}{\text{Number of Pro} \pm \text{Con Responses}} \right)$
I	I*	74*
No	D	74
D	D	73
R	D	71
D	No	71
No	No	70
I	D	69
I	No	66
I	R	58
R	No	55
D	R*	53*
No	R*	50*
R	R	49
D	I*	40*
R	I*	20*

* Groups with a very small number of members, creating N's of less than 15 and providing presumptively unreliable indications of group attitudes.

again prominent. There were, however, apparent changes from the pattern observed in the first study, including the reversal of order of the RR and NR groups, and the shift in relative position of the ID, IR and DI, RI groups. These shifts and inconsistencies may have been a function of unreliably small numbers within the affected cells in one or the other of the studies.¹⁴

Barring the above-mentioned differences between the two patterns, it was felt that the constancy with which the larger groups maintained their relative positions further supported the major hypothesis. Attitudes on issues of national policy did indeed provide the basis for a general scale of support for the

¹⁴ See notes accompanying Tables I and II on small cell populations.

national administration. In the two different studies there was a marked similarity of ordering among comparably defined groups of party preferrers as they were ordered on the basis of attitudinal commitments. The content of these attitudes could, in each case, be described in terms of supporting or opposing policy promoted by the Democratic administration under President Truman. It could be assumed that the time interval separating the two studies (two and one-half years) was not a causal factor relevant to this stage of the analysis.

Exploration of the meanings which can be attributed to the array of the 1948 party preferrers is most difficult because the attitudes involved both domestic and foreign policy issues. At the same time, the use of both categories of issues

TABLE III

Party Preference Groups	Index of Support for the Administration	
	$\left(\frac{\text{Number of Pro Responses}}{\text{Number of Pro+Con Responses}} \right)$	
No D	70	
D D	69	
R D	68	
I D	66	
I No	63	
D No	62	
No No	61	
D I	60	
I I	57	
I R	54	
R No	53	
No I	50	
R I	43	
D R	42	
R R	41	
No R	35	

demonstrates that domestic as well as foreign policy issues provide attitudinal continua on which groups of party preferers maintain a particular order.¹⁵ This demonstration encourages the assumption that almost any set of issues on national policy (issues on which a pro-administration and anti-administration point of view can be distinguished) can provide a pro- to anti-administration attitude continuum. The major implication of this is that the meaning of the arrays is possibly much more general than our earlier discussion of attitude content suggested. The analysis and replication may be said to have involved two specific instances of the general case in which a random sample of people ordered by attitudes toward the national administration exhibited a unique ordering in terms of party preference. In other words, in two completely different surveys people's attitudes toward political issues were similarly related to their preference for political parties.

At this point it was suggested that combining data from the two specific cases would serve the function of providing larger N's for many of those groups whose scores had been described as unreliable because they had varied from the expected pattern. The reliability of specific group measures would be improved, and a "standard" array of the party preferrer groups could be established. The two studies were, therefore, combined in the same manner by which items were combined for each of the separate study analyses.¹⁶ The combination did, in fact, substantially increase the size of all groups except those forming the pairs ID-IR and DI-RI.

The general case, constructed by combining the two specific cases from the 1948 and 1951 data, is illustrated in Table III. The symmetrical distribution of the various groups was, of course, to be expected inasmuch as the similarity of patterns in the separate studies provided the justification for the formation of the above combined distribution.

The assumption that deviations from the completely balanced or symmetrical array were the consequences of unreliable data seemed to be affirmed. The only deviations in the aggregate pattern were provided by the two pairs of groups,

¹⁵ The analysis of various combinations of three issues (instead of six), as described in footnote 9, was also made on the data from the 1948 study. The results were comparable in that any three issues whether they were three domestic, three foreign policy, or a combination of two of one and one of the other, produced similar orderings of party preferrer groups. Again, variations of rank ordering were observed in the middle-range groups—but it could be assumed that such variance was a product of decreased reliability which resulted from decreasing the number of issues included in the index.

¹⁶ For example, the DR group from the first study and the DR group from the second study were considered as one group of people. They had in common the experience of shifting from Democratic to Republican preference at some time prior to (or, conceivably, during) an SRC interview. Each member of the group had also responded to six items eliciting attitudes toward national governmental policy. The group had 6N opportunities (where N=group membership) to verbalize these attitudes (and thereby demonstrate political partisanship). The group score was computed as the number of pro divided by the number of pro and con responses. Again the DK and NA responses were not included in the scoring because of our interest in relating attitudes and party preference rather than in relating party preference to the absence of attitudinal commitments.

ID-IR and DI-RI. These groups were not greatly strengthened by combining the data from the two studies, and were each reliably represented in only one set of data.

III

This "standard" or "aggregate" array promises to be useful in many studies of political behavior. Instead of restricting analysis of political change, i.e., shifts in partisan allegiance or in attitudinal commitment, to analysis of that change which takes place immediately before an election, the meaningfulness of change over longer periods of time (specifically, at least over three or four year intervals) can be studied. Changes such as those produced by election campaigns can be related to changes occurring during the between-election years. The relationship between change in attitudes and change in political behavior can be studied with some assurance that order, not happenstance, and psychological structure, not socio-economic factors alone, underlie both attitudinal commitment and political behavior.

As suggested earlier, attention can also be focused on different kinds of change. Twelve of the sixteen groups of party preferers (all except the DD, RR, II, and NN groups) represented types of change ranging from that related to possible minimal involvement (changes from Non-voting to "Independent" preference) to that related to possible maximal involvement (change from voting for party X to voting for party Y). Although changers have been characterized as the politically disinterested and uninvolved,¹⁷ one of the consistent findings of this analysis was that political change was accompanied, or preceded, by very clear attitudinal commitments congruent with the partisan change. The ND's and NR's consistently were attitudinally the most Democratic and most Republican, respectively, of all groups of political affiliates. The party switchers, likewise, as mentioned earlier, had attitudinal scores that closely identified them with the core of their newly adopted parties.

If further study verifies the apparent stability of the order of groups of party preferers when they are arrayed attitudinally, the information which may be collected on attitudes may disclose much of value about the "politicalness" of suspected issues in party politics. For example, an additional analysis of the 1948 Election Study strongly suggested that while foreign policy was not an overt issue in the 1948 election, the rank and file voters were apparently divided, even then, along party lines on foreign policy questions. By 1951 the partisan differences were much more pronounced, but the change from 1948 was primarily one of degree for many people.

At this point it seems evident that during at least two periods in the past four years, groups of party supporters as defined by two statements of party preference, were uniquely distributed attitudinally on a pro-anti national administration continuum. In projecting future studies greater attention can be given to the search for explanations of the voting behavior of persons within each of the groups forming the attitudinal distribution. This past work can also

¹⁷ See n. 12.

be used as a point of departure for historical or dynamic studies of voting behavior. The problems of studying changes in voting, changes in political partisanship, and changes in attitude on national policies can be conducted with at least one point fixed for comparison.

A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

It was found that defining party preference by the use of statements concerning past and present political behavior produced groups of respondents which assumed a unique rank order when the groups were placed on a continuum of pro-anti attitudes toward issues relevant to national politics. The rank ordering produced by reference to attitudes toward national governmental policies was observed to be constant (within variations possibly related to the unreliability of small numbers in the groups producing the variations) whether foreign policy issues alone or a combination of foreign and domestic issues were used to elicit the expressions of attitude.

The consistency of ordering existed for two different samples of the national adult population surveyed at two different times, 1948 and 1951. Variations of the kinds of past and present party preferences which could be combined from the data available did not produce significant variations in the ordering. That is, whether past preference was taken to be "usual voting behavior," "vote in 1944," or "preference in 1948," with present preference being either "vote in 1948" or "preference in 1948"; or whether past vote was "vote in 1948" with present preference being "preference in June, 1951"—all of the permutations produced groups which followed the same ordering when ranked by pro-anti attitudes on the selected national policies.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION

JOHN CLARKE ADAMS

University of Buffalo

AND

PAOLO BARILE

University of Siena

The new Italian Constitution was written by the 556 deputies the Italian people elected to their first Constitutional Assembly on June 2, 1946. The Assembly approved the Constitution on December 22, 1947, by a vote of 453 favorable, 62 opposed, and 31 absent. After this approval the Constitution was promulgated by the Provisional President of Italy, Enrico de Nicola, and became effective ten days later, on January 1, 1948. Numerous evaluations of the Constitution are available,¹ and it is not our purpose here to duplicate this work. We are concerned solely with discovering to what extent the Constitution was actually in effect during the four and one-half year period following its promulgation and with explaining, if possible, why there has been so much delay in implementing some of its basic provisions.

What we shall find is that some enabling legislation was passed by the Constitutional Assembly in the interim period between the effective date of the Constitution and the election of the first Parliament in April, 1948. Parliament has implemented a few more constitutional provisions, but vast and basic sections of the Constitution are still ineffective, owing to Parliament's inaction. To a lesser degree the administration and the courts are in a position to implement the Constitution. The administration has done little to this end, and although the courts have taken the Constitution more seriously than the other branches of the government their work has often been conflicting and inconclusive. The President's power to implement the Constitution is operative almost entirely in times of emergency or by tradition. Constitutional emergencies did not arise in this period and traditions have not been established; thus the President's effect on the Constitution has been negligible.

¹ Studies in English include Mario Einaudi's section in Fritz Morstein Marx, *Foreign Governments* (New York, 1949), as well as numerous articles by the same author; and John Clarke Adams, "The Government of Italy," in Adams, *et al.*, *Foreign Governments and Their Backgrounds* (New York, 1950). Studies in Italian include Piero Calamandrei and Alessandro Levi, *Commentario sistematico alla costituzione italiana* (Florence, 1950, 2 vols.); Antonio Amorth, *La costituzione italiana* (Milan, 1948); Giorgio Balladore Palieri, *La nuova costituzione italiana* (Milan, 1950); Gastone Baschieri, Luigi Bianchi D'Espinosa, and Carlo Giannattasio, *La costituzione italiana* (Florence, 1949); Emilio Crosa, *Diritto costituzionale* (Turin, 1951); Paolo Biscaretti di Ruffia, *Diritto costituzionale* (Naples, 1949); Vincenzo Falzone, Filippo Palermo, and Francesco Cosentino, *La costituzione della Repubblica italiana illustrata con i lavori preparatori* (Rome, 1948); Pietro Virga, *Diritto costituzionale* (Palermo, 1950). Studies in French include Emilio Crosa (ed.), *La constitution italienne de 1948*, in *Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques* (Paris, 1950).

In order to explain this state of affairs, we must take into consideration how, by whom, and in what political climate the Constitution was written, and the nature of its content.

I

The members of the Constitutional Assembly were, on the whole, of high caliber. They included distinguished scholars such as the philosopher Benedetto Croce, the economist Luigi Einaudi, the Latin scholar Concetto Marchesi, the mathematician Gustavo Colonnetti, and the law professors Piero Calamandrei, Tomaso Perassi, Costantino Mortati, Giuseppe Dossetti, Egidio Tosato, and Giuseppe Grassi; prominent pre-Fascist statesmen, including former Prime Ministers Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Francesco Saverio Nitti, and Ivanoe Bonomi; former Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza; outstanding Partisan leaders, such as Ferruccio Parri and Luigi Longo; and almost all of the post-Fascist political leaders.

The Constitutional Assembly was dominated by three parties, the Christian Democrats (Catholic), the Communists, and the Socialists. Four other parties, the Liberal, the Labor Democratic, the Republican, and the Action parties, which were also anti-Fascist and basically democratic, were active in drafting the Constitution. Owing to the prestige of their leaders, these four parties had, in fact, greater influence than their numbers merited. The other minor parties were mostly of a reactionary nature and had little influence in forming the Constitution. No single party had a majority in the Constitutional Assembly, and no stable coalition was formed that could impose a unified program. Therefore a separate majority was formed on each major issue. The Christian Democrats were usually the nucleus of this majority, but its other component parts varied according to the issue at stake.

A body of over 500 persons is not well adapted to constitution-making. The Assembly was therefore wise in delegating, on July 15, 1946, the task of drafting the Constitution to a committee of 75 of its members, chosen to represent the parties in proportion to their strength in the Assembly. In general the parties were represented on the committee by their abler men.

The Seventy-five elected as its president the respected jurist and pre-Fascist deputy Meuccio Ruini, a member of the Labor Democrat party. The Committee then divided itself into three sub-committees, charged respectively with drafting the parts of the Constitution dealing with (1) rights and duties of citizens, (2) the constitutional organization of the State, and (3) social and economic rights and duties. These sub-committees elected as their presidents respectively the Demochristian Umberto Tupini, the Communist Umberto Terracini, and the Socialist Gustavo Ghidini. The second sub-committee, which was the largest, was again subdivided to permit the creation of a special section dealing with the judiciary, headed by the Republican Giovanni Conti.

When the various sections and sub-committees had finished their work, the Seventy-five appointed a committee of 18 to coordinate the Constitution and put it into final form for presentation to the Constitutional Assembly. The

Eighteen was composed of the presidents of the committee and its subdivisions, of outstanding law professors such as Calamandrei (Action party), Perassi (Republican), Grassi (Liberal), and Tosato, Dossetti, and Mortati (Christian Democrats), and of top political figures such as Togliatti and the Liberal party leader, Marchese Roberto Lucifero. The Seventy-five adopted the re-draft made by the Eighteen with only slight modifications and presented it to the Assembly on January 31, 1947. During the rest of 1947 the Assembly discussed, altered, and after 173 sessions finally approved the Constitution.

The Constitution was not submitted to the electorate for approval. This saved the Assembly from the possible embarrassment of having the voters reject the Constitution it had approved, as had occurred in France shortly before. On the other hand, the Italian Constitution was deprived of the prestige it might have gained through approval by popular vote. Such prestige might have helped it overcome some of the obstacles that are in its path today.²

The provisions in the Italian Constitution can be divided into two categories: those primarily of an institutional nature, which either establish or authorize the establishment of the principal organs of government and describe their functions and inter-relations, and those that state the rights and privileges of Italian citizens and the obligations and aims of the government. The first type is found in Part II of the Constitution (Arts. 55-139). The second type is found in the section of the Constitution called "General Principles" (Arts. 1-12) and in Part I (Arts. 13-54).

Still another classification of constitutional norms must be borne in mind in examining the implementation of the Constitution. Jurists distinguish between preceptive norms (*norme precettive*) and programmatic norms (*norme programmatiche*). Preceptive norms are those that are immediately applicable. Programmatic norms are those that require implementation by enabling legislation. Some of the preceptive norms in the Italian Constitution, however, are not effective today and some of the programmatic norms are effective regardless of parliamentary inactivity. Such preceptive norms as those found in the freedom of speech article (21), for instance, are not implemented because Parliament has not repealed certain Fascist legislation still in effect, and the Constitutional Court, which could declare those laws unconstitutional, has not been established. On the other hand, programmatic norms such as those authorizing already existing institutions are effective without further parliamentary action.

The organizational section of the Constitution in the main reestablishes the institutions of the former *octroi* constitution that Carlo Alberto of Savoy gave his people in 1848 and that became effective throughout Italy as the House of Savoy extended its domain, but it grafts onto this structure a number of institutions and procedures taken from modern democratic theory and practice. The Albertine Constitution, known as the *Statuto*, was a vague document that could be altered by ordinary legislation. Without being formally abrogated or

² Piero Calamandrei, "Cenni introduttivi sulla Costituente e sui suoi lavori," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. lxxxix-cxl.

amended, it underwent drastic changes in 1866 when parliamentary government was established, and again after 1926 when the Fascists began legalizing their anti-democratic activities. Although not in itself tyrannical, it offered little protection against tyranny.

The section provides for five important institutional changes: (1) the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a parliamentary republic (Arts. 83-91); (2) the transformation of the Senate from an appointive to an elective body (Arts. 57-60); (3) the establishment of the Constitutional Court (Arts. 134-137); (4) the establishment of regional governments (Arts. 114-133); and (5) the creation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Arts. 104-107). None of these changes can be considered revolutionary. Each is in keeping with modern trends and in line with the experience of other western democracies. The President's powers and functions are similar to those of the French President; the Senate is modeled after the Senate of the Third French Republic; the influence of the United States is seen in the Constitutional Court; the example of democratic Switzerland, as well as the doctrine of self-determination, is behind the establishment of regional governments; and the creation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary has the support of a cardinal democratic principle, that of the separation of powers.

Other changes in Part II of the Constitution are equally unrevolutionary and include (1) provision for initiative and referendum (Arts. 71, 75); (2) the new amending provisions, designed to give the Constitution greater rigidity and prevent its being altered by a process indistinguishable from ordinary legislation (Arts. 138-139); (3) the creation of an advisory council on economic and labor problems (Arts. 99-100); (4) the institution of a mild type of presidential veto (Art. 74); and (5) a series of provisions aimed at strengthening the government *vis-à-vis* Parliament (Arts. 92, 94).

Of these changes, six are primarily of a programmatic nature, and four, the abolition of the monarchy, the amending process,³ the presidential veto, and the provisions aimed at strengthening the government *vis-à-vis* Parliament,⁴ are preceptive and therefore in force without need of implementation. Of the six which require implementation only two have been implemented, and the second of these only in part. In both instances enabling legislation was passed by the Constitutional Assembly in the interim period between the promulgation of the Constitution and the election of the first Parliament in April, 1948.

Transitory Article XVII of the Constitution empowered the Constitutional Assembly to pass laws implementing three specific constitutional provisions: the Senate electoral law, the charters for the special regions, and the law on the press.⁵ The Constitutional Assembly carried out these instructions.

The election laws have followed the Constitution in most respects. They have established universal adult suffrage (for the Chamber of Deputies) and have

³ Except insofar as the provision for the referendum is not implemented.

⁴ For a discussion of these provisions, see Mario Einaudi, "The Constitution of the Italian Republic," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, Vol. 42, pp. 661-76 (Aug., 1948).

⁵ Discussed *infra*.

guaranteed the secrecy of the vote (Article 48), but the constitutionality of making voting compulsory and recording failure to vote in the *Certificato di buona condotta* is questioned by at least one authority.⁶

The Constitutional Assembly enacted enabling legislation, in this case charters, for three of the five special regions (Sardinia, Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige) and approved the previously granted charter of Sicily. Although all of these charters differ, and the three written by the Constitutional Assembly give less autonomy to the regions than the Sicilian charter did, their provisions raise no constitutional problems, as the Constitution simply states that these regions are to enjoy a special status as set forth in their charters (Art. 116). The Constitutional Assembly was also justified in not issuing a charter for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as Transitory Article X of the Constitution states that this region will be treated "provisionally" (i.e., until Italy regains Trieste) as an ordinary region.

II

The efforts of Parliament to implement the Constitution have been neither strenuous nor effective. Most of the members of the Constitutional Assembly were elected to Italy's first Parliament in April, 1948. This fact led one to expect that Parliament would hasten to enact enabling legislation to make operative the Constitution its own members had written. Such, however, was not the case. The change can be explained in part by the waning idealism and democratic fervor noticeable in Italy by 1948 and in part by the increase in Catholic and reactionary strength at the expense of the minor democratic parties. In the 1948 elections the Communists about held their own with respect to their power in the Constitutional Assembly, but the Liberals, the Republicans and the right-wing Socialists lost heavily. The Christian Democrats, under the leadership of Alcide De Gasperi, won an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a plurality in the Senate. This was the party that had the largest number of deputies in the Constitutional Assembly and therefore had the major voice in writing the Constitution. Nevertheless, though it has a fine record of achievement in many respects, the De Gasperi government, in its four and a half years' existence, has failed to implement many significant features of the Constitution.

Much of the important enabling legislation would have the effect of reducing the powers and freedom of Parliament. This is true with respect to the five principal institutions which have not as yet been activated: the Constitutional Court, the regions, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the initiative and referendum, and the National Council of Economics and Labor. Perhaps it is too much to expect mere human beings to be so profligate with their powers as to

⁶ *Testo unico*, February 5, 1948, No. 26; Carlo Lavagna, "Atti e eventi costituzionali in Italia dal 1 gennaio 1948 al 31 dicembre 1950," *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, Vol. 1, pp. 180-84 (1951). In June, 1952, the government proposed a new electoral law abolishing proportional representation and guaranteeing a majority of seats to the coalition that receives the plurality of votes. Such a law may be unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives citizens of an equal vote.

vote them away, and perhaps one can accuse the Constitutional Assembly of naïveté for assuming otherwise.

The fulcrum of Italy's constitutional system is the Constitutional Court. Without this institution the Constitution cannot function effectively. In spite of this fact, Parliament has taken no final action for the establishment of the Court. A bill was presented in the Senate by the government on July 14, 1948, and passed on March 17, 1949. This bill was presented to the Chamber on April 2, 1949. Over a year later, on April 17, 1950, it came out of committee, considerably altered, and was approved March 15, 1951. After this it returned to the Senate, where a committee drew up a compromise bill for re-submission to the Chamber. Another measure in the form of a constitutional amendment supplementing the brief and inadequate provisions passed by the Constitutional Assembly (February 9, 1948) was presented in the Chamber May 20, 1950, and passed the first time March 16, 1951.⁷

Parliament has not set up the ordinary regions.⁸ Although a bill to this effect, marked "urgent," was presented to the Chamber by the government December 10, 1948, no action has been taken.⁹ This failure on the part of Parliament has led to special difficulties. Since the Constitution specifically delegates to the regions powers over many local matters, Parliament tends not to legislate on those matters pending the creation of regions,¹⁰ or if it does legislate, its acts may be of questionable constitutionality.¹¹

⁷ This bill passed the Chamber for the second time on July 3, 1952 (two votes at least three months apart are required for constitutional amendments) and will now go to the Senate. This amendment deals primarily with procedural questions. It defines, for instance, the manner in which impeachment proceedings can be brought before the court. Such action will require the vote of a joint session of Parliament.

There is an extensive bibliography on the Constitutional Court. See Piero Calamandrei, *La illegittimità costituzionale delle leggi del processo civile* (Florence, 1950); Eduardo Garbagnati, "Sull'efficacia delle decisioni della Corte Costituzionale," in *Studi in onore di Francesco Carnelutti*, Vol. 4 (Padua, 1950), pp. 191-213; Michele Petrucci, "La corte costituzionale," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 431-64; Alfonso Tesaro, "Relazione sul progetto di legge per la Corte costituzionale," *Atti parlamentari*, Camera dei Deputati, No. 469A, pp. 1-42 (1950); Ernesto Bruneri, *La corte costituzionale* (Florence, 1952); Carlo Lavagna, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-95, 429-52.

⁸ For the powers and functions of the region, see Giovanni Miele, "La regione," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 225-379.

⁹ One author has suggested that in failing to implement this part of the Constitution the senators and deputies may be guilty of violating two articles of the Constitution itself: Article 54, which reads, "All citizens have the duty of remaining faithful to the Republic and to observe the Constitution and the laws," and Transitory Article VIII, which specifically directs Parliament to establish the regions and hold regional and provincial elections within a year of the promulgation of the Constitution. (Alberto Predieri, "Due anni di esperienza costituzionale," *Belfagor*, Vol. 5, pp. 80-88, at 81-82 (1950).) The provincial elections, which according to the Constitution should have been held in 1948, were held in 1951 and 1952.

¹⁰ Massimo Severio Giannini, in some remarks made before the *Congresso dei giuristi democratici* in Rome on June 2, 1952.

¹¹ Predieri, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Hundreds of bills for the creation of new communes, for instance, have been presented, some of which have been acted on favorably.

Parliament cannot be held entirely responsible for the inaction and delay with respect to the creation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, as in this case the government has not even presented an enabling bill. Any deputy or senator could, of course, have presented the bill regardless of governmental inactivity, but such initiative beyond the call of duty is hardly to be expected. In a speech before the Senate on April 23, 1952, the Minister of Justice, Adone Zoli, promised to present a bill for the establishment of the Council before the summer recess of Parliament.¹²

The provisions for initiative and referendum are still inoperative for lack of enabling legislation. A bill presented by the government and passed by the Chamber March 8, 1951, was altered by the Senate and returned to the Chamber January 1, 1952. The committee of the Chamber accepted all of the Senate's changes with respect to the constitutional referendum and the initiative, but it recommended minor variations in the articles dealing with the legislative referendum.¹³

Enabling legislation for the National Council of Economics and Labor was presented in the Senate March 15, 1949, where it passed December 6, 1951, but by July 1, 1952, no action had been taken by the Chamber. This delay has been due in part to differences of opinion on some of the technical questions involved, such as whether or not there should be special sections for economic and labor problems, the number of councilors, and the percentage of technical experts to be included.¹⁴ It is interesting to note that the inclusion of this Council in the

¹² *La nuova stampa*, Turin, Vol. 8, No. 98, April 24, 1952. The function of this body is to protect the judiciary from undue influence by other branches of the government. According to the Constitution, the Council is to be presided over by the President of the Republic, and the Chief Justice and the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation are members *ex officio*. Two-thirds of the other members are elected by the judges from their own ranks, and the other third by Parliament in joint session, from among law professors and lawyers with at least 15 years' practice. Among the functions of the Council are the selection and promotion of magistrates.

A similar innovation was adopted by the French in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. The Italian Constitution provides for a substantially independent Council, in that the majority of its members are career judges elected by career judges. The majority of the members of the French Council, however, represent the non-judicial branches of the government. (See Carlo Giannattasio, "La magistratura," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 169-97, at 179.)

¹³ According to the Constitution (Art. 125), the referendum is not to be admitted in the case of tax bills, amnesties, or authorizations of treaty ratifications. These limitations pose a serious problem, as it will not always be clear whether or not a law for which a referendum is requested falls within the subject matter for which the Constitution permits a referendum. The Constitution is silent as to what government agency is empowered to decide this question. It is proposed to give it to the Constitutional Court by a constitutional amendment. On the specific question, see Roberto Lucifredi, "Il controllo sulla costituzionalità delle richieste di referendum abrogativo," *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, Vol. 1, pp. 128-37 (1951). On the referendum in general see Maurice Battelli, "Le istituzioni di democrazia diretta," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 61-78.

¹⁴ Lavagna, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-92.

Constitution was primarily the work of Christian Democrat leaders, particularly Professor Costantino Mortati and Edoardo Clerici.¹⁵

The Constitution further directs (Arts. 25, 102, 103, and Temporary Art. VI) that within a year of its promulgation the courts martial be reorganized in accordance with the Constitution, and that within five years all other special courts but two (the *Consiglio di stato* and the *Corte dei conti*) be abolished. In spite of this directive, no final action has been taken with respect to the reorganization of the military courts, although a bill was presented in the Chamber of Deputies December 18, 1948, just under the legal deadline and just before the Christmas recess. Parliament had until January 1, 1953, to enact legislation absorbing the other special courts into the regular judicial system. The major courts involved are tax courts and admiralty courts. It has been pointed out that there are no political considerations to explain and partially excuse parliamentary inaction in this matter.¹⁶

A bill was presented in the Chamber June 6, 1952, to regulate the powers of the Council of Ministers and its President. This bill attempts to implement and clarify Articles 76, 77, and paragraph 5 of Article 87 on executive orders, and would give the President of the Council the power of determining the agenda for the cabinet meetings.¹⁷

By way of summary, it can be said that the following provisions of Part II of the Constitution are inoperative because of Parliament's failure to act: parliamentary incompatibilities (Art. 65), initiative (Art. 71), referendum (Art. 75), National Council of Economics and Labor (Art. 99), Supreme Council of the Judiciary (Arts. 104-106), regions (Arts. 115, 117-133), and Constitutional Court (Arts. 134-137). This is a total of 29 out of the 84 articles in Part II of the Constitution. Virtually all of the effective articles were operative without parliamentary intervention, either because they contain preceptive norms, which require no enabling legislation, or because the enabling legislation had been passed by previous legislatures. It should in fairness be remembered, however, that the government has presented enabling legislation for the implementation of almost all of the presently inapplicable provisions in this section of the Constitution. There is no sign of a conscious effort on the part of the government to prevent the application of this section; rather there has been a lack of that positive concern necessary to overcome parliamentary inertia. With respect, however, to the section of the Constitution dealing with civil liberties and the ends of the state, the government has not shown even this limited initiative.

The "General Principles" and Part I of the Constitution can be considered

¹⁵ Alberto Bertolino, "L'attività economica, funzioni e forme organizzative del lavoro. Il consiglio nazionale dell'economia e del lavoro," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 407-40, at 440.

¹⁶ Predieri, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹⁷ On the general subject of the President of the Council of Ministers, see Alberto Predieri, *Lineamenti della posizione costituzionale del presidente del consiglio* (Florence, 1951).

together. This section attempts to state the limitations and obligations of government *vis-d-vis* the people. It comprises an extensive bill of rights that adds to the classical limitations on government common to all democratic constitutions, a series of positive obligations the government is supposed to perform in the interests of the individual citizen, such as free medical care for the poor (Art. 32), free education for the deserving poor (Art. 34), and vocational training (Art. 35). Unfortunately, these are obligations that the state is unable to fulfill, either at present or in the foreseeable future. Some theorists feel that these statements of principle, which are in fact little more than pious hopes, belong in a preamble and not in the corpus of a Constitution.¹⁸ Others feel that since they represent the ends to which the state created by the present Constitution aspires, they belong in the corpus, where they will have a normative value in the sense that they will (1) invalidate any action directly contrary to their provisions, (2) serve for the interpretation and application of other norms, and (3) create a moral obligation on the part of Parliament to implement them.¹⁹

The application of any of the norms in this section is handicapped by the fact that they are often mutually contradictory, the result of compromises approved by different political coalitions. An example is seen in the provisions dealing with illegitimate children. Article 3 reads in part:

All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, and personal or social status.

Article 30 reads:

The law assures to children born out of wedlock all legal and social protection compatible with the rights of the members of the legitimate family.

These provisions do not seem reconcilable with respect to the rights of illegitimate children.

Other serious problems of incompatibilities result from the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution (Art. 7). This article reads:

The state and the Catholic Church are independent and sovereign in their own spheres. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Modifications of the Pacts accepted by the two parties do not require the procedure for constitutional amendment.

Included in the Lateran Pacts are several provisions obnoxious to Western democratic concepts of civil liberties found in the Italian Constitution. Such a provision, for example, is the one that a former priest cannot be employed by the government in a position that puts him in contact with the public—obviously in contrast with the “equal protection” provision of Article 3 of the Constitution.

The incompatibilities between the Constitution and the Pacts, however, extend beyond the question of civil liberties and result in at least one instance in

¹⁸ See, for example, a speech by Piero Calamandrei in *Atti dell'Assemblea costituente*, Vol. 49, pp. 1743–55 (Mar. 4, 1947).

¹⁹ Paolo Barile, *La costituzione come norma giuridica* (Florence, 1951), pp. 44–58.

an outright absurdity, i.e., Article 26 of the Lateran Treaty (one of the Lateran Pacts), which states:

The Holy See recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy.

The dilemma raised by these incompatibilities is resolved by the majority of the authorities by giving preference in cases of conflict to the constitutional provision on the grounds that Article 7 of the Constitution merely establishes that the Lateran Pacts determine the basic relations between Italy and the Vatican, and that specific provisions in the Pacts patently at variance with other articles of the Constitution are ineffective.²⁰

The case for this opinion is greatly strengthened by an examination of the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly. Amerigo Crispo, one of the Liberal deputies, offered an amendment to Article 7 inserting after the words "Lateran Pacts" the clause "insofar as they are not contrary to the present Constitution,"²¹ but withdrew it on the assurance of responsible Demochristian deputies that "the sole legal significance of this article" was to establish the fact that "of the various possible systems for regulating the relations between state and church, Italy adopts the one that distinguishes between the two powers and coordinates their relations through a bilateral pact, and provides that unilateral changes in this relationship can be made only by constitutional amendment."²² On the strength of this interpretation the Republican Count Sforza voted for Article 7.²³ Also worthy of note is the fact that an

²⁰ Paolo Barile, "Religione cattolica, religione dello stato, religione privilegiata (a proposito della vigenza dell'art. 402 c.p.)," *Diritto ecclesiastico*, Vol. 52 (1951); Paolo Barile, "Regime costituzionale e disciplina concordatoria in tema di educazione di prole," *Il foro padano*, Vol. 4, Sec. 4, pp. 168-74 (July-Aug., 1949); Marino Bon di Valsassina, "La Repubblica italiana è uno stato confessionista?," *Rassegna di diritto pubblico*, Part 1, pp. 50 ff. (1952); Balladore Pallieri, *op. cit.*; Bertola, "L'état, l'église catholique et les autres confessions religieuses," in Crosa (ed.), *La constitution italienne*, pp. 215 ff.; Bertola, "Costituzionalizzazione dei patti lateranensi?," *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 102, Sec. 4, pp. 172 ff. (1950); Costantino Mortati, "L'évolution constitutionnelle italienne," in Crosa (ed.), *La constitution italienne*, pp. 40 ff.; Virga, *op. cit.*, p. 394; Checchini, "Stato e chiesa dallo statuto albertino alla costituzione repubblicana," *Nel centenario del 1848* (Padua, 1949), pp. 119 ff.; Del Giudice, *Manuale di diritto ecclesiastico*, 7th ed. (Milan, 1949), pp. 93 ff.; Guido Calogero, "La scuola, la scienza e le arti," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 315-24; Cesare Grassetti, "I principi costituzionali relativi al diritto familiare," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Luigi Bianchi D'Espinosa in Baschieri, Bianchi D'Espinosa, Giannattasio, *op. cit.*, p. 32. The opposite view is held by the following authors: Amorth, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53; Pietro Agostino D'Avack, "I rapporti fra stato e chiesa," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 107-16; Vezio Crisafulli, "Articolo 7 della costituzione e 'vilipendio della religione dello Stato'," *Archivio penale*, pp. 416-17 (1950); Arturo Carlo Jemolo, "Religione dello stato ed articoli 402-404 c.p.," *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 54, Sec. 2, pp. 203 ff. (1949); Arturo Carlo Jemolo, *Chiesa e stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni* (Turin, 1949), pp. 702-14.

²¹ *Verbale dell'Assemblea costituente*, No. 60, p. 2038, and No. 75, p. 2438.

²² *Ibid.*, No. 70, p. 2327 (the words are those of Giuseppe Dossetti). See also No. 62, p. 2113 (Count Stefano Iacini) and No. 70, p. 2319 (Dossetti).

²³ *Ibid.*, No. 75, p. 2470.

amendment by the neo-Fascist Gennaro Patricolo explicitly inserting all the provisions of the Pacts in the Constitution was voted down with the help of the Christian Democrats.²⁴

In spite of the preponderance of authority for this interpretation of the effectiveness of the Lateran Pacts as constitutional norms, the fact remains that their inclusion in the Constitution has increased the doubt and confusion in the minds of many as to the applicability of those parts of the Constitution which are in conflict with provisions in the Pacts.

The implementation of the programmatic norms in Part I of the Constitution might have been made easier if Parliament had established a Constitutional Court, as then the Court could have weeded out the patently unconstitutional articles in Italy's basic codes and laws. Faced by the necessity of filling the vacua left by these judicial nullifications, Parliament might have been forced to revise these laws without delay. The fact that Parliament has not established the Constitutional Court, however, has not relieved it of the responsibility of implementing Part I directly. Transitory Article XVI of the Constitution reads:

Within a year of the effective date of the Constitution, the pre-existing constitutional laws not implicitly or explicitly abrogated will be revised and coordinated [with the Constitution].

The failure of Parliament to implement Part I of the Constitution does not mean that many of its provisions—the so-called preceptive norms—cannot be applied by the administration and the courts. The administration, however, has shown less interest in the Constitution than the legislature. It would appear that the courts have taken the new Constitution more seriously than the other branches of the government. That the legal profession should respect the law more than politicians and administrators is natural. But with Parliament's failure to enact enabling legislation for the Constitutional Court, and with the non-existence of the principle of *stare decisis*, the regular courts have been powerless to create an adequate and coherent jurisprudence. Many of the major inefficiencies will be alleviated and some will be eliminated with the establishment of the Constitutional Court, but the effectiveness of this court will depend in large measure on the quality of the enabling legislation.²⁵

A few provisions in this part of the Constitution were implemented by the Constitutional Assembly. Article 21 was partially implemented by the law on the press, which abrogated the law of January 14, 1944, requiring authorization

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 75, pp. 2444, 2483.

²⁵ The Constitution (Art. 36), for example, states that an act which the Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional will become ineffective the day after the publication of the sentence. Parliament should clarify this provision. If it means that the party to a dispute who claims that the Constitution has been violated can get no redress for his personal grievance, but only the altruistic satisfaction of having helped others, only those persons who can expect to be handicapped in the future by a law or regulation are likely to go to the trouble and the expense of testing its validity. (See Alfonso Tesaro, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38; Michele Petrucci, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-59; Piero Calamandrei, *La illegittimità costituzionale*).

by the prefect before publication. The new law²⁶ only requires notification. It retains the Fascist provision, however, that every periodical must have an editor who is criminally responsible for everything that appears in the periodical. In 1952 Parliament was considering the repeal of this article, which some think is incompatible with Article 27 of the Constitution, which reads in part: "Criminal responsibility is personal."

The charters of Aosta (Chapter VI) and Trentino-Alto Adige (Chapter X) guarantee protection to linguistic minorities, and in this way they in part implement Article 6 of the Constitution, which reads: "The Republic protects linguistic minorities by appropriate legislation." A bill to this effect presented to the Chamber December 10, 1948, is still pending.

On June 19, 1952, Parliament passed a bill implementing Transitory Article VII, outlawing the reorganization of the Fascist party. With its approval of the treaty creating the Council of Europe, the Italian Parliament expressed an opinion in accordance with Article 11 of the Constitution, which gives Parliament the right to delegate sovereignty to an international organization.

Although no action has been taken for the thorough revision of the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the law on Public Security, a number of bills have been presented to abrogate or to revise specific articles of these laws. For example, a bill to abrogate Article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure passed the Senate and was presented before the Chamber June 19, 1952. This article provides that no criminal action can be initiated against public officials or members of the armed services for actions performed with the use of arms or other physical coercion, in line of duty, without the consent of the Minister of Justice. Another bill was presented January 25, 1949, marked "urgent," that would annul all the sentences of the Fascist political tribunal (*Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello stato*). After three and a half years it is still in committee. Two bills were presented to implement Article 30, paragraph 3, which protects illegitimate children. One bill, presented March 15, 1951, by the Christian Democratic deputy Maria Pia Del Canton, would eliminate all mention of the parents' names in government certificates. The other, presented by the Socialist Bianca Bianchi, authorizes public officials to invent names for children whose parents' names are unknown. Since in Italy one has to present documents that among other things include the parents' names, from the first appearance in grade school on through the rest of one's life, this is a matter of some importance.²⁷

A bill implementing Article 16, paragraph 2, was approved by the Senate on March 27, 1952, and approved with only minor changes by a committee of the Chamber June 17, 1952. This bill regulates the issuance of passports. Previously passports could be denied by the government for any motive and without explanation. The bill before Parliament implements the Constitution in that it grants a general right to a passport to all citizens who do not fall within

²⁶ Law of February 8, 1948, No. 47.

²⁷ The Bianchi bill passed in the Chamber July 17, 1952.

one of eight groups. Included in these groups are persons who have not performed their military service, condemned persons who have not served their sentences or paid their fines, minors, idiots, and workers who want to seek work abroad and who are not acceptable under the immigration laws. This bill would also implement Article 30 in part, as the parents' names would not be included in the passports. From a constitutional point of view the most questionable article in this bill is article 8, which permits the Minister of Foreign Affairs to refuse to issue or to revoke a passport when it "appears prejudicial to the internal or international security of the state." The intention of this article is apparently to permit the government to continue its practice of refusing or revoking passports of Communists who speak against the government when abroad. Although it is difficult to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of article 8 as it stands, it is unfortunately liable to uses and interpretations that violate the spirit of the Constitution.

With the abolition of the corporate system, there has been a large void in Italian law in the labor field, a void all the more felt because of the copious legislation and control in this field under Fascism. The Constitution speaks of "registered" unions, of collective agreements, and of the right to strike (Arts. 39-40). Three successive Ministers of Labor (Fanfani, Marazza, Rubinacci) prepared legislation in this matter, but only the last actually presented his project to Parliament. This bill has been strongly criticized, particularly in labor circles, and many of its provisions are of questionable constitutionality. Informed persons feel it unlikely that Parliament will accept it.

Parliament has not only failed to implement major sections of the Constitution, but in several instances it has also enacted legislation that appears to violate the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. The new law against Fascism, for instance, provides for punishment of public expression of praise for Fascist principles, deeds, means, or leaders (Art. 4). This seems to be in open conflict with the freedom of speech article (21). A bill authorizing pre-censorship of comic books appears equally incompatible with the Constitution's freedom of speech article. This bill had strong Catholic support in Parliament and was fought by the Liberals, Republicans, right wing Socialists and some of Italy's more responsible newspapers, such as *La stampa* of Turin and *Il corriere della sera* of Milan. It passed the Chamber without serious difficulty in the spring of 1952, but by July 1 no action had been taken by the Senate. A new bill on the freedom of the press is also under discussion. It is severely attacked by the liberal press for its illiberal and allegedly unconstitutional restrictions.²⁸

The land reform law, one of the few pieces of truly "liberal" legislation that Parliament has enacted in the postwar period, also appears to be unconstitutional. It empowers administrative officials to expropriate land, and classifies this action of the administrators as legislative and therefore not subject to re-

²⁸ See Mario Ferrara, "La legge sulla stampa," *Il nuovo corriere della sera*, Vol. 77, No. 155 (July 2, 1952); Mario Ferrara, "Ancora sulla stampa," *Il nuovo corriere della sera*, Vol. 77, No. 156 (July 3, 1952); and Emilio Crosa, "Le insidie d'un progetto," *La nuova stampa*, Vol. 8, No. 157 (July 4, 1952).

view by the administrative courts. Italy's highest administrative court has denied the legislative nature of these acts, declared its competence to review them, and annulled them as *ultra vires*, although the acts were admittedly valid under the law.²⁹

Parliament avoided a constitutional question over an alleged conflict of authority between Parliament and the Regional Council for Trentino-Alto Adige. Both bodies claimed the power to write the law for the election of local government officials in the province of Bolzano. The Regional Council, basing its authority on some equivocal provisions in the regional charter (Arts. 4, 5, 54), passed a local election law in December, 1949. The legality of this law was questioned by the Commissioner for the region (the representative of the Italian government, with powers similar to those of the prefect in other regions). On recourse to the *Consiglio di stato*, the supreme tribunal for administrative adjudication, the view of the Commissioner was upheld. Thereupon the De Gasperi government presented a detailed election bill for the region of Trentino-Alto Adige to the Senate. This body, in a conciliatory mood, passed a sort of skeleton bill, delegating to the regional parliament the authority to fill in the details. This bill was later passed by the Chamber of Deputies as well. This appears to be the first time that Parliament has been called upon to judge the constitutionality of an act, and the legislators avoided the constitutional issues involved by enacting compromise legislation.³⁰

III

The President³¹ is concerned with the Constitution in at least two ways. His oath of office requires him to observe the Constitution (Art. 91), thus giving him a degree of control over the constitutionality of the acts of other branches of the government that he must sign. He is also required to participate in governmental activities, and by his participation he delimits his own constitutional powers, a point on which the Constitution is not clear. Like many chiefs of

²⁹ Decision of *Consiglio di stato* March 20, 1952, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 7, Sec. 4, p. 33 (1952). The government has appealed this decision to the Court of Cassation.

³⁰ *Atti parlamentari*, Camera dei Deputati, Vol. 855, pp. 35564-35579 (February 13, 1952). This problem was avoided in the case of Sardinia when the Sardinian Regional Legislature authorized the temporary use of the national election law (Sardinian Regional Law of August 10, 1951, No. 12).

³¹ The constitutional position of the President of Italy is somewhat obscure. Many authorities believe he is not part of the executive branch of the government, which is headed by the President of the Council of Ministers, and place him outside of all three conventional branches. (See Aldo M. Sandulli, "Il presidente della Repubblica e la funzione amministrativa," in *Studi in onore di Francesco Carnelutti*, Vol. 4 (Padua, 1950), pp. 215-42; Giuseppe Guarino, "Il presidente della Repubblica italiana," *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, Vol. 1, pp. 903-92 (Oct.-Dec., 1951); Teodosio Marchi, "Il capo dello stato," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 105-24; Emilio Crosa, "Gli organi costituzionali e il presidente della Repubblica nella costituzione italiana," *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, Vol. 1, pp. 91-113 (Jan.-Mar., 1951); Meuccio Ruini, "La controfirma ministeriale degli atti del capo dello stato," *Il foro padano*, Vol. 7, Sec. 4, pp. 18-32 (1952).

state today, the Italian President is legally irresponsible, except for treason or violation of the Constitution (*attentato alla costituzione*) (Art. 90), and all his acts must be countersigned by the proposing Minister (Art. 89). It is simple enough to follow the Constitution on this point in those cases in which the President's action was proposed by a Minister, but it is hard to decide who must countersign the many discretionary acts the President performs, such as the appointment of the President of the Council of Ministers, the dissolution of Parliament, and the nomination of the five life senators and five of the judges of the Constitutional Court. It seems to be agreed that even these acts must be countersigned,³² but there is a difference of opinion as to whether they are to be taken on the President's initiative or whether he should formally appoint the persons actually chosen by the government. The latter view, incorporated in the Fumagalli amendment to the bill on the Constitutional Court, appears to express the Christian Democrat position on the question.³³ Those who support the President's right to initiative are divided as to whether the Minister who countersigns the nomination has control over the President's discretionary powers or merely over the legality of his acts. The commentators seem to favor the second view.³⁴

In order to support the opposite thesis the Christian Democrat leaders have suggested that the President does not have to accept the government's nominees. Were this view accepted, the President's veto power might be extended by analogy to any governmental action requiring his signature, such as ratification of treaties, declaration of war, dissolution of Parliament, or calling of referenda.³⁵ It is doubtful if the Constitutional Assembly intended to give the President such sweeping power.

The Constitution gives the President a limited veto power. Instead of signing a bill he may send it back to Parliament for reconsideration, at the same time giving his reasons for not signing it (Art. 74). This so-called "suspensive veto" can be overridden by simple majorities of both houses of Parliament. The suspensive veto may be used for bills that the President feels are merely inexpedient as well as for those that he may consider unconstitutional. During his first four years of office President Einaudi used his limited veto power only twice, in the case of bills that were patently unconstitutional. On April 15, 1949, President Einaudi returned two bills to Parliament that were in violation of Article 81 of the Constitution, which prescribes that "every law which calls for new and greater expenditures must indicate the revenue from which they will be met." Again, on January 11, 1950, the President returned to Parliament for further consideration a bill that would give tenure in the judicial system to certain temporary appointees. This bill appeared to the President to be in contrast with Article 106 of the Constitution, which states that members of the

³² Ruini, *op. cit.*; Guarino, *op. cit.*, p. 985; Marchi, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

³³ *Atti parlamentari*, Camera dei Deputati, pp. 27232 ff. (1951).

³⁴ Ruini, *op. cit.*; Guarino, *op. cit.*, pp. 985, 988-89; Luigi Bianchi D'Espinosa, "Il parlamento," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1-60, at 23.

³⁵ Guarino, *op. cit.*, pp. 986-92.

judiciary are to be chosen by competitive examination. On reconsideration this bill was modified by Parliament.³⁸

The uncertainties in the constitutional relationships between the President and the other government organs can only partially be blamed on obscurities in the Constitution itself. The judicial status of a constitutional monarch or of a president in a parliamentary democracy is necessarily ambiguous in that it is based on antithetical concepts of sovereignty. On the one hand, there is the fiction of popular sovereignty, delegated by the electorate to the President of the Council of Ministers; on the other, there is the fiction of the sovereignty and the prerogative of the head of the state—king or president—who is not responsible to the people. The powers and prerogatives left to the head of the state in such illogical systems cannot be clearly delimited in a legal document. Their delimitation can result only from compromises sanctified by tradition.

IV

It is impossible in a few pages to give a systematic account of the implementation, and violations, of the Constitution by the administration and the courts. The administration is obviously in no position to implement those parts of the Constitution that are inoperative for want of enabling legislation. Under ideal conditions, however, it might show a greater interest than it has so far shown in governing in accordance with the preceptive norms of the Constitution. No case has come to light where the administration, of its own accord, has formally determined not to apply patently unconstitutional laws, or where it has formally taken into consideration, in making future policy, court decisions declaring such laws unconstitutional. Informally, however, it appears that the police have been convinced that *confino* is no longer to be applied. *Confino* is a system by which the police could require anyone to move to an isolated and out-of-the-way place, where he remained indefinitely under strict police surveillance, without judicial trial and without the right of appeal to the courts.

Serious conflicts between the Constitution and the administration arise in the field of civil liberties. A comparison of the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Fascist Law on Public Security with the civil liberties provisions of the Constitution shows the basic incompatibility of these laws and the Constitution. The courts have repeatedly declared certain articles of these laws unconstitutional, without much effect on the subsequent actions of the administration. The continued application of these laws is in part the result of the legislature's failure to rewrite them, but since a large portion of the administrative acts of questionable constitutional validity are discretionary rather than ministerial in nature, many instances of conflict with the Constitution could be avoided if the administration were persuaded that where discretion is involved, the law should be applied in the spirit of the Constitution. This sentiment, far from pervading the administration, has hardly made itself felt.

According to Transitory Article VII:

³⁸ This information was obtained from the Office of the Secretary of the President of Italy.

... pending the creation of the Constitutional Court the regular courts have the power to judge the constitutionality of laws and other public acts in the manner and in the limits of the law as it existed before the promulgation of the new Constitution.

This provision gives the regular courts limited powers with respect to the Constitution. They can do nothing to implement the programmatic norms, which are considered unenforceable on the grounds that they are merely directives to the legislature and are not in themselves legally binding.³⁷ They cannot directly implement the preceptive norms. By declaring laws unconstitutional that are incompatible with the preceptive norms, they can at least clear away some of the impedimenta to the observance of these norms.³⁸ Even this power, however, is seriously limited by the fact that the principle of *stare decisis* is not admitted in the Italian legal system and consequently the regular courts are not empowered to lay down general principles on the constitutionality of laws and on the interpretation of articles of the Constitution. When an Italian court within the regular judicial system declares a law unconstitutional, the decision applies only to the case before the court, and there is no assurance that other courts higher or lower (or the same court, for that matter) will follow the precedent.³⁹

The result of this state of affairs is that the courts have pecked away at some of the patently unconstitutional provisions in the Codes and principal laws of Italy, preventing their application in single instances; but since on many questions there has been little consistency in the court decisions, there can be little assurance on the part of the public that a future violation of these provisions will be condoned. In other words, the citizen has no way of knowing what his rights and privileges actually are.

The absolute lack of adjustment of the former criminal law to the democratic principles of the new Constitution, resulting in the coexistence of norms which are basically antithetical in inspiration and clearly incompatible in more than one instance, has brought about a crisis in the relations between the law and the citizen, with the result that the citizen's obligation to know the criminal law becomes increasingly difficult to fulfill.⁴⁰

³⁷ Barile, *La costituzione*, pp. 93-100. Decision, Court of Cassation, United Criminal Sections, March 5, 1949, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 101, Sec. 2, pp. 281-89 (1949).

³⁸ Barile, *La costituzione*, Paolo Barile and Alberto Predieri, "Efficacia abrogante delle norme della costituzione," in Calamandrei-Levi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 69-86; Piero Calamandrei, *La illegittimità costituzionale*; Gaetano Azzariti, *Problemi attuali di diritto costituzionale* (Milan, 1951).

³⁹ In decisions dated May 31, June 19, July 17, July 24, and July 27, 1950, various sections of the Tribunal of Rome held that Article 114 of the Law on Public Security, prepared by the Fascists, prohibiting the printing of photographs of persons who have committed a crime, was unconstitutional because it was in conflict with the guarantee of freedom of the press in Article 21 of the Constitution. On July 1, 1950, another section of the same tribunal convicted the editor of one of Rome's prominent newspapers of violating this article by printing a picture of a man accused but not convicted of a crime, in spite of the fact that Article 27 of the Constitution provides that "The accused is not considered guilty until he has been convicted (*sino alla condanna definitiva*)."

(See *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 103, Sec. 2, pp. 52-60 (1951).)

⁴⁰ These are the words of an Italian judge, Massimo Severino, "Rimpatrio coattivo e costituzione," *Il foro padano*, Vol. 6, Sec. 4, pp. 103-7, at 103 (1950).

In Italy the judiciary is a career service. Young law students enter it by passing competitive examinations, and often remain in it for life. At first glance it may seem surprising that the young pretors eager for advancement in the service should be more zealous guardians of the Constitution and more ready to limit the powers and activities of the government than the judges of the Court of Cassation, who have reached the top rung of the judicial ladder. Nevertheless an examination of the reported cases⁴¹ shows that the pretor has often been more diligent than his older and more august colleagues on the higher benches in enforcing the Constitution. This diligence may be due in part to the greater degree of idealism and naïveté considered inherent in the young, and in part to the fact that the humble pretor is likely to officiate in a hamlet, where happenings are of little concern to the government in Rome. The judges of the Court of Cassation, on the other hand, sit in Rome. They are older men, less interested in change *per se*, in constant contact with government leaders, and continually subject to their informal pressure.

The courts have been most consistent in implementing those sections of the Constitution which increase their powers. Thus there has been little disagreement over the enforcement of Articles 111 and 113 of the Constitution, which give the right of appeal to the Court of Cassation from the various administrative courts, or of Article 103, paragraph 3, which limits the competence of courts martial in peacetime to military crimes committed by members of the armed forces.

Much of the work of the courts on constitutional matters in this period has been over the application of laws which appear to be in open conflict with the civil liberties provisions of the Constitution. An examination of a few of the more important constitutional provisions in this field will suffice to show the general confusion that reigns in Italy today. Most of the cases reported have dealt with administrative actions based on Fascist legislation which the present Parliament has not yet modified or repealed and which is in sharp conflict with the basic civil liberties.

Religious freedom is guaranteed by Articles 3, 8, and 19 of the Constitution, which read in part, respectively:

All citizens . . . are equal before the law without distinction . . . of religion. . . .

Relations between the government and the various churches are regulated by agreements between them.

Everyone has the right to profess his own religious faith . . . and perform its rites in private or public as long as the rites are not contrary to public morals.

In spite of these provisions, religious freedom appears to exist in Italy only in the larger centers. The police, at the instigation of local priests, regularly enforce patently unconstitutional provisions of the Fascist legislation forbidding religious activities of non-Roman Catholic groups, such as church services, ringing of bells, and proselytizing. In one instance the local authorities went so far as

⁴¹ There is no systematic reporting of the decisions of the Italian courts. Interesting cases, chosen somewhat at random, are written up and commented on in the various law reporters. The only exception is for the Court of Cassation. All of the points of law decided by this court are collected and published as maxims (*massimari*).

to forbid a man to have running water in his home on the grounds that he was a Holy Roller.⁴³

In three cases, at least, the courts have enforced the Constitution in protection of religious freedom. The right to hold religious services was upheld by the pretor of San Giorgio del Sannio.⁴³ In a decision of October 26, 1950, the Tribunal of Catania upheld the right to attempt to proselytize for any religious faith whose rites are not contrary to public morals.⁴⁴ The Court of Appeals of Bologna reversed a lower court decision in a separation case, which held that a father who read anti-clerical newspapers and used profanity was *ipso facto* an unfit guardian for his child.⁴⁵

In general it can be said that the present Italian government has practically refused to reach agreements with the minority religious groups and to issue regulations in modification of the present provisions of the Criminal Code and of many other laws that appear clearly unconstitutional.⁴⁶

Freedom of speech and of the press also have had a rocky road. These freedoms are protected in the Constitution in quite unequivocal terms: "Everyone has the right to express his opinion verbally or in writing" (Art. 21). There have been so many and such conflicting decisions on these matters that only a

⁴³ Giorgio Spini, "Le minoranze protestanti in Italia," *Il ponte*, Vol. 6, pp. 670-89 at 682 (June, 1950). See also a note by Giorgio Spini in *Il ponte*, Vol. 8, p. 844 (May-June, 1952); and Gaetano Salvemini, "I protestanti in Italia," *Il mondo*, Vol. 4, No. 32, pp. 3-4 (August 9, 1952).

⁴⁴ The Minister of the Interior in the Fascist era sent instructions to the prefects interpreting Article 650 of the Criminal Code so as to make it a crime for Holy Rollers to hold religious services. The instructions read: "The Pentecost cult is not admitted in the Kingdom because it expresses itself in rites that are contrary to social order and are harmful to the physical and psychic integrity of the race." Several years later, after the fall of Fascism and the promulgation of the new Constitution, at the instigation of a local priest the prefect decided to break up the Holy Rollers' meetings and so instructed the police. In his decision upholding the Holy Rollers' right to meet, the pretor observed (1) that the instructions were invalid because the Holy Rollers had not been advised of their content, (2) that the instructions were unconstitutional because they were incompatible with Article 19 of the Constitution, (3) that Article 18 of the Law on Public Security, requiring notification of public meetings, was abrogated with respect to religious services. The following extract from the pretor's decision is worthy of citation: "They abandon themselves to shouts, to sudden rough bodily contacts, and to the emission of incomprehensible words. Now, admitting that such incandescence and fanatical collective exuberance (not unknown to the greatest religious movements) may in certain instances and over a period of time upset the nervous equilibrium of the less balanced persons, it would still be absurd to hold that public morals are offended by these meetings . . . to such an extent as to justify their suppression." (Pretura of San Giorgio del Sannio, June 24, 1950, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 102, Sec. 2, pp. 310-16 [1950].)

⁴⁵ Reported in *Diritto ecclesiastico*, p. 150 (1951).

⁴⁶ Decision of April 13, 1950, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 102, Sec. 1, Part 2, pp. 241-48 (1950).

⁴⁷ Paolo Barile, "Appunti sulla condizione dei culti acattolici in Italia," *Diritto ecclesiastico*, p. 342 (1952). It is the opinion of two prominent Italian lawyers that under the present Codes it is a criminal offense in Italy to recite the Articles of Faith of the Church of England and the Protestant Episcopal Church, as such recitation would be a slander of the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church.

few of the decisions of the Court of Cassation can be mentioned here. In a decision of January 17, 1950, the Court of Cassation refused to apply Article 113 of the Law on Public Security requiring previous authorization for distributing circulars in public places, putting up wall posters, or using lights or loudspeakers as a means of communication, on the grounds that this law was incompatible with Article 21 of the Constitution.⁴⁷ This decision was confirmed with respect to putting up wall posters a week later.⁴⁸ Less than three months later, however, the Court of Cassation decided that Article 21 of the Constitution was programmatic and not preceptive and that Article 113 of the Law on Public Security was still effective.⁴⁹ Shortly after, the Court of Cassation decided that *giornali murali*, that is, newspapers printed solely to be posted in public places, are free from the obligations of Article 113 of the Law on Public Security, not because this article has been abrogated by Article 21 of the Constitution, but because of the provisions of Article 10 of the law on the press of February 8, 1948, No. 47.⁵⁰ Three months later, however, the same court decided that only *giornali murali*, and not ordinary newspapers, can be posted without the previous consent of the police.⁵¹

Article 16 of the Constitution reads:

Every citizen may move about freely and settle in any part of the country, except for the limitations which the law may establish for motives of health and safety.

The Court of Cassation has come to the conclusion that this article does not deprive the police of the power to return any Italian to his place of residence if he lacks an identity card or is considered perilous to public order, public safety, or public morality. It should be borne in mind that the citizen has no legal redress against this police action.⁵²

According to Article 17 of the Constitution, citizens have the right to assemble, and it is not necessary to have the previous consent of the public authorities even for meetings open to the public. In this case the Court of Cassa-

⁴⁷ Reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 102, Sec. 2, p. 129 (1950), and in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 5, Sec. 4, p. 67 (1950), and *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 55, Sec. 2, p. 291 (1950).

⁴⁸ Court of Cassation, January 24, 1950, reported in *Il foro italiano*, Vol. 73, Sec. 2, p. 73 (1950).

⁴⁹ Court of Cassation, April 15, 1950, reported in *Il foro italiano*, Vol. 73, Sec. 2, p. 105 (1950), and *Il foro padano*, Vol. 5, Sec. 4, p. 121 (1950); Court of Cassation, October 12, 1950, reported in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 14 (1951); Court of Cassation, January 11, 1951, reported in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 640 (1951).

⁵⁰ Court of Cassation, October 16, 1950, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 103, Sec. 2, p. 287 (1951), also in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 115 (1951).

⁵¹ Court of Cassation, January 20, 1951, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 103, Sec. 2, p. 289 (1951), and in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 57, Sec. 2, p. 11 (1952).

⁵² Court of Cassation, December 9, 1950, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 6, Sec. 4, p. 271 (1951), and in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 99 (1951); Court of Cassation, June 19, 1950, reported in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 55, Sec. 2, p. 971 (1950); Court of Cassation, April 28, 1951, reported in *La giustizia penale* (Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 922 (1951)); Court of Cassation, January 20, 1951, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 6, Sec. 4, pp. 175-84 (1951). See also Paolo Barile, "Costituzione e misure di sicurezza restrittive della libertà personale," *Il foro padano*, Vol. 6, Sec. 4, pp. 175-82 (1951).

tion has decided that Article 18 of the Law on Public Security, requiring the consent of the police and notice to the police at least three days beforehand for meetings in public places or open to the public, is abrogated by the Constitution with respect to meetings open to the public.⁵³ Article 25 of the Constitution outlaws *ex post facto* laws. Italy's highest court, in a case involving persons accused of "Fascist crimes," perhaps overhastily decided that this provision was in itself not retroactive, and that it only applies to future legislation.⁵⁴

Articles 36 and 40 of the Constitution protect the workers' right to a living wage and to strike. According to Article 36 the worker has a right to remuneration proportioned to the quality and quantity of his work, and in any case sufficient to assure him and his family a free and decent life. This article has been applied in many instances for the purpose of nullifying provisions in individual labor contracts at variance with the minimum pay established in collective agreements.⁵⁵ In other instances the courts have considered the article programmatic and have refused to apply it.⁵⁶

Article 40 of the Constitution reads in full: "The right to strike will be exercised in accordance with the laws that regulate it." Owing to parliamentary inactivity, no such laws have been enacted. The meaning of Article 40 seemed clear to the Naples Tribunal when it refused to hear a criminal case in which the defendants were accused of striking.⁵⁷ Five months later, however, the Tribunal of Cremona disagreed. In upholding the dismissal of striking workers, this court said, "The right to strike cannot be held to exist, since, according to Article 40 of the Constitution, it is dependent on the enactment of legislation that will distinguish between legal and illegal strikes."⁵⁸ The Court of Cassation later held that Article 40 of the Constitution is clearly preceptive, that striking is therefore a right, that *qui iure suo utitur neminem laedit*, and that the em-

⁵³ Court of Cassation, March 31, 1951, reported in *Il foro italiano*, Vol. 74, Sec. 2, p. 124 (1951), and in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 103, Sec. 2, p. 281 (1951), and in *La giustizia penale*, Vol. 56, Sec. 2, p. 673 (1951).

⁵⁴ Court of Cassation, February 7, 1948, reported in *Il foro italiano*, Vol. 71, Sec. 2, p. 57 (1948), in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 100, Sec. 2, p. 129 (1948), and in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 3, Sec. 4, p. 7 (1948). See also decision of Court of Appeals of Milan, January 27, 1948, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 3, Sec. 4, p. 33 (1948); and articles by Francesco Carnelutti, "Abrogazione del reato di collaborazionismo," *Rivista penale*, pp. 34 ff. (1948), and Barile-Predieri, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁵⁵ Notably Court of Cassation, February 21, 1952, reported in *Orientamenti della giurisprudenza del lavoro*, Vol. 1, p. 203 (1952).

⁵⁶ Tribunal of Milan, April 18 to August 6, 1951, reported in *Orientamenti della giurisprudenza del lavoro*, Vol. 1, p. 205 (1952); Tribunal of Parma, November 3, 1951, reported in *Orientamenti della giurisprudenza del lavoro*, Vol. 1, p. 207 (1952). See also the discussion on this point in *Orientamenti della giurisprudenza del lavoro*, Vol. 1, pp. 208-13 (1952).

⁵⁷ Decision of July 24, 1950, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 102, Sec. 2, p. 353 (1950).

⁵⁸ Decision of December 16, 1950, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 103, Sec. 1, Part 2, p. 300 (1951), and in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 6, Sec. 4, p. 132 (1951). See also decision of the same Tribunal of June 29, 1949, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 5, Sec. 4, p. 112 (1950).

employer has no legal redress against strikers as such. The court went on to declare, however, that, pending legislative determination to the contrary, slowdowns or similar practices (*scioperi a scacchiera, a singhiozzo, e simili*) were not strikes and that employers were not restricted by Article 40 in the steps they could legally take against workers who participated in such practices.⁵⁹

Although the Constitutional Court has not been established, the High Court of Sicily has. This latter is set up in accordance with the provisions of the Sicilian Regional Constitution, and is empowered to judge the constitutionality of the laws passed by the Regional Assembly, of national laws in the light of the Sicilian Constitution, and the effectiveness of national laws within the region.⁶⁰

The High Court of Sicily has handed down at least two decisions which have done their part in increasing the present confusion in Italian constitutional law. One decision declared unconstitutional a law of the National Parliament that would have permitted alterations in the Sicilian Constitution by Parliament through ordinary legislation rather than by constitutional amendment.⁶¹ The other approved the validity of a regional law permitting issuance of bearer stock, which was in conflict with national legislation.

CONCLUSION

The Seventy-five wrote, and the Constitutional Assembly approved, a Constitution that in spite of its ambiguity and excessive length was on the whole a good piece of work. The labor of giving birth to this Constitution, however, seems to have exhausted the democratic fervor that spread over Italy at the close of the war, and there has been no serious attempt to implement its provisions.

It seems that the new Constitution was the final achievement, at least for the present, of the liberal *Risorgimento* spirit that united Italy in the nineteenth century, only to peter out with the disappearance from the political scene of men of the caliber of Cavour, D'Azeglio, Ricasoli, Mazzini, and Garibaldi. The enormity of Fascism and the Partisan movement reawakened this spirit, which was expressed in its highest political form by the ill-fated Action party.⁶²

As so often happens in Italian history, the spirit of renewal and reform has been overcome by the forces of tradition. In Italy these forces are ubiquitous. One should not condemn too severely Parliament, the administration, and the courts for failure to implement and enforce the Constitution when there has been little popular demand for its implementation or enforcement. Although it preserves most of the old institutions, the new Constitution implies a spiritual revolution in which the majority of the Italian people, traditionally cynics in political matters, do not believe.

⁵⁹ Decision of March 15, 1952, reported in *Il foro padano*, Vol. 7, Sec. 4, p. 9 (1952).

⁶⁰ Sicilian Constitution, Art. 25.

⁶¹ High Court of the Region of Sicily, September 20, 1948, reported in *Giurisprudenza italiana*, Vol. 101, Sec. 1, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. (1949). This law was to have been effective for only two years.

⁶² Jemolo, *Chiesa e stato*, pp. 718-719.

In spite of the formally effective new Constitution, Italy is actually being governed under much the same laws, and people, as during Fascism. There is no longer a King; the top Fascists are out; there is no longer a death penalty; there is no legally sanctioned racial discrimination; but the inertia of Parliament and the prejudices of the bureaucracy have resisted most of the changes envisaged in the new Constitution. Otherwise so modern, so youthful and so eager to adopt the newest and best from abroad, the Italian culture has a limited concept as to the practicability of political reform.

The Italian Constitution is essentially a liberal Constitution. The De Gasperi government is essentially Roman Catholic in political orientation. It can understand and actively support such welfare measures as a revolutionary land reform, an overhauling of the tax structure, and large public works programs to improve education and transportation, but it has little feeling for liberalism. The present government, therefore, is likely in time to implement the institutional changes planned in the Constitution, but it is less likely to implement the civil liberties provisions. Only if and when the dormant liberal spirit arises again in Italy, are these provisions apt to become really effective.

THE POLITICS OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT IN THE STATES*

KARL A. BOSWORTH

University of Connecticut

In the wake of the Hoover Commission reports, a great majority of the states authorized special inquiries into the organization and operation of their executive institutions. With very few exceptions, the numerous postwar movements for state reorganization appear to have resulted in only moderate or negligible legislative acceptance of the reorganization proposals. The spectacle of such meager accomplishment from so much effort invites reflection on the politics of management improvement in the states.

Through the generous cooperation of professional colleagues about the country, data were assembled on the successes and failures of these reorganization movements, upon the initiation, organization, and scope of the surveys, and upon the methods of presenting the survey reports to the legislatures and to the public. The data cover thirty states, in twenty-four of which the state legislature has had at least one chance to consider commission recommendations. In the remaining six states¹ the reports are still in the process of preparation, or await legislative consideration. Included in the twenty-four are four states in which the study group has made some reports but continues in existence to make further reports, so that the success of the efforts in these states must be tentatively judged on the basis of legislative reception of reports so far received.

In only two of the twenty-four states—New Hampshire and New Jersey—was the legislative response pronouncedly positive. In New Hampshire, under the gubernatorial leadership of Sherman Adams, the legislature accepted all major proposals and all but one of an estimated 24 moderate-scale proposals. New Jersey is a special case in that this state was in a continual turmoil of constitutional revision and administrative reorganization efforts from 1941 into 1948, with five committees and commissions and a constitutional convention working on these problems and having among them some overlapping leadership. The commission created in 1944 to study administrative organization issued reports and recommendations serially over a period of years and received several positive legislative responses. In 1948, when the legislature met under a new constitution requiring all administrative agencies to be placed in no more than twenty departments, the legislature quickly completed a reorganization of the state's numerous agencies into fourteen statutory departments. This stage in New Jersey took place under the leadership of members of the

* A paper presented at the annual meetings of the Association in Buffalo, August 26¹ 1952. Acknowledgment is made to J. F. Isakoff, Illinois Legislative Council, who proposed the inquiry on which the paper is based and assisted in it in various ways.

¹ Indiana, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas.

commission created in 1944, including Governor Alfred E. Driscoll, and with the assistance of a joint legislative committee and strong, sympathetic party majorities in both houses.²

In contrast, in nine of the states³ the legislative reception has either been completely negative or so slight as to be regarded as a soundly negative response. In thirteen states,⁴ the legislative response has been ambivalent with a score—according to my rough weighted scoring method—of between twenty-nine and fifty-two per cent adoption. In about half these states with ambivalent legislative responses, the classification would have been negative on the basis of the acceptance of major proposals, and was saved from that category only by greater legislative receptivity to moderate- and minor-scale proposals.

For those of us who have participated in these reorganization efforts, the question may be: What did we do wrong? From a more detached point of view, the inquiry could run either in the direction of a critique of the content of reorganization proposals and organization theory or toward an inquiry into the politics of state administrative reorganization. Following the latter course and the view that reorganization is as much a political as a scientific process, I propose in this paper to investigate the conditions affecting the likelihood of legislative acceptance of Little Hoover Commission or similarly sourced proposals for state administrative changes.

I. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

It is appropriate to state certain general assumptions at this point. Legislatures tend generally to be negative toward proposals for either moderate-scale or major changes in the formal allocation of influence in their governments. The formal organization of the executive branch is, among other things, a distribution of political power and influence which reaches beyond the confines of the executive branch. There is a strong probability of alliances between legislators and officers and groups having a stake in the present organization, and there is some particular negativism toward building the influence position of the governor. These may be, in part, corollaries to a condition of general conservatism in the legislative consideration of any proposed major changes in public policy.

Certain general conditions in a setting may tend to reduce legislative negativism toward major proposals. Possibly situations of either deep despair or high optimism regarding the fate of individuals and institutions generally may reduce legislative negativism. When horizons are low because of despair, it is easy to reason that any change is unlikely to worsen conditions and may improve them (e.g., Nebraska's shift to unicameralism and other depression

² I am indebted for insights into these New Jersey matters to William Miller, Princeton Surveys, and Paul M. Douglas, Oberlin College.

³ Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Ohio.

⁴ Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.

changes in important state policy). When horizons are wide with general optimism, the risks of any change seem lessened (e.g., the many changes in the period from the late 1890's to World War I).

If these assumptions have some validity, one may say that regardless of the immediate motivations of state reorganization activity, the excellence of surveys, the current political alignment or misalignment of the legislative houses and the governor's office, and the vigor and art of programs to interpret reorganization proposals to the public and to legislators, there is a good chance of failure in getting a positive legislative response. The existing institutions represent some sort of balance among existing forces. The usual negativism is such that a substantial share of the possible favorable conditions directly related to the reorganization effort will be needed in order to overcome what should be the expected negative legislative response. If one could time the starting of reorganization movements, probably periods of generally low personal expectations and—should they again occur in an area as large as a state—periods of high general optimism are most propitious.

II. THE MOTIVES FOR REORGANIZATION STUDIES AND PROBABLE SUCCESS

The news that "good public administration is good politics" has obviously been getting around. There seem grounds for supposing that some political leaders have sought to reap some of the benefits of this proposition without paying the price.

If a reorganization study is undertaken for motives other than improved public management, it is quite probable that little will be accomplished. Motives of "getting into the act" by imitating other states and the national government, of diverting attention from other parts of the current scenery, or of creating supposed campaign advantages, seem to have been factors in the rash of Little Hoover Commission activity. Such motives may be exhausted in the study effort, leaving little or no motivation among the influential for the consideration and adoption of proposals. Further, if the mixed-objectives situation exists in the survey commission, the recommendations may be tailored for the accomplishment of public relations motives rather than with a view to making proposals having some chance for legislative adoption. Then too, if the motives of the proponents of a survey are suspected by the populace, the popular support generally necessary for legislative action may not be forthcoming. An administration survey undertaken halfheartedly and for devious reasons may nevertheless gather support and result in significant achievement. If I interpret accurately one of our participant's questionnaire responses, something like this may have happened in one state where the survey committee "brought temporary relief to a much harassed political organization" which was being harried in regard to services and taxes. The major problem of taxation was not resolved by the committee, but several of its reorganization proposals were adopted.

A nucleus of political leaders who clearly have good faith in seeking management improvement can quite likely find strong popular support for their pro-

posals. This is a variant expression of the Brownlow-reported Wilsonian prescription to politico-administrators to "take high ground," for who can directly oppose improved administration? That private career motives may also be aided by this approach is generally not a detracting factor.

The muckrakers taught us that finding scandalous or notorious conditions is one way to provoke reform. Though one might question some of their methods and objectives, it does seem clear that the likelihood of positive action on administrative improvement is heightened if the inadequacy of existing administration has been publicly dramatized and if the motivation for reorganization activity arises out of protests at the dramatized inadequacies. It matters little that the breakdowns may have been personal moral lapses rather than the results of faulty administrative arrangements: the "ins" and their political allies are put on the defensive. They are vulnerable to an opposing political movement to reorganize the state government, or they may be persuaded to purify themselves in the public mind through measures for administration improvement.

Probably little planned help can be expected, however, from dramatized inadequacies. Crusading newspaper publishers and sophisticated reporters of state administration are seemingly scarce about state capitols. State government news seems to rank well behind national and local government news in the value systems of many publishers. With the best of will, the inadequacies of generally honest, but bumbling, public management are about as difficult to dramatize on a broad scale as is superior, professional public management. Those hopeful of a favorable moral and emotional climate for administrative reform probably must generally rely on the happenstances of defalcations, briberies, prison breaks, accidental patient and inmate deaths, failures of state structures, the discovery of fraudulent relief clients, and similar newsworthy calamities of life in the shadow of the dome.

It appears that the economy motive is still of relatively slight force in initiating administration improvement at the state level. In most states, the systems and levels of state taxation do not inflict sharp pains upon large, politically significant groups as do the local property tax and the national income tax. Although the lush state financial picture of 1943-45 is gone, it would appear that few, if any, states are making large numbers of taxpayers cry for professional state administration, as the taxpayers of hundreds of municipalities have sought relief from rising tax rates through council-manager government. Though this present judgment is, I believe, still correct, there is every indication that the economy motive may be heightened at the state level as a result of the rapidly growing state budgets and the trend toward shifting increasing amounts of the local government burden onto the payers of the state taxes.

State taxpayer organizations are, of course, present in many of our states, but their financial and political support seems to be limited largely to those particular elements of the business, financial, and industrial community having a direct economic concern with state taxes and state policy. Although such agencies are frequently vocal and active in the camp of administrative reform, the

desire of the constituency to retain friendly state policy developers and enforcers can easily neutralize the taxpayer agencies in the political battles for legislative adoption of administrative changes which increase policy uncertainties. The utilities, banks, and insurance companies know where they stand with their current state regulatory agencies. Perhaps the present situation of state taxpayer pain as a motive for administrative reform can best be described as one in which the scattershot state tax systems provide substantial motivation for the consideration of change but frequently inadequate motivation for making changes.

III. SPONSORSHIP AND REORGANIZATION SUCCESS

Hypothetically, it might be supposed that the opportunities for legislative enactment of reorganization proposals would be most favorable in a situation in which the survey is carried out under the leadership of the "outs," who thereupon become the "ins" and adopt their own recommendations before new vested interests are established in the offices to be eliminated. In 1948 Mr. Truman, with the cooperation of millions of voters, prevented the testing of this hypothesis at the national level, and, so far as has been learned, no state's reorganization activity falls exactly into this pattern.

Generally, we may agree that favorable auspices for reorganization activity would occur in the joint sponsorship of an administrative survey by a governor and legislative houses having majorities of the same political faith as the governor, with the recommendations received by the same alignment. One would also think that legislative council sponsorship would be auspicious in those states where the legislative council is well accepted as a source of legislative proposals; but in only one of the three such surveys was there significant achievement. In the South, gubernatorial sponsorship of administrative reform, with or without formal joint sponsorship by the legislature, appears to be generally auspicious. Sponsorship by a citizens' or taxpayers' organization may in some situations present feasibilities, especially if the private organization is given a temporary official connection or status by a co-sponsoring governor or legislature. The Colorado reorganization movement developed in this way. Sponsorship by the legislature through a special legislative committee or commission without formal sponsorship or participation by the governor is an alternative of rather dubious merit in most states.

In eight of the states in which there was no significant adoption of reorganization recommendations, the initiative came from the legislature in five instances. In three, the governor was the initiator or participated in the initiation. In one of these, the governor later withdrew his support, and the other two movements failed when "model" plans were rejected. In fifteen states where there was some significant adoption, governors participated in the initiation in ten, legislators were the apparent initiators in four, and a private agency sold the idea to legislators in the other one. Even more striking evidence of the significance of governors in these movements is seen in the fact that governors were active in the sponsorship of the movements in eight of the nine states

adopting more than 40 per cent of the proposals, in my weighted measure.⁵

As to party divisions between the legislature and the governor, or between one house and the governor, we know that in some sharply partisan situations the division has been fatal to reorganization proposals, while in other circumstances it has not. In these latter situations, the political risks of giving the governor something for which he could take credit have apparently seemed less than the risks of killing a popularly supported measure. In Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts governors lacked party majorities in their legislatures, yet significant accomplishments were attained.

We have had ample evidence that legislative sponsorship of surveys does not forecast receptivity to recommendations and that governor-sponsors sometimes lose their enthusiasm for administrative reform. However, the legislators and governors are the "powers that be" in the formal government; and unless they are willing to give consideration to administrative alterations, there is no basis for any expectation of legislative action for management improvement.

With regard to political party leaders, it would seem that one must adopt the view that professional politicians, of whatever party, are likely to be no more than reluctant allies in moves for administration improvement. They have learned how to operate in the situation as it is and should generally not be expected to be enthusiastic for changes in the rules of a game in which they have perfected some art, unless such changes would remove some inconvenient obstacle.

Changes which have the tendency of making the formal government *the* government—the gathering into a neat hierarchy of most of the decision points—may be particularly well understood by and likewise obnoxious to the professional politicians. To the extent that the non-office-holding professional politicians have confidence in their ability to operate through the official hierarchy, this conclusion may need modification. Thus, one might find the party leaders of a regularly dominant party somewhat more receptive to proposals for administrative integration than the party leaders of a state with relatively evenly divided party contests where the chance of losing all direct influence is a risk to both parties. Likewise, in situations in which the leaders of both parties think the trend in statewide elections is toward dominance by their party, the opportunities for action may be improved. Generally, it would seem that assistance from the professional politicians can be expected only as a short-run compromise of their long-run objectives in order to support a popu-

⁵ The eight states are Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Virginia. In the ninth state, Colorado, the governor appears to have cooperated in at least some parts of the movement. The influence of governors in these matters is illustrated by developments in Louisiana and Rhode Island where substantial major and moderate-scale reorganizations were adopted under the leadership of governors, without benefit of reorganization commissions. In Louisiana the changes were both in the direction of disintegration and integration, while in Rhode Island they were in the direction of integrating both central and departmental administration.

lar issue. Governors and others with large fractions of influence can sometimes compel the professional politicians to take a passive, or even reluctantly a co-operating, role in reorganization legislation.

To round out the consideration of the political bases for reorganization activity, one must cite the almost automatic resistance to being "reorganized" of the leaders and clienteles of most administrative agencies. The Mississippi Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Reorganization of State Government interviewed the head of each state agency, quizzing him on his reaction to creating conditions for greater efficiency by a program of consolidation. In a letter of transmittal, the Mississippi committee synthesized the uniform agency head response in the following words:

I think this is one of the very best things that has ever been done in the State of Mississippi and I have long been of the opinion that this work should have been accomplished in the past. However, my department is of a type, character and kind that cannot be consolidated with any other agency, as its duties and functions are unique, and a reduction of personnel or a transfer of any duties of this department would work a hardship and prevent certain citizens from receiving benefits to which they are entitled.

Such reactions are familiar to all of us, and one must recognize that these agreeing opponents of reorganization commonly have large resources of political influence which they have cultivated in their daily work of agency survival and growth. A clientele organization controlling the policy of the fragment of state government that specially affects it is a potent and sure source of opposition to reorganization and a ready ally in log-rolling to preserve realms undisturbed among organizations similarly situated. There are, of course, exceptions in which the case for independence is so weak as to be indefensible or where politically weak agencies become ready to seek a formal alliance with a politically strong agency. There are also the existing departments which may stand to gain by consolidations, but their enthusiasm and power potentials frequently do not match those of the agencies which have decided that "you can't reorganize us." The pluralistic character of our political organization at the state level is probably best illustrated when typical general reorganization proposals are announced.

IV. COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSION

In considering the probable fate of commission proposals in terms of commission composition, it is probably of greatest importance that the members be persons of high general prestige and of actual political influence. It is normally not enough that they be respected, able, personally successful citizens. To express it crudely: How many votes can they swing in the legislature, and how effectively can they rally popular support? It is probably of next importance that the commission be so composed that it cannot be identified as representing any limited elements in the political spectrum of the state. The first of these considerations is expressed with a view toward the positive organization of support for the recommendations. The second, although indirectly beneficial to that end through broad representation, is expressed primarily as a defensive

and cautionary concept with a view to avoiding the effective and easy labelling of the commission's effort as a minority report from a limited segment of the polity. Most other considerations with regard to commission composition are subsidiary or corollary to these two seemingly basic ones.

As to the value of legislator memberships, there are the to-be-hoped-for positive considerations of having leading legislators both committed to the recommendations and prepared to explain the proposals to their colleagues. There are, at the same time, the risks that particular legislator members will choose to entertain specific or general reservations about the recommendations and become in the inner chambers trained opponents of the proposals. There is the further risk that if an election intervenes between the formation of the commission and the legislative session which considers the report, some of the legislator members may become lame ducks and lose their influence, while others succeed to posts which remove them from the legislative arena.

The occasional lukewarmness of governors to commission proposals suggests the desirability of attempting to get commissions constructed so as to avoid this contingency. Although other means may be designed, the arrangement which allows the governor to appoint at least some of the members serves to involve him and may make some member the governor's delegate who keeps the governor informed about and possibly privately committed to the commission's work, step by step.

It is, of course, desirable that commission members be well informed about a state's executive organization and about the feasibilities of political action in the state, and it would be presumed that persons of high prestige and influence in state affairs could generally fulfill these requirements. Former governors and others who have been near the center of the complex of executive-legislative forces, if they have escaped with their reputations fairly well intact, may have particularly valuable contributions to make to a commission's endeavors and may have an authority of personal knowledge of large weight. Even some unsuccessful candidates for governor may have thought more about the executive problems of the state than most citizens. All of these considerations have been evident in our data, and in states where it is appropriate the bipartisan theme has been emphasized. There are other important personal qualities, such as the disposition and ability to work with others towards agreement in the conference situation and ability in public expositions of the commission's work. But these are minor compared with the individual prestige and influence of the members and the invulnerability of the members collectively to easy attack.

Commission size in our data varied from four to forty-one members, with each extreme having some successes in adoptions. About three-quarters of the groups had from seven to thirteen members, and size, except for the risk of unrepresentativeness in smaller commissions, has no apparent relation to success.

Certain of the commissions have had advisory committees. The success in New Hampshire where this device was used suggests the desirability of giving careful consideration to adaptations of this arrangement. An advisory group of over thirty participated with the nine commission members in subcommit-

tees, studying and making recommendations for particular areas. This group, along with the commission members, actively organized the public campaign for the adoption of proposals.⁶ The New Hampshire story suggests that the advisory committee was not a decisive factor in their success; rather, it was one of several important contributing factors.

The Oregon interim legislative committee on state organization, which had significant successes, created an advisory committee of six university professors. Although most of us might agree that this was a wise move, I have no information regarding the role played by these professional advisers, unless it is reflected in our respondent's comment that "the staff work, while quite limited, was of high quality. . . ." The Minnesota commission divided into committees to which approximately 150 citizens were added. In this case, it appears that the added members participated in the investigatory work and the committee deliberations.

V. ORGANIZATION, SCOPE, AND METHOD OF SURVEY

In considering the scope of surveys, factors such as the terms of the authorization of the survey, the issues which precipitate the survey, the present condition of state administration, time, money, and the judgment of the commission or director may be determinative. It is with this exercise of judgment that we may be most appropriately concerned here. It has been the fashion to make the scope broad and to be expansive in the setting of objectives. Insofar as our professional craft has influenced these decisions, it is probably understandable that we have wanted to give the states the full benefit of our knowledge and wisdom. The state does not ask for our prescription every year. All too frequently, it would appear, commissions and advisers have not curbed these perfectionist inclinations; and where the authorization is broad and the time and funds are adequate, there may seem to be no alternative to the making of large plans.

Although in some states the conditions of state administration may almost compel the making of broad prescriptions, prudent judgment in the interest of securing some positive accomplishment may dictate the curbing of scope and the concentration of efforts on the areas of greatest vulnerability and the areas of greatest practicable gains. The device of being prescriptive on certain points and of being only educational on others, with suggestions of alternatives or of areas for further study, is frequently preferable. The generally limited results of the completed surveys suggest strongly that the planners of additional surveys give hard thought to the question: What are the feasible objectives of this survey?

The fact that constitutional proposals were made in all the states (with the possible exception of Delaware) in which the legislative response was negative is suggestive. Of the fifteen states in which there was significant legislative accomplishment, only six of the reorganization proposals included constitutional

⁶ John D. Langmuir, "New Hampshire Secures Partial Reorganization," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 39, pp. 344-46 (July, 1950).

amendments.⁷ In most of the states where the scope of the survey was limited or the proposals have concentrated on a relatively few objectives, there has been some significant legislative acceptance of recommendations. The fact that the New Hampshire proposals were not perfectionist in any doctrinaire fashion seems relevant also.

Rather definitely to be avoided, at least on the basis of the Connecticut experience and perhaps that of other states, is the stretching of the scope beyond that understood by the authorizing body. Reorganization movements have sufficient hazards without raising the question of the legitimacy of the progeny.

In organizing general surveys, the commissions have apparently learned not to turn the whole job over to one of the national consulting firms. Monumental as the surveys and reports of these agencies have been, and useful as they may remain for various educational purposes, they have rarely been the means of producing directly positive legislative responses. Only Delaware and Virginia, among the states on which we have postwar data, turned the survey job over to one of the national consulting firms and in Delaware the accomplishment was nil. South Carolina, in a 1942-45 survey using a different national organization, had a similar experience, although a later attempt apparently using home grown talent was somewhat more successful. The outside firm arrangement creates several risks. There may not be enough participation by the commission and others for them to become parties to the conclusions and to gain an understanding of the proposals for purposes of communicating them persuasively. There is the risk that the surveyors may give too little attention to feasibilities, local values, and traditions. There is the ease of labelling the surveyors as foreign experts and thus as ignorant men so far as local conditions are concerned. With the best of will on the part of the consulting firms, continued consultation for the purpose of making explanations and modifications is likely to be difficult when the surveyors have to be pulled off new jobs and must travel back to the scene for necessarily limited periods. These observations relate solely to the use of consultant organizations for the whole survey job and not to their use on particular area surveys, as a task force, nor to their use as adviser consultants in planning surveys or reports where the survey work is done by the commission and other local agencies or consulting firms.

Although it is not a completely reliable touchstone, the engagement as survey director of a professional researcher already having some experience in the state and a favorable local reputation seems to be auspicious. Of fourteen states having some significant reorganization accomplishment for which this information is available, eleven had arrangements something like the above prescription. In several of the states with negative legislative results, the research direction seems as auspicious as in those above; but in more of them the research director had generally had less direct experience with the state government or very brief experience with the state. In one case, the director was apparently

⁷ The states in which specific constitutional proposals were not made are Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.

not a professional governmental researcher, although he had had state government experience.

If the governmental researcher skill group about state capitols and in nearby institutions is a superior hunting ground for survey directors, why is this so? Certainly these individuals have a head start in knowledge of state institutions. Also, they may already have in existence the nucleus of a research staff upon which to build. They are likely to continue available for the persuasion and modification stages. Finally, these individuals probably have a superior sensitivity to the feasible, the vulnerable, and the immobile and possess an authority based on the personal confidence of legislators and others in their abilities and trustworthiness. Some of them may also be able to give positive assistance in the political dynamics.

Whether task forces are used, whether specialists in functions survey the functions, whether "generalists" are used, whether the data collection on operations is heavy, moderate or slight—just so it doesn't seem to be altogether sketchy—appear to be of relatively little consequence in determining the fate of proposals for legislation on reorganization. Probably the heavy data collections are generally wasted effort, except where detailed legislation on procedures is being sought. Winners and losers have tried all methods. Perhaps the sales engineer needs to know only somewhat more about the products than do the customers. Having a few distinguished specialists may help lend authority to proposals and some of them may ease the gathering of the essential minimum of information in a field, but Connecticut, as well as other examples, illustrates the fact that having numbers of blue ribbon task force leaders does not sell the proposals. Giving attention to minor- and moderate-scale proposals seems to be somewhat controversial, some regarding it as likely to distract attention from the major proposals or otherwise disapproving of it. Most of the surveys have given attention to the lesser aspects of affairs and their successes have been largely in this area. This approach probably does distract attention, but it may also be a means of getting the legislature started in making positive responses so that the consideration of more moderate- and major-scale proposals may continue with possible favorable action. Some accomplishment, even though it be not of a first order, is a great solace to the participants and avoids the reputation of a fiasco, so that the start of future efforts may be easier. Where administration is generally good, details may be the appropriate objects of attention.

The plans in which committee consideration of reorganization is spread over a period of time, or indefinitely, with interim reports and recommendations from time to time, vary from the usual procedure. In some of these situations, as in New York, California and Massachusetts, the widespread use of legislative interim committees with vague deadlines seems to be habitual, and the prospect of results is probably closely related to the motives of the committee members and their influence in their houses, with governors possibly providing significant overtones. In Maryland, however, it is apparently the plan to complete the work before some not too distant date, but to report and recommend

as studies of specific areas are completed. This approach may have the merits of concentrating attention on particular proposals and of avoiding having all the wolves howling at once. However, it risks a collapse of the movement following an adverse legislative response to the first recommendations.

VI. PRESENTATION OF SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At least two related major considerations bear on the presentation of survey reports and recommendations. One concerns the attempts to influence the politically potent directly; the other has to do with attempts to interest the public widely so that there may be strong popular support nudging the politically potent toward action. As minimums in these two categories, one may expect the preparation of bills and appearances by the commission and its staff before legislative committees and the publication and distribution of a report with newspaper notice of the event. The varieties and variable intensities of additional efforts in the several state reorganization movements cannot all be catalogued and measured, but one can safely risk the proposition that it is the measures in addition to the minimum which generally produce the positive responses.

Measures to influence the more powerful include keeping the governor informed, interested and pleased so that he may be ready to use his influence on the legislature and the "wounded" agency heads, and the inclusion on the commission or advisory bodies of individuals with large direct political influence. In New Hampshire and Maryland explanation sessions on the proposals were held for groups of legislators about the state, presumably before the sessions at which the proposals were considered. In Utah the executives of private agencies which constitute the important lobbies about the legislature were cultivated, with efforts to neutralize them or to make them allies on the reorganization issues. In Kansas and other states some individuals representing these interests were on the commission. In states where the current configurations of political power are relatively simple, measures such as these may be adequate. In the more complex states, and anywhere in case of doubt, measures for inducing popular interest in reorganization are, of course, appropriate.

Some legislatures, in authorizing reorganization surveys, have restricted the press and public campaign opportunities by requiring a single report and directly, or in effect, extinguishing the commission upon the submission of its report. How strictly these directions are followed may depend upon the consciences and dexterities of the commission leaders. On the other hand, in Michigan there were three press releases on each of thirty reports over a two-year period, and one wonders if the human capacity for interest in reorganization may have been satiated. The device of releasing the report in chapters over a period of about two weeks has proved an effective way of getting large amounts of publicity and of producing public discussion of the report.

These considerations raise the question of secrecy for the proposals being considered and the trends of commission thought during the survey and report preparation stages. There is the quite natural tendency of commissions to at-

tempt to minimize the pulling and hauling of contending forces about them which would be stimulated by news of commission thinking, and a like tendency to ease the altering of decisions by avoiding early tentative public commitments. There is possibly also some thought in this approach of giving the opponents less time to prepare their defenses. However, in most reorganization surveys the news gets around as to some of the commission views, and rumors and surmises based on inferences flow freely. If to these considerations are added the New Hampshire free press experience and the general tendency to involve larger numbers in the commission effort, one wonders if a nearly complete goldfish bowl policy isn't worthy of further trial. For the participants in the survey, it is undoubtedly a less comfortable, more tense situation than secret or semi-secret deliberations. The researchers should be stimulated to harder thought about the premises underlying their proposals and about the arguments and data which support these premises when their proposals and data formulations are to be opened quickly for public discussion. The injured may damage their case as much as they help it if the commission can maintain a mood of sweet reasonableness.

If a campaign for public support is to be conducted, there must be time for it as well as organization. Several of our surveys have had difficulties with their timing, getting their reports out just as legislative sessions were scheduled to meet or after sessions were well under way. All of us know some of the reasons why reports are late in appearing, but the difficulties encountered through late reporting suggest the desirability of curbing tendencies toward perfectionism and of leaving time in which public discussion of a completed report can be organized.

In the campaigns, newspapers, radio, and, in some areas, television, are media which have been used with some apparent success. Literature appropriate for mass distribution has been tried, particularly in Michigan. The device of the public forum has proved effective, particularly in New Hampshire, where over 300 such meetings were held before all sorts of organized groups. A one-day institute at the University of New Hampshire possibly helped train some of the people who participated in the forums.

The form of the commission report is, of course, significant in the campaign. If it is written and printed in a manner to stimulate wide reading, it can help. However, the generally limited success of reorganization efforts suggests the desirability of not keeping the report so simple that the substantial data relating to the proposals are omitted and are thus not readily available for later consideration of the original and alternative proposals.

In relation to the organization of mass campaigns, it seems in point to note that legislative council research directors and other similar types of persons who may direct surveys generally have disabilities for leading mass political action. For quite appropriate reasons, these researchers frequently cultivate political neutrality and the judicial habit of giving opinions only when properly requested. The university bureaus of governmental research also frequently have a cautious orientation toward political action. If these persons or agencies

are leaders in the survey job, it may be appropriate for them to indicate clearly the limits within which they operate so that the commission, committee, or council can plan for and organize other leadership for a mass campaign. In contrast, survey directors who are heads of citizen or taxpayer organizations are generally in their element in the attempted organization of popular support. This has been the experience in Colorado and Michigan.

It is also to be noted that even legislative councils, which are accustomed to making legislative proposals; as well as many legislative interim committees, exercise restraint in organizing campaigns for popular support for their proposals. The courtesies among legislators, though somewhat indistinct, do not generally permit the indiscriminate building of fires under colleagues through mass political action.

The device embodied in the federal reorganization enabling acts of authorizing a chief executive to submit reorganization plans to the legislature, with the plans going into effect unless the legislature takes positive action to veto them, has had very slight use in the states. This attempt to put inertia and indecision on the side of change has been considered in a number of states but has been rejected, apparently generally in fear of adverse decisions on constitutionality. So far as has been learned, only in New Hampshire and South Carolina was legislation authorizing such plans adopted; and in New Hampshire this method was dropped when a request by Governor and Council to the Supreme Court for an opinion on the constitutionality of the procedure brought an adverse report.⁸ In South Carolina the device was provided for in their 1948 reorganization act (Act 621 of 1948), and, of nine plans submitted, three were allowed to become effective, one of the three being an alternative to one of the rejected plans.⁹

In view of the usual result of partial or complete failure in reorganization movements, it is appropriate to consider how it may be possible to keep the movements in existence so that the proposals may have additional chances for consideration. Inside of government there are the possibilities that a governor may continue to press for action, that an interim committee to give further consideration may be formed, or that a legislative council may receive such an assignment, or, if it was the survey group, may continue the studies and resubmit proposals. In several states a legislative research agency is filling such a role. In Nevada, a legislative research agency is going this year into its third legislative session with its administrative survey proposals; some of its proposals were adopted in each of the first two sessions.

Outside of government are the existing private civic agencies and groups and newly formed citizens' committees to support the reorganization proposals in imitation of the national committee. Examples of the latter are to be found in Michigan and Minnesota. Some of these agencies and groups may have difficulty avoiding the label of special pleader and others may be amateurish at

⁸ Letter from George H. Deming, University of New Hampshire.

⁹ Letter from George R. Sherrill, University of South Carolina.

times; but when their actions are coordinated with similar moves inside government, action sometimes takes place. Even when a reorganization movement has been such a failure that no one wants to nourish it back into existence, the following years and even decades may see action on particular points treated or suggested in the survey. Although our frame of reference is legislative action following surveys, it is perhaps permissible to say that these reorganization studies and proposals have values in civic education regardless of the legislative accomplishments of the movements and that they sometimes stimulate agency-sponsored administrative improvement programs. The education of legislators and the stimulation of executive offices into thought about management may produce gains which in time justify the costs and efforts of the survey.

VII. LEGISLATORS' VIEW OF THE PROPOSALS

Previous reference to the nature of the reorganization proposals themselves have been oblique. They will not be analyzed here in any detail. The Council of State Governments' *Reorganizing State Governments*, published in 1950, analyzes the recommendations of the state commissions as of that date. There seems to be little change in the later developments except perhaps for some new emphasis on legislative financial controls.

What is generally in controversy and what is in point here is the executive-management-unity-of-command-single-head-departments-centralized-auxiliary-services pattern. In the nineteen general surveys which have in some sense been completed and for which we have data on this point, fifteen embodied in their report some version of the theme of making administration responsible to executive political authority. It would thus seem that among the surveyors the executive-management-unity-of-command ideas still tend to prevail. When one looks at the adoption of *major* proposals in these fifteen states, he finds New Hampshire's and New Jersey's large successes and some fraction of adoption in Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia, and almost no adoption of major proposals in the others. As the New Hampshire proposals tended to be very mild in their expression of the executive management concept, and as the enactment of major proposals has otherwise been quite slight, one can, I believe, assume a rather general resistance on the part of legislatures to the full acceptance of the executive management theme. There seems to be some willingness to give the governor added or enlarged tools for influencing management, but the unity-of-command-single-head administrative agency pattern seems to have limited attractiveness to the legislatures, perhaps less than in the 'twenties and 'thirties.

If these inferences are correct, we may, insofar as the content of proposals has influenced legislative reactions, have a situation of conflicting values and viewpoints. There is no way in logic to reconcile differences resulting from affinities for conflicting premises, and there is no point in attempting it. If some legislators want to think of reorganization proposals in terms of how they affect employees Mabel and Joe, the sportsmen and the dentists, and of how

the likely officeholders they know about fit the gubernatorial and department head thrones prepared for them in a reorganization plan, these ways of thinking are to be expected. If other legislators, some governors, citizens, and students of state administration want to think in terms of countering the centrifugal tendencies toward governments for every group and region within a loose holding corporation state government and of creating conditions which are more favorable for the resolution of conflicts, for the coordination of those activities which may with economy be coordinated, for the location of responsibility for executive development and execution of policy, and for the development, preservation, and communication of the arts of professional management and professional performance of functions, these ways of thinking are also to be expected. Whatever one thinks of these varied expectations, there is for the professional participant in movements for administrative change no basis for being doctrinaire. There is rather an opportunity to try to find the accommodations to these various values which can be arrived at currently in enactable measures. What is arrived at in reorganization proposals may not be neat in pattern and may look both toward integration and particularism, but if the conditions for developing professional administration are bettered, that is much to be preferred than having copies of a rejected "model" report.

Certainly to be avoided is the highly vulnerable position of asserting that economy or better services will flow from the enactment of reorganization plans. Any legislator knows that the occupants of the governor's and commissioners' chairs may have as their better talents and primary interests other matters than the general management of large enterprises. What they may not know and can perhaps be taught by modest demonstrations is that better services and economies can be attained by creating the conditions in which many people in the administration search regularly and broadly for optimum methods and arrangements for performing public tasks.

THE HOOVER COMMISSION'S PERSONNEL RECOMMENDATIONS—A PROGRESS REPORT

HAROLD H. LEICH*

U. S. Civil Service Commission

The Hoover Commission's personnel management report was published on February 9, 1949, early in the first session of the 81st Congress.¹ Four sessions of the Congress have had an opportunity to act on the report, and the executive branch has had four years to take advantage of those recommendations that could be adopted by administrative action. This seems to be an appropriate time, therefore, to review the record of progress in both legislative and executive branches, in order to learn the extent to which these far-reaching recommendations for improvement of federal personnel management have been adopted.

Soon after publication of the report, intensive study and discussions began within the executive branch. The Civil Service Commission sent a preliminary memorandum of its views to the President on March 23, 1949, with a transmittal letter referring to the report as a "constructive document," and agreeing with the objective of establishing a civilian career service.² The Federal Personnel Council, composed of personnel directors of federal agencies and representatives of the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget, made a detailed study of the report and submitted a number of comments to the Civil Service Commission.³ The Council endorsed most of the recommendations and suggested perfecting amendments to others, particularly those dealing with performance ratings and reductions in force.

Comprehensive bills embodying all personnel recommendations of the Hoover Commission that required legislation were introduced in June, 1949 by Senator McCarthy (S. 2111) and Representative Clare E. Hoffman (H. R. 5181) under the title "Federal Personnel Policy Act of 1949." Thus began intensive legislative activity in the form of hearings, committee reports, and revised bills that continued throughout the 81st and 82nd Congresses. Detailed consideration of the complex sequence of events in the executive and legislative branches is beyond the scope of this paper, but major developments are discussed under the subject headings below, which are arranged in the general order of the Hoover Commission recommendations.

* The opinions expressed in this article are the writer's and are not to be construed as those of the U. S. Civil Service Commission.

¹ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Personnel Management* (Washington, 1949).

² The memorandum (15 pp.) has not been published, but the Commission used much of the material in a report to the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments in July, 1949. See the Committee's press release of July 26, 1949. The *66th Annual Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission* (Washington, 1949) likewise gives the Commission's position on the major Hoover Commission recommendations (pp. 2-10).

³ See Federal Personnel Council's mimeographed report (Washington, July 21, 1949).

Staff Functions of the Civil Service Commission. The Hoover Commission's first and fundamental recommendation was that the Civil Service Commission place primary emphasis on staff functions, rather than upon "processing a multitude of personnel transactions." While the Civil Service Commission still performs many operating functions, the past ten years show a trend in the direction advocated. This trend began early in World War II, when the Commission delegated authority to agency heads to take final action on such matters as employee reassignments and promotions. At the end of World War II a definite effort was made to carry over the benefits of decentralized administration into peacetime operations.⁴ Executive Order No. 9830 of February 24, 1947, enunciated the principle of decentralized personnel management in the following terms:

Personnel management is a primary responsibility of all who plan, direct, or supervise the work of Federal employees. . . . The Commission shall . . . delegate to the agencies its authority to act in personnel matters in accordance with standards issued by the Commission.

The Hoover Commission's recommendation for expanding the Commission's staff functions has unquestionably strengthened the movement toward decentralized personnel operations. In the legislative field, two important acts of Congress reflect the Hoover Commission's influence: the Classification Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 954) and the Performance Rating Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1098), both of which recognized the Civil Service Commission as a standard-setting rather than an operating agency. In the executive branch some progress in this direction has been made by expanding the program for boards of civil-service examiners, by setting standards governing agency promotion programs, and by establishing guidelines for agency personnel programs. The Korean emergency stimulated a new wave of delegation from the Commission to the agencies.⁵

The Commission's Inspection Service, established in 1946 to check on delegated authorities under the decentralization program, has broadened its scope to emphasize a positive program of assistance to agency personnel offices. As a result of periodic visits by inspectors to review agency personnel operations, both in Washington and the field, this service has accumulated a fund of information on agency personnel management. It receives frequent requests from personnel officers for advice on such matters as installation of new promotion programs and selection of materials for training courses.

On the other hand, the Civil Service Commission still operates a centralized system of conducting record checks and inquiries regarding the loyalty of applicants for federal employment, of adjudicating retirement claims, and of maintaining service records of all federal employees. The Commission's present dichotomous role is recognized in its current internal instructions:

⁴ See Gladys M. Kammerer, "Revolution by Decentralization," *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 137-42 (July, 1952).

⁵ 68th Annual Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission (Washington, 1951).

The U. S. Civil Service Commission has two very definite, yet very different roles in the field of Federal personnel administration.

One is to serve as a management arm of the President, and in this capacity to make top policy decisions and develop relationships between the agencies, the Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget which will provide the leadership in Federal personnel administration that the President would provide if he had the time to do so.

The other role is that of an operating agency charged with the responsibility of administering certain Federal personnel programs as required by various acts of the Congress.

While the line between staff and operating functions may shift within the Commission's total program, there probably will always be a certain number of personnel services which must be performed centrally, either in the Commission or elsewhere.⁶

Reorganization of the Civil Service Commission. The Hoover Commission recommended that the Civil Service Commission be reorganized to vest in its chairman full responsibility for the administrative direction of its work. Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1949 promptly carried out the principal features of this recommendation.⁷ Under this plan the title of the Commission's head official was changed from "president" to "chairman," and he was given full responsibility for administrative direction of the Commission's day-to-day operations, with a few exceptions such as appeals and appointments to key staff positions. The other two Commissioners and the Chairman serve together as a policy-making, appellate, and investigating body for general supervision of the merit system. The new organization represents a compromise between the previous plan of a commission of three members, each with equal administrative responsibility, and the controversial recommendation of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937 for a single civil-service administrator assisted by a civil service board of prominent citizens.⁸ Three years of operation under the plan seem to indicate that it is serving its dual purpose of speeding up internal operations and freeing the other two Commissioners to concentrate on appeals and improvements in policy. Nevertheless it is already apparent that the compromise will not satisfy the proponents of the single-administrator type of personnel authority.⁹

Reorganization Plan No. 5 did not adopt the Hoover Commission's proposal that the Civil Service Chairman should serve "in the President's Office in a coordinate capacity with such officials as the Director of the Office of the Budget." This issue was revived in the 82nd Congress, when Senator McClellan

⁶ Commissioner James K. Pollock, in his vigorous dissent to the personnel management report, recommended that the residual operating activities of the Civil Service Commission, such as retirement, be transferred to an Office of General Services (*Personnel Management*, p. 52).

⁷ H. Doc. No. 226, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

⁸ Floyd W. Reeves and Paul T. David, *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service*, pp. 6-7 (Washington, 1937).

⁹ For example, see Bradley D. Nash, *Staffing the Presidency* (National Planning Association Pamphlet No. 80, Washington, 1952).

and 13 colleagues introduced the "General Executive Management Bill" (S. 1134), incorporating a number of the Hoover Commission proposals. Chairman Ramspeck indicated his disagreement, stating that "The position of Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, I can assure you, is a full-time job," and that the responsibility of advising the President on the diverse personnel systems of the executive branch constituted a separate full-time job. He felt that the President's liaison officer for personnel management effectively fulfilled the latter need.¹⁰

Role of the Personnel Director. The Hoover Commission recommended that personnel directors be made members of the "top management staffs" of all departments and agencies and that they be consulted on personnel matters whenever important management policies are being developed.

Through the influence of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, the basic transition between the former chief clerk system and a system of personnel directors had been completed some years before the Hoover Commission study.¹¹ Executive Order No. 7916 of June 24, 1938, which resulted directly from the Committee's work, required each agency to appoint a "director of personnel supervision and management," a rather unfortunate title for a staff official. This order was superseded by Executive Order No. 9830, which required the head of each agency to "... designate a director of personnel or other similar responsible official. . . ." The latter order attempted to establish the personnel director's influence in the following terms: "Such director or other official shall represent the head of the agency in personnel matters, subject to his instructions."

Even though most federal departments and agencies employed personnel directors in 1949, the Hoover Commission recognized that in many cases their activity was limited to the formal paper work of personnel management. The influence of its recommendation is difficult to assess. Some indication of the place of federal personnel directors in top management councils is afforded by the grade classification of their positions. At the time of the Hoover Commission study, the typical grade of the personnel director in a large organization was CAF-15. Under the new Classification Act, three new grades have been added to the former grade ceiling of CAF-15. Four directors of personnel have achieved the lowest rung in these so-called "super grades," the top personnel positions in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and Air Force having been placed in grade GS-16. It could be argued that in relative rank the personnel directors have lost ground since 1949, since they are now in the third or fourth career rank instead of the first. This classification criterion indicates that much greater progress was made in increasing the stature of personnel officials between 1937 and 1948 than in the briefer period since then.

¹⁰ *Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments . . . on Bills Relating to Commission on Organization*, U. S. House, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952), p. 128.

¹¹ Reeves and David (cited above, n. 8), pp. 6, 7, 31-36.

The President's Committee on Administrative Management found that in 1937 top personnel officials were usually classified in grades CAF-11 or 12, with a few in CAF-13 or 14.¹²

Possibly a more valid method of evaluating the personnel director's role would be to determine the extent to which he can actually speak for his agency head. This might be done by comparing positions taken by the personnel directors at the Federal Personnel Council with official positions on the same issues later taken by their superiors. It may be significant that the Bureau of the Budget still requests written reports from agency heads when clearing drafts of personnel legislation or executive orders, instead of relying exclusively on the Council's views. In any event, considerably more progress must be made before federal personnel directors can enjoy the prestige of their colleagues in private life who have achieved such titles as "vice president in charge of industrial relations."¹³

A related recommendation of the Hoover Commission was that personnel officials serve in an advisory capacity only, with most personnel activities being carried on by operating officials. Executive Order No. 9830 had aimed at this objective in the following words:

Authority for the conduct of personnel matters within each agency should be delegated to the extent compatible with provisions of law and with economical and efficient administration to those officials responsible for planning, directing, and supervising the work of others.

The military departments have taken the leadership in delegating authority for civilian personnel matters from headquarters to local commanding officers. The Post Office Department has made considerable progress in the last year or two in delegating final appointing authority to postmasters of several hundred of its largest offices. Some agencies, on the other hand, still operate on a fairly centralized basis, in that appointments and removals even in the lower grades must be referred to Washington headquarters for approval. For several years the Civil Service Commission has urged agencies to delegate personnel authority.¹⁴

Standards for Agency Personnel Office Operations. The Hoover Commission urged that the Civil Service Commission develop standards for the operation of agency personnel offices, so that each agency head could tell whether his personnel force was overstaffed. This recommendation reflected a feeling that personnel administration in the federal service had become overdeveloped.

Encouraging progress in making this recommendation effective can be reported. On January 17, 1950, President Truman issued a statement in which he gave "approval and strong support" to a recommendation of his Committee on Management Improvement that "To improve the operation of agency

¹² Reeves and David, p. 33.

¹³ For a discussion of the role of the personnel office in government, with particular reference to the federal service, see William E. Mosher, J. Donald Kingsley, and O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York, 1950), pp. 571-89.

¹⁴ See *60th Annual Report* (1943), pp. 6-7.

personnel offices, the Commission will define the nature and scope of agency personnel programs and develop improved operating practices and standards." This was the first clear-cut authorization to the Commission to proceed in this field. Under the directive, the Commission issued a handbook entitled *Basic Personnel Records and Files System for Federal Agencies* (Handbook S812, October 12, 1950). It was prepared by the Bureau of the Budget and the Commission with agency cooperation and prescribes an integrated system for maintaining personnel records. By standardizing record-keeping, the handbook frees resources for more important phases of the personnel program. The Commission has also issued a new chapter in the *Federal Personnel Manual* entitled "Guides for Determining the Nature and Scope of Agency Personnel Programs." These guides, written with the help of the Federal Personnel Council, list the minimum acceptable standards for an agency personnel program. They include standards under such headings as "position classification," "promotion," "employee performance evaluation," and "employee development." The guides provide a check-list for agencies and are used by the Commission's inspectors in determining whether an agency has a satisfactory personnel program. They represent a new development in civil-service administration, since state and local civil-service systems do not generally prescribe standards for departmental personnel administration. The guides are now being revised and strengthened on the basis of a year's experience in their use.

Standards for determining whether a personnel office is properly staffed were developed by the Bureau of the Budget in 1948 in response to a request from the House Appropriations Committee. This emphasis on staffing standards reflected the findings of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.¹⁵ The Committee discovered that personnel workers had tripled in number since 1940, while the total size of the service had only doubled. Some departments had ratios as high as 1 personnel worker to every 50 employees. As a general yardstick, the Bureau of the Budget set a ratio of 1 personnel worker to 103 employees but exceptions were allowed for agencies having unusual conditions such as large seasonal employment or abnormal turnover rates. The Congress did not consider this ratio sufficiently stringent, and established a statutory ratio of 1 to 115 for all independent agencies by a rider to the 1950 Independent Offices Appropriation Act (63 Stat. 631). This ratio has since been tightened to 1 to 135 by the 1953 act (P.L. 455). The Department of Labor and the Federal Security Agency operate under a statutory ratio of 1 to 105. Most other departments and agencies have no statutory ratio but are subject to the original ratio administratively applied by the Bureau of the Budget.

Emphasis on personnel ratios has had a mixed effect. While some agencies have shifted personnel work to operating officials, others have re-centralized the work from subordinate levels back to the headquarters personnel office. Many personnel officials state that ratios have hampered constructive developmental work while regulatory "paper work" has necessarily continued. Unfor-

¹⁵ H. Rept. No. 1593, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

tunately the numerical ratio does not measure the quality of the personnel services rendered.¹⁶

A satisfactory solution to the personnel office staffing problem has not yet been achieved. Variations from agency to agency in personnel operations are so wide that development of realistic staffing standards is extremely difficult. Strengthening of the Commission's program guides would seem to form an appropriate first step, since a personnel program must be defined before its staffing requirements can be determined. As a further step the Budget Bureau has requested the Commission to undertake a study of the problem.

Responsibility for Recruitment and Examining. This is at the heart of the controversy between the Hoover Commission proponents and those favoring the *status quo*. The essence of the disagreement lies in the Hoover Commission's recommendation that "primary responsibility" for recruiting and examining federal employees be transferred from the Civil Service Commission, where it has been since 1883, to the departments and agencies. In its letter to the President of March 23, 1949, the Civil Service Commission opposed the proposal. The major veterans' organizations and employee unions also vigorously opposed this recommendation. Some spokesmen expressed the belief that the Commission's postwar decentralization plan had already gone too far and that the trend should move back towards a centralized plan of operations.

No congressional action was taken on the Federal Personnel Policy bills because of the opposition of veterans' groups. In the spring of 1950 staff members of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Service Commission drafted a revised bill with the hope of meeting the principal objections raised to S. 2111. This bill was limited to matters of recruitment, examination, transfer, and procedural standards. The key provision lay in section 3 (a):

It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Commission to maintain and protect a system of recruitment, examination, certification, and selection of persons for competitive civil-service positions in the departments which will result in open competition and selection on merit.

This draft was introduced as the Federal Personnel Recruitment Act (H. R. 8925) by Chairman Murray of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Senator Frear introduced a companion bill, S. 3830, and hearings were conducted by both House and Senate Committees. The Civil Service Commission endorsed the bills, stating that they represented a merging of the best features of the Hoover Commission proposals with existing civil-service procedures. Chairman Mitchell's letter of June 27, 1950 to Chairman Murray pointed out that the bill contained five specific safeguards for the merit system.¹⁷

¹⁶ The Senate Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies has recommended elimination of statutory ratios. See statement by Senator Olin D. Johnston, *Congressional Record* (Daily), Vol. 98, p. 9656 (July 5, 1952).

¹⁷ H. Rept. No. 2698, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.

Then began a round of amendments. Arthur S. Flemming, speaking for the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report and drawing on his experience both as a former Civil Service Commissioner and as a member of the Hoover Commission, proposed that sec. 3 (a) be changed to read "It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Commission *and the departments* to maintain . . ." [italics added] thus substituting co-equal authority for the sole responsibility of the Commission. The Commission countered with an amendment stating that "It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Commission, *with the assistance of each department*, to maintain . . ." [italics added] and this version was adopted in the bill reported out by the House Committee on July 20, 1950. No further action was taken in the 81st Congress.

The issue was revived before the Senate Committee in the first session of the 82nd Congress, when the version proposed by the Citizens Committee was included in S. 1135, a modification of the Federal Personnel Recruitment bill. A final solution was then agreed to by the Commission and the Citizens Committee: "It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Commission *and the departments under regulations of the Commission* to maintain . . ." [italics added]. As the Senate report stated, this version "makes it clear that the Civil Service Commission will continue to have primary responsibility for protection of the merit system."¹⁸ The bill passed the Senate in the hectic final week of the first session; its passage was generally considered a "fluke."

Hearings on S. 1135 were conducted by the House Committee during the second session of the 82nd Congress. As indicated below, the major veteran and employee groups consistently opposed the measure. The House Committee ordered a print of the bill striking out sections 8 and 9, which contained the provisions on the "rule of 5" and category ratings, but the bill died in committee at the end of the 82nd Congress.

Space does not permit discussion of other skirmishes in the battle of amendments. Attention is called, however, to one significant feature proposed by the Commission, agreed to by the Citizens Committee, and incorporated as section 6 (d) in the version of S. 1135 passed by the Senate. This provided that whenever the Commission performed additional examining work as a result of withdrawing examining authority from an agency found to be violating standards, the Commission would be reimbursed from the funds of the agency concerned upon approval of the Bureau of the Budget. The final version of S. 1135, therefore, left no doubt that the Commission would still be "in the driver's seat" and represented a considerable change from the original Hoover Commission position.

Although no change has occurred in basic legislation, further decentralization of examining operations to boards of examiners has continued under the spur of the Korean emergency. The number of boards has increased to some 825 and they can hold examinations for many additional types of jobs. Early in 1951 the Commission reported that it had delegated a greater degree of au-

¹⁸ S. Rept. No. 956, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1951).

thority, on a national scale, to boards of examiners than in World War II.¹⁹ The board system proved so effective in maintaining the competitive system of examinations in the field service under emergency conditions that in November, 1951 the Commission urged agencies to establish boards of examiners at agency headquarters in Washington. Thus, while opposing the transfer of primary examining authority to the agencies, the Commission sponsored the actual devolvement of examining work to agency officials, who serve as part-time members of examining boards under the Commission's supervision. The present plan is not too different from that contemplated by S. 1135 so far as the sharing of examining work between the Commission and the agencies is concerned. The essential difference lies in the intangible element of responsibility. Today, with the Commission bearing the major responsibility, an operating official may mistakenly feel that it is legitimate for him to seek loopholes in the civil service system. Under S. 1135 the agency head as well as the Commission would have a direct legal responsibility for upholding the merit system.

Category Ratings. Building on the experience of the TVA, the Hoover Commission recommended a new system for grading and selecting competitors in civil-service examinations. Instead of a numerical scale with the traditional "rule of three," a scale of categories such as "outstanding," "well qualified," "qualified," and "unqualified" would be used. Appointing officers would be given free choice within the highest category, except that veterans would be considered ahead of non-veterans.

This recommendation also has had a stormy history. Veterans' groups and employee unions consistently and bitterly opposed it. Opposition has centered on the very latitude that the Hoover Commission sought. The adverse arguments were succinctly stated by Luther C. Steward, long-time president of the National Federation of Federal Employees:

I would say that it would be a very obtuse operating official who could not with the aid of someone at his right hand versed in personnel administration procedure run a coach and four through your category certification and appoint just exactly what individual he pleased.²⁰

In its letter to the President, the Civil Service Commission conceded that agency officials needed greater latitude in selection for high-level positions and possibly some other positions, but objected to the use of category rating for *all* positions. It made a counterproposal that the rule of three be continued for most routine lower grade jobs, with a rule of five for more complex jobs in the middle grades, and category ratings for high level positions and any other positions prescribed by the Commission.²¹

S. 2111 (81st Congress—1st session) presented the category method in its undiluted form: that is, applicable to all positions. The history of later bills is the progressive weakening of the principle under the attack of its opponents.

¹⁹ *The U. S. Civil Service Commission and the Defense Emergency—An Informal Progress Report from the Chairman*, duplicated, 13 pp. (January, 1951).

²⁰ *Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service*, U. S. Senate, on S. 1135, S. 1148, and S. 1160, August 30, September 5 and 12, 1951, p. 46.

²¹ See also the Commission's *66th Annual Report* (1949), p. 5.

H. R. 8925 (81st Congress—2nd session) embodied the Commission's idea of a three-step plan: rule of three, rule of five, and category rating. The bill gave the Commission full authority to prescribe the jobs for which category rating would be used, and the Commission's favorable report on the bill made it clear that due caution would be used by limiting the method at first to a "relatively few specialized positions." Significantly, the postal field service was singled out in the bill as being confined to the rule of three. The Citizens Committee proposed an amendment which would require the use of category ratings for "professional, administrative, and scientific positions of a high level," except in unusual circumstances. The Commission agreed to this amendment, and it was embodied in the bill as reported out by the House Committee. When S. 1135 was introduced in the 82nd Congress, it contained the same wording. In the meantime, however, discussions had taken place between representatives of the Commission and veterans groups. With the hope of enlisting veteran support, the Commission proposed that category rating not be applied to administrative positions. Therefore, in the bill as finally passed by the Senate, category rating was authorized only for "such scientific and professional positions as the Commission may designate."

Failure to obtain legislative authority for category rating, even in diluted form, may be attributed chiefly to a suspicion on the part of veterans' representatives that the proposal was a device to by-pass veteran preference provisions. Disputes arose as to whether a veteran obtained a greater or lesser amount of preference under category rating than under traditional numerical rating with its addition of 5 and 10 points for veteran preference. The problem cannot be solved arithmetically; the two methods are wholly different and defy easy comparisons.

In the writer's opinion, there is no reason to despair of good selection practices in the absence of category ratings. After all, the British civil-service has built a rather respectable reputation on the foundation of the rule of one. Better examining devices, coupled with greater participation by administrators in the examining process, may provide one answer to this problem pending a more fundamental legislative solution.²²

Veterans' Placement System. The Hoover Commission recommended establishment of a nation-wide recruiting system to place veterans in federal positions through selected government agencies. While general agreement was expressed with the objectives of this recommendation, it found little specific support in the legislative or executive branch or even among the veterans' groups, despite the fact, as indicated by Lewis B. Sims, that the Hoover Commission staff discussed it with representatives of the major veterans' organizations and the Commission.²³

S. 2111 contained a section authorizing "Veterans' Civil Service Counseling

²² See Robert Ramspeck, "Administrative Flexibility in the Federal Civil Service," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 234-41 (Autumn, 1952), for examples of effective selection procedures within the present legal framework.

²³ "The Hoover Commission: A Symposium," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, Vol. 43, p. 992 (Oct., 1949).

and Placement Facilities." This section was not included in H. R. 8925, but reappeared in the original version of S. 1135. It was later stricken by the Senate Committee.²⁴ One reason why no action has been taken to date may be that 60% of all male federal employees are now entitled to veteran preference, a rather conclusive indication that the existing appointment system does place veterans in federal jobs.

Recruitment of Junior Personnel. While the Hoover Commission recognized that some progress had been made in recruiting competent juniors, it recommended that far more emphasis be placed on attracting first-rate young men and women into professional, scientific, technical, and administrative posts.

Its concern on this score was understandable. Before World War II the Junior Civil Service Examiner examination, initiated by Leonard D. White, and later the Junior Professional Assistant examinations, had achieved some degree of success. Emergency hiring practices in World War II, however, meant that many of the young persons recruited during wartime had to be released in postwar reductions. Furthermore, young men were not generally available to compete during the war expansion. The postwar examinations for junior personnel failed to maintain the high reputation of their predecessors. In the administrative field a special examination was conducted under the title of Junior Administrative Technician. The examining plan provided only for a general abilities test, with no oral examination. Though thousands passed the examination, the agencies formed a poor opinion of the quality of the candidates and few appointments resulted.

A drastic change in this examining plan was underway at the time of the Hoover Commission study. In 1948 the Committee on Administrative Personnel, an advisory group to the Civil Service Commission under the chairmanship of Emery E. Olson, had recommended that a new examination be tried with the title of Junior Management Assistant. The Committee urged that the written test measure knowledge and ability in the field of administration and that oral examinations be required. Under the guidance of an interagency committee of expert examiners, the JMA was initiated in the fall of 1948 and the first appointees entered on duty in June, 1949. The examination has been repeated annually with a growing degree of success. Typically some ten or twelve thousand persons have taken the written test, of whom only about five hundred have passed. Almost every successful candidate has had one or more offers of permanent federal employment, usually in an agency having an administrative internship program.²⁵ The success of the JMA examination owes much to the fact that agency users of the register have a voice in the examining plan.

A never-ending discussion goes on regarding the academic requirements for the JMA examination. Originally designed to admit persons with specific training in business and public administration and political science, the examination was changed in 1951 to admit persons trained in any of the social sciences. The

²⁴ S. Rept. No. 956, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10 (1951).

²⁵ See Albert J. Schaffer, "The 1952 Model of JMA," *Personnel Administration*, Vol. 15, pp. 19-22 (Sept., 1952).

answer to the problem would seem to be in long-range research regarding the relative success in federal work of recruits with differing backgrounds.²⁶

The internship programs now underway in a number of federal agencies represent a most encouraging development.²⁷ They insure that new recruits receive a careful introduction to their work and are not forgotten in some obscure cubbyhole. Thus these programs help to avoid the danger cited by Commissioner James K. Pollock that "Public servants conditioned to be clerks during their whole formative experience may be expected to remain clerks even when great responsibilities are thrust upon them."²⁸ The internships of the National Institute of Public Affairs led the way for the current federal programs. The fields of engineering and public health as well as administrative work are now included. Although both the JMA and the internship programs began before the Hoover Commission's report was published, the report unquestionably furnished an impetus and was influential in winning acceptance for the programs from top federal officials.

A Comprehensive Pay Policy for the Executive Branch. The Hoover Commission proposed comprehensive pay legislation governing the entire executive branch under which the Congress would limit its participation in pay matters to setting maximum and minimum pay rates. Subject to the President's approval, the Civil Service Commission would set detailed pay scales within these legal limits and would issue standards for agency job evaluation plans. Actual pay-fixing for individual employees would be done by the agencies under the Commission's standards.

These pay recommendations were endorsed by the Civil Service Commission, which pointed out that:

At present a variety of different and in many instances conflicting pay policies and authorities exist which result in inequality and inconsistency of employee treatment. The organization for the control of pay administration is incomplete and cumbersome. No single law prescribes and no single agency has the responsibility and authority to establish, develop and coordinate government-wide policies and standards governing pay administration.²⁹

The Federal Personnel Council also endorsed the recommendations. They were incorporated in the Federal Personnel Policy bills of the 81st Congress (section

²⁶ Not so well known as the JMA, possibly, are the professional and scientific examinations under such titles as Junior Social Science Analyst, Junior Agricultural Assistant, Junior Physicist, Junior Engineer, etc. These attract thousands of applicants annually and provide an entrance into the career service for hundreds of able persons. Particularly in engineering and the physical sciences, the federal service has taken the lead in employing college students during summer vacations as a means of arousing their interest in a government career.

²⁷ See U. S. Civil Service Commission Pamphlet 30, *Junior Management Assistant Programs in the Federal Civil Service* and Pamphlet 46, *Guide for Internship Training in the Federal Service* (including bibliography).

²⁸ *Personnel Management*, p. 56.

²⁹ Report of July 29, 1949 to Chairman, Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on S. 2111.

4 of S. 2111 and H. R. 5181). The pay issues, however, received relatively little attention in the furore over recruitment policies. The pay section was not carried over into the various personnel bills of the 82nd Congress.

The chaotic federal pay structure was improved somewhat by the Classification Act of 1949, which brought within its coverage customs and immigration inspectors, previously paid under different statutes, the employees of certain agencies whose pay had been established by administrative action of the agencies concerned, and some positions previously covered by specific law. Today, however, the two-and-a-half million federal employees are still paid under many different systems and a comprehensive pay policy remains to be achieved.

The Hoover Commission's influence did help to bring about delegation of pay-fixing authority to agencies for the single largest group of federal positions governed by one pay statute: the Classification Act group. The Classification Act of 1923, covering most "white collar" federal employees outside of the Postal Field Service and the Foreign Service, set detailed salary scales on a nation-wide basis. The law required a highly centralized type of operation for covered positions in headquarters offices in Washington, since prior approval of the Civil Service Commission had to be obtained before a new position could be classified. (In the field service, agency heads had authority to classify positions subject to the pay schedules in the act.) For several years the Commission had recommended that the act be re-written to grant classification authority to agencies for all covered positions.³⁰ With the added backing of the Hoover Commission report, a completely revised law was enacted as the Classification Act of 1949. The new act represents the "standards-post audit" approach to the problem of achieving delegated action in a widespread organization under central guidance and control. The Commission publishes detailed standards describing the various series and classes of positions under the act. Each agency head is responsible for applying these standards in classifying the covered positions in his own agency (except those in the three highest grades). From time to time the Commission's representatives review the classification actions taken in the agencies. The Commission has full power to act on appeals, to correct improper classifications, and even to withdraw classification authority in whole or in part if the findings justify such action.

Thus for more than one million positions under the Classification Act, the Hoover Commission's recommendation for delegation of authority from the Civil Service Commission to agency heads is now in operation, although the various pay steps between the maximum and the minimum are still prescribed by law. The centralized postal pay system has not been affected, nor, at the opposite extreme, has the individual authority of agency heads to fix "blue collar" wage rates without centralized coordination or control.

National Pay Rates versus Locality or Industry Differentials. With regard to postal, clerical, subprofessional, and "blue collar" workers, the Hoover Commission recommended that pay be fixed according to differentials existing in

³⁰ See 64th Annual Report (1947), pp. 1-4.

private business for different localities, areas, or industries. This recommendation recognized the substantial differences between industrial pay levels in most rural areas and in large metropolitan centers. Federal blue collar workers are now paid according to local prevailing rates as determined by each agency head, usually on the basis of data collected by agency wage boards from private employers in the area. The other groups of federal workers mentioned by the Hoover Commission are paid under nation-wide scales set by Congress.

The Civil Service Commission agreed with the objectives of this recommendation but pointed to a number of administrative difficulties. No coordinating machinery existed for setting locality pay rates for the 600,000 federal blue collar workers on the rolls in 1949. The Commission was reluctant to see the principle extended to some 1,200,000 additional workers before the existing problem was solved. In addition, the relationship of locality rates in the lower grades to national rates in the middle and higher grades would cause difficulties. In a small town there might be a large gap between the highest locality rate and the lowest national rate, while in metropolitan areas the locality rates might overlap the national rates. "It appears to us," the Commission stated, "that this question has not been thoroughly thought through."²¹ To help overcome these difficulties in high-pay areas, the Commission suggested that it be authorized to set entrance pay levels for Classification Act grades at one of the steps above the minimum whenever necessary to obtain a sufficient number of qualified employees in the area. An annual review would be made to see whether the increased rate should be maintained or adjusted. The Commission recommended this plan as a part of the Classification Act of 1949 but the proposal failed of adoption. It is still carried as an item in the Commission's legislative program.²²

Provisions in line with the Hoover Commission proposals were incorporated in the Federal Personnel Policy bills of the 81st Congress, but were not carried forward into the personnel bills of the next Congress. The Commission, however, has recommended legislation to remove some 70,000 positions from the Classification Act and place them under agency wage-board authority. These are the blue-collar positions in the present crafts, protective, and custodial schedule, such as maintenance workers on government projects.²³ In the meantime, some administrative progress is being made in coordinating the wage boards which fix the pay of federal blue-collar workers, who now number more than 850,000 under the defense expansion. The Department of Defense is coordinating the periodic wage surveys of the three military departments so that a joint survey will be made in each labor market and private employers will not be asked to provide data three times. While this represents progress, it does not answer the basic problem, since the actual wage rates are not yet coordinated or made consistent for all three military departments.

²¹ Letter to Senate Committee on Expenditures of July 25, 1949.

²² *68th Annual Report* (1951), pp. 6-7.

²³ *68th Annual Report* (1951), p. 8.

Increased Salaries for Higher Grade Positions. Pointing out that pay rates in the lower grades had increased more proportionately than rates in the higher grades, the Hoover Commission urged that the salary ceiling of \$10,330 for career employees be raised. It also recommended increases for legislative and judicial salaries and for presidential appointees. This recommendation found ready acceptance, and quick action followed for executive branch positions. Public Law 359, 81st Congress, fixed an increased salary schedule for 229 top positions in the executive branch, such as heads of departments and agencies and their assistants and members of boards and commissions. Previous annual salaries for these appointive posts, ranging from \$10,000 to \$15,000, were superseded by new rates ranging from \$14,000 to \$22,500. Increases for the top career posts were provided by the Classification Act of 1949. Three new "supergrades" were added to the previous ceiling of CAF-15 (\$10,330), and the number of positions in the new grades was prescribed by law. Three hundred were allowed in GS-16 (now \$12,000 to \$12,800), 75 in GS-17 (now \$13,000 to \$13,800), and 25 in GS-18 (now \$14,800). Positions can be classified in grades GS-16 and 17 only by action of the Civil Service Commission, and in GS-18 only after approval of the President upon recommendation of the Commission. The defense expansion caused an inevitable increase in the number of supergrade positions. Various laws granted agencies additional positions in these grades outside of the quota of 400, until today 934 in all are authorized. The Commission has recommended that the number of supergrade positions be increased through elimination of the existing quota or through a broad authorization of additional positions.

The Hoover Commission mentioned no figure as a desirable maximum salary for career positions, but the personnel task force report recommended \$15,000 as the top career salary. The present \$14,800 career maximum (GS-18) does not fall too far below this amount, although lower living costs in 1949 made the \$15,000 figure more attractive than it is today. There is still a serious gap between the percentage increases in the higher grades and those in the lower grades, as may be seen by comparing entrance salaries. The present GS-1 salary of \$2500 is 98 per cent greater than the prewar figure of \$1260 for CAF-1. Before the war CAF-15 carried a salary of \$8,000, which has now been increased only 35 per cent to the present \$10,800 salary for GS-15. If, however, CAF-15 is compared with GS-18, now the top grade, the increase represents 85 per cent.

Rewards to Administrators Who Reduce Payrolls. As part of its proposed new pay system, the Hoover Commission recommended that administrators and supervisors be rewarded for reducing the payroll. This recommendation was readily agreed to and was incorporated in the Classification Act of 1949 as Title X. Under regulations of the Budget Bureau, each department makes periodic reviews of its various activities to determine efficiency of operations and to identify supervisors and employees whose efforts have caused their units to be outstanding. Cash awards are authorized for such supervisors and employees through an efficiency-awards committee in each department. This authorization is in addition to the salary step-increases for superior accomplish-

ment under Title VII of the Classification Act and the cash awards under P. L. 600, 79th Congress (60 Stat. 806). Here we have too much of a good thing. An administrator is confronted by three methods for rewarding efficiency, and administrative responsibility for the programs is divided between the Bureau and the Commission. The Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service has recommended a new bill merging the three awards authorizations into one statute, with the Commission responsible for issuing regulations and encouraging agencies to carry out effective programs.³⁴

Promotion Programs. Dissatisfied with the lack of systematic promotion programs in the federal service, the Hoover Commission recommended that the President require all agencies to work out promotion programs.

In 1938, in an attempt to solve this problem, Executive Order 7916 required agencies to establish promotion systems, and the Civil Service Commission urged the use of competitive promotion examinations. A start had barely been made when the defense program prior to World War II ended the experiment. Nevertheless some agencies continued their efforts to develop systematic promotion plans. A few held occasional written promotion tests, announced to all employees. Others posted vacancy notices on bulletin boards and invited qualified employees to apply at the personnel office. In other cases the qualifications of employees were coded on punch cards so that the names of all having the required qualifications could be quickly ascertained by placement officers. In all too many agencies, however, promotions were made within narrow units, or on the basis of personal acquaintance or the chance spotting of a likely prospect.

The Hoover Commission recommendation served to expedite a study which was then underway in the Civil Service Commission. A plan was discussed with employee unions and the Federal Personnel Council and was issued in May, 1950. Each agency in the competitive service was required to establish a systematic promotion program after consultation with employees. Seven principles were established by the Commission, but no attempt was made to prescribe the details of screening methods or selection procedures. The chief effort was to insure systematic consideration of qualified employees in broad areas of selection. In fact, one of the principles was that "Attention shall also be given to the qualifications of individuals outside of the agency who might be available, in order to insure that the best qualified persons will be selected according to merit." Significantly, the concept of seniority was not even mentioned. Most agencies have announced promotion programs, and these are subject to review during the Commission's regular inspections. A frequent criticism made by the inspectors is that competition for promotion is confined to too narrow an organizational area. The Commission has recently issued a handbook for agency use giving examples of the best practices found in the federal service.³⁵

³⁴ S. Rept. No. 2101, *Incentive Awards Program in the Federal Government*, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.

³⁵ *Building Better Promotion Programs* (Personnel Management Series No. 2) July, 1952.

The selection of employees for their first supervisory jobs is a particularly crucial phase of the promotion process. Mere length of service or technical competence is not enough; potential supervisory ability is the key. In recent years the Navy Department and the Commission have worked out a competitive plan for selecting blue-collar supervisors in the naval shipyards in which workers are ranked according to ratings on a written supervisory judgment test and evaluations by their superiors. The results seem to indicate that leadership factors can be successfully weighed.

Development of an Administrative Corps. The Hoover Commission recommended that the Civil Service Commission be required to identify the jobs which could be appropriately classified as administrative. This recommendation merely hinted at the real problem, which was stated more explicitly in the fourth finding of the Commission's *General Management* report:

The Federal Government has not taken aggressive steps to build a corps of administrators of the highest level of ability with an interest in the program of the Government as a whole.³⁶

Although no formal administrative corps exists today, progress has been made in recent years in developing able administrative personnel. Some former interns of the National Institute of Public Affairs have attained the highest career ranks in the years since 1934, and those coming through the Civil Service Commission's internship programs, beginning in 1944, are well started up the ladder. The annual intake of JMA's, reaching five or six hundred a year, promises well for the decades ahead. Typically the young people who have entered the service through these varied programs have sought their own opportunities across bureau and departmental lines. Many have worked in three or more agencies and on the way have acquired the interest in the government program as a whole that the Hoover Commission stressed.

A striking development of postwar years is the growing federal interest in executive development. Here private business took the lead. James V. Forrestal, while Secretary of Defense, requested the Navy Department to make a study of the leading industrial programs. The report exercised a great influence among federal administrators.³⁷ The need for rotational training and a broad outlook is especially acute in the federal service because of the high degree of specialization. The Civil Service Commission was made aware of this problem several years ago while exploring the possibility of an executive-development program. It found its own qualification requirements for administrative jobs to be a serious barrier to the plan. In 1949 the Commission proposed a program to the Federal Personnel Council to encourage rotational assignments among the various administrative specialties. The original proposal was limited to employees already in some phase of administrative work. At the Council's suggestion the program was broadened to include specialists outside of the ad-

³⁶ *General Management of the Executive Branch*, p. 5.

³⁷ United States Naval Institute, *Personnel Administration at the Executive Level* (Annapolis, 1948).

ministrative field. Thus an engineer, a chemist, or a forester, for example, who has shown leadership ability can undergo administrative experience and training with the objective of preparing himself for an administrative post in his professional field.

The Commission has appointed a Director of Executive Development Programs to assist federal agencies in establishing and conducting executive-development programs, and has completed executive-development agreements with seven departments and agencies.³⁸ In 1952 the Commission began a career development program to train a selected number of agency employees centrally, in order to bridge the gap between internship programs and higher-level executive development efforts. After six months of work assignments in several agencies and seminars with their fellows from other agencies, trainees return to the job with a broad view of federal administrative problems. Here in a modest way may be the beginnings of the "pool of career administrators" recommended by John J. Corson.³⁹

Transfer Program. The Hoover Commission recommended that the Civil Service Commission be authorized to develop a program to facilitate transfer of competent career personnel—particularly in the technical, scientific, and executive areas—from one agency to another. The desirability of this proposal was generally recognized, although the Civil Service Commission suggested that it be limited to "grades or classes of positions which represent in one or more agencies a ceiling of opportunity, or 'blind alley.'"⁴⁰

A beginning along the lines of the Hoover Commission proposal was made in 1946 when, at the suggestion of the Federal Personnel Council, the Civil Service Commission organized the Interdepartmental Placement Committee. This committee, composed of the placement officers of some 40 federal agencies, meets once a week to exchange information concerning current vacancies in the higher grades and available career employees. The number of higher level placements is not great, possibly 300 to 400 a year, but to this extent the committee fulfills a need.⁴¹ In 1951 another step towards a systematic plan for transferring career administrators was taken when an examination for "Federal Administrators" was announced. Competition was limited to current federal employees at GS-12 and above regardless of occupational field. Competitors were given a difficult written test in administrative judgment and the higher ranking

³⁸ See James C. Stephens, "Navy Develops Its Civilian Executives," *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 161-66 (Oct., 1952).

³⁹ In *Executives for the Federal Service* (New York, 1952) pp. 78-86. For an excellent discussion of federal administrative personnel, see also Paul T. David, "The Development and Recruitment of Administrative Leadership in National and International Programs," *America's Manpower Crisis*, ed. Robert A. Walker (Chicago, 1952) pp. 137-67. A group of executives, called together by a Federal Personnel Council committee, is now studying methods of improving the selection, training, mobility, and retention of executives throughout the federal service.

⁴⁰ *86th Annual Report* (1949), p. 8.

⁴¹ See Clyde C. Hall and Harold H. Leich, "The Human Touch in Civil Service Placement," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 178-80 (Summer, 1952).

candidates were referred for consideration to the defense agencies. A number of transfers and promotions have resulted, although the great expansion was over by the time the list was ready. The Commission's Career Service Section has added the records to its referral service for federal administrative personnel.

Employee Training. The Hoover Commission recommended enactment of legislation which would clearly set forth the policy of the federal government on the conduct of training programs for civilian employees. This recommendation pointed to the need for clarification of legal authorization for employee training. Some agencies over the years have succeeded in establishing well organized training programs with full legislative approval: for example, the FBI, the Foreign Service, and the military departments. Because of unfavorable decisions of the Comptroller General in the past, many agencies have hesitated to carry on organized training in the absence of specific legislative authority. There has been a feeling in the executive branch that Congress might not be sympathetic to the expenditure of funds for training. Actually there are indications to the contrary in both houses of Congress. The Rees report of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee on federal personnel activities supported the expenditure of personnel office funds for legitimate training.⁴² The Senate Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies has likewise endorsed the need for strengthened training programs.⁴³

Any doubts about employee training that exist in the legislative branch may reflect a feeling that some federal agencies have "gone overboard" in establishing elaborate and unnecessary programs. Members of Congress are particularly suspicious of attempts to hire untrained clerks and give them stenographic and typing training at government expense.⁴⁴ It is clear that Congress does not favor official training in basic skills which applicants can reasonably be expected to acquire at their own expense before presenting themselves for employment. This is far removed from legitimate types of in-service training; for example, training in matters peculiar to government employment, such as customs regulations.

The Hoover Commission's recommendation was embodied in S. 2111 and H. R. 5181 as section 11, the wording of which represented several years of work by the Council's Training Committee. The section would have authorized agencies to conduct training programs themselves and to send employees to educational institutions, research laboratories, etc., for training. The Commission would have been authorized to carry on research and establish a clearinghouse and reference service on training materials. The section was not included in the Federal Personnel Recruitment bills, but a revised version was proposed by the Commission and introduced by Senator Olin D. Johnston in the second session of the 82nd Congress as S. 2987. Representative Katharine St. George introduced a slightly modified version as H. R. 8013. No action was

⁴² H. Rept. No. 2198, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

⁴³ See Chairman Johnston's statement, *Congressional Record* (Daily), Vol. 98, pp. 9653-9656 (July 5, 1952).

⁴⁴ Section 610 of Public Law 488, 82nd Congress, is aimed at this type of training.

taken on these bills. Late in the session Senator Johnston, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies, reintroduced the Commission's version as S. 3494 with tighter restrictions and a parallel section governing the training of military personnel.

Today the Commission is resuming its active interest in the training field that was interrupted in 1946 by the termination of its Personnel Management Advisory Service because of lack of funds. Recently, at the Council's request, the Commission started a modest training reference service to gather examples of agency training materials for use by training officials.

Employee Participation in Determining Personnel Policies. The Hoover Commission recommended that the President require the heads of agencies to provide for employee participation in formulating personnel policies. Although this recommendation did not require legislative action, it was included as section 8 (d) in the Federal Personnel Policy bills. The Civil Service Commission expressed sympathy with the idea, but advised against the adoption of a mandatory rule on the subject.⁴⁵ Bills introduced by Representative George M. Rhodes provided that an administrator would be required to consult with union representatives at their request under penalty of suspension or dismissal for failure to do so.⁴⁶ The Commission objected to the punitive provisions and suggested that no legislation was necessary, since the goals could be achieved by administrative action.

Some steps have been taken in the executive branch since publication of the Hoover Commission report. Agencies such as TVA and Bonneville Power Administration had previously established well developed plans for union-management consultations.⁴⁷ Other agencies have recently worked out plans for dealing with unions or for direct consultation with employees. In 1952, the Navy Department announced a plan for systematic consultation with union representatives on all important personnel policies. The Commission occasionally holds informal discussions with heads of the leading employee unions on major policy issues affecting federal employment.

For some years the Commission has required agencies to consult with employees on specified personnel policies. The standards for approval of agency grievance procedures, first published in 1941, require that both supervisors and employees shall have an opportunity to participate in developing the procedures. In at least one case formal approval of an agency's plan was withheld until this was done. The standards for agency promotion plans, published in 1950, contain a similar provision. The guides for agency personnel operations require

⁴⁵ 66th Annual Report (1949), p. 9.

⁴⁶ H.R. 3702 (81st Congress) and H.R. 554 (82nd Congress). See *Hearings before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service . . . on H.R. 554 and H.R. 571*, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.

⁴⁷ Harry L. Case, "Cornerstones of Personnel Administration in TVA," *Personnel Administration*, Vol. 11, pp. 10-12 (Jan., 1949). See also U. S. Congress, Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, *Labor Management Relations in TVA* (Senate Report 372, 81st Congress).

agencies to provide for "consideration of employee views in the formulation and adjustment of policies that affect him as a worker."⁴⁸

Performance Ratings. The Hoover Commission urged simplification of the existing efficiency rating system and recommended that it be used solely for developing a better understanding between supervisors and employees rather than for salary increases, lay-offs, and dismissals. In its own way this recommendation was as drastic as the one regarding category rating, since efficiency ratings had traditionally been used in federal, state, and local merit systems as a means of administering rewards and punishments. The Civil Service Commission itself had become dissatisfied with the uniform rating system then in use, and had decided to try to make ratings more realistic. For two years the Commission had conducted a pilot study of a new performance rating plan in its own organization. The actual duties of the job, instead of uniform government-wide elements such as "industry" and "dependability," were used as rating elements.⁴⁹

S. 2111 contained a section on "Appraisals of Performance" (section 9). In reporting to the Senate Committee on this bill, the Civil Service Commission endorsed the Hoover Commission's stand with one important difference: it recommended that *no* evaluation system be required by law. Its memorandum to the President of March 23, 1949 stated: "The opportunity to discover that efficiency ratings may be advantageous to management and employees is too frequently lost in the surge of resentment against being compelled to do something that is not apparently necessary."

The new Classification Act required the Commission to study the rating problem and submit recommendations to the Congress by February 1, 1950.⁵⁰ The Commission's recommendations were along the general lines of the Hoover Commission's proposals with the difference noted above. Emphasis was placed on the purpose of performance evaluation rather than on the mechanics of rating. The Commission urged flexibility of rating systems rather than government-wide uniformity. Periodic conferences between employees and supervisors should be encouraged in order to achieve mutual understanding of performance requirements. Ratings should not be used as the sole basis of personnel actions. The Commission's report contained a draft of legislation which was introduced by Representative Tom Murray, Chairman of the House Committee, as H. R. 7264 on February 13, 1950. Shortly thereafter Chairman Murray introduced a new bill, H. R. 7824, representing a compromise between the Commission's

⁴⁸ *Federal Personnel Manual*, p. A4-4. It is interesting to note that over the past two years employee consultation has received more attention from the Federal Personnel Council than any other subject. Two comprehensive reports have resulted, "Guide for Employee Participation in Agency Management" and "Guide for Effective Relationships with Organized Employee Groups."

⁴⁹ See "Standards of Performance—A Symposium," *Personnel Administration*, Vol. 10, pp. 21-46, 51 (July, 1948).

⁵⁰ Title IX, later repealed. The Commission's report was published by the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service as an unnumbered Committee print.

draft and the existing system. The Commission, while preferring its own draft, accepted and endorsed the new bill with minor reservations.⁵¹ This was passed as the Performance Rating Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1098).

The new system differs somewhat from the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the Civil Service Commission but aims at the same broad objectives. Ratings are still geared to certain personnel actions: extra retention credit for those rated "Outstanding," automatic pay increase within certain time periods for those rated at least "Satisfactory," and removal or reassignment for those rated "Unsatisfactory." Each agency is required to have a rating system and each agency's plan must be approved by the Commission, but great latitude is allowed in the details. An appeals system is still required. At the same time, the act gives recognition to the Hoover Commission recommendation in providing that employees shall be informed of proper performance requirements and in emphasizing the strengthening of supervisor-employee relations. Appeals have decreased greatly in number, and attention seems to have shifted from the search of the past decades for the perfect rating form.

Reduction in Force. In accordance with its fresh approach to other traditional civil-service practices, the Hoover Commission recommended a complete transformation of federal lay-off policies. It urged that emphasis be placed on determining which employees should be retained for continuing work, rather than on determining which should be eliminated under a rigid formula. To this end, employees would be ranked in quality categories similar to those recommended for category rating in entrance examinations. Some extra credit would be provided for seniority and military service, but the primary factor would be the employee's qualifications for the remaining work.

The Federal Personnel Council and the Civil Service Commission disagreed with the Commission's recommendations. The former approved the views of two study committees, which challenged the idea that the efficiency of the service would be promoted by deciding retention primarily according to fitness for the remaining work. The committees pointed out that a career service must give reasonable security in an employee's later years if the government is to hold him during his earlier and more productive period.⁵² The Civil Service Commission based its objections on the administrative difficulties involved:

The Commission agrees that existing reduction-in-force requirements should be modified, but feels that the proposal made in the report is too cumbersome to be practicable. The rating of each individual in a large unit where only a few are to be separated is expensive and unnecessary.⁵³

The recommendations have not resulted in legislative action. They were included in section 12 of the Federal Personnel Policy bills, and numerous other bills have been introduced embodying various formulas to solve the reduction-

⁵¹ Report to Chairman Murray of May 19, 1950.

⁵² Federal Personnel Council, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵³ 66th Annual Report (1949), p. 10.

in-force problem.⁵⁴ The chief issue in recent years has been between the veterans' groups and employee unions as to the relative weights to be given military preference and seniority. The veterans' organizations have shown determined opposition to any change in section 12 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.⁵⁵ This section requires that due effect in reductions in force be given to "tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings," with a proviso that veterans be given absolute priority within a tenure group regardless of length of service.

The Hoover Commission's personnel task force focused attention on the administrative complexity involved in the numerous reassignments resulting from a reduction in force.⁵⁶ The problem has been intensified by the fine distinctions in tenure applied under emergency procedures since Korea; in some cases four or five reassignments have resulted from the abolishment of a single position. To alleviate this problem the Commission recently announced a plan to restrict reassignment rights to permanent employees.⁵⁷

Special Consideration for Laid-Off Employees. The Hoover Commission recommended that career employees who are laid off be given top priority for any vacancies for which the Civil Service Commission considers them qualified, and that while awaiting placement they remain on the payroll for three months. Since 1946 priority consideration for "displaced career employees" has actually been required. At that time the Council and the Commission worked out a plan for referring such employees to other agencies. In fact, at one time the plan provided for displacing war-service employees with career employees who had been laid off in other agencies. As might be expected, agencies frequently objected that trained war-service employees had to be released to make room for less competent career workers. Expanding employment in the Korean emergency temporarily solved the problem.⁵⁸

No action has been taken to continue the pay of federal employees who are laid off in reductions in force. Several bills to grant severance pay under these conditions have been introduced but not acted upon.⁵⁹

Dismissals for Inefficiency. The Hoover Commission recommended a more workable method for separating inefficient employees. The report outlined a procedure requiring the supervisor to present the facts regarding an employee's alleged incompetence through the director of personnel to the under secretary. A designated official would then investigate the case. If the employee were a probationer he would be dismissed without appeal if the facts

⁵⁴ See *Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service . . . on S. 660*, U. S. Senate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949; and *Hearings before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service . . . on H.R. 2446*, U. S. House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949. Bills in the 82nd Congress include S. 455, H.R. 373, and H.R. 3700.

⁵⁵ 58 Stat. 387.

⁵⁶ Task Force Report, p. 68.

⁵⁷ See Commission's press release of December 19, 1952.

⁵⁸ See James E. Drury, Inter-University Case Series No. 10, *The Displaced Career Employee Program* (New York, 1952) for a detailed discussion of the program.

⁵⁹ For example, S. 3477 and H.R. 511 in the 82nd Congress.

justified it. An employee who had completed probation would be given a letter of charges and provided a hearing. If the charges were sustained, he would be dismissed at the end of 30 days, within which he could appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If the Commission accepted his appeal, he would remain on the payroll until the final decision.

The report stated that this procedure would speed removal action. As the Federal Personnel Council pointed out, however, the plan did not represent a simplification of existing procedures.⁶⁰ In many departments it would have required a recentralization of removal powers which have long been delegated to subordinate operating officials. Probationers, both veterans and nonveterans, now can be removed without hearing or appeal by a simple letter stating their shortcomings, and no review by headquarters authority is required by civil-service regulations. Nonveterans, representing 53 per cent of the whole service, today have no appeal rights to the Civil Service Commission on the merits of their cases. Even among veterans, only a small proportion of those who are discharged for cause now appeal to the Commission. The proposed procedure would offer the chance of a cash bonus to any employee who appealed to the Commission, since if his case were accepted for hearing he would continue on the payroll until the final decision, whether favorable or unfavorable to him.

The Commission expressed general agreement with the recommendations, but felt that nonveterans should not be given appeal rights outside their agencies.⁶¹ The Council took the same view. Section 8 of the Federal Personnel Policy bills included the major points of the recommendations without the detailed procedural steps. In May, 1952 Chairman Murray of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service introduced H. R. 7845 to grant nonveterans approximately the same appeal rights to the Commission that veterans already have. Hearings were conducted (unpublished), but no action resulted.

Three steps have been taken by the Commission to speed removal of incompetents. (1) In July, 1950 the three Commissioners signed a circular to all agency heads urging them to take prompt removal action when necessary and to eliminate successive layers of hearings.⁶² (2) In January, 1952 the Commission issued instructions requiring federal supervisors to make written appraisals of the performance of each probationer after ten months of service, to insure that incompetents do not slip into the permanent force by default.⁶³ (3) Recently, the Commission reviewed its own procedure for hearing appeals of veterans who were removed by agencies, and announced a simplified procedure which provides for only one hearing in the average case.⁶⁴ Previously it was

⁶⁰ Federal Personnel Council, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁶¹ *66th Annual Report* (1949), p. 10.

⁶² Departmental Circular No. 634. The Veterans Administration recently completed a thorough review of its internal appeals system and instituted a combined hearing plan in place of several separate hearings.

⁶³ *Federal Personnel Manual*, p. S2-17. This plan followed the general lines of a recommendation in the Task Force Report (p. 72).

⁶⁴ Press release of November 13, 1952.

fairly common for cases to be heard in a regional office and later in Washington.

As in any large organization, removals for inefficiency in the federal service will always present a problem, and there is no simple answer. Discharges for all reasons (aside from lay-offs) now occur at the rate of about 24,000 a year, thus demonstrating the falsity of the popular myth that "You can't fire a government worker." A sample survey by the Commission in July, 1950 showed that of 2,287 removals under charges, 827 or 36 per cent were for inefficiency. The next largest categories were abuse of leave (24 per cent) and crime or fraud related to work (9 per cent).⁶⁵ Despite these statistics, many administrators remain convinced that present removal procedures are too cumbersome.⁶⁶ The problem for the future is to find a method that will insure prompt removal of the unfit while preserving reasonable safeguards against arbitrary action.

Better Working Relationships. Although the efficiency-rating recommendations touched on the desirability of better relationships between employees and supervisors, the Hoover Commission majority report did not make a major point of the matter. Commissioner Pollock was more specific. Under the heading "A Modern Concept of Personnel Administration" he deplored the emphasis on personnel techniques and urged a deeper study of human motivation:

... The employee must be made to feel that he belongs in the organization, that he is creatively, not passively participating, and that he is contributing to its total effort. ...

In terms of modern management, this means that we must develop a personnel program which has more concern with people than with procedures; which gives more attention to motivation, incentives, and morale than to the refinements of written examinations, pay plans, and service ratings.⁶⁷

These comments were generally overlooked in the debate over more controversial issues. Nevertheless, the concept of developing better working relationships is spreading in the federal service. The work of industrial concerns and universities in the field of human relations is reflected in numerous employee handbooks and supervisory training manuals published by federal agencies.⁶⁸ Much recent research in this field was done under Navy grants to universities and became readily available to civilian personnel officials.⁶⁹ The various management societies in Washington also have stressed this topic in their discussions. In fact, the movement has gained such momentum in American life that at least one critic has felt the need to administer an antidote.⁷⁰

Conclusion. The story of the first four years of the Hoover personnel report

⁶⁵ 68th Annual Report (1951), p. 44.

⁶⁶ For example, see Bernard L. Gladioux, "Civil Service Versus Merit," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 173-77 (Summer, 1952).

⁶⁷ *Personnel Management*, pp. 51-52.

⁶⁸ For example, U. S. Department of the Army, *Introduction to Supervision; a Plan for Training Inexperienced Supervisors* (Washington, 1952) (Civilian Personnel Pamphlet No. 41-A).

⁶⁹ Harold S. Guetzkow, *Groups, Leadership and Men; Research in Human Relations* (Pittsburgh, 1951). See also Rensis Likert, "Motivational Dimensions of Administration" in *America's Manpower Crisis*, pp. 89-117, Public Administration Service (Chicago, 1952).

⁷⁰ William H. Whyte, Jr., "Groupthink," *Fortune*, Vol. 45, pp. 114-117, 142, 146 (March, 1952).

is one of mixed failure and achievement. The most far-reaching legislative proposals have not yet been attained: those providing for further decentralization of recruitment, category ratings, training authority, comprehensive pay legislation, and a revised reduction-in-force system. Many of the recommendations requiring administrative action are partially in effect, or at least some action has been initiated. Here the critic can point to failures of quality or scope, but not to total inaction. Not all observers would agree with the statement of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments in 1950 that "The record of the entire Federal structure with respect to the Hoover Commission report in personnel management is remarkably good."⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Hoover Commission already deserves high rank among the major study groups that have speeded the progress of personnel management in the federal service.

Since 1949 those who believe that federal recruitment should be centrally operated have gathered considerable ammunition from allegations of sales of federal offices and other abuses of merit principles. They can charge that current standards of political morality indicate that a restrictive central merit system is as badly needed as it was in 1883. Perhaps the truth lies in an intermediate position. Many federal agencies have demonstrated complete faith in merit principles, while others have shown themselves susceptible to personal or political pressures. If the law were sufficiently flexible, the Civil Service Commission could recognize this disparity in the degree of surveillance that it exercised. It could apply the traditional type of merit system to the laggards, and to the leaders it could grant the latitude recommended by a majority of the Hoover Commission. Possibly to a few outstanding agencies it might even grant the responsibility and freedom for experimentation urged by Commissioner Pollock.

The 83rd Congress and the new administration may be expected to scrutinize carefully the remaining personnel recommendations in the Hoover Commission report. Much work has already been done by the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies, by Temple University, and by the Rockefeller Committee. Even if the unfulfilled recommendations of the Commission were put into effect, however, the federal personnel structure still would not represent the best of all possible worlds. Some matters the Commission overlooked; for example, the need for intensive personnel research on selection methods and on ways to increase output on the job. And in recent years many new problems have crowded to the front, such as the loyalty and security issue, the need for better personnel practices affecting many thousands of employees serving overseas, the problem of reconciling the civil-service retirement and social-security systems, and the need for an appointment system which can adjust itself to expansions and contractions of the service without a paroxysm of executive orders and regulation-writing. These will warrant as careful study as the unfinished business of the Hoover Commission report.

⁷¹ S. Rept. No. 2581, *Actions on Hoover Commission Reports*. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1951-1952

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

The 1951 Term of the Supreme Court,¹ during which there was no change in its makeup, continued to exhibit the behavior pattern of the previous Term, both in the mechanics of operation² and the drift of decision. The work of the Truman Court is a compound of new Justices and the shifting concatenation of historical forces. It operates amidst the strains and tensions of the Cold War. The leading cases of this Term, dealing with such subjects as presidential seizure of private property, the treatment of aliens, by-products of the trials of Communists, and the pressure on civil liberties generally, all reflect the push of current history.

The total number of dispositions during the 1951 Term, 1207, was almost the same as the number for the 1950 Term, which was 1202. There were only 83 signed opinions, as compared with 98 in the 1950 Term and 87 in the 1949 Term. Twenty-five years ago the number of signed opinions averaged around 200 per Term. The reduction in the number of signed opinions was matched by a growing number of dispositions on the merits by memorandum order. The Court disposed of 200 cases on the merits; 101 came up by appeal (in about equal numbers from the federal district courts and the state courts) and 99 reached the Court on certiorari (72 from the federal Courts of Appeals, 24 from state courts, and 2 from the Court of Claims). The Court continued to keep a tight rein on its discretionary jurisdiction.³ On the appellate docket it denied certiorari in 511 cases, dismissed 9 petitions, and granted 93 (15.2%). On the miscellaneous docket it denied 382, dismissed five, and granted 19 (4.7%). Some choices, as always, are difficult to explain, for the Court agreed to review

¹ Several books in the public law field which were published during the period under review are worth noting: Fred V. Cahill, Jr., *Judicial Legislation* (New York, 1952); Irving Dilliard, ed., *The Spirit of Liberty—Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand* (New York, 1952); Elizabeth Kelley Bauer, *Commentaries on the Constitution, 1790-1860* (New York, 1952); Franklin A. Smith, *Judicial Review of Legislation in New York, 1906-1938* (New York, 1952). Other titles on specialized subjects are cited later. For sketches of former Justices see: Alpheus T. Mason, "Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 791-817 (1952); Thomas Reed Powell, "Charles Evans Hughes," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, pp. 161-72 (1952); Martin B. Hickman, "Mr. Justice Holmes: A Reappraisal," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 66-83 (1952); Lester E. Mosher, "Mr. Justice Rutledge's Philosophy of the Commerce Clause," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 27, pp. 218-47 (1952).

² See Robert H. Jackson, "Advocacy before the Supreme Court," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 37, pp. 1-16 (1951).

³ Fowler V. Harper and A. S. Rosenthal, "What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term—An Appraisal of Certiorari," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 99, pp. 293-325 (1950); Harper and Edwin D. Etherington, "What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1950 Term," *ibid.*, Vol. 100, pp. 354-409 (1951).

some cases of minor importance,⁴ and denied certiorari in seemingly important litigation.⁵

In addition to the denials of certiorari, it should be noted that 50 appeals were dismissed, 37 for want of a substantial federal question. Since the Court must pass judgment on the question of substantiality, its so-called compulsory jurisdiction has a strong element of discretion in it. The only difference between a dismissal of an appeal for lack of a substantial federal question and a denial of a petition for certiorari is that in the latter case no reason is ordinarily given, whereas in the former the Court must at least assert the absence, in its judgment, of a substantial issue.

During the 1951 Term 104 cases were disposed of with full opinion, with 90 opinions being written, of which seven were *per curiam*. Of these cases, 24 (27%) commanded unanimous votes, and there were one or more dissents in 66 (73%). Seventy-nine cases were disposed of on the merits by memorandum order, 52 (66%) with unanimous votes, and 27 (34%) with dissents. In all, 73 dissenting opinions were filed; Justice Black wrote 16, Justice Douglas 15, Justice Frankfurter 14, and Justice Jackson 9; on the other hand, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton each prepared only three dissenting opinions, and Justice Clark none at all. In all cases decided on the merits, whether with full opinion or by memorandum order, Justice Black dissented in 50, Justice Douglas in 43, Justice Reed in 29, and at the other extreme, Chief Justice Vinson dissented 15 times, Justice Minton 14 times, and Justice Clark only once. There were in all 211 dissenting votes. In addition, there were 19 concurring opinions, Justices Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson each filing four, and the Chief Justice and Justice Minton none. In six cases the decisions below were affirmed by an equally-divided Court.

In connection with memorandum orders denying certiorari or dealing with miscellaneous applications, Justice Black dissented 19 times and Justice Douglas 12 times; on the other hand, Justice Jackson dissented three times, and Justices Clark and Reed only once each. In addition, Justice Frankfurter filed three "memoranda," his view being that while it is impossible for the Justices to give reasons in writing for refusing certiorari, it is occasionally appropriate to explain the issues at stake in litigation where the Court refused to exercise its review powers. When the Court voted to grant certiorari in the steel seizure

⁴ *E.g.*, *United States v. Kelly*, 342 U.S. 193 (1952); *Bruner v. United States*, 343 U.S. 112 (1952).

⁵ *E.g.*, *Remington v. United States*, 343 U.S. 907 (1952) (propriety of the government's withholding from the defendant knowledge of the fact that the foreman of the grand jury was the financial and literary collaborator of the chief prosecution witness in a book-publishing venture the success of which required a true bill); *Koshler v. United States*, 342 U.S. 852 (1951) (how federal judges should instruct juries in cases involving criminal prosecutions for violation of federally-guaranteed rights); *Land v. Dollar*, certiorari denied, 340 U.S. 884 (1950), motion for leave to ask for reconsideration of the denial continued on the docket, 343 U.S. 973 (1952). The case was finally settled out of court in June, 1952. See Note, "The Dollar Litigation: A Study in Sovereign Immunity," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 466-78 (1952).

case,⁶ Justices Burton and Frankfurter did the unusual thing of recording their dissents.

While the vote of four Justices is sufficient to grant certiorari, it is possible for a bare majority of five to dismiss the petition after argument without deciding the controversy on its merits. Justice Frankfurter maintained, in *United States v. Shannon*,⁷ that since it then appeared that certiorari had been improvidently granted, the case being unique and not presenting a problem of general importance, the Court should not hesitate to correct the original mistake by dismissing the writ. In another case decided the same day, Justice Frankfurter insisted that the writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted, with the result that since the Court was otherwise evenly divided, the judgment of the court below was affirmed.⁸ Thus no opinion was written to dispose of a case that four Justices had voted to hear. In the *Shannon* case Justice Douglas sharply disagreed with Justice Frankfurter's view. He declared:

A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument, those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired. By long practice—announced to the Congress and well-known to this Bar—it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired.

On the other hand, it still remains true that after four Justices have voted to grant certiorari, argument is presented to the whole Court on the merits of the case in the light of its record. The will of the four who favored granting certiorari, therefore, is not altogether frustrated.⁹

I. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER

1. SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,¹⁰ decided on June 2, 1952, was by all odds the most elaborately-argued and discussed case of the Term.¹¹ Not since

⁶ *Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.*, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).

⁷ 342 U.S. 288 (1952).

⁸ *United States v. Jordan*, 342 U.S. 911 (1952).

⁹ That the new and more restrictive Rule 27(9) relating to the submission of *amicus* briefs, 338 U.S. 959, is not working to everyone's satisfaction is suggested by Justice Frankfurter's memorandum in *On Lee v. United States*, 343 U.S. 924 (1952). For a discussion of the new rule see Robert L. Stern and Eugene Gressman, *Supreme Court Practice* (Washington, D. C., 1950), pp. 295-97.

¹⁰ 343 U.S. 579.

¹¹ See Donald R. Richberg, "The Steel Seizure Cases," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 38, pp. 713-27 (1952); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., "The President and the Law," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, pp. 321-38 (1952); Arthur M. Williams, Jr., "The Impact of the Steel Seizures upon the Theory of Inherent Sovereign Powers of the Federal Government," *South Carolina Law Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 5-32 (1952); Bernard Schwartz, "Inherent Executive Power and the Steel Seizure Case," *Canadian Bar Review*, Vol. 30, pp. 466-82

the *Myers* case,¹² of a quarter a century ago, has the Court come to grips with such a fundamental aspect of the boundaries of presidential power. This litigation dealt with the question of the President's power to seize private property at a time of alleged crisis. The seizure came as a climax to a long dispute between the steel companies and their employees. On December 18, 1951, the Union gave notice of its intention to strike on December 31. Following the intervention and failure of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the President referred the dispute, on December 22, to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board. In other words, the President chose to act under the Defense Production Act of 1950 rather than the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board's report did not bring about a settlement, and on April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike, to begin April 9. Believing that steel production was indispensable and that a stoppage would jeopardize national defense, the President ordered Secretary of Commerce Sawyer, a few hours before the strike was to begin, to take possession of and operate most of the steel mills. The following day the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action, and twelve days later he sent a second message. Congress took no action.

On April 30, Judge Pine of the District Court of the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction on petition of the steel companies.¹³ The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc on the same day, issued a stay.¹⁴ The Supreme Court, to which the United States immediately petitioned for review, granted certiorari on May 3.¹⁵ Thus the Court of Appeals did not review the case at all. This falls within the terms of the jurisdictional statute which provides that certiorari lies to review cases in the Courts of Appeals "before or after rendition of judgment or decree."¹⁶ In other words, the Supreme Court need only wait for the case to reach the Court of Appeals, though it very rarely takes the case before the Court of Appeals has made its decision.¹⁷ Justices Burton and Frankfurter voted to deny certiorari, the former filing a statement protesting the bypassing of the Court of Appeals. He maintained that the issues were such as to require all the wisdom the judicial process makes available, and that it was more important to have a sound result than a quick one. But the Court majority was in a hurry. Oral argument was set for May 12, and the decision was announced on June 2. Where there is a will, there is a way.

The Supreme Court sustained the District Court by a six-to-three vote. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court, but each of the Justices who concurred with him, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson and Burton, filed his own

(1952); Jay W. Murphy, "Some Observations on the Steel Decision," *Alabama Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 214-31 (1952).

¹² *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

¹³ 103 F. Supp. 569.

¹⁴ 197 F. 2d 582.

¹⁵ *Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.*, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).

¹⁶ 28 U.S.C.A. §1254(1).

¹⁷ This happened, for example, in *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

opinion. Justice Clark concurred separately in the judgment of the Court but not in its opinion. The views of the dissenters, Vinson, Reed and Minton, were set forth by the Chief Justice in a long and vigorous opinion. All in all, these seven opinions contain a vast amount of material on the office of the chief executive. Since everyone agreed that Congress could authorize seizure under its eminent domain power, the case turned on the inferences to be drawn from the legislation already on the books and the nature of the President's constitutional powers. The government rested its case upon a theory of inherent presidential powers to deal with a national emergency. Neither the President nor the Solicitor General relied upon the seizure provisions of the Defense Production Act or of the Selective Service Act of 1948.

Considering the magnitude of the issues, the amount of public interest, and the expansiveness of his colleagues, Justice Black's opinion for the Court was unusually brief, and on the crucial constitutional issue almost peremptory. Apparently his rather general statement was all that a bare majority of the Court would go along with. Justice Black first of all rejected the argument that the injunction should be denied on the non-constitutional grounds of the absence of irreparable damage and the existence of adequate legal remedies for compensation for any possible damages. He doubted whether there would be any right to recover in the Court of Claims, and took the position that seizure was certain to result in damages which it would be difficult if not impossible to measure.¹⁸ He noted that no statute either expressly or impliedly authorized the seizure, and pointed out that before this controversy arose, Congress refused to adopt the seizure technique for settling labor disputes, and specifically rejected an amendment, when the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration, which would have authorized seizure in cases of emergency. He took this to mean that Congress had its own theory about collective bargaining.

Justice Black proceeded to a consideration of the argument that the aggregate of constitutional powers vested in the President in Article II supports the seizure order. He did not find justification in the President's military powers as commander-in-chief, noting that cases dealing with the broad powers of military commanders in theatres of war were of no concern here. The President as commander-in-chief does not have "the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." Nor was the seizure order justified by the constitutional clauses vesting the executive power in the President. His power is to enforce the laws, not make them; his law-making functions are limited by the Constitution to recommending laws and the veto. The Constitution clearly vests the lawmaking power in Congress. And while Congress undoubtedly has the power to authorize the taking of private property for public use, and can regulate labor-employer

¹⁸ The government's position on these points of equity law was not mere declamation. See Paul A. Freund, "The Year of the Steel Case," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 66, pp. 89-95 (1952).

relationships, "the Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control."

Justice Black rather summarily dismissed the argument that other Presidents have without congressional authority taken possession of private business enterprises to settle labor disputes. Even if this is true, he maintained, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make all necessary and proper laws. He concluded: "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand."

In his incisive opinion, Justice Jackson discussed the scope of presidential power in three different situations. First, when the President acts pursuant to congressional authorization, his authority is at a maximum. Secondly, in the absence of a congressional grant or denial, there may be an independent presidential responsibility. Thirdly, when the President acts contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. In this case Congress has neither authorized this sort of seizure nor has it been silent on the subject, for it embodied its policy in several statutes. Turning to the Article II considerations, he noted that the executive powers of the President are enumerated, not given in blanket form, and that the President is commander-in-chief of the army and the navy, not of the country, its industries and inhabitants. Even assuming that we are at war, he was unwilling to believe that this alone empowered the President to seize industries, for the power to raise and support armies is vested in Congress. Finally, he considered the appeal to inherent emergency powers dangerous, and not warranted by any provision of the Constitution. He cited the example of Germany to illustrate the dangers involved, and called attention to the fact that in both France and Great Britain emergency executive powers always rest upon legislation. Describing how potent the presidential office has already become, Justice Jackson refused to believe that it would suffer if the Court declined further to aggrandize it.

Justice Burton wrote: "The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of emergency. Congress has reserved to itself the right to determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in meeting such an emergency." As for the inherent constitutional power of the President, Justice Burton said that this situation was not comparable to imminent invasion or threatened attack, and took the position that the order in question was not the military command of the commander-in-chief to a mobilized nation waging a war or imminently threatened with war.

Justice Clark agreed that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, the latter must follow them; but in the absence of such action by Congress, he thought the President had an independent power to act which "depends upon the gravity of the situa-

tion confronting the nation." He also expressed the opinion that the President could have acted under the seizure provision of the Selective Service Act of 1948, but chose not to do so. No other Justice agreed on this last point.

The presence of emergency conditions, Justice Douglas argued, does not transfer the legislative power to the President. Conceding that the Executive can move more swiftly, Justice Douglas developed the thought that the separation of powers principle was not designed to promote efficiency, but rather to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. Furthermore, he pointed out that the seizure of property is a taking in a constitutional sense, and therefore carries with it a duty to pay. This is a congressional prerogative, for the President cannot raise revenue.

Reviewing the problem in historical perspective, Justice Frankfurter concluded that every time Congress has authorized executive seizure (16 times since 1916), it has carefully circumscribed the grant of power, by fixing time limits and describing detailed conditions, with special attention to the question of compensation. Here Congress has not given the President any such power. Nor did he believe that seizure power was derived from the constitutional grant of the power faithfully to execute the laws. There were three cases of seizure without statutory authority in the period from June to December, 1941, but this did not add up, in his view, to a long-continued practice which established a construction of the Constitution.

In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Vinson began by describing in considerable detail the state of our international relations, including the Korean War, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the threat of Russian military power. He then summarized the large body of implementing legislation which Congress has enacted to carry out our international responsibilities, the appropriation since June, 1950, of \$130 billions for defense and military assistance, the Mutual Security, Selective Service and Defense Production Acts, and others. The President, he insisted, has the duty of executing all these legislative programs, and their success depends upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel. Reciting the great constitutional powers of the President, he reasoned that it was "apparent that the Presidency was deliberately fashioned as an office of power and independence." While the President is not an autocrat, neither is he an automaton, impotent to act at a time when the Republic's survival is at stake.

The Chief Justice reviewed rather discursively and uncritically the history of executive action, with or without statutory authorization, in times of national emergencies, ranging from President Washington's intervention in the Whiskey Rebellion to President Truman's decision to send troops to Korea. His conclusion was that "Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the particular method of execution." In this instance President Truman had acted to carry forward two legislative programs, military procurement and price stabilization. Thus he was executing the laws. Unlike an administrative agency or a subordinate official, the President is a constitutional officer taking

care that a mass of legislation is executed. Flexibility of execution to meet critical situations is a matter of practical necessity. The Chief Justice emphasized the gravity of the emergency, and argued that in times of great peril the Executive must not be weak. He accused the majority of holding a "messenger-boy concept" of the office of President. "Presidents have been in the past, and any man worthy of the Office should be in the future, free to take at least interim action necessary to execute legislative programs essential to survival of the Nation." Finally, he stressed throughout that the seizure was temporary, that the President reported promptly to Congress, and that the seizure was subject to approval, or disapproval, or change, by Congress, whenever it chose to act.

2. FEDERAL RIGHTS

Right to Privacy. Whether a public transportation utility may inflict commercial radio programs upon its "captive" audiences was the interesting question litigated in *Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak*.¹⁹ The Capital Transit Company, which operates the street railway and bus system of Washington, D. C., installed "music as you ride" radio programs, consisting of about 90% music, 5% news, weather reports and matters of civic interest, and 5% commercial advertising. The Company took a poll of its passengers and reported that 92% favored continuance of the programs. The Utilities Commission of the District ordered an investigation, after protests were made, and concluded that these radio programs did not interfere with public convenience, comfort or safety. On the appeal of several passengers, the Court of Appeals held that objecting passengers were deprived of liberty without due process, insofar as commercials and announcements were concerned.²⁰ The Supreme Court reversed.

Speaking for the Court, Justice Burton agreed that while the First and Fifth Amendments restrict only the federal government and not private parties, there was a sufficiently close relationship between the government and this radio service to bring the matter within the scope of the Bill of Rights. The Company had a substantial monopoly as a public utility under an authorization by Congress, and operated under the regulatory supervision of a federal agency. It was concluded that there was no violation of the First Amendment, first, because the testimony did not show any substantial interference with the passengers' freedom of conversation, and secondly, because there was no substance to the claim that the programs had been used for disseminating objectionable propaganda. The assertion that the due process right of privacy was invaded was also rejected on the ground that the Fifth Amendment does not secure to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the federal government a right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy one is entitled to in his own home. When one rides in a public conveyance, Justice Burton asserted, the right of privacy is "substantially limited by the rights of others." He also stressed the

¹⁹ 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

²⁰ 191 F. 2d 450 (1951).

fact that the majority of passengers approved of the programs, and that the Commission had reached its conclusion only after notice, investigation and public hearings.

Justice Black concurred on the due process issue, and agreed that music programs do not violate the First Amendment, but he thought otherwise insofar as passengers were subjected to the broadcasting of news, views, public speeches, or propaganda of any kind. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the case, saying that his feelings were "so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy" he had better not sit in judicial judgment. Justice Douglas dissented, asserting that the practice violated the due process right to privacy, which is "the beginning of all freedom." He thought the passengers were subjected to a form of coercion, since they have no real choice but to ride on the vehicles, and sit and listen. He expressed the fear that once privacy is invaded, it is gone, and while today it is the radio program of a business enterprise, tomorrow it may be a dominant political or religious group which seeks to force its views upon captive audiences.

Deportation of Aliens. It is a sign of the times that some of the most significant decisions of the 1951 Term dealt with the treatment of aliens.²¹ The leading case was *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*,²² where the Court was called upon to decide whether the United States may constitutionally deport a legally resident alien because of a membership in the Communist party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which authorized such deportation. The three appellants all admitted membership for some periods of time prior to 1940. Each lower court made a finding that the Communist party, during the period of the alien's membership, taught and advocated the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence. The Court held that such deportation was not in conflict with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The government, Justice Jackson asserted, has always had the power to terminate its hospitality to aliens, and while the expulsion of aliens long resident here entails hardships, the power to expel them, like the power to exclude, is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as an inherent power of every sovereign state. Whether the congressional policy is harsh or unreasonable is not a question for judges to answer; it is up to the political branches of the government to frame a policy in an area so vitally and intricately connected with the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of the republican form of government. Justice Jackson pointed out that the present statute was enacted by Congress as a result of the Court's decision in 1939 in the *Kessler* case,²³ wherein it was ruled that the act dealing with the deportation of subversives was intended to reach only those aliens who were members of subversive organizations at the time the proceedings against them were instituted. The Court could not say that the congressional alarm concerning the Communist conspiracy was either a fantasy or a pretense when the bill was passed in 1940.

²¹ See Ellen Raphael Knauff, *The Ellen Knauff Story* (New York, 1952).

²² 342 U.S. 580 (1952).

²³ *Kessler v. Strecker*, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).

The Court also ruled that the deportation law did not violate the First Amendment, for the Constitution does not prevent Congress from making a distinction between advocacy of change by lawful processes and change by force and violence. Under our Constitution, Justice Jackson pointed out, there is no excuse for a violent attack on the status quo, since there is the legal alternative of the ballot. It is true that it is hard to draw the line, but the problem is not solved by suppressing everything, as the Communists do, or suppressing nothing short of this side of immediate success. Justice Jackson thought that the test was fully discussed in the recent *Dennis* case,²⁴ and didn't require re-statement. Finally he ruled that the statute was not *ex post facto*, because the 1940 Act was actually a continuation of prior legislation dating from 1920; these aliens, therefore, were adequately forewarned. But even if the Act is retroactive, it was argued that the *ex post facto* clause applies only to penal legislation, and deportation, however severe its consequences, has consistently been classified as a civil procedure. As an original proposal Justice Jackson conceded that this might be considered debatable, but he insisted that it was well established in statutory and decisional law.

It was argued that the congressional policy permitted no escape by reformation. Again, said Justice Jackson, the wisdom of a policy of "atonement and redemption" is for Congress and not the judiciary to decide upon. Furthermore, when the Communist party as a matter of strategy formally expelled alien members *en masse*, following the adoption of the 1940 Act, it destroyed any significance that discontinued membership might otherwise have as evidence of a change of heart.

Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Black concurred. He noted that the conception of an absolute congressional deportation power was based on the old *Fong Yue Ting* case,²⁵ and thought this precedent was inconsistent with the philosophy of constitutional law which the Court has since developed for the protection of resident aliens. A resident alien is a person within the meaning of the due process clauses, and is entitled to the basic guarantees of liberty and livelihood. He thought that Justice Brewer's dissenting protest in *Fong Yue Ting* against the doctrine of inherent powers as both indefinite and dangerous had grown in persuasiveness with the passing years. And he insisted that banishment was punishment in the practical sense. He conceded that Congress could deport dangerous aliens, but here aliens were ordered deported not for what they are but for what they once were, thus ruling out "the principle of forgiveness and the doctrine of redemption," which seem in his view to be part of our constitutional law.

Another important case dealing with the deportation of aliens, and decided by a five-to-four vote, was *Carlson v. Landon*.²⁶ Section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 authorizes the Attorney General to hold alien Communists in custody without bail, at his discretion, pending determination of their de-

²⁴ *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

²⁵ *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

²⁶ 342 U.S. 524 (1952).

portability. The Court had no doubt of the validity of the statutory provision making Communist membership alone a sufficient ground for deportation, since the doctrines and practices of Communism teach the use of force to achieve political control. Detention, it held, is a necessary part of the deportation procedure, and since not all aliens are necessarily dangerous, the 1950 Act gave the Attorney General discretion to grant or refuse bail. The legislative history, said Justice Reed, supports the government's contention that the Attorney General's discretion is not beyond judicial review, but that it is presumptively correct and unassailable except for abuse. Reviewing the facts of the five aliens involved in this litigation, Justice Reed concluded that since they were all active Communist party members, discretion to refuse bail was properly exercised.

The crucial question of the relationship of bail to the factor of availability for trial was relegated to a footnote. This was held to be of no great significance in security cases involving alien Communists. Furthermore, Justice Reed observed that the past record of Communists, in failing to show up for trial, was far from decisive against the Attorney General's action. He drew attention to a report filed by the Department of Justice at the request of the Court which showed that in fact a large majority of aliens arrested on warrants of deportation are granted bail. Justice Reed also held that Section 23 did not delegate legislative power unconstitutionally, because of the lack of standards, since in the light of the statute as a whole the Attorney General must have a wide discretion, each exercise of which Congress is not obliged to spell out in detail. Furthermore, the Attorney General's discretion is not untrammelled, since it is subject to judicial review, and the refusal of bail must be justified in terms of the purposes of the statute.

Finally, Justice Reed held that Section 23 did not violate the bail clause of the Eighth Amendment, which, he argued, has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail is not compulsory, as, for example, in criminal cases where the punishment may be death. In other words, the Eighth Amendment does not say that all arrests are bailable.

Justice Black castigated the Court for what he termed a "harsh holding," a decision in "shocking disregard" of the Eighth (bail), First (free speech) and Fifth (due process) Amendments. He stressed the fact that the aliens in question were not denied bail because if released they might try to evade obedience to possible deportation orders, but because they were regarded as security risks. Thus it follows that their imprisonment is unrelated to any question of deportation, and "a power to put in jail because dangerous cannot be derived from a power to deport." If Congress can authorize the imprisonment of dangerous alien Communists, it can authorize it for citizen Communists on the same grounds. Actually the Bureau agent could throw a citizen in jail merely by saying he is an alien. Justice Black also protested against the Attorney General's delegating this tremendous power to subordinates. More fundamentally he insisted that condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary in accordance with due process which cannot be farmed out to the police and prosecuting

attorneys. He maintained that to keep people in jail because of fear of their talk was a flat violation of the First Amendment, which "grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, discuss all governmental affairs, and argue for desired changes in the existing order." Finally, he thought the statute as construed violated the Eighth Amendment. He characterized the Court's ruling as a "weird, devitalizing interpretation" which reduces the Amendment to the level of "a pious admonition." For the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not limit Congress, but only the courts.

In his dissenting opinion Justice Frankfurter emphasized that the Attorney General was given "discretion," not the power to decide arbitrarily, and that aliens arrested on warrants of deportation need bail for the same reasons that lead to bail where persons are held on serious criminal charges. He thought that the Attorney General had not in fact exercised discretion, but had made an abstract, class determination. Dissenting briefly, Justice Douglas stated that the expulsion of aliens for past actions or present expressions unaccompanied by conduct was more important than the bail issue. On the other hand, Justice Burton thought the bail issue was crucial, and argued that since the unreasonable denial of bail has the same consequence as excessive bail, the Eighth Amendment should be construed to prohibit unreasonable denial of bail.

Still another case involving the deportation of aliens was *United States v. Spector*,²⁷ decided by a five-to-three vote. At issue was a section of the Internal Security Act of 1950 providing that any alien against whom a specified order of deportation is outstanding "who shall willfully fail or refuse to depart from the United States within a period of six months from the date of such order of deportation, . . . or shall willfully fail or refuse to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure," shall be guilty of a felony. (Italics added.) The District Court dismissed an indictment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.²⁸ The Supreme Court reversed, Justice Douglas taking the view that the command of the statute was "simple and intelligible." He construed "timely" as meaning within six months, and said that which travel documents were needed depended upon the country the alien chooses to go to.

Justice Black thought the alien was forced to make a series of guesses, as to when an application is "timely," what constitutes a "good faith" application, what kind of "documents" are "necessary" for his departure, and to whom he must apply for them. He observed that "aliens living in this country are not necessarily sophisticated world travelers familiar with the present-day red tape that must be unwound to get from one country to another." Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Frankfurter agreed, maintained that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, within the rule of the *Wong Wing* case,²⁹ which held that punishment for unlawful residence by an alien cannot be had without a judicial trial. Here the statute does not permit the court which tries the alien

²⁷ 343 U.S. 169 (1952).

²⁸ 99 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Calif. 1951).

²⁹ *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

for the crime of unlawful residence to pass on the illegality of his presence. Thus the mere production of an administrative order for deportation becomes conclusive evidence of unlawful presence, without the possibility of judicial inquiry into the order's validity. It is true, said Justice Jackson, that the alien has no constitutional protection against administrative deportation, but he stands on an equal footing with the citizen when he is charged with crime. The Court majority had refused to deal with this issue because it hadn't been briefed or argued. Said Justice Jackson: "I abstain from comment on this new squeamishness whereby the Court imprisons itself within counsel's argument." At the very least, he said, the Court could order the case reargued.

Alien Property. An enemy alien's claim to property vested by the Alien Property Custodian had better luck in *Guessefeldt v. McGrath*,³⁰ decided by a five-to-three vote. The appellant, a German citizen who lived in Hawaii continuously from 1896 to 1938, took his family to Germany for a vacation in 1938 and was kept there involuntarily until 1949. He alleged he had done nothing to aid the enemy's war effort. The Court agreed with his contention that he was not "resident within" Germany within the meaning of the definition of "enemy" in the Trading with the Enemy Act, and that he could therefore sue the Custodian. The debatable point was whether Section 39, forbidding the return of property to any "national" of Germany or Japan, applied to Guessefeldt. Justice Frankfurter held that as a matter of legislative history and purpose, this section did not apply to this party, and that if it did, it would raise "debatable constitutional questions." His theory was that friendly aliens are protected by the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compensation.³¹ He agreed that there were contrary views, but insisted that in any event "the constitutional problem is not imaginary." Of course, he did no more than argue the desirability of deciding the case without answering the constitutional question. In his dissent, Chief Justice Vinson said that plainly Guessefeldt was an enemy alien in every ordinary sense of the term, and "there is no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties."³²

Denaturalization. Finally, in *Bindczyck v. Finucane*³³ the Court held that the denaturalization procedure spelled out in the Nationality Act—which requires the United States district attorney to file an affidavit showing good cause, and gives the individual concerned sixty days' personal notice to answer the petition—was the exclusive procedure for revoking citizenship on account of fraudulent or illegal procurement based on evidence outside the record. Bindczyck was naturalized in a Maryland state court in 1943, and then seven days later, at the same term of court, and in accordance with its power under local law to

³⁰ 342 U.S. 308 (1952).

³¹ He relied upon *Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States*, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); *Ex parte Kawato*, 317 U.S. 69 (1942); *The Venus*, 8 Cranch 253 (1814).

³² Quoted from *United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.*, 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926). He also leaned heavily on *Ludecke v. Watkins*, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) and *Brown v. United States*, 8 Cranch 110 (1814).

³³ 342 U.S. 76 (1951).

set aside judgments during the term in which they were rendered, the court set aside the order of naturalization on motion of the government. Speaking for a majority of five, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the denaturalization section of the Nationality Act, adopted in 1906, was the result of a half-century of agitation designed to avoid the evils of haphazard denaturalization.³⁴ Congress intended to formulate "a self-contained, exclusive procedure," and did not intend to leave the matter to the confused medley of state procedures for setting aside local judgments. For errors on the record, the United States may appeal, in accordance with the rule of the *Tutun* case.³⁵ For errors outside the record, the statutory denaturalization procedure is provided. Justice Frankfurter rejected the contention that a grant of citizenship is a judgment which, like any judgment, is within the control of the issuing court during the term. "Such abstract reasoning is mechanical jurisprudence in its most glittering form," and disregards both the purpose of the statute and "the capricious and haphazard results that would flow from applying such an empty syllogism to the actualities of judicial administration." The dissenting Justices, Reed and Burton, thought that Congress clearly gave state courts concurrent jurisdiction over the matter, and that as a matter of course the states are free to exercise the grant of power in accordance with their normal procedures, unless specifically forbidden to do so by the federal legislation.

Bail. While the Court ruled that aliens held for deportation may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be denied bail altogether, a unanimous Court construed the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's interdiction of "excessive" bail favorably to the petitioners in *Stack v. Boyle*.³⁶ Twelve persons had been indicted in the federal District Court, Southern District of California, for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. On arrest, bail was fixed at \$50,000 each. The only evidence offered by the government in opposition to a motion to reduce bail was that four persons previously convicted under the Smith Act in the southern district of New York had forfeited bail. After the District Court refused to reduce bail, the petitioners filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in the same court. The writs were denied, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the holding was that the bail was excessive, the Court ruled that the proper procedure for challenging bail is by motion to reduce, and then appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order denying the motion. Habeas corpus should be withheld where an adequate remedy available in the criminal proceeding has not been exhausted. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded to the District Court with direction to hold a hearing on the question of excessive bail.

As to the substantive issue, Chief Justice Vinson asserted that since 1789, "federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-

³⁴ See John P. Roche, "Pre-Statutory Denaturalization," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 35, pp. 120-37 (1949).

³⁵ *Tutun v. United States*, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).

³⁶ 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

capital offense *shall* be admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." A defendant must provide bail in order to give adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if convicted. Bail is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment if the figure is higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose.³⁷ This is the directive of the applicable federal rule of criminal procedure.³⁸ The bail fixed in this case, the Chief Justice noted, was higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties.³⁹ And it cannot be assumed, without evidence, that each petitioner is a pawn in the hands of a superior. He said: "To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act. Such conduct would inject into our system of government the very principles of totalitarianism which Congress was seeking to guard against in passing the statute under which petitioners have been indicted." If higher than usual bail is required, it must be supported by evidence brought out in a hearing.

Searches and Seizures. On Lee operated a laundry in Hoboken. Poy, an old acquaintance and former employee, came in to his place of business and engaged him in conversation, during which On Lee made incriminating statements which led to his conviction on an opium charge. He did not know that Poy was an undercover agent for the Bureau of Narcotics, nor did he know that Poy was wired for sound, with a small microphone in his pocket and a small antenna running along his arm. Nor did he know that an agent of the Bureau, Lawrence Lee, was stationed outside with a receiving set. On Lee could be seen through the large front window, and agent Lee could hear the conversation. It was conceded that agent Lee's testimony was prejudicial. A majority of five Justices rejected On Lee's claim that the admission of agent Lee's testimony violated the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment, Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, and the principles of fair play.⁴⁰ Four Justices voted to reverse.

³⁷ See Charles E. Desmond, "Bail—Ancient and Modern," *Buffalo Law Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 245-48 (1952).

³⁸ Rule 46(c). "AMOUNT. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant."

³⁹ Maximum penalties under the Smith Act are five years in jail and a fine of \$10,000.

⁴⁰ *On Lee v. United States*, 348 U.S. 747 (1952). See Alan F. Westin, "The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 165-208 (1952); Osmond K. Fraenkel, "The Fourth Amendment and the Federal Courts," *Lawyers Guild Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 73-77 (1952); Leon R. Yankwich, "The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 27, pp. 499-528 (1952); William S. Fairfield and Charles Clift, "The Wiretappers," *The Reporter*, Vol. 7, December 23, 1952, pp. 8-22; Vol. 8, January 6, 1953, pp. 9-20.

For the majority, Justice Jackson held that there had been no unlawful search and seizure because, since Poy entered the place of business with On Lee's consent, if not by an implied invitation, no trespass had been committed. He ruled that Poy's subsequent conduct did not vitiate the consent and render the entry a trespass *ab initio*.⁴¹ The contention that Poy's entrance was a trespass because consent to enter was obtained by fraud was rejected as a "fine-spun" doctrine, and the suggestion that agent Lee, outside the laundry, was a trespasser "verges on the frivolous." The cases dealing with unlawful seizure of tangible property, Justice Jackson held, do not apply in the field of mechanical or electronic devices, at least where access to the listening post was not obtained by unlawful search. The Court refused to reconsider the *Olmstead* case,⁴² which held wiretapping to be outside the ban of the Fourth Amendment. But it would do On Lee no good, said Justice Jackson, even if the *Olmstead* decision were overruled, because there is no analogy between wiretapping and what transpired here. Eavesdropping outside an open window, or use of field glasses to magnify vision, are not forbidden, and they would have no more effect on the petitioner's privacy. Similarly, Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was not violated because On Lee had no communications facility to be interfered with.

Finally, Justice Jackson rejected the plea that the evidence should be excluded in order to discipline federal law enforcement officers, within the rule of the *McNabb* case.⁴³ Here neither the agent nor the informer had violated any federal law. Furthermore, the general rule of common law is that otherwise admissible evidence is not rendered inadmissible by the fact of having been obtained illegally, and departure from this rule must be justified by some compelling social policy. "Society," said Justice Jackson, "can ill afford to throw away the evidence produced by the falling out, jealousies, and quarrels of those who live by outwitting the law." In fact, he asserted, the recent trend of the law is in favor of admitting testimony, leaving its weight up to the trier of fact. He did not believe that the government should "be arbitrarily penalized for the low morals of its informers."⁴⁴

Justice Frankfurter thought the majority was adopting the doctrine that

⁴¹ He cited *McGuire v. United States*, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) as authority for the proposition that the fiction of trespass *ab initio* is a rule of liability in civil actions only, and *Zap v. United States*, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), to show that extension of the fiction is not favored.

⁴² *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Said Chief Justice Taft: "There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry. . . ." Justice Holmes said in dissent: ". . . For my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. . . ." Said Justice Brandeis, dissenting also: "Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law. . . ."

⁴³ *McNabb v. United States*, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). This case held that a confession should be excluded if made during a period of unlawful detention in violation of a federal statute requiring prompt arraignment.

⁴⁴ See Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 60, pp. 1091-1131 (1951).

the end justifies reprehensible means. He conceded that a criminal prosecution is more than a game, but insisted that it is not a dirty game. He argued that the *Olmstead* decision was a mistake, and should be overruled for the reasons originally given by the four dissenting Justices—Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone—who were not sentimentalists about criminals, “no softies.” The Court’s rule is a bad one, Justice Frankfurter stated, because it “makes for lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts a premium on force and fraud, not on imagination and enterprise and professional training.”

A much simpler problem was resolved in *United States v. Jeffers*.⁴⁵ Here officers entered the hotel room of the defendant’s two aunts, in their absence and his, and without warrant searched the place and seized narcotics claimed by the defendant. The Court ruled that the motion to exclude the evidence should have been granted. The fact that the evidence was not on the defendant’s premises did not deprive him of standing to suppress it. The search cannot be separated from the seizure. The Court, said Justice Clark, will not permit “a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to protect a fundamental right.”

Illegal Detention. In the recent *McNabb* and *Upshaw* cases,⁴⁶ the Court laid down the rule that confessions should be excluded if obtained during a period of illegal detention, due to failure to bring the defendant promptly before a committing magistrate. In *United States v. Carignan*⁴⁷ the Court declined to extend the rule. Carignan was arrested in Anchorage, Alaska, on an assault charge, on a Friday, and while in lawful custody on that charge was questioned the following Saturday and Monday about a murder. He finally confessed, after being permitted to consult a priest twice. There was no evidence of violence, persistent questioning, denial of food or rest, or promises. The conviction was reversed on another ground, that error was committed when the trial court refused to permit the defendant to testify in the absence of the jury on the question of the voluntariness of the confession. But on the detention issue the Court ruled that, absent coercion, threats or inducements, the Constitution does not forbid police examination in private of those in lawful custody, and that since Carignan was lawfully detained, his case fell outside the reason of the *McNabb* rule, which was to abolish unlawful detention. The exclusion of involuntary confessions, said Justice Reed, gives an accused complete protection, and it would not promote justice to extend a mechanical rule based on the time of a confession. Three concurring Justices agreed that the conviction was properly set aside, but for the reason that the police should not be permitted the practice of arresting a man on one charge in order to investigate a wholly (and usually) different crime. Said Justice Douglas: “The rule of evidence we announce today gives sanction to the police practice which makes detention the means of investigation. Therein lies its vice.”

⁴⁵ 342 U.S. 48 (1951).

⁴⁶ *McNabb v. United States*, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); *Upshaw v. United States*, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).

⁴⁷ 342 U.S. 36 (1951).

Habeas Corpus. In Section 2255 of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress provided that prisoners in custody under sentence of a federal court, claiming the right to be released because of a violation of the Constitution or laws, or because the court lacked jurisdiction, or because the sentence was in excess of the authorized maximum, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed sentence to vacate or correct the sentence. Such a motion for relief may be made at any time, and in its discretion the court may act *ex parte*. The sentencing court is not required to entertain a second motion for similar relief, and appeal lies to the court of appeals. The statute also provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion shall not be entertained if it appears that the petitioner has failed to seek relief by motion to the sentencing court, unless the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit thought that in precluding resort to habeas corpus Section 2255 unconstitutionally suspended the writ. Since a habeas corpus action must be brought in the district of confinement, two important consequences followed which the new rule sought to correct. First, the habeas corpus hearing had to be held in a court in which the records are not readily available; and secondly, the few district courts in whose jurisdiction the major federal penitentiaries are located were required to handle unusually large numbers of petitions, often far from the scene of the facts, the witnesses and the records. Accordingly, after extensive consideration, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended the change in procedure, to permit collateral attack on convictions in the sentencing courts. The new remedy is in fact in the nature of the ancient writ of error *coram nobis*. The Court ruled unanimously that there was no impingement upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon convictions, and that the sole purpose of Section 2255 was "to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum."⁴⁸ But actually the Court refused to rule directly on the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that, since the district court had not followed the procedure outlined in the statute, no constitutional question was properly before the Court.

The Rule of Definiteness. A federal statute making it a crime for anyone to solicit or receive contributions in consideration of a promise to support or use influence in obtaining for any person "any appointive office or place under the United States" was sustained by a five-to-four vote in a case where the office in question, while authorized by an act of Congress, was not yet in actual existence.⁴⁹ The majority thought the statute plainly reached "dealing in futures," as to offices which might "reasonably be expected" to be established, for "it is no less corrupt to sell an office one may never be able to deliver than to sell

⁴⁸ *United States v. Hayman*, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 32, pp. 143-61 (1952); Rex A. Collings, Jr., "Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?", *California Law Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 335-61 (1952).

⁴⁹ *United States v. Hood*, 343 U.S. 148 (1952).

one he can." This construction does not run afoul of the requirement of definiteness, for "the sale of non-existent but plausible offices" is not likely to entrap the influence merchant. The four dissenters thought the statute applied only to actual existing offices, and stressed that this "reasonably to be expected" office hadn't as yet been set up.

In another case,⁵⁰ the Court upheld, by a six-to-three vote, a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission which provided that "drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas shall avoid, *so far as practicable, and, where feasible*, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts and dangerous crossings." (Italics added.) The District Court held that the words "so far as practicable, and, where feasible," were too vague and indefinite as a standard of guilt. The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that "few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded." It was pointed out that in the *Sproles* case⁵¹ Chief Justice Hughes held the term "shortest practicable route" not to be too vague. The Court noted that the I.C.C. rule was the product of a long history of regulation and study in which the trucking industry participated extensively. Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that the statute punished only those who knowingly violate the regulation, which does much to destroy any force in the argument that the statute was unfair.⁵² The three dissenters felt that the regulation was unworkable and indefinite—that where Congress delegates the crime-making power to an administrative commission, a considerable precision is required.

Fair Compensation. The Alien Property Custodian brought suit to require the Cities Service Company to pay on two debentures; the obligations represented by them had previously been vested under the Trading with the Enemy Act upon a finding that they were owned by a resident and national of Germany. The Custodian never had possession of the debentures. One matured in 1950, but had never been presented for payment, and was last reported to be in Berlin in the hands of the Russians. The other matures in 1969, and was presented in 1950 to Chase National, the indenture trustee, for redemption, and is now in the possession of a New York brokerage house. The Court held that the statute grants the authority to vest obligations evidenced by domestic negotiable bearer debentures, even though the debentures themselves were outside the United States.⁵³ The Court rejected the fiction that, since the debentures were located outside the country at the time of vesting, the debts did not have

⁵⁰ *Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States*, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).

⁵¹ *Sproles v. Binford*, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).

⁵² Reliance was had on *Screws v. United States*, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) and related cases.

⁵³ *Cities Service Co. v. McGrath*, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).

a situs within the United States for purposes of seizure. This would provide a sanctuary for enemy investments, defeat the recovery of American securities looted by conquering forces, and restrict the exercise of the war powers of the United States. Since the obligor was in the country, and the obligation can be effectively dealt with through the exercise of jurisdiction over the obligor, Congress transgressed no constitutional limitations.

The more serious issue, however, was whether the Act took the Company's property contrary to the Fifth Amendment unless it has a remedy against the United States in case a foreign court holds it liable to a holder in due course of the debentures. It was conceded that the Act discharges the obligor of all liability in any American court, but it owns extensive properties all over the world which subject it to foreign suits. The Court agreed that it was possible that Cities Service might suffer judgment in a foreign country, and in the event of double recovery it would have a right to recoup from the United States for a "taking" of its property without just compensation. Only with this assurance against double liability can it be fairly said that the present seizure is not itself an unconstitutional taking of property. Two Justices thought that the determination of the obligation of the United States, in the event that the Company is required to pay another claimant, should not be made until a second judgment is had.

Treason. Kawakita was born in the United States in 1921 of Japanese nationals, and hence was a citizen of both countries. In 1939, shortly before he became 18, he went to Japan for a visit, with an American passport, to obtain which he took the usual oath of allegiance. In 1940 he registered with an American consul in Japan as an American citizen. He remained there, entered a university in 1941, and once more renewed his passport and took the oath. In 1943, he registered in a family census register, and got a job as interpreter with a nickel company. At this time he had his name removed as an alien and changed his address from California to Japan. Later he went to China on a Japanese passport and accepted labor draft papers from the Japanese government. Hired to interpret for prisoners of war working for the nickel company, his treasonable acts consisted in mistreating them. In December, 1945, Kawakita went to the American consul at Yokohama and registered as an American citizen, stating under oath that he was a United States citizen and that he had not done various acts amounting to expatriation. He was issued a passport and returned to the United States. Soon after that he was recognized, arrested, and convicted of treason. The trial judge charged the jury that if Kawakita had lost his American citizenship he must be acquitted, but if he remained an American citizen then he owed the same duty of allegiance as any other citizen, and that even if he was an American citizen, he must be acquitted if he honestly believed that he was no longer a citizen, for in that event he could not have had the necessary treasonable intent. The Supreme Court, by a four-to-three vote, affirmed the conviction.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ *Kawakita v. United States*, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).

The Court held, in the first place, that Kawakita had not expatriated himself, and that since the implications of his acts were ambiguous, it was for the jury to decide. Justice Douglas noted that Kawakita had held no "office, post or employment" under the Japanese government, which would be proof of denaturalization, and that the company he worked for was a private institution organized for profit. The Court also rejected the contention that a person with dual nationality can be guilty of treason only to the country where he resides. Neither the Treason Clause of the Constitution nor the Treason Act of 1790 has a territorial limitation. It is not true that an American citizen living beyond the territorial limits of the United States may not commit treason against the United States. American citizenship, until lost, carries obligations of allegiance as well as privileges and benefits. A person with dual citizenship, who happens to be in the other country when war breaks out, may choose one or the other, but he may also elect to continue his dual citizenship. The dual citizen may owe paramount allegiance to the other country while there, but this does not mean that he therefore owes no allegiance to the United States. Certain acts which are done voluntarily or wilfully might be treasonable, even though they would not be such if done under compulsion of law or the job. Here the jury found that Kawakita had not been forced to commit the traitorous acts. He cannot say that being a citizen of Japan he owed no allegiance to the United States even though he was an American citizen.

The ingredients of treason are adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. Disloyal thoughts are not enough; there must be proof of overt acts. The jury found Kawakita guilty of eight overt acts; one would have sufficed. Some of the acts consisted in mistreating American prisoners to get more work out of them. Though Kawakita's contribution to the Japanese war effort was minor, yet it was treasonable, the important thing being the nature of the act. The act may even be unnecessary to the success of the enemy, or only abortive. The test is whether it gives aid and comfort to the enemy, at the moment of its performance. The other acts of cruelty to American prisoners were not required by Kawakita's job as interpreter. And it is immaterial that what he did was lawful under Japanese law; the source of the law of treason is the American Constitution. Finally, the Court held that the two-witness rule for each overt act is met even though the witnesses differ in details. While two witnesses must testify to the same act, it isn't necessary that their testimony be identical.

Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black and Burton dissented because they believed that Kawakita had expatriated himself by virtue of his various activities in Japan, including the heinous treatment of American prisoners of war.

Discrimination. While not involving a direct interpretation of the Constitution, *Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard*⁵⁵ is worth noting as an additional step forward in the war against discrimination in employment. On threat of a strike, the union, bargaining representative for the brakemen under the Railway Labor Act, forced the Frisco railroad to agree to discharge all colored

⁵⁵ 343 U.S. 768 (1952). See Note, "Duty of Union to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 490-502 (1952).

"train porters," who actually performed all the duties of white brakemen. The Negroes had their own union. By a six-to-three vote the Court held the agreement to exclude the Negroes from employment illegal, following the rule of the *Steele* case,⁵⁶ although in *Steele* the Negroes had no union of their own and the Brotherhood was the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire craft (of firemen). Justice Black ruled that the breach of statutory duty was the same in both cases, the illegality consisting in racial discrimination, which Congress did not authorize. The federal act, said the Justice, prohibits bargaining agents from using their power to destroy the jobs of colored workers in order to give them to white workers. Three Justices dissented on the ground that *Steele* was not controlling because, since the Negroes had their own union in the instant case, the Brotherhood had no duty to contract for them. While neither a state government nor the federal government may discriminate on the ground of race, private parties may, and no applicable federal law says they may not. They asserted that it was up to Congress to write a fair employment practices act, and is not the province of the Court to do so.

Federal Protection of Civil Rights. The Court's war of attrition against the surviving remnants of the post-Civil War civil rights acts⁵⁷ continued with *Stefanelli v. Minard*.⁵⁸ Newark police officers entered petitioner's home without legal authority and seized property dealing with bookmaking. It was not disputed that if federal officers had made this search, they would have violated the Fourth Amendment. Following his indictment, Stefanelli made no move in the state court to suppress the evidence, since under New Jersey law the seized property is admissible. He therefore sued for an injunction in a federal District Court against the use of the evidence on the basis of a federal statute which authorizes any person who is deprived by anyone acting under color of local law of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to sue at law or in equity or in any other proper proceeding. The Court sustained a dismissal of the suit by the trial court. Justice Frankfurter reminded that the recent *Wolf* case⁵⁹ held that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence secured by an unreasonable search and seizure although due process embraces the search and seizure problems.⁶⁰ He refused to decide whether the complaint stated a cause of action under the federal statute, because the balance was against a federal court of equity using its discretion in favor of the petitioner. "The maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution summa-

⁵⁶ *Steele v. L. & N. R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

⁵⁷ Eugene Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 50, pp. 1323-58 (1952). See also John Edgar Hoover, "Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 175-95 (1952).

⁵⁸ 342 U.S. 117 (1951).

⁵⁹ *Wolf v. Colorado*, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

⁶⁰ Justice Douglas, dissenting alone, noted that he had dissented, along with Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in the *Wolf* case. He said: "To hold first that the evidence may be admitted and second that its use may not be enjoined is to make the Fourth Amendment an empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are concerned."

rizes centuries of weighty experience in Anglo-American law. It is impressively reinforced when not merely the relations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political authorities are at issue." Federal courts should therefore not interfere piecemeal to try collateral issues arising in pending state criminal cases, there being too much danger of "insupportable disruption."

3. THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER

An interesting controversy over federal taxation was resolved by a five-to-four vote of the Court in *Rutkin v. United States*.⁶¹ The issue was whether money obtained by extortion was income taxable to the extortioner. The Internal Revenue Code, Section 22(a), covers "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." The jury found that \$250,000 which petitioner had received from a former partner was obtained by extortion. In support of his argument that this was not taxable income Rutkin relied upon the recent *Wilcox* case,⁶² which held that embezzled funds were not taxable income to the embezzler because he had no rightful claim to the money and was under legal obligation to return it. Speaking for a bare majority of the Court, Justice Burton rather lamely "limited the *Wilcox* case to its facts"; that is to say, he didn't overrule its holding nor did he applaud it. He said merely that embezzling is not extortion, which is technically true, but which ignores the fact that analogy is the life of the law. It is established, he argued, that an unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes taxable income when its recipient has such control over it that as a practical matter he derives readily realizable economic value from it. This accords with settled administrative and judicial rule and practice. The original 1913 income tax act, it was pointed out, taxed incomes from any "lawful" business, but in 1916 an amendment deleted the word "lawful" with the obvious intent of taxing unlawful gains as well. The broad language of Section 22(a) shows that Congress intended to exercise its full power to tax income.

The four dissenters thought the *Wilcox* case was controlling, an extortioner having no better claim to his money than an embezzler. Justice Black noted that Justice Burton had dissented in *Wilcox*, and said that actually the Court was now adopting, as a result largely of a change in its personnel, the reasoning which had previously been rejected. Justice Black agreed that income derived from such enterprises as gambling and bootlegging are taxable though illegal, because those so engaged have a bona fide claim to their money. But he insisted that Congress did not intend to treat the sporadic loot of an embezzler or extortioner or robber as belonging to them.

Above all, Justice Black severely criticized this effort on the part of the national government to punish such purely local crimes as embezzlement and extortion. He maintained that this expansion of the federal criminal jurisdiction into fields of law enforcement heretofore left wholly to the state and local com-

⁶¹ 343 U.S. 130 (1952).

⁶² *Commissioner v. Wilcox*, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).

munities was unwise for all concerned. Many think it lowers the prestige of the federal system of justice, and tends to make it top-heavy, but above all the United States cannot do its own job properly if it expands into the state criminal law field. This development is also bad for the states because the elements of these offenses and their underlying problems vary from state to state, because it weakens the sense of local responsibility for local conditions, and weakens control by state courts over interpretation of their own state laws. It also imperils the possibility of fair trials because of the danger of double or even triple prosecutions. Finally, such prosecutions are always prejudicial to the defendant, because of the resulting confusion of issues, as in this case, where Rutkin was hardly tried for tax evasion. Of some 900 pages of printed testimony only 13 related to tax questions.

4. THE COMMERCE POWER

While there were quite a number of cases during the 1951 Term in the commerce field, few involved interpretations of the basic constitutional scope of the power of Congress. Perhaps the most interesting was the case of the *Lorain Journal*,⁶³ in which this Ohio newspaper was enjoined under the Sherman Act because, as the only newspaper in town, it refused to take advertising from anyone who patronized a competing radio station. A unanimous Court found that the conduct complained of was an attempt to monopolize interstate commerce. "There can be little doubt today," said Justice Burton, "that the immediate dissemination of news gathered from throughout the nation or the world by agencies specially organized for that purpose is a part of interstate commerce. . . . The same is true of national advertising originating throughout the nation and offering products for sale on a national scale." The distribution of news and advertising transmitted to Lorain in interstate commerce was regarded as an inseparable part of the flow of interstate commerce. "Without the protection of competition at the outlets of the flow of interstate commerce, the protection of its earlier stages is of little worth."

Similarly, the Court ruled that a company which grants patent licenses embodying price-fixing agreements was in commerce, and subject to the Sherman Act, even though it manufactured nothing, but was merely the owner of the patents, granting the right of making and vending to others.⁶⁴ "We think it beyond question," said Justice Reed, "that this making of license contracts for the purpose of regulating distribution and fixing prices of commodities in interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act, even though the isolated act of contracting for the licenses is wholly within a single state." In another case the Court held that a power company with its plants on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania, which sells to a Baltimore company when the river flow permits and buys from it during periods of low flow, is in interstate commerce

⁶³ *Lorain Journal Co. v. United States*, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). See Comment, "Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 948-1009 (1952).

⁶⁴ *United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.*, 342 U.S. 371 (1952).

and therefore subject to regulation as to rates and service by the Federal Power Commission.⁶⁵ The Commission's authority to regulate this commingled flow of power is complete, and does not vary with the rise and fall of the river. The Court also affirmed *per curiam* and without opinion an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission increasing intrastate commuters' fares on the New Haven Railroad to the level of interstate rates.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the furnishing of prepaid medical care on a local plane, with no showing that any across-the-state-line activities were adversely affected, and with only a few sporadic and incidental payments to out-of-state doctors and hospitals, was held to be outside the scope of interstate commerce and therefore of the Sherman Act.⁶⁷

5. FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

Contempt Power. One of the by-products of the turbulent, marathon trial of the eleven Communist leaders which came to a close in 1951 with the *Dennis* decision⁶⁸ was the Court's approval by a six-to-three vote of Judge Medina's sentencing of the lawyers to jail for periods up to six months, after the jury's verdict was in, without giving further notice or a hearing.⁶⁹ Certiorari had been limited to the question whether the judge had properly followed the relevant Rule. Rule 42(a) provides that a criminal contempt may be punished sum-

⁶⁵ *Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission*, 343 U.S. 414 (1952). Two Justices dissented on the theory that this case should be approached as an antitrust problem, and that by merely regulating, the Commission is actually condoning a violation of the Sherman Act.

⁶⁶ *New York v. United States*, 342 U.S. 882 (1951). Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the ICC hadn't supplied an adequate basis for its decision, since all it did, so he argued, was to make findings that the interstate rates were reasonable, and then fix the intrastate rates at the same level. It made no findings as to what would constitute a fair proportion of the railroad's total income for intrastate traffic; there was no finding as to the necessary relation between interstate and intrastate commutation rates. He warned against over-reliance upon *expertise*; it is "the strength of modern government," but it "can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion."

⁶⁷ *United States v. Oregon State Medical Society*, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). It was pointed out that *American Medical Association v. United States*, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) involved a conspiracy in the District of Columbia, and therefore presented no commerce issue. Three important cases in the commerce field not involving questions of constitutional law were: *Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co.*, 343 U.S. 470 (1952), which approved a new approach of the Commission to the problem of curbing price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act; *Brannan v. Stark*, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), in which, by a four-to-three vote, the Court expressed disapproval of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture, under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, relating to the marketing of milk in the Boston area by cooperative marketing associations; *National Labor Relations Board v. American National Insurance Co.*, 343 U.S. 395 (1952), where by a six-to-three vote the inclusion of "management functions" clauses in bargaining agreements was held to be within the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act.

⁶⁸ *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

⁶⁹ *Sacher v. United States*, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). The Court had originally denied certiorari, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, but later reconsidered and granted it, 342 U.S. 858 (1951).

marily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and it was committed in his actual presence. Rule 42(b) states that otherwise criminal contempts shall be prosecuted on notice; reasonable time must be allowed to prepare a defense; the defendant is entitled to trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides; and if the contempt involves disrespect of the judge, he is disqualified from presiding at the hearing except with the defendant's consent. The lawyers who were held in contempt maintained that Judge Medina could have proceeded summarily if he had acted at once upon the occurrence of each incident; but that since he waited till the end of the trial, punishment would no longer have anything to do with any obstruction of the trial. They maintained that they were entitled to a jury trial before another judge under Rule 42(b).

Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, made no direct mention of any constitutional issue. He said there were good practical reasons why a judge should have a summary contempt power, to protect the integrity of the judicial process, but that "summary" does not refer to the timing of the action in reference to the offense, but rather to a procedure which dispenses with formality. He could find no prejudice to these lawyers if the judge waited till the end of the trial, if their conduct warranted immediate summary punishment. "The overriding consideration is the integrity and efficiency of the trial process, and if the judge deems immediate action inexpedient he should be allowed discretion to follow the procedure taken in this case." In fact, to summon a lawyer and pronounce him guilty during the trial might prejudice the client by denying him counsel and give grounds for demanding a new trial. Furthermore, Justice Jackson thought it might be better for the lawyer if the judge waits till he cools off. Though he thought most judges reliable, he conceded that the contempt power may be abused, but if that happens appeal lies to the court of appeals and to this Court. He served notice that this Court "will unhesitatingly protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every duty pertaining to the office of the advocate on behalf of any person whatsoever. But it will not equate contempt with courage or insults with independence. It will also protect the processes of orderly trial, which is the supreme object of the lawyer's calling."

Justice Black dissented vigorously. He thought the record showed that the judge had been so bitterly hostile to these lawyers that he was disqualified to try them. "No man," he asserted, "should be forced to trial before a judge who has previously publicly attacked his personal honor and integrity. The risk to impartial justice is too great." Justice Black thought these men had been denied the constitutional rights to indictment by grand jury and trial by jury. The Court had previously reduced the contempt power to "the least possible power adequate to the ends proposed," the ends being decorum and obedience to orders.⁷⁰ Furthermore, he argued that there was no need for summary conviction because the trial was over and the danger of obstructing it had passed.

⁷⁰ Citing *In re Oliver*, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).

Indeed, trial by jury was all the more necessary because the alleged offenses related to conduct that affronted the judge personally. Nor could Justice Black find much reassurance in the fact that lawyer-judges are available to review contempt citations, arguing that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury is based on a preference for a trial by laymen.

Justice Frankfurter thought that the judge's accusations were too personal for him to act as both accuser and judge, and that it was established that no judge should sit in a case in which he is personally involved.⁷¹ He also thought that Judge Medina had not been entirely without fault himself. Justice Douglas agreed that it would be difficult to decide who had behaved worse, the judge or the lawyers, and that no one was without blame. He also agreed with Justice Black that the defendants were entitled to trial by jury.

Fair Procedure. The decree of a federal District Court in a civil action under the Sherman Act required the issuance of patent licenses on a fair royalty basis. To fix reasonable royalty rates the Court directed the government and the offending company each to select two arbitrators, with these four choosing a fifth person in case of a stalemate. If agreement could not be had on the fifth man, then the trial judge would appoint someone or sit himself. In this instance he served as the crucial member of the committee himself. The company argued that the royalties must be determined in judicial proceedings based on hearing and evidence. The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that it was always within the power of the trial judge to establish the royalty rates.⁷² It was not mandatory for the judge to hold a full hearing or refer the royalty matter to a master. While the judge's procedure was an innovation, Justice Jackson asserted that "novelty is not synonymous with error." There was no abuse here in the discretion which a trial judge has in framing relief in anti-trust cases.

Military Justice. In *Madsen v. Kinsella*,⁷³ the Court held that in the absence of statutory limitations, the President as commander-in-chief may establish a U.S. Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany and authorize it to try a civilian citizen of the United States and dependent wife of a member of the Armed Forces, on a homicide charge. It was conceded that a regularly convened general court-martial would have had jurisdiction. The Court ruled that "since our nation's earliest days, such [military] commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war." These "common-law war courts" have taken many forms and names, without statutory prescription. The President's authority in this respect survives the end of hostilities. "The President," said Justice Burton, "has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the United States by force of arms." Congress may legislate on this subject as it chooses, but when the Articles of War were revised in 1916 by extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial

⁷¹ *Cooke v. United States*, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).

⁷² *Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States*, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).

⁷³ 343 U.S. 341 (1952). See Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power* (Chicago, 1951).

to include civilian offenders, an express reservation was made for military commissions. That the occupation courts were military commissions, the crucial issue, was assumed without proof or argument. Justice Black dissented alone, arguing that all legislative power is vested by the Constitution in Congress, and that the President is not specifically authorized to create courts to try American citizens.

Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions. A standard clause in government contracts provides that all disputes involving questions of fact shall be decided by the contracting officer, with the right of appeal to the head of the department "whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto." The Court ruled that a finding by the head of the department on a question of fact may not be set aside by the Court of Claims unless it was founded on fraud, and that by fraud is meant conscious wrong-doing, with an intention to cheat or be dishonest.⁷⁴ It follows that a finding by the Court of Claims that the decision of the department head was "arbitrary," "capricious" and "grossly erroneous" is not sufficient to justify setting it aside. Three Justices dissented. Justice Douglas filed a very strong statement on the subject of administrative absolutism. He said the Court's rule in this case "makes a tyrant of every contracting officer."

Eleventh Amendment. The Georgia Railroad & Banking Company was chartered in 1833 by a special act which included exemption from taxation. In 1945 the Georgia Constitution was amended to include a provision declaring null and void "all exemptions from taxation heretofore granted in corporate charters." When the State Revenue Commissioner threatened to proceed against it for the collection of ad valorem taxes, the company filed suit in the state court for an injunction and a declaratory judgment, but the Georgia Supreme Court ruled this was an unconsented suit against the state,⁷⁵ and the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on the ground that the judgment was based upon an adequate nonfederal ground.⁷⁶ Thereupon the company filed an action in the federal District Court for injunctive relief, and a three-judge court dismissed on the ground that it was an unconsented suit against the state contrary to the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed unanimously, and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.⁷⁷ Chief Justice Vinson ruled that the action was not one to enforce an alleged contract with Georgia, as the court below supposed, but rather a suit to enjoin the collection of taxes in violation of federal constitutional rights. "This Court has long held," the Chief Justice asserted, "that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State." This position was reexamined in the *Young* case,⁷⁸ and has been consistently followed. The rule is that the immunity of the state from judicial interference

⁷⁴ *United States v. Wunderlich*, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).

⁷⁵ *Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.*, 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E. 2d 26 (1948).

⁷⁶ 335 U.S. 900 (1949).

⁷⁷ *Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine*, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).

⁷⁸ *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

"does not extend to individuals who act as officers without constitutional authority."

Relations with State Courts. There were during the Term under review the usual cases dealing with the relations between state and federal courts. We were reminded once more that where the highest state court delivers no opinion and it appears that its judgment *might* have rested upon a nonfederal ground, the Supreme Court will not take jurisdiction to review the judgment.⁷⁹ One case was continued to enable petitioner's counsel to secure a determination in the state supreme court as to whether its judgment was intended to rest on an adequate independent state ground,⁸⁰ and later on the Court refused to regard a letter from the clerk of the state court, not apparently a part of the record, as a sufficient "determination."⁸¹ In another instance, the case was continued to enable the petitioner to secure, in an appropriate state proceeding, a determination as to the effect upon the appeal of the repeal of the state statute the constitutionality of which was drawn in question by the appeal.⁸² Finally, in another phase of the seemingly endless merry-go-round⁸³ of Illinois procedure, the Court remanded a case to the state's highest court for a determination of the adequacy of the state remedy for the protection of federal constitutional rights alleged to have been infringed in the course of trials.⁸⁴ The Court felt that it could not proceed until the state court had construed the meaning of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, under which relief had been sought and dismissed without opinion.

II. QUESTIONS OF STATE POWER

1. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Free Speech. The Court at long last came to grips with the problem of motion picture censorship in *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*.⁸⁵ A unanimous Court held unconstitutional a portion of a New York statute which required the licens-

⁷⁹ *Stembridge v. Georgia*, 343 U.S. 541 (1952). Three Justices dissented without opinion. The Court's decision might conceivably encourage state appellate courts to dispose of cases raising federal questions without opinion.

⁸⁰ *Dixon v. Duffy*, 342 U.S. 33 (1951).

⁸¹ *Dixon v. Duffy*, 343 U.S. 393 (1952).

⁸² *Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.*, 342 U.S. 35 (1951).

⁸³ The phrase is Justice Rutledge's, in *Marino v. Ragen*, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947). For a brief discussion of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act and the events leading to its adoption, see David Fellman, "The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts," *Nebraska Law Review*, Vol. 31, at pp. 31-38 (1951).

⁸⁴ *Jennings v. Illinois*, 342 U.S. 104 (1951). On the remand, the state court's decision was eminently satisfactory, *People v. Jennings*, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E. 2d 824 (1952).

⁸⁵ 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See Note, "Motion Pictures and the First Amendment," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 60, pp. 696-719 (1951); Theodore R. Kupferman and Philip J. O'Brien, Jr., "Motion Picture Censorship—The Memphis Blues," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 36, pp. 273-300 (1951); Ruth A. Inglis, *Freedom of the Movies* (Chicago, 1947). For a discussion of the censor's trade see Hollis Alpert, "Talks with a Movie Censor," *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 22, 1952, pp. 21, 50-54. For the background of the *Burstyn* case see Bosley Crowther, "The Strange Case of 'The Miracle'," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 187, pp. 35-39 (1951).

ing of all films by administrative officials, and denied licenses to any film which is "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime." The responsible agency barred the Italian film *The Miracle*, after a hearing, as being "sacrilegious." Justice Clark took note of the 1915 case in which the Court had ruled that the exhibition of motion pictures was a business pure and simple, outside the guarantee of a free press.⁸⁶ He overruled it, and pointed out that it had been decided before the Court expanded the reach of due process in the *Gillow* case⁸⁷ in 1925.

Justice Clark asserted that there was no doubt of the fact "that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas," in very many ways. Their importance is not lessened because they are "designed to entertain as well as to inform," nor does it matter that movies are exhibited for profit, since books, newspapers and magazines are also published for profit. Even if it is conceded that motion pictures have a greater capacity for evil, it does not follow that the "substantially unbridled censorship" present in this case is justified. It is clear that there is, under the Constitution, no absolute freedom to exhibit any kind of movie any time and in any place, and it is also true that movies are not necessarily subject to the same rules which govern other media of communication. Nevertheless, this statute imposes a previous restraint, and as was held in the *Near* case,⁸⁸ such restraint can be justified only in exceptional circumstances.

The New York Court of Appeals had defined "sacrilege" as meaning "that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule." It also said that sacrilege is "the act of violating or profaning anything sacred." With such a statute, thus authoritatively defined, said Justice Clark, "the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies." In fact, this test might raise substantial questions concerning the principle of the separation of church and state. "... The state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views." Finally, Justice Clark drew attention to the fact that the Court was not deciding whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly-drawn statute designed to bar obscene films.

Justice Frankfurter filed a lengthy and learned concurring opinion, maintaining that as a technical ecclesiastical term sacrilege has a long history, and means essentially injury to priests and religious symbols. He thought that Cath-

⁸⁶ *Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio*, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).

⁸⁷ *Gillow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The decision in the *Burstyn* case was foreshadowed by a dictum in the recent antitrust case, *United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.*, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), where Justice Douglas remarked that "we have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."

⁸⁸ *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

olic doctrine limited the term to protecting physical things against injurious acts. In English law sacrilege meant stealing from a church or otherwise damaging church property. This also is the dictionary and encyclopedia definition, as evidenced by numerous citations from the Eighteenth Century onwards. He also thought that the absence of an established church in the United States made the term even more vague. But as defined by the New York Court he maintained that the statute permits the censorship of religious opinions, and furthermore, that its lack of appropriate objective standards offends due process.⁸⁹

Another case of surpassing importance in the field of free speech was *Beauharnais v. Illinois*,⁹⁰ which, by a five-to-four vote, upheld for the first time the constitutionality of a group libel law.⁹¹ Beauharnais is president of a Chicago organization, the White Circle League, which demands the segregation of Negroes. On one occasion he distributed leaflets in the streets containing a petition to the City Council demanding segregation, and stated: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will." Beauharnais was convicted in the Municipal Court of Chicago and fined \$200 for violating a statute which forbids the publication of "any lithography, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race,

⁸⁹ In *Gelling v. Texas*, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), a Texas decision upholding a municipal ordinance which authorized a board of censors to deny a license for the exhibition of any movie which in its opinion was "of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people" was reversed *per curiam* and without opinion, on the authority of the *Burstyn* case and *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Justice Frankfurter filed a brief statement to point up the fact that the statute violated due process on account of indefiniteness, and Justice Douglas concurred separately to emphasize the evil of prior restraint, here in "flagrant form."

⁹⁰ 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

⁹¹ On this subject see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Government and Mass Communications* (Chicago, 1947), Vol. I, Chap. 5; Note, "Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 252-64 (1952). For articles on free speech problems published during the 1951 Term see: Edward S. Corwin, "Bowing Out 'Clear and Present Danger,'" *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 27, pp. 325-59 (1952); Louis B. Boudin, "'Seditious Doctrines' and the 'Clear and Present Danger' Rule," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 38, pp. 143-86, 315-56 (1952); Elliot L. Richardson, "Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 1-54 (1951); Wallace Mendelson, "Clear and Present Danger—from Shenck to Dennis," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 313-33 (1952); Burton C. Bernard, "Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the U. S. Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 50, pp. 261-96 (1951); Note, "Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 521-34 (1952); Walter L. Daykin, "The Employers' Right of Free Speech under the Taft-Hartley Act," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 212-41 (1952). See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech* (New York, 1952).

color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. . . ."

Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter noted that the Illinois court treated this law as a criminal libel law, designed to prohibit words liable to cause a breach of the peace, and that this is the traditional justification for punishing libels criminally. Today every state punishes libels directed at individuals; if a state may do this, he maintained, then it may punish utterances directed at a defined group, unless the utterances are unrelated to the peace and well-being of the state. He thought there was plenty of evidence, both here and abroad, to support the conclusion of Illinois "that wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community." Illinois has a long and bitter history of racial tension and violence, from the murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy in 1837 to the Cicero riots of 1951. The law under discussion was enacted in 1917, when the state was struggling to assimilate vast numbers of new inhabitants. It is out of bounds, Justice Frankfurter declared, for the Court to say that this legislation will not help, since no one has the solution, and the legislature has a choice of policy so long as it is not unrelated to the problem. It would be "arrant dogmatism" for the Court to say that the legislature may not believe that speech directed at the reputation of groups cannot be outlawed. Justice Frankfurter also ruled that the statute was not void for vagueness. He saw no occasion for considering the "clear and present danger" test, since libellous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.²²

Each of the four dissenters filed his own opinion. Justice Black thought that *Beauharnais* was exercising the constitutionally-guaranteed right to petition his elected representatives. He criticized the Court for ignoring the First Amendment, and for the fact that it "degrades First Amendment freedoms to the 'rational basis' level." And he rejected altogether the view that this matter must be left to legislative trial and error. "My own belief is that no legislature is charged with the duty or vested with the power to decide what public issues Americans can discuss." This statute, he asserted, imposes censorship upon every medium of communication, and to sugar coat it by calling it a group libel law may make it more palatable but not less deadly. The law of libel, he insisted, has always dealt with individuals, not huge groups.

Justice Reed thought the statute was too vague because of its use of such terms as "virtue," "derision," and "obloquy." While fully aware of the terrible evil of group vilification, Justice Douglas repeated his well-known arguments, that the First Amendment is couched in absolute terms, that speech has a preferred position in our constitutional law, and that the tendency of recent

²² The well-known case of *State v. Klapprott*, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 Atl. 2d 877 (1941) was distinguished on the ground that it did not involve a case of libel at all, and dealt with quite a different statute.

decisions of the Court to permit regulation of the right of free speech "within reasonable limits" was "an ominous and alarming trend." He declared that legislation dealing with free speech should not be considered in the same light as one considers social and economic legislation, for while the Constitution does not guarantee the economic status quo, it places free speech apart, "above and beyond the police power."

Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion sounded more like a concurring opinion. He did conclude that the petitioner had been denied proper safeguards at the trial, in that he was not given a chance to justify his statements by proving their truth, and was denied the defense of privilege as to comment on public matters. Furthermore, he thought there was no showing of any clear and present danger of an injury. Otherwise, his opinion was devoted to arguing mainly that the general restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment do not incorporate the more precise provisions of the First Amendment, and that the states have greater powers over this subject than does Congress. He would not limit the states to the severe standards appropriate for federal power, because the two great purposes of libel laws, to protect integrity of reputation and public tranquility, are not objects of federal cognizance, but are largely local functions. He thought that state libel laws do not present a threat to a free press because of the available safeguards: the right to jury trial of the law and facts, the defense of truth, and the clear and present danger rule.

Loyalty and Subversion. New York's Feinberg Law, adopted in 1949 to weed out subversives from the public schools, was sustained by a six-to-three vote in *Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York*.⁹² It should be observed that well before 1949 New York laws denied any form of public employment to those who wilfully advocate or teach the overthrow of government by any unlawful means or organize or join any group advocating such a policy. The Feinberg Law was written to further implement established policy. It provides that the Board of Regents, "after inquiry, and after such notice and hearing as may be appropriate," shall prepare a list of subversive organizations. The Board is authorized to utilize any similar listings of any federal agency. Then the statute provides that membership in any listed organization "shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification." The preamble of the Feinberg Law made elaborate "findings" to the effect that members of subversive groups, and especially of the Communist party, have infiltrated into public employment in the public schools, are disseminating propaganda to children, do not follow the truth and free inquiry, and are very subtle and escape detection. Before one is fired or denied a job, he is given a right to a full hearing, with representation by counsel and a chance for judicial review. Justice Minton, speaking for

⁹² 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See Walter Gellhorn, ed., *The States and Subversion* (Ithaca, 1952). See also Lawrence H. Chamberlain, *Loyalty and Legislative Action* (Ithaca, 1951), which deals only with the New York experience; Marie Jahoda and Stuart W. Cook, "Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 295-333 (1952); Osmond K. Fraenkel, "Law and Loyalty," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 153-74 (1952).

the majority, stressed that the listings were made only after full notice and hearing, and that in addition the New York Court of Appeals had ruled that listed organizations have a right of review.

The Supreme Court ruled that this statute did not violate free speech. It is clear that persons have a right "to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will," but "it is equally clear they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms."⁴ The state has a right to prescribe reasonable terms, and those who do not choose to work on such terms "are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere." The schoolroom, said Justice Minton, is a sensitive area, and the state has a vital concern in preserving its integrity. He then proceeded to give the doctrine of guilt by association the Court's stamp of approval in the following words: "One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps." Furthermore, Justice Minton ruled that the Feinberg Law did not conflict with the due process doctrine of unreasonable presumptions. The New York court construed the statute as requiring that the member of the organization must have known about its purpose. The legislative presumption that a member of such an organization supports the things the organization stands for is not contrary to fact or the "generality of experience." Nor was there any denial of procedural due process, since the presumption is not conclusive, and arises in a hearing where the person against whom it is drawn has full opportunity to rebut it. The constitutional issue of vagueness was not considered because it had not been raised in the state courts.

Justice Black dissented briefly, lamenting the "rapidly multiplying legislative enactments which make it dangerous—this time for school teachers—to think or say anything except what a transient majority happen to approve at the moment." Justice Frankfurter dissented on the theory that the issues were not ripe for litigation, since the legislative scheme had not yet been put into effect, and the issues were therefore merely abstract and speculative. In addition to crying before they were hurt, the eight petitioners had no standing to sue, either as taxpayers or parents, the injury being either *de minimis* or altogether too tenuous or argumentative. Justice Douglas dissented on the merits in a noble statement which will live as long as Americans remain interested in human freedom. It must be read in full to be appreciated. He refused to concede that a civil servant can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights; he vigorously rejected the concept of guilt by association, and warned that the sanctioned procedure will raise havoc with academic freedom. "Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms—all long forgotten—become the ghosts of a harrowing present. Any organization committed to a liberal cause, any group organized to revolt against an hysterical trend, any committee launched to sponsor an unpopular program becomes suspect.

⁴ Citing *United Public Workers v. Mitchell*, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

These are the organizations into which Communists often infiltrate. Their presence infects the whole, even though the project was not conceived in sin. A teacher caught in that mesh is almost certain to stand condemned." Furthermore, once membership is established, the views of the teacher must be examined to decide whether his connection was or is innocent. Thus, "the law inevitably turns the school system into a spying project." Of course, he concluded, the country's schools need not become forums for spreading the Marxist creed, but the guilt of the teacher should turn on overt acts; his private life and political and social philosophy should not be the cause of reprisals.

Religious Freedom. In 1948, eight Justices agreed in the *McColum* case⁶⁶ that a "released time" plan of religious instruction in the public schools of Champaign, Illinois, was forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment as being inconsistent with the principle of the separation of church and state. The instruction was given during school time in the public school buildings, by outside religious teachers supplied by the various denominations. The Court's decision was promptly subjected to an extraordinary amount of heated criticism. Apparently the Court couldn't take it, for in *Zorach v. Clauson*⁶⁷ a majority of six Justices beat a retreat. This case involved a test of the New York City program of "dismissed time," the only difference being that the children leave the school buildings and go to religious centers for their religious instruction. All the other circumstances were about the same as in *McColum*. The parents must request dismissal of students; the churches supply the application blanks; those not released stay in the classrooms; the churches report attendance; above all, religious training is given during school time. In New York the teachers are forbidden to announce the program to the students and to comment on attendance or nonattendance. The *Zorach* litigation was initiated by two men as taxpayers, residents and parents. The trial court denied a motion for a trial on the asserted issues of fact, and dismissed the proceedings on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals approved of this procedure on the ground that the matters pleaded were not well pleaded, a great many of petitioners' allegations being "conclusory in character," insufficiently supported by facts.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the New York court ruled that many of the conclusory allegations suggest merely that teachers have been disobeying the rules and regulations. If true, this would warrant at most disciplinary proceedings against the offending teachers, not a total discontinuance of the program, which was the relief prayed for.

Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. He made it clear that the

⁶⁶ *Illinois ex rel. McColum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

⁶⁷ 343 U.S. 306 (1952). On this general subject see: George E. Reed, "Church-State and the Zorach Case," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 37, pp. 529-51 (1952); Leo Pfeffer, "Church and State: Something Less Than Separation," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 1-29 (1951); J. M. O'Neill, *Catholicism and American Freedom* (New York, 1952); Mark De Wolfe Howe, *Cases on Church and State in the United States* (Cambridge, 1952); William W. Boyer, Jr., "Public Transportation of Parochial School Pupils," *Wisconsin Law Review*, Vol. 1952, pp. 64-90.

⁶⁷ *Zorach v. Clauson*, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463 (1951).

wisdom or efficiency of the program from an educational point of view was no concern of the Court. Furthermore, he thought it would take "obtuse reasoning" to inject into this case any issue of freedom of religion, since nothing in the record showed that any student was forced to take religious instruction. The school authorities were neutral. The refusal of the state courts to permit the introduction of evidence on the issue of coercion, Justice Douglas ruled, rested on an independent state ground, and therefore was not reviewable. Since the allegation did not even implicate the school authorities, he insisted that it cannot be said that a federal right was being defeated by a rule of local practice. Finally, he held that this program was not an establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. It is clear beyond doubt that this Amendment decrees a "complete and unequivocal" separation, but it "does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation." Church and state are not required to be hostile and suspicious aliens to each other. Thus, churches enjoy tax exemptions, police and fire protection; prayers are given in legislative halls; messages of the Chief Executive appeal to God; oaths are given in courts, etc. It would be pushing the principle of separation to extremes to hold the New York law unconstitutional. "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," said Justice Douglas. "When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Finally, Justice Douglas distinguished the *McCormack* case on the ground that there the public school classrooms were used for religious instruction. Here the public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction. "We follow the *McCormack* case. But we cannot expand it to cover" this situation, for "we cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion."

Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each filed a dissenting opinion. They could see no significant difference between this case and *McCormack*. The distinction, said Justice Jackson, is "trivial, almost to the point of cynicism." Actually, Justice Black asserted, *McCormack* held that the state cannot constitutionally manipulate the compelled classroom hours of its compulsory school machinery so as to channel children into sectarian classes, and yet that is exactly what New York does here. As to Americans being a religious people, he pointed out that this was quite as true when the First Amendment was adopted. He also noted that since the New York regulations refer to "duly constituted religious bodies," the state will have to decide what constitutes a religion; this is censorship, which is what the Constitution forbids. The American people have always been divided into many sects, and this was and is the justification for the constitutional mandate to keep church and state "completely separate." Justice Black also thought that the Court's opinion drew an invidious distinction between religionists and nonbelievers. He concluded: "State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field. It too often substitutes force for prayer, hate for love, and persecution for persuasion. Government should not be allowed, under cover

of the soft euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the sacred area of religious choice."

Justice Frankfurter conceded, as the majority opinion argued, that the state may close the schools so that pupils may attend religious exercises; it may dismiss classes for any reason or no reason. But the essence of this case is that New York did not suspend operations. He said: "There is all the difference in the world between letting the children out of school and letting some of them out of school into religious classes. . . . The pith of the case is that formalized religious instruction is substituted for other school activity which those who do not participate in the released-time program are compelled to attend." And he complained that there was no proof of coercion because the petitioners were not allowed to make proof of it, and insisted that issues raising federal claims cannot be foreclosed by state rules of practice.

Justice Jackson thought it was clear that the New York program was founded on a use of the state's power of coercion. It is the truant officer who makes this system more effective than voluntary attendance after school hours; the school serves "as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to Church." And he declared that his position was not anti-religious. "My evangelistic brethren confuse an objection to compulsion with an objection to religion."

At long last, the Court had a chance, in *Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne*,⁹⁸ to rule on the constitutionality of Bible-reading in public schools, but refused to take it. The case tested the validity of a New Jersey statute requiring the reading, without comment,⁹⁹ of five verses of the Old Testament at the opening of each school day. Six Justices voted to dismiss an appeal on jurisdictional grounds. As to the petitioner who sued as a parent, it was noted that the child had since graduated, and therefore the case was moot. In any event, Justice Jackson pointed out that any student on request of the parents could be excused from Bible-reading, and hence no child was compelled to do anything, even to listen. The other petitioner was a taxpayer, and the Court ruled that he had not shown any direct injury, even though he may have had standing to sue under state practice. Of course, said Justice Jackson, a state court may give an advisory opinion on a federal constitutional question, but it isn't reviewable unless there is "a good-faith pocketbook action." He could find here no "direct and particular financial interest"; the grievance "is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference." This is the first time the Supreme Court has ever said that the federal *Frothingham* rule¹⁰⁰ forbidding taxpayers' suits in federal courts for lack of interest applies to reviews of state cases. Speaking for three dissenters, Justice Douglas pointed out what most observers would take as a self-evident proposition, that "New Jersey can fashion her own rules governing the institution of suits in her courts."

Fair Procedure. A prisoner serving a life sentence in a Michigan state peni-

⁹⁸ 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

⁹⁹ Query: What business does any American public school have to read or study anything that cannot be commented on?

¹⁰⁰ *Frothingham v. Mellon*, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

tentiary filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that while he was living in Chicago, Michigan officers forcibly seized him and took him to Michigan, thus violating his due process rights. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the Federal Kidnaping Act had changed the rule of prior holdings. The Supreme Court disagreed,¹⁰¹ asserting that it has never departed from the rule of *Ker v. Illinois*,¹⁰² that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by a forcible abduction. Due process is satisfied, said Justice Black, if the defendant had fair notice of the charges and a fair trial. The Constitution does not require a court "to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." It is for Congress, not the Court, to add to the sanctions written into the Federal Kidnaping Act a further sanction barring a state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to it by its officers.

Oregon is the only state in the Union which requires a person accused of crime who pleads insanity as a defense to carry the burden of proof, and to establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the English rule and was also the rule of most American courts in the Nineteenth Century. The rule for federal prosecutions, announced by Justice Harlan in 1895 in *Davis v. United States*,¹⁰³ is that an accused is "entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime." In *Leland v. Oregon*¹⁰⁴ the Court held, by a seven-to-two vote, that Oregon is not obliged to follow the *Davis* rule, which is not a constitutional doctrine but only a rule of practice to be followed in federal courts. Justice Clark also noted that some twenty states place the burden on the defendant of establishing his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and he thought the difference between this standard and Oregon's is not of such magnitude as to be determinative of the constitutional issue. Above all, it was emphasized that in order to convict, Oregon required the prosecutor to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and that only on the issue of insanity was the burden of proof placed on the defendant. In all English-speaking courts, he pointed out, the defendant is obliged to introduce proof if he would overcome the presumption of sanity. But in addition, the Oregon statute provides that proof of a "morbid propensity" is not sufficient to support the defense of insanity. Justice Clark said that this merely means that the state has adopted the "right and wrong" test of legal insanity, instead of the "irresistible impulse" test, and that the former is the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in a majority of American jurisdic-

¹⁰¹ *Frisbie v. Collins*, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See Note, "Illegal Abductions by State Police: Sanctions for Evasion of Extradition," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 445-50 (1952).

¹⁰² 119 U.S. 436 (1886). To the same effect was *Mahon v. Justice*, 127 U.S. 700 (1888).

¹⁰³ 160 U.S. 469, 484.

¹⁰⁴ 343 U.S. 790 (1952).

tions. He refused to believe that the science of psychiatry has come so far that the states should be compelled to eliminate the "right and wrong" test from their criminal law.

Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Black agreed, filed a dissenting opinion. He agreed that in the present state of knowledge no single test of insanity can be imposed on the states, but he argued that when a state has chosen its theory for testing culpability, it is a denial of due process to send a man to his doom if he cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was insane. Oregon, in his judgment, is the only state which makes inroads on the principle that the state must prove guilt by requiring the accused to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of one of the essential elements for the commission of murder, culpability.

Coerced Confessions. A novel question reached the Court in *Rochin v. California*.¹⁰⁶ When Los Angeles policemen, on information that Rochin was selling narcotics, unlawfully entered his dwelling, he swallowed two capsules containing morphine. He was taken to a hospital, his stomach was pumped against his will, and he was convicted on the basis of the regurgitated evidence. The Court by unanimous vote set aside the conviction. Justice Frankfurter put the decision on due process grounds, that is to say, he found that this "conduct shocks the [his?] conscience." To permit this brutal conduct, he said, would discredit the law and brutalize society. Justice Black, concurring separately, thought this was a clear case of self-incrimination, repeating once more his well-known objections to reliance upon the "nebulous standards" of due process when the specific provisions of the Fifth Amendment afford a much better protection for human rights. And Justice Douglas observed, that since all but four states apparently would admit this evidence, how can the Court say that what California did violated the "decencies of civilized conduct?" He too thought the Fifth Amendment provided "an unequivocal, definite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal courts."

In two cases¹⁰⁶ appeals raised questions concerning confessions allegedly coerced, but in both of them the Court affirmed the convictions, treating the question of voluntariness as the decisive issue. In both cases Justices Black and Douglas dissented because the confessions were obtained by the police before arraignment. These are additional phases of a long campaign by these two Justices to discourage the police practice of holding persons for questioning incommunicado.

Right to Counsel. The prevailing rule is that a defendant in a noncapital state criminal case is constitutionally entitled to representation by counsel

¹⁰⁵ 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See Carl H. Imlay, "The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule," *Miami Law Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 147-61 (1952).

¹⁰⁶ *Stroble v. California*, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); *Gallegos v. Nebraska*, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). The *Stroble* case also involved the issue of trial by newspapers; on the facts the Court concluded that the defendant had a fair trial. See Note, "Due Process for Whom—Newspaper or Defendant," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 101-11 (1951); Note, "Freedom of the Press—A Menace to Justice," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 249-61 (1952).

only if there are special circumstances showing that justice could not be had without counsel. In *Palmer v. Ashe*¹⁰⁷ five Justices ruled that a young irresponsible boy who had been incarcerated previously for imbecility came within this rule.¹⁰⁸ In a case coming up from Pennsylvania,¹⁰⁹ judgment was reversed on the authority of *Townsend v. Burke*,¹¹⁰ which held that due process has been denied where the lack of counsel at the time of sentencing resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant.¹¹¹

Jurisdiction to Tax. An Ohio corporation owns boats and barges which it employs for the transportation of oil along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. While the vehicles are registered in Cincinnati, and are stopped in Ohio occasionally for fuel or repairs, they neither pick up nor discharge oil in Ohio, their main terminals are in four other states, and the mileage travelled through waters bordering Ohio is very small. The Court held, two Justices dissenting, that an Ohio ad valorem personal property tax on the full value of all these vessels violated due process.¹¹² The rule now is that the apportionment principle which is applied to railroad cars used in interstate commerce also applies to vessels moving in interstate operations in inland waters.¹¹³ "The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis," Justice Douglas stated, "precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile." Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations, and the tax would be unrelated to the benefits extended by the taxing state.

Jurisdiction to Entertain Suits. During the Japanese occupation a foreign corporation owning mines in the Philippines carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, though limited, part of its general business, including directors'

¹⁰⁷ 342 U.S. 134 (1951).

¹⁰⁸ Four Justices refused to believe that the trial court would have accepted the plea of a mental defective.

¹⁰⁹ *Foulke v. Burke*, 342 U.S. 881 (1951).

¹¹⁰ 334 U.S. 736 (1948).

¹¹¹ For other publications dealing with civil liberties problems see: Robert K. Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities* (Ithaca, 1952); Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber, *Political and Civil Rights in the United States* (Buffalo, 1952); American Jewish Congress and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, *Civil Rights in the United States in 1951* (New York, 1952); Morroe Berger, *Equality by Statute* (New York, 1952); Jacob D. Hyman, "Judicial Standards for the Protection of Basic Freedoms," *Buffalo Law Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 221-44 (1952); Sydney Brodie, "The Federally-Secured Right to be Free from Bondage," *Georgetown Law Journal*, Vol. 40, pp. 367-98 (1952); Whitney R. Harris, "Freedom and Businessmen," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 196-211 (1952); Comment, "Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 171-204 (1952); Joseph S. Ransmeier, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 50, pp. 203-60 (1951); E. H. Hobbs, "Negro Education and the Equal Protection of the Laws," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 488-511 (1952); Chester James Antieau, "Equal Protection Outside the Clause," *California Law Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 362-77 (1952); Pamela H. Rice and Milton Greenberg, "Municipal Protection of Human Rights," *Wisconsin Law Review*, Vol. 1952, pp. 679-710.

¹¹² *Standard Oil Co. v. Peck*, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).

¹¹³ *Ou v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.*, 336 U.S. 169 (1949).

meetings, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, stock transfers, banking operations, etc. A nonresident of Ohio filed an action in personam against the company, for dividends and damages due to failure to issue stock certificates, in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. The trial court sustained a motion to quash the service of summons on the defendant, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded the case, on the ground that while federal due process does not *compel* a state to open its courts to a proceeding against a foreign corporation to enforce a cause of action not arising in the state and unrelated to the corporation's activities within the state, due process does not on the other hand *prohibit* Ohio from granting such relief.¹¹⁴ Whether such a suit can be brought depends upon whether the business done in Ohio by the foreign corporation was sufficiently substantial, and reviewing the facts, the Court found that the Ohio activities were substantial. The conclusion was that it would not violate due process for Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction.

2. STATE POWER OVER ELECTIONS

There were two interesting cases during the Term dealing with state legislation affecting the conduct of elections. *Ray v. Blair*¹¹⁵ sustained a requirement made by the Alabama State Executive Committee of the Democratic party, pursuant to statutory authority, that every candidate for presidential elector pledge himself to support any candidate named by the Democratic National Convention. It will be recalled that in 1948 one Tennessee elector chosen on the Truman ticket voted for the Dixiecrat candidate. The Alabama Supreme Court had ruled that this pledge was in violation of the Twelfth Amendment, under which the electors are free agents. Speaking for a majority of five, Justice Reed pointed out that the requirement of a pledge from primary candidates is not unusual, especially in the one-party South. He argued that while presidential electors exercise a federal function, they are not federal officers; they act by authority of the state, which in turn gets its authority from the federal Constitution, and the Constitution does not forbid this pledge. Thus it is immaterial whether the primary is part of the election machinery, for the question is whether some constitutional provision is violated. Justice Reed ruled that the Twelfth Amendment does not require absolute freedom for the elector; it does not prevent an elector from pledging himself in advance, and as a matter of history it is known that electors are never expected to do otherwise than support the party nominees. In fact, more than twenty states do not even print the names of the candidates for elector on the ballot. Whether or not the pledge is legally enforceable has nothing to do with the issue of the validity of the pledge itself.

Justice Black, who is from Alabama, and Justice Frankfurter, who was ill, and who feels that he ought to record the reason for not participating, took no

¹¹⁴ *Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.*, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).

¹¹⁵ 343 U.S. 214 (1952). See Joe Pilcher, "Ray v. Blair—Its Political and Legal Significance," *Alabama Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 248-83 (1952).

part in the disposition of this case. Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice Douglas, maintained that the original intent was that electors would be free agents, and that the powers granted federal officials by the Constitution cannot be forfeited by the Court for disuse. "A political practice which has its origin in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions." He thought it would be a gain to abolish the whole electoral college system and provide for direct popular election of the President, but he complained that the Court's decision moves in the direction of entrenching the worst features of the existing system. Above all, he argued that the Court's sanctioning of this "new instrument of power" would strengthen and centralize party control. He seemed to take it for granted that this would be a bad thing.

*Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri*¹¹⁶ upheld a state law providing that an employee may absent himself from his employment for four hours between the opening and closing of the polls without penalty or deduction of wages, the employer specifying the hours. Justice Douglas brushed aside the appeal to liberty of contract, which once carried so much weight: "Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare." Justice Douglas regarded the Missouri law as a form of minimum wage requirement, though not for the usual purpose of protecting health and morals, but rather "to safeguard the right of suffrage," which in our system is "basic and fundamental." Due process is not necessarily transgressed by requiring the employer to pay wages for the period when the employee performs no services. Many forms of regulation reduce the net return of the enterprise, and most regulations of business impose financial burdens without compensation. Justice Jackson dissented because the voter in question lived only 200 feet from the polling place and it actually took him only about five minutes to vote. He thought the analogy with minimum wage laws was "farfetched and unconvincing." And he observed that "a state-imposed pay-for-voting system appear[s] to be a confession of failure of popular representative government."

3. STATE POWER AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Regulation. San Diego County, California, requires all cab drivers to take out permits, upon payment of a \$1 annual fee, and after passing an examination testing knowledge of the vehicle code, traffic regulations and the geography of the county. Permits may be denied for bad moral character, violation of the regulations, or conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude. The Court held, by a five-to-four vote, that the ordinance could be applied to cab drivers who picked up passengers in Mexico and transported them across the unincorporated area of the county solely to points outside the area.¹¹⁷ The Court found that the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the relevant ICC regulations did not preempt the field, and further, that the operation of taxicabs is a

¹¹⁶ 342 U.S. 421 (1952).

¹¹⁷ *Buck v. California*, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).

local business, which is why Congress left the field largely to the states. Absent discriminatory treatment or the imposition of a direct burden, the regulation in this fashion of all taxicabs operating in the community affects interstate and foreign commerce only indirectly. The four dissenting Justices thought that the petitioners were engaged solely in foreign commerce, and that the local ordinance levied a tax on the privilege of engaging in such commerce.

Taxation. The operator of a laundry and cleaning establishment in Memphis, Tennessee, sends ten of his trucks to eight Mississippi counties where his drivers pick up, deliver and collect for laundry and cleaning, and seek new customers. He was required to pay a Mississippi privilege tax of \$50 for each driver for the privilege of soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in the state. The state supreme court held that the drivers were "transient vendors or dealers" and hence taxable. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, taking the state court's word for it that this was a privilege tax for soliciting business.¹¹⁸ In a long line of "drummer" cases, beginning with the *Robbins* case,¹¹⁹ the Court had ruled that a tax on the solicitation of interstate business is a tax on interstate commerce itself. Even if the tax is on the picking up and delivery of laundry and cleaning, within the meaning of the "peddler" cases, the Court found that there was an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce, because those working for local laundries were required to pay only \$8 per truck.

4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

State Enforcement of Federal Law. In an action in a state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Court held that the question of the validity of a release granted to the carrier by the injured employee was a federal question, to be determined by federal rather than state law.¹²⁰ The jury had ruled for the worker on the basis of the evidence, but the trial judge had entered judgment for the carrier on the ground that the employee had been guilty of supine negligence in signing a release. The Court ruled that the right of recovery was granted by Congress and cannot be defeated by permitting the states to have the last word as to defenses. Furthermore, there ought to be a uniform application of the federal act. Four Justices disagreed with that portion of the opinion which held that the employee was entitled to a jury trial as a basic remedy under the federal statute.

Intergovernmental Taxation. Section 9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provides: "The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner or form by any State, county, municipality, or any subdivision thereof." The Court held that under this section, two private companies who were contractors on a cost-plus basis with the Atomic Energy Commission, and two merchants who sold goods to these contractors, were exempt from state use and sales taxes

¹¹⁸ *Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone*, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).

¹¹⁹ *Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District*, 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The rule was reconsidered and reaffirmed in *Nippert v. Richmond*, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).

¹²⁰ *Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.*, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).

respectively.¹²¹ The contracts were regarded as "activities" within the meaning of the Act. The statute adopted as a national policy the use of management contracts for the operation of government-owned plants. The Atomic Energy Commission's activities can be performed by it directly or through the agencies of private enterprise. Congress used the word "activities" in a broad sense to include all functions of the Commission. Since this question was covered by the statute, there was no occasion to discuss any problems of implied constitutional immunity.

Interstate Comity. The Alaska Legislature provided for the licensing of commercial fishermen in territorial waters, imposing a \$5 license fee on residents, and a \$50 fee on nonresidents. The Court by a six-to-three vote declared the statute invalid under the rule of *Toomer v. Witsell*,¹²² which held that a state cannot charge different and higher fees unless they are related to higher costs of administration.¹²³ Relevant sections of the Organic Act led to the conclusion that Congress did not authorize the Territorial Legislature to treat citizens of the states in a manner not permitted to the states themselves in their treatment of citizens of sister states. The Comity Clause of the Constitution therefore applied.

Full Faith and Credit. Questions regarding divorce decrees continue to be grist for the full faith and credit mill. In one case the Court ruled that it is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a Florida court which granted a decree of divorce had jurisdiction over both parties, thereby rendering the issue of jurisdiction over the cause *res judicata* on a collateral attack in another state.¹²⁴ Another case presented a more complicated problem.¹²⁵ Sutton divorced Leib in an Illinois state court, with judgment for alimony until remarriage. Later Sutton remarried in Nevada, but this marriage was subsequently annulled in New York. Then Sutton sued Leib for unpaid installments of alimony in a federal district court in Illinois, under its diversity jurisdiction, relying upon her New York annulment decree as determining that her Nevada marriage was void. She contended that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Illinois to hold the Nevada marriage void ab initio by virtue of the New York annulment. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled, however, that since the Nevada marriage was valid in Nevada, it terminated the liability for alimony under the Illinois judgment of divorce. In other words, they gave full faith and credit to the Nevada marriage rather than the New York annulment. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of constitutional law Illinois is free to decide for itself the effect of New York's declaration of annulment on the obligations of Leib, a stranger to that decree. The case was

¹²¹ *Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.*, 342 U.S. 232 (1952).

¹²² 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

¹²³ *Mullaney v. Anderson*, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).

¹²⁴ *Cook v. Cook*, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). See Erwin N. Griswold, "Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees—A Comparative Study," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 193-233 (1951).

¹²⁵ *Sutton v. Leib*, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).

therefore remanded to the Court of Appeals, with direction to determine just what the Illinois rule was. Justice Frankfurter took the occasion to remark in a concurring opinion that this case illustrates what little excuse there is left for the diversity jurisdiction since the *Tompkins* case.¹²⁶ If there is no Illinois rule, then the federal Court of Appeals will have to fashion one, but it will be tentative at best because only the Illinois Supreme Court can settle the issue. He preferred to remand the case with instructions to hold it until the petitioner gets a decision in the Illinois courts.

One final full faith and credit problem remains to be discussed. Nelson was killed when one of United's airliners crashed in Utah. Claiming \$200,000 under the Utah wrongful death statute, Nelson's executor, an Illinois bank, brought an action in the federal District Court in Illinois. The decedent had been a resident and citizen of Illinois. United is a Delaware corporation doing business in Illinois, and suit was brought under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. An Illinois statute provides that "no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to recover damages for a death occurring outside of this State where a right of action for such death exists under the laws of the place where such death occurred and service of process in such suit may be had upon the defendant in such place." The District Court and the Court of Appeals both dismissed on the basis of the *Tompkins* rule. The Supreme Court reversed,¹²⁷ holding that it was unnecessary to consider *Tompkins* problems because the case was controlled by the recent decision in *Hughes v. Fetter*,¹²⁸ which held a similar Wisconsin statute to be in violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The only difference Justice Black could find between the two statutes was that the Wisconsin statute barred suit in Wisconsin courts for any wrongful death caused outside the state, whereas the Illinois statute permits suit if service cannot be had in the state where the death occurred. He said: "That Illinois is willing for its courts to try some out-of-state death actions is no reason for its refusal to grant full faith and credit as to others." Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Minton agreed, filed a concurring opinion to argue that the *Tompkins* rule did not apply, because this case did not involve a substantive rule of law, or "rule of decision." And he complained that the Court was silent on the question as to which law shall be applied in this case. Actually, he argued, the Court in effect said that the law of Illinois was wrong, then remade the Illinois law, and then said that the federal court applies Illinois law. He believed that the federal district court could apply the laws of Utah without straining them through the Illinois sieve. Justices Reed and Frankfurter dissented for the reasons given in the *Hughes* case, where both had dissented.

¹²⁶ *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

¹²⁷ *First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines*, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).

¹²⁸ 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

NOTES ON THE THEORY OF POLITICAL OPINION FORMATION

AVERY LEISERSON
Vanderbilt University

I. OPINION FORMATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The role of public opinion in the political process is more often justified than explained by political theorists. Insofar as contemporary theory offers an explanation, it replaces the primitive democratic notion of "The People as Legislator" with a neo-idealistic conception of public opinion as the "sense of the community" (A. D. Lindsay), an emergent product of the process of public discussion that enfolds the struggle of private group leaders, public administrators, and political representatives to influence the substance and direction of governmental policy.

However, this is not the meaning of the term as used either by the man in the street or by the social scientist. In both popular and scientific language "public opinion" has come to refer to a sort of secular idol, and is a "god-term" to which citizens, scientists, and office-holders alike pay allegiance, partly as an act of faith, partly as a matter of observation, partly as a condition of sanity. The public opinion idol has its high priests, claiming to be expert translators of the oracles of the personified deity. The idol also has its heretics, divided like all protestants into many denominations. The least heretical sect, perhaps, consists of those who postulate a conceptual fiction somewhat resembling the legal relation of "principal-and-agent," except that they recognize that political representatives possess the power to act as trustees as well as agents of their amorphous principal. An agnostic position is taken by some emancipated souls who suggest that the influence of public opinion is best understood by comparing it to the effect of weather on behavior—pervasive, varying by geographical areas, penetrating or enervating, as the case may be, perceived and enforced through our pores and central nervous systems rather than by determinate physical sanctions. The atheistic position is held by extreme advocates of the view that there is no general public opinion common to the community as a whole, but that we have a series of public opinions, ideologies, world views, and thought patterns, corresponding to determinate class cleavages or divisions in society. The most aggressive unbelievers consist of those who replace public opinion with the symbols of "Society" or "Culture," and preach that political behavior is only a derivation of deeper social uniformities resulting from the interaction of personality and culture in the critical stages of maturation when individuals undergo their common socializing experience, integrated, e.g., with the adjustments between parents and siblings in the family, sexual attitudes, the development of moral codes and religious beliefs, educational experience, social role and class position and mobility, and so on.

To modern empirical ears, there is an air of futility and triviality about all

controversies over the nature and role of public opinion whose theoretical foundations boil down to religious symbolism, legal fictions, or physiological metaphors. Why not go out and directly ask people how they feel about public affairs? Once the distinction is recognized between legal sovereignty (predominant power in the constitutional system) and political sovereignty (predominant sentiment in the population to which power-holders feel impelled to acknowledge obedience), the question naturally arises as to why it is not possible to reject all this "group personality" and "State-fiction" business, and simply act on the hypothesis that public opinion can be identified directly by asking people questions about how they feel about things. So present-day opinion research, armed with the techniques of sampling, questionnaire-drafting, coding, and interviewing, suggests an operational definition of public opinion as "the distribution in the political community of people's response to issues, personalities, symbols, or events." Classified by significant correlates of opinion such as national origin, race, sex, education, religion, socio-economic status, area of residence, and so forth, the results of opinion surveys are tremendously helpful in discriminating between fact and fancy in the analysis of public wants and feelings, particularly in discriminating group differences.

This gain in clarity, however, is achieved by concentrating on the mass-verbalized-response end of the political continuum. The processes by which persons and groups characterized by different social viewpoints and attributes are actually connected with opinion-leaders and policy-makers are considered to be "another problem." If public policy is defined as "the authoritative program directives and decisions which establish the purposes and limits of action by public officials," nothing is clearer than that public opinion is not identical with policy formation. This is not to say that opinion research has no value. The point is that opinion research seeks to extrapolate public opinion from the complexity of the political process, in which public officials and governmental opinion leaders who assume responsibility for program formulation have already anticipated the consequences of public scrutiny of their views upon their respective positions of responsibility and influence. The political scientist's conception of public opinion demands that research be focussed upon behavior in this more inclusive context, which thus assumes a discrepancy between public and political opinion.

If we, as students of government, are more interested in the larger political process that relates political leadership and popular opinion in the formation of policy, then the character of that relationship ought to be stated. Harold Lasswell sought to identify it by giving the name "political opinion" to the predominant sentiment that supports the power position of political leaders or elites, and "propaganda" to the manipulative techniques by which such policy-makers influence mass attitudes on controversial issues. Greatly influenced by Robert Michels, Lasswell constructed a conceptual model of the political process as a determinate hierarchy of authority, controlled by leaders at the apex who act on behalf of the classes in society from which they are recruited

or upon whose ideological support their retention of power depends.¹ In this context, *public opinion* refers to the frequency distribution of attitudes on political subjects in the population at large. Political opinion denotes a psychological relation—a circular or reciprocal process of symbolic interaction—between leaders seeking to acquire or retain power by identifying their public personalities, beliefs, or programs with the beliefs and values of a mass political audience. Policy, originating in the strategic aims and tactical objectives of power-holders, is thus limited by the extent to which the conditions necessary for their achievement can be made to appear natural, necessary, or desirable to the perceptual structure of the audience. Policy also may be modified by the practical necessities of securing a predominant basis of agreement or acceptance on the part of other organized and politically important publics. From the standpoint of any given elite, the relation between public opinion and propaganda may be visualized as a technical division of labor, as follows:

- (1) The power-holders' activity of strategic policy determination.
- (2) The intelligence operations of gathering, analysing, and reporting data concerning the ideological and material position of one's allies and opponents and intermediate entities.
- (3) The information operations of initiating thematic ideas underlying the presentation of opinion-forming materials, and deriving appropriate channels for release through the mass media.
- (4) The managerial function of coordinating publicity with tactical operations at appropriate levels of decision.

The Lasswellian conception of political opinion probably provides the most adequate formulation available of the "instrumentalist" view of the relation between political leadership and public opinion. It clarifies the common theoretical orientation of public information programs in both private and governmental organizations, not to mention military psychological warfare. It is coherent, communicable, researchable. There are two vital objections, however, to generalizing this conception to the total political process. The first point is that the approach is vague about the determinants of policy beyond specifying the class and personality attributes of power-holders at top levels of organization. The problem of factional or multi-group support for political leadership is simply assumed away. Also excluded are (1) the situation and (2) the alternatives of action. The anticipatory effects of traditional popular loyalties and expectations upon the premises of policy-thinking, to say nothing of the conditioning effect of the training process during which leadership capacity and reputation are acquired, are either neglected or dismissed. In spite of its emphasis upon the psychodynamics of power, the "tool" conception of political opinion minimizes the process by which conflicting values inherent in public opinion are internalized within the personalities of power-holders, qualifying

¹ Since the foregoing was written, a somewhat more generalized model has been formulated in H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society* (Yale, 1950), Ch. 6, and by D. B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), Part I and Ch. 8.

their psychological fitness and objective capacity for meeting the institutional requirements of public office.

The second objection is even more fundamental. It goes to the question of whether the single hierarchy of authority can be considered as the typical model of political society, or whether the general case consists of a number of competing, relatively autonomous units of political influence, *within each of which the instrumental conception of political opinion may be said to apply*. Obviously, the "limiting" and "directive" functions of public opinion operate differently under conditions when significant differences in policy views are resolved within a single organization effectively monopolizing political influence and within a pluralistic political universe in which *intergroup competition for control of policy is institutionalized* and continually exposed to an open forum of public discussion. Nevertheless, even the brief constitutional history of Soviet Russia has revealed the sensitiveness of Soviet leadership to political opinion (a) during the conflicts between the heirs of Marx and Lenin for the power to interpret the Marxian gospel, and (b) in working out the conflicts involved in coordinating the power elements separately organized in the party, the Soviets, and the functional organs of administration.

In brief, the implications of the foregoing analysis can be summed up in the following propositions:

1. Public opinion cannot be significantly interpreted in isolation from the historical, structural, and interest-group components of the power equilibrium in the community.
2. The conception of politics which restricts political opinion to the role of a mere tool of leadership is but a partial view of the relation between public opinion and public policy.
3. Adequate political perspective visualizes the political process as the conditions under which political leaders compete for positions of public responsibility for coordinating multi-individual or group interests and value conflicts.
4. Stabilized government presupposes a symbolic structure of political authority with which personal and mass loyalties have to be identified; if these loyalties are displaced by revolutionary propaganda, they have to be projected upon another system of legitimate authority.
5. Politics may also be considered in another aspect, as a continuing, functional process of political management, or determination of the purposes and limits of administrative action. Modern political science rejects the notion that political decisions are provisioned or predetermined by an omniscient mind, or by an automatically functioning planning authority, or by an omnipotent socio-political elite whose ideology provides an unquestionable basis for deriving policy in indeterminate situations. Public policy emerges as a composite product of physical force (actual or implicit), economic sanctions, mass public persuasion, and rational discussion, participated in and fostered by influential leaders representing significant elements of group opinion.
6. Analysis of the political management function in relation to the vital problem of mobilizing opinion reveals the *opinion-forming* process operating at successive leadership levels. At subordinate levels, political opinion is constantly being mobilized in support of leadership within each of an indeterminate number of inchoate or potential and organized publics. Each participating agency in policy formation faces internal problems of achieving inner unity and at the same time sufficient recognition from outside publics to establish influence of its own leadership.
7. The higher function of political coordination arises from the objective necessity of

formulating programs of governmental (administrative) action compatible with the maintenance of the structure of political opinion in the community as a whole. Group leaders are forced to recognize the need either for direct collaboration with other influential groups in order to establish a working preponderance of power consistent with a relatively stable, but contingent equilibrium of political influence, or for submitting to the coordinating role of politicians capable of analyzing the requirements and possibilities of the situation and proposing programmatic solutions for intergroup conflict that are acceptable to popular sentiment. The higher function of political management may be monopolized by a single social class or political party, or it may be divided up among several organs of political influence; but it cannot be abdicated without undermining the vital structure of political opinion that enables society to cohere.

II. POLITICAL RESEARCH AND THE MASS MEDIA

As Lowell and Lippmann pointed out, the significance of the mass media lies in their strategic function of formulating the content and emphasis of issues brought to public attention. While this is a far cry from identifying the content of mass communications with public opinion, nevertheless the leadership role of the media in "structuring the situation" for their reader or listener is of inestimable political importance. As Bernard Berelson has shown, communications media affect public opinion, and public opinion affects the media, in more or less specified ways; but this approach provides no conceptual picture of the press or the radio or the movies as political entities in themselves, with historic organizational, interlapping functional relationships with other centers of influence in society. The hypothesis of political research into the relations of the media to public opinion is that the media should be analyzed as political structures of interest and organization, fulfilling educational and entertainment functions of the highest public importance, controlled and operated by individuals capable of acting both in the public interest and in the pursuit of private or partial group interests.

Considerable research has already been undertaken into the structure of political opinion represented by the organization and control of the opinion industries. Some of the propositions established by such research are the following: (1) the political role of the media varies both with its managers' conception of the role of the enterprise in the life of the community and with the number and type of group interests upon which its financial solvency depends. (2) The conditions suitable for the survival of the mass media as free private enterprises vary with the conditions of competitive entry into the business, freedom of access to sources and facilities for information, and the conditions of responsibility imposed upon staff personnel for approving the content of disseminated materials. (3) The quality of performance of the communications industries in meeting their responsibilities of freedom in a democratic polity depends upon the social origins, group affiliations, and qualifications of competence and job survival acquired by reporters, commentators, editors and publishers in the course of their training and experience. Thus there is already considerable evidence upon which to build further research into the politics of the mass media—the relations of its controlling values to those of the society

of which they are a part, the internal and external pressures to which policy-makers at operating levels are institutionally exposed, and the professional and social standards of decision that are applied by administrative personnel in determining content. Available studies of the economic structure of the media constitute only a starting-point for the investigation of the power relationships at policy-making levels of organization.

For most students of politics and government, the significant area of research into the mass media centers upon their functional relationship to the structure of political opinion in the community. One set of questions here has traditionally involved the constitutional position of the media themselves, because their legal rights and obligations are an essential condition of their political influence. Most of the work in this field has been done by constitutional lawyers and political analysts, concentrating upon the permissible conditions that government may impose on the right to do business and upon the judicial sanctions to which the media are exposed for injuring individuals or violating public standards of security and morals. Important as the constitutional value problems are, emphasis in the future will probably be placed less upon judicial doctrines than upon the policy questions involved in the operating relationships between the media and the political and administrative agencies of government. For example, how shall the media permit themselves to be utilized by the President, Congress, the military agencies, the State Department, or the informational services of the great civilian departments, in return for improved access to news and a recognition of governmental responsibility for advising and shaping, as well as informing public opinion? How should the representatives of the mass media secure access to authoritative sources of program formulation without losing vital elements of independence necessary for public perspective and understanding? To what extent should responsibility be delegated to the mass media for official public information programs, as in the earlier phases of the U. S. Overseas Information Service? Under what conditions are self-government and responsibility in the opinion industries possible so that formally representative, advisory, and consultative relationships can be worked out with governmental organs in the formulation of policy? It is extremely interesting to observe that the newspaper-radio chains which maintain the most continuous clamor about the dangers to press freedom in the growth of government public information activities are increasingly incurring the epithet of "irresponsibility" from public officials, critically thinking citizens, and publicly respected representatives of the media themselves. Irrespective of whether the charge is valid in specific cases, the question remains, how far can responsibility go without losing the public's interest in maintaining the freedom to be irresponsible from the official standpoint? Reliance upon "informal contacts" and the easy distinction between policy-making and policy-explaining are only provisional hypotheses for a tremendous field of experience in the relations between government and the mass media in the formulation and execution of public policy.

The third group of questions in this area relates to public policies that control

the media in reporting and commenting upon the policies of the administration in power. Historically, it is well recognized that the mass impact of the opinion industries has replaced the political factionalism of the early "hole-in-the-wall" printing press days with a self-selected label of "independence." For this reason, helpful as content analyses and effect studies have been, it is not likely, even under cold war conditions, that the method of judicial application of quantitative standards of balanced content will become a normal technique of public control or that administrative scrutiny will be established to prevent unlabelled propagandizing in the news columns, where it is probably most effective. Starting from the standpoint of the media themselves, political analysts will focus attention on the organizations, methods, and codes that the industries develop as a matter of self-control for maintaining political neutrality, not so much as a basis for imposing public controls, but in order to understand the internal difficulties faced by the industry members in their own efforts toward self-regulation. The problem for political analysis is to identify the conditions under which the "political independence" claimed by the mass media has meaning; the issue is not so much to prove whether the media are independent or not, but to disclose the pattern of interpersonal and group relationships in the community that explain the actual position taken in the content of editorial or news reporting. As Ruth Inglis pointed out in her brilliant study of self-regulation in the movies, it may well be that the policy of "nonpartisanship" or "independence" in political controversies is only one part of the broader problem of "raising the public taste and standards of expectation"; but, even so, complicated problems of research are involved in analyzing or exposing internal differences within the opinion industries and the varying political alignments within the industry, relationships with special interest groups in the community, and relationships with public regulatory agencies (including congressional investigatory committees). In short, the task for political research into the mass media in the community is to show how public policies affecting the mass media are related to the character of political organization within the opinion industries, the impact of proposed public policies upon the various control groups within the media, and the type of arrangements provided by the media managers for leaders of both governmental and non-governmental opinion seeking public expression of their political views.

THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY*

ELMER B. STAATS

U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Americans differ in their views as to the proper role of the government in our economy. It is generally agreed, however, that government—state, local, and national—has become the most important single factor affecting the level of economic activity. The purpose here is not to discuss the arguments for or against a greater or lesser role to be played by government, but to outline the more significant ways in which this role manifests itself in our daily economic life.

The remarks which follow obviously cannot treat in detail the relationships between government and industry. They are intended rather to set forth in overall terms the importance of various governmental programs to the economy as reflected in governmental budgets at all levels. Examples and illustrations are drawn primarily from the federal budget, although the importance of governmental action upon the economy at the state and local level has been too frequently underestimated.

This paper discusses, first, the overall impact of the budget upon the economy; second, the effect of the changing emphasis in the budget upon national security programs in a peacetime period; and, third, the process through which more effective public understanding and control of governmental expenditure can be achieved.

I. HOW GOVERNMENT INFLUENCES THE ECONOMY

In discussing the government sector of the American economy, economists usually address themselves to figures indicating the total receipts and expenditures at all levels of government. These budget totals themselves tell a significant story. In the fiscal year 1952, which closed June 30, 1952, the federal government spent approximately \$66 billion and collected in taxes approximately \$62 billion. In the current fiscal year which began last July 1, it is estimated that federal expenditures will rise by about \$8.5 billion, with tax receipts increasing by about \$6.5 billion. Under the stress of defense emergency spending, the estimate for fiscal year 1954 is for a further increase in federal expenditures. Receipts are estimated at about the same level as the current fiscal year. State and local budgets in total are nearly in balance, with expenditures running at an annual rate of nearly \$26 billion, and receipts at more than \$24 billion. This means that government revenues at all levels in fiscal year 1953 will amount to approximately 31¢ of every dollar of national income, compared with 12¢ out of each dollar 25 years ago, and 5¢ at the beginning of the century.

* The substance of this paper was originally presented in an address before the Workshop on Economic Education, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, July 2, 1952.

These overall budget totals reflect a multitude of government activities and services affecting the economy of this nation as well as the economies of other free nations. They also reflect a demand by the electorate—irrespective of political party or political doctrine—for a steady expansion of governmental activities.

Significant as these figures are, they tell only a very small part of the story. Government activities affect economic activity in many different ways which are not fully reflected in the totals of receipts and expenditures.

Trust Funds. Budget totals leave out of account, for example, the federal government's role as a trustee for several highly important trust funds, such as the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, National Service Life Insurance Fund for Veterans, and the Civil Service Retirement Fund. At the present time these trust funds take in receipts of about \$9.0 billion a year and pay out about \$5.5 billion a year. In other words, they are receiving approximately \$3.5 billion more than they pay out. While these expenditures and receipts are not legally the same as federal expenditures or direct tax receipts, they have the same kind of impact on the economy as normal budget expenditures and receipts. These transactions, which enter into what is commonly called the "cash budget," have a significant effect on the economy and certainly must receive consideration in any analysis of government expenditures.

Government Purchases. Government also affects the economy in its role as a major purchaser of goods and services. If we add the 2.6 million employees of the federal government to the approximately 4 million employees of state and local government, the total is one out of every nine employed persons in the United States working directly for the government. If we add military personnel to the total, the ratio is approximately one out of every six. Government today is also a major purchaser of commodities. For example, the federal government buys over 90 per cent of the output of the aircraft industry, about 60 per cent of the output of the electronics industry, and is the largest single purchaser of the output of the shipping industry. Government purchases of goods and services amount to more than one-fifth of the gross national product.

Grants, Loans, Guarantees, and Direct Payments. Government affects the economy in a third way by assisting various groups through grants, loans and guarantees, or through direct payments to individuals. Especially important is the ever-increasing number of examples of the government's acting to take the risk off the shoulders of private enterprise, to subsidize through low interest rates, or to "underwrite" the market. This type of action has become far-reaching, as may be seen from the following illustrations:

1. The Commodity Credit Corporation in fiscal year 1953 will make farm loans totaling \$2.2 billion under the price support program.
2. The Federal National Mortgage Association has authority to purchase up to \$3,650 million of mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Agency or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration. New commitments of \$1.3 billion are anticipated in the fiscal year 1953. About 35 percent of the mortgages purchased will be to finance defense-housing construction.

3. The Defense Production Act authorizes three types of aid to defense industry:
 - a. Section 301 authorizes defense procurement agencies to guarantee loans to defense contractors and subcontractors. New commitments in fiscal year 1953 are estimated at \$1 billion.
 - b. Section 302 authorizes the RFC and the Export-Import Bank to make direct loans and to participate in private loans for expansion of capacity, development of technological processes, or production of essential materials—available to borrowers ineligible under regular lending authority of these agencies. New commitments in 1953 will total \$260 million.
 - c. Section 303 authorizes the Defense Materials Procurement Agency to guarantee minimum prices and to make advances on purchase commitments for strategic minerals and metals and industrial equipment. New commitments in 1953 will total \$60 million.
4. The Veterans Administration guarantees and insures loans made by private lenders to veterans of World War II for the purchase or construction of housing. It also guarantees and insures a relatively small number of business and farm loans and makes direct housing loans to veterans in areas where guaranteed loans are not available at 4 per cent interest.
5. The Housing and Home Finance Agency makes loans and grants to communities to plan and execute projects for the elimination of slums and the redevelopment of blighted areas.
6. The Federal Housing Administration insures loans for the purchase or construction of housing through several insurance programs—for example, the new program of mortgage insurance for homes built in defense-housing areas.
7. The Rural Electrification Administration makes loans, mainly to cooperatives, to finance construction of electrical distribution, transmission, and generating facilities in rural areas. It also makes loans to finance improvements in rural telephone systems.
8. The Farmers' Home Administration makes loans for production and subsistence, for farm ownership and improvement, for farm housing, and for improvement of water facilities in semi-arid areas.
9. Federal intermediate credit banks make short-term loans to farm lending institutions to help them finance production credit needs of farmers.
10. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized to make direct loans and to participate in private loans to help finance private businesses which are unable to obtain credit on reasonable terms elsewhere. Also, under the Defense Production Act, it makes loans to small businesses for defense purposes.
11. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures the deposits of all banks entitled to the benefits of insurance under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. To protect depositors it may also make loans to or purchase assets from the insured banks when such loans or purchases will facilitate a merger or consolidation and will reduce the probable loss to the Corporation. It makes loans and purchases assets to prevent the closing of an insured bank or to re-open a closed insured bank.
12. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation guarantees the safety of savings and credited earnings up to \$10,000 for each investor's account in an insured institution. It makes loans to, purchases assets of, or contributes to, insured institutions to prevent their default or to restore them to normal operation.
13. Under the tax amortization program, businessmen may "write-off" certain amounts of the cost of expansion of their businesses for government defense work by charging such expansion to "business expenses" for tax purposes.
14. The Public Housing Administration is authorized to make loans and grants to assist local housing authorities to construct 135,000 low-rent public housing units annually over a six-year period.

Many other examples could be added to this list. The programs mentioned, however, will provide financial assistance totaling nearly \$17.5 billion to business firms and individuals in the fiscal year 1953. These programs have little direct effect on expenditures since they are reflected in the budget only on a net cost basis, but their economic effect is obviously great.

Unlike the above programs, direct payments or subsidies to business, farmers, and other groups have a substantial effect on expenditures. Payments to farmers for soil conservation practices, subsidies to the merchant marine and the airlines, aid to the newspapers in the form of subsidized postal rates, grants to local communities through navigation and river and harbor and flood control work—these are but a few illustrations of direct federal payments which have an important effect on the economy.

Probably most controversial are payments to individuals under various social security and welfare programs. These payments include old-age and survivors insurance, unemployment benefits, and railroad retirement benefits—which are financed out of trust funds—and public assistance benefits, which are included in the budget totals. Taken together, these payments amounted to \$4.2 billion in 1950, and are estimated at \$5.3 billion in the current year. The economic effects of these payments are far-reaching, in terms of the number of people who benefit directly from them. For example, the average number of persons receiving public assistance in the current year is estimated at nearly 4.9 million, and about 5 million will receive OASI benefits.

Federal benefit payments to veterans also reach and affect the economic behavior of many people. This year, more than 700,000 veterans will receive education and training benefits, and more than 3 million veterans and their dependents will receive compensation and pensions. Total payments will amount to about \$3 billion.

Other direct payments are made, of course, to the several million persons covered by the employee retirement systems operated by federal, state and local governments.

Through its own hospitals and out-patient clinics, the federal government provides medical services and hospital care that are available in some measure to more than 25 million people. Included in this eligible group are 20 million war veterans; 3½ million officers and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and certain of their dependents; 400,000 American Indians and the Eskimos and other natives of Alaska; and nearly 20,000 persons in federal institutions. The federal government operates more than 500 hospitals, which have nearly 20 per cent of all the hospital beds in the United States. In addition, the armed forces maintain many hospitals overseas.

Regardless of what one thinks of the political or social implications of the programs outlined above, their economic effect of stabilizing purchasing power is generally conceded.

Government Enterprises. The government affects the economy in another way by directly operating many enterprises producing goods and services. In the current fiscal year the Tennessee Valley Authority, for example, will add new

capital investment of \$267 million and will spend \$122 million for operating expenses. The Post Office Department, the largest single business operation in the country, will spend nearly \$3 billion.

Regulatory Activities. Through government regulation of the economy, moreover, the government has undertaken programs to protect consumers by controlling certain monopoly-type industries such as power, transportation, and communications. It also has undertaken to protect the consumer through programs such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other regulatory activities. While these programs involve only a small percentage of total budget expenditures, they have far-reaching effects upon the entire economy.

Taxation. Finally, there is the matter of taxation. Besides the amount of taxation, the kind of tax and the manner of its collection are also significant. Every time government spends money, it provides purchasing power for someone; every time it levies taxes, it takes purchasing power away from someone. Whether these revenues are obtained from taxes on individuals, from taxes on corporations, or from excises, or from borrowing, it affects not only the future of individuals and businesses but also the general stability of our monetary and credit structure.

II. THE POSTWAR BUDGET

The above classification of governmental activity—and many other such classifications might be made—has only one purpose, to provide a better understanding of how government activities affect our economic life. A somewhat more controversial subject is the purposes or objectives which government programs are designed to achieve. This, of course, goes to the heart of the issue of what the government should and should not do.

Governmental activities at all levels have increased sharply in the past fifty years, and I believe that government will continue to play an increasingly important part in our lives, regardless of the political party in control. Whatever may be the motivating factors, the pressures to increase the size and number of activities of government appear to be greater than those which seek to reduce them. I believe it can be safely assumed that government will never again occupy the relatively minor role it played in the economic life of the nation twenty or thirty years ago. The problem confronting us, therefore, is agreement, first upon objectives and, second, on how the machinery of government can be improved to best serve our common needs.

The dominant factor today is the need for national security. In the fiscal year which started July 1, it is estimated that total expenditures will reach nearly \$75 billion. More than seventy per cent of this total, or roughly \$53 billion, will be required for six major national security programs—military services, international security and foreign relations, atomic energy development, civil defense, ship building, and defense production. Thus, it can be seen that all but approximately \$21 billion of total federal expenditures this year will be the direct result of programs designed to deal with the problem of communist

aggression. More than one-half of the remaining \$21 billion will be required to pay the costs of past wars, in the form of veterans' services and benefits, and interest on the national debt, most of which was created during World War II. This leaves about \$10 billion out of the total expenditure of \$75 billion for all other federal services.

Paradoxically enough, this \$10 billion is the area against which the charges of big government and bureaucracy are most frequently hurled. This is the area, also, to which those who would balance the budget frequently direct their attention.

It can be appreciated how keen the competition is for a greater share of the limited dollars available. We emerged from World War II with a relatively large military program and new international responsibilities, *both* designed to preserve our national security in the uncertain postwar world. We emerged with a debt more than five times greater than before the war, costing us more than \$5 billion annually in interest alone. We emerged with 15 million new veterans, many needing hospitalization and eligible for readjustment training and education benefits. These new and enlarged programs created a new base for the federal budget—a base five times greater than it had been a decade before. Consider also that during the war our domestic programs had been virtually closed down. Our economy had been expanding, science and technology had made tremendous strides, and our population had grown, but during these years we had been building up an ever-increasing backlog of needs—needs for more housing, for improved highways, for increased medical research and training, for new natural resource developments, for more adequate measures of social welfare and security. Thus, one of the great problems facing the federal government during the postwar years has been the achievement of an adequate domestic program within the limited number of available dollars.

Yet even within this segment of the budget, only slightly more than one-half is subject to re-allocation or reduction through the normal budgetary process. Much of it is committed for meeting such relatively fixed and predetermined obligations of the government as the contributions to retirement funds for railroad workers and government employees, the recurrent postal deficit, and agricultural price support. This part of the budget provides also for practically all the \$3 billion of grants to state and local governments under existing laws—among them the annual grants of more than \$1 billion for public assistance and more than one-half billion dollars for highways and airports, as well as the grants for hospital construction for which actual expenditures in the current fiscal year will exceed \$100 million. Moreover, this \$10 billion for civilian domestic programs includes numerous items which have direct and obvious relationships to the defense effort, including defense power projects, internal security, and protection of harbors and ports.

When part of the \$10 billion is set aside for relatively fixed commitments, open-end grants, and obvious defense-related items, civilian domestic programs subject to significant annual revisions constitute a relatively small part of the \$75 billion total of expenditures for the fiscal year 1953.

In referring to the limited funds available for civilian or domestic programs in the budget, I do not mean to imply that there is any fixed or arbitrary total available for these programs from year to year. Nothing could be further from the truth. Each individual program must be weighed and compared with a multitude of other programs in terms of its potential importance to the nation as well as its short-run contribution to defense needs and essential civilian requirements. In our rapidly expanding defense economy, the government's jobs of providing postal service, operating the federal airways, patrolling the borders, or collecting taxes and customs get bigger, not smaller. In other fields, the government's efforts must be redirected so that housing, the protection of health, and the operation of schools are particularly assured in critical defense areas.

All these factors have a bearing upon our ability to manage the budget so as to achieve the broad fiscal policies necessary to promote growth and stability in our economy. Most economists now appear to be in some degree of agreement with the principle of compensatory fiscal policy. That is, during depression periods they believe that the government should either spend more, tax less, or both, and that in inflationary periods, on the other hand, the government should tax more and spend less. In effect this means that during depression periods the government is adding purchasing power to the income stream and during inflationary periods it is withdrawing purchasing power from the income stream. Thus, the government tends to compensate for the ups and downs of the business sector of the economy. We must recognize, of course, that there are many practical limitations to this principle. For example, during periods of international tension, such as the present, government spending is determined largely by national security needs. As a result, the fiscal program of the government cannot fully compensate for the economic pressures generated by increases in government demand. During World War II and following the North Korean aggression, the Congress found it necessary to impose direct controls as a means of restraining inflationary pressures.

The Committee for Economic Development has suggested that budgetary policy be based upon a stable structure of taxes and a stable structure of expenditures, endeavoring to achieve a balance at a reasonably high level of employment, allowing surpluses to occur in booms and deficits to occur in depressions. Unfortunately, when we have a fairly large surplus, as in 1948, there is a strong temptation to reduce tax rates and initiate new programs. So it is very difficult to adhere to a policy that involves relying upon the automatic impact of changing levels of business activity.

Most of us have come to realize that in a period of severe deflation it is not in the best interests of the nation to attempt to balance the budget. Any attempt to balance the budget at a time when national income sharply declines will prove self-defeating, because the very attempt to take out more taxes from the pockets of consumers who have lower incomes than they had before reduces still further the amount they have to spend and aggravates the economic decline. This used to be a radical idea, but it is becoming an accepted fact.

For example, in 1949 a special subcommittee on monetary credit and fiscal policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, headed by Senator Douglas, after extensive studies explicitly recognized that annual budget balancing was not a feasible objective in all types of economic conditions.

We have to strive for some kind of a budgetary balance over a longer period, recognizing that deficits are inevitable in depressions and periods of national tension. It would be convenient if we could stop at this point and simply say, "budgetary policy stimulates the economy when we have deficits and slows down inflation when we have surpluses." But the fact is that a balanced budget can readily be either inflationary or deflationary. The economic effect varies depending on the specific kinds of expenditures and taxes, i.e., what income groups pay the taxes, or what income groups get the bulk of the benefits from the expenditures.

With respect to expenditures, payments for public assistance grants, for example, will give a far more direct stimulus to the economy than payment of interest on the public debt, which goes chiefly to financial institutions or relatively high income groups. With respect to revenues, to take an extreme case again, a sales tax, or an excise tax, will retard business much more than will an estate tax, the effect of which is very indirect and not too definable.

In measuring the economic impact of federal financial transactions, the so-called "consolidated cash budget"—which reflects the actual flow of money between the government and the public—is regarded by many economists as a better tool than the conventional budget. The consolidated cash budget includes the transactions between the trust funds and the public, which are not reflected in the conventional budget. Since the trust funds have been taking in more money than they have been paying out—building reserves for future liabilities—the difference between the cash budget figures and the conventional budget figures is substantial. For example, in the seven postwar fiscal years 1947 through 1953, the conventional budget shows a *deficit* estimated at \$2.2 billion, while the "cash" budget shows a *surplus* estimated at \$20 billion.

III. CONTROL OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES

Among the governmental mechanisms through which these various types of needs are evaluated and determined, the most important is the annual budget process.

There is a general misconception of the kind of information necessary to evaluate a federal budget. The size, scope, and direction of the President's budget are not determined by a multitude of unrelated decisions reached on individual items and activities. The question of how much money is needed to run a given activity efficiently has to be asked about every budget request, but it is not the major decision that has to be made—and even this question cannot be decided on a piecemeal basis. More basic is the question whether each activity shall be conducted at all, and if so at what level. For any particular program, this question can be answered only in the perspective of such broad

considerations as the general outlook for expenditures and revenues, economic trends, the requirements of law, and many other factors.

These are the kinds of questions encountered again and again in the preparation of the budget. Long before detailed estimates are prepared by the agencies, meetings have been held to identify problems and discuss the prospects for each major program, forecasts have been prepared to indicate the probable totals of revenues and expenditures and their relationship to the general economic outlook, appropriation ceilings have been determined for the larger agencies, and general policies have been defined. The agency requests are reviewed in the light of these basic decisions and policies as well as the requirements of existing law. Such considerations determine the broad outlines of the President's budget.

Certainly the Congress in its review of the budget should bring to bear, both with respect to the total and each individual part, all possible information that will help it to obtain a full understanding and independent judgment of the budget requests submitted by the President. I am inclined to think, however, that this is not simply a matter of increasing the quantity of information placed before the Congress. Instead, it would seem to be a matter of the relevance of information. That is to say, instead of knowing more about the lesser detail of budgetary proposals, the Congress might want to know more about the issues and problems that determine the budget in its main elements and as a whole.

Fortunately, the Congress already has available for its use a sizeable amount of information which has a direct bearing upon the budget and the major considerations which underlie it. This available information includes the estimates and justifications presented to the Appropriations Committees; the detailed work of the staffs of the Appropriations Committees; the valuable audit reports, as well as other reports and data, of the General Accounting Office; the various reports produced by the staff of the Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Expenditures; similar reports from the staff of the House Committee on Expenditures; the factual research available through the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress; the information pertaining to the budget developed by the Joint Committee on the Economic Report; the technical work of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation; and the factual data furnished by the Bureau of the Budget.

Of great importance in any consideration of expenditure control is the review of the fiscal effects—the effects upon subsequent budgets—of authorizing legislation which is introduced and considered at any given session of Congress. At present, such a review is not systematically and uniformly provided in either house. It would seem fundamental that in appraising legislation from the standpoint of public policy, the Congress should do so with as full a knowledge as is possible of its effect upon the future fiscal position of the government.

A careful budget review, however, is not enough. We need to review again the question of improved legislative procedures at all levels of government. While there have been many improvements, the roll calls and quorum calls in the national Congress still take up 10 per cent of the entire time of that body. The

Congress last year enacted a total of 411 private relief bills—nearly twice as many private bills as public bills—many of which could have been handled under a delegation to the executive branch. We need higher salaries and better staff for members of our legislative bodies. What we particularly need is a careful reexamination of the machinery for the review of fiscal policy and the budget. We must also find additional ways to improve the organization and management of the administrative agencies. I think that we need to establish from time to time a commission along the lines of the Hoover Commission. No commission in itself can provide a simple formula for economies or reductions in the budget, but it can provide the basis for better public understanding of the problem, an understanding which is the essential prerequisite to major reforms or improvements in the administration of governmental programs. We need to provide better incentives for employees through awards, through more adequate salaries, and through improvements in the merit system.

Finally, steps should be taken to increase citizen interest and participation in government. No document has more implications for all of our people than the budget itself. Yet, for the fiscal year 1952 only 1,000 copies of the Budget Document were distributed to the public. This means that for a state the size of Ohio not more than 50 copies of the budget were available. Three years ago the Bureau of the Budget began the publication annually of *The Federal Budget in Brief*, a small document of less than 50 pages, in which it has undertaken through the simple devices of charts, tables, and short narrative descriptions to present the basic facts with respect to where the money is spent and where it comes from. The response to this document has been excellent, but we still need to make available to the public more factual data. There is still too much misinformation with respect to the budget, some of it coming from individuals and groups who have not been too careful to set down the facts clearly. In most cases, however, it has come from individuals who do not understand the complex make-up of this important document.

The experience of the Bureau of the Budget over several decades demonstrates that there can be no simple, easy, single-shot approach to economy, efficiency, and restraint in the fiscal operations of the government. This is a goal that has to be achieved through continuous, unremitting, intensive review of both the operations and the programs. The operations must be watched to see that they are managed carefully and competently. The programs must be watched to see that they are the right programs, each in a balanced relationship to the rest of the government program and to the economy as a whole. There is no single answer to the question of controlling expenditures—there can be only a series of separate, considered judgments on a series of individual items. It is most important that these shall be well-informed judgments, consistent with one another and with the general military, fiscal, and economic situation.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

HALFORD L. HOSKINS

Library of Congress

On April 4, 1949, the representatives of twelve European and American nations, assembled in Washington, D. C., affixed their signatures to an instrument called the North Atlantic Treaty. This was the crucial step in the formation of one of the most impressive alliances ever entered into by sovereign states. The pact bore testimony to the rise of a new menace in the world, a menace spearheaded by a specious form of communism and powered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose postwar activities left to the free nations no practicable alternative other than to seek safety in a regional collective security pact.

The North Atlantic Alliance, as its name implied, was designed primarily to make provision for the defense, in time of emergency, of the nations grouped about the North Atlantic basin. The logic in this lay in the circumstance that about the shores of this oceanic basin were grouped most of the nations whose industrial potentials and whose institutions constituted the only serious challenge to world domination by the Soviet Union. Certainly in April, 1949 the Soviet threat was not confined to the North Atlantic area, nor was the pact confined to those limits. The inclusion of France in the alliance necessarily involved the inclusion also of its Algerian department. Strategically speaking, France—with Algeria—represented the Mediterranean approximately as much as it did the North Atlantic area. Italy also was embraced by the treaty. Largely shut off from other parts of continental Europe by the Alps and situated well away from the North Atlantic area, Italy was definitely Mediterranean in character. Thus, the North Atlantic Pact contained within its own original structure evidence to the effect that security in the North Atlantic area called for defense arrangements at least in the western Mediterranean. This was tacit recognition of the fact that, in the contemporary world, security is indivisible. It reflected the realization that security in the North Atlantic or in any other specific area necessitates coming to grips with a world menace wherever it may choose to appear. Indeed, no sooner was the North Atlantic Alliance a functioning organization than it was faced with the necessity of extending the bounds of its direct concern eastward to embrace other Soviet pressure areas.

Historically, imperial Russia, whose mantle of external policy now is worn so fittingly by the Soviet Union, aimed at expansion southward—toward the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf—rather more consistently than in any other direction. Since 1696, when the expanding realm of the Tsars reached the northern shores of the Black Sea and incorporated the town and port of Azov, one of the most persistent themes in international relations has been

* This article is an adaptation of parts of a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics*, to be published by The Macmillan Company.

supplied by the efforts of this great northern power to reach the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf on its own terms. Except for the timely assistance rendered to the waning Ottoman and Persian Empires by Great Britain, sometimes reinforced by other European states, the political map outlines of southern Europe, southern Asia and parts of Africa indubitably would not have been those now familiar to us.

Until after the North Atlantic Pact had begun to function, the United States had no coordinated policy applicable to the Middle East as a whole. Its previous postwar contacts with that area had taken the form of *ad hoc* measures not yet bound up with long range national policy. While undoubtedly it had been conditioned to respond to needs arising beyond the defined limits of the Atlantic Pact by having participated in the development of a wartime supply route to Russia through Iran and in the final campaigns in North Africa and the Mediterranean, the assumption by the United States of responsibilities within this area resulted from the practical requirements of leadership in the postwar world. In its efforts to establish situations of strength in the Middle East, the United States was under the necessity at the outset of proceeding more or less in the role of deputy of the powers which, although enfeebled by war, still maintained recognizable spheres of influence in the area. France and Italy no longer maintained important holds on the Levant, but the residual interests of Great Britain were still extensive. As early as 1946, before any serious thought had been given to the need for a North Atlantic Alliance, Soviet and satellite pressures on Greece, Turkey and Iran led to the granting of emergency forms of United States economic assistance to those states. The British announcement in February, 1947 that, owing to a disastrous state of economic affairs at home, all forms of British support for Greece would have to be suspended at once, called for American policy decisions of a more fundamental sort. Time being of the essence, hasty conferences of American political and military chiefs ended in the conclusion that, on security grounds alone, the United States could not afford the risks involved in an extension of the Soviet sphere to the Mediterranean. "It must be the foreign policy of the United States," said President Truman, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . ."

The pronouncement, coupled with a request to the Congress for an appropriation of \$400 million for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and authorization for the sending of technical missions to those countries, opened up a new era in the relations of the United States with outposts of the Middle East. Although primarily defensive in character and limited for the time being as to geographical area of application, the doctrine set forth for congressional approval contained overtones that were neither defensive nor local in character. Practically speaking, an ultimatum had been issued. While it contained more of bravado than of promise, since little or no military force could then have been mustered in support of it, the President's pronouncement was a precursor of successive steps each of which was more far-reaching than the last, until the United States was deeply committed for the whole of the Middle East.

Further aid for Greece and Turkey—and incidentally Iran—was continued in 1948. In October, 1949 came the enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, conceived as a means of promoting the interests of the free world apart from, but in relation to, other forms of assistance to the same end, namely, the Economic Recovery Program, the Point Four or Technical Assistance Program, and the North Atlantic Treaty program. By the Mutual Security Act of 1951 all of the methods previously developed for the promotion of the security interests of the United States and its allies were brought into closer relationship. Under this Act, for the fiscal years 1952 and 1953, sums totaling more than \$13 billion were appropriated. Of this, substantial amounts were earmarked for direct aid of one kind or another not only to Greece, Turkey and Iran, but also to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Israel. It was natural that the assumption of these responsibilities of an economic nature were followed, as need arose, by political responsibilities, as well.

British policy in this area, meanwhile, had reached a state of bankruptcy. It rested still, as in earlier times, on a lively realization that the Middle East is strategically vital as the barrier between the Soviet Union and the earth's richest oil regions, the vast resources of the African continent, and the major routes of communication to South and East Asia and to the commonwealths in the antipodes. At the close of World War II, British Ministers believed that, despite many wartime changes, British influence in the area could be maintained through two organizational channels: the Arab League, reinforced by treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, as the political and military basis of stability; and the Middle East Supply Center, as an agency through which depressed populations might be brought with economic aid to the stage of development where "princes and pashas" could be dispensed with. Within the next five years these assumptions were found to be fallacious. Owing particularly to troubles growing out of a "National Home for the Jewish People" in Palestine, the Arab League, originally formed under British sponsorship, became embittered and ineffectual. Egypt, the bell-wether of the group, inaugurated a campaign aimed at the canceling of the 1936 treaty and the ousting of the British from both the Suez Canal zone and the Sudan. The Middle East agency in these circumstances met only with frustration.

The single source of hope in attaining British Middle East objectives in the future thus appeared to lie in the growing disposition of the United States to share in British aims and objectives and to make available both the financial and the physical means for the implementation of policy. Obviously this would call for close Anglo-American understanding and cooperation in building up the economies and the military strength of the Middle East states, in reducing the animosities growing out of the Arab-Israel war, in resettling the Arab refugees, and in creating conditions in which forms of aid could be made acceptable to the indigenous populations. It would also call for a miracle: the miracle that, even if British and American objectives should prove to be substantially the same, complete agreement and cooperation could be maintained as to the methods to be employed in pursuing them. British Government heads must have been

aware of the risks inherent in seeking cooperation from a powerful ally far removed from and relatively a stranger to the scene of action—an ally, moreover, upon whom the United Kingdom was largely dependent for its own economic recovery. Yet the only visible alternative would have been to withdraw as completely from the whole of the Middle East area as had been the withdrawal from Greece in 1947 and Palestine in 1948. To the extent that hope still remains that the countries of the Middle East can be retained within the sphere of influence of the free world, the course chosen by the British would appear to have been judicious. The event has borne out the usual human experience, however, that miracles are extremely rare and can not confidently be counted upon.

It was natural that, once having absorbed the British doctrine that no comprehensive plan of security would be effectual without some provision for the Middle East, American planners should plunge boldly into schemes for incorporating that area into western defense plans. They were the less restrained in their efforts to achieve desired results in an unfamiliar environment because of a rather widely prevalent suspicion that the British, because of preoccupation in characteristic ways with their own national interests, had failed signally to maintain an adequate working basis for a mutual security scheme.

Illustrative of contrasting views was the case of Turkish-Greek candidacy for full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the time of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers expressed the hope that a comparable Mediterranean pact might be formed to extend the zone of joint defense into the Middle East. The western powers did not view that proposal as practicable, but in the autumn of 1950 both Turkey and Greece were made consultants to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on matters of Mediterranean defense. As the Korean war progressed, however, Turkey became increasingly concerned over its exposed position on the frontier of the Soviet Union and inaugurated a campaign aimed at achieving full membership in NATO. Similar representations were made by Greece. United States officials, coming more and more to regard Turkey as a cornerstone in any comprehensive scheme for the security of the free world, reached the conclusion in the early months of 1951 that it would be the part of wisdom to accede to Turkish wishes. This conclusion was stoutly opposed at first by several members of the Alliance, notably by Great Britain. British spokesmen pointed out that the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 19, 1939 between Great Britain, France and Turkey contained such assurances for Turkey as were needed from the West. They submitted that the proper role for Turkey was to serve as the keystone in a Middle East, not a North Atlantic, defense structure. These arguments did not weigh heavily with Turkish leaders nor with their American sponsors. When, in September, the Atlantic Pact Council met in Ottawa, representatives of the United States were able to secure a unanimous agreement that both Turkey and Greece should be invited to join the Pact. In February, 1952 the formalities of extending the Pact were concluded. At the latitude of Istanbul the defense zone jointly guarded by fourteen states then extended three-fifths of the distance around the globe.

The eastward extension of the Atlantic Pact into the Middle East by way of Greece and Turkey did not end the differences in the points of view of the two principal Allies on Middle East issues. The efforts to provide for the military defense of the area not infrequently provided occasions for the display of contrasting views arising from differences in experience, in criteria, in analyses of situations, in methods of approach, and—to some extent—even in objectives. This is well illustrated by efforts to apply the "strategic concept" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the southern flank of the European defense area. Both political and military considerations were bound up in the lively controversy concerning the high command of NATO forces in the Mediterranean corridor. This question, no doubt, had been implicit all along in the extent to which naval power and naval bases in the Mediterranean and British commitments in the countries of the Middle East entered into the objectives and the calculations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The issue first became acute in March, 1951 upon United States insistence that an American naval officer be given the principal naval command in the Mediterranean—a proposal stoutly resisted by British authorities. The latter argued that British naval tradition called for leadership in Mediterranean waters and that, since NATO defense plans in the Middle East area rested to a very large extent on British treaty relations with Middle East states, it was essential that a British officer be placed in chief command for reasons of prestige, if no other. United States spokesmen contended, however, that American security interests in the Mediterranean had become second to none, that only an American supreme commander in the area could prevent jealous rivalry with the French and Italians, and that an American officer could work the more effectively with supreme headquarters in Paris. The decision substantially in favor of the United States contention after many months of wrangling was in keeping with United States sponsorship of Greece and Turkey for Atlantic Pact membership and with measures being taken for American development and equipment of British and French bases in North Africa, the Mediterranean and in the Middle East countries.

On February 1, 1951 it was announced that the United States, on the basis of studies by the NATO military committee, had requested permission from Great Britain to station war planes—fighters and bombers alike—at fourteen British airfields in the Mediterranean and Middle East. As far as the British Government was concerned, there was no lack of willingness to accord facilities to the United States at any airfields or ports under their control anywhere within the defense area. But Britain was sovereign only at Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus. Other bases were held under the terms of treaties and agreements with the indigenous states. Consequently, whatever its virtues as a feature of the strategic concept for the Middle East, the announced plan could not quickly be realized. Egypt already had determined upon the liquidation of British bases in that country. Iraq was fearful that the use of treaty bases in that country might provoke retaliation by Russia. Jordan had become increasingly disposed to place strict limits on its treaty concessions to Britain. King Ibn Saud

was hesitant with respect to the further development by the United States of the air installations at the Dhahran base in the heart of the Persian Gulf oil area, originally constructed during World War II. In February, 1951 he was willing to agree only to a six months' extension of American privileges at that place. Israel already was on record as opposed to any foreign controlled and operated base within its borders. The Turkish Government, too, had concluded that, while advanced air bases ought to be constructed and fully equipped, it would be impolitic in time of peace to place their control in the hands of a western power. Under these circumstances, there was no lack of agreement between British and American planners with respect to the great need for the further extension of a defense system that would contain strategically located, defensible positions which would be available to at least one of the great powers for a considerable time to come under any foreseeable conditions.

The need for a well-knit Middle East defense organization beyond the expanded periphery of the Atlantic Pact obviously was called for. As the Arab-Israel war had amply demonstrated, this was not to be looked for in the Arab League. However, as Greece and Turkey came to receive guarantees of aid from the West and were accorded associate, and finally full, membership in the Atlantic Pact, the Arab states gave thought to the steps which they might be able to take independently with any prospect of acquiring from western countries the arms and armaments which they so conspicuously lacked. In October, 1949 the Political Committee of the Arab League reported agreement on the principle of setting up a new Arab collective security pact and Egypt presently assumed the task of enlisting the members of the League in this undertaking. While this was accomplished in the course of the next three years, the western powers could glean little satisfaction from the fact inasmuch as the principal objective of the new military association so clearly was the creation of a stronger united front against Israel rather than the resistance of aggression from the Soviet Union.

The closing of the security gap between Turkey and the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, on the west, and the Himalayas, flanked by Pakistan and India, on the east, thus called for an area organization along lines quite different from those of the Arab security pact. In this the guidance and support of the NATO powers, specifically including both Great Britain and the United States, and provisions for the inclusion at some point of Israel and Iran as well as the Arab states, would be indispensable. From these considerations emerged the idea for a new Middle East association which might enable Great Britain to find a satisfactory solution for the continuing controversy with Egypt over the former's retention of a base in the Suez Canal zone and bring Egypt—and, by implication, the entire Arab group of states—within the western defense perimeter.

The idea materialized in the shape of two formal instruments, drafts of which were transmitted to the Egyptian Government on October 14, 1951. The first of these was a four-power proposal by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey for an Allied Middle East Command. "Egypt belongs to

the free world," ran the introductory section, "and in consequence her defense and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations." In the pact envisaged, Egypt was to occupy a place of equality with the proponents. Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa were to be associated with the organization and provision was made for a relationship—undefined—with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A technical annex to this document outlined the circumstances under which, in the event of Egyptian acceptance of the proposal, Great Britain would be prepared to hand over to Egypt its bases held under the treaty of 1936. The second draft instrument conveyed by the British Government consisted of proposals with respect to means of reaching an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the future administration of the Sudan and the use of the Nile waters.

It quickly became apparent that in tendering these proposals the powers had reckoned without their host. A more untimely moment, in view of the temper of Egypt, could hardly have been found. Failure to include that state in the preliminary discussions leading to the four-power proposal proved to have been a serious blunder. These errors, in Egyptian eyes, were compounded by assurances given to Israel at the same time that, in the working out of the Middle East Command, Israeli interests would be duly cared for and by ill-timed statements by the British Governor General of the Sudan with respect to his intention of resisting any unilateral attempt to alter the working of the Sudanese Condominium. Egyptian response to the joint overture, consequently, was instantaneous and dramatic: the four-power proposal was rejected outright. Within another twenty-four hours the Egyptian Parliament had unanimously adopted measures abrogating the treaties under which Great Britain held sway in the Sudan and maintained bases in the Suez Canal zone. A train of events had been put in motion which resulted presently in armed clashes and in complete frustration for the time being of the Middle East security plans of the western powers.

To have accepted this defeat as final would have been to jettison an important part of the comprehensive program on which the security, possibly the survival, of the free world depended. Consequently, on October 24, 1951, a Department of State announcement gave notice of the intent of the United States to establish a Middle East defense command regardless of Egypt's refusal to join. Plans were being worked out, this stated, for the cooperation in this task of the United States, Britain, France, Turkey, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of South Africa. Once plans were complete, invitations to membership might be extended to the Arab states and Israel. This statement was amplified on November 10 by the publication of an eleven-point statement by the Big Three powers and Turkey purporting to be the framework of a program determined upon to secure the Middle East against "outside aggression." This four-power plan as issued was "a peculiar document drafted to meet a peculiar situation." It was studiously vague on various points, notably on any relationship that the Command might bear to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, as it coincided with the inauguration of a \$160 million program of economic and

technical aid to Middle East countries, it may have contributed momentarily to the hampering of renewed efforts on the part of Egypt to vitalize the Arab security pact.

During the succeeding months one plan modification after another, originating in London or in Washington and generally representing joint consultations, was brought forward in the not-overly-confident hope that one might prove to be acceptable to Egypt and the Arab states. By August, 1952 the Americans were disposed to discard plans for a "command," implying the concentration in the area of armed forces, in favor of a defense "organization" with functions limited to liaison with the native states and consultation on matters of defense. The British preferred a "going concern" as one more likely to bring in the Arab states and Israel than any paper scheme. The upshot was a partial compromise. The Middle East Command project was abandoned in favor of a Middle East Defense Organization sponsored by the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey, together with Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. MEDO, consisting essentially of a committee of generals to plan the defenses of the area, would be concerned also with the issues making for instability.

A significant feature of the plan as made public was the British proposal to establish MEDO headquarters on the island of Cyprus. No clearer indication could have been given of the importance attached to the eventual inclusion of Egypt in the Organization and of the necessity of making fundamental concessions to that end. Obviously little was to be gained from the continuation of a feud which necessitated the retention of large armed forces at considerable cost in the Suez Canal zone for possible employment against the Egyptians themselves. Intimations already had been given that, once Sudan matters had been settled satisfactorily, British forces would be withdrawn by stages from the Canal zone. As the year 1952 passed along it became increasingly probable that, as a central base for Allied operations in the Middle East, the Suez Canal zone would prove to be more of a handicap than an asset. However determined the British may have been at an earlier period to retain the base, its evacuation had become a matter of time and opportunity. Since the Egyptians could not have misinterpreted these indications, their unwillingness to defer to British representations on Sudan issues is readily understandable. Time clearly was on the side of Egypt in the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. Hope was not abandoned for MEDO, meanwhile, although the outlook for the inclusion of both the Arab states and Israel in any defense organization in which the western powers would be entitled to introduce military forces into the area in time of emergency admittedly is bleak.

In both World War I and World War II the strategic bearing of the Middle East on power issues elsewhere in the world was clearly demonstrated. In both conflicts the western allies possessed bases and starting points within the area itself. In both these proved to be of vital importance in shaping the outcome. Seven years after the close of World War II, with a cold war pointing the way toward a possible third world war, none of the western powers possessed a

secure foothold on continental ground within the area. Apart from Turkey, which had unqualifiedly cast its lot with the West, the Allied powers could count on little aid of any kind from within the area itself, and this at a time when Middle East oil resources had become vital to any plan of free world defense. Iran, which not too willingly had played a prominent part in enabling the Soviet Union to stem the German onslaught in World War II, had become essentially a hostile country; almost as likely to contribute to the advance of communist power as to be of any service to the free world. The treaty relationships which still subsisted between Great Britain and Egypt, Iraq and Jordan were of increasingly doubtful value as time passed. In these and in most of the other Arab states dislike of the West appeared to be gaining over fears of the designs of Communist Russia. The fact that Israel had decided in some circumstances to cast its lot with the West might one day prove to be fortunate. In the meantime, its very existence had much to do with the major problems confronting the Allies in the area.

Under these circumstances, Allied strategy as applied to the Middle East has required further examination. One of the leading questions necessarily brought under consideration has had to do with the extent to which Cyprus can be made to serve as a main base and pivotal point in a defense system in place of the Suez Canal zone. In this respect Cyprus does possess certain advantages, some not foreseen when Great Britain took over the island from Ottoman rule in 1878 as a "*place d'armes*." Its principal claim to virtue as a base, of course, lies in the fact that it is the only bit of territory now possessed by any of the western Allies within the compass of the Middle East which can be held indefinitely without serious injury to relations with any state or group of states. Its fitness for use as a principal military-naval base is reasonably good. Upon the expenditure of substantial sums on harbor works, the ancient port of Famagusta is becoming an acceptable substitute for Alexandria in Egypt and for Haifa, once in British-mandated Palestine, now in Israel. The median plain and the dry climate of Cyprus make it adaptable as an air base. Its geographical location, too, is advantageous with respect to possible objectives in time of war. Moscow is only 1500 air miles distant; Baku, the Soviet oil center on the Caspian Sea, lies only 1000 miles away; Rostov, a main industrial center on the Don River, is distant 900 miles; Sverdlovsk, a new center of Soviet heavy industry in the Ural Mountains, can be reached at a distance of 2000 miles; the oilfields of Rumania are as near as 800 miles.

There are serious limitations in the plan of substituting Cyprus for the Suez Canal zone, however. Its principal shortcoming lies in the fact that under no imaginable circumstances can it effectively protect and control the Suez Canal itself. The complete withdrawal of British armed forces and technical personnel from immediate proximity to the waterway, if carried out, thus will necessarily open up an entirely new era in the strategic calculations of western countries. British protection and political control of the Canal, after all, have been essentially of an international nature. Under the nine-power Suez Canal Convention of 1888 and an accompanying reservation, Great Britain to all intents and

purposes became the agent of the world community for the political supervision of the waterway, a position still provided for in the 20-year Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. It is inconceivable that the transfer of guardianship to Egypt, to be followed within a relatively few years by complete control of the commercial operations now carried on by the Suez Canal Company, would insure to the same extent the uninterrupted use of the Canal at all times, even if Egypt should become a member of a western-sponsored Middle East defense organization. Already there have been significant instances of Egyptian interference with Canal traffic where national interests were conceived to have been concerned. The transformation of the Suez Canal from a principal intercontinental maritime highway into a territorial waterway inevitably will give local national interests a priority over those of the international community.

Thus, the assumption of complete control of the Suez waterway by Egypt potentially will add thousands of miles—the additional distance involved in passage by way of the Cape of Good Hope—to the maritime distance between points west and points east of the Isthmus of Suez for naval operations and for commercial traffic alike. In view of the possible interruption of oil transportation by pipeline from the great Iraq fields or from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean owing to political upheavals or military operations, any limitations placed on the unrestricted commercial use of the Suez Canal instantly will affect the security of the industrial countries of western Europe whose economies are linked so closely with fuel supplies from the Middle East. But the erection of any barriers at the Suez Canal has other and equally far-reaching implications. Under British control the Suez Canal is not only a maritime but an air route, both actually and potentially, between West and East. Whereas under normal conditions and under license commercial airlines, and ordinarily military planes as well, are permitted to operate on the most favorable intercontinental routes through the Middle East, the rise of political tensions could result in the canceling of such privileges at any time. While the physical inhibiting of air navigation is almost impossible to countries deficient in fast planes and anti-aircraft devices, effective barriers still can be erected in terms of unfriendly diplomatic relations. When instances of aerial trespass are likely to be reflected in attitudes throughout an area such as the Middle East, protests may be fully as effectual as military equipment.

For these reasons, the final ending of British sway in the Suez Canal zone will make possible a return, practically speaking, to the time when the Ottoman Empire interposed a barrier between the western world and the countries of the farther East. Aden, long a British key position on the Arabian coast commanding the mouth of the Red Sea, will have lost much of its meaning. The oil resources of the Persian Gulf will be less secure and potentially less accessible. The Sudan, whatever its political future, will find itself relatively remote from the western world. Members of the British Commonwealth in distant parts will be even more distant. Australia and New Zealand presumably will have no less interest in a Middle East Defense Organization, but will occupy a somewhat altered relationship to it. A strategic concept in which the Suez Canal is no

longer under international control and no base available to western powers remains within the Canal zone would appear to be fraught with handicaps. For these, Cyprus offers no remedy, nor does the presence of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The reasons for such an unpromising situation undoubtedly have been many. Some derive from circumstances of an historical nature, others from events, policies and conditions recent or current. Many of the existing differences in outlook between western powers and the Arab-Iranian states stem in one way or another from the grafting of the spirit of modern nationalism upon the ancient trunk of Islam. The fruits of this union seem strange to western eyes and sour to western tastes. Among these fruits is lasting hostility toward the Jewish state of Israel and animosity toward the nations regarded as having collaborated in Israel's establishment. The reluctance of Great Britain, traditionally a great imperial power and even recently the ruler of a large part of the Arab world, to surrender its remaining footholds in Egypt and the Sudan contributes to Arab doubts as to British aims and purposes. The more recent activities of the United States as an ally of Great Britain and as a sponsor of Israel are suspect. There is considerable doubt as to the real motives behind the Point Four program—doubt augmented by the zeal with which economic and technical aid is proffered while the arms and armaments ardently desired are withheld. The fate of any national policy in the international field rests largely with its attractiveness to those toward whom it is directed. Unless policy is to be implemented by force, those who seek must be prepared to negotiate in terms intelligible to and esteemed by those from whom advantage is sought. Mutual security depends upon the mutuality of the ends sought and the means proposed.

At least until this precept is fully learned and acted upon by western nations, the Middle East will continue to be a problem area. Many of those long acquainted with the criteria and the institutional life of the peoples of the area hopefully express the opinion that their prejudices toward the nations of the West are not yet so deeply ingrained as not to be susceptible of neutralization and that there is still the possibility of enlisting them in the effort to gain free world security through cooperative endeavor. In the idiom of the East, *inshallah* that may come to pass. Those charged with the task of pursuing this objective, however, at best will find it a difficult assignment. The Middle East is so situated relative to the principal habitable areas of the world that at all times there is bound to be international competition for predominant influence in its constituent countries. In view of the fundamental needs and deficiencies of the area, such competition is very apt to cause confusion and disturbances among the indigenous peoples. Considering their long experience with the methods employed by great states bent on consolidating their positions and advancing their own interests in the Middle East corridor, there is little occasion for wonder that the peoples of the area, skeptical as to offers of friendship and uncertain as to where the greater danger lies, prefer for the time being to seek safety in neutralism.

THE JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1952*

PAUL S. DULL

University of Oregon

Japan, on October 1, 1952, held the first general election for members of the House of Representatives since the end of the occupation. In that election, the conservative government party, the Jiyūtō (Liberal party), won a clear majority, the Communist party failed to elect a single candidate, and there was a marked advance by the two Socialist parties.¹

An analysis of the election, however, does not fall into easy classifications. Although Japan's relations with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, the question of rearmament and revision of Article IX of the constitution to provide the legal base for rearmament, the San Francisco treaties, and internal financial policies furnished controversial issues for party stands, the Japanese voter was confused by both the complexities of intraparty quarrels and the ambiguities of many of the candidates' campaigns. Japanese party politics since the inauguration of the Meiji constitution has been characterized by groupings around personalities rather than platforms. That characteristic appears to be a continuing political phenomenon under the new constitution.

Prime Minister Yoshida dissolved the lower house of the Diet in August, although his Liberal party had the support of 285 of the 466 members of the House of Representatives.² It was generally agreed that an election at this time would afford him the best opportunity to extend his premiership and his party's superiority in the Diet. Postponement of a general election would have allowed the articulate opposition to his government to crystallize. It was a political gamble, but Yoshida was playing gambler's odds.

Since the last general election of January 23, 1949, there had been much shifting of personnel within and among parties. In the Liberal party, a struggle had developed between Yoshida and the former party president, Hatoyama Ichiro. Hatoyama had been purged in 1946, the party presidency passing to Yoshida. In 1952 Hatoyama was depurged and began a campaign to recapture

* The research upon which this article is based was undertaken by the author as Research Associate for the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies at Okayama City, Japan, and was supported by grants from the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Board for Overseas Training and Research, and the Graduate Council of the University of Oregon.

¹ Unfortunately, Japanese political party labels often do not describe the ideological nature of the party. Japanese political parties include: Jiyūtō—Liberal party; Kaishintō—Progressive party; Saha Shakaitō—Left-wing Socialist party; Uha Shakaitō—Right-wing Socialist party; Kyōsantō—Communist party; Kyōdōtō—Cooperative party; Rōnōtō—Labor-Farm party; Saiken Renmei—Reconstruction League.

² There was general grumbling in the newspapers at the time of the dissolution that it was an unconstitutional act because Yoshida's government had not received a vote of no-confidence, nor had it been censured. However, this did not develop into a major campaign issue.

his lost influence and position. Thus the Liberal party entered the election campaign with an internal battle. While most of the Liberal candidates avoided taking sides publicly, the internal quarrel made the choice of the new Prime Minister dependent upon intra-Liberal party conferences and inter-party deals prior to the reopening of the Diet around November 1. The split between the two factions became acute on September 29th, when the Yoshida-controlled executive committee expelled the pro-Hatoyama ex-Finance Minister, Ishibashi Tanzan, and the former Secretary-General of the party, Kono Ichiro.³

Shigemitsu Mamoru, released last year from Sugamo prison after having served the sentence imposed upon him as a war criminal by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, entered politics and became the president of the Progressive party.⁴ The Progressive party has shown instability since its postwar inauguration. Drawing from prewar Minseitō personnel and policies, it first appeared as Shimpotō, then Minshutō, and, last year, it was again reorganized under Shigemitsu as Kaishintō. Its primary need has been a popular name to draw support, Ashida Hitoshi never having recovered from the bribery scandal which overthrew his premiership in 1948. With its reorganization, the Progressive party attracted some members from the Liberal party.

The Socialist party, too, has had difficulties since its postwar appearance. Disagreement over basic policies, as well as personal quarrels, finally led to a split into two parties: Right-wing Socialist and Left-wing Socialist.

The election campaign was vigorously but peacefully fought. On the related problems of rearmament and the maintenance of Japan's independence, the Liberal party, although implicitly in favor of eventual rearmament, advocated for the present a program of strengthening the national power, materially and spiritually, before rearming. It also advocated maintenance of internal order by a tough subversive activities prevention law and a strong National Police Reserve. It stood by its treaties and agreements with the Western bloc and its friendship with the United States. It also pressed for a strengthening of international collective security. On the issue of relations with China and Russia, the party platform said that such relations depended upon the sincerity of these two countries. Individual candidates, however, attacked both.⁵ On domestic problems, the Liberals stood for a reduction of taxes, and were opposed to taxes which prevented the accumulation of capital. They were accused by their opponents of proposing the lowering of the taxes of the wealthy without a proportionate reduction in taxes affecting the working class. The party also stood for government control of prices, crop requisitioning, and planned food production. It also advocated industrial rationalization and increased bond issues,

³ *Osaka Mainichi*, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 1.

⁴ Shigemitsu had never taken an active part in politics before this time. Before and during the war, he was a career diplomat. Today, he has considerable popularity, symbolizing what many Japanese consider unjust aspects of the Tokyo trials.

⁵ In a political rally held at the Uchisange Shōgakkō in Okayama City, the author heard Liberal candidates take the position that American troops in Korea were defending Japan and that Russia and China were aggressive states that must be suppressed eventually.

which the opposition said would lead to another spiral of inflation. Liberals were for legal restrictions against general strikes.

The Progressive party did not differ materially from the Liberal party on the major issues. The Progressives did advocate rearmament without the Liberal time restriction. In essence, they were for the Liberal program but said they could carry it out better. The Right-wing Socialists placed their faith in the United Nations to protect Japan and were against rearmament. They were not anti-American. With regard to China and Russia, the platform requested these two countries to renounce recourse to armed revolution and to cooperate with international efforts for peace. It recommended that attempts be made to reopen trade relations with both countries. In domestic policy, the party wanted reduced taxation of those in the lower income bracket, including complete exemption from taxation of all incomes below ¥20,000 per month.^{*} It advocated government control and government planning but not government ownership of industry.

The real beginning of a division between left and right was marked by the Left-wing Socialist party. It opposed not only rearmament but also those parts of the Peace Treaty that provided for American garrisons in Japan. It opposed the Security Pact and the Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan. Many of its candidates were openly hostile to the United States. On the other hand, the party advocated opening of trade relations with China and Russia and the negotiation of an overall peace treaty that would include these two countries. Domestically, while not going so far as to endorse all-out government ownership of property, Left-wing Socialists were in favor of a greater degree of government control of the nation's economy than were Right-wing Socialists.

The Labor-Farm party, in the anti-American camp, opposed the San Francisco agreements and rearmament. The Cooperative party placed its trust in maintaining Japan's independence in "new international socialism," but would rearm by autonomous defense units guarding against the resurgence of militarism. The Reconstruction League was openly chauvinistic.

The Communist party platform followed its usual line. The United States must be excluded from Japan, Japan's economy must be oriented toward China and Russia, the National Police Reserve, whose members were called mercenaries of the United States, must be liquidated and the defense of Japan entrusted to People's Armies. On the domestic side, the Communists advocated a program that would be a transitional stage from Japan's present position to socialism.

Despite predictions of possible disorder during the election—it was feared that the Communist party might adopt strong-arm tactics—the election was without major incident. There were more than 11,000 reported violations of Japan's rather stringent election laws which forbid, among other things, house-to-house solicitation of votes, general distribution of handbills or public posting

^{*} ¥20,000 a month is above the average working man's wage.

of campaign signs, and unauthorized public rallies.⁷ On election day the Communist party covered the cities with illegal handbills, but beyond that the anticipated trouble did not develop.

The Liberal party, with 240 candidates elected, captured a majority in the House of Representatives. However, this number was a reduction of 45 seats from the 285 held at the time of the dissolution of the Diet. The Progressive party captured 85 seats, a gain of 18, but far below its pre-election expectations. The Right-wing Socialist party gained 57 seats, an increase of 27; the Left-wing Socialist party won 54 seats, a gain of 38. The Communist party failed to seat a single candidate, although it had captured 35 seats in the 1949 election and held 22 at the time of the dissolution of the Diet. Its total vote of 894,823 comprised 2.6% of the ballots cast, compared with its 1949 total of 2,984,771, which was 9.8% of the votes cast. The Cooperative party with 2 seats compared with the 5 it held in August, and the Labor-Farm party with 4 seats, the same as in August, remained unimportant. The Reconstruction League, the new nationalist party, gained but a single seat. The various other small parties had 4 seats as against 6 in August. The unaffiliated successful candidates numbered 19 as against 2 in August.

TABLE I^a

Party	Seats after 1949 election	% of vote	Seats at time of dis- solution	Seats after 1952 election	% of vote
Liberal	264	43.8	285	240	47.8
Progressive	69	15.7	67	85	18.9
Socialist	48	13.5			
Right-wing Socialist			30	57	11.5
Left-wing Socialist			16	54	9.9
Communist	35	9.8	22	0	2.6
Cooperative	14	3.4	5	2	1.2
Labor-Farm	0	0	4	4	0.7
Reconstruction League	0	0	0	1	0.5
Miscellaneous	24	7.2	6	4	0.1
Unaffiliated	12	6.6	2	19	6.8
Vacancies	0	0	29	0	
Total	466	100.0	466	466	100.0

There were 1,243 registered candidates (2.67 times the number of seats). Of these, 317 were incumbents, 393 former representatives, and 533 new

⁷ *Nippon Times*, Oct. 3, 1952, p. 1.

^a Table based on compilations of statistics from *Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1951*, Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister (Tōkyō, 1952), pp. 360-62; *Mainichi Nenkan, Shōwa Nijūshichi*, Mainichi Shimbun Sha (Tōkyō, 1952), p. 132; *Osaka Mainichi* (Japanese edition), Oct. 3, 1952, p. 1; and *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1952, p. 2.

candidates. Among the candidates were 321 depurged persons. Twenty-six women ran for office.⁹ Table II shows the distribution of the successful candidates in these groups by party.

TABLE II¹⁰

Party	Former represent- atives	Incum- bents	New represent- atives	Total	De- purged	Women
Liberal	132	56	52	240	79	2
Progressive	37	38	10	85	32	1
Right-wing Socialist	26	25	6	57	13	4
Left-wing Socialist	16	13	25	54	3	1
Communist	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cooperative	1	1	0	2	1	1
Labor-Farm	3	1	0	4	0	0
Reconstruction League	0	1	0	1	1	0
Miscellaneous	1	1	2	4	0	0
Unaffiliated	1	4	14	19	11	0
Total	217	140	109	466	140	9

The election results, although establishing a majority party, did not give it any positive mandate regarding the major issues of the campaign. Any interpretation that the loss of seats by the Liberals and the sizeable gain by the two Socialist parties mean a partial repudiation of American policy in Japan and a stand against rearmament must be tempered by several other considerations. Dissatisfaction with a government faced with disagreeable problems that have no popular solution, the lack of a definite stand by many Liberal candidates on these issues, and voting for persons rather than for policies enter the political equation. The complete ousting of Communists from the House of Representatives was a major political change. It did not come about because of the Communist party's shifting its support to Socialist candidates. The Communist offer of a united front with the Socialists was rejected, and Communist attacks on both wings were as bitter as those made against the Yoshida government. The shift from the Communist to the Socialist parties can be better interpreted as a shift of non-Communist party member leftists from support of the Communist line to support of the Socialist program. Even though many Japanese dislike Yoshida's arrangements with the United States, they are not beguiled at this time by the Communist story of Russia's benign policy toward the Far East and Japan. Furthermore, the election stands as a repudiation of the Communist party's recent Bolshevik tactics. If this election indicates a trend toward the left, it is toward an indigenous left. The desire for real independence, it is suggested, transcends other political ideologies.

⁹ *Nippon Times*, Oct. 1, 1952 p. 1.

¹⁰ *Osaka Mainichi* (Japanese edition), Oct. 3, 1952, p. 1.

At the same time, evidence of resurgent nationalism is to be found in the election of 140 candidates who have been depurged. Yet it is doubtful that this means a rising Fascism, as some political observers fear. In general the depurged were distributed among all parties and were not ultra-nationalists as a group. While a few ultra-nationalists, such as Tsuji Masanobu, Kuhara Fusanosuke, and Kita Reikichi, were elected, the Reconstruction League succeeded in electing only one representative, and other ultra-nationalists such as Muto Santoku of Okayama-ken were defeated.

It would appear, then, that the Japanese voter has rejected both right and left extremism and has continued to support a conservative government. The loss of conservative support as compared with the 1949 election has been to the advantage of the more moderate and independent leftist politicians.

Japan's policies during the life of the new government are rather clearly defined by the results of the election. Japan has, for the moment, cast her lot with the West, particularly the United States. The San Francisco patterns, therefore, will be continued. The government will try to stabilize Japan's economy through positive cooperation with the United States, with defense industries as the heart of Japan's economy. Japan will assume the character of a sub-contractor of the United States, particularly in American procurements for Korea and development projects in Southeast Asia. With regard to rearmament, the new government will have the strength to present, if it so decides, an amendment to Article IX of the constitution, looking forward to an ultimate conscription system. The opposition (Left-wing Socialist party and Labor-Farm party) does not have the parliamentary strength to stop this program. Thus, even though the conservative politicians have lost ground in the election, they maintain enough strength to continue their right-of-center program.

If the Liberal party cabinet fails to have a long life, its fall will be due more to a resumption of intra-party quarreling together with political opportunism by the Progressive party and the Right-wing Socialist party than to inherent opposition to the government's program.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS..... 206

- Resources for Freedom, A Report to the President by the President's Materials Policy Commission, 1952. ARTHUR MAASS..... 206
- Barrett*, The Tenney Committee; Legislative Investigation of Subversive Activities in California; *Countryman*, Un-American Activities in the State of Washington; The Work of the Canwell Committee; *Chamberlain*, Loyalty and Legislative Action; A Survey of Activity by the New York State Legislature, 1919-1949; *Gellhorn* (ed.), The States and Subversion. LANDON G. ROCKWELL..... 211
- Gewirth*, Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of Peace: Volume I, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy. THOMAS I. COOK..... 215
- Crossman* (ed.), New Fabian Essays. GEORGE CATLIN..... 217
- Seagle*, Law; The Science of Inefficiency. WILLARD HURST..... 220
- Hardin*, The Politics of Agriculture; Soil Conservation and the Struggle for Power in Rural America. ERNEST A. ENGELBERT..... 221
- Cheever and Haviland*, American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers. DON K. PRICE..... 223
- Ulam*, Titoism and the Cominform; *Korbel*, Tito's Communism. ANDREW GYORGY..... 225
- Fitzgerald*, Revolution in China. HAROLD M. VINACKE..... 226
- Latourette*, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951. RALPH J. D. BRAIBANTI..... 228
- Overacker*, The Australian Party System. JAMES R. ROACH..... 230
- Einaudi and Goguel*, Christian Democracy in Italy and France. G. LOWELL FIELD..... 232
- Sharp*, International Technical Assistance; Programs and Organization. WALLACE PARKS..... 233

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 235

- AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS..... 235
- FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT..... 243
- INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS..... 252
- POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY..... 261

BOOK REVIEWS

Resources for Freedom, A Report to the President by the President's Materials Policy Commission, 1952: Vol. I, Foundations for Growth and Security; Vol. II, The Outlook for Key Commodities; Vol. III, The Outlook for Energy Sources; Vol. IV, The Promise of Technology; Vol. V, Selected Reports to the Commission. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. vi, 184; 210; 43; x, 228; 154. \$1.25; \$1.50; \$.50; \$1.75; \$1.25.)

The Paley Commission has injected a stream of fresh air into a public policy atmosphere that had become stuffy from the constant recycling of the ideas of the early New Deal and those usually associated with the names of Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and Robert Malthus (the latter ideas known today as "Neo-Malthusian"). Its approach to the free world's resources problem emphasizes the requirements or end use side of resources: "The growth of demand is at the core of the materials problem we face." Very broadly, this approach, first, foresees for a considerable number of years the basic economic characteristics of the society with which it is concerned—by projection of such factors as population, working force, and gross national product. Second, it estimates the resources requirements of such a society. How much copper, for example, would be demanded in the year 1975, if the price of copper, relative to the general level of prices, were to remain constant? This estimate is derived, in turn, from estimates of the demand for those end products, such as telephones, which use copper. Third, this approach estimates the supplies of resources that are likely to be forthcoming at the assumed prices. These projections depend, among other factors, on careful estimates of reserves, in terms of their economic as well as physical availability. And finally, by indicating the probable extent of demand and supply at constant relative prices, this approach enables one to foresee potential price rises and to plan in advance to forestall them or adjust to them by measures designed to expand production, where this can be done without much increase in cost, or by measures designed to develop substitutes, reduce physical waste, and the like, where increased supply cannot be induced.

It will be objected by some that the Paley approach places too great emphasis on economics and especially on costs and prices. This need not and should not be the case. To the contrary, the Paley approach can be used to introduce a degree of flexibility into analyses of conservation which, too often in the past, have become stuck on inflexible concepts of physical stocks of resources. Thus, the use of projections and of price factors in these projections can provide a sensible framework for balanced judgment between policies for increasing domestic production of any resource (by pushing back the technological, physical, and economic boundaries that limit supply); policies for increasing procurement from foreign sources; and policies for reducing demand for the resource (by more efficient designs and processes and the use of substitute materials). No other approach to conservation and resources problems offers a framework of analysis so broad and yet so useful and meaningful.

By its very nature, the Paley approach requires the combined consideration of resources related in use. Thus, for example, it becomes well-nigh impossible to consider petroleum policy without giving full attention to competing sources of energy—coal, natural gas, and hydroelectric power. This has not been the case in the past where, under other frameworks of analysis, petroleum policy has been considered independently of policies for the other energy fuels.

It will be argued that the grouping of resources in terms of end uses, as required by the Paley approach, is deficient because it deflects emphasis from the overriding importance of the unity of resources in nature. Thus, relating hydroelectric power to coal and oil overlooks the relation of hydroelectric power to irrigation, navigation, and the general multiple purpose development of the river and its watershed—a concept which has at long last asserted itself with great insistency. Certainly the natural unity of resources cannot be disregarded, and the concept of multiple purpose river development must be applied. But this does not mean that the most fruitful framework for resources analysis is one which uses for major classifications water, land, and minerals. The need is rather for an analysis of hydroelectric power in relation to other energy sources, of irrigation in relation to other sources for increasing agricultural production, of navigation in relation to other means of transportation; and then for an adjustment and modification of the results obtained in the light of the optimum multiple purpose development of the river basin.

It is true, of course, that the Paley approach, like any other, can be applied too narrowly; and this must be guarded against if it is to serve as a framework for public policy. The approach might be applied so as to emphasize only national and overlook regional factors in resources development; and to a certain degree the Paley report does slight regional factors. On the other hand, the Paley approach will minimize the danger of equating resources development with regionalism, an error committed too often under other frameworks of analysis. Similarly, the Paley approach might be applied so as to emphasize economic policy issues and overlook those related to social objectives and organization. But the *Report* gives adequate attention to problems of organization and states explicitly certain social objectives, about which more will be said below.

In its 25-year projections of the basic economic characteristics of our society, the Commission has made two assumptions which are of considerable interest to the student of political economy. First is the emphasis on growth. Our gross national product, says the Commission, will be double in 1975 what it was in 1950—almost 550 as against 273 billion dollars. Why this belief in growth? At one point, the Commission says its belief is irrational: "... we share the belief of the American people in the principle of Growth. Granting that we cannot find any absolute reason for this belief we admit that to our Western minds it seems preferable to any opposite, which to us implies stagnation and decay." At another point the Commission presents a very definite rationale for the growth rate selected, and impliedly for the belief in growth itself, when it states that the rate of growth assumed is merely the past or historical rate of 3 per cent a year.

These statements taken together are a reflection, it is believed, of a somewhat awkward or self-conscious attitude of economists in adjusting to a new emphasis for public policy. Only since the postwar depression, for which they planned so carefully, failed to develop, have economists as a group turned their backs on depression psychology with its stress on fiscal policy, compensatory spending, and the like, and turned instead to an emphasis on steady and continuing growth and on projections of this growth. Yet, in doing this and in seeking the "scientific" data to support it, they find that, through it all, there has been a long range rate of growth of roughly 3 per cent a year, and it is only this rate which they now predict for the future.

In a real sense it is this emphasis on growth which distinguishes the Paley approach to resources development and conservation from that of the early New Deal. Then, conservation was associated with depression public works (PWA) and the social need to get unemployed boys out of the sweaty city and into the open (CCC). Roosevelt himself, and men like Harold Ickes, had a more genuine belief in sustained resources development for use. They had the faith and vision to realize that works such as Bonneville and Grand Coulee would be vitally needed in the future and would help to build an industrial empire in the Pacific Northwest. But many opposed these dams; they called them "white elephants." And a good number of those who supported them did so primarily because they were employment-creating, economy-stimulating public works.

A second basic assumption of the Paley Commission which deserves discussion is that the combined materials requirements and supplies of the entire "free non-Communist world" should be considered at the same time. Thus, projections are made of gross national product and of material requirements for Free Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan; and of material requirements alone for the rest of the free world—the less developed, raw material producing areas, for which gross national product would have no special significance. There is a chapter in Volume I entitled "Promoting Free World Expansion"; and the commissioners "believe that the destinies of the United States and the rest of the free non-Communist world are inextricably bound together. This belief we hope will color everything we have to say about the Materials Problem." These projections and statements might lead one, especially a fellow free world citizen, to expect that the resources demands of West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Indonesia, will be given equal consideration in the *Report* with those of the United States. But they are not. The major emphasis throughout is on the needs of the United States and on public policies to meet them—so much so, in fact, that the Commission has been charged by some with bowing towards the free world and speaking a prologue in its behalf, and then proceeding to act out a highly nationalistic drama.

I do not concur in this charge, though I recognize that the *Report* is somewhat schizophrenic in this regard. This can be attributed to a number of factors: First, considerably less information is available on the requirements and resources of the free world than on those of the United States alone; second, the

Commission feared, no doubt, that it would be charged with meddling in the affairs of other nations if it ventured beyond the foreign resources functions and responsibilities of the United States Government, United States investors, and possibly international agencies of which the United States is a member; finally, with respect to the underdeveloped areas, to which the *Report* devotes considerable attention, the Commission has proceeded on an assumption which it does not, and in the light of available data probably cannot, prove. Thus, the Commission *assumes* that the development of mineral resources in an underdeveloped country, both for export and for domestic use, will lay the basis for a general and diversified economic development in that country, thereby improving its living standards. On the basis of this assumption the Commission proposes increased foreign investment in the mineral industries of the underdeveloped countries, estimating the costs of the desired development in the terms of the mining engineer, with some allowances for port and other direct development costs.

Critics of the *Report* look at these cost estimates, complain that they do not include the *total* costs of minerals and concomitant general economic development, and conclude that the Commission has viewed the problems of the underdeveloped area from inside the United States rather than from inside the underdeveloped country itself. The critics are wrong if the Commission's assumed relationship between minerals and general economic development is right. But who knows? The few considerations which the Commission presents to support its view are not conclusive.

The Commission's policy proposals, designed to enable society to forestall or adjust to potential price rises indicated by the projections, are too numerous to mention, let alone evaluate, in a review. The philosophy underlying these proposals, however, can be discussed with profit. This philosophy is that unfettered private enterprise, free from government controls and regulated to the greatest extent by "the spur of the profit motive," "the competitive market structure," and "the price system," will bring about the desired adjustments. "We believe in a minimum of interference with these patterns of private enterprise."

"But," the Commissioners go on to assert, "to believe in a minimum of interference is not to believe that this minimum must be set at zero. Private enterprise has itself from time to time asked for helps, or restraints, or counterpoises from Government. . . . for this reason, among others, we have experienced for a long time a mixture of private and public influences on the functioning of our economy." In reviewing the proposals for "public influences" on "the competitive structures" of the mineral resource industries, one might conclude that it is the "helps"—in the form of free government services and subsidies, largely as tax relief—with which the Commissioners are most concerned. Their proposal that the present liberal provisions for expensing of exploration costs for oil and gas be retained and, *at the same time*, that the rates of percentage depletion for these fuels be kept at their present high levels—27½ per cent per annum—provides a dramatic illustration.

The strong bias for unfettered, but aided, private enterprise in its proposals

for the mineral industries stands in sharp contrast, however, to the Commission's proposals for the renewable resources. For forestry, the Commission supports the ultimate in control—compulsory regulation of cutting on private forest lands. States are to be encouraged to enact such legislation, but "if after five years there still remain important gaps in the State system of compulsory regulation, Federal legislation should be enacted authorizing the Federal Government to establish minimum cutting practice regulations." For industrial water supplies, the Commission suggests the possibility of a federal punitive tax against industrial polluters. The application of such a tax would have effects similar to that of close federal regulation. And for agriculture, the Commission accepts pretty much the present system of supports and controls, though it hopes that a greater emphasis on farm management planning will reduce the necessity for relying on them.

How, then, can these proposals for vastly increased regulation for forestry and for consideration of further federal controls over industrial water users be explained? One can always say that the problems are vastly different from those in the mineral industries. And this is right; but so are the problems in the oil industry quite different from those of copper. Furthermore, the whole flavor of the chapters and monographs on the renewable resources can be distinguished from that of the chapters on the mineral resources; they are not nearly so aggressively free-market oriented. Again, why? I do not know; but I should like to suggest two possible reasons: First, most of the mineral resources (except, to a limited extent, the energy fuels and those minerals located on the public domain) have not been the object of broad and comprehensive public policy treatment in the last thirty years as have forestry, water, and agricultural resources; and the leaders of the mineral industries, as well as the government's mineral experts in the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines, continue to resist such treatment. Second, and not unrelated, the Paley Commission included more mineral industry executives than any other group. George R. Brown is a big Texas oil man, and Arthur Bunker is president of Climax Molybdenum Company; and their points of view in many of the Commission's deliberations were, as should be expected, those of the mineral industries. The other Commissioners were William Paley, Chairman of the Board of Columbia Broadcasting Company; Eric Hodgins, a senior editor of *Fortune*; and Edward Mason, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard.

Though there may be many valid criticisms of the Commission's proposals and even of the insistency and consistency with which the Commission has pursued its basic philosophy in regard to the non-renewable resources, the Paley report is the most original and significant contribution to the study of resources and public policy since the 1933 report of the Mississippi Valley Committee and the early reports of the National Resources Committee. Already, most government agencies are reexamining and reevaluating their resources programs in the new light of the "Paley approach."

ARTHUR MAASS.

Harvard University.

The Tenney Committee; Legislative Investigation of Subversive Activities in California. BY EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 400. \$5.00.)

Un-American Activities in the State of Washington; The Work of the Canwell Committee. BY VERN COUNTRYMAN. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 405. \$5.00.)

Loyalty and Legislative Action; A Survey of Activity by the New York State Legislature, 1919-1949. BY LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. vii, 254. \$4.00.)

The States and Subversion. EDITED BY WALTER GELLHORN. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. vii, 454. \$5.00.)

These are four volumes in the series of Cornell Studies in Civil Liberties sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and conducted under the direction of Professor Robert E. Cushman. It is a distinguished series, dealing with one of the most perplexing problems of our times and written by exceptionally qualified, temperate, and responsible scholars. It constitutes the most meticulous description and penetrating analysis ever undertaken of the many-faceted governmental programs purporting to promote internal security through exposing and controlling disloyalty and subversion. Thoughtful citizens, whether professional scholars or not, should be beholden to the Rockefeller Foundation for making these studies possible and to Professor Cushman for his initiative in this notable enterprise.

The Tenney Committee is a tight, carefully documented account of the major activities of California's Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities. Authorized to investigate "subversive" activities generally, the committee interpreted its mandate broadly, exercising unfettered discretion substantively and procedurally. Operating mainly through the technique of generously publicized public hearings, the committee spent \$146,000, produced over fifty volumes of typewritten transcripts of hearings and five formal reports totaling 2,241 pages, and recommended a legislative program of more than twenty bills, of which five were ultimately enacted. One was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court. The flavor of these bills is suggested by one providing that courses in the Constitution of the United States and American History should not be combined with social science or social studies, and by another forbidding the teaching of politically controversial subjects in the elementary grades. Neither was enacted. The redoubtable Tenney emerges as a legislative St. George dedicated to destroying dragons of ideological impurity in California.

The author attributes the public opposition which the committee ultimately engendered to its dogmatic assumptions concerning the nature and extent of the communist movement, which led it to identify opposition to its methods with sympathy with communism. As the *San Francisco Chronicle* quipped:

A Communist is any
Who disagrees with Tenney.

Tenney's withdrawal from the committee in 1949 probably ranks among the more fortuitous events in California since the gold rush. Vigorous critics of the committee have asserted that it was an instrumentality of reactionary business interests to break crusading labor unions and discredit liberal movements. The author states that he saw no evidence to support the charge of such a deliberate conspiracy. On the contrary he is convinced that Tenney and other members of the committee were honestly convinced of the justice and necessity of their endeavor.

The author includes generous quotations from the transcripts of committee hearings and reports, and from press accounts of its activity. He writes with a disciplined objectivity which one might argue is too detached in the light of the record he presents. His technique, however, is to project the documentary evidence, which speaks for itself. This is vivid and effective. "There are no scales," he writes, "that can tell us accurately whether in the balance the activities of the Tenney Committee were of service or disservice to the state." Barrett's sharpest criticism is directed toward the conduct of the hearings. The evidence convinces him that they "were not conducted in a manner calculated to permit rational finding of fact. A general view suggests that prosecution rather than investigation was the theme." Senator Tenney's personality, he says, "added much that was irrational to the hearings"; the obvious purpose of the hearings was to publicize conclusions rather than find facts; and much of the testimony presented was not tested for reliability. The pattern has become a familiar one, but nowhere does it emerge more bluntly than in this most melodramatic of all un-American activities committees.

Un-American Activities in the State of Washington is a report of the brief, episodic life of the Canwell Committee (Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities) and the investigation conducted by the University of Washington. Compared to the Tenney Committee the Canwell Committee was a model of restraint. It held two extensive hearings, the second of which resulted in a successful contempt action against five witnesses for refusing to answer questions concerning their political affiliation. Two volumes of testimony were published, naming a vast number of people afflicted with a vague species of ideological sin. Unlike some of its counterparts in other states, membership in the Canwell Committee produced no great political pay-off. Of four members of the committee whose legislative terms expired in 1948, only one was re-elected. Canwell himself was defeated after campaigning on his committee record, declaring that "those who attack the committee are either ignorant or subversive." The lone successful candidate made no issue of his work on the committee.

The author presents a meticulous job of factual reporting, eschewing all value judgments until his final chapter of general appraisal. This reviewer had the feeling that, given the mass of detailed material presented, some advantage would have accrued from drawing conclusions and presenting short summaries at the end of several of the chapters. In his appraisal the author seriously questions the legitimacy of the committee's work, which focused almost exclusively

on the political beliefs and associations of the people it investigated. He is convinced that much of the vast bulk of evidence published by the committee is questionable on its face. Much is hearsay, personal opinion, impossible to evaluate. Some is patently capricious, as when one J. B. Matthews, a professional "friendly" witness among committees of this sort, devised a formula for identifying "fellow travelers" which scooped in the names of Albert Einstein and Senator Charles Tobey. Countryman concludes that the general flavor of the interrogation at committee hearings was "well designed to produce a collection of rumors, opinions, suspicions, and perhaps hallucinations which will furnish content for newspaper headlines, but is not likely to get information of much reliability. . . ." Hence the "committee was not after facts . . . it was after charges." A careful analysis of the tenure proceedings of the University of Washington convinces the author that ". . . it is impossible to conclude the University of Washington is better equipped today for its 'quest for truth' than it was before the Canwell committee began its investigation."

Loyalty and Legislative Action surveys New York's activity from 1919 to 1949: the Lusk Committee investigations of 1919-20; the Ives Loyalty Oath Law; the McNaboe investigations; the Devany Law; the Rapp-Coudert Committee investigations of the New York City schools; investigations of the Board of Higher Education; and the Feinberg Law. The author handles his subject on a high level of reporting and critical evaluation throughout. His judgments are discriminating and precise. While deploring the substance of the Devany Law, he emphasizes its detailed procedural safeguards. Criticizing the procedural defects of the Coudert Committee, he emphasizes its honest desire to protect the innocent and avoid sensational publicity. His conclusions are comprehensive and direct. The Lusk Committee and the McNaboe Committee engaged in "egregious nonsense." The Lusk Committee, in particular, "violated almost every canon of responsible conduct," employed "the tactics of the side show barker and the old-time patent medicine hawker," and "ranged recklessly over the entire area of individual rights with wanton disregard for such fundamentals as separation of powers or due process of law." The New York experience convinces the author that politically constituted committees are inherently incapable of dealing satisfactorily with subversive activity. He warns of the semantic fog which blankets the word "subversive," of the problems of identifying communists, that the price of communist purges is a closed society, that loyalty probes focus on the transgressor rather than on the conditions which have produced unrest, and that judgment in these matters is guided by formula rather than evidence. He recommends certain procedural reforms in the conduct of investigations, and finally expresses more concern over the possibility of intellectual conformity in schools than over the possibility of a few instances of taint.

The States and Subversion is a symposium dealing with California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Washington. Chapters on California, New York, and Washington are capsule presentations of the foregoing books by their respective authors. E. Houston Harsha writes on the Broyles Commis-

sion of Illinois which, on the record he presents, accomplished little other than the stimulation of the adrenal glands of its own members. Possibly the most fruitful result of the hearings, which focused largely on alleged subversion in education, was Robert Hutchins' statement that "The question is not what our professors belong to but what they are doing." William B. Prendergast analyzes Maryland's anti-communist Ober Law. His estimate is judicious. Believing that the need for the law was never satisfactorily demonstrated, he nevertheless concludes that it avoids many defects which frequently debase this kind of statute. Robert J. Mowitz examines Michigan's bout with subversion. Michigan has augmented the usual safeguards against subversion by forbidding the display of Red flags and establishing a special Subversive Activities Division in the state police department. Detroit initiated the first full-scale municipal loyalty program, and to this the author devotes considerable attention.

The concluding chapter, written by Gellhorn, is pithy and forthright. He believes the record shows that freedom has sometimes been threatened and impaired by the attempts to preserve it. "Prudence can be overborne by hate and fear as well as by carelessness." He is worried about the enlarged concern over groups as distinct from individuals; he wonders whether "anticipatory criminality" ought to gain recognition in American law; he thinks legislation is an inappropriate medium for expressing loathing; and that democracy is not likely to be preserved by closing the ballot box to those who may not cherish democracy, or by eliciting orthodoxy from teachers by stratagems of creeping pressures. He warns that American principles of fairness, wisdom, and freedom were not wrought for periods of calm and comfort.

In all of the books except *Un-American Activities in the State of Washington* the authors include selected documentary materials in appendices.

Few communists have been caught by the vast apparatus of investigation and legislation ostensibly devised to entrap them. By 1950 over 300 state statutes were directed at subversion. This is defense in depth with a vengeance. One may well think of this what Holmes thought of three generations of imbeciles: it's enough.

The wages of orthodoxy are stagnation and death for the democratic community. These volumes offer variations on the same theme: professional patriots engaged in competitive orthodoxy. On the evidence presented, moderation and a rational relation of means to ends are the exception in the search for subversion. Sincerity may motivate the search, but sincerity without temperance imperils. Inquisition is usually clothed with sincerity. What emerges from these studies is the fact that America is ideologically unprepared for the exigencies of cold war. Why? Part of the answer lies in the nature of American culture and the psychological responses of Americans to their present travail. We are a people of action, unusually ethnocentric, accustomed to achieving results on a grand scale. Confronted with an invidious and protean form of imperialism, we are frustrated. Unable to cope effectively with the source of the danger in Moscow, we have become victims of a pervasive anxiety neurosis. Fearing that which we cannot reach, we transfer our hostility to that which we can reach.

We are burdened with the irrationality of fear. The legislative activity related in these studies reflects attempts to assuage varieties of conscious and subconscious anxiety. Unmistakable overtones of sadism are revealed by the record. Psychologists inform us that sadistic strivings help the individual to escape his unbearable feelings of powerlessness. Research in the authoritarian personality or the ethnocentric personality reveals tendencies of stereotypy, intolerance, self-glorification, lack of individuality, condemnation of complex political behavior. Contributions of analysts such as Fromm, Frenkel-Brunswick, and Adorno offer much to clarify understanding of the psychological and sociopolitical facets of the phenomena with which these volumes deal. Research in political behavior can further enlighten understanding in these matters. Perhaps causes of this particular trauma in the body politic are also to be found in structural aspects of American society, as C. Wright Mills and Sebastian de Grazia have suggested in their respective analyses of social morality and the disintegration of belief systems in the political community.

These studies in the Cornell series admirably fulfill the purpose for which they were written: to describe and analyze their subject largely within a legal frame of reference. Beyond this frame of reference, however, lie broad and significant factors suggested above. Further exploration along these paths would provide a valuable supplement to the excellent work already accomplished by the authors of these books.

LANDON G. ROCKWELL.

Hamilton College.

Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of Peace: Volume I, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy. BY ALAN GEWIRTH. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. 342. \$4.75)

Perhaps the most difficult task confronting the historian of political thought is to steer a clear course between that historicism which reads the past as though it were concerned with contemporary issues and that historical relativism which renders that past an absolute elsewhere, relevant to itself alone. Positively, it is his job to understand past thinkers and movements by a clear grasp of their problems, their frame of reference, and their intellectual and cultural heritage in such a way as to discover their genuinely relevant insights and the proper applicability and limitations of their fundamental viewpoint, and to avoid their facile use as supports or as whipping-boys in current controversies, in an age which professes reliance on scientific reason but too often searches for the support of authorities who lend, or can be made to lend, prestige to positions presently taken.

Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* (1324) has in recent times been construed as an anticipation of most subsequent political thinkers and doctrines, and has been read successively in our own day as an ardent defense of democracy and as a support of totalitarianism. Patient and careful examination by a thorough scholar possessed at once of the submissive humility to give his author careful and respectful attention, of that degree of equality basic to effective

appreciation and critical judgment, of that range of knowledge both of previous and of later thought necessary to sound construction and correct inference, and of that disinterested concern for truth which eschews superficial similarities and ready lessons, has for some time been wanting and wanted, especially for the service of the non-specialist confused by claims and counter-claims, and lacking in the expertise required for their judicious assessment.

Professor Alan Gewirth meets the criteria, and discharges the obligation in the volume here reviewed; and one may anticipate with reasonable confidence that the second volume, a critical edition and translation, will effectively complete the task of providing a definitive treatment for our time of a thinker who by sustained and consistent system radically challenged and changed for his time and place the terms and presuppositions of discourse concerning man and God, church and state, the individual and the social order. It is Professor Gewirth's great accomplishment to clarify the key concepts which are at the root of that change, to show its true nature, to make clear its ideological provenance and its institutional matrix, and so to reveal its fundamental force, which is something more and other than a plea for different governors and government: it is an insistence on different criteria of good, and on different measures and methods of analysis and assessment, for the political-social order and for the realm of religion, than those prevalent in the dominant thought of the Middle Ages, which, whatever the attitudes to papal claims, generally accepted the doctrines of the Two Powers and an absolutistic and transcendent ethic as criterion by which to measure and judge all earthly performance.

At the root of Marsilius' teaching, Professor Gewirth shows, is biological nature, human will, a search for earthly satisfactions, and consequent conflicts to be resolved. The political order is necessary to such resolution, and to the provision of satisfactions: the criterion of its success and adequacy is earthly peace, and the value of any regime depends on the relation of its ends, as effective purposes, to the attainment of common weal, the effective welfare of its people. Marsilius' viewpoint is, then, secular and naturalistic; and he reconstructs authorities and reshapes traditional issues in that light. In particular, he relies on Aristotle, but follows Averroes, not Aquinas, in discovering his meaning and significance; as he uses the realistic and positivistic insights of St. Augustine's analysis of the city of earth, while abandoning his concern with the ultimate City of God.

From these general attitudes, Professor Gewirth brilliantly demonstrates, follow all of Marsilius' specific political teachings, including the very real difficulties he confronts and the imperfect reconciliations he achieves where the logic of his assumptions makes for imperfect consistency. Moreover, once granted the assumptions, the Discourses into which *The Defender of the Peace* is divided become coherent units in one whole, though the first, being a positive construction of his viewpoint rather than pure polemics in others' terms, remains the vital core of the treatise.

Professor Gewirth proceeds to show that Marsilius' state is begotten of men's material needs; that it is concerned with their overt behavior, not their inner

grace; that it aims at stability, at order, at civil peace; and that the functions appropriate to government at any time depend on what is requisite to that end. What is vital is unity, in government and in law: the state, begotten of men's individual needs, becomes overriding authority over them as a very condition of peace. Yet, in the context of the time, such a doctrine was liberating: men were delivered from many jurisdictions, while the state itself was not concerned to make them good by law, but only to render them civil. Moreover, in the last analysis the will of the people, in whose interest the state exists, is supreme, and itself defines the conditions of public safety to which the preservation of the state itself is basic.

The succeeding chapters examine in detail Marsilius' consequent arguments as to the nature and function of law; the meaning of his doctrine that the people is the legislator, and the issue as to whether his concept of the "valentior pars" refers to quantity or quality, to majority rule or to elite; the issue of the relation of government as effectuation of law's commands and the source and authority of the law itself; and the implications for the church and church organization of a secular view of the overriding and final character of the people's authority. The work then ends with a brief but forceful chapter on "The Significance of Marsilius," historical and theoretical.

The whole work is marked by carefully intricate, yet clear, analysis. It is fair to its subject, yet critical. Its great learning is consistently used to prevent false inferences from Marsilius' arguments based on current frames of thought, and to emphasize warranted ones. While Professor Gewirth's structure is of course peculiar to his subject, the principles underlying his analysis and his effective following of them make this work a model of its kind, worthy of a place among the great analyses of individual political thinkers. For by careful steering through a mass of argument where erroneous inference is a constant temptation, Professor Gewirth achieves a clear and forceful interpretation which produces an irresistible conviction of correctness, and shows unanswerably the errors in previous, and conflicting, interpretations. Above all (though Professor Gewirth makes no such claim, save by implication) it becomes clear that, for all his immersion in his own time, place, and issues, Marsilius is worthy of a place among the fundamentally great political philosophers, as he is the basic fount and founder of the modern secular, pragmatically oriented, and democratically directed, approach to politics, and to life in society as a search for the earthly welfare of persons, as they seek and sense it.

THOMAS I. COOK.

Johns Hopkins University.

New Fabian Essays. EDITED BY R. H. S. CROSSMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1952. Pp. xv, 215. \$4.00.)

This volume comprises eight essays, in six cases written by members of the executive committee of the Fabian Society. As Mr. Attlee points out in his introduction, only one, John Strachey, has had ministerial experience. Such names as Gaitskill and Jay are absent. The book is a conscious attempt to

restate at the present time the position of the Fabian Society indicated in 1889 in the original Fabian Essays. The editor states his position to be, not that of "labourism," but of socialism, defined in terms of human equality and of respect for individual personality. This is sharply distinguished from the practice of the Soviet State which, Mr. Crossman urges, is government by an elite, wrongly believed to be that of "a workers' state." Whether, indeed, Marxists will be prepared to agree that this socialist respect for individual personality is incompatible with economic determinism and that, if so, Marxists are not true socialists is an interesting matter for speculation, in which my sympathies are with Mr. Crossman. With his analysis of Asian communism, as in leadership a movement of the intelligentsia, I cannot agree too heartily.

That Mr. Crossman's socialism, unlike Mr. Jenkins', is colored by a romantic secularism of the Bertrand Russell variety, is probably merely due to an error of semantics, due to confusion of religion with the mores of brewers and stockbrokers—or else with the escapism of occupants of ivory towers. The sooner British Socialism gets out and keeps out of this Bradlaughian error, which presents socialism as not only the practical fruit of religion in social equity and safeguard for the individual worker's liberty, but as the *whole* of true religion and undefiled, the better for its stamina and vitality. The alternative, if the lesson is not learned, will be the development of a Christian Social party as inevitably in Britain as in every other country of Western Europe, since a stable majority workers' vote for Toryism is highly improbable. The distributivist tendencies of Mr. Crossman, against bureaucratic and managerial monopoly, are novel, noteworthy and welcome.

Mr. Crossman is not alone in the peculiar kind of chauvinistic piety which holds that Britain is especially elected by destiny, as a non-imperialist country, to hold up the lamp of reason amid the brute contests of battling ideologies. He rightly points out that communism is often regarded by colonial peoples as emancipating and damns Britain's deplorable Iranian policy, not (alas!) unsupported by British Labour. He somersaults to the conclusion that Kremlinism in Asia often is emancipating. Let him tell this to Mr. Nehru. Sometimes Mr. Crossman and Mr. Bevan come near to a preposterous and almost Mosleyan attitude of "minding Britain's business" and endeavor to hoist up again the happily upset balance of power, with Britain astride the barrel. On the contrary what is needed is not ideological "detachment" but, as even Mr. E. H. Carr indicates ("Propaganda and Power," *Yale Review*, Vol. 42, pp. 1-9 [September, 1952]), ideological re-education. Whereas Mr. Crossman endeavors to square his conscience with the deliberately contrived destruction, inside the Iron Curtain, of millions of human beings in order to achieve the best of possible worlds, seeking (as was said of the Swiss in the 40's) to be "neutral between good and evil," Mr. Denys Healey, in his excellent and mature essay on foreign affairs, has no illusions that the Soviet Union will not be guilty of barbarity and aggression just because it has "a socialist economy." Mr. Healey is not, however, guiltless of the oddly parochial illusion that "Britain is now the one true country with genuine friends in Asia" (Iran?). Perhaps he underestimates

the fight still to be waged against imperialist exploitation, for example by rubber lobbyists, or even by the metropolitan workers' own demands on colonial Africa, and shares with Mr. Crossman an uncritical belief in the virtues of General Mao's bloody revolution which, achieving power by promising peace to distressed China, gave war. What Mr. Healey does do is to provide a proper appraisal of the immense importance internationally of Ernest Bevan, while rightly warning against the right-wing materialism which thinks that all will be happy if enough money, unbacked by ideas, is put into buying friendship abroad.

Mr. John Strachey, convert from Mosleyism and convert from communism, in his essay confesses that, in his latest incarnation, he has been brought to accept that piecemeal economic hypothesis which is equally anathema to both systems. From this vantage he informs us that the experience of the Labour government of 1945-50 shows capitalism to be more malleable than the ideologists, doctrinaires and orthodox conventicle-ists had supposed. The peculiar curse of the "intellectuals" of the Labour party, as distinct from the Trade Union Movement, has been their lack of articulate alternatives to this jealous conventicle spirit of "the bitter men," who suffer from dyspepsia and Bloomsbury, of which the *New Statesmen* has often been the especial exponent. Except maybe for Mr. Crossman himself, there are no adequate successors, as social theorists, to Tawney, the younger Laski and perhaps Evan Durbin. It is fascinating for anyone with a long memory to discover Mr. Strachey finding in America an outstanding instance of the shift of social power. He still has indeed doubts, but exhorts "the social and political heart of the West" to be proved "sound and viable" (*sic*). Mr. Crossman, in his article, interestingly comments that much of the trouble in Britain is traditional and psychological, and that America and Sweden both offer the worker still a more "equal chance."

Others of the essays are of a more limited character. Bevanite Mr. Mikardo recommends that the Trade Unions employ more highly paid industrial consultants, a matter on which Mr. Mikardo can speak with authority. Mrs. Cole opines that enough concessions in education have been made to religious minorities, although of course they have some rights; but omits to discuss a major source of British national weakness, the jealous distrust between the leaders of Britain's economy and the still ivory-sheltered leaders of the academic world. Although the book centers on the thesis that equality, and not just "equality of opportunity," is the goal, there is no satisfactory investigation of what is meant by equality, elsewhere discussed by Tawney; or whether men reach worthwhile personality by struggle, as an achievement, or are just born with two legs and equal. The valuable but incomplete phrase as indicating what is "viable," "equality of respect," is not developed to indicate what values are to be respected; and until this is done there remains slackness of thinking. Equality of opportunity, not least for colored folk, has still much good to confer on the world in creating what seems to me to matter more—fraternity. As a beacon of faith amid the darkness of Britain's fate, whether as Great Power or as verging on a Swedish future, this book offers no great light. As a set of useful traffic

lights in the fog, it will be useful to every student. But the search for the compelling social faith, equal to the challenge of the times, it is to be hoped will not be discontinued by traffic regulations.

GEORGE CATLIN.

University of California (Berkeley).

Law; The Science of Inefficiency. BY WILLIAM SEAGLE. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. vii, 177. \$3.50.)

This is a short, staccato recital of failures of the law to achieve some of its declared ends. Criminals escape punishment. Men whose carelessness has damaged others escape civil liability. Both public and individual litigants suffer the law's delays and cost. The charges mount up with satiric intensity; the net effect is to concede little real gain to society from the operation of its legal institutions.

The law man will find little new in the bills of particulars here filed against the courts, the bar, and the litigious process in general (Chs. II-V, VII), codification and "reform" through legislation (Chs. VI, VIII), and the administrative process (Ch. IX). He will not quarrel with most of the items of indictment, taken singly. But he need not be an unbending upholder of things as they are to feel that the book loses force in its many sweeping and dogmatic but debatable assertions of fact as to how the law works. Basically, the book carries less impact than it might because it includes no adequate analysis of the values in the light of which the "inefficiency" of the law is to be judged; instead these are left largely implicit in a way which too often seems to beg the issue. If the sole object of criminal law is to put men behind bars or under treatment, the criterion of efficiency of performance is of course clearcut enough. But if there is a social value in protecting individual freedom against official error, negligence, or malice, the criteria of efficient operation cannot be put so simply. It does not advance analysis to tag observance of the latter values as "inefficiency," condoned for purposes outside the legal order. The author has penetrating things to say about the extent to which the law is "inefficient" because men try to incorporate conflicting values in it. But this is the place at which to begin, rather than to end, discussion.

The book will serve the non-lawyer as a tightpacked, often pungent and witty summary of the leading insights of the literature of jurisprudence in this country of the last generation. Likewise, it reflects the dominantly negative character of that jurisprudence. Wise and learned in legal history, the author cautions and qualifies at various points of his indictment, but the qualifications are apt to be lost to any but the most informed reader, in the general tone of the book. Apart from the felt absence of a general definition of the criteria by which the law's efficiency is to be judged, the analysis suffers from not making explicit the author's theory of what makes society move. Especially it is not clear what is the book's theory of the comparative roles of man's contriving as against institutional inertia, in producing the "inefficiencies" described; the satiric bent of the style tends, more than the author probably intends, toward an in-

nuendo that what happens, happens because of plots, plotters, or backstage maneuvers. This may be due partly to the fact that the weight of the indictment falls on the drama of lawsuits; treatment of legislation and the administrative process is relatively less detailed and is devoted in considerable part to features most analogous to litigation.

The author expresses wise cautions against exaggerating the creative role of law compared with other social institutions. Granting this, one need not believe that law is without major importance in helping set the framework within which social life goes on and the diverse energies of men find opportunity for release. "The law deals with the sickness of society," true (p. 164), but it deals also with the health of society, as it provides working procedures and instruments (e.g., the corporation), and defines the terms on which development may proceed (TVA, credit facilities, health regulation, for example). The author is entitled to choose a catalog of inefficiencies as his subject. But the breadth and detail of his catalog carries something more: an overall judgment against the net worth of the legal system. Taken within its own definition of its task, the book would carry more conviction if it were set in a more adequately stated perspective of the positive role of law in society.

WILLARD HURST.

University of Wisconsin.

The Politics of Agriculture; Soil Conservation and the Struggle for Power in Rural America. BY CHARLES M. HARDIN. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1952. Pp. 282. \$4.00.)

Scholars who pass this book by as simply a case analysis of an agricultural program will be making a great mistake. For Hardin's volume is a rich study in public policy with implications for political understanding and methodology that far transcend the field of agriculture. Unlike much writing by political scientists which deals with the political or administrative process apart from substantive problems, this book focuses upon the values and interplay of relationships of interest groups and agencies that take place in moulding a politically volatile program. Moreover, it is written by a scholar whose analysis is not circumscribed by conventional disciplinary boundaries.

To effectually penetrate the maze of relationships and forces that permeate agricultural programs, Hardin limited his study to what might be regarded as a relatively non-controversial area, the field of soil conservation. But from the first chapter onward, it is apparent that the physical and engineering aspects of erosion control alone involve political issues of great magnitude. The first part of the book is an examination of the interest groups and agencies that are most directly concerned with the national soil conservation program, the colleges of agriculture, the Extension Service, the Farm Bureau, the Soil Conservation Service, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and its successor, the Production Marketing Administration. Here Hardin lays bare the power structure of these organizations—the ideology and representativeness of their membership, the quality of their leadership, their conflicts, alliances, and strategies

for the purpose of controlling the farmers' use of the land and thereby the foundations of rural life. The second part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the policy-making process and the adequacy of conservation policies that emerge from a political environment dominated by vested interest groups. The difficulties that beset both Congress and the Department of Agriculture in ascertaining and formulating desirable policies for soil conservation amidst the ties and cleavages of congressional committees, agricultural agencies, and farm organizations are examined. Particular attention is paid to the appropriations procedure, the congressional hearing, and administrative reorganizations as instruments for achieving well-balanced policies. The final section of the book, entitled "Recommendations and General Interpretation," consists of two chapters, the first dealing with the need for reorientating soil conservation policies to the overall goals of farm family living, the second with the implications of the political-administrative pattern relating to agriculture for democratic government.

Individuals who are particularly interested in agriculture will wish to review in detail Hardin's far-reaching recommendations for changes in agricultural policy and administration. Suffice it to say that he finds the "configuration of political power and influence" which dominates agriculture unhealthy from the standpoint of wise public policy and the democratic process. Though he is properly appreciative of the wholesome relationships that have been built up over the years between the U. S. agricultural agencies and rural people, he argues that where these ties are maintained for the purpose of perpetuating vested organizational and group interests and where they "create obstacles to the development of general policy," they must be broken. To this end, he would separate the Extension Service and the Farm Bureau, abolish the election features of the P.M.A. committee system, break alliances between colleges of agriculture and special purpose groups, and change the relationships of S.C.S. to the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts. As alternatives he argues for more representatively planned congressional agricultural hearings, for a reorganization of the U. S. Department of Agriculture to break administrative power blocs within the Department, and for an agricultural program jointly formulated and administered by the agricultural colleges and the U.S.D.A.

For those who are more generally interested in political science, however, these are the points that will stand out in Hardin's book: First, that the scientific and technical aspects of public programs cannot be divorced from broad social considerations, either in policy-making or in administration; second, that in complex programs the synthesizing of policy involves both centralizing and decentralizing processes; third, that the objectives and success of administrative agencies cannot be viewed apart from the "organization and distribution of political power in this country"; fourth, that the centers of policy-making in our governmental structure must always be buttressed by sufficient political and administrative power to offset the drives of special interest groups; and fifth, that government agencies and interest groups must police one another to

control power and foster the representative character of organizations.

The analysis and documentation give proof that this book was the product of over a decade of research. To be sure, it contains much that is controversial and many "heads are cracked" in the process, but one must agree nevertheless with M. L. Wilson in his tone-setting foreword that this is a well-balanced study. Students of both politics and administration will do well to apply Hardin's meaningful approach to the problems of agriculture to other fields of public policy.

ERNEST A. ENGELBERT.

University of California (Los Angeles).

American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers. BY DANIEL S. CHEEVER AND H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 244. \$3.75.)

A noted scientist once remarked that if you catch fish of only a certain size in your net, it proves more about the size of the openings in the net than about the size of the fish in the sea. A great many political scientists, by ignoring this maxim, have misunderstood some of the most important problems in government organization. Since official surveys have usually done their fishing only within the executive departments, scholars have too often ignored the problems arising from the relations of the departments with the Congress.

Messrs. Cheever and Haviland, however, after working on the Foreign Affairs Task Force of the Hoover Commission, saw what the Commission's assignment did not let it study in detail—that the problem of organizing the federal government for foreign affairs was not one that depended entirely, or even primarily, on internal executive organization. They have worked up their courage to deal, in a book of only 244 pages, with the much more difficult area of legislative-executive relations.

Their book consists of, first, a brief sketch of the constitutional framework and administrative organization through which foreign affairs are conducted. Next, in a series of historical case studies, it discusses the way in which our system of legislative-executive relations has affected the conduct of foreign relations from 1789 to the present, giving special emphasis to the crucial decisions in foreign policy of the last few decades. Finally, it analyzes the more important constitutional and administrative issues. Thus the authors paint a picture in broad strokes of the participation not only of the entire executive branch in foreign affairs, but also of the Congress and many of its committees.

In several ways the authors' approach is a useful one. First of all, they show that the problem of coordinating the executive branch of the government depends on the even more difficult problem of coordinating congressional committees. As they say "... the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees are at present unable to draw together the many elements of foreign-policy activity on Capitol Hill. . . . Other committees jealously guard their prerogatives regarding matters that increasingly are involved in foreign policy, and the Department of State can neglect them only at its peril."

The authors note, too, the effect on international affairs of seemingly technical or procedural details—for example, the rules of the Senate providing an easy procedure for amending a treaty, and the practice of enacting bills not as permanent legislation but with frequent dates of expiration in order to bring executive business more under the influence of congressional committees.

Most important, they take into account the impact of Congress on the internal administration of the executive branch, especially through its powers of investigation. In doing so, they have had to rely mainly on political and diplomatic history for their material; their analysis of such points would be much stronger if more material were available like Leonard White's administrative histories, or the studies of the Committee on Public Administration Cases—both of which the authors use as much as they can.

By such an approach, which is quite different from that of those who study either diplomacy or administration in a constitutional vacuum, the authors come to a generally realistic appraisal of their problem, and avoid the temptation to prescribe some of the usual constitutional cure-alls.

In this respect, however, the authors' conclusions are a triumph of their common sense over their fundamental theory. As the title indicates, their guiding hypothesis is the question whether the separation of powers is not the principal difficulty in the administration of our foreign policy. But they do not define the problem precisely enough to see whether the trouble is really the separation of powers as prescribed in the Constitution, or the various detailed checks and balances which have developed historically.

If the separation of powers is the fundamental trouble, the only real remedy is to adopt a unification of powers. But which variety? The authors note the great difference between the French and British types of unification of powers; in various passages they seem to fear the French version more than they envy the British. In specific terms their main worry is about the ways in which Congress fails to coordinate itself, and congressional committees make difficulties in the conduct of foreign affairs. In matters like this, of course, the French legislature and its committees, in spite of the unification of powers in France, are much more like their American than like their British counterparts.

The authors had no trouble in deciding to recommend a constitutional amendment to abolish the two-thirds rule for the ratification of treaties. By contrast, after setting themselves the problem of the separation of powers, they seemed to fumble the issue, recognizing that any attempt to adopt a parliamentary system of government would "produce a hybrid that might create more problems than it would solve." It is a pity that, having come to this sensible conclusion in spite of their hypothesis, they did not go back and make their statement of the theoretical issue more precise, and perhaps even revise their title accordingly.

Nevertheless, *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers* is a book that was certainly worth doing. It is as difficult as it is necessary to tackle the problems in which the fields of international affairs, constitutional law, and

public administration are related to each other. This book is one that will be suggestive and stimulating to the scholar and interesting to the general reader.

DON K. PRICE.

Department of Defense.

Titoism and the Cominform. BY ADAM B. ULAM. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 243. \$4.00.)

Tito's Communism. BY JOSEF KORBEL. (Denver: The University of Denver Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 368. \$4.00.)

Set against the broad historical perspective of Eastern Europe, these two appraisals of Titoism offer an interesting and lively study in contrasts. Aided by the tools of precise and distinguished scholarship, Professor Ulam probes profoundly, while ex-Ambassador Korbél's personalized approach to the intricate problems of Titoism moves on a lighter and primarily biographical plane. On the one hand, *Titoism and the Cominform* is bound to enrich the doctrinal contents of Eastern European political research; and on the other, *Tito's Communism* will contribute to the storehouse of practical illustrations drawn from field-work. Students of this area stand to profit considerably from both volumes, despite their sharp differentiation in methodology, scholarship and theoretical conclusions.

In Dr. Ulam's work the reviewer is most favorably impressed by the combination of comprehensive knowledge and purposeful modesty which serves to narrow the all-too-broad scope of research on the entire satellite area of Eastern Europe. Ulam wisely centers his attention on the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Poland and Bulgaria, touching only tangentially on the most pertinent pro- and anti-Titoist developments and personalities in such countries as Hungary and Rumania. The author's choice of primary targets is amply justified by his own linguistic skills and academic predispositions, as well as by the depth and extent of the Titoist movement in the countries of his selection. In a field noted for indiscriminate and omnivorous, rather than careful and systematic research methods, Professor Ulam's attempt to avoid the pitfalls of uncharted territories is praiseworthy indeed.

In this reviewer's opinion the two salient points of *Titoism and the Cominform* are the thoughtful analysis of the crisis of June, 1948, which decisively shattered the solidarity of the communist bloc and "raised in the outside world a variety of hopeful expectations, some reasonable, others fantastic" (p. 107), and the detailed discussion of analogous crisis symptoms which have emerged in the Polish Communist party. The latter slowly but inevitably paved the way for the explosive Gomulka conflict and for the political demise of the party's powerful Secretary General. These highlights of the book are successfully buttressed by accounts of such secondary phenomena as the Rajk trial in Hungary, the Kostov case in Bulgaria, and the first rumblings of massive, top-to-bottom "purges to come" in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

In the final chapter of his work Professor Ulam examines Titoism as a current

historical phenomenon. Here he is obviously beset by one of the principal problems and irritants of scholars in the Eastern European field. In a political area where the doctrine of ceaseless change appears as the only feature of continuum or permanence, it is almost impossible to formulate judgments *sub specie aeternitatis*. Thus it is particularly difficult to categorize and evaluate Titoism in a definitive manner since in its initial four-and-a-half year phase this movement could barely afford to harden its ideological arteries. The author by necessity confines himself to a few cautious and tentative conclusions. He correctly diagnoses Titoism as "a grave and recurrent but not fatal disease of Communism" (p. 232), whose political character and long-range historic impact cannot be fully determined at this point. Dr. Ulam's book is meticulously documented throughout; it also has a first-rate bibliographical note and a useful index.

In his *Tito's Communism*, Josef Korbel retraces his personal experiences as Czechoslovak Ambassador to Yugoslavia in the immediate post-war period. Beyond the now familiar discussion of the partisan movement the author succeeds in drawing a valuable political profile of Tito, rich in minor details and helpful in interpreting the enigmatic conduct of the Marshal. The most important chapters are those dealing with the Yugoslav Communist party and its leaders, religion, the silencing of the opposition, Tito's foreign policy, and the "heresy" itself, climaxed by Tito's determined struggle against the Cominform. The weakest and least instructive sections are those concerned with politics and the law, economic affairs, and foreign trade. Here the author contributes little to the vast body of information now generally available on Yugoslavia.

One of Dr. Korbel's principal observations concerns the nature of the struggle between Stalin and Tito. In his opinion the background of the conflict is primarily psychological and not ideological or economic. Even while the Communist party of Yugoslavia gave full support to the expansionist and aggressive foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., "Moscow failed to understand that Marshal Tito . . . national hero and dictator, was a different person from Josip Broz, once underground agent of the Third International" (p. 300).

Although *Tito's Communism* is a significant work, a halting and uncertain use of the English language detracts from its overall value. Careful editing could have improved immeasurably the general readability of the book, whose fund of lively information and timely ideas should appeal both to the non-specialist and to the student of Eastern European politics.

ANDREW GYORGY.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Revolution in China. BY CHARLES PATRICK FITZGERALD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. ix, 290. \$4.50.)

Although the author of *Revolution in China* disclaims intention to present in it a history of the Chinese revolution, he avoids the error of confusing the Chinese revolution with some particular phase of it. Thus his generalizations are in relation to a continuing process. Possibly because he believes that "Revolution in China is primarily the concern of the Chinese people, who suffer, or

benefit, from its result" (p. viii), he tends to view it, in its several phases, as finding its causation in the Chinese environment even where it can be viewed as a reaction against Western imperialism. In this respect he is particularly concerned that its present communist phase be appraised as fundamentally Chinese rather than deriving strength or weakness from the soundness or lack of wisdom of Russian direction and support, or as something that may fall apart in terms of Sino-Soviet rivalries.

Mr. Fitzgerald's thesis as to revolution in China, from the point of view of success or failure, is that it grows out of the problems of livelihood of a peasant population and is given direction and content by the scholar class. Thus there is success in the attainment of revolutionary objectives when the two classes come into satisfactory combination against the established order. The Kuomintang was successful in combining the two elements against the war-lords, reformulating the national tradition in terms of nationalism. "The military rule had alienated both scholars and peasants; it had defied every moral restraint and outraged every hope of improvement; it was the direct cause of the second phase of the Chinese Revolution" (p. 44). But this combination was almost immediately broken up because of the failure of the Kuomintang to develop a program of reform in the interest of the peasantry. As the author puts it: "But the land problem, the peasants and their poverty remained virtually as before. There was as yet no new institution which promised to restore the fallen power of civilian control, there was no ideology to cement the new society, no objective beyond a distant and unreal promise of a democratic constitution and the still unsatisfied demands of nationalism" (p. 61). In his view, the split which occurred in 1927-28 was what destroyed the unity between peasants and scholars. "The peasants, suppressed and uncared for by the reaction, rallied to the Communist Party, when, a little later, that party dropped its dogma and took note of reality. The scholars, the educated class, still imbued with nationalism and believing that the Kuomintang was the party which stood for an independent China rather than subservience to Russian orders, rallied around the new regime in Nanking or at least held off from the Communists" (p. 61). But when Japanese pressures began to be applied, it was the Communist party, not the Kuomintang, which first preached the doctrine of national resistance. The Communists also enlisted the support of the peasantry through propagandizing and putting into effect a program of reform in areas under their control, thus standing for "the people" in enlargement of their role as the party of the proletariat. The scholars, especially those of student age, began to move over to the Communist party during the period of national resistance to Japan. This movement was completed as disillusionment with the Kuomintang as the instrument of national reconstruction and regeneration set in after VJ Day. By 1949, consequently, peasants and scholars had been brought together in support of the Communists as the party of revolution.

This thesis and its application in analysis of the several phases of the Chinese revolution are what give significance to Mr. Fitzgerald's study rather than additional information on the inception and the course of the revolution. He pre-

sents a point of view which cannot be disregarded, whether or not it is completely accepted, by the student of Chinese development. This is also true of the analysis which he makes, which in some respects presents a fresh method of approach to the Chinese revolution. From this point of view his analysis of "Christianity in the Chinese Revolution" (Ch. 5) and of "Revolution and Orthodoxy" (Ch. 6) is most important. On the other hand, his analysis is incomplete because of his failure to devote special attention to the scholar class as such from the point of view of changes in its composition and training and of the effects on it and its role of the social and economic changes in China resulting from the Western impact. A corresponding weakness of the treatment results from almost complete failure to relate analytically the changing social and economic aspects of the revolutionary process in each phase to the political and ideological. These failures, and some misstatements, do not, however, take away its significance from the book. While it cannot be viewed as the definitive treatment of the Chinese revolution, it is a study with which every serious student needs to be familiar.

HAROLD M. VINACKE.

University of Cincinnati.

The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. 208. \$3.00.)

If the new national administration were inclined to brief itself on the past six years of our Asiatic policy, it would do well to require this concise appraisal as a reading. But if its purpose were further to discredit the statesmanship of Acheson or the policies of Truman, it might better ignore this book.

Professor Latourette brings to his latest volume a lifetime of scholarship in Asiatic affairs. Though his scholarship is not obtrusive, it is clear that only substantial erudition would make it possible to draw out the main strands of our policy in eleven brief essays.

In the complex fabric of past relations in Asia the author finds three strands: bipartisan policy in the Far East, an ever-widening scope of American action, and more consistent American intervention than in Europe. Following Japan's defeat the emergence of Asiatic nationalisms, the spread of communism, and the polarization of the world's power made our embroilment in Asia more difficult. Latourette cuts through the maze of discussion over recent policy to conclude that we have had a "consistent and comprehensive policy." The seeming confusion is attributed to the nature of the democratic process, which necessarily and rightly thrusts into the public arena many voices and many points of view. The principles he discerns are these: (1) an identification of the interests of Americans with the interests of Asiatics, (2) the containment of communism, (3) the use of armed force in such containment when it appeared essential, (4) awareness that our policy in Asia should not be executed in a vacuum but should be an integral part of our world-wide policy, (5) defense of American territory, and (6) fulfillment of our obligations as a member of the United Nations.

In describing the application of these main policy principles Latourette devotes a chapter or more to each region. In his evaluation of American administration of the Philippines, he cautiously indicates our success in education, public health and public works and our failure in agrarian reform. It is regrettable that there is no mention of the contributions of Magsaysay, both in combating the Hukbalahap menace and in raising the standards of government. His analysis of our record in Japan is unusually well-balanced and perceptive. He is not hesitant to praise MacArthur as the administrative genius of the occupation—which indeed he was. Neither does he hesitate to approve his removal as Supreme Commander, saying that his recall was salutary in Japan as an object lesson in civilian control of the military. The political reforms begun in Japan were well conceived; the problems remaining are largely economic. In Indonesia and Indochina our inclinations against colonialism are overridden by our efforts to contain communism; hence we incur the disaffection of India by supporting the Dutch and the French.

It was our policy in China which suffered the greatest defeat. But the communist victory is by no means a direct result of American policy. The author points out the great ideological vacuum existing in China because of the decline of Confucianism, a decline largely the result of the intrusion of Western culture. Coupled with a growing intolerance of foreign imperialism, it created an ideal situation for the spread of communism. Latourette implies that the superior discipline and dedication of the Communists appealed effectively to the Chinese masses. He doubts if we could have pursued a policy different from that followed, although he concedes some mistakes were made. The United States would have had a "cleaner record" had we not sanctioned Russian re-entry into Manchuria by the Yalta agreement, but Latourette feels that Manchuria most certainly would have been controlled by the Chinese Communists who perhaps would have let in the Russians even if there had been no Yalta commitments. The chapter on China ends on a note of optimism. Communism is by no means the last stage of the Chinese revolution, and the influence of American democracy has been subtle but profound. Certainly the history of China conquered by Mongols and later by Manchus holds some hope for the belief that what results from the impact of Russian communism on Chinese culture will be a variant not very much like the former. But the pervasive penetration of communism may be different in quality than the impact of other alien cultures in Chinese history. The Mongols had no exportable piety of messianic quality. The Manchus easily absorbed Confucian techniques if not values. The differences between communism and earlier infusions of foreign ideologies cast doubt on how repetitive history may be in this instance.

Korea, that "Land of Morning Calm," in which there has been no real calm for half a century and more, is treated with perception and sympathy, and our policy there is defended.

Professor Latourette offers no solution to our problems in Asia except to approve the general direction of our policy. While conceding certain errors of judgment, these he ascribes to our impatience as a people, our immaturity as a nation, and partisan distortions.

Students of Asiatic affairs are deeply indebted to the American Institute of Pacific Relations for making this publication possible, and to Professor Latourette for reducing a maze of conflicting complexities to comprehensible essentials.

RALPH J. D. BRAIBANTI.

Kenyon College.

The Australian Party System. BY LOUISE OVERACKER. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 373. \$5.00.)

Over the years a few political scientists have found in Australian government and politics subjects of unique interest. In Australia a British-type cabinet government is based upon an American-type written, federal constitution; voting is compulsory; appeal from the Australian courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is possible still; the control of public finance has become centralized to a degree that would seem incompatible with a federal system; and since federation in 1901 Australian governments have been willing to experiment with various schemes for nationalization, regulation, and social welfare. Now a first analysis of Australian parties—which have some unique features of their own—comes as a valuable aid to understanding many of the unusual political developments; and students who have not worked in Australia, and experienced the serious lack of documentation, memoirs, and basic research, will hardly appreciate the great effort required to produce the volume.

Professor Overacker's study is concerned essentially with the development of Australian political parties and a description of their present organization and methods of operation, as the succeeding summary of some of the salient points in her discussion will show. The Labor party is the most permanent feature of Australian politics, for non-Labor parties, although governing nationally for about 34 of the 52 years, have formed, dissolved, and reappeared under new names. Consequently, Labor origins, programs, and organization are explored more exhaustively than those of the other parties. This is justified by Professor Overacker's view that "The matrix of Australian politics is the Labor Party, and Australian politics reflects working-class rather than middle-class thinking." Causes for this are the working-class origins of most Australian settlers, the lack of an agricultural class of small property owners, the early domination of Australian economic life by large monopolies or combines—often controlled from overseas—and the failure of the great strikes of the 1890's. From this background developed a class consciousness and class unity that is strong and bitter even today, and that gave rise to a disciplined—although not always doctrinally harmonious—Labor party.

At first Labor was a third party trading support for favors from one of the others, but by 1910 Andrew Fisher led a Labor majority and henceforth Labor was the party to be reckoned with. A Labor government split over conscription during the First World War and Hughes led a wing of the group into a successful new Nationalist party; a Labor government again divided over depression policies and right-wing Laborites followed Lyons from the Cabinet into a successful new United Australia party; throughout the 20's and 30's both unions

and party were weakened by right-left divisions, there were frequent struggles between unions and party, and occasional disputes marked state and federal party relations. Out of all this came, however, the insistence on majority rule and party discipline that in 1943 and 1946 brought political dividends, if sometimes only "artificial unity." Party candidates pledge in writing to support the party program, endorsement by the party executive of all candidates is required, and all parliamentary party moves (including the choice of leader and of cabinet members) are based on majority decisions in caucus. These procedures are followed nationally and in the states.

Since 1919 a minority Country party—a party that "guards its independence jealously, drives a hard bargain, and exerts an influence which is negative as well as conservative"—has held enough seats to prevent any other non-Labor party from governing except in coalition. Such coalitions have been marked usually by bickering and friction, although the present Liberal-Country government has displayed fewer differences than usual.

The new Liberal party, growing out of a united opposition to certain Labor proposals for constitutional amendment, and out of a series of "unity conferences" stimulated by opposition leader Robert Menzies, was born in 1945. By close cooperation with the Country party, a "me too" program in support of Labor's social legislation, and by capitalizing on public discontent with certain Labor policies (notably continued petrol rationing and efforts at bank nationalization), Labor was defeated in 1949 and again in 1951. It is more likely that the Liberal party will survive defeat than was true of earlier non-Labor parties, for the party has attempted to build strong organizations in each state, to divest itself of the charge that Melbourne business finances and controls it, to interest women in greater political activity, to recruit promising younger men as the party's candidates in many areas, and to build a national secretariat to carry on continuous research and publicity.

Rather surprisingly, Australian Labor has never created such a secretariat and there is no Australian equivalent of Transport House. Further, Australian Labor has tended to be hostile to "intellectuals" and most active Labor politicians still come to office via the trade union route. This has handicapped the development of more effective leadership. On the other hand, Menzies and Fadden (Country party leader) also have been criticized for keeping power in "old hands" and not allowing younger members a greater role in party decisions. The government parties also caucus; and while discipline is not so formally exercised as it is by Labor, the practical result is about the same.

One might wish that Professor Overacker had attempted to describe the general outlook and expectation from life of the "average Australian," for his attitude profoundly influences the Australian political climate and leadership, but such an ambitious effort is perhaps better reserved for an entire book. Others will feel that her admiration for the Labor party stems in great measure from respect for its aims and ideals of an earlier day, and that too little criticism is levied against the present labor movement for its frequent failure to act in the national interest and for lack of constructive leadership. But minor criti-

cism aside, this extremely useful study has brought together for the first time an immense amount of detail, and it is certain that Australian scholars as well as American will welcome this full and orderly explanation of the Australian party system.

JAMES R. ROACH.

University of Texas.

Christian Democracy in Italy and France. BY MARIO EINAUDI AND FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1952. Pp. x, 229. \$4.00.)

Because the pragmatism and materialism of the liberal philosophy and its socialist offshoot were irreconcilable with Catholic metaphysics and also were mortal enemies of the traditional regimes with which the Church had established a *modus vivendi*, the spread of dogmatic individualist and collectivist thinking in the 19th century had the effect of excluding practicing Catholics for generations from political participation in France and Italy. In these nominally completely Catholic countries the entire political class was avowedly hostile to the Church. Until well into the present century Church policy was frequently applied in ways which discouraged participation by communicants in any but the most traditional and undemocratic political movements.

Certain developments have recently altered this situation. Dogmatic individualism, or "economic liberalism," suffered its death blow in the disappearance of the true world market in the period between the world wars. Dogmatic collectivism somewhat later ceased to pass as a democratic trend, once the true costs exacted by the Russian Communist transformation became widely known and believed. The Church lost any hope of the revival of the older type of traditional regime, toward accommodation with which its policy had formerly been directed. In these circumstances large-scale Catholic political movements professing democratic principles and social reformistic aims suddenly became major factors in the politics of postwar Italy and France.

The Popular Republican Movement in France and the Christian Democratic party in Italy profess a positive doctrinal unity embodied in Christian principles. To the English-speaking observer, however, accustomed to such professions as a normal feature of politics, their most notable characteristic is their failure to fit the pattern of dogmatic differentiation between individualists and collectivists, previously universal in continental democratic politics. Here are parties very much of the English or American pattern, professing no precise political doctrine and securing support from widely differentiated segments of the social structure. Not only must they be accepted as sincerely democratic in aim, but insofar as successful democracy in the stable democratic regimes has been embodied primarily in the compromise of clashing viewpoints and in the adjustment of conflicting group claims, these parties appear as almost the first beginnings of practical democratic politics in the countries involved.

Unfortunately the recent strength of this trend is an accident of European political history, and it is by no means certain that European publics will readily

accept for long an undogmatic politics or that the leaders and subleaders of Christian Democracy are undogmatic through choice and not merely because of a lack of long exposure to the political battlefield. Many traditionalists in France before the creation of the separate Gaulist movement supported the P.R.M. as the least dangerous of the various reformist trends which monopolized politics immediately after the war. A similar temporary Fascist vote undoubtedly inflated the early Christian Democratic plurality in Italy. A large part of the activists of both movements (necessarily so in the case of Italy) have an abnormally short backlog of political experience.

In the present book the relatively short and possibly meteoric careers of the two Christian Democratic parties are analyzed with critical realism. Some cautious attempts are made to forecast their futures. Only the Italian party has in any real sense been in power. It would appear that its record will not be attractive enough to secure for it a renewed parliamentary majority. This prospect depends to a great extent upon the handling of economic and social reform questions by the de Gasperi government. These questions and the legislation and administration in respect to them are inadequately explained, most attention being given to constitutional questions and to party organization. In France the P.R.M. has a reformist record of a more definable character dating from its association with the Socialists and Communists in the immediate post-war coalitions. Perhaps for this reason the treatment of this movement seems more complete and less weighted toward purely political or doctrinal matters.

G. LOWELL FIELD.

University of Connecticut.

International Technical Assistance; Programs and Organization. BY WALTER R. SHARP. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1952. Pp. xi, 146. \$2.50.)

Dr. Walter R. Sharp has performed a considerable service by preparing the best published "global inventory" of the organization and operation of the principal technical assistance programs through 1951. The volume will be especially useful to those depending upon published material in their professional work, in view of the "public relations" and "congressional presentation" character of most of the information released by the government during the past two years.

The best chapter, in the opinion of the reviewer, is the one on the United Nations program. The sections on the Technical Cooperation Administration program (U. S.) and the Far Eastern program of the M.S.A.(E.C.A.) are also very well done. The material presented on the Colombo Plan programs and those of the Organization of American States is useful and informative. Many classic problems of public management are illustrated and described as they have appeared in the operation of these programs. The appalling complexity, resulting in part from the participation in program management of so many governments and international organizations, as well as their parts and sub-parts, is abundantly exemplified. One is tempted to remark, "Seldom have so many administered so little."

Professor Sharp appears less successful in "identifying the chief administrative difficulties that have had to be faced," and in offering "tentative suggestions as to . . . improving their operation." According to the Foreword, this volume was intended only to lay the basis for such a difficult task. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether the disclaimer of concern with the "rationale of technical assistance" and with "the substantive impact of major aid programs" was wise, in view of the ultimate objective. Perhaps the Public Administration Clearing House is more interested in "management" than in "administration." At any rate, if our concern is with basic analysis pointing to solutions of major difficulties in program administration, do we not have to attend, on the one hand, to the political realities which condition basic governmental structure, and, on the other, to objectives sought and the subject-matter fields being dealt with?

It is certainly important to be clear and discriminating in categorizing the programs whose administration is being surveyed and analyzed. As Herbert Emmerich once remarked, the term "technical assistance suffers from imprecise definition." The term "Point-Four" arose as a result of a political or editorial accident. At times Dr. Sharp appears to focus on commodity grant and financial aid programs, while at other times he is dealing quite directly with cultural interchange. Private agency programs are included in the historical background chapter but omitted from the others. The discussion of the United States' agency and committee structure is pitched to the totality of its foreign aid programs, of which technical assistance programs are only a small part. Recently much attention has been given to integrating in an organizational sense foreign aid programs with the administration of other branches of foreign economic policy, such as commercial policy. In view of the emphasis placed in this book on the recipient country as a major focus for program integration and coordination, one may question whether technical assistance should be a primary category for purposes of program and organization analysis.

Insufficient attention is given to the role of the field of governmental administration and its linkage with social and economic programs, as for example in the "Bolivian operation." No mention is made of the part that political science and political economy might properly play. In the opinion of the reviewer these topics deserve fuller and more critical attention by the distinguished author of *International Technical Assistance*, his associates and sponsors, and many others. Aside from the potentialities for more specialized contributions from such persons, comparative political economy and governmental administration provide perhaps the best springboards from which to approach the entire institutional side of underdeveloped area programs and to bring overall country programs into line with multiple objectives.

WALLACE PARKS.

Washington, D. C.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Intergovernmental Relations in Public Health.
By LAURENCE WYATT. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951. Pp. ix, 212. \$3.50.)

Intergovernmental Relations in Social Welfare.
By RUTH RAUP. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952. Pp. ix, 234. \$3.00.)

Intergovernmental Relations in Employment Security. By FRANCIS E. ROURKE. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952. Pp. viii, 133. \$2.50.)

These three research monographs, the most recently published in the Minnesota series, provide useful and, on occasion, interesting, additions to the literature of intergovernmental relations. As for form, they are well constructed; each is well indexed, and each contains an extensive bibliography. For the most part, the style is simple, the exposition straightforward and easy to follow. More vigorous editing might well have eliminated some of the overly-lengthy discussions of general concepts of American constitutional law and government, and the occasional digressions into matters tangential to the declared subjects of the studies. These are not, however, serious flaws.

Particularly commendable is the evident care with which research has been done into the formal aspects of intergovernmental relations, such as the plans or work programs required by higher levels of government, the audits and administrative reviews, the statistical reports, and the inspections. Federal requirements in each of these programs have been painstakingly digested. As to state requirements of local governments, descriptions of the Minnesota arrangements should at least suggest a starting point for studies in other states.

Considerable attention is paid also to the informal relationships, particularly with field representatives. The extent to which field representation may succeed in decentralizing the supervision of a cooperative program is well demonstrated in Miss Raup's study (pp. 64-69).

The monographs on social welfare and employment security contain, the first as an

appendix, the second as a part of the concluding chapter, results of questionnaires sent to appropriate state and national officials to test hypotheses concerning intergovernmental relationships which had suggested themselves to the authors during their study. Mr. Rourke's discussion of the value of such questionnaires and the need for caution in their use merits attention (p. 107).

Finally, these monographs, when read within a short span of time so that all three are relatively fresh in the mind, are highly suggestive as to differences in the overall character of intergovernmental relationships in specific programs. Mr. Wyatt characterizes these relationships in health as being generally very happy for all concerned. It is a rare occasion when supervision from a higher level of government assumes a heavy-handed form calculated to ruffle the tempers of those supervised. Wyatt emphasizes that officials engaged in administering public health programs much prefer persuasion to coercion. These are observations borne out by other studies of intergovernmental relations in health. Harmony in intergovernmental relations can, of course, be quite deceptive, for not infrequently it is a harmony flowing from the absence or laxness of effective supervision. For example, so long as many southern state health officials are permitted to blink the requirements of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act concerning facilities for Negroes, they will remain quite content. In the meantime, however, an important objective of the federal legislation will have been defeated.

Mr. Rourke's research showed much suspicion and resentment existing between the state and federal governments in the field of employment security. His exposition of the factors and special circumstances making for these feelings is well done. In the opinion of this reviewer, Miss Raup has shown the most subtle understanding of the complexities of intergovernmental relationships. Her study reveals a full appreciation of the interplay of force and persuasion, and of those conditions which can make for a willingness to cooperate as well as those which may give rise to the most stubborn opposition. Miss Raup, moreover, has made some effort to describe the

sometimes rather devious effects which requirements made by higher levels of government can have upon the overall structure and operations of other governments.—VALERIE A. EARLE, *University of Alabama*.

The Group Basis of Politics; A Study in Basing-Point Legislation. BY EARL LATHAM. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 244. \$3.75.)

In this study of the passage in Congress and the veto by President Truman of a bill to "clarify" (i.e., weaken) governmental handling of basing-point arrangements, Earl Latham does an excellent job of tracing the twistings and windings of the American legislative process. To students of legislation much of the ground and fauna are familiar: the flux of group interests; the complex strands of interaction and influence, the splits within and between official and non-official groups, the role of confusion and ignorance on the one hand and of expertise and parliamentary craft on the other, the importance of key personalities in the legislative process, the sense of group interest on the part of House and Senate.

Familiar—yet with a difference. For surely, as Latham suggests, the story of this bill is anomalous, even for Congress: "... an important measure seemingly sponsored by Democratic officialdom was opposed by a majority of the Democrats in Congress and finally vetoed by a Democratic president. The other side of the paradox is the fact that the minority party commanded a majority of the votes under the auspices of majority party leadership" (p. 210). There was an interesting split between the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, and the Administration's position was obscure until the veto. No wonder the Congressmen were confused.

Equally anomalous was the handling of the bill from the standpoint of procedural due process. It received no hearings in the Senate and no public hearings in the House Judiciary Committee. The only public hearings on the measure were held by a committee that had no jurisdiction over it, and these, Latham feels, were useless as a basis for intelligent policymaking. Legislation was steamrollered through the House and almost steamrollered through the Senate. The data Latham describes raise sharp questions about the capacity of Congress to publicize or clarify policy questions, to pose meaningful alternatives, and to deliberate and legislate in an orderly fashion.

The book has several great virtues. Latham's graceful scholarship and his sardonic insights make the book come alive. The first chapter, "Group Conflict and the Political Process," (substantially reprinted in this REVIEW, June, 1952, under the title "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory") is a useful survey of work in this field, with excellent bibliographical notes and with due attention to the important progress made in other fields than political science. On the other hand, his concluding chapter, "Politics as Process," while offering interesting conclusions on the bill itself, carries group theory no further than where it left off at the end of Chapter 1. Secondly, aside from an admirable treatment of the Cement Institute, the book does not go behind the scenes of congressional policymaking in the manner, for example, of Stephen K. Bailey's study of the Employment Act. Such a study of key legislators and their constituencies might have cleared up some of the mysteries surrounding the bill. Unhappily it would call for more time and money than the average college professor can afford.—JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, *Williams College*.

Conscription in the United States; Historical Background. BY JACK FRANKLIN LEACH. (Tokyo, Japan, and Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Publishing Co. 1952. Pp. x, 501. \$5.75.)

The history of the subject—in public discussion down to the Civil War, and then in practice—is here set out competently and in detail. The high points are the early scheme of Henry Knox for compulsory service in the militia, Secretary Monroe's plan for conscription near the close of "Mr. Madison's War," and finally, in the Civil War, after all lesser expedients had failed, the draft law of March 3, 1863. The account ends at Appomattox, with a glance forward to the eventual determination in 1918 of the constitutional validity of conscription. The author regards compulsory service as a just and necessary measure.

The research was pursued with an intensity and scope quite unusual for a dissertation. The examination of newspaper files was notably thorough. Litigation was an important part of the story of raising the Union army; Dr. Leach has dug out many instances not found in the reports, although his hand is not at its firmest when dealing with legal questions. The exercise of greater mastery in managing the material—e.g., in recounting debates—would have facilitated the reader's

grasp of essentials. The book is, however, in the writing as in the research, a substantial and an honest work.

"Even in World War II and the Korean War, after Americans had become used to a great deal of regimentation and control, some still fret at and use their ingenuity to avoid a draft which is infinitely fairer than that of the Civil War," writes Dr. Leach in his chapter of conclusions. "Americans were not, at the time of the Civil War, and are not yet fully aware of the necessity of paying a heavy price for the right to live in a free land. They have not wholly digested the truism that every privilege has its correlative duty; that enjoyment of life, liberty and property in a democracy carries with it the reciprocal obligation to fight for this Republic's preservation against all enemies, foreign or domestic." If the wrong-headedness with which Madison and Lincoln had to contend manifests itself even now in public discussion, Dr. Leach's book serves, at any rate, to remind us of one of the aspects of national defense in which we have developed maturity and strength.—CHARLES FAIRMAN, *Stanford University*.

Equality by Statute; Legal Controls over Group Discrimination. BY MORRIS BERGER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 238. \$3.25.)

Professor Berger, who teaches sociology at Princeton, has made a welcome contribution to the growing body of literature in the civil rights field. The first three chapters, comprising about half the book, are concerned largely with Supreme Court cases dealing with aspects of American class relations. Following a general contrast between the status of civil rights today and during the Reconstruction Era, Mr. Berger summarizes in the second chapter the Supreme Court cases of the period 1868-1937, which in the main tended to buttress the caste order (to use the author's phrase), and then in the third chapter surveys the decisions from 1937 to 1950, which have been in the direction of undermining the caste order. The cases are described carefully and in an orderly way, but on the whole the first half of the book covers familiar ground. The real contribution of the book is in the long fourth chapter, which analyzes in detail the New York (Ives-Quinn) law against discrimination, adopted in 1945, and its administration by the State Commission Against Discrimination during the first five and a half years. While Mr. Berger carefully points out the difficulties of evaluation, nevertheless he

reaches the conclusion that the law has been effective in achieving a substantial measure of its objectives. The Commission seems to have scored its greatest success in regard to discrimination by unions, and to have had its greatest difficulties with employment agencies. That the Commission is committed to an educational and conciliatory role, and is unwilling to use the sanctions provided for in the law, is made perfectly clear. The final chapter, drawing upon recent studies by sociologists, psychoanalysts and social psychologists, affirms very strongly, as a scientifically tenable proposition, that discrimination can be controlled by law.—DAVID FELLMAN, *University of Wisconsin*.

Commentaries on the Constitution; 1790-1860. BY ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. 400. \$4.75.)

Prior to the Civil War, expositions of the Constitution by members of the bar and bench were primary sources for legal training and important media of constitutional interpretation. The author's purpose, in what is apparently her doctoral dissertation, is to place the constitutional commentaries written between 1790 and 1860 "in their historical setting, to trace the lives of the men who wrote them, to compare them with respect to a few major theories, and to sketch the uses to which they were put when men were aware of their existence." Any one of these several objects requires its own volume. It is questionable if much of significance could be said in the few pages assigned to each.

The discussion of the historical setting consists in little more than a notation of the dates on which the several works were published and a statement that there was a conflict between northerners and southerners over constitutional interpretation. The thirteen brief biographical sketches, about half of the book, include such well known men as Wilson, Kent, Story, and Taylor, as well as some less well known commentators like Peter Stephen Du Ponceau and David Hoffman. Little is added to what we already know about the former, and there is little indication of why we should bother to learn more about the latter. The commentaries themselves are summarized under the topics of "location of sovereignty" and "compact vs. supreme law theory." Story's *Commentaries on the Constitution* are outlined, and in a short but careful discussion of their uses, the author indicates the cases in which the commentaries were cited by

members of the bar and justices of the Supreme Court.

Although the author sticks primarily to a summary of what the several commentators wrote, occasionally she lapses into the "real-reason approach"—an occupational hazard—with the result that we get such statements as "Dane opposed the activities of the Convention [Hartford] only because of his legal mind." Despite its deficiencies, which are chiefly the result of the attempt to do too much, Mrs. Bauer has made available a handy summary of the elaborate rationalizations developed to justify the several views of the nature of the Constitution and the federal union and she has provided a convenient reference to the commentators and their works. She closes with an excellent bibliography.—JACK W. PELTASON, *University of Illinois*.

Administration and the Nursing Services. By HERMAN FINER. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1952. Pp. xiv, 333. \$4.00.)

The study of administration has much to gain from careful analysis of administrative problems in particular professions. Similarly, various professions have much to gain from analysis of their problems in the light of more general administrative analyses. Accordingly, when a distinguished political scientist like Herman Finer works as director of a research project for almost a year, and a seminar of 36 nurses and teachers of nursing work with him for five months on this project, much should be learned by both nurses and students of administration.

A substantial amount is learned in this volume. Finer ranges over the administrative universe, gives many points of administrative theory, and has a number of penetrating remarks about nursing problems for administrators. It is true that the book is wordy and poorly organized. It certainly cannot be viewed as a careful study of the administration of nursing. Nevertheless, it should be useful to thoughtful general administrators and nursing administrators in gleaning some of the scraps of wisdom scattered through the volume.

In his introductory qualifications, the author recognizes clearly that the book is not a comprehensive treatise on nursing administration. It is intended to answer these three questions: (1) "Is the science of administration needed in the conduct of nursing service?" (2) "If so . . . how seriously is it needed?" (3) "... what

inferences are to be drawn for the curriculum of schools of nursing and for the spread of a knowledge of administration among nurses already on the job?"

These questions are answered fairly satisfactorily, though one must hunt around to find the answers. One can also query if 320 pages are necessary to answer these questions. It must be admitted, however, that the answer to the third question is very broad. It includes, for example, a list of 36 novels which nurses should read to broaden their understanding of people. The problem of sex relations between doctors and nurses receives a glancing blow. Robinson Crusoe receives three pages of attention, on the theory that he was becoming a good administrator in learning how to govern himself.

All of these things are relevant and suggestive to the reader who knows much about administration. The reviewer has his doubts, however, about the clearness of the "message" to nurses or to ordinary people.—GEORGE C. S. BENSON, *Claremont Men's College*.

Training for Specialized Mission Personnel.

By WALLACE S. SAYRE AND CLARENCE E. THURBER. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1952. Pp. xiii, 85. \$1.00.)

This survey, sponsored by the Public Administration Clearing House, is concerned with the initial training of the personnel of specialized missions sent overseas by the United States government under programs developed since World War II. The authors describe and evaluate briefly early and present governmental training programs for this purpose (with brief descriptions also of certain business and religious training programs for overseas personnel) and point out the problems that persist in their development. In addition, there is discussion of the major elements in a comprehensive training plan, the need for a center of leadership within the government to view the specialized mission training problem as a whole, and the relation of universities and their resources to this problem.

The CIO and the Democratic Party. By FAY CALKINS. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. xiii, 162. \$4.00.)

Five first-hand case studies (Ohio, Steubenville, Chicago, Rockford, Michigan) of CIO-PAC political activities in the elections of 1950, by the Research Assistant of the National CIO-PAC.

Monopoly and Social Control. By HENRY A. WELLS. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 158. \$3.25.)

Mr. Wells—in a book which Wendell Berge, in a foreword, extravagantly calls “the most illuminating document written in our time”—elaborates the argument that there is a conflict between democratic social control designed to maintain competition and fatalistic forces making for concentration of economic power; contrasts American empirical methods with Utopian and Marxian approaches; and analyzes the problems in making anti-trust policy effective.

The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1913. By IRA KIPNIS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. 496. \$6.00.)

An intensive and well-documented history and analysis of the American Socialist party from its inception through its period of greatest activity and success.

Report on the American Communist. By MORRIS L. ERNST AND DAVID LOTH. (New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1952. Pp. 240. \$3.00.)

A socio-psychological analysis of the motivations inducing persons to join, to remain in, and finally to renounce the Communist party, based on a case study of some 300 former Communists. Some of the authors' conclusions will come as a surprise to the reader, and the work as a whole represents a new approach to the study of the Communist problem in America.

The American Diaries of Richard Cobden. EDITED BY ELIZABETH HOON CAWLEY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. vii, 233. \$4.00.)

Richard Cobden's hitherto unpublished diaries of his trips to the United States in 1835 and 1859, with annotations and a lengthy introduction by the editor.

American Beginnings; Highlights and Side-lights of the Birth of the New World. By JARVIS M. MORSE. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 260. \$3.75.)

A survey of selected writings on British-America published before 1775. Each work is summarized together with information as to its author and the historical circumstances under which it was written.

Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution. By KENNETH R. ROSSMAN. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 344. \$5.00.)

A first biography of a Revolutionary quartermaster-general, president of the Continental Congress, member of the Federal Convention from Pennsylvania, and governor of Pennsylvania.

Elias Boudinot; Patriot and Statesman, 1740-1821. By GEORGE ADAMS BOYD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 321. \$5.00.)

A carefully written biography of a president of the Continental Congress, who later served in the first three Congresses under the Constitution and as director of the U. S. Mint.

R. R. Bowker; Militant Liberal. E. McCLUNG FLEMING. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1952. Pp. xv, 395. \$5.00.)

Biography of a many-sided American of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Bowker, who was long connected with *Publishers' Weekly*, was also a founder of the American Library Association and the *Library Journal*, an ardent advocate of “good government,” and an able industrial executive.

McCarthy; The Man, the Senator, the “Ism.” By JACK ANDERSON AND RONALD W. MAY. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1952. Pp. vi, 431. \$3.75.)

A critical journalistic treatment of one of the most controversial political figures of the last decade and of the techniques associated with “McCarthyism.” Based on numerous interviews and available newspaper and personal files.

Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. By V. O. KEY, JR. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Third Edition. 1952. Pp. xvi, 799. \$5.50.)

An extensive revision of a well-established textbook, incorporating more recent research contributions and significant political developments. Two relatively theoretical chapters have been dropped to make way for new materials which generally give greater emphasis to political parties and somewhat less to the data on pressure groups. Much new illustrative material has been added or substituted for that previously used.

A Future for Nashville. By THE COMMUNITY SERVICES COMMISSION FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY AND THE CITY OF NASHVILLE. (Nashville, Tennessee: The Community Services Commission. 1952. Pp. x, 201. \$4.00.)

A report with recommendations on the problems of government in Davidson County, Tennessee, in which the capital city of Nashville is located, by an agency authorized in 1951 by the state General Assembly. Recommendations pertain to such matters as city and county home rule, annexation, and allocation of functions between city and county.

America's Greatest Challenge. By WALTER E.

MYER AND CLAY COSS. (Washington: Civic Education Service. 1952. Pp. 215. \$2.75.)

An appeal for an intensive campaign for better political education in the United States both in the schools and throughout the nation as a whole.

The Nature of Gambling. By DAVID D. ALLEN. (New York: Coward-McCann. 1952. Pp. 249. \$3.50.)

A study of the role and function of gambling in society. Three basic propositions are formulated and examined: whether gambling is a fundamental human activity, whether it is harmful, and whether it can be suppressed.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Cohen, Julius. Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore? *Minnesota Law Review*. December, 1952.

Harris, Joseph P. Needed Reforms in the Federal Budget System. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Nash, Bradley D. Staffing the Presidency. National Planning Association. 1952.

Perlman, Philip B. On Amending the Treaty Power. *Columbia Law Review*. November, 1952.

Snyder, John W. The Reorganization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Willis, Paul G., and George L. Willis. The Politics of the Twenty-Second Amendment. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr. The President and the Law. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

State Government

Carmon, Raymond, and Nick K. Kittle. A Comparative Study for Watershed Legislation. Bureau of Government Research, University of Kansas. 1952.

Day, William L. Legislative Broadcasting and Recording. *State Government*. October, 1952.

Friedelbaum, Stanley H. Apportionment Legislation in New Jersey. *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society*. October, 1952.

Harvey, Lashley G., ed. Bibliography on State and Local Government in New England. Boston University Bureau of Public Administration. 1952.

Lee, Eugene C. The Presiding Officer and Rules Committee in Legislatures of the United States. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1952.

Legislative Research in the States. *State Government*. October, 1952.

Page, Thomas. Legislative Apportionment in Kansas. Bureau of Government Research, University of Kansas. 1952.

Rich, Bennett M. Administrative Reorganization in New Jersey. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Shumate, Roger V. The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Sturm, Albert L. State Administrative Organization in West Virginia. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. 1952.

Zacharias, W. F. The Proposed Illinois Judicial Article. *Chicago-Kent Law Review*. September, 1952.

Local Government

Agard, Rollin F. Trends and Forecasts in

Finance. *Public Management*. December, 1952.

Andrews, Richard D. Charter Suggestions for Maryland Municipalities. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland. 1952.

Blucher, Walter H. Trends and Forecasts in Planning. *Public Management*. December, 1952.

Lindegren, Martha Murphy. Town Meetings—City Style. *National Municipal Review*. November, 1952.

Meriam, Ted. Approaches to a Solution of the Urban Unincorporated Area Problem. *Western City*. November, 1952.

Morstein Marx, Fritz. Ethics and Local Administration. *Public Management*. October, 1952.

———. Ethics in Local Government. *National Municipal Review*. October, 1952.

Reed, Thomas H. Vigilance—Price of Success. *National Municipal Review*. December, 1952.

Stene, Edwin O. Look to Local Government. *National Municipal Review*. November, 1952.

Warner, Kenneth O. Trends and Forecasts in Personnel. *Public Management*. December, 1952.

Constitutional Law and Judicial Administration

Blaustein, Albert P. The Legal Profession in the United States: A 1952 Statistical Analysis. *American Bar Association Journal*. December, 1952.

Clark, Charles E., and William D. Rogers. The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization. *Yale Law Journal*. November, 1952.

Conrad, Edwin. Let's Weigh Rule 43(a). *Virginia Law Review*. December, 1952.

Driver, Martha M. Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish Contempts of Its Investigating Committees, Part I. *Virginia Law Review*. November, 1952. Part II. *Ibid.* December, 1952.

Kauper, Paul G. The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1952.

Lea, L. B. The Steel Case: Presidential Seizure of Private Industry. *Northwestern University Law Review*. July–August, 1952.

Norton, Clark F. Judicial Reform in Michigan between Two Constitutions, 1835–1850. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1952.

Richberg, Donald R. The Steel Seizure Cases. *Virginia Law Review*. October, 1952.

Woelper, Willard G. Administering the

Courts in New Jersey. *Journal of the American Judicature Society*. October, 1952.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Administration of Corrections and Parole in Maryland. Commission on Administrative Organization of the State. 1952.

Bartley, Ernest R., ed. Papers on Florida Administrative Law. Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida. 1952.

Bromage, Arthur W. The Art of Management. *Public Management*. November, 1952.

Fuchs, Ralph F. Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana: I. *Indiana Law Journal*. Fall, 1952.

Martin, Roscoe C. Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Personnel Administration in Maryland. Commission on Administrative Organization of the State. 1952.

Public Works Administration in Maryland. Commission on Administrative Organization of the State. 1952.

Ramspeck, Robert. Administrative Flexibility in the Federal Civil Service. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Regulatory Administration in Maryland. Commission on Administrative Organization of the State. 1952.

Riesenfeld, Stefan A., John A. Bauman, and Richard C. Maxwell. Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota. *Minnesota Law Review*. December, 1952.

Roberts, Samuel M. Trend Toward Performance Budgeting. *Public Management*. October, 1952.

Ruhl, Eleanor S. Public Relations for Government Employees: An Action Program. Civil Service Assembly. 1952.

Short, Lloyd M., and Kenneth C. Tollenaar. Special Examining Committees for Personnel Director Recruitment. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1952.

Torpey, William G. Promotion from Within. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1952.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Anderson, Dale. Roper's Field Interviewing Organization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1952.

Blair, George S. The Case for Cumulative Voting in Illinois. *Northwestern University Law Review*. July–August, 1952.

Bone, Hugh A. Grass Roots Party Leadership (A Case Study of King County, Washington). Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington. 1952.

Jamison, Judith Norvell. Local Election Administration in California. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles. 1952.

Roberts, Chalmers. The Donkey, the Elephant, and the Gerrymander. *The Reporter*. September 16, 1952.

Stewart, Donald H. The Press and Political Corruption during the Federalist Administrations. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Wiebe, G. D. Responses to the Televised Kefauver Hearings: Some Social Psychological Implications. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1952.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Adamian, Gregory H. The Oil Industry and the Tax Depletion Allowance. *Boston University Law Review*. November, 1952.

Crook, Wilfrid H. Recent Developments in the North-South Wage Differential. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. October, 1952.

Robinson, Harold, and Lewis H. Weinstein. The Federal Government and Housing. *Wisconsin Law Review*. July, 1952.

Voorhis, Jerry. The Cooperatives Look Ahead. Public Affairs Committee. 1952.

Education and Social Security

Greenfield, Margaret. Confidentiality of Public Assistance Records. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1952.

James, Fleming, Jr. Social Insurance and Tort Liability: the Problem of Alternative Remedies. *New York University Law Review*. October, 1952.

Governmental Regulation

Durham, James A. Congressional Response to Administrative Regulation: the 1951 and 1952 Price Control Amendments. *Yale Law Journal*. December, 1952.

———. The Present Status of Price Control Authority. *Columbia Law Review*. November, 1952.

Labor

Conrad, Alfred F. Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient than Employer's

Liability? *American Bar Association Journal*. December, 1952.

Rees, Albert. Wage-Price Relations in the Basic Steel Industry, 1945-1948. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. January, 1953.

Rose, George. Relationship of the Local Union to the International Organization. *Virginia Law Review*. November, 1952.

Tanenhause, Joseph. Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940 to 1952. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Civil Liberties

Antieau, Chester James. Equal Protection Outside the Clause. *California Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

Collings, Rex A., Jr. Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace? *California Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

Graves, Alexander, Jr. The "Clear and Present Danger" Rule as Applied to Contempt by Publication. *New York Law School Student Law Review*. Spring, 1952.

Rice, Pamela H., and Milton Greenberg. Municipal Protection of Human Rights. *Wisconsin Law Review*. July, 1952.

Military Affairs and National Security

Aycock, William B. The Court of Military Appeals—the First Year. *North Carolina Law Review*. December, 1952.

Leighton, Richard M. Allied Unity in the Second World War: A Study in Regional Military Organization. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Wolfers, Arnold. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congress

House. Civil Service Preference, Retirement, and Salary Classification Laws. Compiled by Elmer A. Lewis, House Document Room. 1952.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies. Hearing. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments (now Committee on Government Operations). Federal Supply Management (Air Force Supply—Munitions Board). Hearings before a subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Hearings before a subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Problems Relating to State Applications for Conventions to Propose Constitutional Limitations on Federal Tax Rates. Staff Report. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Committee on Rules. To Create a Joint Committee on the Budget. Hearings. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Communist Activities in the Chicago Area. Hearings. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Compilation of Laws Relating to Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration between Employers and Employees. Compiled by Elmer A. Lewis, House Document Room. 1952.

———. Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States from George Washington 1789 to Harry S. Truman 1949. House Doc. No. 540. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Investigation of Veterans' Loan Guaranty Programs. Hearings before Select Committee. 82nd Cong. 1952.

———. The Steel Seizure Case; Briefs for the Government and Companies. House Doc. No. 534. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Joint Committee on Defense Production. Defense Production Act. Progress Report No. 21. Hearing. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt. S. Doc. No. 123. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. No. 161. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Communist Domination of Unions and National Security. Hearings before a subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. National and Emergency

Labor Disputes. Hearings. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

———. Library. Manner of Selecting Delegates to National Political Conventions and Nomination and Election of Presidential Electors. 1952.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Study of Development of Antitrust Laws and Current Problems of Antitrust Monopoly. Report of Department of Justice to subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Other Federal

Bureau of the Budget. Overseas Pay and Personnel Practices. 1952.

Department of the Interior. Bureau of Reclamation. 50 Years of Reclamation. Financial Report to the Nation's Stockholders, 1902-1952. 1952.

Department of Justice. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Immigration Border Patrol: Its Origin, Activities, Accomplishments, Organization, and Personnel. Revised 1952.

Federal Civil Defense Administration. Federal Civil Defense Administration Manual M 25-1. October 15, 1952.

Federal Security Agency. Public Health Service. Distribution of Health Services in the Structure of State Government, 1950. Part 2, General Services and Construction of Facilities for State Health Programs. 1952.

———. Organized Health Services in a County in the United States. [Monongalia County, W. Va.] 1952.

Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Digest of Public General Bills. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Office of Salary Stabilization. Salary Stabilization: What It Is and How It Works. Part II. August 25, 1952.

Securities and Exchange Commission. General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as in effect September 1, 1952. 1952.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. BY CONRAD BRANDT, BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, AND JOHN K. FAIRBANK. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. 552. \$7.50.)

For twenty-eight years, as Mao Tse-tung put it, the Chinese Communist party "had to travel a zigzag path" before it could gain its

basic victory in 1949. The numerous zigzags along the way are clearly revealed in the forty documents brought together by Messrs. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank. They range from the First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation (June 10, 1922) through the Organic Law of the Central People's Government (September 27, 1949), but cover the pe-

riod from 1922 through 1945 with much greater intensity than the postwar period. The documents are carefully edited and readably translated; they have been selected with a sound sense of discrimination; and many of them, exhumed from obscure and forgotten sources, are made available for the first time to the English-reading public. On every score, the *Documentary History* is a notable contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the Chinese Communist mentality. The work is buttressed by a chronology, a bibliography, and a glossary of terms that make it an important tool for future research. The documents are introduced, usually in groups of two or more, by comprehensive and scholarly commentaries that reflect a high quality of scholarship. Standing by themselves, these commentaries contribute notably to the analysis and interpretation of the Communist movement; taken in conjunction with the documents, they form part of a work that for some years to come will be a standard work of reference on the subject.

The author-compilers direct their attention almost exclusively to the evolution of the "party line," resisting the temptation to deal with more detailed matters of administrative routine or with specific substantive policies. The party line rationalizes the relations between the CCP and the CPSU; it reveals changing tactical concepts in relations with the Kuomintang and with the Japanese enemy; it shows how Marxism-Leninism came to be adapted to the special requirements of the revolution in an agrarian China. Essentially, the party line shows how far the Chinese Communists of 1949 had come from the romantic Marxists who founded the party in 1921 under the illusion that their revolution would liberate the Chinese people from the tyrannies of that time. The old tyrannies have, perhaps, been demolished; but new tyrannies have taken their place and the liberation of the Chinese people still remains for the future.—H. ARTHUR STEINER, *University of California (Los Angeles)*.

The Left Wing in Japanese Politics. By EVELYN S. COLBERT. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1952. Pp. xii, 353. \$4.50.)

This timely, comprehensive study provides the most succinct and enlightening discussion of the origin and development of proletarian groups in Japan which has yet come to this reviewer's attention. The volume comprises

five sections which are concerned with various stages in the evolution of the Socialist, Communist, and lesser left wing groups in prewar and postwar Japan. Section I describes the proletarian movement in Japan during the interim between the two World Wars, the rise of national socialism in Japan and the consequent repression of left wing groups, and the activities of left wing Japanese leaders in exile in both Communist and Nationalist China. Section II provides an excellent summary of the revival of the Socialist and Communist parties in the immediate postwar period and describes the tremendous growth of the trade union movement (from some 400,000 members in the period prior to 1940 to over 6,500,000 in 1948) during the early years of the occupation. Sections III and IV give a concise account of the programs of the left wing parties, an almost chronological treatment of their activities during the years 1945-1947, and cover the period of the coalition cabinets (Socialists, Democrats, and People's Cooperatives) of premiers Katayama and Ashida. Section V deals with major left wing developments between January, 1949 and June, 1950, including an interesting discussion of the decline of the Communist party, due in large measure to its controversy with the Cominform, to popular indignation over Soviet obstinacy on the repatriation issue, and to Soviet accusations against the Emperor.

Very useful biographical data on Japanese left wing leaders are conveniently summarized in the appendixes together with a roster of the leaders of each of the left wing parties. This study should be of real utility to students of Far Eastern international relations and of the governments of the Far East. Of minor consequence, but requiring remedy in subsequent editions, is the evidence of careless proofreading found on page 59.—DONALD M. CASTLEBERRY, *San Francisco State College*.

Southeast Asia. By E. H. G. DOBBY. (New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1951. Pp. 415. \$5.00.)

Professor Dobby has undertaken the ambitious task of presenting in one volume "a picture of environmental conditions and human adaptations in Southeast Asia." Approximately half of the volume is devoted to a detailed description, some of it in highly technical terminology, of the natural landscape of Southeast Asian countries and island groups. The other half deals with the cultural (economic) and social "landscapes" of the com-

ponent countries, followed by four concluding chapters on so-called human geography (agriculture, fisheries, industry and trade, peoples and politics). The author presents an enormous mass of useful reference data interlarded with some searching analyses. The book is illustrated by 120 maps and charts of varying importance.

As a pioneering effort in a field covered elsewhere, if at all, only in a fragmentary way the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Southeast Asia. It is nevertheless uneven in its coverage of the area and in the quality of its treatment of the various regions. The author, for example, devotes some sixty pages to Malaya, the area he knows best, as compared with twenty-eight to Java-Madoera and twenty-nine to Siam. Dutch reviewers have pointed out the handicap of his unfamiliarity with materials in that language. When he leaves the field of his basic competence, natural geography, and undertakes to generalize on historical aspects or social, economic, and political conditions, annoying errors creep in as well as doubtful generalizations. For example, the author underestimates the adverse effects of the recent war on Burma; he is unaware of the vast potential in rice lands still available for development in the Irrawaddy delta; and he makes the erroneous assertion that Burmese Buddhists hold fishermen in disrepute because they destroy life. Mr. Dobby concludes with a gloomy discussion of the prospects for the future of the emerging national states in terms of "congenial poverty," which lacks both historical perspective and an assessment of dynamic political factors. Mr. Dobby's conclusions, in other words, reflect the dismay of the colonial apologist. Mr. Dobby would probably have made a more solidly useful contribution if he had recognized in larger measure the limitations of the geographical approach to political and social problems.—JOHN F. CADY, *Cornell University*.

Public Administration in Siam. By W. D. REEVE. (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. Pp. vi, 93. \$2.00.)

Mr. Reeve's description of the governmental administrative agencies of Siam is one of a series of such studies sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The author served for some twenty years as administrative adviser at Bangkok, and his account concerns primarily the central administration of Siam since 1932. Background factors are sketchily presented; provincial administration is treated

only superficially; no attempt is made to assess the political awareness of the Siamese villager or his attitude toward the expanding agencies of government. The author makes some penetrating comments concerning such administrative problems as bottlenecks, overstaffing, and favoritism, but he does not discuss political dynamics, the stultifying effects of military interference, and the basic problem of developing a public consciousness to which governmental servants can be held responsible for their actions. The book contributes much to our understanding of governmental problems in Siam, but Mr. Reeve could probably have told us much more if he had not been so concerned to avoid offending Siamese sensibilities. A realistic appraisal of government in Siam has yet to be made.—JOHN F. CADY, *Cornell University*.

Population Growth in Malaya; An Analysis of Recent Trends. By T. E. SMITH. (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. Pp. viii, 124.)

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the excellence of this short but scholarly study of the demographic situation in Malaya, the first effort of its kind for any country of Southeast Asia. The author is a British member of the Malayan Civil Service who studied at Princeton University's Office of Population Research in 1949-50 on a Commonwealth Civil Service Fellowship. He utilizes as principal sources the censuses of 1931 and 1947, exposes them to expert scrutiny, and then stays within the bounds of his dependable information. After an introductory chapter on general trends, he describes in turn the Malaysian, the Chinese and the Indian populations. Concluding chapters analyze the vulnerability of Malaya to the vagaries of the world market for rubber and tin, and estimate the prospects for achieving some kind of a demographic balance in terms of productivity and resources. Much of the author's technical analysis of fertility and mortality statistics will be of more interest to the demographer than to the social scientist, but his conclusions are sharply defined. It is clear from his exposition that Malaya cannot be regarded as an area for future immigration from neighboring areas of population pressure, such as Java, China, and India, without aggravating its economic problems beyond the point of possible solution. Here is one study that will not have to be done again soon.—J.F.C.

L'Europe en face de son Destin. By EDOUARD BONNEFOUS. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. 386.)

"Pourquoi le cheminement de l'idée européenne a-t-il été si lent?" asks the author, co-editor of *L'Année Politique* and professor of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, in the concluding chapter of the volume. And he puts the blame squarely upon the nineteenth century with its nationalism, the new German philosophy which killed humanism, and the German unification under Prussia. For these were, in the author's opinion, the influences which pushed into the background "l'idée européenne" which flourished in the eighteenth century. It is this slow "cheminement" of the "idée européenne" (which comprises, in the author's connotation, European unity) which is the theme of the book. After discussing in the first four chapters the main factors which helped to shape European thought, the historical origins of Europe, and the earlier attempts to unite Europe both prior to and after World War I, the author proceeds to what is the main part of his book: a detailed description and analysis of the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, and some other cooperative projects in specialized fields. More than one third of the book consists of documents relating to the various postwar projects of European cooperation.—E.T.

Soviet Opposition to Stalin; A Case Study in World War II. By GEORGE FISCHER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 230. \$4.00.)

The title of this book is somewhat misleading, for only its third part deals with Soviet opposition to Stalin as such, while the first two parts (comprising two-thirds of the book) are devoted to a careful, well-documented, detailed study of General Vlasov's movement from its beginnings until its liquidation and the execution in Moscow of its leaders. A case study of the defection and activities of Vlasov and his associates during World War II does provide a considerable amount of material throwing light on the Soviet opposition to Stalin. Yet much more than that is needed if one embarks upon a general analysis of such a complex phenomenon. Thus the "close interconnection" which the author claims to exist between the first two parts and the third part of the book is not quite as close as it ought to be and the many interesting observations he makes in the last part regarding the "larger

problems of Soviet opposition" are only partly based on what can be obtained from a case study of Vlasov's movement. In collecting and correlating materials and documents on this movement Mr. Fischer has certainly made a worthwhile contribution toward a better understanding of what he rightly calls "one of the most dramatic episodes of World War II."—E.T.

Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites. By ROBERT C. NORTH WITH THE COLLABORATION OF ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. vii, 130. \$1.75.)

This study in the Hoover Institute "elite" series is a suggestive exploration of the motives and attitudes of the leadership cadres within the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party. It is the first serious effort to correlate the social origins and experiences of the leadership cadres with the general political lines of their respective parties, bringing statistical methods to bear upon the data compiled from careful biographical studies.—H.A.S.

Democracy At Bay; A Diagnosis and a Prognosis. By FELIX SOMARY. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xiii, 171. \$2.50.)

A brief review of the history of democracy from the late 18th century to 1914, an analysis of the impact of the two World Wars upon the democratic movement, and a statement of the dilemmas of present-day democracy.

British Colonial Constitutions, 1947. By MARTIN WIGHT. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xxvi, 571. \$8.50.)

A valuable collection of constitutional documents from the dependent empire, superseding the prewar collection by the Foreign Office. A number of constitutions are given in complete detail; others are abridged. An excellent 100-page introduction describes the nature and progress of colonial constitutions and offers a valuable classification of them.

Democracy in the Dominions. By ALEXANDER BRADY. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 604. \$6.50.)

Developments since 1947 are included in this second edition of a useful study of government in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and an added final section compares and generalizes on the significance of social, economic and political trends in the four dominions.

Racial Separation in South Africa; An Analysis of Apartheid Theory. By EUGENE P. DVORIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 256. \$4.50.)

An objective and timely appraisal of a crucial area of racial and political tension. In the program known as "apartheid," the Nationalist party of South Africa proposes to divide the Union into separate areas for whites and blacks, and by means of this geographic apartness to reinforce social, economic and political barriers, with the white or European "master race" in complete power.

The Pilgrimage and After; The Story of How the Congress Fought and Won the General Elections. EDITED BY DR. N. V. RAJHUMAR FOR THE CENTRAL PUBLICITY BOARD WITH FOREWORD BY GULZARILAL NANDA AND INTRODUCTION BY R. R. DIWAKAR. (New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee. 1952. Pp. vi, 176. Rs. 2/8/-.)

This brief account of how the Congress party fought and won the first elections (1951-52) under the new Constitution of India contains a narrative of the election tour of Jawahrlal Nehru, the Congress president, to all parts of the republic, as well as a summary of the subject matter of some of his principal speeches, an analysis of election results for the national parliament and the state legislative assemblies, and the personnel of the Central and State Congress ministries.—J.B.C.

Administrative Directory of the Government of Pakistan. By THE CABINET SECRETARIAT. (Karachi: Manager of Publications. 1951. Pp. viii, 396. Oblong format. Rs. 4/12/-.)

The directory of the Pakistan government as of November 1, 1951, scheduled to be published once a year, gives in Part I a list of the officers of the various ministries and the departments directly attached to them, and in Part II a list of the subjects dealt with as well as a statement of the distribution of the work among the various branches. Parts III and IV are devoted to the provinces and states, and Part V to the listing of the Pakistan representatives abroad. For the Constituent Assembly only the officers and staff are given, not the members. There is no index to agencies or persons.—J.B.C.

Prohibition Inquiry Report in Bombay State. By SHRI M. D. BHANSALI, I.C.S. (Bombay: Government Central Press. 1952. Pp. iv, 58.)

Total prohibition was introduced in Bom-

bay State on April 6, 1950. A subsequent judgment of the Indian Supreme Court held that the State could not impose a general ban on, but could regulate the possession and use of spirituous toilet or medicinal preparations, thus invalidating some provisions of the Act. The inquiry mentions "the good results which are noticeable in the rural areas and among the poorer classes," but indicates that "except for official effort which is handicapped by finance very little public support is forthcoming, and the enthusiasm which marked the advent of prohibition is found lacking." The report summarizes 39 recommendations looking towards the effective enforcement of total prohibition.—J.B.C.

Bihar, 1946-51; a Brief Review. PUBLISHED BY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, BIHAR. (Patna: Government Press. 1951. Pp. xii, 254. Rs. 1-8-0.)

This review of the government of Bihar State in India since the Congress ministry took over in April, 1946, discusses a number of points of interest such as agrarian reforms and the abolition of landlordism, the economic and educational development of backward and suppressed classes, and the adoption of Hindi in Devanagiri script as the official language. At present the Legislative Assembly transacts its business partly in Hindi and partly in English.—J.B.C.

Indicador da organização administrativa federal. (Atualizado até 15 de novembro de 1951.) By DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DO SERVIÇO PÚBLICO. (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional. 1952. Pp. xx, 600.)

The seventh edition of the Brazilian government organization manual as of November 15, 1951, is the first to appear since Getulio Vargas assumed the presidency again at the end of January, 1951. The manual includes all branches of the government, gives the addresses, organization and functions, with citations to constitutional, statutory and other authorization, but does not give the names of the principal officials. Organization charts are included. The volume concludes with a list of the principal current official periodicals.—J.B.C.

El gobierno del Sr. Galo Plaza, presidente constitucional de la república del Ecuador, 1948-1952. Tomo IV and V. (Quito: Talleres gráficos nacionales. 1952. Pp. xli, 739; 526.)

The final volumes of the report on the presidency of Galo Plaza of Ecuador are remarkable

in that they reflect an administration which served out the duly elected term until the end of August, 1952. The fourth volume is devoted to "estudios, proyectos e informes técnicos," 1948-1952; and the fifth, designated "Informe del cuarto año de gobierno," includes the farewell address.—J.B.C.

Der Kampf um den Südweststaat. Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse der gesetzgebenden Körperschaften des Bundes und des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes. BY INSTITUT FÜR STAATSLEHRE UND POLITIK, E.V., MAINZ. (München: Isar Verlag. 1952. Pp. 507.)

A collection of the basic documents in the "Southwest Case," preceding the union of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern as Baden-Württemberg at the end of April, 1952.—J.B.C.

Staatsanzeiger für Baden-Württemberg. (Stuttgart: Staatsministerium. No. 1-27, April 30-Aug. 16, 1952. 15 DM a year.)

The first three numbers of the official gazette of the new Southwest German state of Baden-Württemberg appeared under the title *Staatsanzeiger für das Südwestdeutsche Bundesland*. The gazette, which appears twice a week, contains a report of the proceedings of the *Verfassungsgebende Landesversammlung*, which was elected on March 9th, 1952, and had held four sessions previous to the first number of the gazette. The provisional government or cabinet had been constituted on April 25. In No. 6, of June 4, there is contained a report of the final sessions on May 30 of the *Landtag* in each of the three states of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, which had united to form Baden-Württemberg.—J.B.C.

Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg. (Stuttgart: Buchdruckerei Chr. Scheufele. No. 1-10, April 28-Sept. 27, 1952. Pp. 1-36. 12 DM a year.)

The first issue of the law gazette of the new Southwest German state formed by the Union of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, had the title *Gesetzblatt für das Südwestdeutsche Bundesland*. The "Überleitungsgesetz" of May 15 enacted by the *Verfassungsgebende Landesversammlung* settled upon the name Baden-Württemberg for the state, and with no. 2 of May 17 the title became *Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg*. A "Bekanntmachung" of July 8th by the pro-

visional government in no. 7 defines the functions of the ministries.—J.B.C.

The West German Federal Government. BY ELMER PLISCHKE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF H. J. HILLE. (Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. 1952. Pp. viii, 182.)

General survey of the West German Federal Government from its inception in 1949 to the beginning of 1952. A number of useful charts are appended to the volume.

Berlin: Development of its Government and Administration. BY ELMER PLISCHKE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ELISABETH ERDMANN. (Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. 1952. Pp. xii, 257.)

A study of the government of Berlin with major emphasis on the years 1949-1951 and a brief survey of developments since 1945. Includes an appendix of 20 documents relative to the topic.

Guide des ministères: Revue de l'administration belge, 1952-1953. (Bruxelles: Secrétariat, 37, rue de Pascale. 1952. Pp. 534.)

The second edition of the unofficial directory of the Belgian government is kept up to date by monthly supplements. The volume includes the Royal Palace, the legislative branch, the ministries in alphabetical order, the Conseil d'Etat, the Cour des Comptes, business and other enterprises of the government, provincial and city governments, the ports, political parties, chambers of commerce, etc. There is an index to agencies but not to persons. The official *Almanach royal* ceased publication with 1939, and the only other similar publication has been the long-continuing *Annuaire administratif et judiciaire de Belgique* published by Bruylant at Brussels.—J.B.C.

Impressa publica Regni Danici 1951. Bibliografisk fortegnelse over statens tryksager og statsunderstøttede publikationer, tilligemed Fortegnelse over publikationer udgivne eller subventionerede af Københavns og Århus kommuner, 1951. (København: Det Kongelige Bibliotek. 1952. Pp. 92.)

The annual bibliography of Danish official documents which began with the year 1948 has with this volume added the official documents of the two largest cities of Denmark—Copenhagen, and Aarhus. The main part of

the volume continues arrangement of the ministries in alphabetical order following Rigsdagen, with indexes to topics and persons.—J.B.C.

East Africa High Commission. *Interterritorial cooperation: Work of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly* (Nairobi, Kenya. 1952. Pp. 107.)

The report (Despatch 1/52) to the Colonial Office, London, by Sir Philip Euen Mitchell, the chairman of the High Commission, on the first four years of the High Commission, 1948-1951. The New Central Assembly met first for a further four-year period on January 29, 1952. The rather intricate organization of the executive agencies of the High Commission is explained, together with their relationship to the Central Assembly and to the authorities of the three territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. The report includes the membership of the boards, committees and councils of the Assembly as of May, 1952, and a list of the publications of these agencies, 1948-1951.—J.B.C.

Israel. *List of Government Publications*. COMPILED BY THE STATE ARCHIVES AND LIBRARY. (Jerusalem: Government Printer. 1952 [5712]. Pp. 62. 200 pruta.)

The careful list of the official publications of the government of Israel reveals that there have been a certain number of items issued in languages other than Hebrew. The main title-page and a brief prefatory note are in Hebrew.—J.B.C.

Nigeria. *Standing orders of the House of Representatives*. (Lagos: Government Printer. 1952. Pp. 40.)

The standing orders for the new legislative body of Nigeria, which began functioning early in 1952, were made by J. S. Macpherson, governor of Nigeria, as of January 9, 1952. The practice of the House of Commons of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is to be followed in case of doubt.—J.B.C.

The Forgotten Republics. BY CLARENCE A. MANNING. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xii, 264. \$2.75.)

A study of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, their peoples, culture, and political development from the first century A.D. to their incorporation in the Soviet Union, written by an Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University.

Heroic Finland. BY DAVID HINSHAW. (New York: C. P. Putnam's Sons. 1952. Pp. xxii, 306. \$4.50.)

In nineteen brief chapters the author, highly sympathetic to Finland, covers in a rather general way varied aspects of Finnish life from politics and reparations to music, sports, forests and lakes.

Contemporary Ethiopia. BY DAVID ABNER TALBOT. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. x, 267. \$4.50.)

The American editor of the government-owned *Ethiopian Herald* describes modern Ethiopia and its progress since Haile Selassie first assumed office in 1916.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

General

Krauss, G. Transformaciones de la Democracia. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1952.

McDougal, M. S. Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes. *Yale Law Journal*. June-July, 1952.

Prothro, E. T. Cultural Determinism. *Journal of Social Psychology*. May, 1952.

Van Husen, P. Die Entfesselung der dritten Gewalt. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*. July, 1952.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Bassett, R. British Parliamentary Government To-day. *Political Quarterly*. October-December, 1952.

Birkett, N. Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain. *Modern Law Review*. July, 1952.

Conservative Party. Research Department. One Year's Work. London, 1952.

Goodhart, A. S. Current Judicial Reform in England. *New York University Law Review*. July, 1952.

Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. Local Government in Britain. London, 1952.

Hewison, R. J. P. The Organization of the Cabinet Secretariat. *Public Administration*. Autumn, 1952.

Keir, Sir David L. The British Constitution in 1951. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1952.

Lane, R. E. Problems of Regulated Economy: the British Experience. *Social Research*. September, 1952.

Strachey, J. Britain's Peaceful Changes. *Current History*. November, 1952.

Colonial Areas.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Hong Kong, 1951. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1952.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report on Cyprus for the year 1951. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1952.

Silcock, T. H. Policy for Malaya, 1952. *International Affairs*. October, 1952.

Social Transition in Kenya. *The Round Table*. December, 1952.

Woolf, L. Something New out of Africa. *Political Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Commonwealth of Nations

Banningan, J. A. Hindu Code Bill. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 3, 1952.

Campbell-Johnson, A. Reflections on the Transfer of Power. *Asiatic Review*. July, 1952.

Commonwealth of Nations. A symposium. *Current History*. December, 1952.

The Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference. *The Round Table*. December, 1952.

Cowen, D. V. Legislature and Judiciary: Reflections on the Constitutional Issue in South Africa. *Modern Law Review*. July, 1952.

Ewens, J. Q. Parliamentary Drafting in the Commonwealth of Australia. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1952.

Fifield, R. H. New States in the Indian Realm. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1952.

Gell, C. W. M. South Africa's Real Dilemma. *Fortnightly*. December, 1952.

Geyer, A. L. Apartheid. *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*. June, 1952.

Kirkwood, K. The Constitutional Crisis in South Africa. *International Affairs*. October, 1952.

Munz, A. Elections in India. *Political Science (N.Z.)*. September, 1952.

Northey, J. F. Separate Representation of Voters Case. *New Zealand Law Journal*. August 19, 1952.

Park, R. L. Indian Democracy and the General Election. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1952.

Political Parties in Pakistan. *Eastern World*. October, 1952.

Sarkar, B. Indian Federal Finance and the Finance Commission. *Calcutta Review*. September, 1952.

Schwartz, S. Communism and the Indian Election. *American Scholar*. Autumn, 1952.

Western Europe

Burka, R. V. Catholic Parties in Latin Europe. *Journal of Modern History*. September, 1952.

Central Planning Bureau. The Central Economic Plan, 1947-1952. Hague, 1952.

Five Years of the Monnet Plan. *Economist*. October 18, 1952.

Guiron, J. Wege und Irrwege des Französischen Sozialismus. *Deutsche Rundschau*. May, 1952.

———. Frankreichs Finanzpolitik unter Pinay. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1952.

Historicus. La Vita Politica Italiana. *Rivista di Politica Economica*. September, 1952.

Pergolesi, F. Il Sindicalismo nella Pubblica Amministrazione. *Rivista di Politica Economica*. September, 1952.

Rich, C. A. L. Aspects of the Political Struggle in Italy. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Roegel, O. Aspects of the Saar Problem. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Savary, A. The French Union: Centralism or Federalism. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Sufrin, S. C. Economy of Spain. *Foreign Policy Association Headline Series*. Number 95. September-October, 1952.

Walton, C. C. The Fate of Neo-Federalism in Western Europe. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Central Europe

Ehard, H. Der Bundesrat als Aussenpolitisches Organ. *Aussenpolitik*. August, 1952.

Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for

Austria. Report on Austria, 1951. U. S. Department of State, 1952.

Plischke, E. Allied High Commission Relations with the West German Government 1949-1951. Frankfurt, 1952.

———. Revision of the Occupation Statute for Germany, September 21, 1949-March 7, 1951. Frankfurt, 1952.

Ploechl, W. M. Church and State in Austria. *Jurist*. October, 1952.

Wachenheim, H. German Labor Asks Co-Management. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Williams, J. E. The German Federal Republic To-day. *International Affairs*. October, 1952.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Barghoorn, F. Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage. *Review of Politics*. April, 1952.

Carantino, B. Les Aspects Politiques du XIX^e Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. November, 1952.

Domrachev, M. The Primary Units of the Communist Party. *Soviet Studies*. October, 1952.

Grzybowski, K. Soviet Bloc Defense Laws. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1952.

Industry and Agriculture in Yugoslavia Today. *World Today*. September, 1952.

Just, A. W. Kirchenpolitik in Polen. *Aussenpolitik*. August, 1952.

Kovanovski, P. L. The Financial System of the USSR During World War II. Institute for the Study of the History and the Institutions of the USSR. Munich, 1952.

Mackintosh, J. M. The Soviet Army. *Twentieth Century*. November, 1952.

Mladek, J. V. The Change in the Yugoslav Monetary System. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*. Washington, November, 1952.

Moebus, G. "Bolschevistische Parteilichkeit" als Leitmotiv der sowjetischen Kulturpolitik. *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland*. Bonn, Bundesministerium fuer gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1952.

A New Kind of Parliament for a New Socialist Democracy. *Yugoslav Review*. June, 1952.

Political Work in the Soviet Army. East European Fund: Mimeographed series number 8. New York, 1952.

The role of the Soviet Party Congress. *World Today*. October, 1952.

Semenov, N. Soviet Courts and Punishment Policy. Institute for the Study of the History and the Institutions of the USSR. Munich, 1952.

Simon, S. Le Code Pénal de l'USSR. *Revue de Droit International et de Droit Comparé*. Numbers 1-2, 1952.

Sprague, C. A. Performance of the Dependent Press in the Soviet Union. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 8, 1952.

Timasheff, N. S. Soviet Law. *Virginia Law Review*. November, 1952.

Middle East and Africa

Carvin, V. Problems in the Integration of the Afghan Nation. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Amman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952.

De Gaury, G. Between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*. July-October, 1952.

Dzagabi, W. G. Die Renaissance des Islam. *Aussenpolitik*. June, 1952.

The Egyptian Revolution. *The Round Table*. December, 1952.

Franck, P. G. Economic Nationalism in the Middle East. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Khalidi, I. R. Constitution of the United Kingdom of Lybia. *Middle East Journal*. Spring, 1952.

Mogannan, E. T. Developments in the Legal System of Jordan. *Middle East Journal*. Spring, 1952.

Mosseri, R. The Struggle in Lebanon. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. November, 1952.

Natsir, M. The Future of the Muslim Nations. *Pakistan Horizon*. June, 1952.

Southeast Asia

Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia. Seven Years of Indonesian Independence. 1952.

Jaquet, L. G. M. The Indonesian Federal Problem Reconsidered. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1952.

Levi, W. Government and Politics in Nepal. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 17, 1952.

Mark, M. Nationalism v. Communism in Southeast Asia. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Vandenbosch, A. Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 17, 1952.

Pacific and Far East

Green, O. M. The Deification of Mao Tse-tung. *Fortnightly*. October, 1952.

Kublin, H. Origins of Japanese Socialist Traditions. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1952.

Langer, P. F. The Japanese Political Scene. *Journal of International Affairs*. Spring, 1952.

Oppler, A. C. Courts and Law in Transition. *Contemporary Japan*. May 30, 1952.

Roy, M. N. Democracy and Nationalism in Asia. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1952.

Scalapino, R. A. Japan and the General Elections. *Far Eastern Survey*. October 29, 1952.

Latin America

Biesanz, J. Panamanian Politics. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1952.

Blanksten, G. I. Caudillismo in North-western South America. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay. Pan American Union. Law and Treaty Series 36. Washington, 1953.

Ollero, C. Uruguay: La Reforma Constitucional de 16 Diciembre de 1951, el Ejecutivo "Colegiado." *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1952.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy; Volume II, 1925-1932. SELECTED AND EDITED BY JANE DEGRAS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xxi, 560. \$9.00.)

The editor of this collection of documents, Volume I of which was noted in the September, 1951 issue of this REVIEW, continues in Volume II to bring closer to the present the documentary story of Soviet foreign policy. The list of documents from which the editor has made her selection is to be found in her previous publication, *Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948). This second volume commences with an extract of a speech by Stalin at the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party made on January 19, 1925 and ends with a Tass statement on Soviet-Japanese negotiations for a non-aggression pact released on January 17, 1933. It is particularly valuable as regards Soviet material on Russian policy in the Far East during this period, for many of the documents are concerned with questions of Soviet relations with China, Manchuria, Japan, and other Far Eastern areas. Very significant statements of Stalin made during this period are given; among them is the statement of March 22, 1925 on the task of Communist parties, which is well worth reading to understand contemporary Soviet policy. Stalin defines the task of Communist parties as (1) the exploitation of contradictions within the capitalist countries, (2) the joining of the working class of leading countries with the national revolutionary movement in backward areas against imperialism, (3) the capturing of the trade union movements, (4) the bringing of the

working class into touch with the small peasants, and (5) the supporting of the Soviet Union.

The reviewer believes that the editor of these documents has rendered to those students who do not read Russian a great service in presenting the source material on Soviet foreign policy as it developed in the period between 1925 and 1933, a period which, carefully studied, will lend considerable insight on the trends of Soviet policy more than twenty years later.—WILLIAM B. BALLIS, *University of Washington*.

Make the UN Effective For Peace. BY JOHN BAUER. (New York: Richard R. Smith. 1952. Pp. 160. \$2.50.)

This small book advocates total disarmament and prohibition of aggression to be enforced by a reformed United Nations supplied with inspection staff and military forces. The author seems to think of the execution of his plan as merely administrative, the carrying out of provisions of the treaty which will state policy; but only fragmentary proposals are made concerning matters to be regulated in the treaty. As a result the author never comes to grips with the many real problems inherent in his proposal. There is nothing of value in the rather odd proposals for reconstituting the General Assembly and the Security Council. That the author is aware of difficulties in the way of adoption of his scheme is shown in the chapter on "possible objections." The preface indicates that the author is a "layman," following international relations as an avocation, his field of professional competence being that of economist in the field of public utility regu-

lation. The book has no notes, bibliography or index.—CHESNEY HILL, *University of Missouri*.

Unconditional Surrender; The Roots of a World War III. By F. O. MIKSCHÉ. (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd. 1952. Pp. 468. Cloth 25s.)

Colonel Miksche, former Czecho-Slovak military attaché in Paris, undertakes in this "desperate appeal to common sense," as he calls it, to demolish a number of historical assumptions without which Allied policy in World Wars I and II cannot be fitted into a rational pattern of behavior. Not only that: Colonel Miksche advances with great cogency a historical argument which, if accepted, is conclusive evidence of the complete irrationality of our previous foreign policy. For this reason reviewers, according to their *Gemütsregungen*, will be tempted to praise or damn the book in terms hardly appropriate for scientific periodicals.

The author gives an excellent résumé of the history of Russian Pan-Slav imperialism, beginning with the supposed Testament of Peter the Great and ending with the prophetic remark of Colonel House in December, 1917: "I thought we had to take into consideration the Russia of fifty years from now rather than the Russia of today. While we might hope it would continue democratic and cease to be aggressive, yet if the contrary happened, Russia would be a menace to Europe and not Germany. I asked him [Balfour] not to look upon Germany as a permanent enemy. If we did this, it would confuse our reasoning and mistakes would be likely to be made." Miksche believes that the net result of World Wars I and II was to remove successively the two Central European bastions against Russian expansionism, Austria-Hungary and Germany. The balkanization of the Danube countries after World War I intensified rather than appeased the national and cultural tensions in the area and created a situation inviting hegemony by a great power—either Germany or Soviet Russia.

Colonel Miksche goes at length into the question of supposed German "aggressiveness." "Germany," said Lord Salisbury in 1880, "is clearly cut out to be our ally." Bismarck echoed the idea: "It would be madness for us to quarrel with England." The story of subsequent events, particularly the gradual deterioration of German-British relations from 1900 to 1914 is, as Colonel Miksche tells it,

a story of almost cosmic stupidity on both sides.

In his chapter entitled "Whose Fault Was Hitler?" Colonel Miksche shows how Allied refusal to revise the war-guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty served as a major cause of Hitlerism. "Germany was condemned to disgrace as a criminal nation, and it was that fact that gave the Germans courage in their unequal and disastrous struggle." He agrees that National Socialism was a political disease, requiring a radical operation, but insists that the United States, and to a lesser extent the British, forgetting the long-term problem of Pan-Slav imperialism, set out not to cut out the cancer but to kill the patient.

The author finds only one possible objective for present foreign policy: to pick up the remaining pieces of Europe and put them together as effectively as possible. After a detailed analysis of Soviet and Western military and economic potential, with convincing statistical support, Colonel Miksche concludes that the defense of Europe requires as principal conditions: (1) rehabilitation of Germany and the formation of a German army, (2) the political stabilization of France and (3) the inclusion of Spain in a general plan of European defense. The book concludes with an informative chapter on Communist psychological tactics and the organization of the Cominform, and a futuristic "horror story" of a Soviet invasion of a Western Europe whose members are still arguing about whether German troops should be permitted and Spain accepted as an ally.—KURT GLASER, *Governmental Affairs Institute*.

Principles of International Law. By HANS Kelsen. (New York: Rinehart & Co. 1952. Pp. xvii, 461. \$5.00.)

A new departure in the field of international law texts. Eschewing what he calls the "political" approach to international law, the author relies upon juristic analysis, and the subject is treated from the point of view of his pure theory of law. Hence, for example, the law of war is viewed as a problem in "sanctions" for the punishment of illegal action. Stress is also laid on the integration of the law of the United Nations into the general framework of international law.

Meeting of Minds; A Way to Peace through Mediation. By ELMORE JACKSON. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1952. Pp. xxii, 200. \$3.50.)

Set forth the results of a group effort to determine whether the United Nations may profit from the experience in labor mediation. Included are chapters on mediation in Sweden and settlement of labor disputes in Great Britain by Carl Christian Schmidt and Sir Frederick W. Leggett, respectively, and an appendix on the handling of industrial disputes in the USSR by Lois Jane Stone. Other chapters deal with the settlement of labor disputes in the United States and the problem of mediation of international disputes.

The United States in World Affairs, 1951. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xiv, 473. \$5.00.)

This annual volume surveys the global development of U. S. problems and policies in 1951, while skillfully filling in the background and providing serious thought for the future in a final chapter entitled "The Revolt of the Underprivileged."

Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1952-1953. By THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES GROUP OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1952. Pp. xiv, 412. Cloth \$4.00, paper \$2.00.)

Brookings' sixth annual review of U. S. foreign relations and of current problems facing the policy makers. An extended "problem paper" on raw materials and national policy forms a timely third section of the volume.

The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919. By HENRY R. WINKLER. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 288. \$3.00.)

An analysis of the several proposals for an international organization offered in Britain during the first World War and an assessment of the movement as a whole in that country.

Atlantic Alliance. NATO's Role in the Free World. A REPORT BY A STUDY GROUP OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. ix, 172. \$1.25.)

Summary of the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provocative speculation concerning its future, emphasizing the priority thus far given military prepara-

tion and the preference shown for functional cooperation between independent governments rather than federal experiment.

The Sudan Question. By MEKKI ABBAS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. xix, 201. \$4.25.)

A Sudanese—who has been teacher, political leader, editor, special Rhodes scholar, and is now head of a large-scale irrigation project in the Sudan—reviews the history of Anglo-Egyptian controversy over his country since 1883, the increasing importance of the Sudanese viewpoint in this controversy, and the difficulty of finding a settlement acceptable not only to Britain and Egypt but to various factions in the Sudan.

The Iranian Case, 1946. By RICHARD W. VAN WAGENEN. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1952. Pp. 119. \$0.50.)

An examination of the United Nations' handling of Iran's complaint against the Soviet Union for failure to evacuate its forces at the end of the war. The author concludes that UN action was significantly but not solely responsible for Russia's withdrawal, that valuable procedural precedents were established, and that this open challenge to Russian moves drove one more minor wedge between East and West. The second in Carnegie's "United Nations Action" series.

The Arab Refugee Problem. By JOSEPH B. SCHACHTMAN. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xi, 137. \$3.00.)

A brief report on the origins, location and needs of the 750,000 Arab refugees who fled or were driven from Palestine, and on the protracted political negotiations deadlocked by Arab government demands for repatriation and Israel's insistence that resettlement in Arab lands is the only solution.

Verdict In Korea. By ROBERT T. OLIVER. (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press. 1952. Pp. 207. \$4.00.)

A prolific writer on Korea, and a first-hand sympathetic observer of its people, describes war, politics (domestic and international), and economic problems against a very human Korean background.

Report on Austria, 1951. BY OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRIA. (Vienna. 1952. Pp. 135.)

The section on "quadrupartite affairs" shows particularly the part that the Soviet element has played in the Allied Council discussions by the government of Austria. Also included is a statistical report on displaced persons and refugees in Austria, a chronology for 1951, and a select bibliography on Austria. Especial interest would seem to attach to the volume since the period covers the election and induction into office of the new president.—J.B.C.

The Devil's Chemists. BY JOSIAH E. DUBOIS, JR. IN COLLABORATION WITH EDWARD JOHNSON. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1952. Pp. x, 374. \$3.75.)

An account of the ubiquitous role of I. G. Farbenindustrie in arming and supporting the Nazi government, somewhat dramatically examined by the unsuccessful prosecutor of the I. G. Farben case during the Nuremberg trials.

Crime Without Punishment; The Secret Soviet Terror Against America. BY GUENTHER REINHARDT. (New York: Hermitage House. 1952. Pp. 322. \$3.50.)

A German-born former special employee of the FBI and control investigator of the U. S. Counter Intelligence Corps describes a series of murders and other crimes perpetrated by Soviet agents in America and elsewhere.

I documenti diplomatici italiani. BY COMMISSIONE PER LA PUBBLICAZIONE DEI DOCUMENTI DIPLOMATICI OF THE MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI. (Roma: Libreria dello stato. 1952. Prima serie, vol. 1: pp. xlv, 603; ottava serie, vol. 12: pp. lviii, 694.)

The Commission, which is editing the great series of Italian diplomatic documents, was set up by ministerial decree of September 20, 1946, and is at present headed by Alessandro Casati, senator of the Republic. The plan is an objective historical one, based upon the historical archives of the Italian Foreign Office. Even with very careful selection, the whole work is envisioned as extending eventually to about 100 volumes, arranged in nine series from the first covering the period Jan. 8, 1861–Sept. 20, 1870, to the ninth, for the period

Sept. 4, 1939–Sept. 8, 1943. The above seem to be the first two volumes to appear.—J.B.C.

Tratados públicos y acuerdos internacionales de Venezuela. Vol. I–III. 2ª edición. BY MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES. (Caracas. 1950–51.)

Having gone out of print, the first three volumes of the seven volume treaty collection of Venezuela published from 1924 through 1945 have been reprinted, thus making the whole set still available. The arrangement is chronological, and volumes one to three cover the period 1820–1925. Spanish text only is given. Information is given as to treaties that have been denounced or replaced.—J.B.C.

Brazil; An Interim Assessment. BY J. A. CAMACHO. (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. xiii, 116. \$2.50.)

The maximum amount of helpful and interesting information—geographic, demographic, economic, historical, and political—which can be compressed in such limited space.

Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense et Documents annexes. (Paris: La Documentation Française. 1952. Pp. 78. Fr. 350.)

The text of the Treaty setting up the European Defense Community with accompanying documents, published in the unnumbered series *Recueils et monographies*. There had been two earlier prints of the treaty for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.—J.B.C.

Readings in World Politics. Vol. I, II, and III. REVISED BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN. (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education. 1952. Pp. 670.)

Readings in American Foreign Policy. Vol. I, II, and III. REVISED BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN. (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education. 1952. Pp. 753.)

Widely-ranging and often provocative collection of readings, printed without comment, prepared as a basis for adult discussion programs sponsored by the publisher. Because the materials were chosen for their suitability as a stimulus to discussion and can be properly utilized only with concurrent discussion under competent leadership, the volumes are only available to persons participating in the Foundation's programs.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Alberg, Michael. The Cost of Wars. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1952.

Armstrong, Hamilton F. The World is Round. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Bernard, S. Choice in the West. *World Politics*. January, 1953.

Caldwell, Oliver J., et al. Coordinating Programs for International Understanding. *Educational Record*. October, 1952.

Deutsch, Karl W. The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration. *World Politics*. January, 1953.

Dillard, Hardy C. Nationalism: Midcentury Puzzle. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Gray, G. H. Some Notes on the Organization of International Congresses. *NGO Bulletin*. January, 1952.

Hilsman, Roger, Jr. Intelligence and Policy-making in Foreign Affairs. *World Politics*. October, 1952.

Kunz, Josef L. Supra-national Organs. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1952.

McDougal, Myres S. The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order. *Yale Law Journal*. June-July, 1952.

Pordea, G. A. La Défense de la Paix. *Revue de Droit International*. July-September, 1952.

Sulzbach, Walter. The New Nationalism. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Thompson, Kenneth W. The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Van Wagenen, Richard W. Research in the International Organization Field. Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Pub. No. 1 (1952).

United States

Acheson, Dean. The Pattern of Leadership

* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. John H. Schaar.

—A Pattern of Responsibility. *Department of State Bulletin*. September 22, 1952.

Ballantine, Joseph W. American Policy in Eastern Asia. *Social Science*. October, 1952.

Bell, Philip W. Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign Policy. *World Politics*. October, 1952.

Chamberlin, William H. Bases of American-Japanese Cooperation. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 31, 1952.

Corbett, P. E. National Interest, International Organization, and American Foreign Policy. *World Politics*. October, 1952.

Foreign Policy Legislation in the 82nd Congress. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 13, 1952.

Goodrich, Leland M. American National Interests and the Responsibilities of United Nations Membership. *International Organization*. August, 1952.

Marshall, Charles. United States Commitments: I. The End of Isolation; II. The New Responsibilities. *Department of State Bulletin*. November 17 and 24, 1952.

Millis, Walter. Military Problems of the New Administration. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Rabinowitch, Eugene (ed.). American Visa Policy and Foreign Scientists. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1952.

Strengthening Our Foreign Policy: A Woodrow Wilson Foundation Study Group Report. Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 189. December, 1952.

Latin America

Documents Relating to Latin America. *International Social Science Bulletin*. Vol. 4, no. 3, 1952.

Miller, Edward G., Jr. Achievements of Inter-American Cooperation. *Department of State Bulletin*. November 3, 1952.

Rubottom, Roy R., Jr. Four Pillars of Friendship with Latin America. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 8, 1952.

Commonwealth of Nations

Barkway, Michael. Canada and the Commonwealth Economic Conference. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Berkes, Ross N., et al. Commonwealth of Nations. *Current History*. December, 1952.

Fowke, V. C. The National Policy—Old and New. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1952.

Western Europe

Duroselle, J. B. German-Franco Relations since 1945. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Gozard, Gilles, Le Plan Schuman et la Chambre. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. September 1, 1952.

Hecksher, Kay. Denmark in World Politics. *Contemporary Review*. October, 1952.

Herremans, Maurice-Pierre. De Walen tegenover de Nederlanders en de Benelux. *Internationale Spectator* ('s-Gravenhage). November 26, 1952.

Isaac, Julius. International Migration and European Population Trends. *International Labour Review*. September, 1952.

Maroger, Jean. Le Plan Schuman et le Sénat. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. September 1, 1952.

Roegel, O. Aspects of the Saar Problem. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Shercliff, Jose. Portugal's Strategic Territories. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Trevor-Roper, H. R. The Germans Reappraise the War. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Vlekke, B. H. M. A Dutch View of the World Situation. *International Affairs*. October, 1952.

Weygand. Réflexions sur l'État Militaire de la France. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. October 15, 1952.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

Diplomaticus. Stalinist Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Hoffman, George W. The Shatter-belt in Relation to the East-West Conflict. *Journal of Geography*. October, 1952.

Lee, Asher. Soviet Air Power. *Twentieth Century*. November, 1952.

Mackintosh, J. M. The Soviet Army. *Twentieth Century*. November, 1952.

Pinon, René. Le Destin de la Pologne. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. September 15, 1952.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. Old Russia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. *American Slavic and East European Review*. October, 1952.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Colonial Empire. *Twentieth Century*. November, 1952.

Shiloh, M. S. Anti-Semitism in Eastern

Europe. *Contemporary Issues*. November-December, 1952.

Strobel, Georg W. Die Polnische Widerstandsbewegung seit 1939. *Osteuropa*. June, 1952.

Middle East and Africa

Birdwood, Lord. The Asian Frontiers of Kashmir. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July-October, 1952.

Collins, Frank D. Recent Developments in the Kashmir Dispute. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 27, 1952.

Dupont, Maurice. Les Intérêts Français contre l'Intérêt de la France en Afrique du Nord. *Esprit*. July and August-September, 1952.

Franck, Peter G. Economic Nationalism in the Middle East. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Gavin, Robert. Economic and Social Conditions in Somaliland under Italian Trusteeship. *International Labour Review*. September, 1952.

Hall, Harvey P. The Evolution of Diplomacy in the Middle East. *Social Science*. October, 1952.

Hanna, Paul L. The Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations, 1950-1952. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. August-September, 1952.

Howard, Harry N. The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951-1952. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 8 and 15, 1952.

Sayegh, Fayed A. The Arab Reaction to American Policy. *Social Science*. October, 1952.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. Africa and the West. *Editorial Research Reports*. September 17, 1952.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. Israel and the Arab States. *Editorial Research Reports*. October 23, 1952.

Pacific and Far East

Allison, John M. Japan and Free Asia. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 1, 1952. Recent Progress in Asia. *Ibid.* September 29, 1952.

Angus, H. F. Japan's Economic Challenge. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Eayrs, James. Pacific Pact: "Step in the Right Direction"? *International Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

Killen, E. D. L. The Anzus Pact and Pacific Security. *Far Eastern Survey*. October 8, 1952.

Mitchell, G. E. China and Britain: Their

Commercial and Industrial Relations. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July–October, 1952.

Parr, E. Joan. Korea—Its Place in History. *Political Quarterly*. October–December, 1952.

The Philippines, the United States of America, and Japan. [A. Symposium]. *Philippine Law Journal*. July, 1952.

Priestly, K. E. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1952.

Takeuchi, Tatsuji. Basic Issues in Japan's Foreign Policy. *Far Eastern Survey*. November 19, 1952.

Younger, Kenneth. Western Policy in Asia. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1952.

Southeast Asia

Gillan, Angus. Australia's Mission in South-East Asia. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July–October, 1952.

Lansang, Jose A. The Philippine-American Experiment: A Filipino View. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1952.

Loc, Buu. Aspects of the Vietnamese Problem. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1952.

Mark, Max. Nationalism versus Communism in Southeast Asia. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Silcock, T. H. Policy for Malaya. *International Affairs*. October, 1952.

Symon, A. C. B. The Colombo Plan. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July–October, 1952.

Vandenbosch, Amry. Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 17, 1952.

Colonial Areas

Fiscal Basis for Central African Federation. *East Africa and Rhodesia*. November 6, 1952.

Jessup, Philip C. The Problem of Dependent Peoples. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 13, 1952.

Larché, J. Les Tendances Nouvelles de la Politique Anglaise en Afrique Noire. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. October, 1952.

Luethy, Herbert. Cross-tides of North African Revolt. *Commentary*. November, 1952.

International Economic Policy and Relations

Frankel, S. Herbert. United Nations Primer for Development. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. August, 1952.

Keenleyside, H. L. Administrative Problems of the Technical Assistance Administration. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1952.

Lubin, Isador. Achievements of Public and Private Investment in Underdeveloped Areas.

Department of State Bulletin. November 17, 1952.

Madan, B. K. Forms of Foreign Investment. *India Quarterly*. July–September, 1952.

McGhee, George C. Private Enterprise in Turkish-American Relations. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 13, 1952.

Mendershausen, Horst. Anglo-German Export Competition. *Review of Economics and Statistics*. August, 1952.

Niebyl, Karl H. Criteria for the Formulation of an Adequate Approach in Aiding the Development of Underdeveloped Areas. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1952.

Rao, V. K. R. V. An International Development Authority. *India Quarterly*. July–September, 1952.

Wright, Hume. Problems of International Aid to Underdeveloped Areas. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1952.

International Law

Alexandrowicz-Alexander, Charles H. The Quasi-Judicial Function in Recognition of States and Governments. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1952.

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Stop Being Terrified of Treaties. *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1952.

Deutsch, Eberhard P. The Need for a Treaty Amendment—A Reply. *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1952.

Dickinson, Edwin D. The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. October, 1952.

Ely, Robert B., III. Proposal for an International Criminal Court; a Critique and an Alternative. *Dickinson Law Review*. October, 1952.

Evensen, Jens. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1952.

Fairman, Charles. Finis to Fujii. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1952.

Kraus, Herbert. Die Zuständigkeit der Länder der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Abschluss von Kulturabkommen mit auswärtigen Staaten nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. Vol. 3, no. 4 (1952).

Kunz, Josef L. The Status of the Holy See in International Law. *Revue de Droit International*. July–September, 1952.

O'Connell, D. P. A Reconsideration of the

Doctrine of International Servitude. *Canadian Bar Review*. October, 1952.

Oliver, Covey T. Reflections on Two Recent Developments Affecting the Function of Law in the International Community. *Texas Law Review*. October, 1952.

Perlman, Philip B. On Amending the Treaty Power. *Columbia Law Review*. November, 1952.

Smith, J. A. Clarence. Capacity in the Conflict of Laws. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Sottile, Antoine. Le Conflit Anglo-Iranien et l'Arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 22 Juillet 1952. *Revue de Droit International, des Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. July-September, 1952.

Stevenson, John R. The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law. *Columbia Law Review*. May, 1952.

Troubled Waters: The Marginal Seas Controversy. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1952.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Acheson, Dean. Achieving the Goals of the Charter. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 27, 1952.

Inglis, David R. UN Disarmament Commission Proceedings. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1952.

Issues Before the Seventh General Assembly. *International Conciliation*. October, 1952.

Jurists' Opinion on Questions Regarding Secretariat Members. *United Nations Bulletin*. December 15, 1952.

Sisco, Joseph J. Strengthening the U.N. Collective Security System. *Department of State Bulletin*. November 3, 1952.

Thirty-fifth Session of the International Labour Conference. *International Labour Review*. October, 1952.

Troncoso, Moisés Poblete. Los Derechos Humanos y las Naciones Unidas. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*. May-August, 1952.

United Nations Issue. [A Symposium]. *World Affairs*. Fall, 1952.

Military and Security Questions

Guiard, Marcel. La Communauté Européenne de Défense. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. October, 1952.

Mackintosh, W. A. The Fissure in NATO:

North American and Sterling Area Trade. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. France and Germany in West European Defense. *Editorial Research Reports*. November 15, 1952.

Tremont, Jacques. Le Traité Instituant la Communauté Européenne. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Wilmot, Chester. If NATO Had to Fight. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Wood, Derek H. NATO Air Power. *Aeronautics*. September, 1952.

Regional Organizations

The Council of Europe. *British Survey*. September, 1952.

The Experts' Financial Report to the O.E.E.C. *World Today*. October, 1952.

Schlochauer, Hans-Jürgen. Die Gerichtbarkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. Vol. 3, no. 4 (1952).

The Schuman Plan and the Council of Europe. *World Today*. November, 1952.

Walton, Clarence C. The Fate of Neo-Federalism in Western Europe. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Western European Integration. *Current Notes on International Affairs* (Canberra). April, 1952.

DOCUMENTS

General and Miscellaneous

Belgian Government Information Center. United States Assistance to Belgium and Luxembourg and Their Part in European Recovery. New York, 1952.

Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia. The Colombo Plan: Report . . . 4th Meeting at Karachi. [n.p.], 1952.

Council of Europe. Documentation Centre. Documentation of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1952.

— Secretariat General. The Strasbourg Plan. Proposals for Improving the Economic Relations between Member States of the Council and the Overseas Countries with Which They Have Constitutional Links. [Incorporates "Economic Relations with Overseas Countries," Report by the Secretariat General]. Strasbourg, 1952.

Food and Agriculture Organization. Program of Work and Budget for 1953. FAO, 1952. (Doc. CL.16/9.)

International Court of Justice. Anglo-

Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran). Judgment of July 22nd, 1952. The Hague, 1952. (Sales No. 91.)

International Monetary Fund. The World Payments Situation . . . September 8, 1952. IMF, Washington, 1952.

— Annual Report . . . for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1952. Washington, 1952.

Lega Europea di Cooperazione Economica e Associazione Italiana di Scienze Politiche e Sociali. Atti del Primo Convegno di Scienze Politiche e Sociali sugli Aspetti Storici Giuridici ed Economici del Problema dell' Europa [Milan, April 23-24, 1952]. Milan, 1952.

Oliver, Robert T. (ed.). Korea's Fight for Freedom: Selected Addresses by Korean Statesmen. Washington, Korean Pacific Press, 1952.

Organization of American States. Coordinating Committee on Technical Assistance. Program of Technical Cooperation . . . for the Calendar Year 1952. Approved by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, January 31, 1952. Washington, Pan American Union, 1952.

Pan American Union. Division of Economic Research. The Foreign Trade of Latin America since 1913. Washington, Pan American Union, 1952.

South Africa. Parliament. House of Assembly. Select Committee on Suppression of Communism Act Enquiry. Report. Cape Town, 1952.

United Nations

Disarmament Commission. Second Report. UN, 1952. (Doc. DC/20, 13 October 1952.)

Economic and Social Council. Report . . . covering the Period from 22 September 1951 to 1 August 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2172, October, 1952.)

— Work Programmes and Costs of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations. UN, 1952. (Doc. E/2315, 29 July 1952.)

General Assembly. Agenda of the Seventh Session . . . adopted 17 October 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2227, 18 October 1952.)

— Sixth Session. Disposition of Agenda Items. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/INF/46, October, 1952.)

— Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. First Report to the Seventh Session. . . . UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2157, August, 1952.)

— Collective Measures Committee. Re-

port. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2215, October, 1952.)

— Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2219, 10 October 1952.)

— International Law Commission. Draft on Arbitral Procedure Prepared by the ILC at its Fourth Session. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/CN.4/59, 16 September 1952.)

— Report . . . covering the Work of Its Fourth Session [4 June to 8 August 1952]. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/CN.4/58, 9 August 1952.)

— Special Committee for the Consideration of the Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly for Dealing with Legal and Drafting Questions. Report. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2174, 8 September 1952.)

— United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Report. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2187, October 1952.)

— United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Report. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2126, October, 1952.)

Secretariat. Handbook on the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. UN, 1952. (Doc. ST/LEG/2, 19 September 1952.)

Secretariat. Department of Social Affairs. Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation. UN, 1952. (Pub. No. 1952. IV. 11.)

Secretary-General. Annual Report . . . on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2141, August, 1952.)

— Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available. Report. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2170, October, 1952.)

Security Council. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the Period from 16 July 1951 to 15 July 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2167, October 1952.)

Trusteeship Council. Report of the Standing Committee on Administrative Unions to the Trusteeship Council. . . . UN, 1952. (Doc. T/1026, 17 July 1952.)

— Report of the Trusteeship Council covering Its Fourth Special Session and Its Tenth and Eleventh Sessions, 18 December 1951 to 24 July 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2150, September 1952.)

— Tenth Session [27 February-1 April 1952]. Disposition of Agenda Items. UN, 1952. (Doc. T/INF/24, 13 August 1952.)

Unified Command under the United States.

Special Report. . . UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2223, 18 October 1952.)

Yearbook of the United Nations 1951. U.N., 1952. (Pub. No. 1952. I, 30.)

United States

Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Mutual Security Appropriations for 1953. Hearings. . . 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mutual Security Legislation and Related Documents with Explanatory Notes. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President. . . June 26, 1952. . . 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Doc. no. 523. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953. Hearings. . . 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Committee on Foreign Relations. Legislative History of the Committee . . . 82nd Congress. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Doc. no. 161. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Report on Western Europe by Tom Connally. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States. United States Information Programs: Background Study. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings before a Subcommittee . . . on S. J. Res. 130 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution. . . 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

Department of Commerce. Report by the Secretary . . . on the Economic Survey of Europe by a Presidential Mission headed by Secretary Sawyer. Washington, 1952.

——— Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Office of Business Economics. Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 1940-1951. . . Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

Department of State. Guide to the United States and the United Nations. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4653.)

——— The American Republics Strengthen Continental Security. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4259.)

——— Aspects of Point Four Progress. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4751.)

——— Berlin: City Between Two Worlds. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4747.)

——— Let Freedom Ring. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4443.)

——— Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1950-June 30, 1951. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4571.)

——— The Problem of Peace in Korea, an Oral Report by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. 4771.)

——— United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 1: 1950. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. [Unnumbered publication in new annual series to be cited UST.]

Library of Congress. Orientalia Division. Southeast Asia; an Annotated Bibliography of Selected Reference Sources, Compiled by Cecil Hobbs. Washington, 1952.

——— Reference Department. International Economic and Social Development; a Selective Background Reading List. . . Washington, 1952.

Mutual Security Administration. The Mutual Security Program. Second Report to the Congress for the Six Months Ending June 30, 1952. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Geschichtswissenschaft. By FRITZ WAGNER. (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber. 1951. Pp. viii, 468. DM 18.)

The present volume is the first in a series entitled "Orbis Academicus," a major publishing enterprise under the general editorship of Fritz Wagner and Richard Brodführer. German science as an institution has suffered

a serious break of continuity through the National Socialist interference with academic organization and personnel. The "Orbis Academicus," in each of its volumes, surveys the "history of problems" of one of the sciences, in order to take stock of the present state and to show the development leading up to it. It will be an indispensable means of

orientation for the younger generation of German scholars who suffer from "loss of memory" through the interruption; but it also will be a valuable aid to every scholar in search of information on the development and state of problems in his science.

The volume on *Geschichtswissenschaft* is edited by Fritz Wagner, Professor of Modern History at the University of Marburg. It assembles the sources concerning the principles of a "science of history" from antiquity to the present. The editor does not too well define in his otherwise excellent introductory notes what he means by "science of history," but the actual selections as well as the incidental comments show that negatively he wants to narrow his task to "critical" history, thus excluding uncritical, annalistic historiography and the constructions of a philosophy of history. Positively he sees the "critical" trend running toward a penetration of historical materials by the principles of a philosophical anthropology. This delimitation of his task determines the proportions of the work. The selections from classic and medieval authors, from the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods fill about one half of the text; the other half is devoted to the period from Savigny's historical school to the first World War. In the second part the heaviest accents fall on "Germany's Classic Contribution," with ample selections from Ranke and Droysen, and on "Historism," with equally generous selections from Dilthey, York-Wartenburg, Troeltsch and Max Weber. Between these two pillars are placed the positivistic and Marxist sources, and a section on the "Struggle for the Concept of Culture" containing, among others, very interesting passages from such American historians as Marsh, Parker and McMaster.

There is not much sense in quarreling with the editor about this or that detail of his preferences. Where the limitations of the enterprise lie the reader will easily discover when he compares the Greek section in Wagner's volume with Toynbee's "Greek Historical Thought." The work as it stands is an important source book on principles of critical history, without a rival. The American reader will find it most useful as a convenient manual, practically complete, of the German contributions to the problem from Ranke to the present. The value of the book is materially enhanced by a voluminous critical bibliography (pp. 391-438) and an equally careful bio-

graphical dictionary (pp. 439-463).—ERIC VOEGELIN, *Louisiana State University*.

That Grand Whig, Milton. By GEORGE F. SENSABAUGH. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 222. \$4.00.)

John Milton has sometimes been ranked with such contemporaries of his as Thomas Hobbes, James Harrington, John Lilburne, and Sir Robert Filmer. But it has long been suspected that his position as a political theorist rests upon his unquestioned reputation as a literary genius. In fact, the author of the present study accepts the well-known view that the poet's role in the Puritan Rebellion was minor and unimportant.

"What is not known is how, . . . during . . . the period from the Restoration . . . to . . . Queen Anne, his opinions gained ground and silently won for him many disciples, some of whom stood high in Whig councils." Mr. Sensabaugh continues that "this study therefore purposes to trace the impact of Milton's arguments in the battle of ideas which led to the acceptance of the [Revolutionary] Settlement and the Bill of Rights." He takes the title of his book from the fact that before the Whigs adopted Milton, Tories already called him "that grand Whig, Milton." He feels that he earned the right to the title long before John Locke justified the Glorious Revolution. Well could Milton be cited at the time, since he had blended ideas derived from the English common law, Scripture, the law of nature, and the classical Greek and Roman republics.

The author has exhaustively examined sermons, newspapers, broadsides, and editions of Milton's prose tracts to support his thesis. In that process he has made a significant contribution to our knowledge of an important period in Western political thought.

When the author speaks, however, of Milton's revolutionary program as being connected with the basic pattern of seventeenth-century conflict, there is question as to whether this struggle was quite as simple as Mr. Sensabaugh seems to make it. The Civil War involved more than the questions of "liberty of conscience and the power of Kings." As Professor McIlwain has shown, it was no "clear-cut issue between despotism and freedom. Men on the one side looked to the ancient legal rights endangered by a king who could invade them with impunity; men on the other resisted every tendency to impose on a king checks which had never been imposed

before." An awareness of this generally accepted interpretation would have made more meaningful the discussion of the use of Bracton in this period. Furthermore, it is an oversimplification to link without qualification the Roman jurists with Filmer and James I. And it is wrong to claim that the achievement of toleration rested upon the "medieval separation of Church and State."—GUY HOWARD DODGE, *Brown University*.

Introduction to Political Philosophy. BY WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc. 1952. Pp. xi, 330. \$4.00.)

Basically a re-issue of the author's earlier work, *Great Political Thinkers*, omitting the selections from original sources and retaining and linking together the introductory essays. The coverage extends from Plato to Freud. The bibliography of some sixty pages is of considerable value.

Moral Principles of Action. PLANNED AND EDITED BY RUTH NANDA ANSHEN. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xii, 720. \$7.50.)

A collection of essays by distinguished and contemporary scholars including M. C. D'Arcy, Werner Jaeger, Robert MacIver, Jacques Maritain, and F. S. C. Northrop on the problems of ethics and value and their relation to contemporary social and political problems. Volume VI in the Science of Culture Series.

The Two Sovereignities; A Study of the Relationship between Church and State. BY JOSEPH LECLER. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. x, 186. \$3.75.)

In this book Fr. Joseph Lecler, S.J., Professor at the *Institut Catholique* in Paris and editor of *Etudes* deals with the problem of the relationship between church and state from the time of the Romans to the present. The analysis and conclusions are presented from the Roman Catholic point of view and represent a balanced and authoritative statement of that position.

The Islamic State and Other Political Essays. BY AJIT KUMAR SEN. (Calcutta: Thacker Spink. 1950. Pp. ii, 141.)

A series of essays on Islamic and Hindu

political thought, the government of Pakistan, and the relation of psychology, individualism, religion and science to modern political thought, by a member of the faculty of Calcutta University.

John Locke; The Second Treatise of Government. EDITED BY THOMAS P. PEARDON. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 139. \$0.75.)

A paper-back reprinting of the text of the 6th edition of Locke's *Second Treatise* (1764) with modern spelling, annotations, an introduction and a bibliography.

Bentham's Handbook of Political Fallacies. EDITED BY HAROLD A. LARRABEE. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. xxxii, 269. \$4.75.)

A revised and edited edition of Bentham's *The Book of Fallacies*, originally published in London in 1824, with a preface by the editor. Bentham's meanings are preserved, but his English is simplified.

Theory of Legislation; An Essay on the Dynamics of Public Mind. BY E. JORDAN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. 486. \$7.00.)

The reprinting with a new preface of a philosophical treatise on legislation which was originally published in 1930 by the Progress Publishing Company, Indianapolis.

Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates. BY FRIEDRICH AUGUST FREIHERR VON DER HEYDTE. (Regensburg, Germany: Josef Habel. 1952. Pp. viii, 475.)

The author examines carefully and thoroughly political and legal theories of 1250-1350 and comes to the conclusion that that was the period in which foundations were laid for the modern sovereign state and modern international law.

The Structure of Society. BY MARION J. LEVY, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xvii, 584. \$5.00.)

A technical and detailed conceptual scheme and theoretical system for the comparative analysis of societies, termed by the author a "structural-functional analysis."

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
POLITICAL THEORY

FRANCIS G. WILSON

University of Illinois

History and Criticism

Agus, Irving A. Democracy in the Communities of the Early Middle Ages. *Jewish Quarterly Review*. October, 1952.

Alföldi, A. Die Geburt der Kaiserlichen Bildsymbolik. *Museum Helveticum*. October, 1952.

Altaner, Berthold. Augustinus in der Griechischen Kirche bis auf Photius. *Historisches Jahrbuch*. 71/1952.

Arias Ramos, José. Un Curioso Cargo en la Burocracia Bizantina: el Quaesitor. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1952.

Barrière, Pierre. L'Expérience Italienne de Montesquieu. *Rivista di Letterature Moderne*. January-March, 1952.

Bassis, Henri. Diderot, Théoricien du Réalisme. *Europe*. October, 1952.

Bertier, F. L'Idéologie Politique des Frères Musulman. *Le Temps Modernes*. September, 1952.

Borst, A. Neue Funde und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Katharer. *Historische Zeitschrift*. August, 1952.

Burdeau, G. L'Allegorie Nationale. Essai sur la Notion du Peuple dans la Démocratie Classique. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. January-March, 1952.

Büttner, Heinrich. Aus den Anfängen des Abendländischen Staatsgedankens. Die Königserhebung Pippins. *Historisches Jahrbuch*. 71/1952.

Brown, Robert E. Democracy in Colonial Massachusetts. *New England Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Brunet, Michel. The Secret Ballot Issue in Massachusetts Politics from 1851 to 1853. *New England Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Calamandrei, Mauro. Neglected Aspects of Roger Williams' Thought. *Church History*. September, 1952.

Cherry, George L. The Legal and Philosophical Position of the Jacobites, 1688-1689. *Journal of Modern History*. December, 1950.

Chevalier, Jean Jacques. Una Gran Obra Política: las "Memorias" de Luis XIV. *Arbor*. July-August, 1952.

Cohn, Norman. The Saint-Simonian Portent. *Twentieth Century*. October, 1952.

Corrêa, M. Pio. Ensaios de História da Administração. *Revista do Serviço Público*. February, 1952.

Cranston, Maurice. John Locke's Politics. *History Today*. September, 1952.

Crocker, L. G. Pensée XIX of Diderot. *Modern Language Notes*. November, 1952.

Diamond, Sigmund. Bunker Hill, Tory Propaganda and Adam Smith. *New England Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Dodd, Mary C. The Rhetorics in Molesworth's Edition of Hobbes. *Modern Philology*. August, 1952.

Drexler, Hans. Zur Frage der "Schuld" des Tiberius Gracchus. *Emerita*. XIX/1-2. 1951.

Dunlop, D. M. Al-Fārābī's Aphorisms of the Statesman. *Iraq*. Autumn, 1952.

Eaton, Clement. Southern Senators and the Right of Instruction, 1789-1860. *Journal of Southern History*. August, 1952.

Eayrs, James. The Political Ideas of the English Agrarians, 1775-1815. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1952.

Farrington, Benjamin. La Amistad Epicúrea. *Notas y Estudios de Filosofía*. April-June, 1952.

Guihéneuf, Robert. Psychologie Individuelle et Psychologie Social dans l'Oeuvre de Schumpeter. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. July-September, 1952.

Hammond, N. G. L. The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in Other Parts of Thucydides I. *Classical Quarterly*. July-October, 1952.

Harris, Abram L. John R. Commons and the Welfare State. *Southern Economic Journal*. October, 1952.

Herriott, J. Homer. The Ten Senses in the "Siete Partidas." *Hispanic Review*. October, 1952.

Hodgen, Margaret T. Montaigne and Shakespeare Again. *Huntington Library Quarterly*. November, 1952.

Hogarth, H. Bergson's Spiritual Pilgrimage. *Hibbert Journal*. October, 1952.

Jacobson, Nolan Pliny. The Predicament of

- Man in Zen Buddhism and Kierkegaard. *Philosophy East and West*. October, 1952.
- Jacquot, Jean. Religion et Raison d'État dans l'Oeuvre de Fulke Greville. *Études Anglaises*. August, 1952.
- Kennedy, John J. Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.
- Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Humanism of Irving Babbitt. *Prairie Schooner*. Fall, 1952.
- Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind of Newman. *Sewanee Review*. Autumn, 1952.
- Kirk, Russell. History Without Providence: Henry and Brooks Adams. *Dublin Review*. Third Quarter, 1952.
- Kirk, Russell. Randolph of Roanoke and the Mind of the South. *History Today*. September, 1952.
- Knocke, Ulrich. Die Augusteische Ausprägung der Dea Roma. *Gymnasium*. October, 1952.
- Kochan, Lionel. Acton on History. *Cambridge Journal*. September, 1952.
- Koebner, R. The Emergence of the Concept of Imperialism. *Cambridge Journal*. September, 1952.
- Kridl, Manfred. Two Champions of a New Christianity: Lamennais and Michiewicz. *Comparative Literature*. Summer, 1952.
- Lévy, D. Un Régime Dépassé: l'Absolutisme. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. April-June, 1952.
- Lewis, Gordon K. Fabian Socialism; Some Aspects of Theory and Practice. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1952.
- Lough, J. The *Encyclopédie* in Eighteenth-Century England. *French Studies*. October, 1952.
- Low, J. M. An Eighteenth Century Controversy in the Theory of Economic Progress. *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*. September, 1952.
- Löwith, Karl. Jacob Burckhardt. *Der Monat*. September, 1952.
- Mackenzie, R. T. Laski and the Social Bases of the Constitution. *British Journal of Sociology*. September, 1952.
- Maravall, José Antonio. El Descubrimiento de América en la Historia de Pensamiento Político. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1952.
- Matthews, Thomas. Rafael Altamira: An Appreciation. *Hispanic American Historical Review*. August, 1952.
- Mattingly, Harold. Tacitus. *History Today*. September, 1952.
- Morrall, John B. William of Ockham as a Political Thinker. *Cambridge Journal*. September, 1952.
- Paoli, J. Les Définitions Varroniennes des Jours Fastes et Néfastes. *Revue Historique de Droit Française et Étrangère*. 30/3. 1952.
- Papini, Giovanni. Leonardo e il Savonarola. *Nuova Antologia*. October, 1952.
- Popkin, Richard H. David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy. *Review of Metaphysics*. September, 1952.
- Rezzani, Maria. I Problemi Fondamentali del "Sofista" di Platone. *Sophia*. XX/3-4. 1952.
- Rice, Eugene F. John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural. *Harvard Theological Review*. July, 1952.
- Roebuck, Carl. A Search for Political Stability: Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*. *Phoenix*. Summer, 1952.
- Rosdolsky, Roman. On the Nature of Peasant Serfdom in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Central European Affairs*. July, 1952.
- Roy, N. B. How the Great Mughals Governed India. *Modern Review*. September, 1952.
- Sabine, George H. The Two Democratic Traditions. *Philosophical Review*. October, 1952.
- Schröder, Franz Rolf. Jacob Burckhardt. *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*. October, 1952.
- Scoville, Warren C. The Huguenots and the Diffusion of Technology (II). *Journal of Political Economy*. October, 1952.
- Serrano, Manuel Dualdi. Las Cortes Valencianas durante El Reinado de Fernando e Isabel. *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos*. January-April, 1952.
- Shouse, J. B. David Hume and William James: A Comparison. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. October, 1952.
- Siegel, Paul N. English Humanism and the New Tudor Aristocracy. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. October, 1952.
- Sorenson, Lloyd R. Some Classical Economists, Laissez Faire, and the Factory Acts. *Journal of Economic History*. Summer, 1952.
- Starr, Chester G., Jr. The Perfect Democracy of the Roman Empire. *American Historical Review*. October, 1952.
- Stovall, Floyd. Whitman, Shakespeare and Democracy. *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*. October, 1952.
- Strauss, Leo. On Locke's Doctrine of Natural Right. *Philosophical Review*. October, 1952.

Tabacco, Giovanni. Gli Antecedenti della Politica Francese di Papa Giovanni XXII. *Archivio Storico Italiano*. 897/1951.

Verpeaux, J. Byzance et l'Humanisme. *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*. October, 1952.

Viereck, Peter. The Revolution in Values: Roots of the European Catastrophe, 1870-1952. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Wagner, Helmut R. Mannheim's Historicism. *Social Research*. September, 1952.

Wheeler, Marcus. Cicero's Political Ideal. *Greece and Rome*. June, 1952.

Woodall, John Burwell. Henri Bellot des Minières, Republican Bishop of Poitiers, 1881-1888. *Catholic Historical Review*. October, 1952.

Legal Theory and Public Law Issues

Carlston, Kenneth S. Theory of the Arbitration Process. *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Autumn, 1952.

Cossio, Carlos. Panorama der Egoologischen Rechtslehre. *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*. XL/2. 1952.

Cowen, Zelman. Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Change. *Australian Law Journal*. September 22, 1952.

Dickinson, Edwin D. The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. October, 1952.

Grazia, Alfred de. General Theory of Apportionment. *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Spring, 1952.

Manner, George. The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1952.

Mukhopadhyaya, Rani. Harold Laski's Concept of Law. *Modern Review*. September, 1952.

Nutting, Charles B. The Framework of Freedom. *Temple Law Quarterly*. Fall, 1953.

O'Brian, John Lord. New Encroachments on Individual Freedom. *Harvard Law Review*. November, 1952.

Pound, R. Lo Sviluppo e la Deviazione del Diritto Americano dal Diritto Inglese, *Il Politico*. September, 1952.

Schneider, Peter. Zur Rechts- und Soziallehre Dietrich Schindlers. *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*. XL/2. 1952.

Serna Favre, J. G. de la. Filósofos Modernos del Derecho: Felix Kaufmann. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1952.

Vecchio, Giorgio del. Vom Wesen des Naturrechts—Das Ringen der Rechtswissenschaft um das Naturrecht. *Universitas*. October, 1952.

Special Study and Analysis

Alban-Vistel. Fondements Spirituels de la Résistance. *Esprit*. October, 1952.

Alcorta, José Ignaci. Existencia, Libertad y Opción en el Existencialismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1952.

Anderson, C. Arnold. Soviet Russia and the Nature of Society. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Andreae, Wilhelm. Kritik des Liberalismus. *Neues Abendland*. October, 1952.

Aron, R. Remarques sur la Pensée Politique d'Alain. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. April-June, 1952.

Asmussen, Hans. Sacrum Imperium? *Neues Abendland*. October, 1952.

Ayres, C. E. Creeping Socialism: A Worm's View. *Southwest Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Beck, Curt F. Can Communism and Democracy Coexist? Benes's Answer. *American Slavic and East European Review*. October, 1952.

Becker, Howard. Science, Culture and Society. *Philosophy of Science*. October, 1952.

Berger, G. La Philosophie de John Dewey. *Études Philosophiques*. VII/1-2. 1952.

Bernard, Jesse. Scientists and the Paradox of Power. *Social Forces*. October, 1952.

Bestor, Arthur E., Jr. Aimlessness in Education. *Scientific Monthly*. August, 1952.

Bock, Kenneth E. Evolution and Historical Process. *American Anthropologist*. October-December, 1952.

Böttcher, Karl Wilhelm. Idées et Perspectives du "Bloc des Classes Moyennes." *Documents*. September, 1952.

Boyd, Julian P. The Fear of Ideas. *American Scholar*. Autumn, 1952.

Braun, Siegfried. Demokratie und Todesstrafe. *Frankfurter Hefte*. October, 1952.

Brownell, Baker. The Dilemma of Higher Education. *Journal of Higher Education*. October, 1952.

Brosen, Yale. The Value of Technological Change. *Ethics*. July, 1952.

Bruhns, Fred C. The Appeal of Communism. *Pacific Spectator*. Autumn, 1952.

Cairns, John C. The Historian in the Western World. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. October, 1952.

- Carr, Edward H. Propaganda and Power. *Yale Review*. Autumn, 1952.
- Castejón, Frederico. La Tortura Moderna y su Supresión. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1952.
- Catlin, George. The Role of Political Propaganda. *University of Kansas City Review*. Autumn, 1952.
- Chastaing, M. Existentialisme et Imposture. *La Vie Intellectuelle*. November, 1952.
- Chiaromonte, Nicola. Sartre vs. Camus: A Political Quarrel. *Partisan Review*. November-December, 1952.
- Conant, James Bryant. Education and Liberty: A Look Ahead. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1952.
- Conover, Milton. Thomistic Government in Practice. *Seton Review*. September, 1952.
- Dawson, Christopher. La Tradición Norteamericana. *Estudios Americanos*. June, 1952.
- Dillard, Hardy C. Nationalism: Midcentury Puzzle. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1952.
- Diplomaticus. Stalinist Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.
- Douglas, William O. America's Power of Ideals. *Social Research*. September, 1952.
- Dubarle, Domingo. Cultura y Laicismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1952.
- Ellis, John Tracy. Church and State in the United States: A Critical Appraisal. *Catholic Historical Review*. October, 1952.
- Ellul, Jacques. Propagande et Démocratie. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. July-September, 1952.
- English, Raymond. Conservatism: The Forbidden Faith. *American Scholar*. Autumn, 1952.
- Figueres, Léo. Une Forme de la Démocratie Socialiste: le Pouvoir de Démocratie Populaire. *Cahiers du Communisme*. September, 1952.
- Fleming, Marcus. A Cardinal Concept of Welfare. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. August, 1952.
- Franck, Peter G. Economic Nationalism in the Middle East. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1952.
- Gotesky, Rubin. The Nature of Myth in Society. *American Anthropologist*. October-December, 1952.
- Gotschalk, D. W. Value Science. *Philosophy of Science*. July, 1952.
- Grant, George P. Pursuit of an Illusion; A Commentary on Bertrand Russell. *Dalhousie Review*. Summer, 1952.
- Greenwood, Thomas. Der Geist der Geopolitik. *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. October, 1952.
- Grene, Marjorie. Authenticity: An Existential Virtue. *Ethics*. July, 1952.
- Guérard, Albert. Our Democracy—How Can It Be Improved? *Pacific Spectator*. Autumn, 1952.
- Hallowell, John H. Politics: Art or Science? *Theology Today*. October, 1952.
- Hardon, John A. The Dewey Legend in American Education. *Catholic Educational Review*. November, 1952.
- Hardon, John A. John Dewey—Radical Social Educator. *Catholic Educational Review*. October, 1952.
- Herberg, Will. The Sectarian Conflict over Church and State. *Commentary*. November, 1952.
- Hollis, Christopher. Political and Economic Power. *Politeia*. IV/1. 1952.
- Huygue, René. La Pensée Médiévale et le Monde Moderne. *Cahiers du Sud*. No. 312, 1952.
- Jaeger, Hans. Die faschistische Internationale. *Deutsche Rundschau*. 78/10. 1952.
- Jankélévitch, V. Machiavélisme et Modernité. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. January-March, 1952.
- Jones, W. H. M. Politicians and Generals. *Cambridge Journal*. October, 1952.
- Kaufmann, Otto. Die Erhaltung des Bäuerlichen Grundbesitzes im Lichte der Christlichen Soziallehre. *Politeia*. III/3-4. 1951.
- Kirby, H. Stuart. The Reception of Western Economics in the Orient. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. August, 1952.
- Kristol, Irving. Ordeal by Mendacity. *Twentieth Century*. October, 1952.
- Kublin, Hyman. The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War. *Journal of Modern History*. December, 1950.
- Lasswell, Harold D. L'Analyse du Contenu et le Language de la Politique. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. July-September, 1952.
- Leduc, Victor. Jules Moch, le Dernier en Date des "Théoriciens" de l'Antimarxisme. *Cahiers du Communisme*. October, 1952.
- Leduc, Victor. Quelques Problèmes d'une Sociologie du Fascisme. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*. 1952.

Lefort, Claude. Sociétés sans Histoire et Historicité. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*. 1952.

Leibholz, G. Démocratie Représentative et État de Partis Moderne. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. January-March, 1952.

Leoni, B. Individualismo, Socialismo ed Altri Concetti Politici. *Il Politico*. September, 1952.

Lerner, Max. Big Technology and Neutral Technicians. *American Quarterly*. Summer, 1952.

Loveday, Arthur F. ¡Arriba España! *Quarterly Review*. October, 1952.

Messineo, A. Tolleranza Politica e Democrazia. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. 16 August 1952.

Messineo, A. Tolleranza Politica e Pensiero Cattolico. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. 4 October 1952.

Mowat, C. L. The Approach to the Welfare State in Great Britain. *American Historical Review*. October, 1952.

Natanson, Maurice. Jean-Paul Sartre's Philosophy of Freedom. *Social Research*. September, 1952.

Nisbet, Robert A. Conservatism and Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*. September, 1952.

Opocher, Enrico. Genesis of Totalitarianism in Democratic Societies. *Confluence*. September, 1952.

Panter-Briek, K. Redistribution of Wealth. *Political Quarterly*. October-December, 1952.

Parsons, Kenneth H. Land, Liberty and Communism. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Poblete Troncoso, Moisés. Los Derechos Humanos y las Naciones Unidas. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*. XIV/2. 1952.

Poliakov, L. Launching the New Fascist International. *Commentary*. November, 1952.

Popper, K. R. The Nature of Philosophical Problems and their Roots in Science. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. August, 1952.

Portilla, Jorge. La Crisis Espiritual de los Estados Unidos. *Cuadernos Americanos*. September-October, 1952.

Ricoeur, Paul. Christianity and the Meaning of History. *Journal of Religion*. October, 1952.

Roesslé, L. L'Agriculture et la Personne. *Politica*. III/3-4. 1951.

Roy, M. N. Asian Nationalism. *Yale Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Sjöberg, Gideon. Folk and "Feudal" Societies. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Skerpan, Alfred A. Aspects of Soviet Antisemitism. *Antioch Review*. Fall, 1952.

Smith, James Morton. The Sedition Law, Free Speech, and the American Political Process. *William and Mary Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Sotiroff, G. Introductory Note to an Economic Theory of War and Peace. *Kyklos*. V/1-2. 1951.

Stählin, Wilhelm. Die Christlichen Gruendlagen des Abendlandes. *Neues Abendland*. November, 1952.

Stallknecht, Newton P. Decision and Existence. *Review of Metaphysics*. September, 1952.

Stokes, William S. Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Tauber, Kurt P. Nationalism and Self-Defense. *Ethics*. July, 1952.

Tugwell, R. G. The New Deal: The Rise of Business, Part II. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

United States. La Gauche Americaine. [Various Articles] *Esprit*. November, 1952.

Utiley, T. E. I Principi Astratti e l'Empirismo in Politica. *Il Politico*. September, 1952.

Viereck, Peter. "Bloody-Minded Professors": The Anti-Social Role of Some Intellectuals. *Confluence*. September, 1952.

Viereck, Peter. Will America Prove Marx Right? *Antioch Review*. Fall, 1952.

Vito, F. La "Controversia Metodologica" nel Clima Scientifico del Secolo XX. *Revista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*. July-August, 1952.

Wahrhaftig, S. L. Der Weg der Sozialdemokraten. *Frankfurter Hefte*. November, 1952.

Wittram, Reinhard. Der Nationalismus als Forschungsaufgabe. *Historische Zeitschrift*. August, 1952.

Wolfe, Bertrand D. Operation Rewrite: The Agony of Soviet Historians. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1952.

Woodhouse, A. S. P. Religion and Some Foundations of English Democracy. *Philosophical Review*. October, 1952.

Ycaza Tigerino, Julio. Hispanidad y Nueva Cristianidad. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1952.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

Bernard, Jessie. Scientists and the Paradox of Power. *Social Forces*. October, 1952.

Deutsch, Karl W. Communication Theory and Social Science. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. July, 1952.

Giuliani, A. Positivismo Logico e Scienza Politica. *Politico*. December, 1951.

James, Preston E. Toward a Further Understanding of the Regional Concept. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. September, 1952.

Leclercq, J. Science et Sciences Politiques. *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*. May-June, 1952.

Lindesmith, Alfred R. and Strauss, Anselm L. Comparative Psychology and Social Psychology. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Martin, Roscoe C. Political Science and Public Administration. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. September, 1952.

Nett, Roger. System Building in Sociology—a Methodological Analysis. *Social Forces*. October, 1952.

Prawdin, Michael. Geschichte und Politische Wissenschaft. *Aussenpolitik*. June, 1952.

Rose, Arnold M. The Potential Contribution of Sociological Theory and Research to Economics. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Research Methods and Organization

Hovland, Carl I., and Sherif, Muzafer. Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Item Displacement in Thurstone Scales. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

La Rochette, Joé. La Psychologie des Peuples et L'Etude du Langage. *Revue de Psychologie des Peuples*. 1952, #2.

Macridis, Roy C. Comparative Politics: Method and Research. *Items* (Social Science Research Council). December, 1952.

Marchal, André. L'Empirisme Statistique, Ses Insuffisances et Ses Dangers. *Revue de L'Institut de Sociologie*. 1951.

Orcutt, Guy H. Actions, Consequences and Causal Relations. *Review of Economics and Statistics*. November, 1952.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. 1951.

Smith, Frederick E. Experimental Methods in Population Dynamics: A Critique. *Ecology*. October, 1952.

Smith, Wendell I. and Ross, Sherman. The Social Behavior of Vertebrates: A Review of the Literature (1939-1950). *Psychological Bulletin*. November, 1952.

Motivation and Personality

Bendix, Reinhard. Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Boyd, George Felix. The Levels of Aspiration of White and Negro Children in a Non-Segregated Elementary School. *Journal of Social Psychology*. November, 1952.

Holtzman, Wayne H. Adjustment and Leadership: A Study of the Rorschach Test. *Journal of Social Psychology*. November, 1952.

Lauterbach, Albert. Socioeconomic Instability and Personal Insecurity. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Sakoda, James M. Factor Analysis of OSS Situational Tests. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

Thibaut, John W. and Coules, John. The Role of Communication in the Reduction of Interpersonal Hostility. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

Weinberg, S. Kirson. Personality and the Soviet Society. *American Journal of Economic and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Weschler, Irving R., Kahane, Murray, and Tannenbaum, Robert. Job Satisfaction, Productivity and Morale: A Case Study. *Occupational Psychology*. 1952, #1.

Wilson, J. R. Maximization and Business Behavior. *The Economic Record*. May, 1952.

Wolpe, Joseph. Experimental Neuroses as Learned Behavior. *British Journal of Psychology, General Section*. November, 1952.

Opinions and Attitudes

Davies, James C. Some Relations Between Events and Attitudes. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. September, 1952.

Evans, Richard I. Personal Values as Factors in Anti-Semitism. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

French, Thomas M. Psychodynamic Analysis of Ethical and Political Orientations. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Grace, Gloria Lauer, and Grace, Harry A. The Relationship Between Verbal and Behavioral Measures of Value. *Journal of Educational Research*. October, 1952.

Klineberg, O. L'Etude Scientifique des Stéréotypes Nationaux. *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales*. Autumn, 1951.

Lambert, Wallace E. Comparison of French and American Modes of Response to the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. *Social Forces*. December, 1952.

Morse, Nancy C. and Allport, Floyd H. The Causation of Anti-Semitism: An Investigation of Seven Hypotheses. *Journal of Psychology*. October, 1952.

Piaget, J. and Weil, A. M. Le Développement chez L'Enfant de L'Idée de Patrie et des Relations avec L'Etranger. *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales*. Autumn, 1951.

Westie, Frank R. Negro-White Status Differentials and Social Distance. *American Sociological Review*. October, 1952.

Group Behavior

Argyle, Michael. Methods of Studying Small Groups. *British Journal of Psychology, General Section*. November, 1952.

Fiedler, Fred E.; Warrington, Willard G.; and Blaisdell, Francis J. Unconscious Attitudes as Correlates of Sociometric Choice in a Social Group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. The Independent Vote: Measurement, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. September, 1952.

Goguel, F. Pour Une Etude Scientifique de L'Abstentionnisme Électoral. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1952.

Gordon, Leonard V. Personal Factors in Leadership. *Journal of Social Psychology*. November, 1952.

Janowitz, Morris and Miller, Warren. The Index of Political Predisposition in the 1948 Election. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1952.

Josephson, Eric. Irrational Leadership in Formal Organizations. *Social Forces*. December, 1952.

Lovell, Hugh G. The Pressure Level in Mediation. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. October, 1952.

Martin, William E.; Gross, Neal; and Darley, John G. Studies of Group Behavior: Leaders, Followers, and Isolates in Small Organized Groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. October, 1952.

Martin, William E.; Darley, John G.; and Gross, Neal. Studies of Group Behavior II. Methodological Problems in the Study of Interrelationships of Group Members. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*. Winter, 1952.

Moore, Wilbert E. and Synder, Richard C. The Conference on Theory of Organization. *Items* (Social Science Research Council). December, 1952.

Nilson, S. S. Le Problème des Électeurs Indécis. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1952.

Richardson, Helen M. and Hanawalt, Nelson G. Leadership as Related to the Bernreuter Personality Measures: V. *Journal of Social Psychology*. November, 1952.

Riley, Matilda White; Riley, John W., Jr.; and Toby, Marcia L. The Measurement of Consensus. *Social Forces*. December, 1952.

Simon, Herbert A. A Comparison of Organization Theories. *The Review of Economic Studies*. 1952-53. #1.

Stephan, Frederick F. and Mishler, Elliot G. The Distribution of Participation in Small Groups: An Exponential Approximation. *American Sociological Review*. October, 1952.

Strauss, George and Sayles, Leonard R. Patterns of Participation in Local Unions. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. October, 1952.

Culture and Institutions

Aubert, Vilhelm. White-Collar Crime and Social Structure. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Bates, Frederick L. Status and Priority as Tests of Democratic Society: An Operational Analysis. *Social Forces*. October, 1952.

Berliner, Joseph S. The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. August, 1952.

Bettelheim, Bruno. Remarks on the Psychological Appeal of Totalitarianism. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Bie, P. de. Quelques Aspects Psychologiques du Benelux. *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales*. Autumn, 1951.

Brunner, Elizabeth. Competition and the Theory of the Firm. *Economia Internazionale*. August, 1952.

De Smet, R. La Geographie Electorale en Belgique. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1952.

Gotesky, Rubin. The Nature of Myth and Society. *American Anthropologist*. October-December, 1952.

Heberle, Rudolf. On Political Ecology. *Social Forces*. October, 1952.

Hoselitz, Bert F. Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Katona, George and Klein, Lawrence R. Psychological Data in Business Cycle Research. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Kolaja, Jiri. A Sociological Note on the Czechoslovak Anti-Communist Refugee. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Lohman, Joseph D. and Reitzes, Dietrich C. Note on Race Relations in Mass Society. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Moore, Omar K. Nominal Definitions of "Culture." *Philosophy of Science*. October, 1952.

Moore, Omar K. and Lewis, Donald J. Learning Theory and Culture. *Psychological Review*. September, 1952.

Schneider, Louis and Sverre Lysgaard. Deficiency and Conflict in Industrial Sociology. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1952.

Stone, Robert C. Conflicting Approaches to the Study of Worker-Manager Relations. *Social Forces*. December, 1952.

Swanson, Ernst W. Group Dominations and Economic and Political Instability. *Southern Economic Journal*. October, 1952.

Tesaro, A. I Sistemi Elettorali e le Recenti Esperienze Costituzionale. *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico*. November-December, 1951.

Truman, T. G. The Press and the 1951 Federal Elections. *Australian Quarterly*. December, 1951.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Edelman, Murray. Governmental Organization and Public Policy. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

Goodman, Leo A. and Markowitz, Harry. Social Welfare Functions Based on Individual Rankings. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1952.

Halperin, Jean. La Notion de Sécurité dans L'Histoire Economique et Sociale. *Revue D'Histoire Economique et Sociale*. 1952, #1.

Little, I. M. D. Social Choice and Individual Values. *Journal of Political Economy*. October, 1952.

Malinvaud, E. Note on von Neumann-Morgenstern's Strong Independence Axiom. *Econometrica*. October, 1952.

May, Kenneth O. A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision. *Econometrica*. October, 1952.

Neisser, Hans. The Strategy of Expecting the Worst. *Social Research*. September, 1952.

Samuelson, Paul A. Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom. *Econometrica*. October, 1952.

Scott, A. D. The Evaluation of Federal Grants. *Economica*. November, 1952.

Wold, H. Ordinal Preferences or Cardinal Utility? *Econometrica*. October, 1952.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

AARON, DANIEL (ED.). *America in Crisis*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xi, 363. \$4.00.

ANDREWS, EMERSON F. *Corporation Giving*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1952. Pp. 361. \$4.00.

BANNON, JOHN FRANCIS. *History of the Americas; Volume II, The American Nations*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 568. \$5.50.

BISNO, HERBERT. *The Philosophy of Social Work*. Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1952. Pp. x, 143. \$3.25.

BREWER, JOHN M. *Wellsprings of Democracy; Guidance for Local Societies*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xii, 232. \$4.50.

BUNKLEY, ALLISON WILLIAMS. *The Life of Sarmiento*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xv, 566. \$7.50.

- DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *Understanding Europe*. New York: Sheed & Ward. 1952. Pp. ix, 261. \$3.50.
- EDELMAN, MURRAY ET AL. *Channels of Employment; Influences on the Operations of Public Employment Offices and Other Hiring Channels in Local Job Markets*. Champaign, Illinois: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. 1952. Pp. 210. Paper \$2.50, cloth \$3.50.
- EGLER, WALTER P. *Economic Stabilization; Objectives, Rules and Mechanisms*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 264. \$4.00.
- HACKER, LOUIS M. AND ZAHLER, HELENE S. *The United States in the 20th Century*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1952. Pp. xvi, 695. \$5.50.
- HICKS, JOHN D. *The Federal Union; A History of the U.S. to 1865*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 2nd edition. 1952. Pp. vii, 698.
- JOHN, EVAN. *Atlantic Impact 1861*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1952. Pp. x, 296. \$3.75.
- JORDAN, GEORGE RACEY WITH STOKES, RICHARD L. *From Major Jordan's Diaries*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1952. Pp. 284. \$3.50.
- KOPPERS, WILHELM. *Primitive Man and His World Picture*. New York: Sheed & Ward. 1952. Pp. viii, 264. \$3.50.
- KOSTELSKI, Z. *The Yugoslavs*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xiii, 498. \$4.75.
- LEBOURDAIS, D. M. *Canada's Century*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. ix, 214. \$4.50.
- MARIANO, JOHN H. *A Psychoanalytic Lawyer Looks at Marriage and Divorce*. New York: Council on Marriage Relations. 1952. Pp. 276. \$3.00.
- MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *Surinam; Recommendations for a Ten Year Development Program*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. xix, 271. \$5.00.
- New York State Legislative Annual, 1952*. New York: New York Legislative Service. 1952. Pp. ix, 462. \$7.50.
- PILPEL, HARRIET F. AND ZAVIN, THEODORA. *Your Marriage and the Law*. New York: Rinehart & Co. 1952. Pp. xv, 358. \$3.95.
- RESWICK, WILLIAM. *I Dreamt Revolution*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. 328. \$4.50.
- SCHWARZ, SOLOMON M. *Labor in the Soviet Union*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. xviii, 364. \$6.00.
- SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. xvi, 406. \$7.50.
- SPIEGEL, HENRY WILLIAM. *The Development of Economic Thought; Great Economists in Perspective*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1952. Pp. xii, 811. \$6.50.
- TAYLOR, JACK. *Business and Government; An Introduction*. New York: Barnes & Noble. 1952. Pp. xiv, 322. \$1.75.
- THOMAS, BENJAMIN P. *Abraham Lincoln*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xxvi, 548.
- VAN VALKENBURG, SAMUEL AND HELD, COLBERT C. *Europe*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 2nd edition. 1952. Pp. xiv, 826. \$7.50.
- VINER, JACOB. *International Trade and Economic Development*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1952. Pp. 154. \$2.75.
- WALLACH, SIDNEY (ED.). *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy*. New York: Coward-McCann. 1952. Pp. xxxiv, 305. \$5.00.
- WILLIAMS, WILLIAM APPLEMAN. *American Russian Relations, 1781-1947*. New York: Rinehart & Company. 1952. Pp. 367. \$5.00.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Southern Political Science Association held its twenty-first annual meeting at the Hermitage Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee, November 6-8, 1952. Approximately 150 political scientists from southern colleges and universities attended the sessions.

Topics of the two opening panels were "Responsible Parties Abroad" and "Problems in State Government." Papers on Latin America, Asia, Germany, and Great Britain were read at the first panel. Federalism, interstate relations, the item veto, and state grants to local government were discussed at the second session. Activities of the first day were capped by the presidential address on "The Supreme Court, States' Rights, and Political Freedom in the South," delivered by Professor George Spicer of the University of Virginia.

Subjects considered during the second day included: "Recent Problems of International Law and Relations," "The Case Approach to Public Administration," "The Conflict of Liberty and Authority," and "Party Organization in the South: The Effects of the Campaigns of 1952." Under the latter topic, papers were presented on Louisiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, and North Carolina. At the luncheon on the second day, Senator Estes Kefauver spoke on the subject, "An Analysis of the Election Result." Other topics discussed during the meeting were "Cooperative Research and Education in the South" and "States' Rights."

Newly elected officers of the Association are: Charles B. Robson, University of North Carolina, president; Donald R. Larson, University of Miami, vice-president; Mavis A. Mann, West Virginia University, recording secretary; and Manning J. Dauer, University of Florida, secretary-treasurer and managing editor of the *Journal of Politics*. René de Visme Williamson, of the University of Tennessee, will continue as editor of the *Journal of Politics*.

A Regional Conference on Universities and World Affairs, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Council of World Affairs, was held at Cleveland, Ohio, November 20-21, 1952. Topics on the program included: "The Carnegie Endowment Program in Higher Education," "Interchange of Students and Specialists," "The

Impact of World Affairs on Instruction in the Social Sciences," "Undergraduate Courses in International Relations," "The Training of Specialists in International Relations," "Training of Personnel for Technical and Social Assistance," "Extra-Curricular Programs as a Part of Education in International Relations," and "Off-Campus Services in Adult Education."

The University of Southern California, in cooperation with the colleges and universities of the Pacific Area, sponsored the twenty-ninth Institute of World Affairs, held December 14-17, 1952, at the Mission Inn, Riverside, California. Charles E. Martin, professor of international law and political science, University of Washington, served as director of the Institute. The general theme of the meeting was "New Weapons for a New Diplomacy, United States Foreign Policy and Its Implementation." University of Southern California professors who participated included: Tracy E. Strevey, Ross N. Berkes, Carl Q. Christol, J. Eugene Harley, Donald W. Rowland, Richard W. Van Alstyne, Clifford A. L. Rich, Robert W. Oliver, David T. Cattell, John W. Reith, Wilbert L. Hindman, Arthur Carstens, Lawrence G. Guild, Theodore H. E. Chen, Bruce Adkinson, Totton J. Anderson, Russell L. Caldwell, Paul E. Hadley, and Norman R. Fertig. R. B. von Kleinsmid served as chancellor for the Institute.

An Institute on Military Factors in Foreign Policy was held at the Center for Continuation Study at the University of Minnesota, September 29-October 1, 1952. Major discussion topics included "Influence of Science and Technology on Military Factors," "Government Machinery for the Formulation and Administration of Foreign Policy," "Military Factors in Foreign Policy—The Elements of Power," and "Military Factors in Foreign Policy—Regional Considerations." Political scientists participating on the five panels were Lloyd M. Short, Charles H. McLaughlin, Benjamin Lippincott, Werner Levi, Dorothy Dodge and William C. Rogers—all of the University of Minnesota. Professors Royden Dangerfield of the University of Illinois,

Dorothy Jacobson of Macalester College, and Heinrich Rommen of St. Thomas College served as visiting participants. Professor William C. Rogers, Director of the Minnesota World Affairs Center, was in charge of the Institute. Copies of the proceedings may be secured from Professor Rogers.

The Third Annual Conference on the Caribbean was held at the University of Florida, December 18-20, 1952, under the sponsorship of the School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida, in cooperation with the Alcoa Steamship Company. During the three-day conference, five round tables were presented covering economic, social, literary and artistic, political and diplomatic, and peace and security trends in the Caribbean area. The panel of speakers included representatives from various American universities, U. S. government agencies, inter-American organizations, and professors and government officials from Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Colombia, and the British West Indies.

The American University, in cooperation with the American Political Science Association, will hold the Annual Institute for Teachers of Government and Administration at The American University, Washington, D. C., June 8-19, 1953. The Institute is designed to give college and university teaching faculty an opportunity to meet with leaders of official Washington and to participate in discussion of current political processes and developments with operating officials. The process of policy formation and decision making is emphasized. The teachers will be introduced to source materials for instruction and research which may not be available or cited in standard reference sources. The program is developed by a planning committee of political scientists with an understanding both of the needs of university teaching and of the facilities of the Nation's Capital. Inquiries concerning the Institute should be addressed to Lowell H. Hattery, The American University, 1901 F Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

"Responsibility and Action in Housing Development" was the subject of the Fifth Annual Institute on Problems of Government held at the University of Rhode Island on November 20, 1952. Following the keynote address, delivered by Coleman Woodbury, Norton Professor of Regional Planning at Harvard University, questions of housing, zoning and taxation, and assessment of

property were covered in a full day of panel discussions led by specialists in these fields. Although the Institute was open to the public, it was organized particularly for state and town officials, architects, constructors and real estate people. Extensive, new home-building developments and consideration of new zoning ordinances in many Rhode Island towns have made the subject of the Institute one of outstanding current interest in the State.

The Ninth International Congress of Administrative Sciences, convened by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, will be held in Istanbul, Turkey, September 2-10, 1953. The Institute's Scientific Committee and Committee on Administrative Practices will sponsor round-table discussions on topics such as international administrative jurisdiction, international administrative tribunals, grants-in-aid as techniques of administrative direction, the administration of economic development programs, standards of personal performance in government, organization and management problems, and case studies in the conduct of technical assistance programs. Detailed information may be obtained from Edwin Haelele, secretary of the U. S. Section of the Institute, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37.

The International Union of Local Authorities will hold its Eleventh Congress in Vienna, Austria, June 15-20, 1953. The main themes of the Congress will be: "The Large City and the Small Town: Their Strength and Their Weakness" and "Municipal Finance." Persons interested in attending may obtain details from Herbert Emmerich, chairman, U. S. Committee for International Municipal Cooperation, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37.

A meeting on the teaching of the social sciences was held at Unesco House, Paris, September 16-19, 1952. The meeting grew out of an inquiry conducted by the International Social Science Associations for the main disciplines of the social sciences. A report on the round-table conference held in April, 1952, in Cambridge, England, was published in the June, 1952 issue of this REVIEW. The Unesco House meeting was attended by twenty experts of the different disciplines from eleven countries. Representing political science were the president of IPSA, Professor W. A. Robson; one of its three vice-presidents, Professor Maurice Duverger (University of Bordeaux,

France); Professor Taylor Cole (Duke University); Professor T. Cavalcanti, president of the Brazilian Institute of Public Law and Political Science; and M. Jean Meynaud, secretary-general of IPSA. Professor M. Ginsberg (The London School of Economics and Political Science) was elected chairman, and M. Meynaud rapporteur.

For part of the sessions, discussion was carried on in three sub-committees: one on the status of the social sciences in universities (Professor Duverger, chairman); one on the role of the social sciences in general education and as a preparation for particular professions (Professor Robson, chairman); and one on the training and recruitment of professors and methods of teaching (Professor J. N. Hazard, Columbia University, chairman). Plenary

sessions discussed the reports submitted by each of the sub-committees and reached a certain number of conclusions aiming at the development and improvement of social science teaching.

UNESCO is to publish in 1953 a volume containing the overall reports set up under the responsibility of the International Associations (especially Professor Robson's report). Pamphlets on the teaching of social sciences within three of the surveyed countries (United States, France, and Great Britain) will also be published. The material gathered during this inquiry and the conclusions reached will be valuable, particularly for countries in which social science teaching has not yet been developed extensively.—J. MEYNAUD.

ANNUAL MEETING OF AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The thirty-sixth annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies met at Rye, New York, on January 20-23, 1953. All of the twenty-four constituent societies were represented by delegates, one from each society. Prior to this meeting, the annual conference of secretaries of the constituent societies was held; the secretaries also attended the sessions of the Council. Edward H. Litchfield represented the American Political Science Association as executive director and Kenneth Colegrove as delegate. Unlike usual annual meetings of the ACLS, no representatives of the foundations were present.

Cornelius Krusé, professor of philosophy of Wesleyan University, retired as chairman of the ACLS after service of five years in this post. President C. W. de Kiewiet, of the University of Rochester, was elected as his successor. On September 1, 1952, Dr. Charles E. Odegard, the executive-director, resigned. A veteran staff member, Mortimer Graves, has served as acting executive-director. The Board of Directors is now engaged in selecting a permanent executive-director.

During 1952, the Council received from various sources a total of \$981,421.26. Of this amount, it disbursed \$644,581.87. The treasurer's report will be published in the *Bulletin: American Council of Learned Societies* for March, 1953. A summary of the wide activities of the ACLS for the year 1952 follows in somewhat abbreviated form.

Standing Enterprises and Operations. Of

the standing enterprises of the ACLS, no progress can be reported on the *Linguistic Atlas of the United States and Canada*, although the search for funds for its continuation has been maintained. As to the *Dictionary of American Biography*, there is hope that publication of the supplementary volumes may be resumed. The first supplementary volume, published in 1944, brought the *Dictionary* down to December 31, 1935.

The Council's long continued interest in the study of Asia resulted in the production in the middle of 1951 of *A Program for the Improvement of American Understanding of Asian Civilizations*, comprising eight memoranda covering eight points in such a program. This was presented to the Ford Foundation, which organized its own program of fellowships in the amount of \$500,000 in 1952; it has just announced a similar program for the current year. For basic implementation of the study of Asian languages, including elementary texts, graded readings, and students' dictionaries, the Ford Foundation has made available to the ACLS the sum of \$250,000 over a three-year period beginning in 1952. The operation is now under way. Discussion with the Ford Foundation respecting the later elements of the eight-point program is proceeding, and there is every expectation that some of these will be actualized in the future.

The ACLS Committee on the Language Program continues the work begun under the various ACLS-U. S. Army language programs

during World War II. Its most significant operations are: (1) a program producing for the U. S. Department of State elementary textbooks for teaching English to speakers of eleven Asian and East European languages; (2) the new program in Asian language materials for Americans mentioned above; and (3) summer-study aids in linguistics.

The Committee on American Civilization was responsible for the organization of a series of Conferences on "Changes in Systems of Belief in the United States since World War I." The Committee on the History of Religions sponsored Professor Louis Massignon, of the Collège de France, in a series of lectures on Islamic Mysticism. It continued its editing of readers in the world's religious literatures. The first of these, *Buddhism: A Religion of Infinite Compassion*, was published early in 1952. The Committee on the Humanistic Aspects of Science carried on its work of preparing an annotated bibliography. The Committee on Musicology evaluated its Conference on Music in American Life.

The ACLS, in cooperation with the American Council on Education, the National Research Council, and the Social Science Research Council, continued to be represented on the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, the principal function of which is to advise concerning the selection of professors, lecturers, and research scholars for appointments under the Fulbright program. The Joint Committee on the Recovery of Archaeological Remains extended its activities beyond the borders of the United States by advising the Technical Co-operation Administration on establishing archaeological salvage programs in foreign countries under the Point Four Program. The two regional interests of the ACLS, the Southern Humanities Conference and the Pacific Coast Committee for the Humanities, continue to be restricted by lack of funds.

Fellowships. During 1952, the following awards were administered by the ACLS: 15 first-year graduate fellowships, 25 advanced graduate fellowships, 18 faculty study fellowships, 19 ACLS scholars' grants, and 45 summer study aids in linguistics. Lists of these awards have appeared in the *ACLS Newsletter*. The need to assist graduate students and faculty members in the fields of the humanities is much greater than the programs of aid available. Indeed, the ACLS, through lack of funds, will apparently not be able to operate any fellowship programs for 1953-1954, except the summer study aids in linguistics.

Personnel Studies Program. The ACLS Personnel Studies program has been largely occupied during the past year in completing the collection phase of the National Registration in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Altogether, some 27,000 schedules were received from 55,800 individuals queried. Altogether, twenty-three different societies, sixteen of them constituents of the ACLS, cooperated in the program. Fifteen separate classification checklists were devised. There were some complaints about the program, the more general ones concerning themselves with the use of humanistic scholars in connection with militaristic programs. The staff adviser attempted a formalized answer to objections of this kind which was embodied in an article entitled "Cast Out the Beam Out of Thine Own Eye," published in the May issue of the *ACLS Newsletter*.

Plans for the analysis of registration materials are going forward. The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics expects to produce a general statement with as much detail on separate fields as their numbers and importance in the view of government agencies seem to warrant. Additional analyses will be arranged if necessary by the ACLS, and in some cases cooperating societies are actively concerned. In addition to the basic analytical program, registration materials are being used experimentally for purposes of locating scholars with specific combinations of skills and experience. It is hoped that such use can be regularized and made more widely available.

Beyond these activities, a staff adviser has worked with the National Scientific Register, the National Science Foundation, the National Research Council, the Defense Manpower Administration, the Committee on Relationships with the Federal Government of the American Council on Education, and the United States Employment Service of the U. S. Department of Labor.

Publications. The ACLS has continued to explore the means for cheaper methods of manufacture of books in the interest of scholarly publication. The publications of the ACLS during the last two years have been reflections of these experiments in manufacture, and nearly all of the volumes on the list of publications during 1952 have been prepared on an IBM typewriter in the rooms over the garage at the rear of the ACLS offices, and have been brought up to the lithoprinter's camera with a minimum of expense. While the principal purpose of the operation has been to secure de-

pendable figures on costs, the enterprise has carried itself, including amortization of the initial capital outlay for equipment on an actuarial basis, besides providing composition at a low cost. A total of 7,247 pages has been prepared for the camera, of which 3,251 pages were produced in 1952. This service is available at a trifle over cost to the constituent societies.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the problem of scholarly publication is not limited solely to production. The question of distribution also looms large. During the coming months, emphasis will be placed on ways of reaching the potential market for scholarly books. Here, as with production, the ACLS is in a position to experiment with its own publications. As a first step, a list of all ACLS publications was included in the summer issue of the *Newsletter*, and subsequent issues have included mention of new books as they have appeared. The formulation of specialized mailing lists and direct approaches to college and university libraries are but two of the ways being considered to bring these publications to the attention of a wider public.

Area Studies. ACLS activities in the field which has come to be known, though unsatisfactorily, as "area studies" have been continuous over the past couple of decades and occupied a considerable part in the operations of 1952.

The Committee on Far Eastern Studies met once in Boston, on the occasion of the annual meetings of the American Oriental Society and the Far Eastern Association. Publication of *A List of Published Translations from Chinese into English, French, and German* (Part I, Literature exclusive of Poetry) was finally consummated. The Committee on Near Eastern Studies met twice, both times in New York. Progress was reported on enterprises already under way, such as the Near Eastern Translation Program and *Books and Periodicals in Western Languages Dealing with the Near and Middle East*. Elwell-Sutton's *Guide to Iranian Area Study* came from the press.

The Committee on Slavic Studies met once in New York. The Russian Translation Program and the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* proceeded throughout the year. The former, with twenty-one volumes published or in press, comes to an end with the year as a result of the termination of the subvention. The *Current Digest*, now in its fourth year, seems assured, through action of the Rockefeller Foundation and the East European

Fund, until 1958. The Committee sponsored a Conference on Soviet Economic Growth in New York on May 23-25, and is planning a similar Conference on Russian Intellectual History.

The Committee on South Asian Studies met once in New York. Under joint sponsorship with the Library of Congress, a quarterly accessions list, *Southern Asia: Publications in Western Languages*, appeared.

In the field of Canadian studies, members of the executive staff joined with representatives of the University of Rochester and invited specialists to discuss the question of intellectual relations between the United States and Canada.

For the decade prior to 1948, the ACLS maintained, either by itself or jointly with other Councils, a Committee on Latin American Studies. Recently, the question has been raised as to the advisability of reconstituting an ACLS committee in this field. On May 12, advantage was taken of another meeting of Latin American specialists in New Orleans to hold a conference of specialists from southern institutions. The conference produced an interesting discussion but no very significant proposals as to future operations.

Mortimer Graves suggests that current experience with committees on areas raises a question as to whether we are not beginning to reach a point of diminishing returns from this form of organizational procedure. It is true that for twenty years some of the Council's most spectacular and effective work has been that connected with the committees on underworked area fields. It is equally true that we must question whether continued emphasis on the need for more fellowships, publication opportunities, funds for individual and collective enterprises of research, tools of study, and the acquisition and rendering available of research materials serves a very useful purpose. It is not that these needs are nonexistent; it is that they are not peculiar to the underworked fields of scholarship, but are common to all fields of the humanities.

Other attacks on the same problem should be explored. The most active committee of the ACLS, the Committee on the Language Program, concerns itself with all language and linguistic problems, no matter what the area of their reference. A proposal has recently been made that the ACLS assume an operation of some sort in the field of Oriental philosophy, designed to insinuate concern with Oriental philosophies into philosophy departments.

This is not to argue that we should forsake the areal for the disciplinary or departmental basis in the creation of ACLS committees, but only to point out that there is here an organizational problem which should engage our attention.

Miscellaneous. This year, the executive staff made progress in improving communication between the Council and its widening clientele. The *Newsletter*, started some three and a half years ago in an attempt to bring ACLS activities to the attention of a scholarly public beyond those individuals who were intimately associated with the Council or with its committees, is now being published on a quarterly basis. Individuals on fifty campuses have agreed to act as unofficial representatives of the Council and have accepted responsibility for publicizing ACLS activities among their colleagues.

Three members of the staff represent the ACLS on the twelve-member Committee of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils. Its primary function—the selection of lecturers and advanced research workers for assistance under the Fulbright operation—has been expanded not only by the increasing number of countries being brought into the Fulbright program but also by the introduction into the operation of a much higher degree of planning, especially in the nature of special recruitment, and by the addition of responsibilities in the administration of dollar funds from the Whitney and Ford Foundations for foreign scholars eligible to Fulbright travel grants. The current work load on members is consequently very great and only to be justified if the program is of commensurate value to American scholarship.

The Humanities in the Next Decade. The greater part of the time of the Council at the 1953 annual meeting was devoted to the discussion of the humanities in the next decade. Discussion proceeded on the basis of a carefully drafted paper by Mortimer Graves and other members of the staff. In 1951, the Carnegie Corporation made the ACLS a terminal grant for general support, while the Rockefeller Foundation sharply reduced its support for administration, planning and fellowships. The Rockefeller Foundation explained its action as stemming not from any dissatisfaction with the achievements of the Council but rather from a belief that “as the representative of humanistic scholarship in the United States, the Council should not be dependent on any single agency for so large a proportion of its

support.” In 1952, the Ford Foundation made a grant of \$250,000 to the ACLS over a three-year period for the study of Asian languages. This is a promising start with the new and mammoth educational foundation, but it does not fully answer the problem of future support of the Council.

Delegates from the constituent societies agreed that there is an unfortunate tendency to take the humanities for granted. At the same time, even among the constituent societies, there is wide ignorance regarding the activities of the ACLS. As a holding company for the humanities, there is need for better public relations. In the words of Frank Knight, scholarship is a hard product to sell in a democratic society for the reason that the truth seldom sells itself. In spite of the lip service paid to the humanities, there is incessant need for defending the very existence of the study of mankind.

In the field of personnel, the humanities have consistently lost ground to the physical sciences, and even to the social sciences within their own circle. By 1965, the college population will probably be 85 per cent greater than today, unless some other educational process besides the college be devised. There are now approximately 50,000 permanently employed teachers of the humanities and social sciences in American colleges and universities. On the assumption that an increase of students calls for a commensurate increase of teachers, we shall need as many as 40,000 new teachers in 1965, to say nothing of replacements, half of whom should be in the humanities. But at the slow rate that scholars are being drawn into the professional humanities we will not be able to meet the increased demand for teachers without a destructive lowering of standards. Obviously, this problem requires a study of the life-cycle of the humanistic scholar as well as the development of fellowships and other means of promoting research.

Some delegates detected a breach between the humanists and the social scientists; others thought that there was no more than an unhappy lack of cooperation. Even if the latter is true, such lack of cooperation indicates an absence of realism on both sides. If the humanities be the study of man and of man's belief in mankind, then it is difficult to see how either discipline can forego the closest contact with the other. Some humanists claimed that the tax-exempt foundations had lost confidence in the social scientists and that humanists would do well to cash in on this opportunity

by giving more attention to current problems. The accuracy of the allegation was disputed, and again cooperation was advised. It was generally agreed that there is no harmful competition between the ACLS and the Social Science Research Council. As planning and promoting agencies for scholarship, both organizations possess the highest utilitarian value.

Most delegates were of the opinion that scholars should bring the humanities to the general public by more effective writing for public consumption. Even among the humanities, which includes literature, the ability to combine scholarship with popular writing is all too rare. There should be no aspersions cast upon scholars who write popular books without

loss of their intellectual honesty. If the scholarship is sound, the fact that such publication is financially profitable does not impair its intrinsic value nor its usefulness to the human race.

There was general agreement that the ACLS requires an endowment for administration and planning. To find more than the two or three million dollars necessary for an administrative endowment would be an impossible task. But even in attempting to raise this endowment, the ACLS should not proceed in any way to lessen the responsibility of the foundations for support of the planning and operation of scholarly activities by the Council.—KENNETH COLLEGROVE.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Formation of a study group to reappraise the foreign economic policy of the United States was jointly announced in November by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association. The eight members of the group are: William Y. Elliott, Assistant to the Director for Foreign Activities, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Williams Professor of Government at Harvard University, chairman; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., consultant, Ford Foundation, and formerly Deputy Administrator of ECA; Courtney C. Brown, Assistant to the Chairman of the Board, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; H. van B. Cleveland, Committee for Economic Development; Theodore Geiger, Chief of Research, National Planning Association; Harry D. Gideonse, President, Brooklyn College; Edward S. Mason, Dean, Littauer School of Public Administration, Harvard University; and Don K. Price, Deputy Chairman, Research and Development Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The study group will examine the basic assumptions about the nature of the world economy on which the United States policy has been based and the specific methods by which we have been attempting to make our policy effective during the postwar period. In their final report, the members will assess the degree of success which our foreign economic policy has had to date, will analyze the main reasons why our policy has not been more successful, and will suggest the modifications, both in concept and in methods, which their findings show to be desirable. The group has agreed on an outline of its work and will ultimately prepare a book-length report of its

findings and conclusions.

The National Planning Association has set up a Special Policy Committee on the Organization of the Executive Office of the President to recommend means of improving the President's staff. The Committee includes nineteen members who have long and varied experience with top-management problems gained in business, government, and the study of public administration. Sumner T. Pike, for six years a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and a former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has been designated chairman. Political scientist members of the NPA Committee include Louis Brownlow, Luther H. Gulick, and John D. Millett.

A constitutional convention of 99 members will meet at Nashville, Tennessee, in April, 1953, to undertake a limited revision of the state constitution. The convention is authorized to consider the amending clause, the compensation and expenses of legislators, the veto power, the right of suffrage, home rule, and local governmental consolidation. Professor Frank Prescott, of the University of Chattanooga, and Dr. C. C. Sims, of Middle Tennessee State College, are among the delegates. A voluntary group of political scientists and law teachers has been organized to provide studies for the delegates.

Boston University has announced the establishment of an African Research and Studies Program to be inaugurated formally on July 1, 1953. Dr. William O. Brown, now Chief of the African Research Branch in the U. S. Depart-

ment of State, has been appointed director. This Program, to be established in the Boston University Graduate School, will be closely linked with the social sciences and related fields. Close liaison will be established with individual scholars and research organizations in the United States, Europe and Africa.

The Program will be designed to make a contribution to basic research and studies in the field of African affairs. Emphasis will be placed upon the objectives and fundamental analysis of economic, social, political and technical factors as they relate to social change in contemporary Africa. Consideration will be given to the historical background and the cultural or institutional context of these developments and problems. It is anticipated that such a program will not only serve the interest of scholars, but also will be of use to United States government agencies, and to private individuals and organizations concerned with African questions in the United States, Europe and Africa.

The primary focus of the Program will be on research, with an increasing stress on training in subsequent years. Courses and seminars will be offered in 1953-54 on geographic, cultural, social and political aspects of contemporary Africa. Plans have been made for the development of library resources, and fellowship support and publication requirements for the Program are under consideration.

The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation has made a grant to Boston University of twelve thousand dollars for the academic year for citizenship education. Professor Edward R. Collier is chairman of the committee in charge of administration of the grant. Extensive plans have been made to afford students an opportunity to gain practical experience with political parties and pressure groups. Observations in the field are followed by conferences at which there is an evaluation of group tactics and programs and their relation to the democratic process.

The Institute of Public Service at Boston University, in cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School, is offering three courses this year for public employees in the New England region: "Position Classification," "Techniques for Effective Personnel Supervision," and "Federal Accounting Procedures." Although these courses are designed primarily for federal personnel in the New England area, state and

local employees are invited to enroll. An advisory committee, consisting of federal regional directors and representatives, state department heads, mayors, city managers and students of public administration, has been established to provide general guidance. Each course will be under the supervision of a person concerned with training in one of the federal regional offices and will attempt to elicit maximum exchange of ideas on both theory and practice. Certificates will be given upon completion of courses.

The first steps toward establishment of a program to train students for public service and government research careers have been taken by Western Reserve University. Eighteen civic leaders, including men prominent in federal, state, county and municipal government, are on the advisory committee which is working out details of the program. Ralph J. Besse, vice-president of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, is chairman of the committee. Proposals for the new program include: establishment of the degree of Master of Arts in Public Administration; non-credit studies for executives, creating an executive pool within industry for emergency drafting by the government; and research dealing with all government services, maintained and channeled through a permanent research clearing house.

The Department of Government of Washington Square College, New York University, has received a grant from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of \$36,000 for a three-year study of the political content of the newly established integrated course in social science and to evaluate the impact of such a course on student participation in active politics. A comparative study will be made between students enrolled in the social science course and a like number enrolled in the regular departmental introductory course, government in American society.

New York University's Department of Government has established a local Citizenship Clearing House for the Southern District of New York under the Citizenship Clearing House affiliated with New York University's Law Center. The purpose of the local Citizenship Clearing House is to work with the co-operating institutions in the District to the end that students in the several political science departments may be brought into contact with political leaders and encouraged

to participate actively in the politics of their respective communities.

For the sixth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan will hold its Annual Summer Institute in Survey Research Techniques. This special program is designed to illustrate the theory and application of survey research to such fields as business and human relations, education, psychology and sociology, public affairs, public health, economics, statistics, etc. Again this year a special workshop will be offered in the practical application of survey research methods to these individual fields. The dates for this session are June 22 to July 17 and July 20 to August 14. Further information may be secured from the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, a division of the American Psychological Association, has announced the Industrial Relations Research Award (a \$500 U. S. Government bond) to be presented to the individual whose research is judged most meritorious as a scientific contribution to the understanding of labor-management relations. This award has been made possible by a gift to the Society by the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation. Presentation of this year's award will be made at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in September, 1953.

Closing date for entries is May 1, 1953. Any research study completed during 1952 or 1953 will be eligible for consideration. Inquiries concerning the award should be addressed to Dr. S. Stansfield Sargent, Secretary, SPSSI, Department of Psychology, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York 27.

At Indiana University, Professors Joseph B. Kingsbury, John E. Stoner, Louis Lambert, and Edwin B. McPheron have been assisting the "Little Hoover Commission" of Indiana in its investigation of state administrative organization during the past year.

Paul H. Appleby, Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, spent the first half of the year in India on an assignment for the Ford Foundation. He resumed his duties at Syracuse with the beginning of the second semester.

Samuel J. Eldersveld, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been awarded a grant of \$5,500 by the Ford Foundation for research in the field of behavioral science.

George C. Guins, lecturer in political science and Slavic languages at the University of California (Berkeley), delivered a paper on "Soviet Law in its Development since 1917 up to 1952" at the International Congress of Jurists in Berlin, July-August, 1952.

Leslie Lipson, University of California (Berkeley), delivered two lectures at the National War College, Washington, D. C., in November, on "The British Commonwealth and Colonies," and "The United Kingdom."

Karl Loewenstein, of Amherst College, participated last August in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Academy of Comparative Law to prepare the program for the next Congress of Comparative Law (1954). In September, he delivered addresses at the meeting of the International Law Association at Luzern on the subject "Sovereignty and International Cooperation" and at the meeting of the International Political Science Association at The Hague on the subject "The Role of the Political Ideologies."

Roscoe C. Martin, professor of political science at Syracuse University, delivered a series of lectures at the University of Puerto Rico during the latter half of January on the general theme of emergent trends in public administration.

Dayton D. McKean, of the University of Colorado, delivered the Pi Sigma Alpha Lecture at the University of Utah on February 12, 1953. His subject was "Group Dynamics in American Politics." This event is presented annually by the Institute of Government at the University of Utah.

Emery E. Olson, Dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, returned to Turkey during the summer of 1952 to act as chairman of a United Nations staff of experts participating with a Turkish academic and governmental group in the planning of an Institute of Public Administration at the University of Ankara. Dean Olson was a member of the Barker Economic Mission to Turkey for the International Bank in 1950. Five professors from the University

of Ankara are now being trained in public administration over an eighteen-months period as a technical assistance project under the Mutual Security Administration.

Herbert A. Simon, professor of administration in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology, is directing a project investigating human behavior in business and other organizations. The study is being financed by a grant of \$30,000 from the Ford Foundation. Professor Simon is also one of 45 scholars who received individual grants of \$5,500 from the Ford Foundation for research in fields related to human behavior.

NOTES ON MILITARY VOTING IN 1952

On March 28, 1952, President Harry S. Truman transmitted to the Congress the report made to him by the Special Committee on Service Voting of the American Political Science Association.¹ A presidential message accompanied the report, endorsing the work of the Committee and requesting the passage of legislation recommended in the document.

Finding that twenty-four of the states make it unduly difficult, and in some instances impossible, for absent members of the armed forces to vote, the Special Committee urged the enactment of a temporary national law, applicable to the 1952 election only, which would provide a federal ballot for servicemen whose states did not afford them an opportunity to vote on reasonable terms. The defects found in state voting laws were the following: failure to make provision for absent voting, denial of the suffrage to members of the regular military establishment, requirement of personal registration, refusal to accept the standard post-card form furnished by the Department of Defense as an application for an absentee ballot, and tardy dispatch of absentee ballots, making it difficult for military personnel to receive and return their ballots in time to have them counted. The expectation of the Special Committee that the states themselves would not remedy these defects before the 1952 election was borne out by events.

Senators Green (R. I.), Humphrey (Minn.), and Lehman (N. Y.) sponsored a bill which followed closely the federal law proposed by the Special Committee on Service Voting. This

¹ This report, entitled *Voting in the Armed Forces*, was published in full as House Document No. 407, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., and in summary in this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 512-23 (June, 1952).

measure (S. 3061) passed the Senate without a record vote and without serious manifestation of opposition to its basic features on June 20. A companion measure (E.R. 7571), sponsored by Representative McCormack (Mass.), however, died in committee, caught in the legislative log jam at the end of the session.

No more fortunate was the recommendation of the Special Committee that existing federal law affirming the right of absent servicemen to vote without registering and without payment of poll tax, applicable "in time of war," be amended so that its guarantees would apply in time of peace as well. Doubt as to the constitutionality of such guarantees was offered as the reason for rejecting this recommendation by a House committee, which noted the "tendency to be impatient with constitutional restrictions whenever they stand in the way of legislation that is desirable."²

The net result of the report made by the Special Committee on Service Voting in terms of legislation to date has not been encouraging. It is likely, however, that many states will amend faulty voting laws in 1953. The Drafting Committee of the Council of State Governments has included in its program of "Suggested State Legislation for 1953" measures to eliminate the barriers to service voting. If such measures are enacted, the work of the Association's Special Committee will not have been fruitless.

Reports on the military vote in 1952 will be fragmentary. In no more than a dozen states will there be any computation of the size of the service vote. Information furnished to the Department of Defense by the secretaries of state of six states indicates that the percentage of servicemen of voting age who voted in 1952 falls considerably short of the comparable percentage in 1944.

These figures are somewhat surprising in view of the large turnout at the polls in the recent presidential election. Approximately 62 per cent of the total population of voting age voted in 1952, whereas the 1944 vote represented 56 per cent of the population of voting age. The decline in the service vote, given an opposite trend in the civilian vote, poses an interesting problem for specialists in voting behavior.

A poll of the student body at the United States Naval Academy disclosed that 67 per

² House Report No. 2041 on H.J. Res. 477, Emergency Powers Continuation Act (June 6, 1952).

State	Percentage of Potential Military Voters Who	
	Actually Voted	
	1944	1952
Maryland	24.8	21.1
New Jersey	51.3	28.6
New York	42.2	30.2
Rhode Island	44.8	20.0
Tennessee	15.1	10.4
Virginia	21.5	12.1

cent of the midshipmen of voting age cast ballots in 1952. When allowance is made for those from states which absolutely barred them from voting (New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas), the figure becomes 73 per cent of the men of voting age resident in the forty-five states which granted suffrage to absent military personnel. In great part, presumably, educational differences would explain the differential between the high turnout on the part of midshipmen and the low turnout among service personnel generally.

Meeting residence requirements for voting is a major problem for members of the armed services. During 1952, California contributed something toward the solution of this problem when the Attorney-General of the State held that residence on a federal military reservation within California for the period prescribed by statute satisfies the State's residence requirement for voting. This ruling, subsequently upheld by an inferior court,² has yet to be passed on by the State's highest tribunal. California appears to be the only state which interprets the residence requirement for voting so leniently, but its ruling is worthy of imitation elsewhere.—WILLIAM B. PRENDERGAST.

RESEARCH ON THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS IN 1952

The Association's Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations is preparing a report on state and local aspects of the presidential nominating process in 1952. The report is being organized on a state-by-state basis, with sections for as many states as possible.

In November, 1952, the Association received a second grant of \$24,830 for the project from the donors of the original grant of \$30,000.

² *Arapajolu v. McMamin*, District Court of Appeal, 1st App. Dist., Division Two (unreported).

Renewed arrangements were then agreed upon with the Brookings Institution under which Paul T. David is continuing as project director. The officers of the Association also concluded that a special advisory committee should be appointed, which will have two functions: (1) to advise the project director and the Executive Director of the Association on the continuation and the completion of the work; and (2) to advise the officers of the Association, when the time comes, as to the merits of the final report of the project and its readiness for publication under the sponsorship of the Association.

The membership of the Advisory Committee is as follows: Arthur N. Holcombe (chairman), Louis Brownlow, Richard S. Childs, Alexander Heard, Peter H. Odegard, Louise Overacker, and James K. Pollock.

The Committee held its first meeting on December 2, 1952, and will probably meet again early in April, 1953, at which time it will consider a preliminary draft of portions of the report. The report is planned for completion in manuscript by June, 1953.

The staff at work in the Washington office of the project, in addition to Dr. David, has included Esther Cole Franklin, Ralph M. Goldman, and Robert V. L. Wright, Jr. Professor Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins University has also joined the staff on a part-time basis to assist in editing the draft report.

The existing work is based on field materials secured as indicated by the notes concerning the project that appeared in the June and September, 1952, issues of this REVIEW. When further project financing became assured, a special effort was made to secure additional field work in the states where only one delegation had been studied. These efforts appear to have been successful in at least 11 states: Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Colorado, and Arizona. In addition, in two of the states for which no field reports had been received, new arrangements have been made for consolidated state studies, as follows: New Jersey (Harry R. Davis, on leave from Beloit College); Oklahoma (Cortez A. M. Ewing, University of Oklahoma).

In the earlier stages of the project, complete coverage through field work was not considered a feasible objective, and it remains unlikely that it will be attained. The final project report will include a consolidated roster of the more than 300 persons who have been active as project participants.—PAUL T. DAVID.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Charles Aikin, University of California (Berkeley), spent the summer of 1952 in Germany, where he undertook a study of the German-American Exchange of Persons Program under a grant from the Institute of Social Sciences.

Benjamin Baker, formerly of Hofstra College, has been appointed lecturer at Rutgers University. He will specialize in municipal and public administration.

John W. Baker, formerly at the University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida for 1952-53.

Stephen K. Bailey, associate professor of political science at Wesleyan University, was elected Mayor of Middletown, Connecticut, on October 6, 1952.

Russell Barrett, who recently received his degree from the University of Melbourne, has been appointed acting instructor in political science for 1952-53 at the University of California (Berkeley).

Bohus Benes, former Consul General of Czechoslovakia at San Francisco, was a visiting lecturer at the Ohio State University during the autumn quarter, giving courses in Soviet affairs and international organization.

George J. Bereday, recently a graduate student at Harvard University, is teaching comparative modern government at Boston College. He also serves as a consultant to the Harvard Russian Center.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., director of the Bureau of International Relations, University of California (Berkeley), was on leave during November to serve with the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in reviewing technical assistance programs of specialized agencies.

Joan Bondurant, who was awarded the Ph.D. degree in September, 1952, at the University of California (Berkeley), is undertaking study and research in India under a Social Science Research Council fellowship.

Daniel M. Braum has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan for a two-year period, beginning December 15, 1952. He has been assigned to the Institute of Public Admin-

istration, University of the Philippines, where he will serve as an in-service training consultant and teach courses in office management and related subjects. Professor Braum was formerly Chief, Training Branch, General Services Administration, Washington, D. C.

Burton R. Brazil is serving as instructor in political science at Stanford University during the academic year 1952-53.

Arthur W. Bromage, of the University of Michigan, is on sabbatical leave during the spring semester and is making a comparative field study of Irish and English municipal government. He has received a grant from the Faculty Research Fund at the University of Michigan in support of this project.

Edward H. Buehrig, associate professor in the department of government at Indiana University, has returned from his leave of absence to work on a research project with the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C. Professor Buehrig's leave extended through the academic year 1951-52 and the first semester of 1952-53.

Eugene Burdick has recently been appointed assistant to the new chancellor at the University of California (Berkeley). He will continue to offer course work in political theory.

James L. Burke, S.J., chairman of the department of government at Boston College since 1938, has been appointed Dean of the Boston College Graduate School. He is also serving as a member of the national executive committee of the Jesuit Educational Association.

Ardath W. Burks, assistant professor at Rutgers University, is doing research in Japan under a Social Science Research Council award.

Eleanor Bushnell has accepted a teaching appointment at San Francisco State College.

Leo Cagan began a year's leave of absence from San Francisco State College on February 1, 1953. During his leave he will serve as a public administration specialist with the United Nations Secretariat in New York City.

George Catlin, who taught in the 1952 summer session at the University of California (Berkeley), also spent the fall term as visiting

professor of political science at that institution.

Hugh Clokie has been reappointed lecturer in political science, University of California (Berkeley), to offer work in the dependent areas and comparative government fields.

Francis W. Coker, professor emeritus at Yale University, taught at the University of North Carolina during the winter quarter. This is the fourth successive year that Professor Coker has taught for one quarter at North Carolina.

Morris W. H. Collins, Jr., assistant professor of political science at the University of Georgia, was appointed director of the Bureau of Public Administration at that institution on October 1, 1952. Mr. Collins has been acting director since the reactivation of the Bureau on July 1, 1951.

Thomas Albert Corbett, O.P., has been appointed assistant professor of politics at the Catholic University of America.

Robert F. Cushman has been advanced to an assistant professorship at the Ohio State University.

Robert T. Daland has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Alabama.

James Davies, who received his degree from the University of California (Berkeley) in January, 1952, has been reappointed to a post-doctoral fellowship at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

Guenter Decker, who holds a research assistantship in international studies at the Goethe University in Frankfurt and is in this country under State Department auspices during the current academic year, was a visiting lecturer at the Ohio State University for the autumn quarter, giving a course in international law.

David R. Deener, formerly of Duke University and the University of Pittsburgh, has been appointed to an associate professorship of political science at Tulane University.

Conley H. Dillon has received an extension of his leave from Marshall College to continue in his position in the Office of Price Stabilization, Washington, D. C., during 1952-53.

Christopher Dyer-Bennet has been appointed associate in political science at the

University of California (Berkeley) for the 1952-53 academic year.

Russell H. Fifield will be on sabbatical leave from the University of Michigan during the academic year 1953-54. He will spend the year studying the foreign policy of the Philippines and other nations in Southeast Asia. The project will be financed by a Fulbright grant and assistance from the University of Michigan Faculty Research Fund.

Ossip K. Flechtheim, who was on leave from Colby College during 1951-52, has resigned his position at Colby to accept the offer of a chair in comparative government and politics at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin-Schoeneberg. Dr. Flechtheim has been acting as a consultant to the German Federal Minister of the Interior and has also been appointed contributing editor of the new monthly publication *Politische Literatur*.

Julian Friedman has been reappointed lecturer in political science at the University of California (Berkeley) for the 1952-53 year. Mr. Friedman is offering a course on political institutions in Africa.

Emanuel R. Fuchs has been appointed staff economist to the United States Department of Interior's Missouri Basin Field Committee, which coordinates the programs and activities of Interior agencies engaged in the Missouri Basin development program.

Hubert S. Gibbs was promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at Boston University in July, 1952.

Gilbert S. Gilchrist has been awarded a General Education Board fellowship and is on leave of absence from the University of the South for a year's study at the Johns Hopkins University.

Heinz Guradze's appointment as guest professor in international organization and political theory at the University of Cologne has been extended through the winter of 1952-53.

David Vance Guthrie, Jr., formerly an instructor at the University of North Carolina, has joined the department of political science at the University of the South.

Andrew Gyorgy, formerly of Louisiana State University, is a visiting lecturer in international relations at Boston University.

Luther G. Hagard, Jr., recently a graduate

student at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

Lashley G. Harvey has resumed his duties as chairman of the department of government at Boston University after a year's leave of absence as a Fulbright scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science. While in London, he gave a series of ten lectures on American government and ten lectures on the administrative process. Professor Robert P. Benedict was the acting chairman of the department during the absence of Professor Harvey.

William C. Havard, of Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana, is teaching at Louisiana State University during the absence of Professor Kimbrough Owen, on leave.

Robert S. Hayton, candidate for the Ph.D. degree at the University of California (Berkeley), is spending a year of study in South America on a Doherty fellowship. He is also the recipient of a Pan American World Airways Travel fellowship, through the Institute of International Education, for study in Chile.

Francis Heller, who has been on leave with the U. S. Army, has resumed his teaching duties as associate professor of political science at the University of Kansas.

Paul Heppie has returned to his position as assistant professor in the department of history and government at Kansas State College. Mr. Heppie spent the first semester in Canada, where he was engaged in research on Canadian political parties.

Karel Hulicka, who received the Ph.D. degree from the University of California (Berkeley) in January, 1952, has been appointed acting instructor in political science for 1952-53.

Dunning Idle, formerly a Foreign Service reserve officer, has joined the staff at the University of Miami as visiting professor of political science.

Harry V. Jaffa, assistant professor of political science at the Ohio State University, is on leave during the current academic year. He holds a Ford Foundation grant.

Henry L. Janssen has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara Campus, for 1952-53.

Claudius O. Johnson, professor and former chairman of the department of history and political science at Washington State College, has been appointed a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Sydney and Melbourne for the coming academic year. He has been granted leave of absence from February 1, 1953 to February 1, 1954.

Joseph Kaiser, of the University of Tübingen, Germany, will be a visiting lecturer at the Ohio State University during the spring and summer quarters, giving courses in Western European political institutions and in international law.

Hugh E. Kelso has returned to the staff of the political science department at the State University of Iowa after being on leave of absence for 17 months while serving with the Armed Forces.

Lane W. Lancaster is on leave of absence from the University of Nebraska during the second semester of the present academic year.

Robert S. Lancaster resumed his duties at the University of the South last September after a year's leave of absence, which he spent at the University of Michigan.

Carl Leiden, of Marshall College, is on leave to teach at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan, on a Fulbright appointment.

George Lenczowski, visiting associate professor at the University of California (Berkeley) in the spring semester, 1952, is spending the 1952-53 academic year in the Middle East on a Ford Foundation grant.

Edward G. Lewis, of the University of Illinois, is spending the year in France on a Fulbright fellowship. He is dividing his time between research and lecturing in French universities.

Benjamin E. Lippincott, of the University of Minnesota, has accepted an appointment as visiting professor of political science at Stanford University for the winter and spring quarters of 1953. He is offering courses in political theory while Professor Arnaud B. Leavelle is in England on a Fulbright fellowship.

Al Loeb, recently junior research political scientist at the University of California (Berkeley), has accepted appointment as staff technician with the State Personnel Board of California, Sacramento.

Harvey C. Mansfield, of the Ohio State University, served as a consultant to the U. S. Bureau of the Budget during the fall, in connection with the preparation of the final report of the President's Advisory Committee on Management Improvement.

Yale C. Maxon has been appointed to the faculty of the San Francisco State College for the current academic year.

Lee C. McDonald, who received his doctorate from Harvard University last June, is serving as a visiting assistant professor in the department of government at Pomona College during the sabbatical leave of Professor John A. Vieg.

Theodore McNelly, who recently received his doctorate in public law and government at Columbia University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Washington University, St. Louis, to teach courses in Far Eastern politics and history.

Marvin Meade returned to his position of research analyst in the Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas, on January 1. He has been on leave to serve as staff analyst on the President's Missouri River Basin Survey Commission in Lincoln, Nebraska.

Ernest E. Means, who recently completed his residence for the doctorate at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

James H. Meisel, of the University of Michigan, will be on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1953-54. He plans to be in Europe collecting data for a study of the political philosophy of Pareto.

William D. Metz, assistant professor of history and political science at the University of Rhode Island, has been named editor of the *New England Social Studies Bulletin*, a quarterly publication of the New England Association of Social Studies Teachers.

Edward W. Mill resigned his position as lecturer in political science at the University of California (Berkeley) to complete work for the Ph.D. degree at Princeton University.

Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch has resumed his duties as Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the French University of

New York after a six months' stay in Paris, where he offered his annual course at the Institute of Advanced International Studies, University of Paris, and served as a director in the Institute of Comparative Law.

Emmet V. Mittlebeeler has accepted a part-time lectureship on the faculty of the University of Louisville. He will continue to maintain an office for the practice of law in Louisville.

Jack H. Mower has been awarded a President's fellowship from Brown University to continue research on modern British colonial policy in tropical Africa. He is spending the year 1952-53 in Nairobi, Kenya.

E. E. Naylor, Special Assistant to the Director of Finance, Department of the Air Force, has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science and public administration at the American University and will offer courses in public budgeting.

Louis Nemzer, associate professor of political science at the Ohio State University, is on leave for 1952-53, on a research grant at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

William Newman is on leave from Boston University during the present year as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Rennes.

Edmundo O'Gorman, member of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the National University of Mexico, is a visiting professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.

F. Warren O'Reilly, a recent Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, has been appointed assistant professor at Marshall College during the absence of Professor Leiden, on leave.

George Outland, professor of government at San Francisco College, has resumed his regular duties after a year's leave of absence as a Ford Foundation fellow, studying the social sciences in general education at various institutions throughout the country.

Kimbrough Owen, of Louisiana State University, has been granted an extension of his leave of absence in order to continue as director of research for the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, a privately financed organization for research in state and local government.

Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., has been designated professor emeritus of politics at the Catholic University of America.

Merritt B. Pound, head of the political science department at the University of Georgia, was on active duty with the U. S. Air Force during August and September, 1952, as director of the inventory of reserve personnel for 53 Northeastern Georgia counties centering in Atlanta. Professor Pound is a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force Reserve.

Francis J. Powers, C. S.U., has been named acting head of the department of politics at the Catholic University of America.

Mohammad Tawfik Ramsi, of Fouad University, Cairo, Egypt, has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of Michigan for the academic year 1952-53. Professor Ramsi holds a Fulbright fellowship and has been awarded a grant by the Ford Foundation.

Ellsworth L. Raymond has been promoted to assistant professor of government at New York University.

Clifford A. L. Rich is serving as visiting instructor of political science at the University of Southern California for the academic year 1952-53.

Arnold A. Rogow, formerly of Princeton University, has been appointed an instructor at the State University of Iowa.

Heinrich Rommen, professor of political science at St. Thomas College, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of Minnesota for the winter and spring quarters of 1953. He will give Professor Lippincott's graduate seminar in readings in the classics of politics, while the latter is serving as a visiting professor at Stanford University.

Russell M. Ross, University of Iowa, was promoted to associate professor of political science July 1, 1952. During the summer quarter, Dr. Ross served as a visiting professor of political science at San Jose State College.

Raymond K. Rossiter has been granted a seven months' leave by the Far East Section, Division of Program Evaluation, International Broadcasting Service of the U. S. Department of State, to engage in study and research at Columbia University.

Joseph S. Roucek, of the University of Bridgeport, served as visiting professor at the University of Puerto Rico last summer.

Robert Scalapino is on leave from the University of California (Berkeley) for 1952-53, under grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Carnegie Endowment, to complete a study on the Japanese Labor Movement and to undertake research on Sun Yat-Senism and its impact on China.

Richard F. Scott has been appointed lecturer in political science, University of California (Berkeley), for 1952-53 to offer work in the international law field.

John P. Senning became professor emeritus of political science in June, 1952, after thirty-six years of service on the faculty of the University of Nebraska.

Olive Hall Shadgett has been appointed temporary instructor in political science and research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Georgia.

Robert W. Siebensschuh, associate professor of political science at Roosevelt College, has been engaged by the Committee on City Expenditures of Chicago to assist in the current management survey.

Lewis B. Sims has returned to his position as staff adviser, Division of Engineering Resources, U. S. Public Health Service, after spending the first semester of 1952-53 as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

J. Malcolm Smith has resigned his instructorship at Columbia University to accept a position with the Foreign Policy Association in Los Angeles.

Henry R. Spencer, professor emeritus at the Ohio State University, is serving his second year as visiting professor of political science at Tulane University.

David Spitz has been advanced to an assistant professorship at the Ohio State University.

Harold Sprout, of the department of politics, Princeton University, has been appointed to the newly established Henry Grier Bryant Professorship of Geography and International Relations at Princeton.

T. Noel Stern resumed his duties at Boston

University in January after a year as a Fulbright lecturer at the Universities of Rennes and Strasbourg.

Donald S. Strong has been promoted to a full professorship in political science at the University of Alabama.

Richard N. Swift, on leave from New York University as visiting lecturer on international affairs at Harvard University in 1951-52, has resumed his regular duties as assistant professor of government.

Carl F. Taeusch, professor of public administration, St. Louis University, is on leave of absence during the current year to lecture under a Fulbright fellowship at the University of Ankara, Turkey.

Chun-lin Tan, recent doctoral recipient at Columbia, has been appointed lecturer in international relations at Rutgers University in the absence of Ardath W. Burks, on leave.

William Lonsdale Tayler, chairman of the department of political science at Dickinson College, has returned to his post after two years' leave of absence during which he served as Dean of the Overseas Branches of American International College (U. S. Air Force colleges in Saudi Arabia, the Azores and Bermuda).

Clarence E. Thurber, formerly with the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution, has joined the staff of the Division of Overseas Activities of the Ford Foundation in Pasadena, California.

Glenn Tinder, who received his degree in January, 1952, from the University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed an instructor at Amherst College.

Richard B. Trimble, Colonel, U. S. Army Retired, has rejoined the staff of the political science department at the University of Georgia as instructor.

Robert Tucker, assistant professor of government at San Francisco State College, has been called to active duty as a lieutenant in the U. S. Navy, and is assigned to the Naval War College as a specialist in international law.

Frank Untermeyer was on leave of absence from Roosevelt College during the fall semester, 1952, to engage in research on British colonialism and African federation. Professor

Untermeyer traveled through much of Kenya, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, and the Rhodesias.

John A. Vieg, chairman of the department of government at Pomona College, is on leave of absence during 1952-53. He has a Fulbright fellowship for teaching and research at the University of Oslo, and is lecturing on American institutions and conducting research on the government of Norway and other Scandinavian countries. Professor Vieg has also accepted an invitation to deliver a series of lectures and serve as a consultant in public administration at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, during the spring.

Dwight Waldo, University of California (Berkeley), is on sabbatical leave for the year, which he is spending in Washington, D. C., on a Ford Foundation grant.

Harvey Walker returned to his post at the Ohio State University, in January, 1953, after a 15 months' leave to participate in the work of the Institute of Public Administration at Rio de Janeiro.

Jacob Walkin, recently research assistant, Institute of Slavic Studies, University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed to the research staff of the Division of Research for the USSR, State Department.

Richard C. Welty, recently a graduate student at the University of Colorado, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Hamline University.

Holt Bradford Westerfield has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard University.

John Albert White, a specialist in Far Eastern relations and Russian history, has joined the Claremont Graduate School faculty as visiting associate professor of history and international relations.

R. G. Whitesel, recalled to active military duty in 1951, has resumed his associate professorship of political science at the State University of Iowa. During his absence, Major Whitesel served in the Office of Chief of Staff, Fifth Army Headquarters, and overseas as Civil and Foreign Affairs Officer, United Nations Command Headquarters, Far East.

Charlotte Williams of Middle Tennessee State College, taught at Johns Hopkins University during the 1952 summer session.

John R. Williams resumed his duties in September as assistant professor of political science at West Virginia University after spending a year in England.

Francis G. Wilson, professor of political science at the University of Illinois, was a visiting lecturer at Emory University during the winter quarter, 1953.

Robert R. Wilson has returned to his position as professor of political science at Duke University after a year spent in Turkey as a

Fulbright professor at the University of Istanbul.

H. J. Wood, who was on leave of absence during the last academic year while he served as a Fulbright lecturer in the Philippines, has assumed the chairmanship of the department of history and political science at Washington State College.

Harold Zink is on leave from the Ohio State University to be visiting professor at Duke University during the second semester of the current academic year.

IN MEMORIAM

Charles E. Merriam was born in Hopkinton, Iowa, November 15, 1874, and died in Rockville, Maryland, January 8, 1953. He was a charter member of the American Political Science Association, served on many of its committees over a period of forty years, and was President of the Association in 1925. He was a member of the faculty of the University of Chicago from 1900 until his retirement in 1940, and was noted as a stimulating teacher and a helpful adviser both to his students and his younger colleagues.

His academic interests shifted from time to time in well-marked periods, in accordance with his off-campus activities. He devoted himself initially to municipal government and reform, the principal business on the agenda of the first decade of this century. He was elected to the City Council of Chicago in 1909, and was a candidate for Mayor in 1911, losing by a narrow margin to Carter Harrison. He was reelected to the Council in 1913, but was unsuccessful in resuming his political career after returning from military service in World War I.

His interest now turned to political parties, stimulated by his own experience, his association with Theodore Roosevelt in the Bull Moose campaign of 1912, and the inescapable fascination that he found in politics. This new center of attention resulted in his book, *The American Party System*, and in studies of elections, political leadership, and citizenship. Dissatisfied with the relatively narrow content of political science, he began a private reading course in economics, sociology, and anthropology, and then devoted his inventive mind to the ways and means of cross-fertilizing political science with these sister disciplines. He took an active part in the Conferences on the Science of Politics, and was the principal

founder and the first President of the Social Science Research Council. This was one of his major organizational achievements.

His underlying academic interest was in the history of political ideas and the development of political theory in the context of contemporary life. His first contribution was his doctoral dissertation at Columbia, *The History of Sovereignty Since Rousseau*; his last two, *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* and *Systematic Politics*. The final decade of his teaching was devoted to the defense of the democratic way of life, and to the criticism of authoritarian institutions.

Charles Merriam served on many public and quasi-public bodies, among others the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, the Commission on Social Trends, the National Resources Planning Board, the President's Committee on Administrative Management, and the Loyalty Review Board.

He was influential in the formation of Public Administration Clearing House and in the establishment in Chicago of the national headquarters of about fifteen organizations of local and state public service officials, known nationally and internationally as "1313." Merriam served on many of their committees, and as a member of the Board of the Spelman Fund assisted in their early financing.

He was always interested in the improvement of governmental machinery. In succession he spoke for the short ballot and the safeguarding of election machinery, the initiative and referendum, the city manager plan, charter revision in Chicago and the rewriting of the Illinois State constitution, city planning and the conservation of national resources through state and federal planning, and the reorganization of the federal administrative system.

Charles Merriam had an uncanny perception of emerging trends and great skill in putting young men to work in promising fields. His eye was always on the horizon, and he was always busy searching for ways and means of ferrying mankind to a happier destination. His host of friends and students will remember him as a man who enlivened any gathering of which he was a member. He was friendly, genial, fond of company and conversation, and full of wisdom. He had an extraordinary capacity for commanding the respect, the loyalty, and the affection of those who knew him. Perhaps no political scientist of his generation exerted a greater influence, not only within his own field but upon the constructive development of the social sciences and their contribution to public affairs.—LEONARD D. WHITE.

Julius Turner, associate professor of political science at Allegheny College, died December 24, 1952, at the age of thirty. Already he had won recognition as one of the most promising young scholars in the field of American politics. His published work reflected skill and ingenuity in analysis and both imagination and respect for data in interpretation. At the time of his death he had under

way, with the aid of a Social Science Research Council fellowship, an analysis of congressional elections with a view toward a more complete understanding of the extent and limits of party competition. Fragments of this work, some of which were left in sufficiently finished form for publication, indicate that it would have compelled considerable modification of conventional theories of the party system.

Professor Turner had received his Ph.D. degree in 1950 from the Johns Hopkins University, where he also served as a junior instructor. His doctoral thesis, initiated under the direction of V. O. Key, Jr., was published under the title, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*. He taught at Boston University before moving to Allegheny. He had achieved already an unusual mastery of the art of teaching, and had gone far in establishing mutually valuable friendships in his profession. His untimely death is the occasion of loss and regret which extend far beyond relationships which are merely personal. In evidence of this fact, a number of his friends at different institutions throughout the country have instituted at the Johns Hopkins University a Julius Turner Award, to be given annually for the most outstanding essay submitted in the field of political science.—CARL B. SWISHER.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Next Annual Meeting of the Association

The 1953 meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held at the Statler and Mayflower Hotels in Washington, D. C., on September 10-12. Professor John Gange of the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, has accepted the chairmanship of the program committee. Mrs. Kathryn Stone is to be chairman of the local arrangements committee.

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President

PENDLETON HERRING
Social Science Research Council

President-Elect

RALPH J. BUNCHE
United Nations

Vice-Presidents

CHARLES AIKIN
University of California

CHARLES MCKINLEY
Reed College

E. E. SCHATTSCHEIDER
Wesleyan University

Executive Director

EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD
1785 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Managing Editor

American Political Science Review
HUGH L. ELSBREE
Library of Congress

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officio*

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Pennsylvania State College
OLIVER GARCEAU
Bennington College
LEE S. GREENE
University of Tennessee
BOYD A. MARTIN
University of Idaho
DEAN E. MCHENRY
University of California (Los Angeles)
ROBERT S. RANKIN
Duke University
IVAN M. STONE
Beloit College
DAVID B. TRUMAN
Columbia University

WALTER H. BENNETT
University of Alabama
HUGH A. BONE
University of Washington
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University
DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin
VICTOR JONES
Wesleyan University
JACK W. PELTASON
University of Illinois
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
University of Texas
CLINTON L. ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNRO SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE

WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM
CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL

CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK

International Studies

of the Committee on International Relations
University of Notre Dame

**M. A. Fitzsimons The Foreign Policy of the British Labour
Government: 1945-1951**

The first serious account of Labour's foreign policy aspirations and performance, it graphically describes Britain's postwar position as a power with world interests but no longer a world power. Against this background the volume analyzes the ambiguity in Britain's espousal of European Union, the differing American and British policies toward China, and Britain's successes and failures in coming to terms with Asian nationalism.

Ready, \$3.25

Hans Kohn Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology

The fascinating story of Pan-Slavism, from its beginnings after the Napoleonic Wars to its climax in and after World War II, is told here for the first time in English. All the problems which the West faces today with Russia and its Slav satellites emerge in this book as issues with a long past in cultural traditions and national attitudes. It effectively demonstrates the tremendous impact of nationalism on modern history.

Ready, \$6.25

W. Gurian, Editor Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics

This basic text deals with the central question of the Cold War: Is the Enemy "Eternal Russia" or Communist aggression? The book contains articles by N. S. Timasheff, Michael Pap, Richard Pipes, W. Weintraub, Ling Nai-Jui, and F. Barghoorn.

May 15, \$3.75

Previously published

F. A. Hermens Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy \$4.00

**Waldemar Gurian Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet
Communism \$3.25**

**M. Einaudi and Christian Democracy in Italy and France \$4.00
F. Goguel**

University of Notre Dame Press

Notre Dame, Indiana

Introduction to Government

by ROBERT RIENOW

In this basic textbook, simple and direct in its style and reflecting the long teaching experience of its author, the student is introduced to the principles of government by studying actual governments at work in actual societies. Throughout, Professor Rienow's emphasis is on government in the United States. The author devotes an entire section of his book, however, to an analysis of four types of government in order to highlight (1) the characteristic features of the American political system and (2) the idea that that system, in its operation and development, must take account of systems that differ from it, and often differ fundamentally.

This is a realistic introduction to political science for the student whose work will end with the basic course and a practical introduction to the study of government for the student who will go on to advanced work.

6 $\frac{3}{8}$ x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, cloth, 608 pages, \$5.00 text

Elements of Political Science

by ALFRED DE GRAZIA

This text introduces the student to the elements of political science. It combines traditional materials and recent studies in a smoothly integrated and readable form, carrying the student into the areas of political behavior and governmental institutions. Broad in scope, logical, and well-grounded in the facts of political life, it will arouse general interest in the problems of political science, and special interest in political science as a gateway to liberal education. From this book the student will be able to move easily into more concentrated and advanced study of political parties, comparative government, international relations and other fields of political science. Students of this volume will acquire increased competence as citizens.

6 $\frac{3}{8}$ x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, cloth, 624 pages, 55 diagrams, \$5.00

Examination copies on request

Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

AAKCAAKCAAKCAAKCAAKCAAKCAAK

The Political System

by DAVID EASTON

Serious students of politics will find *The Political System* stimulating and useful for its reflective view of the state of American political science today. The argument of the book, briefly stated, is that political scientists could better explain the structure and processes of political life if they had paid closer attention to general or systematic theory.

No attempt is made in *The Political System* to present a general theory. Instead, the author discusses some of the problems that confront political scientists if they are to develop a systematic science.

No other book provides so lucid an analysis of the types of political thought, their functions, and their interrelations. Students of political science will find it indispensable for its persuasive exposition of the nature and scope of their subject. It sharply outlines the tasks challenging a new generation of political scientists.

8½ x 5½ inches, cloth, 320 pages, \$4.00 text

Examination Copies on Request

Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

AAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAK

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

William H. Riker
Lawrence College



Here is a new textbook of American government that analyzes our political institutions in order to answer the question: How can the democratic ideal be achieved in American practice? To answer this question Dr. Riker analyzes all the major characteristics and institutions of American government and politics.

In the introductory chapter the author discusses and defines "democracy" basing his discussion and definition on these contributions to political literature: *Pericles' Funeral Oration*, *The Agreement of the People*, *The Declaration of Independence*, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, and *The Gettysburg Address*. Subsequent chapters analyze successively suffrage, the Constitution, Congress, the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Federalism.

The order of the subjects is not haphazard but grows out of the definition of democracy in Chapter I which states that the method of democracy is "electoral responsibility." For this reason, the author considers particular institutions in order of their closeness to the electoral process: suffrage first, civil liberties and the party system next, and the constitutional system third. *Published in February.*

paper bound, 448 pp., \$2.25

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

Princeton UNIVERSITY
PRESS

International Shipping Cartels

A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION BY SHIPPING CONFERENCES

By *DANIEL MARX, JR.* The cartels known as shipping conferences or rings have wide influence on both importing and exporting countries and on the carrying trade itself. Mr. Marx seeks to give here an objective description of their operation and to determine their use and necessity and their use or abuse of monopoly power. The arguments for and against regulation or complete prohibition of conferences are carefully considered.

The author, who is professor of economics at Dartmouth college, was formerly a shipping company executive. 400 pages, \$6.00

Bentham and the Ethics of Today

By *DAVID BAUMGARDT.* Based on Bentham's original statements (many of them here published and analyzed for the first time), this painstaking study of Jeremy Bentham's moral philosophy corrects many misconceptions concerning this founder of modern hedonism. Mr. Baumgardt is consultant in philosophy at the Library of Congress. 586 pages, \$9.00

The Life of Sarmiento

By *ALLISON WILLIAMS BUNKLEY.* Domingo Sarmiento, 19th century president of Argentina, educator, sociologist, diplomat, and writer, was a lifelong champion of the progressive forces in this country. This biography is not only a thoroughly documented study, but a brilliantly original approach to an important historic figure. "The most complete life of Sarmiento written in English. This book has the fascination of Sarmiento's own life, and could not appear more opportunely."—*N.Y. Times* 568 pages, illustrated, \$7.50



Order from your bookstore, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS



New books from

*The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes
and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935*

HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS

Edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe. With a Foreword by Felix Frankfurter. From the foibles of judges to the future of free speech, from Sacco and Vanzetti to international gossip, these two uninhibited letter writers—these two so dramatically different personalities—ring witty and moving changes on every subject under the sun.

March 16, 2 volumes, 1,650 pages, \$12.50

THE UNITED STATES and MEXICO

By Howard F. Cline. The heartening story of Mexico's success in pulling herself up by her own bootstraps into the modern world. This revealing account of America's relations with her neighbor to the south should provide a guide for successful dealing with other so-called "backward peoples." A new AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY LIBRARY book.

Coming March 23, \$6.00

THE HARVEST LABOR MARKET IN CALIFORNIA

By Lloyd H. Fisher. An analysis and interpretation of the casual farm labor market and its violent fluctuations. The author convincingly demonstrates that an orderly pattern of economic and organizational factors underlies the apparently haphazard operation of this market.

\$4.50

*At your
bookseller, or*



HARVARD

Cambridge 38,

Harvard University Press

MINERALS A KEY TO SOVIET POWER

By Demetri B. Shimkin. The most authoritative presentation ever made of the USSR's mineral position. The author surveys Russia's mineral resources, and their development between 1926 and 1950, and relates these facts to Soviet policies at home and abroad.

452 pages,

Statistical appendices, bibliography, indexes of place names and subjects. \$8.00

CIVIL SERVICE IN EARLY SUNG CHINA 960-1067

By E. A. Kracke, Jr. An analysis of Sung Civil Service practices, based on contemporary Chinese sources. "Mature, based on solid study . . . revealing in its indication of the growth of political thought in the late 10th and early 11th centuries. No wonder the techniques hammered out at this time have lasted down to our own day."—*L. Carrington Goodrich*

\$6.50

SOVIET LAW IN ACTION

The Recollected Cases of a Former Soviet Lawyer, *Boris A. Konstantinovsky*, translated and with commentary and notes by *Harold J. Berman*

53 cases—52 of which were tried in the Soviet courts and with all of which Mr. Konstantinovsky was connected. The book gives a revealing picture of Soviet law as it affects the daily life of the individual and the corporate life of a Soviet business enterprise.

Paper covers, \$1.50

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Massachusetts



Standard Political Science Texts

BISHOP and HENDEL'S

2nd Edition

Basic Issues of American Democracy

462 pages, \$2.25

CUSHMAN'S

9th Edition

Leading Constitutional Decisions

395 pages, \$3.00

BRIGGS'

2nd Edition

The Law of Nations

1008 pages, \$8.00

MAXEY'S

5th Edition

The American Problem of Government

651 pages, \$5.00

SNIDER'S

American State and Local Government

752 pages, \$5.00

BROMAGE'S

**Introduction to Municipal Government
and Administration**

677 pages, \$5.00

PENNIMAN'S

5th Edition

Sait's American Parties and Elections

574 pages, \$5.00

FENWICK'S

3rd Edition

International Law

745 pages, \$5.00

CHANDLER'S

2nd Edition

The Clash of Political Ideas

335 pages, \$2.75

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

35 W. 32nd St.

New York 1, N.Y.



HARPER

ANNOUNCES
THE PUBLICATION
IN APRIL
OF A DISTINGUISHED
WORK
THAT CONSTITUTES
A LANDMARK
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

**POLITICS
ECONOMICS
AND WELFARE**

*Planning and Politico-Economic
Systems Resolved into Basic
Social Processes*

By ROBERT A. DAHL
and CHARLES E. LINDBLOM
Yale University

Just published, this is a brilliant and original work, one which no political scientist—teacher, scholar, or student—can afford to miss. One of its principal contributions is a stimulating analysis of basic political and economic theory *in which the two are closely integrated*. Economic processes are described as processes of rational calculation and control, and competing systems are compared. The final portion of the book discusses economic planning, examining carefully and methodically the four basic methods of calculation and control in politico-economic life: the price system, hierarchy, polyarchy (democracy), and bargaining. \$5.00

Important Recent Harper Texts

- CONGRESS ON TRIAL: The Legislative Process and the Administrative State.
JAMES M. BURNS. 1950\$2.50
- GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION. JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH. 1951.
.....\$6.00
- INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. FRANCIS H.
HELLER. 1952\$5.00
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. NORMAN HILL. 1952\$5.00
- THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1951. RICHARD P. STEBBINS
and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. 1952\$3.75
- THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS. SAMUEL LUBELL. 1952 ...\$2.75

HARPER & BROTHERS

49 East 33d Street

New York 16, New York

► ► **Coming in 1953** ◀ ◀

Modern World Politics

Third Edition. By Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Staff Associate, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Associates

This edition, completely replanned and rewritten, brings together a combination of academic research and thought with practical experience in the many subdivisions of the general field of international relations.

The co-authors are:

Herman Beukema
Bernard Brodie
Karlín Capper-Johnson
Oliver Carlson
William J. Donovan
C. C. Furnas

Leland M. Goodrich
Stanley K. Hornbeck
George B. de Huszar
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi
Emil Lengyel
Austin F. Macdonald

G. Etzel Percy
Roy V. Peel
Stefan Possony
Pitman B. Potter
Joseph S. Roucek
Howard Wilson

The Legislative Process in Congress

By George B. Galloway, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

An up-to-date, comprehensive, and authoritative account, based upon more than ten years of first-hand observation of Congress in action. The author deals objectively and candidly with both the strengths and the weaknesses of our national legislature. His book describes the operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and contains proposals for further reforms in the machinery and methods of Congress.

Aid, Trade, and the Tariff

By Howard S. Piquet, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

Without taking sides, the author discusses what would happen if the United States should alter or even suspend temporarily all or part of the United States tariffs and quotas. Tables accounting for four fifths of all dutiable imports into the United States list American productions, imports, ratio of imports to domestic production, duties and ad valorem equivalents thereof, and exports for the calendar year 1951.

A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists

By V. O. Key, Jr., Harvard University

A handbook for students of politics without formal training in statistics. Enough of the general logic of scientific inquiry is treated to form a background for the discussion of quantitative techniques.

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 432 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.

OXFORD BOOKS

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

By HIRAM MILLER STOUT. A complete picture of Great Britain today, in which a prominent political scientist surveys its present political system in the light of wartime and post-war changes. Mr. Stout discusses the modern functions of such institutions as the Monarchy, Parliament, the Cabinet and Civil Service. In addition, he provides a wealth of up-to-date information on many controversial subjects, from nationalization and the welfare state to Commonwealth relations and colonial policy.

1953. \$7.00. College edition, \$5.00

THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY

A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom

By ROBERT A. NISBET. Modern man finds himself rootless and alone in a contemporary society which tends increasingly toward centralization and uniformity. Can he rediscover his sense of community and, at the same time, preserve his freedom? Tracing the role of the State throughout history, Mr. Nisbet presents "a thought-provoking analysis which gets at the root causes of our moral malaise . . . It will well repay reading."—*Saturday Review Syndicate*.

\$5.00

PROBLEMS OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON. A cross-section of opinion on Britain's nationalized industries presented by members of Parliament, government ministers and professors of economics and political science. These specialists discuss, from varying points of view, many problems which are applicable to nationalized industry everywhere.

1952. \$5.00

MATERIALS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By JOHN M. SWARTHOUT and ERNEST R. BARTLEY, authors of *Principles and Problems of American National Government*. Readings from Aristotle to the Supreme Court decision on the Steel Seizure Case of 1952. The speeches and documents selected dramatize the history of American government and serve to illustrate what has shaped its present pattern.

1952. \$2.95

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 114 Fifth Ave., N.Y. 11

Publishers of Fine Books for over Four Centuries



International Communication Research

A special issue of the
PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY

Edited by LEO LOWENTHAL (guest editor)

In the Winter issue of PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY a group of leading social scientists combine to make a fresh attack on a basic problem in international affairs. Part I presents the field of international communications research; Part II takes up communication problems in particular areas; Part III considers international communication techniques; and Part IV presents the findings of several important research studies.

CONTRIBUTORS: Paul Lazarsfeld, Harold Lasswell, W. Phillips Davison, Bruce L. Smith, Ralph K. White, Jesse McKnight, Richard Sheldon, Alex Inkeles, Peter Rossi, Daniel Lerner, Joseph T. Klapper, and others.

* * * * *

THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY reports new research in politics, sociology, psychology, polling techniques, and related fields. It is the official organ of the American Association for Public Opinion Research. The rates are \$5.00 per year; \$8.50 for two years; \$1.50 per issue.

PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY

Box 231

Princeton, New Jersey

Gentlemen:

Please enter my subscription to the PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY starting with the special issue on International Communication Research.

.... 1 year at \$5.00 2 years at \$8.50

(Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year)

.... Remittance enclosed. Please bill me.

Name

Address

.....

The outstanding text in American Government

CARL B. SWISHER'S

The Theory and Practice Of American National Government

Some of the many 1952-1953 adoptions:

American International
College

Bradley University

Cornell University

Illinois Institute of
Technology

John Hopkins University

Michigan State College

Oberlin College

Stanford University

Stephens College

University of British Columbia

University of California,
Berkeley

University of Corpus Christi

University of Delaware

University of Kansas

University of Nebraska

University of New Hampshire

Vassar College

Houghton Mifflin Company

BOSTON

NEW YORK

CHICAGO

DALLAS

SAN FRANCISCO

DOUBLED IN SIZE FOR 1953

The American Slavic and East European Review

Now a vehicle for scholarship not only from American universities but from Research Institutes tapping the experience of former East European officials now in the West.

Your college or university library cannot remain off the list of subscribers if it encourages student activity on East European themes or Soviet influences upon international relations.

*Subscriptions—\$5.00 a year**

**Payable to: American Slavic and East European Review
Columbia University Press, Room 705
2960 Broadway
New York 27, New York**

* Subscriptions abroad, including Canada—\$5.30. Those in sterling areas may subscribe through Basil Blackwell, Broad Street, Oxford, England at two pounds, two shillings a year.

Important **RONALD** *Publications*

Ready Spring, 1953—

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 3rd Edition

JOHN M. PFIFFNER, *University of Southern California*; and
R. VANCE PRESTHUS, *Michigan State College*.

This revision of a well-known and widely used textbook realistically analyzes the dynamics of public administration, administrative organization, personnel management, financial administration, administrative law and regulation, and administrative responsibility. The authors accent the informal or "human relations" aspect of organization and management, drawing widely upon studies in the social sciences that illuminate the nature of group action, individual motivation, and leadership. Public administration is viewed as part of a larger social process which includes legislatures, pressure groups, and the separation of powers. *Approx. 590 pages.* **\$6.00**

• **Fundamentals of Political Science**

Edited by **OSSIP K. FLECHTHEIM**, *Colby College*

An up-to-date, integrated textbook, comparing ideas and practices of all major nations. Analyzes government and politics from historical, philosophical, anthropological, psychological viewpoints. *584 pages.* **\$5.50**

• **Federal Administrative Law**

RINEHART JOHN SWENSON, *New York University*

Thoroughly examines the growth, nature and control of administrative action in the United States today. Makes well-considered recommendations with respect to just determination of legal issues of broad public concern. *376 pages.* **\$6.**

• **International Government**

CLYDE EAGLETON, *New York University*

This successful textbook thoroughly covers the gradually evolving body of international law; surveys the institutions which have been created to deal with problems of world government. Rev. Edition. *554 pages.* **\$5.**

• **China, Japan and the Powers**

MERIBETH E. CAMERON, *Mount Holyoke College*; **THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY**, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*; and
GEORGE E. McREYNOLDS, *University of Connecticut*

A new history of the modern Far East, highlighting the impact of the West upon the East, and the resulting ferment in East Asia. Emphasizes the growing role of the U. S. in Asiatic affairs. *682 pages.* **\$6.50**

THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY

15 East 26th St. • NEW YORK 10

An Ideal Teaching Combination
for ★
American Government Courses

☆☆☆

"I am planning to adopt Nixon's AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT for next year's* Sophomore classes in American Government and use it in conjunction with Stubbs and Gosnell: SELECT READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. I have always wanted to try a text and a set of readings related to it if I could find such a combination. I think that the above two books are that combination."

H. C. NIXON

JAMES R. BROWN
Fordham University
*1952-53

AMERICAN
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT ★

476 pp.

\$4.00

STUBBS & GOSNELL

★
Select Readings in
AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT

paper bound, \$3.00

cloth, \$5.00

Write for examination copies

College Department

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

597 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.



THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. New 3rd Edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State College, and DEAN E. MCHENRY, University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. In press.

Thoroughly revised in a more lively and readable style and including and incorporating the 1952 election and new data of the 1950 census, this new edition is organized to include national, state, and local governments. Historical background; general principles; legislative, executive, judicial, and federal powers; administrative organization; and concise treatment of state and local governments are treated. Illustrations are redrawn and expanded.

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. New 3rd Edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State College, and DEAN E. MCHENRY, University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. In press.

For those who wish a separate coverage of only the national government institutions and functions, here is a revised and up-to-date edition containing only those sections from the authors' *THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT*. Presentation is simplified and clarified, and a better integration of treatment of powers and functions is achieved. Recent trends are pointed out, and the activities of the United Nations are emphasized.

PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By NEAL RIEMER, The Pennsylvania State College. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 363 pages, (clothbound) \$3.75 (paperbound) \$2.75.

A supplementary book of readings dealing with contemporary questions of American government. Seventeen controversial problems are included. Each is prefaced with a brief introduction which raises the general issue. Then selections dealing with specific problems, are presented from various sources—newspapers, campaign speeches, congressional debates, etc. A provocative and stimulating approach for the student.

CASES ON THE CONSTITUTION

Edited by J. P. FRANK, Yale University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 339 pages, \$3.50.

A collection of approximately 60 cases and other readings illustrative of the American constitution. An auxiliary teaching tool for introductory government courses, this text can also be used in constitutional law courses where a short, light book is preferred.

Send for copies on approval



MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

BALD EAGLE PRESS

STATE COLLEGE, PA.

verdict
in

K
O
R
E
A

OLIVER

This is the fourth full-length book on Korea by Robert Oliver, and it is by all odds the best of the lot. It is in some respects the most informative and the most moving of any of the analyses of the Korean conflict that have come to this reviewer's attention. . .

There is an abundance of scholarship in this book and ample documentation, both statistical and otherwise. In that sense it is a technical work and a commendable one. But to many persons the warmth of its human approach will overshadow this technical excellence. Sharing in that approach can give us all a better insight into the real meaning of the Korean struggle and help us to arrive at a better "Verdict in Korea."

The New York Times Book Review

A lot of words have been written about what has been done and what should be done in Korea, but none has as much the sound of authority as this work by Robert Oliver.—*Springfield News & Leader*

Verdict in Korea . . . is going to open the eyes of a great many Americans on the whys and wherefores of the most baffling war in our history, because it goes behind the scenes and tells the story behind the headlines.—*Macon News*

. . . The American who probably knows more about the Republic of Korea than any other white man.—*Kansas City Star*

The prose of the author is marvelously readable.—*Syracuse Post Standard*

Verdict in Korea should be read by everyone who has lost track of the reasons why the United Nations went into Korea, or who has never had the reasons clearly in his mind.—*Bakersfield Californian*

Verdict in Korea should interest particularly those who desire definite information about that nebulous country on which American money and American blood have been lavished since June, 1950.—*Beaumont Enterprise*

verdict
in

K
O
R
E
A

OLIVER

BALD EAGLE PRESS

STATE COLLEGE, PA.

available spring...

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By *Dimock and Dimock*. An introductory text that deals with the manner in which the public business is actually organized and conducted. The book is oriented toward both citizenship and a vocation in public administration. Although it is practical and emphasizes cases, the book also deals with the subject systematically and stresses principles.

Prob. 512 pp. \$5.00

READINGS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERN- MENT & ADMINISTRATION

By *Charles M. Kneier, Univ. of Illinois; and Guy Fox, Michigan State College*. A book of readings and illustrative material which strikes a balance between documentary material and provocative writings. Designed to supplement any of the recent basic textbooks in the field.

Published. 486 pp. Paper \$3.90

CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, 3rd Edition

By *Herman Benkema and Associates in Government, United States Military Academy, West Point*. A comparative survey of the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, the U.S.S.R., and Japan. Each chapter of this revision has been completely reorganized and rewritten, with much new material added.

Published. 610 pp. \$5.50

RINEHART & COMPANY

232 madison ave. n.y. 16

recent publications...

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

By *Carr, Morrison, Bernstein and Snyder*. This up-to-date book includes extended treatments of congressional investigations, civil liberties, and foreign relations, with considerable emphasis upon the human side of government.—Joseph E. McLean of Princeton is preparing a supplementary pamphlet (prob. 144 pages) which will cover state and local government.

Text, 1094 pp. \$5.50

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN ACTION, Revised

By *Dimock and Dimock*. This revised edition remains functional in that it combines American government and general political science in one course. Outlines government on the national, state, and local levels.

1004 pp. \$5.50

GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS: Plato to the Present

By *William Ebenstein*. A collection of original writings of political thinkers. Each chapter is prefaced by an introductory essay which places issues in proper perspective.

903 pp. \$6.50

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

By *William Ebenstein*. Composed of the section introductions to the above book, plus a new introductory chapter, this book provides a complete history of political thought.

330 pp. \$4.00

THE HAYNES FOUNDATION

Announces the Publication of Five Important Studies of California Experiences

I. METROPOLITAN LOS ANGELES: A STUDY IN INTEGRATION

- I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE METROPOLIS. Edwin A. Cottrell and Helen L. Jones. 136 pp. Cloth, \$2.50; paper, \$2.00.
- II. HOW THE CITIES GREW. Richard Bigger and James D. Kitchen. 272 pp. Cloth, \$3.50; paper, \$3.00.
- III. REGIONAL PLANNING. Judith Norvell Jamison. 112 pp. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.
- IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT. Robert F. Wilcox. 250 pp. Cloth, \$3.50; paper, \$3.00.
- V. SANITATION AND HEALTH. Winston W. Crouch, Wendell Maccoby, Margaret G. Morden, and Richard Bigger. 160 pp. Cloth, \$2.75; paper, \$2.25.
- VI. FIRE PROTECTION. James K. Trump, Morton Kroll, and James R. Donoghue. 192 pp. Cloth, \$2.75; paper, \$2.25.
- VII. HIGHWAYS. Robert F. Wilcox. Approx. 90 pp. Cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.25.
- VIII. WATER SUPPLY. Vincent Ostrom. *In preparation*. Cloth, \$2.50; paper, \$2.00.
- IX. RECREATION AND PARKS. Ellis McCune. *In preparation*. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.
- X. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. Helen L. Jones. 80 pp. Cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.25.
- XI. GOVERNMENTAL PURCHASING. Paul R. Beckett, Morris Plotkin, and George Pollak. 144 pp. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.
- XII. SCHOOLS. Helen L. Jones. Approx. 110 pp. Cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.25.
- XIII. LIBRARIES. Helen L. Jones. Approx. 100 pp. Cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.25.
- XIV. FINANCE AND TAXATION. Edwin A. Cottrell, John E. Swanson, Richard Bigger, and Winston W. Crouch. *In preparation*. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.
- XV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. Winston W. Crouch and Richard Baisden. *In preparation*. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.
- XVI. THE METROPOLIS: IS INTEGRATION POSSIBLE? Edwin A. Cottrell and Helen L. Jones. *In preparation*. Cloth, \$2.25; paper, \$1.75.

II. APPOINTIVE EXECUTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY JOHN C. BOLLENS

The California experience with the council-manager and chief administrative officer types of municipal and county government. Pp. xi, 236; cloth, \$3.75; paper, \$3.00

In Preparation for Release in Early 1953

III. CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND CROSSFILING BY VICTORIA SCHUCK

A study of the effective of the practice of listing a candidate's name on the primary ballot under several party designations.

IV. SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA, 1920-50 BY JACQUELINE R. KASUN

The end of a series of studies of the effect of business cycles on the economic, social, and political aspects of the Los Angeles area.


V. WATER AND POLITICS: A STUDY OF WATER POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOS ANGELES BY VINCENT OSTROM

THE HAYNES FOUNDATION

916 Consolidated Building

607 S. Hill Street

Los Angeles 14, California



PRACTICAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The ICMA Municipal Management Series

Eight up-to-date texts that treat public affairs from the standpoint of the chief administrator. Written by men of broad management experience, they stress techniques and best administrative practice. They are broad in scope and widely used in the college classroom as well as in municipal in-service training.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 601pp
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION 458pp
MUNICIPAL RECREATION ADMINISTRATION 516pp
MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 435pp
MUNICIPAL FINANCE ADMINISTRATION 491pp
MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINISTRATION 468pp
LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 337pp
MUNICIPAL FIRE ADMINISTRATION 498pp

"My experience with the ICMA manuals in group training for municipal officials and in graduate courses at the University has demonstrated that the texts are authoritative, comprehensive, and stimulating. They train administrators and students how to think about municipal problems and how to solve them."—ARTHUR W. BROMAGE, *Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.*

Here are a few of the many educational institutions that have adopted these texts:

Columbia University	University of Denver	University of California
University of Kansas	University of Michigan	University of Pennsylvania
Syracuse University	New York University	Wayne University

*Single copies \$7.50. Discounts on classroom orders.
Order copies on 10-day approval.*

THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION
1313 East 60th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

NEW

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT—Fourth Edition

WILLIAM ANDERSON, *University of Minnesota*
EDWARD W. WEIDNER, *Michigan State College*

In the revision of this standard text the authors have recast the chapters in order to give special stress to political behavior and to the functional characteristics of American government. *April, About 950 pages, Probably \$6.00*

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

—A Study of Modern Democratic and Dictatorial Systems

DANIEL WIT, *University of Cincinnati*

Presents a chapter-by-chapter description of the chief functions and characteristics of government, devoting the first part to a general discussion and the second part to an analysis of these functions in each major European government. Also includes material on the United States. *March, About 550 pages, Probably \$4.50*

MAN AND MODERN SOCIETY

—Conflict and Choice in the Industrial Era

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, *Northwestern University*
KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *University of Chicago*

With the collaboration of **PAUL K. HATT**, *late of Northwestern University*

This stimulating book of readings for the introductory course in social science presents a thorough analysis of modern society by leading social scientists. The selections are organized around a central theme—the principles and consequences of social choice—and are carefully integrated by the editors' introductions. *April, About 850 pages, Probably \$6.00*

BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT—Revised Edition

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

In revising this popular text the author brings it entirely up to date, adding new material on mobilization and defense and evaluating the effects of the "cold war" on business-government relationships. He focuses attention on current major economic issues of national interest and public policy. *March, About 840 pages, Probably \$5.75*

THE PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE POLITICIAN

—Revised Brief Edition

ASHER N. CHRISTENSEN, *University of Minnesota*
E. M. KIRKPATRICK, *Department of State*

Analyzes the processes of American politics in relationship to democratic government. Half the length of the last edition, this up-to-date edition contains 56 readings, including 11 new ones. *Late March, About 550 pages, Paper-bound, Probably \$2.75*

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

RECENT

AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

AROLD R. BRUCE, *Dartmouth College*

"... an excellent job. I like very much the organization of the material, the clarity of the presentation, and the illustrations and examples."—**PAUL S. JACOBSEN**, *Colgate University*

1952, 836 pages, \$5.75

CONGRESS AT WORK

STEPHEN K. BAILEY, *Wesleyan University*, and **HOWARD D. SAMUEL**

"This is a capital piece of writing and a genuine contribution to the literature on Congress. It provides material which should be eminently useful in courses dealing with legislation."—**ROBERT E. LANE**, *Yale University*

1952, 502 pages, college edition \$4.10

HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL POLITICS

AUL P. VAN RIPER, *Northwestern University*

"This book will be of great value to all those concerned with political work at the grass roots."—**V. O. KEY, JR.**, *Harvard University*

1952, 214 pages, paper-bound, college edition \$1.75

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

—Revised Edition

HARLES FAIRMAN, *Stanford University*

In this successful text 36 fundamental Constitutional decisions are analyzed. A new 32-page SUPPLEMENT contains the Supreme Court decision on the recent Steel Case.

1950, 552 pages, \$2.75

THE RISE OF MODERN COMMUNISM

MASSIMO SALVADORI, *Smith College, Bennington College*

"Combining sound scholarship with exciting insights, Professor Salvadori's *Rise of Modern Communism* is one of the best books I have ever read about the communist menace."—**PETER VIERECK**, *Mount Holyoke College*

1952, 118 pages, paper-bound, college edition \$1.25

—383 Madison Ave., New York 17, N.Y.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS

THE SOVIET IMPACT ON SOCIETY

by Dagobert D. Runes

In what manner has Kremlin-controlled Sovietism raised or lowered human standards? Is man in Soviet society master of his own fate? May he follow unhampered his self chosen vocation and avocation? Can he express his ideas and feelings as he wishes? Can he join his neighbors in groups, unions and confederations? Are his social or cultural activities dictated by political potentates?

To these and other basic questions the distinguished philosopher offers an unbiased reply, out of his direct observations and studies.

\$3.75

20th CENTURY ECONOMIC THOUGHT

Edited by Glenn E. Hoover, Mills College

In this stimulating book, twenty of the most perplexing economic problems of our time are analyzed by professional economists. Each contributor was asked to express his opinion freely, without regard to the opinions of the others. Although written primarily for the general reader, students and teachers of economics will find it invaluable.

\$12.00

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY Publishers

15 East 40th Street, Desk 288

New York 16, N.Y.

Expedite Shipment by Prepayment • Special student bulk rate on orders of 10 or more

Democracy in the Dominions

By ALEXANDER BRADY

A revised and enlarged edition (1952) of Professor Brady's noted study of the nature and development of democratic institutions in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. He presents an original and rewarding comparison, one which has not previously been undertaken in such detail or by so well qualified an observer.

The second edition includes much fresh material. It notes significant changes in Dominion institutions since early 1947, and has an entire section wherein the broader and comparative aspects of democracy in the Dominions are more fully analysed and the contemporary threats to democracy in the whole western world assessed.

"Professor Brady's book is a monumental contribution to the better understanding of the Dominions."—C. Hartley Grattan, in the *New York Times*.

\$6.50

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

A Comparative Study of Modern Governments Constitutional Government and Democracy

Revised Edition—Carl J. Friedrich

A reasoned and searching presentation of the development, organization and operation of American and European constitutional governments. The text discusses bureaucracy, military and diplomatic establishments, the police power, and judicial, legislative and administrative functions in relation to the whole constitutional trend.

Sales Offices:

New York 11
Chicago 16
Atlanta 3
Dallas 1
Columbus 16
San Francisco 3
Toronto 5

This Revised Edition includes new material on constitutional dictatorship and military government, local government, socialization and planning.

Please Ask for Descriptive Circular 71

Home Office:
Boston

GINN AND COMPANY

TWO **UNESCO** PUBLICATIONS

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS

Contain 100 to 200 word abstracts of all articles in ten major political science reviews and of principal articles on political science and international relations in more than seventy other journals of all countries. Published quarterly. \$4.00 a year; \$1.00 a copy.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A Progress Report

This timely and informative study relates the history and principles of international collective security, giving particular attention to the action of the United Nations in the Korean conflict. A series of charts summarizes collective security measures in particular cases. paper, \$1.25

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

2960 Broadway • New York 27

Publishers of The Columbia Encyclopedia

**A
B
C**

Roots of Political Behavior

INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Richard Carlton Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, Princeton University

"The editors have been brilliantly successful, not only in conceiving and blue-printing their new approach, but also in assembling this large collection of stimulating and, above all, pertinent articles. Excellent introductions for each section and article supply a unifying warp."

—*American Political Science Review*

"The book portrays well the interrelations of the social sciences in the formation and expression of political opinion and action. It should serve as a welcome antidote to students who have been forced in their study of government to undergo the systematic regimentation of multitudinous and arid details."

—*Western Political Quarterly*

In Two Editions!

When used as the basic text for core courses in social science, introductory courses in political science, etc., the *Cloth Cover* is ideal. \$5.50

When used for readings in American government courses, courses in political economy, etc., the *Paper Cover* is ideal. \$3.25

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY

College Division, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N.Y.

AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT

Fourth Edition

by
**W. BROOKE
GRAVES**

Please write to us if you plan to teach a course in State Government next summer or fall so that we may put you on our mailing list for an examination copy.

Dr. Graves's complete revision of this authoritative and standard text is now in press and will be ready for distribution late this spring. All users of earlier editions are familiar with the plan and character of the book; which has long been regarded as *the* text for students taking a college course in state government. The Fourth Edition contains the same wealth of up-to-date material as characterized the first three editions. A complete resetting of the text has made possible some reorganization at desirable points. Bibliographies at the ends of chapters have been shortened to selected reading lists.

D. C. Heath and Company

SALES OFFICES: NEW YORK CHICAGO SAN FRANCISCO ATLANTA DALLAS

HOME OFFICE: BOSTON

YALE BOOKS

THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM

LOUISE OVERACKER

A first-hand survey of the development, operation, and effects of a political system unified by a strong independent Labor party which antedated the founding of the Commonwealth in 1901.

\$5.00

UTOPIA LTD

HAROLD ORLANS

This case study of the English "new town" of Stevenage shows how ambitious government plans for a greenbelt development near London met with technical flaws, cultural resistance, and stubborn human nature in the execution of the project.

\$4.50

at your bookseller

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Haven, Connecticut

DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

A CASE HISTORY

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE 1931-33

By R. BASSETT, M.A.

Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics

This book contains a considerable amount of material that will be of great interest to people in America.

In particular it brings out striking parallels and differences in British opinion as regards first Manchuria, and later Korea. There is a critical analysis of Mr. Stimson's book "The Far Eastern Crisis," and an account of the illusions about American policy prevalent in Great Britain at the time of the Manchurian affair, and the lack of information in the British press concerning relevant events in the U.S.A.

42 shillings net, postage 1/- extra

Published for The London School of Economics and Political Science by

LONGMANS, GREEN AND COMPANY, LTD.

6/7 Clifford St., London, England



For March Publication

GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA

By **MIGUEL JORRIN**

Professor of Government and Director of the School
of Inter-American Affairs, University of New Mexico

The AUTHOR'S unique qualifications make this new volume welcomed for its real contribution to the study of Latin American governments. Professor Jorin provides a background of 15 years' experience as a practicing lawyer in these countries (where he took part in administrative and electoral processes and was in the position to see violent changes in government) with 14 years of teaching and lecturing in both Latin American Countries and in the United States.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF THIS NEW TEXT

- Evolution of the patterns of governments are clearly indicated by the author's presentation of the contemporary problems of economic, political, institutional, and social conflicts from the colonial era to the present time.
- Topical approach of the subject matter facilitates the use of the comparative method on the study of these foreign governments.
- Author's conclusions summarize the basic features of the governmental institutions of the area, showing weaknesses as well as achievements.
- Maps, charts and discussion topics for each chapter aid in the study of this important subject.

Governments of Latin America was written for a junior or senior course. It is well suited for graduate work on area studies of Latin America. The usual prerequisites are American Government and Politics, and a history of Latin America. This text is well suited for a 3-hour, one-semester college course which the author combines with conference sessions and discussions of constitutional provisions.

385 pp. 6 x 9 Illustrated Cloth \$4.50

Have You Examined This New Work?

PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT


By **WILLIAM G. TORPEY**


This text gives a realistic treatment of the processes, procedures and problems of personnel administration in the executive branches of federal, state and local governments.

It is well suited for government in-service courses for trainees, supervisors, administrators, and others concerned with personnel administration. Book is filled with a wealth of actual existing problems, up-to-date concepts, and interesting historical accounts showing how present statutes and procedures were derived.

431 pp. 6 x 9 Illustrated Cloth \$5.00

WRITE FOR YOUR ON-APPROVAL COPIES TODAY





The American Political Science Review

VOL. XLVII

JUNE, 1953

NO. 2

LIBERTARIAN MOTIVATIONS ON THE VINSON COURT

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

University of Chicago

Justice Frankfurter is fond of quoting an old English saying that "the devil himself knoweth not the mind of men."¹ The mind of a man who happens to be a judge is the center of many contending impulses when he is making it up, and an external reconstruction of the process is quite impossible. However, the rules of the game require that judges supply clues to their thought processes in the form of written opinions. In every major case decided by the Supreme Court, one or more of its members provide a written justification for the decision announced. The individualistic tradition of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, moreover, permits justices who do not agree with the views of their brethren to say so, and to give their reasons for dissenting. Thus the Supreme Court on decision day takes on the aspect of a small legislature in which votes are cast pro and con on significant issues of public policy, with accompanying explanations much more coherent and systematic and better-reasoned than are customarily available in explanation of votes cast, say, in the United States Senate.

While it has not been usual to do so, these judicial votes can be subjected to the same kinds of analysis as have been traditionally employed for the study of legislative voting behavior. Thus Table I undertakes to throw light on the attitudes of members of the recent Court toward civil liberties claims by recording their votes as favoring or opposing the claimed liberties in some 84 nonunanimous cases decided during the six terms from October, 1946 to June, 1952.²

Such a table is useful, however, only if the analyst has some tenable hypothesis about the nature of the relations between a justice's decisions and his personal convictions. It would be naive to assume that

¹ See *Leland v. Oregon*, 343 U. S. 790 (1952).

² This covers the period since Vinson became Chief Justice. The deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in the summer of 1949, and their replacement by Justices Clark and Minton, account for the only changes of personnel during the period.

justices in deciding cases are completely free to vote their own preferences, or that a voting record necessarily mirrors a justice's inner convictions. On the other hand, it would be even more naive to assume that a Supreme Court justice merely "looks up the law" on a subject and applies it to the case in hand.³

TABLE I. VOTING RECORDS OF JUSTICES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL
LIBERTIES DECISIONS, 1946-51 TERMS

	No. Cases	For Free Speech Claims	For Alien Claims	For Criminal De- fendants' Claims		Total
				Federal	State	
No. Cases		23	18	17	26	84
Murphy	42	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Rutledge	43	100	100	85	100	95
Douglas	72	100	64	87	96	89
Black	83	96	100	53	88	86
Frankfurter	82	50	76	82	42	60
Majority	84	26	33	53	37	37
Jackson	82	23	44	59	13	32
Clark	23	13	0	33	38	22
Burton	84	17	28	18	15	19
Minton	36	19	18	0	17	17
Vinson	84	13	33	0	12	14
Reed	84	22	6	12	12	13

A workable hypothesis on Supreme Court decision-making must be formulated with an appreciation of the operating conditions under which the judge makes his choices. In many respects his situation is quite comparable with that of any individual who must make decisions on important matters within an institutional framework which brings to him questions for decision and provides mechanisms for making those decisions effective. Appellate courts share with legislatures the problem of decision-making in a collectivity of equals, in contrast to the conditions of decision-making in a hierarchy. We may tend to think of legislators as having greater freedom than judges in arriving at policy choices, but upon reflection it becomes obvious that legislators no more than judges

³ Chancellor Kent once explained how he arrived at decisions. He first made himself "master of the facts." Then, he continued: "I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search the authorities. . . . I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the case . . ." Quoted in Jerome Frank, *Law and the Modern Mind* (New York, 1930), p. 104.

are able to vote as free agents. They must think about what is good for their party. They must give some account to the probable effect of their vote on the prospects for reelection. They may decide to vote for something they do not want in order to get support for something they want very much. They may decide to vote for less than they want because their practical judgment tells them that is all they can get.

A Supreme Court justice finds himself in much the same situation, though operating within a judicial rather than a legislative context does make for some differences. He does not have a constituency of electors or a party position to consider. But the rules and traditions of the Court supply institutional preferences with which his own preferences must compete. One of these institutional preferences, for example, is *stare decisis*, the rule of precedent. The individual judge may think that the precedents are wrong, or outmoded. If so, he may follow his personal preference and state his reasons for voting to change the law. He is free to do that. He is not free to ignore the precedents, to act as though they did not exist. He has free choice, but among limited alternatives and only after he has satisfied himself that he has met the obligations of consistency and respect for settled principles which his responsibility to the Court imposes upon him. His private views as an individual help to form and may be incorporated into his public views as a justice, but they are not the same thing.

What this means, in more concrete terms, is that when a civil liberties case comes to the Supreme Court, the justices are not asked whether they are more or less in favor of civil liberties. They are asked how the Court, consistently with its role as the highest judicial body in a federal system, should dispose of a proceeding, the basic facts in which have been found and the form of which has been given by lower judicial bodies. Under these circumstances some justices may not even choose to think of the civil liberties issue in the case. They may see the controlling problem as adherence or non-adherence to the precedents. They may think of the issue as judicial respect for legislative action. As participants in the judicial process they have a perfect right to choose from among the alternatives presented the ones which determine their view of the case.

Thus it is that a statistical table or "box score" such as Table I cannot be accepted as an index of personal attachment to libertarian values on the part of the justices. These votes were cast, not in their personal but in their judicial capacity, and represented their resolution of situations where many legitimate values may have been competing for attention. What the table does establish is the degree to which each member of the

Court found it possible or desirable as a judge to prefer libertarian values over others present in the proceedings. These are what Mark DeWolfe Howe calls "relational statistics," and while Howe is a bitter critic of the statistical method as applied to judicial decisions, he is willing to admit that if interpreted on this basis box scores may be acceptable. But he adds the warning that relational statistics "have significance only when discriminating account is taken of all the values which are brought into relationship."⁴

Obviously it is impossible to identify all the values which each justice may have related to the decision of a case. But our working hypothesis is that a decision involving civil liberties questions will be primarily influenced by the interaction of two factors. One is the direction and intensity of a justice's libertarian sympathies, which will vary according to his weighting of the relative claims of liberty and order in our society. Theoretically, positions on a liberty-order attitude scale could range from an individualistic anarchism at one extreme to rigid authoritarianism on the other. The orthodoxy required for a Supreme Court appointment ensures, however, that the spread of opinion among members of that body will be much narrower.

The second factor is the conception which the justice holds of his judicial role and the obligations imposed on him by his judicial function. Every justice in deciding a case must give some thought to what is appropriate for him as a judge to do. The pressures which bear upon him are many, and they are mostly toward a pattern of conformity—conformity with precedents, conformity with the traditions of the law, conformity with public expectations as to how a judge should act, conformity toward established divisions of authority in a federal system based on the principle of separation of powers. While no justice can be oblivious to these pressures, they are not self-enforcing, and he is free to make his own interpretations of their requirements in guiding his own judicial conduct. The attitude scale involved may be thought of as ranging from an expansionist to a contractionist judicial philosophy, from broad to narrow judicial review, from judicial activism to judicial restraint.

Any attempt to rank justices on these two scales in an absolute fashion would be hopeless, but it should not be as difficult to locate them relatively to each other, and particularly by reference to their deviation from the Court's majority position at any one time. Table I shows that five members of the Vinson Court—Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter—voted for libertarian claims substantially more often than the Court majority. In the terms of our hypothesis, the extremely

⁴ "Justice in a Democracy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 184, pp. 34-36 (Dec., 1949).

high rate of support for libertarian claims registered by the first four of these justices suggests that they are strongly positive on both scales; their personal preferences must be strongly libertarian, and they must have a conception of their judicial function which permits or even requires them to give judicial effect to their libertarian preferences. Without assuming any absolute identity of views on their part, the motivation of these four justices can be characterized as libertarian activism.

II

The intense belief of the four libertarian activists in the principles of an open society could be endlessly demonstrated by reference to their opinions, but this statement of Black's must suffice for the purpose:

I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our governmental system rests and without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.⁵

The primacy which this view attaches to liberty over order has been given a theoretical form in the constitutional doctrine of the "preferred position" of civil liberties. This doctrine has fulfilled an essential purpose in strengthening the "clear and present danger" test as developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, and particularly in remedying a gap in Holmes' work. The rule which he normally applied in determining the constitutionality of legislation was the "reasonable man" test. As he said in his famous dissent to *Lochner v. New York*, he would not invalidate any statute "unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."⁶ Yet when it came to the matter of enforcing the Espionage Act during the First World War, as applied against persons who had used their rights of free speech to try to induce resistance to the draft, Holmes developed a different test.

The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will

⁵ *Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies*, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).

⁶ 198 U. S. 45 (1905). And in *Meyer v. Nebraska* Holmes refused to hold invalid a state law against the teaching of German language in the primary schools, because he believed that whether children in their early years should hear and speak only English at school was "a question upon which men reasonably might differ and therefore I am unable to say that the Constitution of the United States prevents the experiment from being tried." 262 U. S. 390 (1923).

bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.⁷

To be sure, the constitutionality of the Espionage Act was not in question in the *Schenck* case. The clear and present danger test was being employed rather to determine how closely words had to be related to illegal acts in order to be infected with their illegality. But by 1927 Justice Brandeis, with Holmes' concurrence, had developed clear and present danger into a test for the constitutionality of statutes. In *Whitney v. California* Brandeis said that a legislative declaration that a danger existed justifying restrictions on speech and assembly created merely a "rebuttable presumption." If the conditions alleged by the legislature did not in fact exist, then the courts, guided by the clear and present danger test, should refuse to enforce the statute.⁸

Holmes and Brandeis never satisfactorily explained why legislation affecting First Amendment freedoms had to pass the clear and present danger test, while other legislative actions were held to the less stringent test of reasonableness.⁹ It was this failure which the preferred position argument remedied. Widely attributed to Stone's famous footnote in the 1938 case of *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*,¹⁰ the notion that courts and legislatures must observe higher standards when dealing with First Amendment values was accepted not only by the four libertarian activists, but also by Roberts in the 1939 handbill cases¹¹ and Jackson in the second flag salute case. Said Jackson:

The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.¹²

Reenforced by the preferred position doctrine, the clear and present danger test was applied by the libertarians during the 1940's to a wide

⁷ *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).

⁸ 274 U. S. 357 (1927).

⁹ See Frankfurter's comment in *Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 59-62.

¹⁰ 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938).

¹¹ *Schneider v. New Jersey*, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).

¹² *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). However, when Frankfurter reviewed the history of the concept in his concurrence to *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), he contended that the preferred position argument as he understood it had been held only by the four libertarians, and had "never commended itself to a majority of this Court."

variety of new situations, from restraints on picketing to citations for contempt of court.¹³

This inventiveness was motivated by a crusading conception of the judicial function which is well reflected in Justice Murphy's statement that "The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."¹⁴ Unpopular citizens of recent years, or at least "underdogs" in terms of their power positions, about whom the Court's libertarians have been concerned are such groups as aliens, American Indians, Jehovah's Witnesses, injured workmen seeking compensation from their employers, Communists, and defendants in criminal cases.

Sympathy for the underdog can seldom be given effect without a corresponding rejection of the claims of the upperdog. A decision that Jehovah's Witnesses can operate their loudspeaker in a small park on Sunday devalues the claims of those who just want to sit in the park and relax.¹⁵ The right of a fascist to harangue his followers involves some conflict with the right of the community to be free from riots.¹⁶ The activist "infracaninophile"¹⁷ consistently favors the injured few over the allegedly suffering many.

Libertarian susceptibility to the case for the underdog often seems grounded in the judge's sympathetic identification with his plight,¹⁸ but where the judge embraces the activist solution there must also be operating a sense of personal responsibility for the *result* achieved by the Court's decision. This incubus can be avoided by a conception that the Court is operating within limits and manipulating its powers according

¹³ *Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); *Bridges v. California*, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); *Pennekamp v. Florida*, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U. S. 367 (1947).

¹⁴ *Falbo v. United States*, 320 U. S. 549 (1944).

¹⁵ *Saia v. New York*, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).

¹⁶ *Terminiello v. Chicago*, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).

¹⁷ A useful word apparently invented by Christopher Morley, who defines it as "the helper of the underdog." See Preface to *The Complete Sherlock Holmes* (New York, 1953), p. xv.

¹⁸ Differences of approach are illustrated by the deportation cases at issue in *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U. S. 524 (1952). Reed's majority opinion veiled the impact of the proposed deportations by impersonal references to petitioners' "many years residence spent in this country" and "their integration into community life through marriage and family connections." From Black's dissent, on the other hand, we get such particulars as that Mrs. Stevenson's husband is doing the housework while she is "detained in jail as dangerous to our national security," and that her son "has long been subject to attacks of undulant fever"; that Mr. Zydok has two U. S.-born sons who served in World War II, sold \$50,000 worth of war bonds during the war while serving as a waiter, and donated blood on seven occasions to the Red Cross.

to external standards provided by the legal system.¹⁹ But the activist cannot accept this limited role. He cannot rid himself of the notion that the Court does have a range of discretion, that there are choices open to him. Consequently he must make the choice which will give the right result. He cannot reconcile himself to the idea that there can be a wrong without a remedy—and a judicial remedy, not merely a legislative or electoral remedy.

Consistency for the libertarian activist is the consistency of seeking wherever possible the libertarian result. In one case this may require loose construction of a statute, in another strict construction. Take two illustrative cases. Federal legislation covering railroad injuries is hopelessly old-fashioned; railroads are liable only for accidental injuries to employees resulting from the "negligence" of other employees. The activist reaction is to bring the legislation up to date by broadly interpreting its standards. Thus a fireman who had contracted silicosis by breathing silica dust from sand that was used in locomotive sanding boxes alleged faultily to release excessive amounts of sand was held to have suffered an "injury" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and an "accident" within the meaning of the Boiler Inspection Act.²⁰

Contrariwise, narrow construction was the libertarian reaction of Justice Black in *United States v. Alpers*,²¹ involving a conviction for shipping obscene phonograph records in interstate commerce. Black dissented from the conviction, because the statute covered shipment of obscene books, pamphlets, pictures, films, "or other matter of indecent character," but did not mention phonograph records specifically. "Censorship in any field may so readily encroach on constitutionally protected liberties that courts should not add to the list of items banned by Congress," he said.

Again, the libertarian activist's attitude toward procedural requirements varies according to the results achieved. Where procedure is a restraint on interference with liberties, it is welcomed and even treated as a constitutional requirement. Thus in *Trupiano v. United States*,²² the libertarian majority insisted that a search warrant was necessary to justify seizure of moonshining equipment, even though the operator of

¹⁹ This view was well stated by Justice Gibson in *Eakin v. Raub* (1825), where he argued that justices are in the situation of jurors in capital cases, who "do not deprive a prisoner of life by finding him guilty of a capital crime; [they] but pronounce his case to be within the law, and it is therefore those who declare the law . . . who deprive him of life." Quoted from R. E. Cushman, *Leading Constitutional Decisions* (8th ed., New York, 1946), p. 218.

²⁰ *Urie v. Thompson*, 337 U. S. 163 (1949).

²¹ 338 U. S. 680 (1950). Frankfurter and Jackson also dissented.

²² 334 U. S. 699 (1948).

the still was lawfully arrested in the midst of the implements of his crime. But Murphy, who wrote *Trupiano*, is also authority for the view that justices should cut through "formal concepts" if they stand in the way of a libertarian result. As he said in *Carter v. Illinois*:

Legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of ignoring plain facts before us, facts upon which a man's very life or liberty conceivably could depend. . . . But the *result* certainly does not enhance the high traditions of the judicial process.²³

III

The Vinson Court's fifth libertarian, according to the evidence of Table I, is Justice Frankfurter. However, the substantially lesser degree of support for libertarian claims shown by his record indicates that he is either less libertarian, or less activist, or both, than the four justices who outrank him. There is a widespread impression that Frankfurter has not acted like a liberal on the Court. It derives from the position he has taken in such important controversies as the two flag salute cases,²⁴ the two sound truck cases,²⁵ *Dennis v. United States*,²⁶ *Feiner v. New York*,²⁷ *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke*,²⁸ and numerous others.

It derives also from the bitter campaign he has waged against use of the clear and present danger test, with or without preferred position amplification, as a guide for judicial decisions in the civil liberties field. As the self-anointed disciple of Holmes on the Vinson Court, many have found it strange that he should so vehemently deny the utility of Holmes' principal contribution to free speech theory. His answer has been: (1) that the test was being used for a *purpose* other than Holmes intended—namely, to determine the constitutionality of legislation; (2) that it was being applied in much different *areas* than Holmes contemplated, including contempt of court proceedings, libel cases, and application of petty police regulations; and (3) that the *spirit* of its recent use was much different than Holmes would have approved.

On this latter point he said in *Pennekamp v. Florida*:

"Clear and present danger" was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken from its context.

When viewed in context, he contended, the bias of the test was as much toward regulation as toward freedom:

²³ 329 U. S. 173 (1946). Italics added.

²⁴ *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, *supra*.

²⁵ *Saia v. New York*, *supra*; *Kovacs v. Cooper*, *supra*.

²⁶ 341 U. S. 494 (1951).

²⁷ 340 U. S. 315 (1951).

²⁸ 339 U. S. 470 (1950).

In its setting it served to indicate the importance of freedom of speech to a free society but also to emphasize that its exercise must be compatible with the preservation of other freedoms essential to a democracy and guaranteed by our Constitution.

Consequently he concluded in the *Dennis* case:

It were far better that the phrase be abandoned than that it be sounded once more to hide from the believers in an absolute right of free speech the plain fact that the interest in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy or than a determination of the people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the safety of government itself.²⁹

These apparently anti-libertarian doctrines and results, however, can be explained on the basis of a libertarian theory—the theory that the primary responsibility of a liberal justice is to restrain the exercise of judicial power. This theory sees the Court not as crusader or advocate, but as one of the instruments of political and social accommodation and adjustment in a complicated governmental system. As opposed to the goal-orientation of the activists, this view might be called functionally-oriented. Its announced emphasis is not on securing a result conforming to the jurist's own scheme of values, but upon adherence to appropriate judicial standards and proper manipulation of judicial techniques.

Standards for determining the appropriateness of judicial reactions are derived from considerations of the position of an appellate court within the federal judicial system, and of the position of the entire judicial branch vis à vis the legislature and executive in a system based on the separation of powers. This point of view will be much concerned with fixing the boundaries of judicial power, and will conceive that it is the justice's primary responsibility to stay within the confines of those boundaries.

In application, this concern about judicial limitations has been responsible for strict construction of the Court's jurisdiction over "cases and controversies," for the doctrine of "political questions" which are immune to judicial review, for the various rules protecting acts of Congress from being declared unconstitutional, for the "reasonable man" theory of review of state legislation. Where the Court has in the past divided on application of these principles of judicial limitation, it has typically been the liberal justices who have stressed the necessity for

²⁹ As for the "preferred position" doctrine, in *Kovacs v. Cooper* he refers to it as "a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity . . . I say the phrase is mischievous because it radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it."

judicial self-restraint, as opposed to the conservative practice of broad judicial review. It was a liberal minority which spoke through Justice Stone during the New Deal constitutional crisis with the now classic warning that "the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."³⁰ And it was in *Ashwander v. TVA* that the liberal trio of Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo reformulated the general principles of limited judicial review of constitutional questions.³¹

Frankfurter's attempts to apply these principles of libertarian restraint clearly account for many of the anti-libertarian results he has achieved. Because the Court is the least representative or democratically responsible of the three branches of government, he feels under great pressure to yield to both Congress and the executive.³² Examples of his deference to the President are found in the Hawaiian martial law case, where he objected to the Court's second-guessing, from the safe vantage point of 1946, military decisions made in 1941 and 1942;³³ and *Ludecke v. Watkins*, where he foreclosed judicial review of presidentially-approved deportations of alien enemies.³⁴ Comparable examples of deference to Congress are *United States v. Lovett*, where he denied that it is a bill of attainder when Congress forbids specific individuals from being paid out of an appropriation act,³⁵ and *United States v. CIO*, where he was part of a majority which avoided declaring part of the Taft-Hartley Act unconstitutional by holding that it must not mean what Taft had said it meant.³⁶

In the famous steel seizure case, Frankfurter was caught in the cross-fire between President and Congress, and could not be deferential to both. He chose Congress, but his opinion nonetheless gave respectful consideration to the case for the President, and he wound up with the suggestion that a very minor change in the presidential seizure formula might have legitimized the action.³⁷ In contrast, Black and Douglas, un-

³⁰ *United States v. Butler*, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).

³¹ 297 U. S. 288 (1936). Roberts also joined this trio.

³² In *Dennis v. United States*, *supra*, he wrote: "Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits."

³³ *Duncan v. Kahanamoku*, 327 U. S. 304 (1946).

³⁴ 335 U. S. 160 (1948).

³⁵ 328 U. S. 303 (1946).

³⁶ 335 U. S. 106 (1948).

³⁷ *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Frankfurter said: "The judiciary may, as this case proves, have to intervene in determining where authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of government. But in doing so we should be wary and humble. Such is the teaching of this Court's rôle in the history of the country." As to the change in formula, he wrote: "We must . . . put to one side consideration of what powers the President would have had . . . if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be determined automatically unless Congressional approval were given."

deterred by conceptions of self-restraint, dogmatically condemned the President's action on the basis of a rigorous and naive interpretation of separation of powers. Black disposed of the entire controversy in thirteen paragraphs, and on such a plane of lofty moral and constitutional generalities that he did not bother to cite a single Supreme Court decision bearing on the substantive issue.

The principle of federalism is another powerful restraining force for Frankfurter, with state legislatures and courts as the principal beneficiaries. In upholding the Illinois "group libel" law, he contended that state legislatures must have the power to pursue "trial-and-error" methods in seeking solutions for social problems.³⁸ In *Colegrove v. Green* he denied an appeal to the federal courts "to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois."³⁹ In the *Terminiello* case he was appalled that a majority of his colleagues should have reversed a state conviction on a federal ground which the Supreme Court itself had discovered and which the parties had never presented.

This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.

In *Uveges v. Pennsylvania* a somewhat similar eagerness to find error in a state court's action led him to say: "After all, this is the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, not a super-legal-aid bureau."⁴⁰ And in the infamous case of *Screws v. United States*, where a Georgia sheriff had murdered a Negro he had under detention, Frankfurter dissented against application of a federal civil rights law to a "patently local crime."⁴¹

Thus Frankfurter seems to have worked out and applied a fairly consistent policy of self-restraint in civil liberties adjudication. But how do we know whether this is the reflection of genuine libertarian restraint, or merely convenient rationalization for a fundamentally anti-libertarian set of personal preferences? One way of throwing light on such a difficult motivational problem⁴² is to examine his voting reactions in situations where judicial restraint would not be required by his philosophy. Two of the four types of cases in Table I fall in this category—aliens and federal criminal prosecutions. Since both types involve federal action, there is no

³⁸ *Beauharnais v. People*, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).

³⁹ 328 U. S. 549 (1946).

⁴⁰ 335 U. S. 437 (1948).

⁴¹ 325 U. S. 91 (1945). In *United States v. Williams*, 341 U. S. 70 (1951), Frankfurter carried the majority with him in adopting a restrictive interpretation for a companion federal civil rights statute.

⁴² Another method, of course, is to review Frankfurter's record on civil liberties before he became a member of the Supreme Court.

problem of deference to states. Since the alien cases practically all turn on matters of statutory interpretation, there is no problem of restraint to avoid declarations of unconstitutionality. The federal prosecutions do raise constitutional issues, but in the form of practices in the lower federal courts, over which the Supreme Court has rather complete supervisory responsibilities. In both types of cases Frankfurter's record is positively libertarian—in alien cases more so than Douglas', in federal criminal prosecutions more so than Black's. Thus Frankfurter's motivation appears to be genuinely that of libertarian restraint.

IV

The two schools of libertarian thought on the Vinson Court have in a substantial number of cases found common ground to stand on against the views of less libertarian members of the Court.⁴³ But in other respects their differences are great. The strength of libertarian activism is that of a dedicated idealism to the cause of liberty which holds fast against the most powerful pressures. No one should underestimate or undervalue the courage manifested by the Black and Douglas dissents in the *Dennis* case, or fail to appreciate the strength of their conviction that "right" will ultimately triumph. It is very useful and provocative to have the pure free speech doctrine defended in such an influential forum. No matter how much Frankfurter may scorn "preferred position" as a judicial tool, such talk unquestionably has an educational value for an unsophisticated public.

But libertarian activism has the defects of its virtues. A Supreme Court justice has a task which is broader than that of safeguarding or enforcing one set of values. He must balance the competing claims of liberty and authority. If he automatically takes the libertarian side on every issue, he is scarcely functioning in a balancing capacity. The preferred position philosophy is the activists' way of justifying, or even of requiring, this extra emphasis on libertarian values. Actually, the preferred position argument is not incompatible with the balancing process; its result is simply to throw an extra weight on one side of the scales, like the butcher who consistently weighs his thumb along with the meat.

What does seem incompatible with the balancing process is "label thinking," which makes use of absolutistic standards or fixed categories. For Black, prior restraint is prior restraint, and therefore unconstitutional, whether the restraint is aimed at Jehovah's Witnesses ringing doorbells or the gigantic conspiracy of the Communist party. It would

⁴³ In 34 of the 194 nonunanimous decisions during the 1949-51 terms, Black and Frankfurter dissented together. Of these 34 cases, 22 raised civil liberties issues.

seem preferable that the determining factor in a judgment of constitutionality should be, not the label by which the restraint is called, but the seriousness of the threat to freedom and the justification offered for the limitation.

Label thinking unfits a justice to make distinctions based on matters of degree, and results in the kind of absolutistic standards seen at work in Black's steel seizure decision. Label thinking leads a judge into a world of abstractions in which the facts of particular cases are unimportant, as Douglas demonstrated by his unrealistic approach to the *Terminiello* case. Label thinking encourages a justice to apply to a statute legal rather than empirical tests, as Murphy did when he declared an anti-picketing statute unconstitutional "on its face" in *Thornhill v. Alabama*. Considering the subsequent difficulties the Court has had with the *Thornhill* doctrine, it would have been preferable if Murphy had set the holding in a framework of circumstances rather than of concepts. Paul A. Freund makes this point well in comparing the Court's treatment of commerce and civil liberties questions:

A free market in ideas and a free national market in goods are basic processes in our constitutional system. Each must nevertheless submit to qualifications in collision with other public interests. If the Court has on the whole been more successful in finding serviceable accommodations under the Commerce Clause between a national free market and the claims of local welfare than under the First Amendment between liberty of the mind and the claims of public order, one reason may be the more empiric, particularistic approach that has generally characterized the performance of the former role.⁴

Frankfurter's consciously elaborated standard of judicial restraint raises problems of a different sort. He is clearly justified in wanting to develop and act on a sound, consistent philosophy of the judicial function in a democracy. But he has carried his preoccupation with restraint to almost pathological extremes in an effort to ensure and demonstrate that his own decisions are the product of legal principles operating under antiseptic conditions and untouched by personal preferences. In case after case he has prefaced his decision by a disquisition on the duality of Frankfurter the man and Frankfurter the judge. Mostly he has been concerned with showing why as a judge he has felt compelled to come to conclusions which as a citizen he would never support. Thus in the second flag salute case he explained his refusal to hold unconstitutional the compulsory flag salute in public schools as follows:

One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not

⁴ "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term: Foreword—The Year of the Steel Case," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 66, p. 97 (1952).

likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should whole-heartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime.⁴⁵

In *Haley v. Ohio* he referred to the fact that as a judge he could not give effect to his personal disbelief in capital punishment.⁴⁶ In the curious case of *Louisiana v. Resweber*, where a condemned man had failed to die in the electric chair because of its faulty mechanism, Frankfurter supplied the fifth vote for the Court's ruling that a second trip to the chair would not be double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment. He said:

I cannot rid myself of the conviction that were I to hold that Louisiana would transgress the Due Process Clause if the State were allowed, in the precise circumstances before us, to carry out the death sentence, I would be enforcing my private view rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Constitution.⁴⁷

But how does Frankfurter propose to find standards which are external to his own value system? In the electric chair case, he professed to rely on "the consensus of society's opinion." But how did he know what the consensus of opinion was on a subject that had never arisen before? Instead of the result at which he arrived, could he not have assumed with equal validity that his own personal aversion to sending this man on a second trip to the electric chair was what any normally sensitive human being would have felt?

In the *Haley* case he went further, indicating that judicial humility, plus self-administered psychoanalysis, was the answer:

Humility in this context means an alert self-scrutiny so as to avoid infusing into the vagueness of a Constitutional command one's merely private notions. Like other mortals, judges, though unaware, may be in the grip of prepossessions. The only way to relax such a grip, the only way to avoid finding in the Constitution the personal bias one has placed in it, is to explore the influences that have shaped one's unanalyzed views in order to lay bare prepossessions.

These statements afford fascinating glimpses into a sophisticated judicial mind at work, but as public bulletins of successful inner purgation they carry a "holier than thou" inference with respect to disagreeing justices which seems quite unjustified. For Frankfurter's accounts certainly misstate or oversimplify the problem of judicial motivation. No matter how conscious or even heroic the efforts, the man and the judge

⁴⁵ *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, *supra*.

⁴⁶ 332 U. S. 596 (1948).

⁴⁷ 329 U. S. 459 (1947).

can never be separated, and the gratifications of deprivation are as personally rooted as the gratifications of indulgence.

Frankfurter's major guides are negative in character—judicial self-restraint, deference to the legislature, the executive, and the states. But deciding Supreme Court cases is a positive job. There are responsibilities of judging which the Court cannot put off on a state court or a legislature. Frankfurter has on occasions come too close to abdicating this responsibility. Thus in the *Feiner* case he deferred to the New York Court of Appeals because it was an able and sensitive court. Application of this rule would give the preposterous situation of the Court's responsibility varying in different cases depending upon the reputation of the supreme court of the state from which the appeal came.

Both activism and restraint, then, have their limitations as working principles for libertarians on the Supreme Court. Neither emotional zeal which prejudges the issues, nor judicial neutralism which seeks ways of avoiding the substantive questions, will do. A Supreme Court justice must be able, and willing, to balance some of the most delicate, intangible, yet superlatively important issues that can arise in a democratic society. He must be a creature of the times and sensitive to the same currents of opinion as move legislators, to the end that the standards of reasonableness by which he judges legislative action will not be detached from reality. But he must at the same time be sensitive to the system of expectations which has made the Supreme Court the American conscience, with the responsibility, not merely of preaching to legislatures, but of passing judgment on their actions in the light of the great libertarian principles of the Bill of Rights.

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN BRITISH POLITICS

LESLIE LIPSON

University of California (Berkeley)

I

Britain may fairly be called the classic home of two-party government. This claim is justifiable because of some characteristics for which the system, as employed in Britain, is distinctive. Chief among these is its long duration. Although there is room for disagreement among historians about the time and circumstances of its birth, it would be difficult to deny that two-party government was established earlier, has lasted longer, and at the present time is probably more firmly rooted there than in any contemporary state. Indeed, the practice of simplifying the complexities of politics into a contest for office between a pair of major claimants has endured in Britain through a catalogue of changes which would assuredly have wrecked a less effective system. In that country it has survived the evolution from an oligarchy of aristocrats to a democracy of the whole people; the transfer of power from monarchy to parliament and then from parliament to cabinet; the rise of large-scale industry with its social aftermath; the switch in economic policy from mercantilism to laissez faire and from this to state planning; and withal, the expansion and subsequent shrinkage of Britain's international might.

Especially in recent decades, moreover, both major parties have developed a strength of organization and tightness of discipline, to which New Zealand offers the nearest parallel inside the British Commonwealth and no similar approximation exists outside. For this reason, Britain, whose two powerful parties differ so sharply from the plethora of groups in France, also stands in contrast to the United States. What we have in this country can more accurately be described as two party systems rather than a two-party system. In the election of Senators and Representatives and in the conduct of congressional business, the size and diversity of the United States have fostered a multiplicity of groups more akin to the politics of France than of Britain. Every four years, however, in order to capture the presidency, these groups amalgamate into two large and loose coalitions—like federal unions within a federal union. But even during a presidential election the cohesiveness of the Democrats and Republicans is far from matching that of the Conservatives and Laborites.

Many studies have been made of parties which examine their structure and organization, the interests they represent, and the programs they espouse. Also plentiful, because of the controversies surrounding

proportional representation and because of the political experiences of various European nations, are discussions about the pros and cons of having two parties or many. Relatively less attention has been paid, however, to the problem of explaining why one or the other system emerges and survives and to that of detecting the circumstances which accompany and may cause the respective systems. With this problem, as it relates to Britain, the present article is concerned. It is written in the belief that a science of politics needs to devote more attention to the diagnosis of causation and that the comparative study of government can offer the best approach to its elucidation. The study of a single country, as is evident, can lead to conclusions which are valid for it alone and do not in themselves warrant a wider application. But such conclusions will suggest hypotheses for testing in other contexts, so that, when these are checked by a comparative method, a reliable body of argument can be pieced together.

The pitfalls on the way are, of course, many and deep. Frequently in efforts to analyze causal relationships there is much that consists of assertion rather than evidence; of assumed, instead of established, connections; and of effects mistaken for causes. Moreover, there is the danger in a complex situation of seeking the simple explanation of a single cause and believing one has found it. If these traps are successfully avoided, it should be possible to state, with more certainty than can be done at present, what conditions are responsible for the generation and operation of each type of party system; whether the causes that sustain it are identical with those from which it initially derived; whether similar factors, reproduced in like combination in different places, always yield the same results; and whether the same consequences may sometimes flow from dissimilar causes.

To avoid misunderstanding, a few preliminary clarifications are necessary, since discussion can otherwise be sidetracked and mired down in a semantic bog. A state has a two-party system if it satisfies the following conditions:

- (1) Not more than two parties at any given time have a genuine chance to gain power.

- (2) One of these is able to win the requisite majority and stay in office without help from a third party.

- (3) Over a number of decades two parties alternate in power.

Such a statement has the merit of being politically realistic. It recognizes that, even where two giant organizations dominate the political process, some Lilliputian groups may exist alongside of them. Only if one of the latter should succeed in holding the balance between the principal con-

tenders does the two-party system cease, as is the case, for instance, in contemporary Australia. The list of conditions further permits the possibility that a major party may dwindle and decline and eventually be replaced by a newcomer, just as the British Laborites supplanted the Liberals. While this is happening, of course, a three-party system may emerge temporarily (witness Britain in the period from 1918 to 1931). It is also compatible with a two-party system for a major party to suffer a prolonged eclipse and be overshadowed by its rival in a series of elections, as the Whigs overwhelmed the Tories from 1714 to 1760 and the Liberals led the Conservatives between 1846 and 1874, and the Conservatives in their turn prevailed from 1886 to 1905. The presence within the system of minor parties which are unable to affect the control of power; a lengthy ascendancy of one party; even the extinction of a major party and the rise of a new one; these phenomena do not signify the abandonment of the two-party system provided that the previously stated conditions are fulfilled. What really matters is that over the long run government through two parties be clearly revealed as the norm, from which any departure is only temporary and to which the system always returns.¹ Judged by these criteria, Britain may be said to have operated the two-party system for two and a half centuries. Thus the long Whig ascendancy that began in 1714 did not prevent a Tory resurgence in 1760. Domestic conservatism during the Napoleonic period and immediately afterwards did not make impossible the Liberal-sponsored reforms of the 1830's. The Conservatives split in 1846 over the protection of home-grown wheat, but were reassembled by Disraeli so as to triumph in 1874. The Liberals were splintered in 1885-86, but came firmly into power in 1905-6. The Laborites were divided and routed in 1931, yet returned to sweep the country in 1945. A three-party system existed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century because of the Irish question and the talents of Parnell, and again in the 1920's when Laborites were rising and the Liberals were declining. But the two-party system reasserted itself after each of these seeming deviations.

Another problem, which is one of both definition and interpretation, concerns the meaning of the term "party." The statement made earlier that the two-party system in Britain is characterized chiefly by its longevity assumes that certain features persist continuously for centuries. But was there in fact anything in the politics of the eighteenth century that can properly be called "a party"? Is it perhaps a misnomer

¹ In suggesting that British politics are characterized by a two and a half party system, Carl J. Friedrich overemphasizes the deviations. *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (rev. ed., Boston, 1950), p. 414.

to use the same word to refer to the varied political associations that mark the eras of the Pelhams and the Pitts, of Grey and Peel, of Gladstone and Disraeli, of Asquith and Balfour, of Attlee and Churchill?

The truth is too plain to require argument that the lapse of more than two centuries has wrought changes that are substantial and profound. British politics a couple of hundred years ago were decidedly oligarchical and the government of those days was cast in a wholly aristocratic mold. After a hundred years had elapsed, the urban middle class had broken the earlier monopoly of aristocrats, but the majority of the public were still denied an influential voice in decisions that affected them. The principal differences between the older and more modern "parties" are to be found in the interests they represent and the structure of their organizations. The parties of today cohere together in a disciplined fashion which assuredly has no earlier parallel. Between them, their leadership and their followers include members of each class and of all the interests that comprise the national life. Such changes are, of course, explicable in terms of the fact which is fundamental to the politics of a fully developed democracy: the number who participate in its processes. When all adults have the right to vote, and eighty three or four per cent of them exercise it, as happened in the British elections of 1950 and 1951, the coalescing of millions and the harmonizing of their interests become the job of the political party.

But when all this is said, as say it we must, is the existence of parties before the modern era to be denied? No such conclusion is necessitated by the facts. The point that modern parties are greatly changed from their predecessors applies not only to them but to every institution of British government. The twentieth-century parliament, cabinet, monarchy, judiciary, civil service, and local authorities have all evolved into forms unlike what existed earlier. But though the cabinet under Churchill differs from its archetype under Walpole; though the figure-head monarchy of Elizabeth II is a far cry from the personal supremacy of Elizabeth I; though the Commons of Bevin and Bevan is many stages removed in functions, work-load, and membership from that of Pym and Hampden—nevertheless the identical terms are rightly used because of the unifying theme that has persisted throughout the variations. This may be done without abuse to language or to sense, provided that there be a substantial continuity of the institution concerned and reasonable comparability of the functions it performed then and performs now. Do the parties meet this test? In my judgment they do. Essentially a party is a group of people who are sufficiently likeminded to work together in order to secure control of the government and apply the

policies that promote their interests. Within the breadth of that definition may be included a clique of aristocrats, an association of middle-class entrepreneurs, or a mass movement drawing millions to its banners. In that sense the label "party" can be applied alike to the gatherings that followed a Walpole, Peel, or Baldwin, for though these differed in the nature and number of their adherents, there is an unmistakable continuity that underlies the objectives they sought and the role they played.

II

Many reasons have been offered for the existence in British politics of two-party government. The various explanations are broadly of two kinds. Sometimes the system is interpreted as the outcome of specific institutions which supposedly lend themselves to the formation of two major parties and no more than two. Alternatively the roots of the two parties are traced to the foundations of British society and economics. Let us examine each of the suggested "causes" in turn.

The theories which seek to derive the two-party system from the structure of British political institutions have not failed to pay honorable mention to the cabinet. Indeed it was only to be expected that attempts to solve the riddle of the party system would connect it in some way with the cabinet, the latter being the key institution in British government. To assert, however, that a relation exists between factor A and factor B is one thing; to prove that in that relationship A is the cause, and B the effect, is quite another. This difficulty is well borne out by the course of the discussion over this very assumption that cabinet government caused two-party government. When A. Lawrence Lowell wrote his *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, he argued:

The result [so long as the ministers cling together] is that the members either group themselves about the ministers, and vote with them through thick and thin, or else they attach themselves to an opposition party, whose object is to turn out the cabinet, and then take office itself and carry on a different policy. The normal condition of the parliamentary system, therefore, among a people sufficiently free from prejudices to group themselves naturally, and possessing enough experience to know that the practical and attainable, and not the ideal, is the true aim in politics, is a division into two parties, each of which is ready to take office whenever the other loses its majority. . . .

A division into two parties is not only *the normal result* of the parliamentary system, but also an essential condition of its success.²

² (Boston and New York, 1896), Vol. 1, pp. 71-72. My italics.

By the time that he published *The Government of England*, Lowell's position had shifted. He was still convinced that a causal connection existed between the cabinet and the party system. But he had now veered round to the view that, instead of the cabinet system causing the formation of two parties, it was the parties which preceded and caused the cabinet system, though he did think that the consequence had later reacted on its cause.

Neither the parliamentary system nor the party system, neither the responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons nor the permanent division into two parties, grew up in a day. Throughout the eighteenth century the principle of cabinet responsibility was but dimly recognised; while parties at times disintegrated, and the wheels of government were kept going by means of corruption, which has served in all ages as a lubricant for ill-adjusted political machinery. But little by little, with halting steps, the rivalry of parties built up the responsibility of ministers, and this in turn helped to perpetuate the party divisions; for the parliamentary system, like every rational form of government, reacts upon and strengthens the conditions of its own existence. It is based upon party, and by the law of its nature tends to accentuate party. . . . The parliamentary system, as it has grown up spontaneously in England, is *in its origin* and nature government by party, sanctioned and refined by custom.³

Lowell's afterthoughts were more accurate than his first impressions, for the notion that the two-party system is a by-product of the cabinet system encounters some fatal objections. There is, for example, the elementary chronological fact that the clustering of political factions into two major groups occurred at an earlier date than the emergence of the cabinet and thus could not have been caused by that institution. Like complex tapestries, the Whig and Tory combinations were woven of many strands, some of which connect directly with the Civil War between Parliamentarians and Royalists, while others may be more deviously and tenuously traced to the religious controversies of the sixteenth century or to earlier feuds among the nobility such as the Wars of the Roses. Certain it is, however, that after the last and most stupid Stuart was compelled to abdicate, the reigns of William and Mary and of Anne did witness the more orderly beginnings of bipolar politics with its essential corollary of alternation in office. For if it was the Whigs who understood Britain's interest in the War of the Spanish Succession, who pitted the nation's strength against the Sun-King, and who discovered the first genius with the surname Churchill, it was the

³ *The Government of England* (New York, 1912), Vol. 1, pp. 457, 458. My italics. See also Vol. 2, p. 86.

Tories who divined when the time for peace had come and negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht.

The cabinet system, however, postdated these events. Its central principles—that the Crown should select as ministers only those who are supported by a parliamentary majority and that these should be collectively responsible for the acts of one and all—could be applied in practice only because the parties were already there to make them work. Indeed, as G. M. Trevelyan has observed, the party was the vital difference through which cabal was converted into cabinet.⁴ Add the fortunate accident of personality that a Walpole's talents were available to exercise among Englishmen the arts of leadership which a German-tongued Hanoverian prince could not, and thus the same party system which produced the ministry endowed it with its prime minister.

Comparative evidence presents another difficulty to adherents of the view that the cabinet produces two-party politics. Such evidence, it is true, must be cautiously employed, since it is impossible to prove by means of imported data that something must have, or could not have, happened in a particular country. Nevertheless, the fact remains that virtually all the countries of continental Europe which have adopted cabinet government also have multi-party systems. This suggests that the cabinet, *per se*, was not the prime cause of the party system in Britain, for, were that the case, it might reasonably be expected that when cabinets were installed elsewhere, they would give rise to the same consequences. Since the cabinet system, however, can be found associated in more cases with multi-party systems than with a two-party system, and since the latter instances occur only within the British Commonwealth, the existence of two parties would appear to be the product of other elements that are peculiar to the British tradition.

One such element, which some political scientists have proffered in argument, is the cabinet's use of the power to dissolve a parliament. How this is supposed to discourage the formation of more than two parties is thus explained by Harold F. Gosnell:

In Great Britain the two-party system is also perpetuated by the type of parliamentary government which the British have evolved. The Prime Minister can dissolve Parliament and declare new elections. This gives the party in

⁴ "The party bond introduced a principle of unity among Cabinet Ministers other than that of mere individual obedience to the orders of the King. For that reason, party is the real secret of the step upwards from Cabal to Cabinet. The mutual loyalty of members inside the Cabinet was a reflection of the habit of party loyalty among the same persons in the world outside." *The Two-Party System in English Political History*, Romanes Lecture, (Oxford, 1926).

power a firm grip over its members in the House of Commons, and discourages their trying any insurrections or new ventures, since re-election is a troublesome and uncertain matter. In doubtful British constituencies, winning an election is difficult, and the support of a major party is almost a necessity. The party in power keeps its members in the House from straying, and the opposition party is well disciplined because this is the only way that it can hope to come to power.⁵

The case is further buttressed by a reference to France, the classic example of multi-party politics. Because under the Third Republic the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies was used only once and then became obsolescent, people often assume that this fact helps to explain why the legislature, dominated by the cabinet in Britain, dominates over it in France. This line of reasoning scarcely supports the pretended conclusion, since it omits a number of considerations that point in another direction. The argument assumes that a ministry is better equipped to enforce party regularity among its followers in the Commons because it alone can take the initiative of deciding when to hold a general election and, if defeated in parliament, may prefer to go to the country rather than tamely resign. But precisely how this flexibility in the timing of elections strengthens the disciplinary control of the cabinet is not proven. Such a control does, of course, exist. But it rests primarily on other foundations: the cost of winning a general election; the centralization of party finances; the dependence of many members on their salaries; the power of the party leadership to endorse local candidates; and the absence of any requirement that a candidate must reside in his district, which makes him depend for his seat more on the leaders and less on his constituents. In the light of such potent considerations, it makes relatively little difference to most back-benchers whether a general election will be called this year, next year, or two years hence. At some time, as he well knows, the day of reckoning must come. Whenever it does, he depends for renomination on the favor of the leadership, and that dependence would still hold good in Britain even if elections were held there with the clock-work regularity of the American system.⁶

The point is clearly illustrated by the experience of the country whose politics approximate most nearly to the British model. New Zea-

⁵ *Democracy: the Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948), p. 242.

⁶ It is worth noticing that though the intervals between British elections are irregular, the average length of Parliaments corresponds to the term of the President. Between 1832 and 1952, there were thirty general elections in one hundred and twenty years. Moreover, the change from the Septennial Act of 1715 to the quinquennial term provided under the Parliament Act of 1911 made no difference in this respect. From 1832 through 1910 twenty elections occurred in almost eighty years; from 1911 to 1952, ten were held in four decades.

land has a similar two-party pattern; both parties are well disciplined; and its cabinet, of the familiar British type, dominates the legislature. For six decades after 1889, however, the power of dissolution was never employed. Elections were regularly held every three years, save on three occasions when Parliament extended its own life. Even when the power of dissolution was resuscitated in 1951, the circumstances in no way involved the survival of the ministry, a split in the government party, or a parliamentary stalemate. A system of two tight-knit parties, therefore, does not depend upon a power to dissolve and the practice of having irregularly spaced elections.

Furthermore, if the power to dissolve were actually such a deterrent to party rebels as is believed, how does one explain the cases of defiant party members, and actual splits that have occurred? The ministerial power of dissolution did not deter Disraeli from rising against Peel in 1846, or Chamberlain and the Liberal Unionists from crossing over to the Conservatives in 1886, or Henderson and his cohorts from breaking with Macdonald in 1931. Indeed, there may even be occasions when a group of dissidents, so far from coming to heel, withdraw their support from ministers and deliberately provoke a dissolution in the hope that an election may work to their own advantage, as was clearly Parnell's stratagem when he switched from Gladstone to Salisbury in 1885.

Nor can French politics during the Third Republic be properly adduced as evidence that the absence of a power to dissolve modifies the character of the party system. That reasoning is fallacious because it takes for granted, instead of proving, the point which is really in issue. What has to be explained is why a power that was explicitly written into the Constitutional Law of February 25, 1875,⁷ and was employed as early as 1877, was never used again. The answer is, of course, that, owing to the politics of the *Seize Mai* affair, a trick which the monarchists had devised against the republicans recoiled upon the heads of its promoters, for it was the republicans who won the election which their rivals engineered. Henceforth the Right feared to risk a second attempt, so that even Doumergue failed to reactivate the power of dissolution in the early 1930's; and the Left were reluctant to invoke it, since they remembered 1877, and in any case they were unlikely to enlist the necessary consent of the conservatively-inclined Senate. But the implications of this truth have often been misunderstood. The truth is that the power to dissolve atrophied because the structure of the party system precluded the use of its potentialities. When there are many parties, and every government is a coalition, it is harder to reach

⁷ Article 5.

agreement about the time to dissolve than when a single party takes the decision. It was the parties, in other words, that determined the use, or rather disuse, of the power to dissolve, and not the latter which determined the character of the parties. Possibly, moreover, although it is still too early to speak with assurance, the same will prove to be true of France's Fourth Republic. Whilst the Constitution of 1946 reincorporates a power of dissolution,⁸ the parties of the "Third Force" coalition, which could have staged the requisite *crises ministérielles*,⁹ and precipitated an election in 1948 or 1949, showed a marked reluctance to brandish a weapon which might be twisted from night-stick into boomerang.

Of all the attempts, however, to interpret the parties as the product of other political institutions, the most popular view attributes the existence of two parties to the operation of the electoral system. Perhaps no commonplace is so widely held, and so seldom questioned, among students of politics, as the notion that single-member districts combined with plurality victories foster a two-party system, with its corollary that proportional representation promotes a multiplicity of parties. Thus, in a recent work Robert G. Neumann categorically states: "The existence of a two-party system in Britain is an historical accident which has been preserved by the plurality system of elections and the single-member constituency."¹⁰ Similarly, but with more general application, V. O. Key has written:

Among the influences leading the electorate to divide itself into only two major groups, great weight must be attributed to the system of choosing representatives from single-member districts by a plurality vote in contrast with systems of proportional representation which, of necessity, are based on multi-member districts. In a single-member district only two parties can contend for electoral victory with any hope of success; a third party is doomed to perpetual defeat unless it can manage to absorb the following of one of the major parties and thereby become one of the two parties itself. Parties do not thrive on the certainty of defeat. Faced by this prospect the only alternative is to support one or the other of two parties. The single-member district thus molds parties into the bipartisan pattern.¹¹

How does this argument apply to the case of Britain? Does it fit the facts of that country's politics? There are some important respects in which it fails to do so.

In the first place, the effect of the plurality requirement has to be

⁸ Article 51.

⁹ As defined in the Constitution, *ibid.*

¹⁰ *European and Comparative Government* (New York, 1951), p. 142.

¹¹ *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (2nd ed., New York, 1947), pp. 218-19.

considered. If victory in the election required a majority of the votes cast, it is true that a two-party system would be more likely to arise, since groups would be encouraged to coalesce in order to build up the necessary strength.¹² But that is not the British system. On the contrary the mathematics of victory by a bare plurality would, if not counteracted by other influences, foster the politics of a multi-party system, because the larger groups could expect to win seats without entering into wider unions. As for the single-member districts, the proponents of the theory ignore the awkward truth that in Britain these postdated the rise of the two-party system. Prior to the Reform Act of 1832, the House of Commons contained a total of 558 members, of whom only 74 (13%) were returned from single-member districts.¹³ As a result of the redistributions of 1832, 1867, and 1885, districts with a single member were gradually substituted for those with two members. But it was not until 1885 that the former became the rule.¹⁴ From that date through 1952, eighteen elections have been conducted in this new style. What has been the effect of the change?

It is customary to point to the decline of the Liberals in the 1920's as definitive proof of the hypothesis that single-member districts, plus election by plurality, operate adversely upon the weaker or weakest group and thereby cause a two-party system. The argument owes much—too much indeed—to Ramsay Muir's *Book of Lamentations*, which has been uncritically accepted at its face value.¹⁵ Thus E. E. Schattschneider in his provocative study of American party politics allows himself to write:

Many other instances of the operation of the single-member district system could be found. Outside the United States the most conclusive demonstration is to be seen in the fate of the Liberal party in England under an analogous election system. Here was a party that had every advantage—money, prestige, able leadership, a glorious history, and a large body of devoted followers—yet it was strangled by the election system. The Liberal party had the great misfortune to become a third party, and once caught in this position, was destroyed by the statistical tendency of the single-member district system.¹⁶

¹² As happens in the election of the President of the United States through the electoral college. Only once since the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment has the party system failed to produce this majority.

¹³ See L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (2 vols., London, 1929), Vol. 1, pp. 79–80.

¹⁴ Note the comment of Morley in his *Life of Gladstone*: "The election [of 1885] ran a chequered course (Nov. 23–Dec. 19). It was the first trial of the whole body of male householders, and it was the first trial of the system of single-member districts." Vol. 2, Bk. 9, Ch. 2 (2nd ed., New York, 1906), p. 486.

¹⁵ See his *How Britain Is Governed* (4th ed., London, [1940]), Chs. 4–5.

¹⁶ *Party Government* (New York, 1942), p. 79.

To say that it was the electoral process which "strangled" or "destroyed" the Liberals is a gross exaggeration. Their demise was due primarily to other, and far weightier, factors operating quite independently of the method of apportionment and voting. One has only to study the history of the four decades from 1884 to 1924 to see what these factors were. The Liberals declined as a party because the British economy and social order were overcome by cumulative changes for which neither their philosophy nor the combination of interests they had erstwhile represented permitted a solution. The swing of manufacturers from free trade to protection, because they suffered increasingly from German and other competition; the pressure of the newly enfranchised masses for social services and further regulation of business; the consequent need to substitute a positive program of governmental action for the negativism of *laissez faire*; the task of governing an Empire (and especially Ireland) which gave no qualms to Conservatives, but did give to Liberals a sense of guilt; the impact of World War I and the experience of a coalition in which some Conservatives were liberalized, but rather more Liberals were conservatized; and finally the sorry spectacle of discordant leaders squabbling among themselves and hence splitting their followers: these were the long and short term causes of the Liberal debacle. As compared with them, the electoral machinery *per se* had no more weight than the proverbial last straw. The Liberals, like the camel's back, could not have been broken without the accumulation of the innumerable and much weightier straws preceding the last.

But in any case, to use the decline of the Liberals as "proof" that Britain's electoral system perpetuates its two parties by driving the minor groups to the wall fails to explain how Labor ever succeeded in getting their start and becoming a major party. Thus Schattschneider, who contends that "the American two-party system is the direct consequence of the American election system,"¹⁷ also emphasizes that "no minor party in American history has ever become a major party, and no major party has ever become a minor party."¹⁸ This is not true at all, however, of Britain. The "statistical tendency" of the electoral system, which is alleged to have strangled the Liberals in their old age, ought to have suffocated the Laborites in their cradle. Why did this not happen? From 1900 through 1910, Labor won a smaller percentage of seats than the percentage of their votes—the fate that befell the Liberals in the twenties. Yet the one party surmounted this handicap,

¹⁷ *Party Government*, p. 69.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

while the other did not. Does it not appear then that the causal significance of the electoral system has been greatly overrated?

Nor is the British experience an isolated one. Again it is New Zealand which offers a combination of factors precisely parallel to Britain. There too, with the same electoral machinery, the formerly potent Liberals dwindled and died between 1908 and 1931 and Labor supplanted them. So far from Labor's development being arrested by the mathematics of single-member districts, the New Zealand Liberals were not even able, while they still possessed a majority, to stem the oncoming tide by altering the electoral law to suit themselves. At the elections of 1908 and 1911 they employed the second ballot, with the provision that the only contestants at the "run-off" could be the two candidates who were placed highest at the first election. This made not the slightest difference, however, to the rise of the one party and the fall of the other—a process that was due to causes quite unconnected with the electoral system.¹⁹

The thesis that the nature of the electoral system determines the character of the party system runs into still more difficulties when France is brought into the discussion. If single-member districts plus plurality victories are supposed to create two parties, how did the multi-party system persist so obstinately in France even though *scrutin d'arrondissement* was adopted there in 1927? This question is a clear example of a non-existent difficulty which has been conjured up only because the argument of which it is a part begins with an incorrect premise and thence proceeds to a false conclusion. Consider the logic of the following syllogism. The major premise is the proposition that the party system is determined by the electoral system. There follows the minor premise that two parties are the product of single member districts. These errors are then compounded by a fallacious conversion, and it is assumed that where single member districts are established, two parties must ensue as a consequence. In France, however, the multi-party system maintained itself as tenaciously as ever. How is this undeniable fact explained away in order that the theory may be saved? The answer is that the theory's proponents refer to the system of *ballottage* (i.e., run-off elections) and point out that the second contest was normally confined to only two or three candidates, "which," writes V. O. Key, "approached the bi-partisan form."²⁰ They approached it in truth about as closely as many golfers approach the green on their

¹⁹ For details about the effect of the second ballot in New Zealand, see my *Politics of Equality* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 190–91.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 219. Key cites the "French experience as a limitation on the single-member district theory," as do others. But the limitation and the difficulty are of their own making.

second shot! The withdrawal of forlorn candidates after the first election; the negotiation of deals with the leading candidates; a network of temporary *mariages de convenance* in critical districts—all this was still a far remove from the essentials of two-party politics. Moreover, although within many constituencies the electorate fell into two or three groups on the second ballot, throughout the whole of France more than three such groups were formed, so that nationally the Chamber of Deputies continued to be split many ways.

The French case, however, cannot be judged in its proper perspective unless all the electoral vicissitudes of the Third Republic (and not merely its last experiment) are considered together. Actually the Third Republic opened with single-member districts (1876–85), then switched to the list system (1885–89), returned again to single-member districts with plurality elections (1889–1918), swung over to *scrutin de liste* along with preferential voting (1919–27) and finally in 1927 reverted to single-member districts plus *ballottage*. During the entire period 1875–1940, therefore, more elections were fought under the single-member district plan than under proportional representation. But the point to be noted is that the overall character of the party system remained the same despite these oscillations from one method of voting to another. Surely this must indicate that the electoral system could have had only a slight effect, if indeed any, upon the party system. Otherwise one would expect to find some changes in the structure of parties, with alternate increase and decrease in their number corresponding to and consequent upon the electoral changes. That these cannot be detected should have served as a warning that the major premise of the theory examined above and the minor one are both at fault. That party systems are in some way related to systems of voting appears true. But which is the cause, and which is the effect? Students of comparative government would do well to reverse their initial hypothesis and then review the facts in a new light. There is, in my judgment, at least as much evidence to show that the parties are the prime determinants of the electoral system as that the latter determines the parties. In other words, to say that as go the parties, so goes the electoral system, may be as true as or truer than the converse. The predominant parties, whether two or more, select the brand of apportionment and voting procedure which they think will work to their best advantage. While it is then true that electoral mechanics serve to reinforce the parties—acting as a buttress, however, rather than as a foundation wall—the party structure continues thereafter to shape the operation and results of the electoral process to a greater extent than the latter is able to mold the parties.

III

The preceding discussion contains a clear implication: namely, that the character of the party system depends on and derives from factors more fundamental than the structure of political institutions. To understand these factors one must turn to the society within which the parties have their roots and grow. A political party is a collection of individuals clustering around an interest whose furtherance they make an issue and whose value they generalize into an ideal. Anything about which men cohere and feel deeply may become the basis for political activity and conflict. Interests may be simple or complex and their adherents more or less numerous. People may group and regroup in several combinations whose membership is not identical. Hence the party structure takes its substance from the interests which men engender in society and its form from the relations that are organized between them. This poses the question: what sort of divisions can be found in British society which provide the basis for partisan opposition? If sectional, cultural, religious, or economic cleavages occur, how have these been represented by the parties?

It is an arguable hypothesis that the two-party system emerged in Britain because the social order of that country was relatively homogeneous and offered little possibility for a multiple splintering of parties. This is to say that in a number of matters which are fundamental to society such a preponderant majority existed on one side of the question that the arena of practicable controversy was much restricted, and conversely the remaining issues on which two sides were opposed in nearly equal strength were few and the divisions between them fairly simple. Thus, if the small territorial expanse of the British Isles precluded the formation of sectional groups, the numerical superiority of Anglo-Saxons and Protestants prevented the rise of a Celtic or Catholic party. Likewise the dominance of agriculture until the end of the eighteenth century, and of urbanism since the middle of the nineteenth, clarified the battle-lines of economic conflict since it was impossible in the earlier period to dedicate a party wholly to the interests of city-folk, or more recently to those of farmers.

These generalizations are true in the main, but they need to be explained and in certain particulars qualified or corrected. Take, for example, the question of sectional influences on British party organization. It is, of course, doubtful whether parties are ever founded anywhere on a purely sectional base. Even in states that cover a huge area a section acquires much of its political relevance from other factors which happen to be reinforced by geographical concentration. Certainly

in a country whose total area slightly exceeds that of Oregon, and where even the hillier terrain does not approach the contours of a Switzerland, there is less occasion for that sense of a separate political identity which physical remoteness can at least abet or aggravate. To the extent that sectional forces have obtruded into British politics, they have done so because they largely coincided with the boundaries of cultural and religious diversity and represented a genuine economic antagonism. The one clear instance of a party confined to a single section where it predominated is that of the Irish Nationalists. In nine successive elections from 1885 to 1918 their parliamentary seats showed a small variation between a high of 86 and a low of 80. The decision to form a separate bloc, instead of working inside one of the major parties, was based on Parnell's calculation that he could hold the balance between the Liberals and the Conservatives and disrupt the United Kingdom by obstructing its parliament. Theirs, however, was a solitary and special case and serves as the exception to point the rule. Stemming from cultural, religious, and economic differences, the ardent nationalism of the Irish was fostered by the existence of a water barrier and by embittered memories of past warfare. But the significance of the religious cleavage in this whole complex can be gauged by the fact that Ireland ceased to be politically solid in the counties of the north-east where Protestantism was strong and the opponents of Home Rule voted Conservative.²¹

The contrast between Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales, on the other, is instructive. The two latter communities, though both belonging to the "Celtic fringe"²² and maintaining their own brands of nationalism, did not develop a separate Welsh or Scottish party. Why was this? One may suggest that a hilly border has produced among Scots and Welshmen less of an isolationist psychology than a sea channel can do; that their economic grievances were less acutely felt than those of the Irish; and that the divisions between Protestant churches were more easily bridged than the gulf between Protestant and Catholic. Instead of creating sectional parties, the Scots and Welsh have preferred to pursue their objectives within the fold of one or other of the two major organizations. The commonly accepted generalization assigns the Celtic areas to the Liberals at least during the nineteenth

²¹ Outside of Ulster the Nationalists almost always carried every Irish constituency, except for two in Dublin. Outside of Ireland the only seat they could win was the Scotland division of Liverpool where many Irish resided. See Lowell, *Government of England*, Vol. 2, p. 128.

²² As K. B. Smellie calls it. See his *A Hundred Years of English Government* (London, 1937), p. 196.

century, which was true in the main, though Disraeli was able to make inroads on the Liberal strength at the time of the Conservative victory of 1874. But the generalization does not apply to Scotland in the eighteenth century, and, of course, has little force today. In the first half of the eighteenth century Scotland had a politically split personality. Its Jacobite sympathies endowed it with Tory leanings; while those who were antagonized by the Stuart preference for Catholicism sided with the Whigs. Later in the same century the talents of Dundas and his skillful use of jobbery consolidated the Scottish votes into a solid Tory bloc, which was placed—for a price—at the disposal of Tory ministries. The Liberal decline in the twentieth century has proceeded more slowly in Scotland than in England, and still more slowly in Wales than in Scotland. What little is left of the Liberal organization nowadays might be called the last protest of the Celt against the Anglo-Saxon. Those Celtic constituencies where it formerly dominated have been partitioned between Labor and the Conservatives. To the former have gone the Welsh coal-mining areas and most of the "industrial waist" of Scotland; to the latter, the Scottish counties.

Sectional and cultural differences have had less effect on the general development of the British party system than religious dissension. Not only the origins of the Whig and Tory parties in the years from 1660 to 1700,²³ but their continued rivalry in the following century and the subsequent opposition of Conservative to Liberal, would be inexplicable unless viewed in the light of those religious controversies that have plagued the country since the reign of Henry VIII. But how did this issue contribute to the growth of a two-party system? On this point Carl J. Friedrich has commented: "England escaped the religious division (and the consequent development of a Catholic party) on account of the overwhelmingly Protestant nature of the country, buttressing this religious uniformity by depriving Catholics and other religious dissenters (nonconformists) of political privileges until well into the nineteenth century."²⁴ That is a curious statement because it both explains too little and implies too much. If being "overwhelmingly Protestant" means having "religious uniformity," why did some Protestants think it necessary to deprive others of "political privileges"? What "political privileges" were these, and, if uniformity was so securely "buttressed," did the relations between churches cease to be relevant to the strife between parties? Finally, by the same logic, why did the

²³ On which see W. C. Abbott, "The Origin of English Political Parties," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 578-602 (July, 1919).

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

overwhelmingly Catholic character of France or Belgium not promote a two-party system in either of those countries?

The fact is that in the seventeenth century the kingdom was split by religion into three segments. In the middle stood the adherents of the Church of England, who were flanked on one side by the large group of Puritans and on the other by the smaller Catholic group. When the monarchy was restored in 1660, the Anglicans turned the tables on the Puritans, who had predominated in the Cromwellian decade, and wrote their triumph into the Clarendon Code. Though subsequently challenged, the central principles of that Code continued in force and formed the line of demarcation between those Protestants whose church was established and those whose churches were not. The threat of a Catholic revival under James II temporarily solidified the Protestant ranks. But when their victory was assured in 1688, the old cleavage re-emerged. In essentials the politics of the revolutionary settlement amounted to a deal between the two major factions. Parliamentary supremacy was accomplished by the Whigs, Anglican supremacy by the Tories. Neither party was wholly satisfied with this *modus vivendi*. Both, therefore, strove to undo that portion of it which favored their rivals. But the balance of forces was so nearly equal that two generations had to elapse before the agreement could be fundamentally amended. With George III on the throne the Tories assisted in the recrudescence of monarchical power. Owing to the debacle of the monarch's American policy, however, and his later fits of insanity, the principle of parliamentary authority was rammed down their throats.

To secure a Tory acceptance of religious toleration took longer. Throughout the entire eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth, the Tories were identified with the Church of England and championed its establishment. The Whigs were thus cast in the role of representing the Protestant nonconformists, whose numbers were notably swelled by the impact of the one great spiritual force that appeared in eighteenth century Britain—to wit, John Wesley. The political disabilities of the nonconformists were not total, however, and their influence was far from negligible. The intent of the Test and Corporation Acts was to debar dissenters from holding public office. But by no statute were they disfranchised. Still less were they prevented from giving financial assistance to the Whigs. Even the ban on their taking office was not rigorously enforced, and regularly after 1727 an annual Indemnity Act was passed by Parliament to exempt from legal penalties those office holders who did not swear the necessary oaths. The truth is, therefore, that eighteenth century Britain contained not religious uni-

formity, but religious dualism; and this was carried over directly into a two-party system. Nobody has expressed this with greater clarity than G. M. Trevelyan in the following passage:

... From the Restoration to the latter years of the nineteenth century, the continuity of the two parties in English politics was very largely due to the two-party system in religious observance, popularly known as Church and Chapel. . . . The dualism of the English religious world, and the disabilities imposed on Dissenters, form a large part of the explanation of the peculiarly English phenomenon of two continuous political parties in every shire and town of the land, surviving even when obvious political issues seem asleep or settled, or when the party programmes seem in certain important respects to have changed hands. . . . The dualism in the religious life of the nation reflected itself in a political dualism.²⁵

Because this political inequality survived on the statute-book for over a century and a quarter, the time-hardened pattern of a Tory affinity for the Anglicans and a Whig alliance with nonconformists continued to exist long after the decade of the 1820's when the disabilities of the latter and of the Catholics were at last removed. Even in modern times, therefore, it has made some sense to generalize about the church-frequenting Conservative and the chapel-going Liberal or Laborite.

How was this split over a religious issue connected with conflicts of economic interest? Or, to put the question another way, what "durable source of factions" was present in the sphere of economics which could give rise to partisan opposition, and especially to a division into two parties and not more?

Until the end of the eighteenth century British society was primarily rural and the farming interest predominated in the economy. The commercial interest, though far from negligible, was secondary. Under such circumstances party opposition admitted only one possibility. The landowning aristocracy divided into a majority who formed the Tories and a minority who united with the commercial interest to constitute the Whigs. Since the country squires were mostly Anglican, while the leaders of commerce were largely nonconformist, the religious split complemented the economic—a fact that contributed materially to a two-party system. Thus founded and fortified, the system had more than a century in which to settle down before encountering its severest test—the impact of rapid technological changes on the economic and social order. The cumulative effect of such changes has been to substitute an overwhelmingly urban society for one that was rural and to

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

make farming yield pride of place to industry.²⁶ How did the parties adapt themselves to so major a transformation? Were the old bottles able to hold the new contents?

The answer is that the system, though subjected to an agony that was acute and prolonged, did in the end survive the strain. But during the course of readjustment, both great parties were respectively the victims of a major shock, whose results crippled one patient for thirty years and killed off the other. The first of these crises occurred when the manufacturing interest had grown to such proportions that it could challenge the farming interest and assert its predominance by altering to its advantage institutions which formerly favored the owners of land. That was done in the political reform of 1832, amending the franchise and the apportionment of seats in the Commons, and in the ensuing economic reform of 1846, which abolished the protective tariff on food. The immediate sufferer was the Conservative party, which cracked under the blow. The Peelites, including Gladstone, separated off and within a few years coalesced with the Liberals. The Conservative residue followed Disraeli. He, having correctly prophesied the permanent decline of British agriculture and knowing that a party devoted to a minority interest could not win majorities, looked around for a new source from which to replenish its strength—a task that occupied three decades.

At the very time that the Conservatives were emerging with renewed vitality, the crisis of the Liberals was beginning; for the same causes that helped the former harmed the latter. The contest between manufacturers and farmers amounted to a vertical division in the British economy wherein industrial wealth was arrayed against landed wealth. But with industrial predominance secured, a horizontal fissure soon opened in urban politics and poverty now challenged riches along class lines. The factory workers, in order to obtain improvements in their living and working conditions, besought the same voting rights that their Liberal employers had gained in 1832. On this issue there occurred in 1866 the first of the splits that were to prove fatal to Liberalism, since many a manufacturer was unwilling to see his employees enfranchised. When the suffrage was extended in 1867, the statute was enacted by a coalition of the minority Conservatives and the progressive wing of the Liberals. To whom would the huge new labor vote be given? For several decades it was actually divided between the two parties, since some working men voted for the Liberals as champions of nonconformists and

²⁶ In recent British censuses less than 20% of the population are classified as rural. About 5% of the gainfully-employed are engaged in farming.

social progress, while others were attracted to the benevolent paternalism of Disraeli's "Tory democracy" and to the hope of an imperial market for their products. Gradually, however, as the Liberal party weakened after a further split on the Irish question, and as tariff-conscious manufacturers drifted over into the Conservative camp, more Laborites began to whisper: "A plague on both your houses." The birth of a separate Labor organization ushered in temporarily a three-party system which lasted until, and ended with, the depression of the early nineteen-thirties. Even as they broke asunder, however, the Liberals continued to serve their country well, for, by entering the other parties, they made reform more palatable to the Conservatives and the constitution more palatable to Labor.

IV

Throughout this entire process, the timing and the order of events have evidently been crucial to the retention of a two-party system. Its early development, as Friedrich has stressed,²⁷ gave the system an initial advantage, and it was particularly fortunate that the main outlines of the constitutional system were already settled before the social order was convulsed by industrialism. But there is another important aspect of the timing which has received insufficient emphasis. What distinguishes Britain's political history in the nineteenth century is the gradualism whereby the franchise was extended to successive waves of new voters. The great reform acts were spaced at such intervals—1832, 1867, 1884—that the two-party system, already established prior to the first reform, was able to guide, absorb and assimilate the additions to the electorate. Each new interest, as its members received the suffrage, was thus mobilized by and embraced within the system. Every extension of voting rights stimulated more intensive organization by the parties in order that the recently enfranchised might be registered and captured, and better organization reacted upon the parties and fortified them. For purposes of contrast the experience of France is illuminating. That country went to the limit and adopted adult male suffrage in 1848—prematurely, as the result showed, since Napoleon III's *coup* shortly followed. The same broad franchise was reintroduced at the birth of the Third Republic, and with it simultaneously appeared the multi-party system which reflected the diversity and conflict of interests in French society. British gradualism in this respect was better adapted to the rise and retention of a two-party system than French universalism.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

If this survey of the causes of the two-party system in Britain warrants any general hypothesis, it is that parties appear primarily to be the product of their society and are only secondarily the offshoot of governmental institutions. Though the latter are not without influence upon the party structure, they serve mainly to brace and bolster a system whose foundations are deeply embedded in and shaped by the cultural, religious, and economic components of a nation. Moreover, before wider application can be given to evidence drawn from a single country, allowance must be made for any unique elements in its history, which in the case of Britain are certainly the timing sequence and the rate of political adjustment to socio-economic upheaval. Finally, this last word of caution must be offered to those who would diagnose causation: to have shown what caused a certain party system in a given country is not to demonstrate that these causes, and only these, are necessary to produce it in any and every country.

POLITICAL ISSUES AND THE VOTE: NOVEMBER, 1952

ANGUS CAMPBELL, GERALD GURIN AND WARREN E. MILLER
University of Michigan

In March, 1952 the Carnegie Corporation made available to the Social Science Research Council a research grant to support a major study of factors influencing the popular vote in the 1952 presidential election. Under the sponsorship of the Council's Committee on Political Behavior¹ this project is currently being carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

The study was developed around six major objectives:

1. To identify the voters and non-voters, Republicans and Democrats, within four major geographical areas, in regard to
 - a. socio-economic characteristics;
 - b. attitudes and opinions on political issues;
 - c. perceptions of the parties and the candidates.
2. To compare these groups to the corresponding groups in the 1948 presidential election.
3. To trace the resolution of the vote with particular attention to the undecided and changing voters.
4. To study the impact of the activities of the major parties on the population.
5. To analyze the nature and correlates of political party identification.
6. To analyze the nature and correlates of political participation.

Data designed to meet these objectives were gathered by means of nationwide sample surveys conducted in October and November, 1952. Two thousand and twenty-one persons, chosen by methods of probability sampling to represent all citizens of voting age living in private households in the United States, were interviewed by the Survey Research Center field staff shortly before the election; 1614 of these people were interviewed again shortly after the election.² The data of the present article are all based on the sample of 1614 people who were interviewed both before and after the election.

It is apparent that the full analysis of the data of this study will require many months. No major publication from the project is expected before 1954. However, because of the unusual interest in the study, it has seemed desirable to prepare one segment of the data for publication at the earliest possible date in order to acquaint students of political behavior with the nature of the project

¹ The members of the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior are V. O. Key (chairman), Conrad M. Arensberg, Angus Campbell, Alfred de Grazia, Oliver Garceau, Avery Leiserson, M. Brewster Smith, and David B. Truman. The Committee is in no way responsible for the present article.

² Two hundred and twenty-two of the original 2021 respondents, who constituted an extra loading of the sample in the Far West, were dropped from the November sample. An additional 185 respondents could not be reinterviewed. Statements of the sample design and sampling errors and copies of the questionnaires may be obtained from the Survey Research Center upon request.

and of the kinds of analysis which are being carried out. The present article was prepared with this purpose in view.

THE OBJECTIVES

Studies of political behavior and particularly sample surveys related to voting behavior have demonstrated that during recent years the followers of the two major political parties have differed substantially in their views on the pressing issues of the day.³ In 1948, for example, the amendment of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act became an issue of such heat that it divided Republican and Democratic voters almost as clearly as the question as to who was to become president. It has recently been proposed that party identification and attitudes on partisan issues may exercise reciprocal relationships producing uniformity among party followers, some identifying with the party because of its stand on issues, others adopting positions on issues in order to conform to party position.⁴

The major purpose of the present article is to make available new data concerning the role of political issues in a presidential election campaign. Although a short appendix presents data showing the voting records of the major demographic groupings in the 1948 and 1952 elections, the primary intent of the article is to carry further than has hitherto been possible the analysis of the relationship of the voter's attitudes on partisan issues to his actual vote.

Limitations of space and the preliminary state of our analysis preclude any exhaustive treatment of the relation of issues to voting behavior in the recent election. We will concentrate, therefore, on two of the most striking characteristics of the 1952 vote—the unusually large turnout, and the shift to the Republicans after a generation of Democratic rule—and attempt to show how these phenomena were related to the issues covered in this study. The first two sections of this article, therefore, will be mainly concerned with the following two questions:

How were issues related to the movement of citizens from the passivity of non-voting into the act of voting in the 1952 presidential election?

How were issues related to changes in voting behavior whereby blocs of voters were lost by one party and gained by another party?

In addition to the study of campaign issues, another familiar method of analyzing the presidential vote has been through comparison of the voting records of various easily defined sub-groupings of the national electorate. Past research has corroborated common-sense impressions that, during the last twenty years, there has been a tendency for labor union members, college educated people, residents of large cities, farmers, Catholics, Southerners and members of other such social classifications to cast their votes rather predomi-

³ Angus Campbell and R. L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor, 1952); Warren E. Miller, "Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-1951," this *Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 45-60 (March, 1953).

⁴ George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 601-23 (Winter, 1951-52).

nantly for one or the other party. This has in fact led to the proposition put forward by Lazarsfeld and his associates that voting may be largely understood as an expression of the individual's conformance to his basic sociological environment.⁵

Although these relationships between socio-economic groupings and the vote have usually been considered separately from the relationships between campaign issues and the vote, the two analytic approaches overlap in many ways. As politicians have recognized in shifting their arguments to suit their audience, many issues have differential meaning and importance for different segments of the population. An analysis which systematically examines the differential relation between issues and the vote in different sub-groupings of the national electorate should provide added insight both into the meaning of the issues and the reasons for intergroup voting differences. Although such a systematic analysis is beyond the scope of the present report, some preliminary data bearing on this problem will be presented. The third section of this report will be mainly concerned with the following question:

Were the relationships between specified issues and voting behavior in the 1952 election essentially the same for all major sections of the electorate or were there important differences between people in different socio-economic groupings?

THE DATA

A full investigation of public attitudes on the political issues of the 1952 campaign would have required a very extensive interview devoted entirely to this objective. Because of the pressure of other interests it was decided to restrict this aspect of the present study to seven questions, three relating to domestic issues and four to foreign policy issues.⁶ They were asked as part of the pre-election interview. These questions were chosen on an *a priori* basis as representing areas of relatively clear party difference and covering a broad range of governmental activities.

A major characteristic of the items is that they are all issues on which the Truman Administration accepted responsibility for a particular position. Adherence to this criterion means, of course, that these particular questions cannot be thought of as a representative sample of all the questions which might have been asked concerning the issues of the campaign. It will be noted, for example, that no inquiries were made regarding "corruption" or "communism in government" although these accusations were prominently featured in the oratory of the campaign.⁷ The questions were selected with the following broad considerations in mind: The issues should encompass fundamental, long term party differences (e.g., governmental social welfare activity, U. S. foreign in-

⁵ P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948).

⁶ The seven questions are reproduced in Appendix II along with a detailed statement as to how the answers to these questions were categorized for purposes of the present analysis.

⁷ A separate analysis of the importance of these charges, based on the coding of certain open-ended questions in the interview, will be included in a later report.

vovement), they should tap both ideological orientations and the less sophisticated "bread and butter" reactions (e.g., Taft-Hartley, FEPC, U. S. entry in the Korean war), and they should provide information on recent partisan controversies (e.g., U. S. China policy, current U. S. Korean policy).

It is possible that a different choice of questions might have yielded results different from those which are presented here. However, the questions which were used were chosen because they bore on issues which appeared to be of major significance and it is not probable that other questions bearing on these same issues would have yielded substantially different results.

Each of the seven questions was scored as to whether the respondent expressed an opinion supporting the policy of the Truman Administration or opposing it. For each question there were some respondents who did not offer a clearly pro- or anti-Democratic opinion, either because they knew nothing about the question (as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act) or because they did not hold any clearly partisan position regarding it. In the presentations which follow, the proportions of supporting, opposing and neutral-uncertain responses total to 100 per cent for each of the groupings which is being represented. For the convenience of the reader, an Index of Partisanship is also included. This is obtained by subtracting the proportion of responses opposing the Democratic position from the proportion supporting it.

Each of the respondents was asked in the November interview how he had voted on November 4th. Seventy-four per cent of the sample said they had voted.⁸ The two-party division of their two-party vote was 58 per cent for Eisenhower and 42 per cent for Stevenson, indicating a slight bias in favor of Eisenhower but well within the sampling error of the survey. When the opinions of these Democratic and Republican voters on the seven issues are compared it is possible to see the extent to which these particular questions divided the followers of the two parties (Table I).

The absolute values which are presented in this and the following tables are much less important for the present analysis than the relation of these values to each other. The significant conclusion to be drawn from Table I is the fact that on all of the seven questions Democrats and Republicans, taken as total groups, differ in their opinions and differ in the direction of their party position. Throughout the seven issues one finds more Democratic than Republican voters supporting Democratic policies. On four of the items there is both a preponderance of Democratic support for Democratic policies and, at the same time, a comparable balance of Republican opposition to the same policies.

It will be noted that the issue of FEPC was least discriminative of all the seven issues in separating Democratic and Republican voters. Attitudes on this issue are also found to have markedly different relationships to voting patterns than do attitudes on the other six issues. Because of the unique character of this

⁸ It must be remembered that the sample excluded the institutional population, the "floating" population, people living in military establishments, etc. Such people are estimated to total nearly ten million and it may be safely assumed that they are very largely non-voters.

issue, possibly resulting from its strong racial and regional components, it is not included in the analysis which follows. A detailed statement of the interrelations of all the issues studied will be presented in a subsequent report.

TABLE I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT
AND ATTITUDES ON SEVEN 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	Vote— 1952	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neutral or Un- certain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Partisan- ship
Governmental social welfare activity	D	33%	62	5	100%	+28
	R	19%	50	31	100%	-12
Taft-Hartley	D	32%	56	12	100%	+20
	R	9%	55	36	100%	-27
FEPC	D	51%	4	45	100%	+6
	R	40%	6	54	100%	-14
U. S. foreign involvement	D	43%	13	44	100%	-1
	R	28%	7	65	100%	-37
U. S. China policy	D	60%	23	17	100%	+43
	R	38%	24	38	100%	0
U. S. entry in Korean war	D	52%	16	32	100%	+20
	R	34%	20	46	100%	-12
Current U. S. Korean policy	D	52%	7	41	100%	+11
	R	36%	8	56	100%	-20

Number of cases: Democratic voters—494
Republican voters—687

The respondents of the survey were not only asked their 1952 vote; they were also asked how they voted in 1948.³ When these two reports are combined for each respondent it is possible to subdivide the sample into politically meaningful groupings which have more analytical interest than the sample taken as a whole. The discussion which follows deals with five such groups:

The regular voters.

1. The regular Democrats, people who voted for the Democratic presidential nominee in both the 1948 and 1952 elections, hereafter referred to as DD's (362 cases).
2. The regular Republicans, people who voted for the Republican nominee in both 1948 and 1952, hereafter referred to as RR's (385 cases).

³ The authors are aware of the dangers of error in recalling a vote cast four years previously. Examination of the data on the reported 1948 votes shows evidence of some random error in report, but no serious systematic error. The question on 1948 vote was asked in the pre-election interview.

The new voters.

3. The new Democrats, people who did not vote in 1948, either because of age or other reasons, but who voted Democratic in 1952, hereafter referred to as ND's (104 cases).

4. The new Republicans, people who did not vote in 1948 but voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as NR's (125 cases).

The switching voters.

5. The Democrats turned Republican, people who had voted Democratic in 1948 but who voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as DR's (165 cases).¹⁰

I. THE NEW VOTERS

The data of the survey show that those voters of 1952 who were non-voters in 1948 were composed, about one to three, of young people eligible to vote for the first time and older people who, for one reason and another, had not voted in the 1948 election. Both classes of new voters voted in very nearly the same proportions as did the rest of the population, the young people giving General Eisenhower a 57-43 majority of their two-party vote, and their older counterparts voting 53-47 for Republican electors. Inasmuch as the divisions within these two groups were not significantly different from the division within the rest of the population, it is apparent that, given no other changes, the elimination of the 1948 non-voters from the 1952 electorate would not have altered the proportionate distribution of the popular vote.

The fact that both these classes of new voters followed the national trend very closely in their choice of candidates indicates that they were not activated into the role of voters by any common point of view regarding current issues. On the contrary, it would appear that the ND's and the NR's must have differed about as much in their perceptions and attitudes as did the rest of the voters.

In order to reveal the possible relationships which may have existed in these groups between positions taken on the issues with which this study deals and preferences for one or the other candidate, it is necessary to compare the opinions expressed by the ND's and the NR's in answer to the different questions asked. This is done in Table II, which also includes the responses given by the "regular" voters, DD's and RR's.

An overall inspection of this table makes apparent a clear polarity in partisan attitudes on each question, with a strong tendency toward a pro-Democratic position among the DD's and an anti-Democratic position among the RR's. The ND's tend to resemble the DD's and the NR's to resemble the RR's.

It will be noted that the ND's are more consistently similar to their DD associates than the NR's are to the RR's. The distributions of the ND opinions differ only slightly from those of the DD's, in two cases appearing to be slightly more partisanly Democratic than the DD's and in the other four cases some-

¹⁰ There were also a few people who had voted Republican in 1948 but who voted Democratic in 1952. Their number was too small to warrant statistical analysis.

what less. On the other hand, the differences between the distributions of the NR's and the RR's are generally larger and in every case the NR's tend to be less clearly Republican than the RR's.

When one considers the positions of the previously non-voting groups on individual issues, it may be seen that for the ND group four issues (governmental social welfare activity, Taft-Hartley Act, U. S. China policy, and U. S. en-

TABLE II, RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948-1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Un- certain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	ND	37%	52	11	100%	+26
	NR	29%	49	22	100%	+7
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	-24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	ND	27%	63	10	100%	+17
	NR	13%	63	24	100%	-11
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	-37
U. S. foreign involve- ment	DD	44%	11	45	100%	-1
	ND	46%	13	41	100%	+5
	NR	31%	7	62	100%	-31
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	-46
U. S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	ND	51%	24	25	100%	+26
	NR	43%	24	33	100%	+10
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	-12
U. S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	ND	58%	14	28	100%	+30
	NR	36%	21	43	100%	-7
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	-19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	ND	46%	3	51	100%	-5
	NR	46%	4	50	100%	-4
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	-28

try in Korean war) show a significantly larger number of pro-Democratic than anti-Democratic attitudes. On the questions of U. S. foreign involvement and current U. S. Korean policy the ND's are so evenly split as to make any statement about the relationship between *attitudes* on those questions and *behavior* in voting most tenuous.

On only one issue, U. S. foreign involvement, did the NR's show greater partisanship as a group than did members of the ND group. On most of the

other issues they were clearly less homogeneous in their views. It may be concluded that except for the foreign involvement issue and, possibly, Taft-Hartley, the voting behavior of the NR's was only casually or occasionally related to their stands on those issues explored in the survey. Furthermore, the issue-vote relationships were markedly smaller for the NR's than for the ND's.

This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that for each NR voter some one or two issues, but not the remaining issues, were relevant for activating his or her Republican vote. This is a necessary reservation which applies to all such analysis conducted at this level. The absence of direct relationship between factors X and Y insofar as any *group* of individuals is concerned does not mean that the relationship does not exist for any individual within the group. It does mean, however, that in this instance the existence of a factor "X" (attitudes on an issue) is not the influence which alone produced the factor "Y" (Democratic or Republican vote) which is held in common by all members of the group.

It is possible to compare these relationships between the attitudes of "regular" voters and "new" voters in 1952 to comparable data obtained in a Survey Research Center study in 1948. In the earlier study a similar sample were asked how they had voted in the 1948 and previous elections.¹¹ A summary of the data from the two studies is presented in Figure 1. It should be noted that the relative partisanship of the different voting groups is represented in this figure by dividing the number of responses in the group supporting Democratic policies by the sum of the responses supporting and opposing Democratic policies. Thus, a point above the 50 per cent line represents a pro-Democratic plurality; a point below the line represents an anti-Democratic plurality (although not necessarily a majority).

Figure 1 suggests that the role played by issues in activating former non-voters was different in 1952 than it had been in 1948. In the 1948 election voters who had previously been non-voters tended to take positions on issues with a degree of partisanship at least as great as that of the "regular" party voters. The plurality of ND's (individuals who usually had not voted but who voted Democratic in 1948) supporting Democratic policies in 1948 was approximately the same as that found among members of the DD (Democratic voters in 1944 and 1948) group. The NR's were in even greater agreement in supporting Republican policies than were their RR cohorts.

The 1948 election was, it seems in retrospect, by and large a party election. Neither candidate was overly attractive to people who were not confirmed party followers, the campaign was hardly the exciting, arousing campaign of 1952, and the outcome may have appeared to be so certain as to discourage

¹¹ The questions about earlier voting behavior were not exactly the same in the two surveys. In 1948 the respondents were asked, "Have you voted in any presidential elections before this one? Have you usually voted Democratic or Republican?" In 1952 they were asked "In 1948, you remember that Truman ran against Dewey. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election? Which one did you vote for?"




FIG. 1. Change in relationships between summary scores on campaign issues and presidential vote: 1948-1952.*

Score: Number of responses supporting Democratic policies divided by the total number of responses supporting and opposing Democratic policies.

- * ND 1948: Usual non-voters voting Democratic in 1948
- ND 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
- DD 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Democratic in 1948
- DD 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
- DR 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Republican in 1948
- DR 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
- RR 1948: Usual Republican voters who voted Republican in 1948
- RR 1952: Republican voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
- NR 1948: Usual non-voters who voted Republican in 1948
- NR 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952

usual non-participants from leaving their firesides to vote. In the absence of magnetic candidates or an exciting campaign, it may be argued that those usual non-voters who did vote in 1948 must have done so because of party loyalty or out of personal concern over particular political issues. If this supposition is valid, it then follows that the ND's and NR's of 1948 were largely party followers who knew the party line on the campaign issues, or they were citizens drawn into the political conflict primarily because of the issues. In any event, the ND's and NR's in a year of abnormally low turnout proved to be well aware of the political implications of their attitudes on issues and an unmistak-

ably high relationship between their stand on issues and the direction of their vote resulted.

When the 1952 side of Figure 1 is examined it is seen that the degree of resemblance of the two groups of "new" voters to their "regular" counterparts is not the same as it had been in 1948. The attitudes of the ND's appear to be only slightly less Democratic in their direction than are those of the DD's. The NR's, however, who had been particularly partisan in 1948, were very near an even division in their attitudes in 1952.

The 1952 campaign differed from that of 1948 in a number of important respects. It presented two new candidates, one of whom was one of the most widely known and respected men in contemporary American life. It was featured by an intensity of campaigning and general political activity far beyond that of 1948. It was distinguished by the prominence of charges against the party in power, charges which were not issues in the sense used in this article but accusations of "corruption," "communist infiltration" and the like. It brought into focus more acutely than had been the case in 1948 the problem of over-extended one-party rule, the "time for a change" argument.

If it is surmised that the impact of these non-issue elements of the 1952 campaign was favorable to the Republican candidate, the issue positions of the ND and NR groups are not difficult to understand. It is known that the pool of 1948 non-voters, from which both the ND's and NR's came, was largely Democratic in usual party preference.¹² It was this fact that gave rise to the popular supposition before the 1952 election that an increase in turnout would be advantageous to the Democrats. If the "new" voters in 1952 had come into the ranks of voters solely on the basis of party loyalty or party-linked issues, their total vote would very likely have favored the Democratic candidate. However, the other forces at work in the campaign apparently succeeded in changing this Democratic majority into a slight Republican majority. Presumably the 1948 non-voters of a Republican inclination were joined in 1952 by enough defectors from the pool of non-voting Democrats (probably those least firmly committed to a Democratic position on issues) to create an NR group slightly larger than the remaining ND group. Considering this defection of recently, and perhaps only partially, converted Democrats in the NR ranks and the probability that irregular voters of both parties are less likely than their more regular cohorts to be sufficiently involved in politics to hold highly partisan attitudes, it is not surprising that the issue positions of the NR group should not be as partisan as those of the "regular" Republicans (RR's).

In summary, the data presented in this section appear to justify the following statements:

1. As a group Democratic voters were significantly more likely than Republican voters to support Democratic policies on all of the issues subjected to inquiry in this study:

¹² As shown in the 1948 Survey Research Center study and in as yet unpublished data from the present study.

2. The distributions of the attitudes of "new" Democrats were very similar to those of "regular" Democrats.

3. The distributions of opinions of "new" Republicans were generally less "Republican" than those of the "regular" Republicans. The general issue of extent of American involvement in world affairs was the only one on which this group was highly partisan.

4. A comparison of the voting of "new" voters in 1948 and "new" voters in 1952 suggests that differences in the electoral situations of the two years resulted in gains for the Republican party in 1952 which were not primarily associated with partisan issues as defined in this study.

II. THE "SHIFTING" VOTERS

A brief study of the reported previous voting behavior of the 1952 voters is enough to reveal that former Democrats who voted for Eisenhower held the balance of power in the 1952 election. While sizeable numbers of 1948 non-voters were coming into the ranks of 1952 voters, dividing their favors rather equally between the two presidential aspirants, smaller numbers of people who had voted in 1948 were withdrawing from the political arena to become non-voters in 1952. The net result of these additions and subtractions left the Republicans with an added six per cent of the population supporting their cause. In the same way, the Democrats picked up slightly more than two per cent of the population. As these sizeable, but to some extent compensating, shifts were occurring, some eleven per cent of the citizens were deciding to change their votes from 1948 Democratic to 1952 Republican (DR's). Although the net gain realized by the Republicans from the movement to and from active or inactive voting status was enough to jeopardize the Democrats' slim margin of 1948, the movement of changing voters away from the Democrats (offset only by a shift of one per cent in the other direction) was of crucial importance. The switching of the DR changers was not only a movement of a larger number of people, it was also a movement of double importance inasmuch as each Republican gain was also a Democratic loss.

All told, some 25 per cent of the final Republican vote came from 1948 Democrats. Given this added Republican support, only an extreme combination of pro-Democratic shifts among other parts of the total electorate could have salvaged the Democratic party hopes for victory. Conversely, if these "shifting" voters had remained Democrats, DD's instead of DR's, the other shifts which took place within the groups moving into and out of the active electorate would, at best, have been barely sufficient to create an Eisenhower victory.

When the attitudes of these "shifting" voters are compared to those of the "regular" voters of the two parties it will be seen that they occupy a position between the extremes on every issue (Table III). Their disagreements with the position of the "regular" Democrats are about equally great for both domestic and foreign issues. It must be noted, however, that these former Democrats do not go all the way to the "regular" Republican position on any of these issues. In this respect they differ from the DR's of 1948 whose partisanship on the

issues of that year was scarcely less Republican than that of the 1948 RR's (see Figure 1).

The issue positions of the 1948 Democrats turned 1952 Republicans (DR's) resemble those of the 1952 Republicans who had not voted in 1948 (NR's). It will be recalled, however, that the NR's are made up of people of both Democratic and Republican party preference. Their intermediate position on issues appears to result from combining these two unlike groups as well as from their

TABLE III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHIFT OF VOTE, 1948-1952, AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Un- certain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	DR	22%	54	24	100%	-2
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	-24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	DR	12%	61	27	100%	-15
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	-37
U. S. foreign involve- ment	DD	44%	11	45	100%	-1
	DR	35%	7	58	100%	-23
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	-46
U. S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	DR	47%	25	28	100%	+19
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	-12
U. S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	DR	41%	16	43	100%	-2
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	-19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	DR	38%	6	56	100%	-18
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	-28

relatively low level of political involvement (as inferred from their non-voting in 1948). This is not the case with the DR's; they were all voting Democrats in 1948. The fact that the distributions of their attitudes digress so clearly from those of the "regular" Democrats may be explained in either of two ways:

1. The 1952 DR's may have been people whose attitudes had never been as "Democratic" as those of other Democrats, who had voted Democratic in 1948 out of a sense of party loyalty and the lack of any impelling reason to do otherwise, but who were jolted loose from the Democratic party in 1952 by some non-issue factor or combination of factors which was present in the electoral situation of that year.
2. The 1952 DR's may have been no more or less Democratic in their views on issues in 1948 than were other Democrats. During the ensuing four years they may have been

converted from their Democratic point of view to a more nearly Republican position on issues. Having made this ideological transition it was natural for them to vote Republican in 1952.

It is probably safe to assume that both these mechanisms were at work in creating the 1952 DR's. If the process had been mainly one of conversion one might have expected that the foreign policy issues might have shown greater discrepancies from the "regular" Democratic position than would the domestic issues, considering the events of the 1948-1952 period. The fact that this is not true suggests that the "switching" voters were largely people who were not sufficiently bound to the Democratic party by conviction regarding its position on issues or by simple party loyalty to withstand the pressure of other factors which were important at the time of the campaign.

This section may be summarized in the following statements:

1. The "shifting" voters fell between the "regular" voters of the two parties in their attitudes on the issues presented in this study.
2. No single issue appears to have exerted any special influence in the defection of 1948 Democrats to a 1952 Republican vote.
3. It is suggested that the "switching" voters were particularly susceptible to factors favoring the Republicans because of their comparative lack of conviction regarding the Democratic position on partisan issues.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPINGS WITHIN THE ELECTORATE

The two preceding sections have dealt with the relation between voting behavior and six issues of the presidential campaign, with particular emphasis on the change in voting behavior between 1948 and 1952. In this section we will be concerned with the question of whether the relations between these issues and voting behavior were essentially the same for all classes of people within the electorate, or whether there were differential relationships for people in different socio-economic groupings. Since space does not permit a discussion of all relevant demographic groups, the discussion will center around four of the variables generally associated with the New Deal-Fair Deal coalition—occupation, union membership, education, and religion. We will compare the "regular" voters (DD's and RR's) found in these different groupings on their *overall* issue stand¹³ and on their attitudes on two selected *individual* issues.

Inter-group Comparisons on Overall Issue Stands. The distributions of attitudes of the different voting groups within demographic categories are presented in Table IV. Comparing the distributions of the "regular" Democratic voters (DD's) from group to group, and examining the inter-group comparisons of the "regular" Republican voters (RR's), one finds a very high degree of similarity within the demographic groupings. This is particularly true of the Republican voters (RR's). Catholic and Protestant, union member and non-union member, businessman and farmer—all classifications of "regular" Republicans took very nearly the same overall Republican position on issues.

¹³ By "overall issue stand" we mean a summary score based on the attitudes on all six issues, rather than the attitude on an individual issue.

The "regular" Democrats show somewhat more variation from group to group. For example, there is a tendency for better educated DD's to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than their less highly educated party associates. These distributions are based on small samples, however, and the differences which appear are not large.

Although the "shifting" voters and the "new" voters are not presented in Table IV, some mention may be made of their distributions. The DR voters, shifting to the Republican candidate from a Democratic vote in 1948, take a general issue position between the "regular" Democrats and Republicans in nearly all of the socio-economic groupings considered. The ND's and NR's also tended to follow the ND and NR issue pattern described in the first section of this report in all of the demographic subgroups studied. The samples of these voting groups are too small to support detailed presentation.

Inter-group Comparisons on Two Individual Issues. It might be reasonably objected that the failure of these data to show any sizeable differences in attitudes between people drawn from very different circumstances of life may have resulted from the combining of scores from six separate issues. It is possible, for example, that two RR groups that are similar in their distributions of combined scores might show significant differences on individual issues, differences that cancel each other out when the issues are combined. An intensive analysis of all six issues for all demographic groups is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, to give some indication of the additional variations revealed by an analysis of individual issues, inter-group comparisons were made for the DD's and RR's on the most general domestic and foreign issues, those pertaining to government social welfare activity and foreign involvement. The data are presented in Tables V and VI.

These tables show a number of variations from the pattern described in Table IV. Perhaps most striking is the fact that the different RR groups, which showed such similarity in their overall issue scores, differ considerably on these two individual issues. This is particularly evident when the RR's of the different occupational groups are compared. The Republican voters of higher occupational status take a more Republican position on the general domestic issue than do the lower status occupation groups, but are less Republican on the general foreign issue. "Regular" Republicans among "blue-collar" workers are as a group extremely "isolationist" in their views on foreign involvement but they do not support the Republican position on the role of the federal government in domestic welfare programs. As might be expected, the variations among the "regular" Republicans of different educational background follow the same pattern as those associated with occupational differences.

Following the general "cross-pressure" hypothesis,¹⁴ one might be led to explain some of these differences among "regular" Republican voters of different educational and occupational groupings as resulting from the interaction of party position and group position in determining attitudes on issues. Thus, when the issue position dictated by one's party choice comes in conflict with

¹⁴ P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, cited in n. 5.

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUMMARY SCORES ON CAMPAIGN ISSUES AND PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position*	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain*	Oppose Demo- cratic Position*	Total	Index of Parti- sanship*	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	56%	21	23	100%	+33	60
	RR	28%	19	53	100%	-25	127
White collar	DD	49%	25	26	100%	+23	33
	RR	27%	22	51	100%	-24	51
Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	48%	26	26	100%	+22	136
	RR	23%	27	50	100%	-27	75
Unskilled	DD	46%	27	27	100%	+19	49
	RR	21%	27	52	100%	-31	20
Farm operator	DD	42%	28	30	100%	+12	29
	RR	21%	23	56	100%	-35	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	55%	22	23	100%	+32	143
	RR	24%	24	52	100%	-28	74
Non-union	DD	44%	29	27	100%	+17	219
	RR	25%	22	53	100%	-28	311
Education:							
College	DD	57%	21	22	100%	+35	33
	RR	28%	16	56	100%	-28	94
High school	DD	52%	24	24	100%	+28	171
	RR	24%	25	51	100%	-27	193
Grade school	DD	44%	29	27	100%	+17	157
	RR	22%	24	54	100%	-32	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	50%	28	22	100%	+28	119
	RR	26%	23	51	100%	-25	66
Protestant	DD	46%	26	28	100%	+18	207
	RR	24%	22	54	100%	-30	308

* These figures were obtained by adding the scores for all six issues and dividing by six.

TABLE V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE
ACTIVITY AND PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	51%	49	0	100%	+51	60
	RR	15%	41	44	100%	-29	127
White collar	DD	27%	70	3	100%	+24	33
	RR	14%	47	39	100%	-25	51
Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	34%	61	5	100%	+29	136
	RR	24%	51	25	100%	-1	75
Unskilled	DD	24%	76	0	100%	+24	49
	RR	37%	53	10	100%	+27	20
Farm operator	DD	36%	61	3	100%	+33	29
	RR	8%	42	50	100%	-42	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	36%	62	2	100%	+34	143
	RR	27%	43	30	100%	-3	74
Non-union	DD	33%	63	4	100%	+29	219
	RR	13%	45	42	100%	-29	311
Education:							
College	DD	42%	55	3	100%	+39	33
	RR	13%	35	52	100%	-39	94
High school	DD	37%	59	4	100%	+33	171
	RR	15%	48	37	100%	-22	193
Grade school	DD	29%	68	3	100%	+26	157
	RR	20%	47	33	100%	-13	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	28%	71	1	100%	+27	119
	RR	19%	47	34	100%	-15	66
Protestant	DD	32%	63	5	100%	+27	207
	RR	15%	44	41	100%	-26	308

TABLE VI. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	61%	2	37	100%	+24	60
	RR	33%	3	64	100%	-31	127
White collar	DD	41%	15	44	100%	-3	33
	RR	33%	2	65	100%	-32	51
Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	45%	7	48	100%	-3	136
	RR	22%	4	74	100%	-52	75
Unskilled	DD	42%	7	51	100%	-9	49
	RR	0	10	90	100%	-90	20
Farm operator	DD	22%	11	67	100%	-45	29
	RR	14%	9	77	100%	-63	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	143
	RR	19%	7	74	100%	-55	74
Non-union	DD	40%	7	53	100%	-13	219
	RR	26%	3	71	100%	-45	311
Education:							
College	DD	69%	9	22	100%	+47	33
	RR	37%	2	61	100%	-24	94
High school	DD	46%	6	48	100%	-2	171
	RR	25%	4	71	100%	-46	193
Grade school	DD	40%	8	52	100%	-12	157
	RR	11%	6	83	100%	-72	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	119
	RR	24%	5	71	100%	-47	66
Protestant	DD	39%	6	55	100%	-16	207
	RR	24%	4	72	100%	-48	308

the position that is congruent with one's membership in a given socio-economic grouping, one might predict that there would be a compromise between the two extremes. Conversely, when a group position coincides with a party position on an issue, the result might be expected to be a position more extreme than either would have been without the other. Accordingly, one might explain the failure of "blue-collar" Republicans as a group to support the Republican position on the government welfare activity issue as the result of a position dictated by socio-economic group interest counteracting the position associated with party choice. On the other hand, the extremely homogeneous support that the "regular" Republicans of lower education give to the Republican position on the issue of U. S. foreign involvement might be thought of as resulting from a reinforcement of the restricted world view common among people of lower education by a congruent party position.

Although this interpretation may be appropriate for these variations among the "regular" Republicans of different education and occupations, it does not explain other variations which appear in the tables. Unlike the patterns of the RR's, which are different for the two issues, the inter-group occupational and educational patterns for the "regular" Democrats are the same for both issues. On both the foreign and domestic issues there is a tendency for DD's of higher occupational status (professional people and businessmen) to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than that taken by "blue collar" workers, and there is a similar tendency for greater support of the Democratic position to be associated with higher education. In terms of socio-economic group interest one might have expected "blue collar" Democratic voters to show more support for activity of the federal government in social welfare programs than would be shown by Democrats of professional or businessman status, whereas, as indicated in Table V, they tend to show less.

A similar discrepancy appears when differences between the attitudes of the "regular" voters of the two main American religious groupings are examined. If one were to assume that American Catholics might have special reasons to support an internationalist position in current foreign policy, one would expect that Catholics of each party would react more favorably to the foreign involvement question than Protestants within that party. In fact Catholic Democrats do support the foreign involvement policy in somewhat larger proportion than do Protestant Democrats, but among Republicans there is no difference between Catholics and Protestants on this issue. So far as this issue is concerned, religious group position appears to have some reinforcing influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Democratic party, but no modifying influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Republican party.

It is clear that these analyses of the interaction of the influences of party and socio-economic position are hazardous in the absence of the careful control of possible "third factors." More elaborate treatment of these data is not possible in the present article.

The data presented in this section may be summarized as follows:

1. When attitudes on the six issue questions are combined into a single score, the positions of "regular" Republicans among the basic occupational, union, educational and religious classifications are seen to follow very similar distributions. This is also true of "regular" Democrats in these different categories.

2. When distributions of attitudes on two individual questions are considered, differences between demographic groupings within the two parties are apparent and significant.

3. The determination of variations between socio-economic groupings within parties in their attitudes regarding issues is too complicated to be adequately described by the simple juxtaposition of party position and socio-economic position.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis presented in this article was intended to show how the followers of the two major parties in the 1952 presidential election divided in their views regarding prominent campaign issues. It also sought to determine the extent to which shifts in voting behavior, from non-voting to voting and from one party to the other, were associated with attitudes on issues. Finally, it compared the issue positions of people of different socio-economic groupings within each party in order to study the influence of demographic position on relations between issue positions and votes.

Although questions might be raised regarding the selection of the specific issues which were chosen for study, it is noteworthy that all of the issues presented proved to be highly partisan, in the sense that they divided the Democratic and Republican voters to a degree that cannot be attributed to factors of chance. Although other questions might have been asked which would not have divided the voters significantly into party groupings, it is apparent that Democrats and Republicans differed in 1952 in their attitudes on the important issues tapped by the questions asked in this study.

It is also clear that "regular" party followers were as a group more partisan in their views on these issues than were people who do not vote regularly or who switch from one party to the other. The irregular voters as a group held attitude positions midway between the attitudes of regular Democrats and Republicans.

Those people who had not voted in 1948 but who voted in the 1952 election divided their votes between Eisenhower and Stevenson in about the same ratio as the rest of the population. There was a clear difference, however, in the degree to which these new Democratic or Republican voters shared the partisan position on issues of the party they supported. On the issues considered in this study, new Democrats were virtually as partisan as regular Democrats; new Republicans were significantly less partisan than regular Republicans. It is hypothesized that this discrepancy resulted from factors in the campaign situation, not associated with issues as defined in this study, which worked to the advantage of the Republican party.

In the same manner the shifting voters, those who had voted for Truman in 1948 but supported Eisenhower in 1952, were not as partisan as either the regu-

lar Republicans or Democrats in their views on the issues presented in this study. This leads to the supposition that these defectors, who made a critically important contribution to the total Eisenhower vote, were susceptible to the forces which led them to change their vote partly because they had no firm commitment to the Democratic position on foreign and domestic issues. By the same token, the fact that many of them have not accepted the Republican position on these issues implies that that party's hold on them is precarious.

Although the present article could not examine the effects of socio-economic position in great detail, the data are sufficient to indicate that they do not follow an entirely consistent pattern. Although in some cases factors associated with socio-economic position appeared to counteract party position as a determiner of attitudes, in other instances attitudes associated with party position seemed virtually unaffected by socio-economic differences. This question requires much fuller exploration before it can be adequately answered.

Finally, the reader is reminded again that the present article is a preliminary analysis taken from a study of much broader scope. It is hoped that some of the questions which are left unanswered in this presentation will be more adequately treated in the more comprehensive report which will be forthcoming.

APPENDIX I

The preceding discussion has dealt with demographic characteristics and the vote only as these characteristics related to differential commitment on a number of campaign issues. Since there may be some interest in data on the overall distribution of the 1952 vote in different demographic groupings, and a comparison with the comparable distributions in 1948, the following tables are presented. They show comparisons between the 1948 and 1952 vote of the occupational, educational, and religious groupings discussed in this report, as well as a number of others on which there are comparable data.¹⁵

The most striking impression gained from these tables is that the shift toward the Republicans in 1952 was a general one which affected many different classes of the population. Some components of the "Democratic coalition"—skilled and semi-skilled workers, Catholics, young voters, union members—showed large scale defections from their Democratic preference in 1948. The shift toward the Republicans was equally marked among groups which are not usually considered to be members of this "coalition." White collar workers, for example, went from an even vote distribution in 1948 to a ratio of almost 2 to 1 in favor of the Republicans; farmers, who had favored the Democrats in 1948, swung heavily into the Republican column in 1952. Except for the Negro group, the only groups which showed no shift in favor of the Republicans were those which already had a traditionally heavy Republican majority—the high status occupational and educational groups.

The numbers of cases of the separate demographic classifications do not always add to the total sample of 1614 respondents. This results from the omission of small numbers of respondents who did not fall into the classifications represented or from whom the relevant information was not obtained.

TABLE 1. RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Occupation									
	Professional and Managerial		Other White Collar		Skilled and Semi-Skilled		Unskilled		Farmers	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	15%	27%	38%	28%	52%	40%	33%	40%	25%	24%
Republican	57	60	39	52	15	34	12	19	13	42
Did not vote	25	12	18	19	29	26	49	41	54	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	1	5	1	4	*	6	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	117	333	79	155	164	462	85	174	105	178

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

¹⁵ The figures for the 1948 vote are based on the study of the 1948 election conducted by the Survey Research Center.

TABLE 2. INCOME IN RELATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Income					
	Low†		Medium†		High†	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	28%	22%	36%	35%	29%	28%
Republican	16	31	24	40	46	57
Did not vote	53	47	33	24	20	14
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	*	7	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	179	312	327	852	149	415

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† Low income: 1948, \$0-\$1,999; 1952, \$0-\$1,999.

Medium income: 1948, \$2,000-\$3,999; 1952, \$2,000-\$4,999.

High income: 1948, \$4,000 and over; 1952, \$5,000 and over.

TABLE 3. RELATION OF LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	"Does Respondent or Head of Family Belong to a Labor Union?"			
	Yes		No	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	56%	42%	25%	26%
Republican	13	33	32	46
Did not vote	27	24	38	27
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	150	439	493	1165

TABLE 4. RELATION OF EDUCATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Education					
	Grade School		High School		College	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	35%	30%	34%	34%	17%	24%
Republican	16	31	29	46	55	65
Did not vote	44	38	33	20	20	10
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	4	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	293	630	266	712	99	238

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 5. RELATION OF RELIGION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Religion			
	Protestant		Catholic	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	25%	26%	49%	43%
Republican	28	45	25	41
Did not vote	43	29	20	15
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	*	6	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	461	1156	140	343

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 6. RELATION OF TYPE OF COMMUNITY TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Population Classification					
	Metropolitan Areas†		Towns and Cities		Open Country	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	47%	33%	27%	31%	24%	25%
Republican	32	43	30	42	12	41
Did not vote	17	22	38	27	59	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	2	5	*	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	181	438	354	928	127	248

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† "Metropolitan Area" includes the suburban areas and a few rural areas surrounding the big cities. When only the actual big city dwellers are considered, the distribution of the 1952 vote shows an approximately equal Democratic-Republican division, not the 4 to 3 ratio indicated in this table.

TABLE 7. RELATION OF RACE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Race			
	White		Negro	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	33%	32%	18%	26%
Republican	29	46	10	6
Did not vote	33	21	64	67
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	585	1453	61	157

TABLE 8. RELATION OF SEX TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Sex			
	Male		Female	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	36%	34%	29%	28%
Republican	28	45	26	41
Did not vote	31	20	40	31
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	5	*
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	303	738	356	876

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 9. RELATION OF AGE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Age							
	21-34		35-44		45-54		55 and over	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	32%	31%	38%	34%	33%	33%	27%	27%
Republican	18	37	24	41	37	45	31	48
Did not vote	44	32	33	25	25	21	36	23
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	6	*	5	*	5	1	6	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	198	485	174	381	126	284	153	442

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

APPENDIX II

Reproduced here are the questions related to the seven campaign issues which were explicitly included in the questionnaire. The code categories following each question give in detail the manner in which responses were combined to indicate Pro-Democratic, Anti-Democratic or Neutral attitudes on each issue:

GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY: "Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?"

Pro-Democratic

Definitely should do more

Should do more

Should do more on some, don't know or same on others

Anti-Democratic

Should do less

Definitely should do less

Should do less on some, don't know or same on others

Neutral

About right, OK

Should do more on some, less on others

Don't know

FEPC: "There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people having trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government ought to take an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out of this problem? Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other ways that will handle it better? Do you think the national government should handle this or do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way? Do you think the state governments should do something about this problem or should they stay out of it (also)?"

Pro-Democratic

National government should pass laws *and* do other things too

National government should pass laws

State government should pass laws *and* do other things too

State government should pass laws

Government should take an interest, not ascertained how

Anti-Democratic

Government should do other things *only*National government should stay out, *but* state government should take action

Government (national and state) should stay out entirely

Respondent favors restrictive legislation (include here clear anti-Negro statements)

Neutral

Don't know

TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR LAW REVISION: "Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Law? (If yes) How do you feel about it—do you think it's all right as it is, do you think it should be changed in any way, or don't you have any feelings about it? (If should be changed) Do you think the law should be changed just a little, changed quite a bit, or do you think it should be completely repealed?"

Pro-Democratic

Completely repealed

Changed quite a bit—in favor of labor

Changed quite a bit—not ascertained in whose favor

Changed a little—in favor of labor

Anti-Democratic

Changed quite a bit—in favor of management

Changed a little—in favor of management

Changed a little—not ascertained in whose favor

All right as it is

Neutral

Changed, not ascertained how much

Don't know

Never heard of Taft-Hartley

U. S. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT: "Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?"

Pro-Democratic
Disagree, with qualifications
Disagree
Anti-Democratic
Agree
Agree, with qualifications
Neutral
Pro-con, depends
Don't know

U. S. CHINA POLICY: "Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went communistic—others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it. How do you feel about this?"

Pro-Democratic
Nothing we could do to stop it
Anti-Democratic
It was our fault
It was our fault, with qualifications (partially our fault)
Neutral
Don't know

U. S. ENTRY IN KOREAN WAR: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago or should we have stayed out?"

Pro-Democratic
Yes, did the right thing
Anti-Democratic
No, should have stayed out
Neutral
Pro-con
Don't know

CURRENT U. S. KOREAN POLICY: "Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do now in Korea?" (1) Pull out of Korea entirely? (2) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement? (3) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?"

Pro-Democratic
Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement
Anti-Democratic
Pull out of Korea entirely
Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China
Unable to choose between above two alternatives
Neutral
Don't know

THE REGION OF ISOLATIONISM

RALPH H. SMUCKLER

Michigan State College

Isolationism, a persistent refrain in the history of American foreign policy, has received its full share of recent investigation.¹ These investigations have followed a number of approaches, varying from historical research into the interaction of isolationist and interventionist groups and individuals in the pre-World War II period to studies of the underlying causes of isolationist thinking. It is the purpose of this paper to consider one of the ambiguities that still remain; that is, the commonly accepted assumption that in recent decades the Midwest has been the hard core of isolationism.

Midwestern isolationism is actually only one part of the larger question concerning the existence of a regional or geographic isolationist sentiment. On the untested assumption that isolationism is regional has rested the geographic explanation that isolationism is strongest in interior states because of the sense of insulation from international affairs that such location fosters. In this paper certain non-regional factors will be examined for their possible relationship to geographical centers of isolationist strength. Non-regional, socio-political factors might actually form the basis for several separate studies, and their consideration here is only intended to be suggestive of the further limitations these factors impose on a simple geographic explanation of isolationism.

Problems of Definition. The terms in this subject are corrupted by popular usage yet still used by scholars. Neither "Midwest" nor "isolationism" has an exact meaning. The Midwest as defined by some scholars includes five states; as defined by others, it includes fifteen. The variations in definition are endless.² Howard Odum, who has devoted considerable attention to careful definition in his study of southern regions, includes eight states (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio) in what he terms the "Middle States." Odum bases his definition on approximately seven hundred indices of socio-economic and political characteristics of states.³ The Census Bureau, to

¹ For examples of recent inquiries, see Samuel Lubell, "Who Votes Isolationist and Why," *Harper's*, Vol. 202, pp. 29-36 (April, 1951), and *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952), pp. 129-57; Survey Research Center, *America's Role in World Affairs* (Ann Arbor, 1952); George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 133-74; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951); Thomas Bailey, *The Man in the Street* (New York, 1948), pp. 238-55; William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation* (New York, 1952); Frederick Williams, "Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 9, pp. 38-50 (Spring, 1945).

² See *Regionalism in America*, ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison, 1951). Though this entire collection of essays is relevant to the question of regional definitions, see particularly Vernon Carstensen, "The Development and Application of Regional-Sectional Concepts, 1900-1950," pp. 99-118.

³ H. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (Chapel Hill, 1936), Ch. 3. Also, H. Odum and H. Moore, *American Regionalism* (New York, 1938).

take another example, divides the nation into a West North Central group of seven states (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, the Dakota's, Kansas, and Nebraska) and an East North Central group of five (Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio). For convenience, these two groups are commonly combined as the Midwest by those using census data.⁴

The variety of possible combinations does not end with these two. Cortez Ewing in his studies of presidential and congressional elections points out that by generous definition one could easily boost the number of possible regional combinations throughout the United States to more than a hundred.⁵ Geographer Nevin M. Fenneman, heading a special committee of the Association of American Geographers organized to define the natural divisions of the United States, found eight physiographic divisions.⁶ Other regional groupings appear in the writings of Arthur N. Holcombe, who found various regional patterns in his studies of political sectionalism.⁷ The National Resources Committee in 1935 summarized the views of a panel of experts on regionalism in this manner:

It seems to be agreed that regional boundaries are usually indefinite, being zones rather than lines. In the majority of instances, therefore, any boundaries which may be drawn will be necessarily arbitrary. It appears, however, that it is desirable to draw boundaries, providing their arbitrary nature be admitted.⁸

Most of the other studies defining national regions have recognized the problems noted in the Resources Committee's report. Some of them also mentioned the arbitrariness of following state boundaries in defining a region.

These difficulties in definition lead one to conclude that a region can be defined most usefully with limited criteria in mind. A geographer studying soils finds one regional pattern; a sociologist studying educational standards defines another; and a political scientist studying isolationist strength finds still another. Thus our question should not be "Is the Midwest the outstanding area of isolationist strength?", but rather "Is there any region of outstanding isolationist strength?" Then, after such an isolationist region is found (if possible),

⁴ The Census Bureau's geographic divisions are most frequently used as the basis for regional designations because census data are so commonly used by regionalists.

⁵ Cortez Ewing, *Presidential Elections* (Norman, Okla., 1940), p. 9. Ewing defines a seven state Midwest: Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio.

⁶ Nevin M. Fenneman, "Physiographic Divisions of the United States," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 6, pp. 19-98 (1916).

⁷ See his *The Political Parties of Today* (New York, 1924), pp. 105-9; *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 78-85; "Present Day Characteristics of American Political Parties," in *The American Political Scene*, ed. E. B. Logan (New York, 1938), Ch. 1; *Our More Perfect Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 71. In 1924, Holcombe defined the Midwest as a combination of eleven states: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. A different regional pattern was described in 1938 and 1940. In 1950, basing his delineation of regions on a new, non-political basis, Holcombe described a third regional pattern.

⁸ National Resources Committee, *Regional Factors in National Planning* (Washington, 1935), p. 145. Thirty-four regional classifications, based on such varied criteria as retail shopping areas, soils, politics, and farm income, were presented in the Committee's report.

it can be compared to a consensus Midwest region derived from the definitions of those who use the phrase "midwestern isolationism."

The term "region" itself requires definition. A region includes only contiguous territory: though the region need not be symmetric or balanced, its component units must be connected and its area reasonably compact. Some common characteristic, in this case strong isolationist sentiment, binds the components together and separates the region from the surrounding area.

Isolationism offers similar problems of definition. Is isolationism accurately represented by the sentiments of John Adams when he wrote, "I confess I have sometimes thought that, after a few years, it will be the best thing we can do to recall every minister from Europe, and send embassies only on special occasions."⁹ Is it represented by the words of George Washington when in his Farewell Address he advised against political entanglement in the affairs of Europe? Or perhaps Thomas Jefferson's words, "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," best serve to define American isolationism.¹⁰ One finds considerable variety in sentiments which historically have been labeled "isolationist." Thus in 1934 isolationists were said to have opposed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, an economic matter, while in 1939 it was maintained that isolationists opposed fortification of Guam, a Far Eastern matter. Some isolationist sentiment was used to justify opposition in 1934 to the Inter-American Highway program, a Western Hemisphere matter. But spokesmen for what has been termed isolationism have in recent years included certain parts of Europe in the American defense sphere, and supposedly isolationist statements have included recommendations for the stationing of American troops and the maintenance of American bases around the world.¹¹

Perhaps it is most accurate to consider isolationism as one end of a continuum, the other end of which can be considered anti-isolationism.¹² Though rare,

⁹ *The Works of John Adams*, ed. C. F. Adams (Boston, 1853), Vol. 8, p. 37.

¹⁰ *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. H. A. Washington (New York, 1861), Vol. 8, p. 4.

¹¹ For example, in the *Chicago Tribune*, Feb. 1, 1951, a map of American defense zones and an accompanying editorial indicate that the United States should defend Spain, the British Isles, Africa, Iceland, and areas in the Far East and Southeast Asia as well as other points within the "Western Hemisphere Zone of Defense."

¹² For examples of definitions used by others writing on the subject, see Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 34, pp. 539-47 (June, 1940); William C. Rogers, "Isolationist Propaganda (September, 1939—December 7, 1941)," unpubl. diss. (U. of Chicago, 1943), pp. 5-6; Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making* (New Haven, 1946), p. 17; Raymond L. Buell, *Isolated America* (New York, 1940), p. 66; Richard W. Leopold, "The Mississippi Valley and American Foreign Policy, 1890-1941: An Assessment and an Appeal," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 625-42 (March, 1951); Nathaniel Peffer, *America's Place in the World* (New York, 1945), pp. 29-31; J. F. Rippey and A. Debo, *The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation*, in *Smith College Studies in History*, Vol. 9, p. 72 (1924). See also the Survey Research Center, *America's Role* (cited above, n. 1), for a definition similar to the one used here.

advocates of complete isolationism have probably existed—isolationism in its true sense of complete lack of intercourse with any other nation. Such extreme isolationists would advocate American abstention from participation in the international activities—political, economic, and social—of even the Western Hemisphere. The opposite extreme can be termed anti-isolationism (perhaps internationalism or interventionism). While the isolationist favors inaction and non-participation by the United States in world affairs, the opposite extremists would favor constant and world-wide American international action. At least one variety of anti-isolationist would consider the negation of nationalism in favor of world government as his goal. There are probably few people at either end of the scale. Furthermore, a man might be an isolationist on one type of issue and an anti-isolationist on another. An attitude of political isolationism might be combined with an economic internationalist position. A senator might support measures to increase American trade with other lands and yet oppose all other participation by the United States in world affairs. To the extent that he supports American withdrawal or non-participation he would be an isolationist. Whichever view dominates his voting in the Senate determines the group in which he would be counted. According to this definition, therefore, the more isolationist person believes that the role of the United States in world affairs should be more restricted, non-entangling and less active than that envisaged by the less isolationist viewpoint.

Votes in Congress As a Source of Data. What data can be used to determine whether an isolationist region existed during the past two decades? Three possible sources of data exist: election returns, public opinion polls, and congressional roll call votes. The third source, congressional roll call votes, is the most useful. Foreign policy issues in Congress were many and varied during the 1933 to 1950 period. Many of these issues were of the type to divide the members of Congress into more isolationist and less isolationist groups, and many of these produced roll call votes.

Though some objections can be raised to using these record votes to denote degrees of isolationism, none seem formidable. Certainly caution must be exercised in selecting the votes. Key amendments, motions to recommit, and borderline amendments must all be examined carefully. The issues themselves cannot be evaluated without investigation into the situation behind the mere wording of the proposal. However, when adequate care is observed in the selection of votes to be tabulated, sufficient data can be obtained from the voting in Congress to warrant considering one congressman or senator more isolationist than another.

Some objection might also be raised to transferring the voting record of a congressman to the district he represents. Does a congressman or senator vote his own mind, the mind of his party, or the mind of his constituency as he appraises it? If it is the mind of his constituency, and if the representative's appraisal is correct, then the transferral is valid. One of the basic assumptions in using this source of data to locate an isolationist region is that the congressman's ear is attuned to his district regularly enough to justify the transferral

in the long run and over a large number of roll calls. The mere bulk of the evidence would tend to offset the occasions when the member of Congress is unrepresentative of the politically active portion (particularly the "foreign affairs public") of his constituency. Members of Congress register the *effective* opinion on foreign policy, and this is important. Furthermore, by examining the voting pattern in the lower house more closely than that in the Senate one would tend to narrow the margin of error, if the representative is assumed to be usually closer to his district than the senator is to his state-wide constituency. Congressional voting records, primarily votes on issues in the House of Representatives, provide the basic data used here for finding the region of isolationism.

A Region of Isolationism? Seventy-three roll call votes in the House and eighty-eight in the Senate were used in this analysis. They were distributed over the eighteen-year period as follows:

Congress	Number of Record Votes	
	House	Senate
73rd (1933-1934)	6	2
74th (1935-1936)	2	7
75th (1937-1938)	4	4
76th (1939-1940)	10	11
77th (1941-1942)	9	9
78th (1943-1944)	5	7
79th (1945-1946)	12	14
80th (1947-1948)	9	11
81st (1949-1950)	16	23
	73	88

Each of these roll calls was on a foreign affairs issue that divided the more isolationist element from the less isolationist (or more internationalist) group. The issues brought forth record votes on American participation in international organizations, on neutrality, foreign aid programs, the trade agreements program, lend-lease, and on similar foreign policy issues of the period. Such issues were frequently the centers of many amendments and moves of parliamentary strategy. When the votes on such side issues caused more than a minor change in voting alignment, they were used in this analysis together with the vote on the main issue. When the number of such supplementary roll calls warranted, a sampling process was used in order to avoid over-weighting the total number of votes tabulated in favor of one type of issue. The votes in the House of Representatives divide into subjects as follows: reciprocal trade, 10; aid to Allies (pre-1942), 13; international organization, 16; aid programs involving large appropriations, 33. There are other subject divisions that could be made, but this division shows that no one issue dominated. The issues involving authorizations for costly foreign aid included such questions as pre-World War II aid to the Allies, the European Recovery Program, Greek aid, lend-lease, the British loan and Far Eastern aid. These four subject categories are not mutually exclusive.

The ratio of isolationist votes to total votes cast by a state's representatives can be expressed as a "percentage of isolationism" for that state. This percentage can be compared to the "percentage of isolationism" found in a like manner in other states. The states can then be ranked in order of isolationism, with the state having the highest "percentage of isolationism" ranked as most isolationist. This same procedure can be followed for the Senate or for individual districts in the House of Representatives. Figures I and II present the states ranked according to isolationist strength in the House and Senate respectively for the period 1933-1950. Figure I presents the data derived from roll call votes in the House.




FIG. I. Isolationist Voting by States in the House of Representatives (73rd-81st Congress, 1933-1950).

When examined carefully, the data upon which the map is based support the conclusion that a broad band of isolationist strength existed across the northern portion of the United States as compared to a relative lack of isolationism in the southern and southwestern states. North Dakota was the most isolationist state in the nation. It was followed in order by Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The existence of this broad northern band of isolationism is the most obvious conclusion drawn from the data. The votes also indicate that a multi-state region of isolationism centered in the North Dakota to Kansas belt. This region included Ohio in the East and Idaho in the West and reached as far South as Kansas. Included in this region are eleven of the twelve most isolationist states, only Vermont being excluded.

The Senate voting records (Figure II) suggest a slight modification of these conclusions. The northern half of the nation is again distinctly more isolationist

than the South. However, the region of isolationism in Figure II, though roughly similar, is not exactly the same as that found in House voting. North Dakota is again first in isolationist rank as it was in the voting in the House. Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Idaho, and Nevada follow in order. Thus four states—North Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Idaho—are among the first six isolationist states in each house of Congress. In the Senate, as in the House, the core of isolationism in this period centered in the North Dakota to Kansas area.

The votes in the House of Representatives are more useful and more accurate for this analysis of the isolationist region than are the votes in the Senate.




FIG. II. Isolationist Voting by States in the Senate
(73rd-81st Congress, 1933-1950).

Not only are the basic assumptions more sound in the case of the lower house, but also the votes can be examined for the congressional district, a smaller and more useful unit than the state. Figures III and IV show the districts in order of isolationist strength. Redistricting after the 1940 census necessitates dividing the period into two maps. These district maps must be viewed with some caution, since they are obviously not based on population, while the statistics presented on them are basically related to population density. Thus within the state of New York a small dot on the map represents an area including as many as twenty districts, while one district of roughly equal population is represented by an area twenty times as large. Not only must this differential be kept in mind in viewing individual states, but it must be observed in comparing low population states such as Montana with heavily populated eastern states.

It is obvious from Figures III and IV that no one region of the nation had a monopoly on isolationism in the 1933-1950 period. Heavily isolationist dis-

tricts appeared in states from California to Maine and were found, in many cases, adjoining non-isolationist districts in their own states. The district breakdown does show, as did the maps by states, that isolationism existed in a northern belt and was relatively weak in the southern half of the nation. Proximity to the coast was not an absolute deterrent to isolationism. Some districts in coastal states elected and constantly reelected isolationist representatives, while some inland districts were represented throughout the period by non-isolationists. However, there were relatively more isolationist members of the House representing inland districts within the Ohio-Idaho region than districts in coastal states, as can be seen in the state totals represented in Figure I.




Fig. III. Isolationist Votes in the House of Representatives, 1933-1942, by Congressional District.

It is not possible to locate any large regions of isolationism on the maps based on districts. This is due in part to the area, rather than population, basis of the map. But even if one could overcome this handicap, the patchwork of isolationist districts next to non-isolationist districts indicates that no multi-state regions existed. This patch-quilt pattern disappears when the state figures are used because state percentages are actually averages of the districts within the state, and therefore hide the variations. The maps by districts, the most accurate units, suggest definite limitations to the conclusions drawn from maps by states.

In using House roll call data, controls can be exercised that enable one to make comparisons of state or regional isolationist strength on various types of issues. The region of isolationism identified in Figure I can be further examined by withdrawing roll call data on certain types of issues from the totals and then examining the resultant pattern for shifts in isolationist concentrations. For

example, does the region of isolationism disappear as a region or, perhaps, center in another part of the country when all votes on reciprocal trade issues are excluded from the totals? Do the anti-reciprocal trade congressmen come from a different area than the anti-lend lease congressmen? Is there a region consistently reappearing throughout such variations in the data? It is also possible to divide the data into periods and examine the pattern of isolationist strength for shifts corresponding to time changes. Furthermore, the effect of political party affiliation on the voting pattern can be examined by studying separately the group of roll call votes on bi-partisan issues—those issues on




FIG. IV. Isolationist Votes in the House of Representatives, 1943-1950, by Congressional District.

which a majority of both parties voted on one side of the issue. Partisan influence on the data can be minimized by another method, that of studying the pattern of isolationism in the voting records of each party separately. This will show whether there were regions of isolationism within the Republican party and Democratic party in this period.

Analysis of ten roll calls in the House dealing with the Trade Agreements Program reveals a North-South break on this issue similar to the pattern in Figure I. All of the twelve most isolationist states on these ten issues are located north of the Kansas-Illinois-Ohio line. Of the twenty-four most isolationist states on this group of issues, only Florida and Nevada are south of the northern band of isolationism discernible in Figure I. All of the other twenty-two states are in the northern half of the country. Though the basic North-South cleavage follows the overall pattern (Figure I), the regional concentration within the North is considerably different. Two isolationist regions are

easily identified in the reciprocal trade votes, a New England region and a Northwest region. Of the twelve most isolationist states on reciprocal trade issues, four are located in New England (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts). The remaining eight are dispersed in an area reaching from Minnesota to the Pacific Coast. The effect of excluding the data on these ten roll calls from the total tabulation is to make the Ohio to Idaho region an even more pronounced isolationist region than is shown by Figure I.

Data for other groups of issues can be handled in a manner similar to the analysis of reciprocal trade issues, but none reveals as great a deviation from the basic regional pattern. Thus if the votes on issues concerning aid to the Allies, issues concerning United States participation in international organizations, and issues concerning foreign aid or relief programs involving large expenditures are analyzed as separate groups, the results in regional distribution follow a pattern quite similar to the original overall regional pattern in Figure I. With the exception of reciprocal trade issues, the region of isolationist strength remains consistently centered in the North Dakota to Kansas group of states.

The same general consistency is found when the data for the eighteen years are divided into two equal periods. Two exceptions to this general consistency are found, however. Relatively greater isolationism appears in New England before 1942, and increased isolationist inroads into the South appear in the post-1942 period. When the roll calls are divided into three equal time periods these two exceptions become more pronounced. In the 1933-1938 period the four northern New England states are solidly more isolationist than any other grouping of contiguous states in the country. In the 1945-1950 period two states, Louisiana and Mississippi, form an obvious "island" of southern isolationism.

In spite of these deviations from the overall regional pattern of Figure I, there is, with the possible exception of New England in the 1933-1938 period, sound basis for drawing the boundary line of the isolationist region along lines similar to the Ohio-Kansas-Idaho region in each of the shorter periods. Of the twelve most isolationist states, this region contained six states in 1933-1938, eleven in 1939-1944, nine in 1945-1950, eight in 1933-1941, and ten in 1942-1950. The significance of the New England isolationist region appearing in the early years of the period should not be minimized. Fewer issues were tabulated in the early period than in the last six years. Therefore the totals as shown in Figure I are weighted in favor of the later years. Actually, during at least the first third of the eighteen year period, northern New England was as isolationist as any other four-state region in the country.

If any one region of isolationism existed during the total period it was the region consisting of Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming, and Idaho. This eleven-state region contained within its boundaries a consistently high number of leading isolationist states, as evidenced by voting in the House of Representatives. There is sufficient evidence in the district data, however, to support the thesis that this region had no monopoly on isolationist congressmen. And there is

evidence to support the conclusion that in the early years of this period there was no single region, and that isolationism shifted from the East to the West during the period. However, the region most consistently isolationist on the greatest number of types of issues and over the longest time period is the eleven-state region depicted in Figure I.

When partisan affiliations are taken into account, the region of isolationism becomes even more pronounced. A total of eighteen bi-partisan issues were used in this tabulation. All occurred in the last six years of the period. On these issues, ones in which a majority of both parties voted on the same side of the question, party affiliation certainly had a minimal effect on voting behavior. When these bi-partisan roll calls are tabulated as a separate group the same regional pattern appears as on the total tabulation. Eleven of the twelve most isolationist states are located in the region defined above.

If another means of eliminating the effect of party affiliation is applied, somewhat the same result occurs. That is, if the votes of Republicans on all issues are tabulated separately from those of Democrats, the regional pattern within each party can be studied. Of the states that frequently sent Republicans to Congress in the eighteen-year period, Nebraska, North Dakota, Illinois, Idaho, Michigan, and Montana ranked as the six most isolationist. Among the states that sent Democrats with some consistency, Idaho, Nebraska, Mississippi, Montana, Iowa, and Minnesota ranked as the most isolationist. These most isolationist states within each party lie in the Ohio-Kansas-Idaho region, Mississippi being the single exception. Elimination of the effects of party does not, therefore, affect the basic regional pattern seen in Figure I.

The Isolationist Region and the Midwest. The region of isolationism having been located, does it coincide with the midwestern region of the country? Actually, it is more difficult to locate the Midwest than it is to locate a region whose boundaries are determined by one criterion, isolationist voting in Congress. As previously indicated, there are many "Midwests." Whose definition is to be accepted? It is possible to derive a "consensus Midwest" from the many definitions used in lay and professional literature. There is a basic core of agreement, a group of states which rarely fall outside of varying definitions of the region. Included in this core are six states: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. Surrounding this core are six states, part or all of which are sometimes included in the Midwest. These can be considered the midwestern fringe states: Ohio, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska.

How does this consensus Midwest compare with the isolationist region? The isolationist region extends further to the west than does the Midwest. Idaho and Wyoming lie outside of the midwestern region. Furthermore, the core of the isolationist region—Nebraska, Kansas, and the Dakotas—lies in the western fringe of the Midwest. One state in the Midwest fringe, Missouri, is not included in the isolationist region; and two core states of the consensus Midwest, Illinois and Indiana, are outside the most isolationist group. The two regions do overlap, but they do not coincide, nor is either region wholly included in the other.

In summary, what can be said about a regional pattern of isolationism in the period studied? First, the most obvious concentration of isolationist sentiment, as represented in Congress, was in a broad band reaching from coast to coast covering almost all of the northern half of the country. The absence of isolationist strength in the South and Southwest was in striking contrast to its presence in states of the North. This was generally true when partisan influence was eliminated from the data as well as when groups of issues and time periods were studied separately.

Second, the northern states themselves showed considerable variation in isolationist strength within state boundaries. Some of the most isolationist districts were located in Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan in proximity to non-isolationist districts. Almost all eastern, midwestern and western coast states contained some districts ranking high in isolationist strength. Distance from the ocean was no accurate gauge of isolationist strength.

Third, with certain qualifications, a region of isolationism is discernible in the eleven-state area that includes Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming and Idaho. The most isolationist center of this region lies in four states, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The qualifications on this definition of a region of isolationism are important enough to require restating. First, in the early portion of the eighteen years, New England was a second strong region within the northern band of isolationism. Secondly, throughout the period one or more very isolationist states existed outside the region. For example, when the Democratic votes were analyzed as a separate group, Mississippi and Louisiana appeared high in isolationist rank. A final qualification is suggested by the analysis of the data by districts. This analysis by smaller units makes it obvious that no region held a monopoly on isolationist sentiment, nor did the eleven-state region appear as an area of uniformly strong isolationist sentiment.

Fourth, the region of isolationism so defined fits only partially the midwestern region of the United States as defined in a consensus. The two regions overlap, but they do not coincide.

Non-Regional Factors. Are there factors other than regional location which characterize isolationist districts? Is there some socio-economic or political factor which is consistently found in an isolationist district but is absent from the anti-isolationist area? A region of isolationism was found to exist, with limitations, in the Ohio to Idaho portion of the country. Perhaps a non-regional correlate exists which will suggest further restrictions on a geographic explanation of isolationism based on the existence of such a geographic region.

It is possible to compare population characteristics such as urban-rural residence, economic level, educational level, percentage of foreign-born, and partisan affiliation of isolationist areas to non-isolationist districts. In each comparison, the counties of the isolationist and anti-isolationist districts within the same state can each be compared to the state average for the particular factor. By using the state average and comparing districts within the same state, variations due to regional differences can be eliminated. For example,

the educational level in counties composing the two or three most isolationist districts in Illinois can be compared to the average educational level of the whole state. If 20 per cent of the isolationist counties have a higher educational level than the state, this "percentage higher" can be compared to a similarly determined percentage figure for the non-isolationist counties in Illinois. This procedure can be repeated in other states where a wide range in degrees of isolationism existed, permitting a comparison of the educational level of the most isolationist counties (components of the most isolationist districts) with the non-isolationist.¹³

Turning first to a consideration of rural-urban residence, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that rural areas were more frequently represented by isolationist voting congressmen than were urban areas in the same state. Twenty four percent of the counties composing selected heavily isolationist districts were more densely populated than their respective states; the comparable figure for anti-isolationist counties within the same states was 34 per cent.¹⁴ This difference of ten percentage points corresponds to results of other comparisons. When the isolationism of heavily populated areas in fourteen states was compared to the strength of isolationism in the state as a whole, in only one case was the urban community more isolationist than the state as a whole.¹⁵ In the other thirteen states, on the other hand, state exceeded urban isolationism by a sizeable margin. In four instances the state percentage of isolationism was more than twice that of the urban area. In six other cases, the state percentage was more than 50 per cent greater than the urban figure.

Another means of comparison can be used. If the strongly isolationist districts are classified as metropolitan, urban, semi-urban, and rural, the totals in each category can be compared with those in similar classifications of non-isolationist districts.¹⁶ This comparison is presented in the following table:

¹³ Statistics on socio-economic characteristics of the population, unless otherwise stipulated, were obtained from the Census of 1940.

¹⁴ Twenty-three districts with high "percentage isolationist" rankings were selected for this and other similar comparisons. These districts were located in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The same number of relatively anti-isolationist districts were selected from the same states. The anti-isolationist districts contained fewer counties than did the isolationist districts.

¹⁵ The urban areas and states used were as follows: Los Angeles County and San Francisco, California; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan; New York City, New York; Philadelphia and Alleghany County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania; Boston, Chelsea, and Cambridge, Massachusetts; Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; Denver, Colorado; Baltimore, Maryland; Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Cleveland and Cincinnati, Ohio; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri; Louisville, Kentucky.

¹⁶ The classifications are used by Arthur Holcombe, *The Political Parties of Today*, pp. 62-63. Metropolitan districts are those formed in or containing an urban area consisting of a city of at least 200,000 inhabitants. An urban district contains a city of at least 100,000 population; semi-urban districts contain a city of at least 50,000 persons but none of 100,000. Rural districts have no city as large as 50,000. In this comparison the isolationist districts were all those having a percentage of isolationism greater than 80 per cent.

SELECTED ISOLATIONIST AND ANTI-ISOLATIONIST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF URBAN POPULATION

	Total Districts Classified	Per Cent Metropolitan Districts	Per Cent Urban Districts	Per Cent Semi-Urban Districts	Per Cent Rural Districts
(1933-1942)					
Isolationist	63	15.8	12.7	25.5	46.0
Anti-Isolationist	42	47.6	16.7	2.4	33.3
(1943-1950)					
Isolationist	16	0.0	6.2	25.0	68.8
Anti-Isolationist	24	79.2	8.3	4.2	8.3

Metropolitan and urban districts are those controlled by urban populations. In many semi-urban and in all rural districts, the rural population dominates. The division into two periods was made necessary by redistricting following the 1940 census. In both periods, the districts dominated by urban populations are found in relatively larger numbers in the anti-isolationist group. On the other hand, the isolationist group is dominated in each period by a preponderance of semi-urban and rural districts. The obviously frequent co-existence of isolationist strength and rural population dominance in a district points to the same conclusion as stated previously. Non-urban and rural areas are more frequently isolationist in Congress than urban and metropolitan communities.

A second non-locational factor, economic level, shows little relationship to isolationist strength. Whether one defines economic level in terms of rural level of living or of per capita income, analysis of congressional districts indicates little correlation between it and isolationism. Comparing the county rural level of living index to the respective state index in each case, we find that the indices of the isolationist counties are higher only two per cent more frequently than those of anti-isolationist counties. Per capita income comparisons yield similar results.

Educational level shows a somewhat more positive correlation with strength of isolationism than did economic level. In contrast with public opinion poll findings,¹⁷ analysis of the districts found to be isolationist or anti-isolationist leads to the conclusion that isolationism tends to be stronger in the more highly educated communities. Comparing the portion of the population in isolationist counties that finished the fifth grade and the percentage that finished high school to the similar part of the population in the non-isolationist counties, the isolationist counties were found to be more highly educated in both cases. Al-

The anti-isolationist districts had less than 5 per cent isolationism and were located in the same states as the isolationist districts.

¹⁷ Most opinion polls show that higher education is correlated with less isolationist sentiments. Of thirty-nine postwar polls presenting educational breakdowns on foreign affairs questions, thirty-six found college educated less isolationist than high school educated. In thirty-eight of the polls high school educated persons were found to be less isolationist than grade school educated.

most 49 per cent of the isolationist counties were above their respective state levels for fifth grade education; only 34 per cent of the anti-isolationist counties bettered their comparable state percentages. The comparable figures for high school education are 28.4 per cent higher for the isolationist and 20.4 per cent for the anti-isolationist counties.

There is little doubt that some correlation existed between the degree of isolationism in the 1933-1950 period in a particular community and the strength of certain foreign-born elements or foreign white stock in that community. A general correlation existed but there were many exceptions. The maps (Figures III and IV) showing isolationism by districts were compared to Census Bureau maps showing the proportion of the natives of various countries to the total population in 1890. One census map showing "The Proportion of the Natives of the Germanic Nations to the Aggregate Population," was very useful in these comparisons. Similar maps for Irish and Scandinavian elements were used, as well as maps based on the censuses of 1910 and 1920.¹⁸ Close comparison of the census maps to Figures III and IV made it possible to study the pattern of isolationism in relation to the distribution of foreign-born population. Other census data on foreign-born and foreign white stock in isolationist and non-isolationist counties were also useful.

In some areas a high degree of correlation was found. For example, the most isolationist areas of California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Minnesota were relatively heavily populated with persons of Germanic origins. In general, the broad isolationist areas of the northern and eastern parts of the country were more heavily settled by Germanic peoples.

Important exceptions were found, however, and when smaller areas were analyzed more carefully, the more heavily German population did not always appear as the most isolationist, nor did all isolationist districts show a significant foreign-born population. For example, the isolationist areas of Tennessee and Kentucky appeared to be uninfluenced by foreign stock. Idaho and North Dakota, most isolationist of all, appear as relatively unpopulated by foreign born of German background. In Missouri, heavily Germanic St. Louis is the least isolationist portion of the state. The southern portions of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana show similar inconsistencies.

Comparisons with other than Germanic population maps yielded similar exceptions to the general correlation. The Irish element in New England is an example. If Irish birth or parentage could be considered a link to isolationist sentiments in the period of American friendship and cooperation with England, one would expect to find isolationism stronger in heavily Irish southern New England than in northern New England where the Irish element is relatively sparse. However, Massachusetts was less isolationist than either Vermont, New Hampshire, or Maine, each of which is relatively uninfluenced by foreign-born population. This is not to suggest, however, that a general overlapping

¹⁸ These maps appear in *Statistical Atlas of the United States* (for the Eleventh Census, 1890, Washington, D. C., 1898), Maps 56-61. See also similar statistical atlases based on the 1910 census, plates 146-184, and the 1920 census, plates 147-180.

of Irish and isolationist areas was not common. It merely supports the conclusion that the generally close relationship of certain foreign-born and foreign-stock population elements with isolationist strength had many important exceptions.¹⁹

Partisan affiliation was closely related to isolationist voting. Of all votes cast by Democrats, 10.8 per cent were on the isolationist side. More than 57 per cent of the Republican votes supported the isolationist position. As indicated above, the partisan factor seemed to have a relatively small effect on the regional location of isolationism; that is, even with party influence eliminated the same region of isolationism was definable from the data.

In summary, this examination of non-regional factors suggests additional limitations on the importance of geographic region as a factor in isolationist strength. It seems clear that regional concentration of isolationism in the 1933 to 1950 period was but one of several identifiable characteristics: rural-urban residence, foreign origin or background, partisan affiliation and, to a lesser extent, educational level are characteristics joining together the isolationist districts and separating them, in some cases only slightly, from non-isolationist areas. Partisan affiliation and rural-urban residence were the strongest non-regional factors. Republicans were considerably more isolationist than Democrats. Rural areas were, with rare exception, more isolationist than urban districts within the same state. Though analysis does not indicate any relationship between economic level and isolationism, it does reveal a higher level of education in isolationist districts than in nearby non-isolationist districts. With important exceptions, heavily Germanic population areas tended to be more isolationist than neighboring areas of different national origins. Analyses of other nationality groups indicate similarly general relationships with isolationism and also suggest important limitations to any generalizations on this one factor. Thus, not only is the definition of a region of isolationism surrounded by doubt; but, if defined, the importance of the regional factor is lessened by the fact that other, non-regional correlates are readily discernible.

This analysis allows one only to speculate as to the causes of isolationism. No cause and effect relationship, no explanation of isolationism, can be stated firmly from these conclusions. But if one were to speculate, the soundest explanation would undoubtedly lie in the direction of a combination of these factors—regional and socio-economic—and others. Certainly no single or double factor explanation is possible. Each of these needs further investigation if we are better to understand isolationism, and, more generally, the attitudes of Americans toward foreign affairs.

¹⁹ Findings in this research do not support the relatively strong statement of relationship between isolationism and national origins found in Samuel Lubell's works, *n. 1*. Though the relationship exists, it is but one of several such correlations, and does not seem to be the strongest.

AGRARIAN SYNDICALISM IN POSTWAR FRANCE

GORDON WRIGHT

University of Oregon

In an age of mass movements and pressure groups, even the most rugged individualists find that organization pays. So it is that the French peasants, surely among the most rugged of all individualists, have embarked since World War II on a major experiment in syndical unity. In place of their prewar organizations, which were relatively weak and deeply divided, a single *Confédération Générale de l'Agriculture* has brought together approximately 80 per cent of all French farmers.¹ In the lobbies of Parliament, in the antechambers of the ministers, in the Economic Council, and in some 280 government commissions, the CGA represents the interests of the agricultural profession. Its existence plainly constitutes a new socio-political factor in the Fourth Republic.

Potentially, a united farmers' organization would seem destined to be the most powerful pressure group in France. Organized labor has mass voting support; the organized employers have rich financial resources; but only the farmers possess both of those weapons.² Yet the CGA today, after eight years of existence, continues to be a somewhat marginal power factor in French politics. Its dues-paying membership has dropped off markedly since the 1947 peak; its lobbying activities have produced only spotty results; its central organs are weakened by internal feuds and tensions. Critics proclaim from time to time that the CGA has no real influence among its members and no real prestige in the nation; they predict that it is doomed to disintegration or collapse. Clearly, the organization has not yet fulfilled the hopes of its founders. Nevertheless, it survives, and each year of survival strengthens the likelihood that some kind of agrarian syndicalism on a mass scale is here to stay in France. This essay proposes to examine the CGA's record to date, and to assess its actual and potential role in French politics.

I

Farm syndicalism in France is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although the first such organizations were formed in the 1880's, none of them developed mass support until the last decade of the Third Republic. As late as 1929, not more

¹ This figure was given by Secretary-General Lamour at the CGA's 1947 congress. He added that the seven component federations in the CGA had two million adherents in all (P. Lamour, *Pour un statut paysan* [Paris, 1947], p. 3). The largest of the federations, the FNSEA, claimed 1,750,000 dues-paying members in 1949 (*Annuaire de la CGA 1949-1950* [Paris, n.d.], p. 18).

² Cf. the Paris weekly *Samedi-Soir* for Jan. 7, 1950, which described the CGA as the most powerful special-interest group in France. According to the 1946 census, about one-third of the active French population (7,290,000 of 21 million) is engaged in agriculture or stock-raising (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, *L'espace économique français* [Paris, 1951], p. 35). The financial resources available to the organized farmers cannot be measured, but they are doubtless potentially greater than those which organized labor can command from its own members.

than one peasant out of seven belonged to a syndicate,³ and as a rule his chief motive was to get cheaper fertilizer rather than to express a sense of class solidarity or to ensure the defense of agricultural interests. Furthermore, this organized minority of peasants was split into several different syndicates, each with its own political color. The impact of the depression speeded up syndical activity in rural areas, so that by 1940 one peasant out of three or four had been "unionized."⁴ But division rather than unity continued to be the rule; there still existed no peasant syndicate which could inspire politicians with the respect or fear which the labor unions, for example, could command. Such political influence as the peasantry possessed (and that influence was traditionally very great in France) came through the massive bulk of their voting power, and through the curious electoral system which made the Senate their special preserve. Even before 1940, however, some farm leaders were becoming convinced that their amorphous electoral strength was no longer enough; that to it, there must be added a new organized syndical strength. Vichy's Peasant Corporation was in part the product of this prewar sentiment. Whatever the Corporation's faults (and they were many), it did give the peasantry a taste of unity and potential power which some of them were determined to preserve.

The origins of the CGA go back to this Vichy period—to 1943, when French patriots could begin to envision the end of the German occupation and could begin to plan for a brave new world. It was conceived by Pierre Tanguy-Prigent, a young Breton peasant who had entered politics in 1936 as a Socialist deputy. Tanguy, who had sought unsuccessfully to build a strong Socialist organization among the farmers before the war, realized that the liberation might give him a new chance. Late in 1943, with a few friends, he sketched out plans for a unified national confederation which would parallel labor's CGT. An underground newspaper, *La Résistance Paysanne*, was founded to propagandize for the cause, but there was barely time to publish two issues before the Allied forces landed in France.⁵

With the rout of the German armies and the collapse of the Vichy regime, Tanguy's rudimentary plans were threatened from two quarters. First, the Algiers government of General de Gaulle decreed in July, 1944 that all prewar farm groups which Vichy had abolished were to be resuscitated. Such a return to the prewar pattern of division and weakness, Tanguy felt, had to be blocked. Tanguy's chance soon came when de Gaulle, on the recommendation of resistance leaders, named him Minister of Agriculture in the first post-liberation

³ M. Augé-Laribé estimates that in 1929 only 600,000 peasants were members of syndicates or cooperatives of any kind (*La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940* [Paris, 1950], p. 477). At that time, there were almost four million farms in France.

⁴ Augé-Laribé's estimate for 1939 is one million peasants in farm organizations of some sort (*loc. cit.*). Meanwhile, the total farm population had dropped. The largest syndicate of the 1930's—the UNSA—claimed at the time to represent 1,200,000 families.

⁵ After the liberation, efforts were made to inflate the CGA's resistance record. The first issue of *La Libération Paysanne* in October, 1944 asserted that the CGA had been founded in 1941. One ex-official of the CGA claims to possess an issue of *La Résistance Paysanne*, circulated just after the liberation, which bore the serial number 31.

cabinet. One of his first acts was to abrogate the Algiers decree, and to order instead that a single peasant organization be authorized to exist.

The second threat came from the Communists. Throughout large parts of central and southern France, they had built a network of peasant resistance groups—the so-called Committees of Peasant Defense and Action (CDAP). At the liberation, these groups seized control of local farm newspapers and Vichy Corporation offices; and their leaders (notably Léopold Rambeau and Jean Laurenti) convoked a CDAP congress at Toulouse in November at which they planned to create a permanent national organization. With some difficulty Tanguy persuaded the Communist leaders to abandon these plans and to merge their CDAP with the new CGA. Evidently the Communists decided that they could effectively colonize and control the larger organization from within. At any rate, they converted the Toulouse congress from a baptismal into a funeral rite, and the CDAP disappeared in an orgy of speechmaking.

Meanwhile, Tanguy's plans were rapidly taking shape. In October, 1944, he appointed a National Committee of Agricultural Action to build the framework for the CGA. He also set up local committees for each department of France, to supervise the establishment of village and departmental units. The National Committee, hand-picked by Tanguy, was remarkable for its high proportion of Socialists and its low ratio of peasants. Only five of the seventeen members were farmers, and the key figure, Philippe Lyonnet, was a high official in the electricians' union.⁶

The task of blueprinting the machinery for so complex and unwieldy an organization as the CGA was a forbidding one. Although in theory the planners were starting from scratch, in practice a complicated series of farmers' organizations still existed at the end of the war. Almost ten thousand cooperatives of varying size were scattered throughout the country; even Vichy had not been able to fuse them effectively into national units. Likewise, separate hierarchies of mutual aid societies and of farm credit associations had grown up over several decades. More important still were the so-called "specialized associations" which grouped the wheat growers, the sugar-beet producers, the wine-growers, and so on. These groups had sprung up during the two decades before 1940, and had come to be the most effective of all farm pressure groups. Finally, there were the remnants of several prewar farmers' syndicates whose leaders, of Leftist sympathies, were free of the Vichy taint. On the other hand, those prewar syndicates which had rallied to Vichy (and the largest ones had done so) were doomed to extinction, and their leaders were excluded from any share in planning the CGA.

This inherited complexity made it clear that the CGA, as its name indicated,

⁶ Tanguy later explained his choice of Socialist technicians rather than peasants by admitting that his "peasant" resistance movement had been made up of the former. "Could I repudiate the friends who had shared with me the risks of the resistance?" he asked (*Congrès d'unité paysanne* [Paris, 1945], p. 52). For details of the CGA's beginnings in 1944-45, see Lyonnet's report to the first CGA congress, published by the CGA in the pamphlet just cited; and J. Serve, *Le syndicalisme agricole* (Paris, 1945).

would have to be a confederation rather than a unitary structure. As finally worked out, the blueprint provided for seven national federations as the component units of the CGA. Three of them would bring together the principal technical branches of farm organization: the cooperatives, the mutual aid societies, and the farm credit associations. Three others would represent certain special segments of the rural population: the agricultural technicians and the farm laborers (the latter divided between a Catholic and a Communist federation, as in prewar days). The seventh federation would be the most novel and potentially the most significant. Labelled the *Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles* (FNSEA, or Farmers' Federation), it would be open to all active farm operators, whether owners, tenants, or sharecroppers. In it, the whole agricultural population except absentee landlords and farm laborers would be represented directly. In the other federations, in contrast, the peasants would be represented indirectly through cooperative or mutual aid officials (generally technicians or bureaucrats rather than farmers). The FNSEA, therefore, would rest upon remarkably broad base of some two and one-half million peasant families, whose consolidated voting strength might give the Paris politicians something to think about. Here, rather than in the CGA above it, would be the peasants' own trade union.

Tanguy-Prigent and his associates, however, intended no such dominant role for the FNSEA. They aimed, rather, to make it one subordinate segment of a powerful CGA, with the confederal organs functioning not as a mere capstone linking seven autonomous federations, but rather as the central agency of guidance and decision. Such was the nature of labor's CGT, within which the various federations were only parts of a greater whole. The voice of the FNSEA would be influential in CGA councils, but its desires could presumably be overridden by the votes of the technicians, bureaucrats, and farm-labor organizers. And these latter groups, as Tanguy and everyone else of course knew, were predominantly Leftist in their political views.

But Tanguy and his advisers had in mind something more than building a Socialist political machine among the farmers. Their principal aim in this rosy liberation epoch was to revolutionize French agriculture. This did not mean (as their enemies then and since have alleged) that they aimed to collectivize French farming on the Soviet model.⁷ What they wanted, rather, was a planned, renovated, efficient agriculture in place of the old heterogeneous agrarian structure which contained everything from the medieval to the ultra-modern. They proposed the rapid mechanization of agriculture; the cooperative use of machinery; the consolidation of small scattered strips of land into larger units; the expansion of cooperative buying and marketing; and the planning of crops on a rational, nation-wide basis. Such a program could not be carried

⁷ The charge that the CGA's founders aimed at outright collectivization has been made repeatedly: e.g., R. Maspétiol, *L'ordre éternel des champs* (Paris, 1946), p. 518; R. Cercler, "Le syndicalisme agricole et les Chambres d'Agriculture," *Revue politique des idées et des institutions*, May 15, 1949, pp. 274-79; A. Rougié, *Peints par eux-mêmes; la vague marxiste sur l'agriculture* (n.p., 1947), pp. 60-85.

through by the peasants themselves; it could be achieved only by governmental action working through the technicians with the consent of the peasants. The CGA was envisaged as one of the major agencies for carrying out this agricultural revolution; therefore the balance of power within it would have to favor the technicians and bureaucrats rather than the peasant mass.

With these aims in mind, the CGA's planners moved rapidly from the blueprint to the construction stage. It is worth noting that in this process, the CGA's confederal organs were set up first, and the most important federation—the FNSEA—last. In a sense, therefore, the CGA was built from the top down. Late in 1944, under the guidance of Tanguy's local Committees of Agricultural Action, peasants met in villages throughout France to form local CGA units and to elect their officers by show of hands. In the Center and Southwest, this process was simple: the local CDAP, usually under Communist leadership, simply took over the CGA label. The problem was more difficult in regions where the local peasant elite had supported Vichy. Tanguy's appointees saw to it that Vichyites were shunted aside, but it was not always easy to find other village leaders in their place. By March, 1945, however, the ground had been prepared for the CGA's first national congress. Delegates from almost every part of France gathered in Paris to celebrate the achievement of peasant unity, and to consider the proposals of Lyonnet's preparatory committee.

On the face of it, the congress was a great success for the planners. Oratory flowed in profusion: Tanguy-Prigent greeted the delegates at such length that one peasant said he must have been speaking for both Tanguy and Prigent. Lyonnet's report was approved almost without debate, and the Lyonnet group was left in control of the CGA's permanent machinery. Still, some signs of peasant dissatisfaction were already apparent. One Catholic delegate got the floor to declare that syndical unity could be nothing more than a facade; that the French peasantry was too varied to be represented by a single organization. He was promptly howled down, for the *mystique* of unity was still powerful in that post-liberation era. The malcontents managed only to get several more non-Socialists added to the CGA's top council, and to extort from Tanguy a promise that a more representative congress would be held within a year.⁸ Some weeks later, Tanguy retreated before Catholic pressure and promised that syndical liberty would shortly be restored. He insisted, however, that the CGA's temporary monopoly of the right to form farmers' organizations would have to continue until the CGA had been completely built. Otherwise, he argued, peasant unity might be wrecked by selfish political rivalries.

The chief remaining organizational task was the establishment of the Farmers' Federation (FNSEA). All of the other federations, as well as the CGA capstone, were in place and functioning by mid-1945. But the FNSEA, if it were to mean anything at all, could not be set up by decree and direction from above: it required free elections at the grass-roots level. Such elections would be

⁸ Despite the idealistic tone which pervaded the congress, the liveliest applause went to a delegate who demanded that the national dues be reduced from 20 to 10 francs, on the ground that "We don't intend to maintain a collection of bureaucrats in Paris."

the first real test of peasant opinion since the CGA planners had begun their work; the outcome might have a vital effect on the CGA's future. Shortly before this critical moment arrived, Tanguy took one last step to keep the new FNSEA within bounds. He decreed that the syndicates would be denied the right to engage in business activities: e.g., to buy fertilizer or to market their members' crops. The prewar farm syndicates had gotten their start through such prosaic but useful operations, and had held their members' loyalty mainly through such services. Now, however, those functions were to be monopolized by the cooperatives, while the FNSEA would confine itself to purely syndical activities. This decision, while logical enough, left many peasants skeptical about the purpose and utility of the FNSEA.

Early in January, 1946, the peasants went to the polls. There had been some controversy in Paris over the question of eligibility to vote; according to rough estimates, only about one-third of the three million farm operators had formally adhered to the CGA or to one of its technical branches. It was finally ruled that all farmers might vote, and that the act of voting would automatically make them members of the FNSEA. In each commune, delegates were to be chosen to a departmental assembly of the Federation; and from these assemblies would come the delegates to the first FNSEA congress in Paris.

What proportion of the peasants responded to the election call is still obscure. CGA officials announced triumphantly that approximately 70 per cent had turned out, and that the farmers had proved their passionate interest in syndical unity. Hostile observers placed the figure at about one-third; but as no statistics were ever published, an accurate estimate is impossible.⁹ Far more important was the character of the vote cast; and CGA leaders had less reason to rejoice when they saw the kind of delegates who had been chosen. Jubilant conservatives claimed that 80 per cent of those elected had not previously been active in the CGA. At any rate, a strong trend away from the Left was evident almost everywhere except in central and southern France. In Tanguy-Prigent's home department of Finistère, only three Socialists were elected. The Communists too were sorely disappointed, despite a number of victories in the Center and Southwest. Their candidate for the national presidency of the FNSEA, Waldeck Rochet, could not even win election to the presidency of his departmental unit in Saône-et-Loire.

This FNSEA election represented in part a conscious peasant revulsion against the organizers of the CGA, whose interests seemed to them to be urban and political rather than rural and professional. Even more, however, it represented a natural village tendency to choose tried and trusted local spokesmen:

⁹ On the 1946 elections, see the reports by Lyonnet and Rambeau at the first FNSEA congress (published as separate pamphlets by the CGA); E. de Felcourt, "La législation agricole depuis la libération," *Monde français*, May, 1948, p. 199; R. Cercler, "L'organisation professionnelle agricole en France," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, May 10, 1946, pp. 132-44. Some Communists feel in retrospect that the worst error in CGA history was the decision to let all farmers vote in 1946, rather than active adherents alone (*Le Paysan du Sud-Ouest* [Toulouse], May 15, 1951).

the same men who had been active in prewar farm syndicates or cooperatives and, often, in the Vichy Corporation. The rural elite in France is small; the liberation did not magically produce a new elite to take the place of the old. In most cases, therefore, the peasants returned to the leaders whom they knew. In areas where the village elite had been Leftist (notably in the South and Center), those same Leftists were elected in 1946, but throughout most of the northern half of France, the Christian Socialists or Rightists swept the polls. In the first national congress of the FNSEA which followed shortly, the posts of command went to centrists and conservatives. Eugène Forget, a Christian Socialist smallowner from the Angers region, became president; and the number two post of secretary-general fell to an unrepentant Rightist—René Blondelle, a large-scale operator from northeastern France. Both men had held positions in the Vichy Corporation—Forget in a minor role, Blondelle near the top. Clearly, a new phase in CGA history was about to begin.

II

The first phase in the CGA's development (1944–46) had been concerned mainly with organizational problems, and had been dominated by Leftist planners. The second period (1946–1950) was marked by a sporadic internal conflict over the structure and spirit of the CGA. Three major factions were competing in this "cold war." The Leftists (mainly Socialists, with a minority Communist wing) still clung to control of the CGA's confederal organs, and sought to keep the locus of power there. Their rising star, rapidly eclipsing Lyonnet as the chief Leftist spokesman in the CGA, was Philippe Lamour—a colorful and controversial figure who had been chosen secretary-general of the CGA in 1945. Lamour had had a checkered but intriguing career: a brilliant young lawyer in the 1930's, a prolific novelist and world traveler by avocation, he had been forced to abandon his legal practice shortly before 1940 and had taken to operating a large farm—first near Vichy, then in the deep south near Nîmes. Lamour's political record was as bizarre as his professional career: he had been a Radical Socialist candidate for deputy in 1936; had served as one of Ana Pauker's lawyers in Rumania in the same year; had allegedly gone through a brief Pétainist stage in 1940; and had emerged after the liberation as an unaffiliated Leftist. Although his enemies scoffed at Lamour as a "comic-opera peasant," his unflagging energy, his persuasive oratory, and his personal charm brought him to the top in the very first months, and kept him there long after other Leftists had been shunted aside.

The Rightist faction found its natural center of gravity in the FNSEA; its aim, therefore, was to shift power from the confederal organs to the separate federations, and to make the FNSEA virtually autonomous. The ablest spokesman for this viewpoint was René Blondelle, whose vigor and tenacity balanced the dynamic brilliance of Lamour. Blondelle had a record of twenty years' activity in agrarian syndicalism in the Aisne department, where he rented and operated a 600-acre farm. His social conservatism had led him in the direction of corporatist doctrine before 1940, and he had therefore been a natural sup-

porter of Pétain. After the liberation, the farmers of the Aisne had at once reaffirmed their confidence in him by reelecting him as head of their local organization.

Between the Left and the Right, the Christian Socialist element held the balance of power during this transitional era, and sought to find some compromise which would preserve peasant unity. Eugène Forget, its principal spokesman, was one of the most remarkable rural leaders to emerge in the post-war period. A sincere and selfless man with a purely local reputation before 1946, Forget was overwhelmed by the unexpected honor which came to him when he was chosen first national president of the FNSEA.¹⁰ During his three years in office, he strove unceasingly to mediate between the factions in his organization, and to shift the CGA's focus from the peasant as producer to the peasant as human being. In his few spare moments, Forget managed to commute to his 40-acre farm, and to keep it a model of efficiency and modern methods. Forget's more cynical critics treated him as naive and "soft," useful only as a buffer during a period of internal stress. But to many of those who knew him, he served as a kind of symbol of personal integrity and sincere dedication to the welfare of rural France.¹¹

The CGA's inner tensions during this transitional period are not easy to analyze, for politics, personalities, and differences of principle all played a part. The central fact, however, was the struggle for power between the Leftist technicians and planners in the cooperatives and at the top of the CGA, and the Rightist element in the FNSEA whose emphasis on "the organized profession" smacked more and more of corporatist doctrine. René Blondelle brought the dispute into the open at the FNSEA'S second congress in November, 1947. The peasants' new union, he declared, was hamstrung by the confusion of authority between the CGA and the FNSEA. Housed in the same building, sharing the same secretarial services, the officials of the two groups were continually stepping on each others' toes and disputing over the locus of authority. The solution, he argued, was to strip the CGA confederal organs of everything except a small secretariat. He proposed to make it merely a coordinating organism, while all of the CGA's essential services (including the official newspaper, *La Libération Paysanne*) would be transferred to the FNSEA. Such a change, declared Blondelle, would drive politics out of the organization, and would leave syndical interests supreme. Blondelle also proposed that minority factions in the FNSEA be squeezed out of the Federation's Bureau (the top policy-making body) by allowing the majority to elect the entire Bureau.¹²

¹⁰ Forget was allegedly lifted out of obscurity by a prominent Catholic farm leader from Lyon named Genevrey, who for personal reasons could not be elected himself.

¹¹ It was typical of Forget that, although eligible for a high priority to buy a new automobile, he insisted on waiting for two years until his regular turn came up. During an official tour of the United States with other farm officials, Forget left the party at Kansas City and flew home in order to meet a prior commitment to make a "whistle-stop" speech near his home town.

¹² On the 1947 congress, see N. Drogat, "Y a-t-il une crise de la C.G.A.?", *Travaux de l'Action Populaire*, pp. 34-41 (Jan., 1948); and R. Blondelle, *Rapport moral sur l'activité de la F.N.S.E.A.* (Paris, 1947).

Blondelle's blunt assault stirred up a violent debate; and while his report was adopted by a large majority, most of the thorny issues contained in it were referred to a committee for further study. No group wanted to take the initiative in forcing a showdown which would have split the CGA; the facade of unity was therefore maintained. For two more years, the internal bickering went on, but it was clear that the Blondelle faction was steadily consolidating its hold. One factor which strengthened the Rightists was the revival of the prewar "specialized associations" (such as the Wheat Growers' Association) and their partial absorption by the FNSEA. Several of these groups were wealthy, powerful, and aggressively led; they were potentially dangerous to the CGA either inside or outside it. In 1947 they were finally brought into the FNSEA as semi-autonomous units, with separate budgets and separate representation on the FNSEA's national council. Their most vigorous spokesmen were Rightists who threw their support to the Blondelle group, and who exercised an influence out of proportion to their numbers.

Meanwhile, the Leftists in the CGA were being progressively weakened. One symbolic blow was the fall of Tanguy-Prigent from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1947, and his replacement by Pierre Pflimlin of the MRP.¹³ Another setback was a split in the cooperative movement; some of the largest and oldest cooperatives seceded from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives which the Leftists had founded after the liberation.¹⁴ Still another source of weakness was the Communists' effort to carve out a special preserve for themselves within the FNSEA. Disgruntled at their poor showing in the FNSEA elections, the Communists decided to try to split the 700,000 small tenants and sharecroppers away from the main body of peasants. Late in 1946 they suddenly announced the creation of a Tenants' and Sharecroppers' Association which, as they planned it, would have been a completely autonomous unit within the FNSEA. This maneuver was partially blocked by the various non-Communist elements, who joined the new organization, got their man elected president, and voted to make it merely a "section" of the FNSEA rather than an autonomous "association." The new Tenants' and Sharecroppers' Section (SNPBR) failed to develop much momentum during the years that followed, but its existence further divided and weakened the Left-wing element within the CGA.¹⁵

¹³ Some time before his fall, Tanguy had finally been forced to restore syndical liberty, so that groups rivalling the CGA could be legally formed. In fact, few such groups were created. One exception was the *Fédération Nationale de la Propriété Agricole*, an extreme-Right organization which represents the interests of large landlords, many of them absentee. Its official organ is *La Renaissance Agricole*. The MRP abandoned its plan to set up a rival syndicate when the 1946 FNSEA elections strengthened its position within the CGA. Likewise, certain prewar syndicates in the provinces which had been demanding full independence decided to remain affiliated with the FNSEA when the latter showed signs of moving to the Right. Such was the case, notably, in the Nord, Finistère, and Côtes-du-Nord departments.

¹⁴ The seceding cooperatives formed a new union of Rightist tendencies, linked closely with the Wheat Growers' Association on the rue des Pyramides.

¹⁵ Useful details on the origins of the SNPBR may be found in the MRP's farm weekly,

By 1950, the Rightists were ready to take over outright control of the FNSEA, and to inject into it a more aggressive and intransigent spirit. At the fourth national congress in March, President Forget announced his resignation, remarking sadly that his efforts at mediation and persuasion had found little echo either in syndical or in governmental circles. He was replaced as president by René Blondelle, while another Rightist, 300-pound Jean Laborbe, took over as secretary-general. The last remaining Communists, and most of the Socialists, were pushed off the Bureau of the FNSEA. A new strategy of mass peasant demonstrations, buyers' strikes, and direct political action was promised by the Blondelle leadership.

Since that time, the Rightists have completely dominated the FNSEA, and the FNSEA in turn has increasingly dominated the CGA. It is true that Philippe Lamour still clings to his post as CGA secretary-general, and that a prominent cooperative official, Pierre Martin, has been CGA president since 1950. These, however, are exceptional cases. In the CGA's central offices behind the *Opéra* in Paris, only a handful of bureaucrats from the 1944-46 era remain. Socialists and Christian Socialists are clearly outnumbered in the CGA's national council, and the Communists have been totally excluded from posts of influence.¹⁶ The CGA no longer holds an annual congress; only the component federations such as the FNSEA meet in full session. Outwardly at least, 1950 seems to have marked the end of factionalism, and the achievement of syndical unity and solidarity.

III

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Behind the facade of harmony and unity, both the peasants and their leaders have been in frequent internal conflict. At the top, the old Left-Right feud still smolders, and flares up briefly at intervals. In April, 1952, for example, René Blondelle (president of the FNSEA) and Pierre Martin (president of the CGA) were rival candidates for the national presidency of the revived Chambers of Agriculture.¹⁷ Blondelle won, but by a

Monde Paysan, for April 30 and Sept. 24, 1947. The SNPBR's newspaper admitted in 1951 that fewer than 200,000 tenants and sharecroppers were dues-paying members, and that very few of them took the trouble to read the official organ (*Le Fermier et le Métayer*, April, 1951).

In 1952 the non-Communists took full control of the SNPBR, and replaced every Communist who had held a high post in it. The Communists then proceeded to organize a new subdivision of the SNPBR, of dubious legal status, and confined to fifteen central and southern departments where Communist rural strength is great (*La Terre*, March 13 and 20, 1952). They denounce M. Bajeux, the new secretary-general of the SNPBR, as a "*gros fermier capitaliste du Nord*." When I visited M. Bajeux's farm in 1951, I found this "big capitalist" stripped to the waist in his barn, putting in hay along with two hired hands.

¹⁶ The only high-ranking Leftist who is still a full-time official in the CGA central offices is Director-General Henri Canonge. The chief remaining stronghold of the Christian Socialists is in the mutual aid societies, whose elected boards supervise the social security system in rural areas.

¹⁷ The Chambers of Agriculture before 1940 were public organisms in each department with power to recommend programs of rural improvement and to speak on behalf

margin of only 47 to 37 votes; his victory has increased the restlessness of the Leftist element in the cooperative, mutual aid, and farm credit federations of the CGA.¹⁸ The same conflict appears when a Rightist cabinet like that of Antoine Pinay adopts measures which irritate the peasantry. Then the FNSEA's Rightist majority is torn between loyalty to the cabinet and a desire to protect farm interests, while the Leftist element denounces the government with redoubled fervor.

But there are other lines of cleavage in the CGA as well. Once the Rightists had won clear control of the organization, they could afford to revive their own internal differences. One issue which soon arose was the question of direct CGA intervention in politics. Most of the Rightists favored such intervention in the 1951 elections, but only part of them advocated the creation of a separate peasant party rather than activity within the established parties.¹⁹ Partially linked to this issue was the broader question of corporative doctrine: some CGA leaders still insist that the parliamentary republic must be modified or replaced by a corporative structure, founded upon the organized professions.²⁰ Still another controversy has brought to grips the "expansionists" and the "malthusians" within the CGA. Until 1948 at least, all factions in the CGA had rallied to the "expansionist" doctrine of the CGA's founders, who preached that French agriculture should vastly improve its productivity and expand its production in order to become a great exporting branch of the national economy. From 1948 on, however, the farmers' optimism dimmed as their production began to catch up with demand, and as the favorable price scissors began to turn against them. A "neo-malthusian" doctrine began to make headway among certain farm leaders, who urged a return to the prewar tradition of limited production for a highly-protected domestic market. Such a policy was frankly proposed at the FNSEA's congress in 1951 by Jean Deleau, head of the Wheat

of farm interests. They were elected by the peasants and by organized farm groups, and had a regular though small source of income from taxes. Vichy suspended them in 1940, and their surviving members demanded that they be reactivated after the war. CGA leaders resisted this demand for several years, on the ground that the CGA had taken over the functions of the Chambers, and that useless rivalries between the two would split the peasantry. A compromise was finally reached which permitted the revival of the Chambers, with slates of candidates jointly drawn up by Chamber and CGA leaders. Early in 1952, these slates were elected without opposition in most parts of France. No clear division of functions between the Chambers and the FNSEA has yet been made, but so long as Blondelle remains president of both organisms, there should be no problem of rivalry.

¹⁸ In June, 1952 these three federations held a joint congress and decided to coordinate their activities through a new permanent committee. *Le Monde* described this decision as a "defensive reflex" against the growing encroachment of the FNSEA (*Monde*, June 27, 1952). The debates at the congress, summarized at length in *Libération Paysanne* for July 3, 1952, give clear evidence of this resentment at FNSEA domination.

¹⁹ I have described the CGA's recent political ventures in an article entitled "French Farmers in Politics," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 51, pp. 356-65 (July, 1952).

²⁰ Such a proposal was advanced in the FNSEA's 1952 congress (*Monde*, Feb. 1, 1952). Blondelle had hinted at the same thing in the 1949 congress.

Growers' Association. The proposal split the Rightist leadership in the FNSEA. President Blondelle himself opposed the malthusian thesis, which was also vigorously fought by Philippe Lamour and the Leftist minority. Together, the Blondelle and Lamour factions have been able to keep the CGA officially committed to expansionism, but there is increasing unrest in some farm circles.²¹

Differences continue to exist, then, at the top of the CGA. To what extent do these differences reflect similar cleavages within the farm population as a whole? This is perhaps the most significant question which must be answered in assessing the future of agrarian syndicalism in France. CGA officials like to proclaim that "the peasantry is less divided than its leaders"²²; and some observers even claim to detect the growth of a sense of class solidarity among the peasants analogous to that which inspires the city workers.²³ If this viewpoint is valid—if there is really a rising sense of unity and class-consciousness at the base—then the feuds in the CGA are mere temporary aberrations which will pass in time.

The loudest exponents of the opposite viewpoint are the Communists. For several years they have been asserting that the rural population is deeply divided along social and economic lines, and that the CGA has cut itself off from the mass of small farmers by adopting policies dictated by the large capitalist operators. So clear is this class bias, say the Communists, that the small farmers have been abandoning the CGA in droves. They point out that some departmental units of the FNSEA have become mere skeletons; that 22 of the 90 departmental sections were denied voting rights in the 1950 congress for inability to pay their national dues, and that 19 of these 22 departments were located south of the Loire, where small farming is most general, and where farm incomes are relatively low.²⁴

There is some real evidence, and much superficial evidence, to support the Communist case. The dominant element in the FNSEA is undoubtedly conservative in its political and social ideology; it is strongly attracted to corpora-

²¹ See P. Drouin in *Le Monde*, April 13, 1951. The CGA officially favors the creation of a "green pool" in Europe to provide a common market for agricultural products. It has also supported the Schuman Plan for a coal and steel pool. On the other hand, CGA leaders boast that they were instrumental in blocking a Franco-Italian customs union somewhat similar to Benelux. Italian competition, they insist, would ruin many French farmers unless food-importing countries could also be brought into the union.

²² E. Forget in *Libération Paysanne*, March 18, 1950.

²³ N. Drogat, *loc. cit.*, p. 36; cf. also P. Couvreur, "La C.G.A. et les grandes lignes d'une politique agricole," *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, p. 16 (Jan. 1950).

²⁴ The Communists asserted in 1950 that two-thirds of the CGA's members had left the organization (*La Terre*, Nov. 16, 1950). No accurate membership figures are available, but this estimate seems to be grossly exaggerated. It is true, however, that seven departmental units are totally moribund, and had to be suspended in 1952 for failure to pay any national dues for three years (*Libération Paysanne*, Feb. 7, 1952). All of these departments are in the southwest. It is also true that fifteen or twenty other departmental units are in bad condition. Some are kept afloat by a strong cooperative organization, which assumes the burden of collecting FNSEA dues. In three departments where Communist influence is strong (Corrèze, Landes, and Haute-Garonne), the FNSEA unit has split into two rival syndicates, with the non-Communist organization officially recognized by the Paris leadership.

tist doctrines, and to the idea that social stability is more important than productivity or material well-being. Within the FNSEA, the influence of a few dynamic leaders representing the specialized associations balances, and perhaps even outweighs, the influence of those delegates who represent the individual peasants. Furthermore, the greatest decline in FNSEA membership since 1947 has occurred in small-farming regions with a Leftist tradition, and in part has reflected dissatisfaction with FNSEA leadership.

Even so, it is a gross oversimplification to reduce the cleavages within the peasantry to a simple two-way pattern of class struggle, and to interpret the CGA's record according to that pattern. It is easy to show that small and middle farmers are in the majority in the national councils of the CGA and the FNSEA, and that large capitalist operators like Blondelle and Deleau are the exception rather than the rule.²⁵ True, the Communists argue that these small farmers are the prisoners or the henchmen of their big colleagues, but such an argument is more convenient than convincing. Political and social conservatism are by no means monopolies of the big owners. It can be proved, too, that the sharp decline in FNSEA membership has other causes than the small farmers' revolt against the national leadership. Alongside small-farming departments where the FNSEA is moribund, one can find other departments of similar social structure with vigorous and sizeable FNSEA units.²⁶ Where syndicalism has decayed, the cause has often been apathetic leadership or bitter political squabbles. Finally, it ought to be said on behalf of the FNSEA leadership that its record has not been one of pure reaction or of the cynical defense of big agrarian interests at the expense of the small peasantry. Some of the FNSEA and CGA leaders are sincerely concerned with the small farmer's problems, not only for the sake of social stability but also from a sense of obligation to the largest group in their "trade union."²⁷

²⁵ FNSEA officials assert that three-fourths of the members of their National Council operate "family farms" (*Libération Paysanne*, April 6, 1950). Among them are some of the most influential of the Federation's leaders: e.g., honorary president Eugène Forget (40 acres), secretary-general Albert Génin (25 acres); assistant secretaries-general Fernand Van Graefscheppe (60 acres) and Lucien Biset (40 acres); vice-president Clément Bardet (70 acres). Van Graefscheppe is often described in the Communist press as "*un très gros exploitant du Nord*." The average size of French farms, according to the 1946 census, is about 40 acres.

In FNSEA congresses, there was some discrimination against populous but poor departments prior to 1947. Representation then was based on a combination of membership and total value of farm production in a department. Thus, Seine-et-Marne with only 7,448 farmers had three delegates, and Ariège with 19,106 farmers had only two. Since 1947, representation has been based on membership alone; this democratic gesture has been partially nullified by allotting 76 delegates to the specialized associations.

²⁶ On this point, see J. Laborbe in *Libération Paysanne*, March 30, 1950. It is true, however, that the FNSEA has more often disintegrated in subsistence-farming regions than in prosperous small-farming areas.

²⁷ The CGA's program to aid the small peasants has both progressive and regressive aspects. In the latter category one might classify the CGA's constant efforts to keep farm taxes low. In 1950 Blondelle boasted that the number of peasants subject to the agricultural profits tax had been cut from a million and a half to 593,000, thanks to the CGA's

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that peasant unity is still a slogan and a myth rather than a reality. The basic weakness of agrarian syndicalism in France lies in the nation's complex agrarian structure—in the varied social and economic status of the farmers, made still more complicated by a wide and deep variety of political traditions. On almost every practical or doctrinal issue which the CGA must face, the interests of various farm groups are bound to diverge and conflict. Thus, for example, small farmers will often benefit by regional price variations, while large producers are likely to prefer a uniform national price high enough to let most marginal peasants survive. Or, again, the interests of one wine-producing region may clash sharply with those of another area. The urban workers constitute a fairly coherent class, but the rural world, like the bourgeoisie, is made up of a whole congeries of classes.²⁸ And each of these rural classes is further divided by a varying religious and political heritage.

Agrarian syndicalism is likely to be hampered for years to come by the diversity of the base upon which it rests. It will be weakened, too, so long as the purpose of syndicalism remains controversial. For most peasants, its *raison d'être* is the defense of farm interests against those of rival social groups.²⁹ For a few of the more far-sighted farmers, and for many CGA leaders, its most important function is to educate and to modernize, not merely to defend what exists. Defense alone may mean stagnation; but education is likely to be a painful and unpopular process, for it may require the conversion of many farms to new types of production, and the disappearance of many marginal peasants. Even those CGA officials who believe that French agriculture must be thoroughly shaken up, and that "there are a million peasants too many" on the land, dare not say so openly.³⁰ When demagogues of Left and Right stand ready to distort any reform proposal, it is safer for syndical leaders to take a dema-

lobbying (*Libération Paysanne*, May 4, 1950). On the other hand, the CGA has sponsored a number of constructive projects designed to aid small farmers in technically backward areas, for example, to furnish them with selected seed at low prices.

²⁸ Cf. R. Gendarme, "Esquisse d'une théorie du revenu des agriculteurs," *Revue Economique*, Vol. 3, pp. 357-60 (July, 1952).

²⁹ The tendency of the peasants to consider themselves constant victims of injustice is well illustrated by an opinion poll carried out in 1949. The respondents were asked to rate seven social categories (industrialists, workers, peasants, etc.) in the order of their economic status. Virtually all of the farmers rated themselves in the bottom three categories, while all other groups rated the farmers in the top three categories (*Sondages*, August, 1949).

³⁰ An outspoken young Christian Socialist named René Colson used this phrase in *Témoignages Chrétiens* (April 13, 1951). His thesis, borrowed from one of the ablest Catholic agricultural experts in France, was that there are too many marginal farmers on the soil, and that real rural prosperity cannot be attained until these marginal operators disappear from agriculture. Colson's article was loudly denounced by farm leaders of both Right and Left, especially by the Communists, who called it proof that the CGA wishes to destroy the small peasantry. Most CGA officials who are interested in rural progress agree privately that many marginal peasants must and will disappear. Men like Eugène Forget, however, prefer to save as many as possible through technical aid and better planning of crops.

gogic line themselves, and to declaim loudly that they are the best defenders of what exists.

Some of the more severe critics of the CGA believe that the organization has no real authority over its members, and that it is doomed to extinction or disintegration.²¹ It is futile, they contend, to preserve the appearances of unity when irreconcilable diversity is the basic fact. The critics disagree, however, in predicting the future character of farmers' organizations. Most of them believe that the technical associations such as the cooperatives and the mutual aid societies have an assured future, no matter what happens to the CGA. Pure syndicalism, however, as represented by the FNSEA, is on shakier ground. Some prophets expect it to wither away at the local and departmental levels, and to survive only as a central coordinating agency for the various specialized associations. Others hold that the FNSEA should disappear entirely after it has served its purpose (which, as they see it, is to build a solid structure of cooperatives and mutual aid societies throughout France). Still others suggest that some new semi-public organization with official status and with an assured income from taxes (such as the recently-revived Chambers of Agriculture) may gradually take over the FNSEA's functions. Some FNSEA leaders, on the other hand, seem to envisage a powerful quasi-corporative structure through a kind of fusion of the Chambers and the FNSEA.

The future form of agrarian syndicalism, then, is obscure, but the survival of one or more mass movements to represent the farmers seems certain. Divided though the peasantry may be, there is a new self-consciousness in the French rural districts which is likely to grow in strength and to manifest itself in some institutional form. Traditionally, the peasants have been aggressively independent and impervious to organization. But the idea is rapidly spreading that they have too long been the passive objects of government and of economic forces. In a variety of ways, and for a variety of ends, they are determined to share actively in shaping their own destiny. The spirit in which they use this new self-consciousness, and the kind of leadership which they can produce and are willing to follow, will do much to shape the course of the Fourth Republic.

²¹ See, for example, R. Cercler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 276-77; and J. François in *Cahiers du clergé rural*, March, 1951, pp. 122-23. On the other hand, N. Drogat in *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, Vol. 43, pp. 572-73 (Nov., 1950), holds that the CGA has a great educational role to play, and that it may survive not as a mass organization but as an agency grouping the rural elite. Most of the views about the CGA's future summarized in this paragraph were gathered in conversations with syndical and cooperative officials in Paris and the provinces.

AN AMERICAN VIEW OF EUROPEAN UNION*

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE

Harvard University

The official American policy regarding a United Europe has developed rapidly since the end of World War II and has already gone far toward committing the United States to the establishment of a European Union of some kind. The first important overt act in this development was the declaration of policy in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. One purpose of this legislation, Congress declared, was "to encourage these countries [that is, European participants in the Marshall Plan] through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts as set forth in the report of the Committee on European Economic Cooperation, signed at Paris on September 22, 1947." With this encouragement the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was soon effected. The next step was to extend the area of American interest from the economic to the military field. One of the purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was "to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest." This legislation led eventually to the effort to organize a European Defense Community capable of playing an important role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A further step was the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which declared American policy to be "to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe." Thus the American government finally became involved in the projected establishment of a constitution for a United States of Europe.

This was a bold undertaking. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, and others, whom Americans are too prone to call Europeans without adequate evidence that such is in fact their proper political classification, were quick to point out what seemed to them the fallacy of the simple and naive belief that, because a few isolated American states were able to form a useful and durable federal union a century and a half ago, it would be feasible to repeat the performance in modern Europe. Important advantages possessed by eighteenth-century Americans could not be expected to recur in twentieth-century Europe. In the first place, Americans had become accustomed to the idea of union through long association in a common subjection to Great Britain. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, *et al.*, unhappily were more accustomed to fighting one another than to united action for any but the most trivial purposes. Moreover, the secrecy with which the proceedings of the Federal Convention of 1787 were conducted had facilitated the process of reconciling their conflicting economic and political interests by acceptable compromises. Such secrecy would be impossible under the changed technological conditions of modern times. Further, the draft of a Constitution, which the Convention of 1787 eventually pro-

* Based on observations made during a visit to Europe in 1952 primarily for the purpose of lecturing on federal government at The College of Europe at Bruges in Belgium.

duced though not without overcoming many obstacles, was referred for final adoption to special conventions in the states, which could act more independently and rationally than the regular legislative bodies many of whose members would have been influenced by adverse interests of their own. A draft European constitution would have to be submitted to national parliaments with at least equally important adverse interests among their members. These procedural difficulties alone, to say nothing about the more substantial differences between eighteenth-century Americans and twentieth-century Europeans, promised no easy triumph for the new American policy.

To an American, who observes the contemporary European political scene with a reflective eye, the case for federal union in Europe naturally seems strong. In his own country the federal system has eased the transition from a loose confederation of imperfectly assorted states without an effective general government to a tight union with a strong national government and an illogical but not too inconvenient set of decentralized institutions for administering local affairs. What Americans continue to call their federal union is a political structure that is radically different from what originally passed under that name, but it still serves to combine in an acceptable and serviceable form the solid advantages of local self-government in matters of primarily local concern with those of a vigorous central authority in greater matters. A political principle which has served Americans so well, it is easy to conclude, should be useful also in an area like Europe, where there is obvious need for the greater centralization of political power and equally manifest reluctance to jeopardize established systems of local and territorial self-government. Nothing seems more timely and reasonable than a convention, like that in Philadelphia one hundred and sixty-six years ago, to form a more perfect union of the European states, or at least of such of them as do not fall within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.

Why can't Europeans follow where Americans have already shown the way? It is evident that the difficulties are greater than those so happily overcome by the American founding fathers. Doubtless the foremost difficulty is the scarcity of Europeans in the political sense of the term. There are of course plenty of people on European soil to provide the material for a European federal union of high political potential. The six states, which have within a year successfully formed the Coal and Steel Community Organization, comprise a population approximately equal to that of the United States, and, if able to join in a viable federal union, would constitute a powerful body politic. But it is easier for Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians, Belgians, Hollanders, and Luxemburgers, to say nothing of others, to behave like Americans, after a few years on American soil, than to behave like Europeans in their native habitat. The mystic chords of memory, to borrow Lincoln's fine phrase, which bind native-born Americans to their ancestral country, may not add much to the strength of the pragmatic bonds of shared hope, which tie the immigrant to the land of his adoption. But at least national sentiments are not forces of disunion as in Europe. A Frenchman's or a German's intellect may bid him press forward with

schemes for European Union, but his heart will hold him back. It is not enough to convince him by rational argument that he should behave like a European; it is necessary also to put him in the right mood for such behavior.

There is another hard question, the answer to which Americans could take for granted, but for which the advocates of federal union in Europe must find an answer. What are the states which should join in forming a European federal union? That is to say, for the purposes of European federation what is Europe? It takes no more than a quick glance at a good map to see that some parts of Western Europe are naturally adapted to a much closer relationship than is possible under the existing system of independent national states. Somewhere about the mouths of the Rhine, for instance, there should be a great sea-port to serve the needs of the rich hinterland drained by that historic stream. Nature seems to have intended that the greatest port in Europe should spring to life in that highly favored region. But unnatural political boundaries stand in the way. No American tourist can drive his car across the German frontier at any point between the Swiss border and the North Sea without feeling keenly the absurdity of such artificial barriers to good neighborly living. Nor can one drive across the French border anywhere between Basle and Dunkirk without forming a strong conviction that this political boundary also is ill-suited to the requirements of strong and prosperous independent statehood under the developing economic conditions of our time.

The case for a federal union of at least France, Germany, and the Low Countries is supported by economic considerations of the most urgent and compelling kind. It is not equally clear what other European countries should be included within a federation organized primarily for economic reasons. Consider, for instance, the case for the inclusion of Great Britain in such a federation. The British have certainly some important common interests with their neighbors directly across the Channel and North Sea, but they also have interests overseas which they do not share with Continental Europeans, and which strengthen the sense of independence derived from their insular position. It is the Italians who have been quickest to see substantial advantages to their country in joining a federal union which would include also France and Germany. A land with a shortage of coal and iron and a surplus of labor obviously stands to gain much from the establishment of a union which would assure better access to supplies of the essential raw materials of modern industry and better opportunities of employment for its unnaturally depressed workers. The Scandinavian states, on the other hand, appear to have less to gain from joining a West European Federation which, while lowering the barriers to trade with their neighbors to the south, might raise new obstacles to trade with good customers and suppliers in the British Isles. Spain and Portugal, and also Greece and Turkey, to say nothing of the countries behind the Iron Curtain, have economic interests of their own which, like those of the Scandinavian states, make the case for a federal union on economic grounds less urgent and compelling than it must seem to the peoples of the nuclear group of states in the middle of Western Europe.

Yet there are persuasive economic reasons for a broadly planned European Union of some kind. General Marshall's original offer of economic aid, contingent upon a beginning of closer union among the European states, brought an immediate response, not only from the eligible states of Western Europe, but also from some of those farther east within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The resulting Organization for European Economic Cooperation, despite its name, eventually left a large part of Europe outside its membership, but its history clearly demonstrated that no narrow concept of Europe can satisfy all the needs which help to create the current demand for some sort of European Union. The OEEC proved to be the most comprehensive European community organization which it has been possible to establish up to now. It included besides the British Isles and Iceland all the West European states except Spain together with Austria in Central Europe and also Greece and Turkey in the Southeast. But the actual membership of the OEEC manifestly did not supply a definitive answer to the basic question, what is Europe for purposes of federal union.

Among Europeans the foremost advocate of European Union since World War II is generally considered to have been Winston Churchill. His key-note speech at Zurich in 1946 made an impact on European political thinking even greater than that of his "iron curtain" speech in the same year at Fulton, Missouri, on the political thought of Americans. Churchill was undoubtedly the most outstanding political figure at the Amsterdam Congress in May, 1948, where the nascent European Movement put in train the course of events which culminated in the establishment of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg a year later. Leading continental advocates of European Union were greatly disappointed that the British Labour Government, then in power, was unwilling to cooperate in establishing as powerful an organization at Strasbourg as they desired and, but for the reluctance of the British, could probably have brought into being. Later, when Churchill returned to power at Westminster, high hopes were formed of the help to be received from him in strengthening the Council of Europe and making it better able to accomplish the purposes of its creators. But these hopes were disappointed and Churchill's credit among European Unionists was badly damaged.

Closer attention to Churchill's speeches on the subject of European Union might have prevented some of the unhappy disillusionment with his leadership of the European Movement. Speaking on May 14, 1947, at a United Europe meeting in London,¹ he clearly indicated his point of view. "There are several important bodies," he observed, "which are working for the federation of the European States and for the creation of a Federal Constitution for Europe." And he immediately added: "I hope that may eventually be achieved." But he had yet to indicate the role of the British in such an undertaking. "It is not for us at this stage," he declared, "to attempt to define or prescribe the structure of constitutions. We ourselves are content, in the first instance, to present

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 and 1948*, ed. Randolph Churchill (Boston, 1950), pp. 77-85.

the idea of United Europe, in which our country will play a decisive part, as a moral, cultural and spiritual conception to which all can rally without being disturbed by divergencies about structure." When he reached the question, what are the political and physical boundaries of the United Europe you are trying to create, he refused to face the problem of determining which countries should be included and which should be left out. "It is not our task or wish to draw frontier lines," he exclaimed, "but rather to smoothe them away."

But Churchill did make clear his profound conviction that the idea of European Union must be subordinated to the grander conception of world government. "We do not of course pretend that United Europe provides the final and complete solution to all the problems of international relationships. The creation of an authoritative, all-powerful world order is the ultimate aim towards which we must strive. Unless some effective World Super-Government can be set up and brought quickly into action, the prospects for peace and human progress are dark and doubtful." To make his meaning doubly clear he took pains to describe the relationship of Britain to Europe more precisely. "We accept without question the world supremacy of the United Nations Organization. In the Constitution agreed upon at San Francisco direct provision was made for regional organisations to be formed. United Europe will form one major Regional entity. There is the United States with all its dependencies; there is the Soviet Union; there is the British Empire and Commonwealth; and there is Europe, with which Great Britain is profoundly blended. Here are the four main pillars of the world Temple of Peace." Was Great Britain to figure at the same time and in the same way as material for two of these main pillars? Churchill did not say.

In his great speech before the Congress of Europe at The Hague, May 7, 1948,² Churchill was more precise. "We aim," he asserted, "at the eventual participation of all European peoples whose society and way of life . . . are not in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and with the sincere expression of free democracy." He now thought that the governments of the countries which had become associated for the purposes of the Marshall Plan could most conveniently take the lead in planning definite arrangements. He still insisted that nothing should be done which would conflict with the paramount authority of a world organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, he declared, "a Council of Europe was a subordinate but necessary part of the world organisation." As for the relations between the British and the Continental peoples who would join in a United Europe, Churchill reminded his audience that "we in Britain must move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth, . . . undue precipitancy . . . would hinder and not help the immediate mission we have to fulfill."

It was evident that Churchill was thinking of United Europe as a European Defense Community rather than as an Economic and Social Welfare Community, and that he was reserving a more independent role for Great Britain as head of the British Commonwealth than would be practicable or proper for

² *Ibid.*, pp. 310-17.

the democracies on the European Continent. He still clung to his concept of regional organizations as necessary pillars of a world organization for peace. "We must do our best to create and combine the great regional unities which it is in our power to influence, and we must endeavor by patient and faithful service to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting upon the main groupings of mankind." Advocates of European Union were plainly put on notice that Churchill's dominating purpose was the organization, not merely of Europeans, but above all of mankind.

The meaning of Churchill's speech was not lost upon his listeners. Those who advocated the immediate creation of at least a European customs union, if not a genuine political federation, realized that they could not count upon his aid. Accepting the view that any form of constitutional or organized union was impracticable, and that close consultation between governments was the most that could be hoped for at that time, the leaders of the Congress of Europe at The Hague consented to settle for the comparatively modest scheme embodied a year later in the Council of Europe. This embryonic European Union was established with a roving Committee of Ministers without executive power and a Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg without legislative power. Such a purely deliberative Assembly, Churchill contended, in a speech delivered towards the end of 1948 at a United Europe Exhibition in London,³ would not develop into an irresponsible talking shop, as many of his associates in the European Movement feared. On the contrary, he assured his friends, "The Assembly will perform an essential task and one which cannot be performed by governments; the task of creating a European public opinion and a sense of solidarity among the peoples of Europe." But obviously Churchill was losing his earlier interest in European Union, as the danger of aggression from the East grew more menacing and urgent, and turning his attention toward new plans for a defense organization originating beyond the Atlantic.

The organizers of the Council of Europe were unable to persuade all the European states belonging to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to join the new organization. Eighteen countries, if West Germany, Austria, and Trieste may be so described, eventually became active members of the OEEC, but only fourteen of them have been represented in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. Austria and Trieste lacked the necessary political independence, Portugal was not wanted, and Switzerland wished to preserve the appearance of neutrality. Meanwhile American statesmen had conceived the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to supplement, and eventually to supplant, the OEEC, and friends of European Union, who regarded a European Defense Community as more urgent than a European Economic and Social Welfare Community, under whatever name, were bound, like Churchill, to shift their interest from the economic and social to the military reasons for a Union of Europe. The organizers of NATO, however, were not even able to persuade all the European states belonging to the Council of

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66.

Europe to join the new organization. The Federal Republic of Germany was ineligible, Ireland was uninterested, and Sweden deemed it prudent to abstain. The only additional state gained for the new organization was Portugal. In the nature of things, nevertheless, such advocates of a United Europe as Churchill, like the Americans, threw their support to the new and more vigorous organization.

The history of the Council of Europe⁴ has been a history of constant struggle between the Committee of Ministers, seeking to keep the Consultative Assembly within the narrow limits prescribed by its original constitution, and the majority of the Assembly, seeking to obtain for that impotent body some genuine legislative powers. The struggle has been unequal. More powers could not be obtained for the Assembly except at the cost of losing some of its members; none of its members could be spared, if the Assembly was to perform its essential task, the promotion of West European solidarity. The greatest obstacle to the strengthening of the Assembly's powers was the reluctance of the British Labour Government to involve itself more deeply in the political affairs of the Continent. It could not find a suitable adjustment between its traditional obligations to its old associates overseas in the Commonwealth and its growing responsibilities to its new associates in the Council of Europe across the Channel. The Scandinavian states were unwilling to abandon Britain, with which they were connected by important ties. The minor states on the Continent, particularly Belgium and the Netherlands, were unready to face their more powerful neighbors, France and Germany, in an Assembly possessing important law-making authority without a third major power to hold the balance between these two powers. Frenchmen and Germans, however eager they might be to bury the past and turn toward a brighter future together, could not form an acceptable federal union by themselves alone.

It is not surprising that the advocates of a United Europe should seek escape from their dilemma by trying a new approach to the problem of European federation. In the Spring of 1950 the harbinger of a new phase in the organization of Europe appeared in the form of the Schuman Plan. A beginning was to be made without further delay by bringing together the states which had the most to gain by forming a single joint organization to govern the production of coal and steel and a single common market to regulate their sale and distribution. The formation of a Coal and Steel Community would be a functional approach to the problem of European federation. The successful formation of such a community might be expected to attract other European states. Likewise, the approval of the method might be expected to lead to the formation of other functional communities among them. In fact the aggression upon the Korean Republic shortly after the publication of the Schuman Plan and the menace of further aggression elsewhere led immediately to the proposal of the Plevin Plan for a European Defense Community. It was clear that plans for other functional organizations would follow and that, if they should be adopted, the neces-

⁴ For an excellent account of this organization, see Frederick L. Schuman, "The Council of Europe," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 724-40 (Sept., 1951).

sity for their coordination by some suitable political agency would eventually lead to a genuine federal union of the European states belonging to these various community organizations.⁵

The triumph of the functional approach to the problem of European federal union was facilitated by the attitude of Churchill. When he became Prime Minister for the second time in October, 1951, European federalists looked to his new Government for more constructive cooperation than they had received from the Labour Government. They did not get it. The new British Government was manifestly more interested in the development of a European Army under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and was not disposed to become involved in the efforts by Continental statesmen to transform the Council of Europe into a genuine federal union. British statesmen vigorously supported American efforts to strengthen NATO, while the West European leaders resolved to push on with the Schuman Plan and other proposals for the organization of special limited-purpose communities, regardless of the stand-offishness of the British. The Schuman Plan was duly ratified by the nuclear group of states, and the organization of the European Coal and Steel Community was completed in the Summer of 1952. The High Authority, which was to serve as the executive of the new Community, established its headquarters at Luxembourg, and the Common Assembly shared the facilities of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. It was a modest but auspicious beginning of the federalization of what European federalists liked to call "Little Europe."

The European federalist leaders, particularly Spaak of Belgium, the most active and influential member of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly, Foreign Minister Schuman of France, who maintained the cause of European Union through a long succession of French ministries, Chancellor Adenauer of the West German Republic, who staked the life of his Government on the issue of European Union, and Prime Minister De Gasperi of Italy, who persistently asserted the claims of his country to an equal place in any European federal union, skillfully utilized the interest of British and also American statesmen in one of the plans for a special limited-purpose community, namely, that for a European Defense Community, to exploit the functional approach to the formation of a more perfect European Union. This plan was of the greatest importance to the sponsors of NATO, since it was designed for the purpose of integrating German forces into a West European army. The same group of nuclear states, which formed the Coal and Steel Community, were to be the original members of the European Defense Community. The plan further called for the establishment of a parallel set of institutions, a Common Assembly to meet at Strasbourg, an executive organized like the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, and a court which might be identical with that of the Coal and Steel Community. The Defense Community would need much more money than the Coal and Steel Community, but in general its structure and procedures would be similar.

⁵ For a scholarly account of these developments, see Clarence C. Walton, "The Fate of Neo-Federalism in Western Europe," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 366-90 (Sept., 1952).

The master-stroke of the federalist leaders was the insertion of a provision in the Defense Community plan authorizing its Assembly, as soon as it should be organized, to prepare a plan for organizing a European Political Community with power to coordinate the Coal and Steel Community and Defense Community organizations, together with any other special limited-purpose community organizations that might be established. Such a coordinating agency would necessarily be a genuine federal union of "Little Europe" with a population at the beginning not inferior to that of the United States, and with good prospects of eventually attracting additional members until it should become a veritable West European federal union. Such a federal union the British might not wish to join, but certainly they would hesitate to put obstacles in its way in pursuance of their alleged traditional policy of keeping Europe divided in the interest of a successful balance of power.

The interest of the six nuclear states in a European Defense Community is not necessarily identical with that of its principal sponsors. British and American statesmen doubtless are primarily concerned to make a show of organized force great enough to deter the Soviet Union and her satellites and associates from beginning a third world war. But they also wish to create a military establishment strong enough to help win such a war, if unhappily it should occur. The governments which have been in power in the nuclear group of West European states certainly have shared the first of these objectives. It is not so clear that they or their successors are or will be equally devoted to the second. There is undoubtedly a substantial body of opinion in the countries which suffered most cruelly in World War II that another world war would be a greater evil than the anticipated alternative of subjection to the aggressor, costly and painful as such subjection might prove to be. There is perhaps an even greater body of opinion which is willing to support a policy of well-organized rearmament for the purpose of intimidating possible aggressors, but which deliberately refuses to consider a present choice of alternatives in anticipation of the event that the policy of organized intimidation should fail to preserve peace. It is not surprising that even within the nuclear group of West European states there should be more opposition to the proposed European Defense Community than to the plan for a Coal and Steel Community.

The European federalist leaders shrewdly resolved not to let their plan for establishing a genuine Federal Union of "Little Europe" remain contingent upon the prompt organization of the proposed European Defense Community. As soon as the Coal and Steel Community Organization was established, the Committee of Ministers invited the Common Assembly to create a special Constituent Assembly, consisting of its own members together with three additional representatives of the French, German, and Italian Governments, respectively, for the purpose of preparing a plan for a European Political Community.⁶ This special Constituent Assembly was to be further strengthened by the admission of observers from states belonging to the Council of Europe but not to the Coal and Steel Community. The original purpose of this pro-

⁶ *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, Nos. 18-19, p. 8 (Sept.-Oct., 1952).

cedure was to avoid the delay which would ensue if the charter for the European Political Community were to be framed in accordance with the provisions in the plan for the European Defense Community. It was fortunate that this more expeditious procedure was adopted. In some respects the plan for the European Defense Community had been less carefully prepared than that for the Coal and Steel Community. Controversies over details of the plan, and growing differences over the relations to be established between the armed forces to be put under the control of the Defense Community and those to remain under the control of its member states, caused unexpected delay in the ratification of the Defense Community Treaty. It began to seem likely that, instead of the European Defense Community becoming one of the pillars of the European Political Community, the latter would pave the way for the Defense Community.

At the present writing the plan for the European Political Community is in process of preparation. The special Constituent Assembly was directed to report a draft in March of the present year as a basis for further proceedings. The draft was duly reported and was obviously the product of many compromises. There are still many difficulties to be overcome, many conflicting interests to be reconciled. It is of course possible that the obstacles will prove insurmountable at this time. The vagaries of French politics are unpredictable. General elections in Germany and Italy may bring radical changes in the political scene. It is enough to observe that the drive for the establishment of a genuine Federal Union of "Little Europe" enjoys the good will of all the members of the Council of Europe and has developed greater momentum than seemed possible only a short time ago.

The attitude of the British Government toward the unexpected turn in the road to European Union gave deep concern to the European federalist leaders. Since the British would not participate in the formation of a more perfect Union of West European states, it would have to choose between benevolent non-participation and obstruction. There were fears that the latter policy might prevail at Westminster, even under a Government headed by Churchill. The traditional British policy toward the Continent had seemed to favor the multiplication, or at least the preservation, of independent sovereign states, regardless of inconvenient boundaries or irrational economic systems, in order to facilitate the management of the balance of power. Churchill apparently had lost interest in the obsolete system of a European balance of power, but would his Government actively support federalist efforts to organize a United States of Europe, or such part of it as might be capable of organization at this time? Or would the Conservative Government under his leadership put further difficulties in the way of the European federalists, in addition to the immediate difficulty resulting from the absence of a Great Power widely regarded as an almost indispensable component of a well-balanced and stable federal union which would include the major Continental powers? Happily from the European federalists' viewpoint the Churchill Government decided to cooperate with

the Coal and Steel Community, and also with the special Constituent Assembly, as closely as possible without compromising its own constitutional freedom of action.

The American attitude has always given less concern to European federalists. Certainly the policy of the government at Washington to encourage the further unification of Europe had been made plain at every convenient opportunity. In the Autumn of 1951 the Congress had gone so far as to authorize a conference of Senators and Representatives with the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. A frank and interesting discussion took place in November between a strong Congressional delegation and a representative delegation from the Consultative Assembly.⁷ But earlier there had been some misgivings concerning the possible reaction of American statesmen to European Union. Churchill himself had confessed in his keynote speech in the 1948 Congress of Europe at The Hague that he had been anxious at first lest the United States of America should view with hostility the idea of a United States of Europe. It may have been that he suspected the development of an attitude across the Atlantic, since the United States had become a major world power with a special responsibility for the maintenance of world peace, similar to that in Churchill's own country during the long period when it had accepted a major responsibility for the maintenance of peace through the manipulation of the balance of power. But he rejoiced, he was quick to declare on that occasion, "that the great Republic had risen far above such moods."

The immediate problem of American policy is not to decide whether to support or oppose the further unification of Europe, but rather how far to go in trying to influence the nature and extent of a European Union. When Paul G. Hoffman was speaking for the United States as head of ECA, he seized every convenient occasion to point out the economic advantages of a common market for at least that part of Europe that had joined in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. When General Eisenhower was speaking for the United States as head of SHAPE, he was equally diligent in pointing out the advantages of an organized European Political Community in order to provide for the common defense of Western Europe. In a well-publicized speech before the English-Speaking Union in London on July 3, 1951, he associated himself explicitly with the Churchillian approach to European unity. "Winston Churchill's plea for a United Europe," he declared, "can yet bear such greatness of fruit that it may well be remembered as the most notable achievement of a career marked by achievement." Eisenhower was also truly Churchillian in his devotion to the cause. "The difficulties of integrating Western Europe," he conceded, "appear staggering to those who live by ritual"; but he presumably did not live by ritual. Be that as it may, the difficulties did not stagger him.

The plan for forming a European Political Union, incorporated in the Euro-

⁷ Council of Europe, Secretariat-General, *Official Record of Debates*, Conference of Strasbourg, Nov. 19-23, 1951.

pean Defense Community Treaty, signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, provided that the Union should be a federal union and that its frame of government should be based upon the principle of the separation of powers and should include a bicameral legislature. All of these provisions might eventually have been adopted without any advice from Americans, but American influence undoubtedly helped to secure their acceptance at that time. The official spokesmen for the American policy toward European Union seemed to be committing themselves to the project of a West European constitutional convention for the purpose of doing for Western Europe what the Federal Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 had done for the United States. This did not prevent putting the influence of American representatives in NATO behind the functional approach to the problem of uniting Europe, when the prospects for that kind of approach began to seem brighter than for the more generalized political approach. The improving outlook for the adoption of the Schuman Plan for a Coal and Steel Community naturally increased American interest in schemes for building a European political community upon the foundation of a number of limited-purpose and limited-membership functional communities.

It is easy to conclude that American interests will be best served by the adoption of a permanent constitution for a European Federal Union, based as far as possible on approved American principles of constitutional government, and that American influence in Europe should be exerted to the utmost to bring such a European Union into existence. But such a conclusion disregards some important considerations. One is, that the approved American principles of government give no answer to the question, what European countries should be included in the United States of Europe. Particularly, should Great Britain be included, as most Continental federalists would prefer? Or should a beginning be made with the West European states which have already formed the Coal and Steel Community, in accordance with the plans of the functionalists who now control the European Movement and are taking the lead in the work of the provisional Constituent Assembly?

Another important consideration is, that the democratic monarchies and republics of Western Europe have developed some principles of government of their own to which their peoples have grown accustomed and in which they have greater confidence than in principles developed across the Atlantic. The European arrangements for distributing the executive power between kings (or republican presidents) and ministers, for distributing the legislative power between ministers and parliaments, and for utilizing political parties as instruments of representative government, differ greatly from the corresponding arrangements in the American system of government. In the United States there is constitutional government and there is also party government, and the relations between the two are important but obscure. Recent legislation designed to ensure that presidential electors will vote for the regular candidates of the parties whose nominations they seek raised questions of constitutional law which only the Supreme Court could decide, and some of its judges thought they

were decided wrongly. The theory of party government is by no means generally understood. In Europe the importance of party government has long been recognized and legislation designed to preserve and extend the role of the parties in the governmental process has long been accepted, as is plainly indicated by long-continued experiments with partisan election laws and proportional representation. The American system of bi-partisan politics is not for export to the Continent of Europe.

A federal constitution is not only a written description of a scheme of government for a group of states, but also a kind of treaty of peace between the states providing systematic arrangements for elaborating the terms of the peace settlement and ensuring their enforcement. The process of constitution-making resembles in many ways the process of treaty-making. Good treaties are those which confer mutually acceptable and lasting advantages upon all parties to them. They can only be made with the concurrence of the parties themselves. It is still true, as Washington declared long ago, that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation." The details of a European federal constitution, as well as the determination of the states which shall be parties to such a constitution, must be left to the decision of those primarily concerned, if the business of constitution-making is to prosper. Up to now the West European federalists have managed their affairs with impressive skill and assiduity. Success, though in the nature of things uncertain, and in a quieter age perhaps unlikely, is in these unsettled times a reasonably promising political speculation.⁸

Winston Churchill, speaking originally for himself alone but implicitly for the Government which he now heads, defined an attitude toward European Union which deserves the closest attention of American policy-makers. It was a consummation devoutly to be wished, he believed, which might well be encouraged by the British Government in all convenient ways not compromising British independence. But it was not to be regarded as a final end of British policy. It was rather as an integral part of a larger scheme for world organization that European Federation stirred his imagination and found a place in his program for political action. The great dominant purpose of his political planning was the preservation of international peace through the universal reign of law. A general international organization for this purpose would in his judgment be stronger and more serviceable if there were a suitable European Union capable of functioning as one of its supporting pillars, than if the West European states remained divided against themselves. Nevertheless, he wished above all, as he expressed it at The Hague in 1948, "to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting upon the main groupings of mankind."

American policy toward European Union has run a logical course. First, the objective was economic recovery, and incidentally such a degree of Euro-

⁸ For a less sanguine view see M. J. Bonn, *Whither Europe—Union or Partnership?* (New York, 1952).

pean Union as might be helpful to that end. The next objective was military strength, and therefore a closer union of such portion of Europe as might be persuaded to unite in order to provide for the common defense. This, however cannot be a final end of American interest in European Union. American commitments to encourage the political federation of Europe have been made in pursuance of an ulterior purpose which happens to have been suitably expressed by Winston Churchill. Nothing short of making the United Nations Organization itself strong enough to keep the peace can be accepted as the logical fulfillment of the American policy of encouraging European Union. The export of the principle of federalism can not stop until its use has been extended to an organized world.

POLITICAL FACTORS IN U. S. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION, 1945-1950

JACK N. BEHRMAN

Washington & Lee University

International cooperation through multilateral organizations sharply distinguishes the post-World War II economic policies of the United States from those it employed following World War I. After World War I, the United States eschewed any form of international economic organization, which some governments thought should be continued; early in the more recent conflict, United States officials pressed hard for the acceptance of world-wide institutional cooperation. The purpose of the present article is to review, through an examination of its policy toward multilateral financial arrangements, some of the important discussions and decisions which moved the United States towards internationalism in economic relations; to emphasize the role of political factors in the development of financial organizations, in the retreat from international "democracy," and in the growth of regional cooperation; and to examine some of the difficulties of international financial cooperation.¹

A primary objective of the United States government's postwar policy preparations was the re-creation of a *method* of conducting international economic transactions which would not result in economic warfare; the major technique was that of international agreement on accepted rules for conducting transactions. Government officials considered that this approach was not only desirable but also possible, in view of the success of wartime collaboration. Administration officials were so determined to take advantage of wartime cooperative attitudes that they set about, even during the war, to obtain agreement among the United Nations on the international administration of relief assistance, on a short-term exchange balancing mechanism, and on an agency to make loans for reconstruction and development. This early emphasis on obtaining international agreement stemmed from the belief that it would take considerable time to develop concrete proposals and that substantial progress along these lines was a necessary part of the overall military strategy.²

¹ In order to limit the scope of the study, only the cooperative arrangements in the disbursement of grants and loans by the United States are considered. Thus, though political factors are found in United States lending and in the development of postwar commercial policy agreements, their study is excluded. For a recent masterly treatment of both the economic and political factors in the collapse of cooperation projected under the International Trade Organization, see Wm. Diebold, Jr., "The End of the ITO," *Essays in International Finance*, No. 16, Princeton University, International Finance Section, October, 1952.

² This view is well stated in the following portion of an introduction to the early proposals on the International Monetary Fund, written in 1942: "The people of the anti-Axis powers must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid international ground, they must be given to understand that a United Nations victory will not usher in another two decades of economic uneasiness, bickering, ferment, and disruption. They must be assured that something will be done in the sphere of international economic relations that is

Many official statements were made during the war and postwar periods to the effect that the postwar world had to be offered a type of international collaboration that was both "new and different." One of the main purposes of the method of international cooperation was the avoidance of economic conflicts and use of economic power for political purposes. All international organizations were to be "de-politicized," in that the use of political methods by which small countries are dominated by larger ones and the injection of political factors into what were then considered purely technical questions would be avoided. In this way, it was hoped that instead of the much discussed postwar "blocs" of nations there would emerge a more inclusive "world-wide" cooperation of the allied and associated nations.³ The new internationalism was to embrace countries of varying races, creeds, and economic and political systems. Events in the postwar period forced a reversal or modification of such ideals and policies, and led to the creation of other types of international financial cooperation which recognized the presence and force of political considerations.

I. INTERNATIONALISM: WORLD-WIDE (A-POLITICAL) COOPERATION

The world-wide (functional) approach to international financial cooperation—with an international agency responsible for coordinating members' actions in a narrow and specified field, as distinct from a regional organ performing several different functions—was first made concrete in the United Nations

new, that is powerful enough and comprehensive enough to give expectation of successfully filling a world need. They must have assurance that methods and resources are being prepared to provide them with capital to help them rebuild their devastated areas, reconstruct their war-distorted economies, and help free them from the strangulating grasp of lost markets and depleted reserves. Finally, they must have assurance that the United States does not intend to desert the war-worn and impoverished nations after the war is won, but proposes to help them in the long and difficult task of economic reconstruction." (Harry D. White, "Preliminary Draft: United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations," U. S. Treasury Department, March, 1942, pp. 3-4. This document and some others cited *infra* may be found among the papers of Harry D. White, former Chief of the Division of Monetary Research and later Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, which have been donated to the Princeton University Library. Citations of manuscripts and documents found among these papers will hereinafter refer to White's *Papers*.)

³ Cordell Hull wrote that during 1943 both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were in favor of establishing regional organizations (particularly in Europe, the Far East, and the Americas) to guide postwar political and economic relations. Each of the "Big Three" (Britain, Russia and the United States) would be represented in one of these regional organizations. A supra-regional council of the "Big Three" would coordinate the work of the regions. Secretary of State Hull and most of his staff were in favor of a world-wide association under the conviction that an international organization would eliminate any need "for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests." These officials hammered at Roosevelt until he agreed and set the stage for the UNO and related economic organizations. See *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 1640-48.

Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The experience with UNRRA provides a good example of the difficulties of intergovernmental cooperation in financial disbursements and was a prominent factor in shaping the organizational structure of cooperation in aid programs in the years 1947-1950.

The United States was greatly concerned that the provision of relief supplies (particularly food) should not be used as a political weapon by elements within the liberated and devastated countries or by neighboring countries. Administration officials based their plan for an international organization on the belief that only through multilateral responsibility could economic assistance be divorced from the political intentions of the granting and receiving nations and be administered without preference as to the political affiliation, race, or creed of recipients. In its request that Congress approve U. S. participation in UNRRA, the Administration stated that the fact that assistance was to be provided by a multi-national agency was a most important aspect of the program, since only through such an organization could this non-discriminatory end be gained. It pictured UNRRA as the initial effort towards postwar international cooperation, without whose success the future of all subsequent collaboration would be endangered: "If UNRRA should fail, there is grave doubt that any collaboration of the United Nations can survive the test of practical application."⁴

The "world-wide" character of UNRRA is evidenced by the fact that 47 nations signed the agreement in 1943, among them Russia and several of the Eastern European countries. It was precisely this world-wide character which disturbed many members of Congress, who believed that the inclusion of Russia would cause UNRRA to fail of its purpose of being politically non-discriminatory. Some of them opposed the program as likely to aid the spread of Communism by giving Russia a voice in its administration and by supplying most of its assistance to Eastern European countries. Congressional supporters of the Administration's view held that this form of international organization was the only way to familiarize peoples of various nations with each other's problems and ideas and to gain adequate spread of information whereby tolerance and peaceable relations would be maintained.⁵ Those dissatisfied with the

⁴ Testimony of Herbert Lehman (first UNRRA director-general and former chief of the State Department's section responsible for preparing postwar policy on relief). *To Enable the United States to Participate in the Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Hearings on H.J. Res. 192*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., p. 120 (Dec., 1943 and Jan., 1944). See also a similar statement by the United Kingdom delegate before the second session of the UNRRA Council on September 21, 1944, *UNRRA Journal*, Second Session of the Council (Washington, 1944), p. 47.

⁵ This viewpoint is a reflection of the Cobden-Bright idea that international contacts are the basis of knowledge which, in turn, is conducive to peace. There are some analogies between this idea and the foreign economic policy of Hull and his followers from 1934 to 1947. The principle is questionable even in conditions under which it was supposed to operate; when a nation's external relations are channeled through government agencies, whatever validity exists in the concept becomes inoperative. In 1951 a State Department official admitted that the advantage of "keeping a window open" by trade is a fiction

international aspect of UNRRA argued that the U. S. government should retain full control over the relief and distribute it through the Army and Navy or the American Red Cross in order to prevent "misuse" of the funds it contributed and to gain for itself the good will resulting from aid.⁶ Such proposals were rejected, however, on the ground that, besides being the "least cost" way of providing relief since other nations would contribute, UNRRA was the first step toward a continuing international cooperation which was necessary to secure the peace.⁷

The same principle of international sharing of responsibilities, costs and risks to avoid "political" influence and tensions arising from unilateral action by one or a few nations was applied to the Bretton Woods Agreements. Under these Agreements, 44 nations contributed funds to be used in supplying short- and long-term capital to member countries for the purposes of helping to balance international payments and of hastening reconstruction and development. These institutions also were supposed to be world-wide in membership; although the Axis countries were not initial members, provision was made for their later admission. Russia attended early consultations on the Fund and Bank, and its representatives signed the Bretton Woods Agreements. The Administration stated categorically that the economic organizations were appropriate to any kind of economic or political system and that the institutions were to be "non-political," in that political relations would have no direct effect on the decisions of the agencies.⁸

when trade is conducted through state trading agencies. See *Mutual Security Program Appropriations for 1952, Hearings*, Part 1, House of Rep., Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, September, 1951, p. 404. In any case, no support for the idea that such cooperation leads to mutual understanding, tolerance and peace can be gained from the experience of UNRRA.

⁶ The program for government and relief in occupied areas administered by the Army and the Navy was even larger than UNRRA's. One UNRRA official has since argued that UNRRA should have been merged with the Army's program or that at least Army officers should have been assigned to important UNRRA posts to assure their cooperation and the use of their experience and knowledge, and perhaps also for political reasons. See Marvin Klemme, *The Inside Story of UNRRA* (New York, 1949), pp. 214-18. The Red Cross, too, could almost certainly have built up an organization as quickly as UNRRA did to handle the problem. The case for UNRRA as against the Army and Navy or the Red Cross seems to have rested almost solely on the merits of international cooperation.

⁷ United States officials were not alone in urging international financial cooperation as a means of alleviating disaster and of gaining peace. See, for example, the statement of Hugh Dalton in defending the Bretton Woods Agreements and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 417 H. C. Deb. 5 s, December 12, 1945, col. 443.

⁸ The question of the role of politics arose over a statement of Secretary Morgenthau before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency that the United States "has the greatest interest in seeing that international trade and investment are determined by economic and not by political considerations":

"Senator Fulbright: It occurred to me that before the war we did business with such countries as Japan and Spain without any regard to political considerations. It does not seem to me that in the future we can isolate the economic from the political; and in stating several times that this must be done on an economic basis without regard to politics, that is not quite correct. . . .

Congress, however, took a different view, and in order to assure that the foreign economic policy of the United States would be coordinated with its political policy, it established a National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems composed of Cabinet-level members (including among others the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce). The Council was charged, *inter alia*, with fixing United States policy in the Fund

Is not this a part of the political international arrangement?

"Mr. Morgenthau: Senator Fulbright, the discussion at Bretton Woods was based on the economic needs of a country and not on the political needs. And the thought all through the discussions was, particularly as affecting the small countries, such as Greece, Czechoslovakia—

"Senator Fulbright: And the Argentine and Spain.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I did not put them in.

"Senator Fulbright: But you will be faced by that situation, is what I mean.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I can only report to you—and the two American delegates that are sitting here at this committee table can either affirm or deny what happened—but the thought was—

"The Chairman: I have just checked with Senator Tobey, and neither one of us heard any politics at all at Bretton Woods.

"Mr. Morgenthau: The thought was that those countries could come to a world bank or a world fund and get their financial needs taken care of without having to sell their political souls. And that was the whole idea. I am sorry, Senator Fulbright, but I would not be honest if I did not stick to my guns on that, and that is my conception of Bretton Woods. These are to be financial institutions run by financial people, financial experts, and the needs in a financial way of a country are to be taken care of *wholly independent of the political connection*.

"Senator Fulbright: Then if this country has no foreign policy and blunders along as it did for the last 20 years, you would go ahead and finance, say, the Argentine, regardless of what you thought it would do, and the same as to any other country.

"Mr. Morgenthau: You put me in an embarrassing position, but I will have to answer.

"Senator Fulbright: I do not mean to embarrass you, but do want to know what the idea is.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I understand. But I will go through with it: If the Argentine was a member of the Bank and the Fund, and she needed certain financial help to meet her requirements, being a member her requirements are to be taken care of independent of her political ideology. *I choked on it, but I went through with it.*

"Senator Fulbright: It seems to me that is going pretty far, and I do not quite agree that that is a sound policy.

"Mr. Morgenthau: That is in the record, too.

"Senator Fulbright: It would seem to me that it means the fund will have no relationship to the State Department. But let us assume the State Department does develop some consistent policy in foreign relations; I cannot help but believe that our financial policy should be subservient to the political policy as established by the State Department. It does not seem proper that our various relationships with other countries should be conducted entirely separate from and without any regard to other relations.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I would rather not answer that on the record. . . .

"Senator Taft: Do you think when a board is set up, composed of the great nations and the small nations of the world, they are not going to be affected by politics about the making of a loan to a nation?

"Mr. Morgenthau: I am repeating myself on this, but the institutions will carry out their work as far as it is humanly possible to do it—and it depends on the people running it—on a strictly business basis.

"Senator Taft: We may be as noble as we are pleased to hope we will be, but what

and Bank; thus, United States foreign economic policy was subject to review and determination by those also responsible for political policy.⁹

Another aspect of U. S. postwar foreign economic policy which shows that its early orientation was world-wide and without restriction as to foreign political or economic systems was the Administration's consideration in 1944-45 of a large-scale loan to Russia for reconstruction and development.¹⁰ That this loan was never negotiated was due in part to Russian recalcitrance with reference to other foreign economic policies of the United States, in part to the growing recognition of the importance of political considerations, in part to fortuitous circumstances in the postwar period, and in part to the reluctance of the Administration to precipitate in later years (1947 and 1948) a full-scale congressional debate on Soviet-American relations.

II. INHERENT POLITICAL FACTORS

Basic contradictions existed between the Administration's attitude toward international financial cooperation and the world in which the agencies had to

justification is there for the theory that the English, the Russians, and other people will take that position? Aren't they going to use any weapon they have for their purposes in Europe?

"Mr. Morgenthau: Gentlemen, I hope you will believe I am very sincere. I think in these things like Bretton Woods we have to assume the nations of the world have learned something while going through this bloody war we are just emerging from in Europe, and that we have the right to assume as between nations there is going to be a new conception of dealings one with another. If there is not, the world is lost.

"Senator Taft: I certainly would be glad to be able to join you in that hope. But I think it hard to imagine having an international body of this sort free from politics resorted to by people sitting on the board.

"Senator Fulbright: *I don't see why it should be.* I think politics is not such a disreputable thing that it cannot be accepted in this or any other international organization, if by politics is meant some regard for the best interest of one's own country. . . .

Therefore, I don't think the administration should say we are not going to have any consideration for politics in various countries. It seems to me to be perfectly proper to say, 'Yes, we are, but we are going to try to be intelligent about it.' That does not mean we are going to try to control Europe's internal politics. That is quite different from saying that all the internal affairs of a country is of no interest to us, which seems to me also rather stupid."

(*Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Hearings on H. R. 3514*, U. S. Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Congr., 1st sess., June 1945, pp. 14-16; italics added.)

⁹ The desirability of some such council was urged earlier by Secretary Morgenthau himself, who in July, 1944 wanted to place in a new committee, of which he would be chairman, all questions of international financial relations and aid to foreign countries so as to coordinate all financial policy under a single authority and maximize the good will obtainable from foreign aid.

¹⁰ The Treasury Department drew up a proposal for a \$10 billion loan, to be repaid over 35 years in raw materials. The plan was discussed in 1944 in the Treasury and communicated by Secretary Morgenthau to President Roosevelt in January, 1945 with the argument that it would contribute greatly to ironing out difficulties with Russia over postwar policies. Memoranda on the proposal evidence no concern over political relations between the U.S. and Russia and provide no basis for a conclusion that the loan was for political purposes in any direct sense. (The author has in preparation a study of this loan and the developments surrounding it.)

operate. Far from being the "non-political" enterprise its originators intended it to be, the cooperation was, unavoidably, political. The organizations' members were governments whose delegates were government officials. These delegates were hardly able to examine a problem solely on its economic or financial merits and quite apart from the political consequences of the solution for the power and prestige of each member.¹¹ Nations are, by their very nature, political and cannot act governmentally without considering political implications (in the sense of national interests and of relative national position in the world) unless they deny the basis of their existence. Thus, for example, in intergovernmental organizations the mere question of membership becomes political. Again, the movement of international investment and the extension of foreign aid are fraught with political implications concerning the balance of power within and among regions.

It is only necessary to pose the question of what would be the characteristics of an a-political international economic organization to show the difficulty of divorcing its operations from political considerations. First, what would be its membership? Would the exclusion of any nation be discriminatory and thus lead to political tensions? Second, how would decisions be taken? By simple majority? How would coalitions of nations be prevented so as to avoid exercise of political influence? Should each member have one vote, or should voting power be weighted according to some criterion of power or responsibility? Third, how would the "experts" representing each nation be chosen? How would they be politically divorced from their government? If an expert were politically divorced, what responsibility or authority would he have? Could he count on support of his political parent? If not, would his decisions be of any avail? If so, would his decisions not take on a political character immediately? To what degree would any member government guarantee to abide by a-political decisions of a group of "disinterested" experts? Is any nation likely to surrender sovereignty to such an institution? Finally, do not the facts that any decision has to be politically ratified and that any member has the power to withdraw require that political power and position be taken into account by each and every international economic organization in some degree?

These questions were not publicly debated, but the Administration's policies in promoting the technique of international economic cooperation were questioned not only, as noted above, as to their inherent political character, but also with regard to the problems of sovereignty and of whether Russian participation would make the agencies unworkable. On the latter point, the standard reply of Administration officials was that international cooperation required the participation of Russia even if its being a member appeared contradictory

¹¹ The fact that members had not decided questions on purely technical grounds was the basis of Australia's plea during the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C., for a "non-political and impartial approach" to problems before the Fund. By this time United States officials and others recognized, and so asserted, that political positions and viewpoints could not be disregarded. (Fund Session No. 3, September 11, 1951.)

to the purposes of the economic organizations established, as in the case of the International Monetary Fund.¹² With reference to the question of sovereignty, the Administration argued that joining an international organization was not a surrender of sovereignty but an exercise of it and that the ability to withdraw protected the ultimate freedom of action of any government.

The question of sovereignty is not so easily answered. Even if voting is perfectly "democratic" (whatever that may mean as to the weighting of voting among nations represented¹³), those being out-voted lose some freedom of action; they must now conform to something they do not desire, or find escape from it under the agreement, or withdraw and face some degree of moral, political or economic suasion. To assume that a nation with a very large stake in the results of an agreed-upon international policy will accept the decision of the majority, if it is in the minority, when most of the responsibility for carrying out the decision successfully will rest on its own shoulders is, again, naive in view of the historical relations of nations.¹⁴

The problem of sovereignty is pointed up in the fact that nations have as yet shown no propensity to forego popular domestic policies or programs merely to conform to what other nations might desire—and it should not have been assumed that the war had made any change in this respect, especially in light of the conflicts even on the technical level during negotiations of postwar agreements. Thus, national programs of land reform, of redistribution of income, of full employment, and of social services, for example, were instituted in spite of conflicts which arose with the aims of some international economic organizations, and to state in the International Monetary Fund Charter that certain actions of members would not be objected to merely because of underlying "domestic political and social" policies and programs begged the question and showed a willingness to become blind to reality in order to obtain agreement on high-sounding principles. The degree of incompatibility of domestic policies

¹² The impact of Russian policy on international cooperation is discussed below.

¹³ The principle of "one nation, one vote" is itself, of course, a method of "weighting." It was employed under UNRRA and was a reason for many of its difficulties. This particular means of practicing "democracy" among nations is necessary and desirable where broad policies are to be decided by an international body but have to be ratified by national legislatures; otherwise, a minority of governments may cause friction by attempting to impose policies on a larger number of nations. However, when the mere allocation of financial assistance is involved, and when the funds are contributed by a few member nations, the practice of weighted voting has much to commend it as a means of preventing misuse of the funds by the recipients. If voting is weighted, giving some nations more authority than others, these then have a pragmatic responsibility not to impose their will on others when trivial or technical questions arise, yet it is equally foolish for them to refrain from using their voting authority to support national viewpoints on policy questions.

¹⁴ An interesting case arose during 1949–51, in the disagreement over the price of gold as set by the International Monetary Fund, with a few nations deciding not to adhere to the policy adopted by the majority and eventually forcing a change in this policy. See our discussion of the Fund's "gold policy" in the 1949, 1950, and 1951 volumes of *Survey of United States International Finance*, by Gardner Patterson and Jack N. Behrman (Princeton University, International Finance Section, 1950, 1951, and 1952).

with principles which can be agreed upon internationally is shown by the number of exceptions and escape clauses attached to the implementation of the principles by the nations party to the Bretton Woods Agreements and the ITO Charter.

Any program of international financial cooperation which does not recognize and make provision for the dominance of larger and more powerful nations in the economic and political relations of the world, or for the existence of "national interests," or for the desire to retain freedom of action over domestic policies and programs, is incompatible with the conditions of international economic and political relations. The following discussion of postwar experience emphasizes that attempts to "de-politicize" inter-governmental economic organizations were doomed to failure and that, given the current nationalist mentality, international organizations set up without adequate recognition of the preoccupation with "national interests" will most likely be circumscribed or circumvented by crippling exceptions and escape clauses, leaving the principles without adequate means of implementation. On the other hand, recognition of the power-relations of nations and of their preoccupation with domestic policies will mean that a much narrower field of international cooperation is possible; it would probably, however, be a more active field. Such a limited agreement would not preclude agreement on the general principles which all nations would strive to implement "in due time and when conditions permitted," and provision could be made for continuous consultation on the possibility of putting the principles into effect. International economic cooperation is not impossible, but the framers of international organizations should recognize the circumstances (both political and economic) within which they will operate. As is shown below, almost total absence of this recognition was what brought disappointment to the United States in the operations of UNRRA and a reversal of its "de-politicization" policy, which in turn disappointed some other nation-members of the Fund and Bank, and led to a new form of international financial cooperation under later aid programs.

III. A BI-POLAR WORLD AND TRUNCATED INTERNATIONALISM

The Administration adopted the position that it would be necessary for the success of international cooperation to have full participation by Russia in each organization. In the field of economic cooperation, where Russia was bent on state-controlled trading, there were significant reasons why its participation would not have been advantageous to the United States.¹⁵ But there was reason to encourage its participation in relief and reconstruction assistance so long as political relations continued on a friendly basis,¹⁶ both to prevent the charge of

¹⁵ See, for example, the arguments by Jacob Viner, "International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 34, Suppl., pp. 315-29 (March, 1944); Raymond F. Mikesell, "The Role of the International Monetary Agreements in a World of Planned Economies," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 55, pp. 497-512 (Dec., 1947); and M. Hoffman, "Problems of Trade between Planned Economies," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 41, suppl., pp. 445-55 (May, 1951).

¹⁶ UNRRA's official historian has concluded that administratively the several nations

imperialism against any nation and to spread the financial burden. The United States was concerned that relief aid should not be used to place any particular regime in power or to bolster the influence of a foreign power in the recipient's economy. This "non-political" use of aid was the espoused aim of the United States in cooperating internationally in UNRRA. But there were several political reasons why Congress, at least, was to become dissatisfied with UNRRA and why the Administration abandoned it before its work was completed.

Major disappointments to Congress were the lack of gratitude on the part of recipients and the large volume of aid sent to nations sympathetic to communism. In justification of these results, it must be understood that the Articles of Agreement of UNRRA provided that it should operate through the existing governments, which were largely unwilling and unable to distribute the aid on other than a "political" basis. And the feeling of some U. S. officials that the aid was not distributed in such a way as to maximize goodwill for America (see below) did not take into account the fact that wartime propaganda from the Allies promised that liberation would be followed immediately by relief and that strong resistance by the peoples of the enemy-occupied countries would hasten that day.¹⁷ Thus, when relief supplies came, governments felt little obligation to play up the fact that the goods were supplied from an international or United States source, since they were considered a "reward" for the country's participation in driving out the enemy. Also, the charge made by some members of Congress that UNRRA had aided Eastern European countries more than it should have in comparison to other countries was invalid, although that area received by far the largest allocation of aid. The allocation had actually been made in the light of United States insistence that countries able to pay with international reserves do so, thus leaving Eastern Europe as the primary area (besides China) to receive aid.

A further source of discomfort to Congress consisted of reports that Russia, through its membership in the UNRRA administration,¹⁸ was hampering the operations of the organization, especially in countries bordering it, and was using the supplies sent to areas under its shadow to strengthen the hands of

did work together effectively until their willingness to cooperate diminished and then disappeared with the growing ideological and political conflict. (G. Woodbridge, and others, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (N. Y., 1950), Vol. 2 pp. 535-52.)

¹⁷ The attitude on the part of liberated countries that aid was "due" them was stressed by the Russian member of the UNRRA Council during 1946 when he stated: "Peoples of occupied countries had been promised assistance. These promises had inspired them to greater resistance, which in turn had led to greater destruction of their resources. People who had borne the burden of invasion and had suffered so much destruction of their property had earned the right to assistance." (*UNRRA Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, Atlantic City, N. J., March 19, 1946, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 6.)

¹⁸ The fact that Russia contributed only to the administrative budget of UNRRA and not to its operating budget made its actions all the less palatable to Congress, since Russian representatives were partially controlling the use of funds contributed largely by the United States.

those favoring the spread of communism.¹⁹ There appeared to be evidence that the distribution of supplies was not "non-political," within recipient nations, as was intended by the United States;²⁰ and the question of repatriation of displaced persons was injected into deliberations and operations.²¹ Even the problem of personnel recr

¹⁹ The author has been told privately by a former UNRRA staff member in which the Russian official in charge of purchasing items for aid would not ap for small tractors (such as would be used on small, individually-held farms) Eastern European countries, but insisted on the procurement of large tract bines, to be used on collectivized farms. Another UNRRA official, noting and large-scale types of agricultural machinery sent to Czechoslovakia, w included about everything that would be used on a modern farm in Kansas or ever, the item that particularly struck me was the one of eighty-five grain cc accompanying tractors . . . at that particular time, the Russians were pla prominent part in saying which supplies went where." He concluded that th was destined for later use on collectivized farms in Czechoslovakia or for re the Ukraine. (Klemme, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-41.) UNRRA's official historian, ho that, contrary to reports that equipment was inefficiently used and distribute " . . . the records of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Divisions give every e farm machinery and equipment sent to UNRRA countries were utilized ful pletely, with the aid of UNRRA technicians where necessary" (Woodbridge, 1, p. 487). The lack of adequate observation and reporting of distribut countries casts some doubt on this conclusion, and the UNRRA historian di to grips with the question of whether distribution of supplies was political repeats that recipient governments were responsible for distribution unde ment and that UNRRA officials [wholly inadequate in number to do the rported "that they were satisfied that the receiving governments, in so far able, distributed UNRRA supplies in accordance with the council direction cluded instructions that distribution be non-political and non-discriminator 50).

Klemme also states (p. 144) that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, took from returning DP's any food distributed to them by UNRRA on the thereby forcing a change in UNRRA policy.

²⁰ And at least verbally by others; for example, even in 1946 the Cze member of the UNRRA Council warned that "UNRRA was a humanitar tional organization, and should not be mixed with international politics. *Journal*, March 20, 1946, p. 4.)

²¹ As UNRRA's historian states, repatriation was a political problem UNRRA's early intent of mere care of the DP's. See Woodbridge, Vol. 2, 1 The question of forcible repatriation of DP's was a sharply controversial is Eastern and Western European nations, with the United States and the Unit arguing against it and the Communist governments favoring it. See the UNRRA's *Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, by members from Pola Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the United States, on March 20, 25, 26 1946. An interesting account of the background of these positions is afforded pp. 126 ff.

Political considerations were involved also in discussions of the extensi ex-enemy countries (e.g., Italy) and to those not occupied during the war See on the Italian question, *Journal*, Second Session of the Council, Septen pp. 104-25. They arose also over a resolution that UNRRA should requisit other resources in occupied countries for use in relief—particularly in Austri jointly occupied. Communist delegates argued that this question was outside

came political.²² Despite the political overtones, the U. S. argued until late 1946 that UNRRA be allowed to continue to prove that international organizations could function successfully.

Apart from the political aspects injected by other nations, circumstances into UNRRA's operations, the United States had some political strings of its own. Many members of Congress apparently intended that UNRRA should instill a sense of fear in the countries around the Soviet border and assist in the fight against communism. This interpretation is supported by the emphasis placed on the "goodwill" factor before Congress in the Act of 1943 and in the congressional desire to impose conditions which would make it difficult for them to turn to communism. The Administration was apparently operating on the basis that an absence of restrictive conditions on the aid would be a vote for the status quo and that, without attached conditions, Russia would in turn insist on im-

position of UNRRA. The U. S. member argued first that he thought it should be divorced from the political considerations, but later remarked that it was a course of cowardice to retire because there might be political aspects to the problem; and both UNRRA and the whole cause of international relief would suffer as a result." (*Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, March 27, pp. 1-4 and March 29, pp. 1-3.)

At the Fifth Council Session, August, 1946, at Geneva, the Soviet representative, Feonov, pointed out that friendly criticism of UNRRA had not attracted attention; thus, contrary to the USSR's counsel, the Korean program had made little progress with the repatriation of displaced persons. He also mentioned the presence of occupational troops in Austria and some action by the Austrian authorities—questions clearly within the scope of other international relief organizations of which the USSR had warned, would endanger UNRRA's reputation as an international relief organization." (Woodbridge, Vol. 1, p. 47.)

²² The hiring of personnel was not intended to be at the suggestion of the government because of the pressure of officials in all governments to gain employment. The lack of information on applicants (especially from Russia), and the fact that many applicants were already in government service, UNRRA's selection of personnel was under considerable political pressure. In the case of Russia, its suggested personnel were without preliminary interviews." Russia also opposed strongly the employment of enemy nationals, neutrals, or nationals of non-member governments. The Council finally approved their employment in principle, but on the condition that they be employed. In evaluating the effect of political and social factors on UNRRA's operations, its historian concluded that "... it is not easy for an organization to be efficient and simultaneously to implement policies politically and in accordance with the customs of the society in which it functions" (Woodbridge, Vol. 1, p. 542).

²³ See letter of July 3, 1946 from W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs, to Senator Kenneth McKellar, Department of State, p. 35.

favor of its political and economic policies.²⁴ The Administration supported its position with the argument that once aid was stopped, there would be no assurance that the conditions previously imposed would be accepted by the foreign country, and that in fact a reaction against such reaction would have militated against the success of the Administration's long-term plans for postwar reconstruction; it was reluctant to set a precedent for attaching conditions to any subsequent economic assistance and long and hard in later programs of economic aid against any extra-activist conditions on the receipt of aid and any overt or explicit injective political pressure.

But after so strongly supporting UNRRA in mid-1946 as a successful organization in administering relief assistance, the State Department, in a position at the end of 1946 on proposals for continued international relief through the United Nations after the end of UNRRA,²⁵ flatly rejected the use of the United Nations organization for relief: "... the United States does not believe that post-UNRRA relief should be conducted by an UNRRA type organization."²⁶ Acting Secretary of State Acheson then denied the charge that the United States is abandoning international cooperation in refusing to participate in relief on an international basis and the charge that "the United States intends to use food as a political weapon."²⁷ He stated that these charges were disproved by the facts that relatively few nations needed relief and that relief could best be supplied by direct request to the U. S. government, which would clear the requests through the United Nations:

In this manner, nations receiving free relief must prove their need for it, and be held to a much closer and fairer accountability of the use of food and other relief. Those in power will be compelled to distribute relief food on the basis of need, *not be allowed to feed their political supporters and starve their political opponents*.

²⁴ This question of imposition of conditions on recipients of aid from an international agency shows clearly that political aspects were not absent and should, at the time, have placed grave doubts on the feasibility of Russian-American cooperation as long as so ardently desired adherents to its system; but who will argue that the experiment has not been made?

That the successful operation of any international organization in which each country has an equal voice and which includes both Russia and the United States (so long as they continue to support their present ideologies) precludes the attaching of conditions to assistance appeared never to strike Congress; nor was the point ever present to the Administration in just this way. For additional comment on the feasibility of Russian-American cooperation in such a relief organization, see Philip C. Jessup, "Sample of World Organization," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 22, pp. 372-73 (April, 1944); J. Perry, "Why UNRRA Has Failed," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 192, pp. 8-10 (August, 1946).

²⁵ UNRRA Director-General LaGuardia had proposed the establishment of an Emergency Food Fund of \$400 million (*New York Times*, November 29, 1946).

²⁶ Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1946, p. 1107.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1107-8.

The people of the United States and the Congress of the United States were not of their minds that the relief problems of the near future are not of the kind that warrant grants of enormous sums of money from the United States which would leave little or no effective control by the grantor of the funds.

The italicized phrases indicate that the end of UNRRA was not a failure of politics but a cessation of its need, and that relief was politicized," notwithstanding Mr. Lehman's previous assurance that the failure of UNRRA would betoken failure of other world-wide relief efforts. The word "failure" should not be construed as meaning that UNRRA failed in alleviating suffering, preventing the spread of disease, or saving large numbers of people: it was successful in its relief work within the limits of its resources. Nor did it fail as an experiment in international relief: as long as its member governments were willing to cooperate, it worked as well together as could be expected, given different methods, and procedures in handling similar problems. The word "failed" was in meeting the unrealistic expectations of United States members of Congress that it would operate independently of the United States and yet bring international goodwill to the United States. The idea that the pooling of national resources to assume a common burden was unsound.²⁸

Thus, the primary factor in the United States policy of relief was the support from an international agency it had fostered as "a political use of internationally supplied goods coupled with the consideration of some of the problems it faced (such as DP's) in the political conditions."²⁹ In the post-UNRRA aid program it sought to conceal the fact that the aid would not be given to countries that

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1108 (italics added).

²⁹ Klemme asserts that UNRRA was a failure if success is measured by the funds were spent "in the most efficient manner for the benefit of the deserving people." He charged that "International politics got in the way of personnel and in the acquisition and distribution of supplies" and gave an interesting discussion of how and to what extent UNRRA failed, pp. 535-52.

³⁰ In presenting the post-UNRRA aid program to Congress for 1948, the Administration testified that the aid was necessary to keep the political situation in the recipient countries from turning into one that the United States did not want. In the debate on post-UNRRA aid, many members expressed concern over the misuse of UNRRA funds by Russia and the extension of its aid to countries whose practices to be guarded against in the new program. (*Congressional Record*, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3822 ff., 3861 ff., and 4167 ff., and May 21, 1947, pp. 4167 ff.) The Administration asked for "plain talk" from the Administration as to the political situation in the program, which they conceived to be a result of not being able to cooperate with Russia. The Administration admitted (after the decision in early 1947 that Turkey had pointed up the rift with Russia) that a prime difficulty was the lack of cooperation with Russia and that its postwar policy had been predicated on four-power cooperation in relief and reconstruction. See testimony of the Secretary of State and Tyler Wood on June 25, 1947, during the House Subcommittee Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION, 1945-1950

Communism, and aid authorized to Poland and Hungary was not except because each was soon taken over or dominated by the Communists.

The changed attitude of the Administration and Congress toward international financial cooperation was evidenced again by the failure to provide Greek-Turkish aid be provided through the UN, though the purpose of the program were much wider than the extension of relief or the improvement of bilateral relations. The Administration justified the bilateral approach in the face of grave doubts in Congress, on the grounds that it could not present the requests to the UN because (1) the governments addressed the United States, (2) Congress had not taken a position on American participation in any UN program of such assistance, (3) the UN had no money, Congress would have to appropriate some anyway, (4) the UN would have had to call a special session and would not have gotten a program in time, and (5) it would be better to support the UN by quick, direct aid rather than to foist off on it a job it could not handle effectively. Congress approached so decidedly that only a few voices were raised to question the retreat from international (world-wide) cooperation to a policy of reconstruction through bilateral arrangements as under the European Recovery Program (1948) and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (1949).

These developments showed that the "non-political" character of international financial cooperation, as earlier conceived by the United States, was incompatible with the existence of two (or more) parties having diametrically opposed ideas as to the proper form of world political and economic organization. Recognition of this opposition and the apparent dislike of having to provide information to other countries about internal affairs were factors in Russia's withdrawal from further international financial cooperation. Russia's policy of avoiding membership in international economic institutions was evidenced first in 1945 by its non-ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreements, which its representatives had signed. This abstinence presaged a growth of non-cooperation, since it was accompanied by Russia's expression of unwillingness to negotiate promptly a settlement of wartime lend-lease. This attitude was reflected most clearly in its decision not to accept a bid to join the European Recovery Program and even to keep its satellites from joining. In offering to include Russia in the Marshall Plan, the United States ostensibly supported international (world-wide) financial cooperation, but after Russia had shown that it was not only unwilling to cooperate more likely directly to oppose the reconstruction of the world under the leadership of the United States, as witnessed by its indirect support of guerrillas and its pressure on the borders of Turkey during 1947.

³¹ The account of Russia's initial negotiation in the Marshall Plan talks with the United States and France and its withdrawal and initiation of a Molotov Plan is given in *Current History*, Vol. 13, pp. 129-34 (Sept., 1947). For the official U. S. view of the Russian attitude, see "The European Recovery Program," *Sen. Doc. No. 111*, 80th Congr., 1st sess., December, 1947, pp. 47-48, 151-152. S. B. Fay, "The Marshall Plan," *Current History*, Vol. 13, pp. 129-34 (Sept., 1947), the newspaper accounts during July, 1947.

This pressure and opposition of Russia was a primary (if sole) reason for the failure of the system of world-wide economic cooperation envisaged by the United States to remain a-political; and after 1947. But in 1944-45 there were no strong indications that four-power collaboration was inappropriate. The major powers had considered that, although Russia would not join a lateral, nondiscriminatory trading system, it would seek to maintain peaceful political and economic relations by means of trade. In addition, the major part of the burden of postwar reconstruction was expected to be borne by the "Big Four" (China was expected to contribute directly to the financing of any economic program). Four-power collaboration was a key to the successful restoration and to the reopening of trade channels to the mutual benefit of all because of the ability of at least the Big Three (Russia, United States, and United Kingdom) to provide needed goods; their cooperation would be effective in removing the disease and unrest left in the wake of war. Political and economic stability would have been fostered if reconstruction had been forthcoming. The world did not expect and was not prepared for overt hostility to, and outright sabotage of, its long-range economic cooperation.

Given this hostility, certainly the hopes of the United States for world-wide economic cooperation in the reconstruction program were bound to be dashed, and the type of internationalism which had been effective was changed. This change was reflected both in the attitude of the United States after 1946 and in the attitude of the United States toward international financial organizations.

Some Administration officials realized that the United States had to turn toward the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund as crucial in making them "international" (in the sense of including a few members).²² Other officials, however, had shown by their attitude toward the institutions largely "American" in character indirectly to the political foreign policies of the United States. As revealed in the early negotiations on the location of the two institutions, the extent of supervision of the Fund over the use of its resources. At the Bretton Woods Conference, Lord Keynes had pressed the United States to maintain the dominance of that city in financial affairs.

²² "It is important that governments, too, recognize that these are international institutions. No country, however great or strong, in its economic position in the world, can take the attitude that these are creatures of its own. Nothing could destroy the usefulness of the Fund and the Bretton Woods Institutions more than a feeling in other countries that they are subservient to the interests of the United States."

"And nothing would more enhance the world prestige and the prestige of the United States Government than a demonstration of its appreciation of the character of international institutions." (J. W. Pehle, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, "The Bretton Woods Institutions," *Yale Law Journal*, 1946).

world; when this move failed because of American objections, he urged that they be located at the situs of other international organizations,³³ but the American delegates finally gained acceptance of their proposal to locate them in the United States. Many persons were concerned that they might be located in Washington and thus tend to be politically-oriented institutions. Arthur Krock reported, however, that in Washington, "There is a feeling against locating an international institution in the capital city of any nation, and this will probably prevail."³⁴ Those having this feeling had reckoned, evidently, without taking into account the views of Secretary of the Treasury Vinson. After stating that Keynes had tended to take for granted that the Fund and Bank would be located in New York with the UNO, R. F. Harrod writes that Keynes has the following account in his notes on the meeting at Savannah:

"... in New York they would be in the daily contacts which can be provided by a great centre of international finance; they would be sufficiently removed from the politics of Congress and the nationalistic whispering gallery of the Embassies and Legations of Washington; and they would probably be sufficiently near to the seat of UNO to be able to co-operate closely on the economic and statistical side of their work with the Economic and Social Council.

"... Mr. Vinson told me that the American Delegation had decided that both institutions should be placed in Washington and that this was a final decision the merits of which they were not prepared to discuss. The U. S. Administration, he said, was entitled to decide for themselves what location within the U. S. was to be preferred."³⁵

Because of this and other more or less unilateral decisions by the American delegation, Keynes had a foreboding that the institutions might assume a political character under which every action "shall not be for its own sake or on its own merits but because of something else."³⁶

Keynes' fear was not wholly justified by the actual operations of either the Fund or Bank; but neither has functioned without political implications or has avoided some "dictation" by American officials.³⁷ The possibility of the latter arose, also at an early stage, concerning the question of whether the Fund's role should be active or passive: that is, whether it should be a "school-mistress" and assert a positive control over the use of its resources or whether the drawing rights would be "automatic" at the volition of the member (once declared eligible within the Articles of Agreement). United States officials had agreed in principle (but apparently only under pressure from other countries) to the latter role during most of the negotiations prior to and during Bretton

³³ See *New York Times*, July 12, 1944.

³⁴ *New York Times*, December 19, 1945.

³⁵ *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (New York, 1951), pp. 629-30. Harrod goes on to report that this decision was a personal one of Mr. Vinson, having the support of the President but not of the U. S. delegation. Nevertheless, what the other members saw was a unilateral decision of the United States which had political coloring.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 632.

³⁷ A probable strong source of friction and resentment among members is the fact that a creditor nation in the Fund is given increased voting power while a debtor suffers a reduction; debtors do not generally agree with the U.S. view that responsibility for their deficit is wholly theirs and that creditor countries should therefore have added power to direct Fund policy.

Woods; but at the Savannah Conference in late 1946 the American delegation reverted to its initial stand, arguing that two full-time directors would be required to represent each major country or group of countries because of the importance of operational questions.³⁸ Harrod reports, again, that the American view carried because the United States was in a dominant bargaining position and was not beyond using that position for its own purposes.³⁹ Keynes considered that the Savannah meeting showed that national power had been "used, for irrelevant motives, to frustrate a good purpose, and he had been denied by the possibility of the defeat of the British Loan in Congress the weapons to which a combatant was entitled."⁴⁰ There is no evidence that the United States used the resources of the Bank or the Fund for political purposes in the sense of imperialism or that its national power was used for unimportant purposes.⁴¹ But, as intended by Congress, the guidance of the U. S. executive director on the Fund and Bank by the National Advisory Council (a Cabinet-level body) lends a political air to American participation.⁴²

³⁸ Raymond F. Mikesell, who was a technical adviser to the U. S. delegation at Bretton Woods and attended the Savannah meeting, has written that, in the decisions on the role of the executive directors and on the location of the Fund in Washington, the United States injected political considerations into the Fund's operation but that such a result was inevitable when policy questions were involved, since only government representatives could make the decisions. See his "The International Monetary Fund, 1944-1949," *International Conciliation*, No. 455, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 1949, pp. 843-47. For similar comment on the decisions at the Savannah Conference, see E. A. G. Robinson, "John Maynard Keynes," *Economic Journal*, March, 1947, p. 65.

³⁹ Harrod (cited above, n. 35) pp. 634-35. This view of the events at Savannah in 1945 is supported by Herbert Feis, "Keynes in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, p. 572 (July, 1951): "The American Government, speaking through Mr. Vinson, made it plain that it intended to assert its power as provider. American wishes would be most influential if not dominant. Further, the task was not to be left to sheltered experts and officials. It might be taken over by untutored politicians."

As mentioned earlier, one way to reduce political influence in an organization of "experts" would be to disassociate them from governments. In selecting official representatives to the Fund and Bank, the United States apparently avoided appointing men from private financial circles (though many applied for the positions) and placed government officials, who were familiar with the political considerations involved, in the more responsible positions. See the attack on this policy in the *New York Times*, May 22, 1946, by its associate financial editor, E. H. Collins.

⁴⁰ Harrod, pp. 638-39.

⁴¹ An outsider can have little knowledge of the detailed workings of either organization, so the conclusion cannot be firmly drawn that petty questions were not decided on the basis of power.

⁴² The National Advisory Council itself has expressed the idea that the Fund more or less automatically follows the policies of the United States or, at least, that it could force the Fund to do so. When reporting on the U. S. official attitude toward the use of the Fund's resources, NAC wrote: "The National Advisory Council [in formulating] United States policy with respect to the Fund . . . has tried to avoid the extreme, on the one hand, of acquiescing in the virtually automatic use of the Fund's resources to meet any type of current deficit, while also, on the other hand, avoiding the extreme of *insisting* upon such rigid standards as would practically have suspended the Fund's currency operations until

One evidence of possible political influence by the United States in the International Bank is the practice, due largely to the fact that most of the loan funds came from the United States government's contribution or the American capital market, of the U. S. executive director's being asked for the official American view on any loan application received by the Bank even *before* it is submitted to the executive directors as a group for consideration.

Despite the probability that the American position is formed as much on political as on economic grounds, a strong case can be made that the International Bank has, by and large, lived up to the intentions of its founders that it be a means of avoiding the political pressures which formerly surrounded international (public and private) lending. It extended loans amounting to more than \$1 billion during 1947-1950 without any borrower charging imperialism or interference in its domestic political affairs. Most of its loans were for specific projects in countries which needed construction aid or were programming economic development. But it cannot be argued that the Bank has completely avoided political pitfalls and remained "exclusively technical," as some members have argued that it should be.⁴³

Although the Bank is explicitly prevented by its Articles of Agreement from extending (or not extending) loans for political reasons,⁴⁴ considerations of political conditions and positions of members were taken into account. Bank officials recognized early that in the disturbed conditions in the postwar period, political uncertainty and instability were prime considerations in the determination of whether a member was a good economic risk for a long-term investment.⁴⁵ Political considerations were cited by the Bank as being most significant in determining its policy on loans to Europe during the time of the European Recovery Program.

Considerations of political instability could, of course, be taken into account

greater progress had been made toward general elimination of exchange restrictions." (*Second Special Report on the Operations and Policies of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Washington, D. C., May, 1950, p. 13; italics added.)

⁴³ See statement of Pierre Mendes-France, Chairman of the Board of Governors during the Fourth Annual Meeting, *Proceedings*, September 13, 1949, p. 4.

⁴⁴ "Article IV, Section 10: *Political Activity Prohibited*:

"The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I."

⁴⁵ "It is unfortunate but nonetheless true that the existing political difficulties and uncertainties in Europe present special problems which have thus far prevented the Bank from making loans in those countries. The Bank is fully cognizant of the injunction in its Articles of Agreement that its decisions shall be based only on economic considerations. Political tensions and uncertainties in or among its member countries, however, have a direct effect on economic and financial conditions in those countries and upon their credit position." (IBRD, *Third Annual Report*, 1947-1948, p. 14.) See also *Second Annual Report 1946-1947*, pp. 16, 17, and statement of John J. McCloy, *Proceedings*, Second Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, October 31, 1947, p. 7.

in determining the economic soundness of a loan without power politics or political alliances greatly influencing the decisions. In fact, however, the Bank apparently has been guided in some of its decisions by the political ideologies of applicants. In 1947, Czechoslovakia applied for a loan of \$350 million and Poland for \$600 million. Negotiations by the Bank with these two nations resulted in a scaling down of the amounts, but early in 1948 (after these countries, at the insistence of Russia, failed to join in the Marshall Plan) negotiations were suspended, no reason being made public by the Bank.⁴⁶ During the Third Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (October, 1948), there were some expressions of "fear that the Bank was, to some extent, influenced by political considerations in making loans," and Czechoslovakia has repeatedly charged "discrimination" at successive meetings. Poland withdrew from both the Bank and the Fund on the ostensible grounds that the Fund, at least, had become "a submissive instrument of the Government of the United States, whose economic and political expansion is in direct contradiction to the purpose to be served by the Fund."⁴⁷ (The Fund did not, of course, admit these allegations, saying that they were refuted by its history and actions.)

The Bank did, however, hold on for some time to the "a-political" requisites for its lending and attempted to negotiate during late 1947 and early 1948 some special loans for financing exports of timber from Eastern European countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, and Yugoslavia) to Western Europe in the hope of expanding the volume of East-West trade. Such loans were worked out in 1948 with Finland and Yugoslavia, but Poland and Austria stated that they would not need the financing and withdrew, while Czechoslovakia withdrew only after it found it impossible to work out payments agreements with importing countries.⁴⁸ In actuality, therefore, no loans were extended to help increase a rapidly falling volume of vital East-West trade in Europe; but whether any volume of loans would have stemmed the decline is questionable given the contract terms demanded by Eastern European countries and Russia's apparent aim of turning the trade of its satellites toward itself.

The obverse side of the above policy is illustrated by the extension of aid to Yugoslavia in increasing amounts after it showed a tendency to become independent of Russian influence, with the International Bank making a loan of \$9 million in 1949. Yugoslavia was still, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, communistic, but its defection was politically and strategically important and was

⁴⁶ The loans were apparently denied because of the closer political and economic affiliation of the applicants with Russia. They were not denied because of the size of the requests: Yugoslavia, France, and the Netherlands made loan requests of \$500 million or over, which were scaled down but granted. And political instability could not have been the sole criterion, since loans were granted to Yugoslavia, where a like uncertainty existed.

⁴⁷ IMF, *Annual Report*, April 30, 1950, p. 102; membership in the Fund is a prerequisite of membership in the Bank.

⁴⁸ IBRD, *Fourth Annual Report, 1948-1949*, pp. 28-29, and *Fifth Annual Report, 1949-1950*, p. 34.

the basis for financial support from the West. Some additional political influence on Bank lending arising partly from the rift of the West with Russia can be seen in the loans to economically under-developed countries *outside* the Soviet orbit. These loans were explicitly stated to be in line with the Point IV Program—none were given to support the Molotov Plan for Eastern Europe—and no small percentage were justified on the ground that they would increase the supply of raw materials needed for mobilization programs of the West.⁴⁹

A final example of the injection of considerations of political alliance into Bank policy is that of the repeated requests by Czechoslovakia that the *de facto* rule of the Communist regime in China be recognized by admission of that government to the Bank and Fund and by the ejection of the Nationalist Chinese representative. In 1951, on a motion by the governor from the United States, seconded by the governor from the United Kingdom, the resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia was not acted upon.⁵⁰

These observations on the impact of political considerations and alliances on the Bank's lending operations should not be construed as an indictment of Bank policy. They do, however, refute the view that the Bank is a purely technical body, divorced from international political pressures. The Bank should not have been expected to stay aloof from politics; that it has been able to reduce the influence so much among Western members is a result of its dealing with specific projects needing capital rather than with governmental programs or "credit worthiness" of members.

The record of the International Monetary Fund on "political lending" is similar to that of the Bank, but it has been subjected to more severe attack by members because its rejection of applicants involved some ranking of nations as to "credit-worthiness." Like the Bank, the Fund did not allow drawings from its resources by Poland or Austria,⁵¹ and it extended credit to Yugoslavia, in 1949, only after its break with the Comintern. An exception to the pattern of lending only to countries sympathetic to the cause of the West was a \$6 million drawing by Czechoslovakia in the fiscal year 1948-1949 even after it had refused to participate in the European Recovery Program and had turned its economic and political orientation toward Russia. This has been the only credit

⁴⁹ The Bank has allowed some of its funds to be tied directly to the development program of the British Commonwealth through Britain's release in 1953 of some of its "18% subscription" for use in lending only to Commonwealth borrowers. The Bank's Articles of Agreement allow a member to determine whether or not the 18% of its initial subscription, made in currency of the member, shall be loaned, but they do not provide for limitation on the countries to which the funds shall be loaned. The Bank may pick the projects and the receivers, within the limited number of Commonwealth countries, but this sort of identification of lender and borrower was a characteristic of international lending which the Bank was to eliminate.

⁵⁰ For detailed arguments, see the IMF, *Summary Proceedings*, Fifth Annual Meeting, 1950, pp. 63-72; and IBRD, *Proceedings*, Sixth Annual Meeting, November 30, 1951, p. 27.

⁵¹ The Allied sector of Austria did receive grant-aid from the United States, directly and indirectly, from 1945 on.

to Soviet-oriented nations, however, and, as stated above, Poland withdrew in protest over the Fund's policy on lending and Czechoslovakia has repeatedly charged the Fund with discriminating against its requests. It would be difficult to prove such discrimination, however, for public records do not report all requests or rejections or the reasons therefor. Further, Fund policy on use of its resources underwent a sharp change in 1948, and while most Western European nations received no credits from the Fund, Czechoslovakia did. The ostensible reason for the restrictions on Fund operations with Europe from 1948 through 1950—no loans at all were made in 1950—was the large volume of aid received under the European Recovery Program, but underlying the action was the existence of political and economic instability in Europe.

During 1948, political instability in Europe and the "need" of governments to institute large-scale investment and social service programs—despite their tendency to accelerate an already rising inflation—made it apparent that any use of the Fund's resources by European members would tend to remove the pressure to make the reforms which were necessary to reduce the deficit in international balances of payments.⁵² The decision was based in large measure on political considerations and their impact on the economic soundness of the use of additional resources. Another political aspect was evidenced in the pressure the United States apparently put on other members to restrict Fund operations through the exercise of its great bargaining power arising both within the Fund and through the projected ERP aid.⁵³ The Fund, therefore, like the Bank, found that it had to take political conditions and alliances into account. The decision was apparently (regardless of its correctness) an example of what Keynes had predicted in the use of political power to gain action on questions which, in many minds, should have been dealt with on purely economic grounds.

The explicit recognition in 1948 of the existence of a bi-polar world and the resulting truncated internationalism discussed above were followed in U.S. policy by a desire for greater control over financial assistance and for a closer identification of aid programs with political objectives. The policy of "containment of Communism" was supported by a regional association of European countries based on bilateral agreements with the United States, stressing the unity of economic and political objectives among the signatories.

IV. THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION

Under all economic assistance programs until 1948, the needs of and assistance given to each country were determined with little consideration of pro-

⁵² Fund officials justified their action in restricting use of its resources by potential borrowers by emphasizing that "the purpose of the use of the Fund's resources is to give them time to make necessary readjustments and not to avoid the necessity of such readjustments." (*Annual Report, April 30, 1948*, p. 47.)

⁵³ *The Economist*, September 19, 1949, p. 576, reported sometime later that the decision to suspend the Fund's facilities for use by ERP countries was taken "despite the opposition of prominent member countries. . . ."

grams for other countries. The volume of aid given to each country under UNRRA and post-UNRRA was inadequate to meet even its relief "needs"; thus, it would have made little sense to attempt to integrate the supply of relief items among all countries receiving assistance. Also, loans by the International Bank and drawings of members from the Fund were considered in the light of the needs of individual members and not with a view to assisting two or more countries as a group. Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza contended that this country-by-country approach was a prime factor in the slow recovery of Europe prior to 1948:

The task of making peace was viewed as a series of separate problems, to be dealt with through a process of endless bargaining which resulted almost always in a success for Russian tactics and an extension of Soviet influence. European problems were never viewed as an organic whole, and economic reconstruction was looked upon as a problem of procuring emergency aid which would set in motion again a mechanism which had supposedly only jammed. In other words, each country tried to carry on from day to day by means of American aid, without plans and, as a result, often with a waste of relief funds. Naturally there was no European recovery.⁵⁴

This criticism places an excessive burden on the one factor of the *form* of cooperation and overlooks many of the more fundamental internal obstacles to recovery, which Sforza, if directly questioned, would probably not deny. But there was a growing view among official circles in both Europe and the United States to the effect that Europe's political and economic problems needed to be faced as a unit, thus preparing the way for the regional approach when a large-scale effort at European recovery was made with U. S. assistance.⁵⁵

Although the United States did attempt to look at the problem of Europe as a whole at the beginning of the European Recovery Program, it found that the task was too difficult in the time available, and the volume of aid was de-

⁵⁴ "Italy, The Marshall Plan and the 'Third Force'," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 26, pp. 450-51 (April, 1948).

⁵⁵ It must be admitted, however, that the association of European nations into a continuing organization to oversee the use of economic assistance was an idea originating not in Europe but in the United States—and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established mainly at the insistence of the United States. Sforza asserts (above, n. 54) that the United States waited too long to urge economic association on Europe; that immediately after the war there was widespread feeling among European countries that some new type of economic cooperation was necessary and feasible. It may be doubted, however, whether the "feelings" of various enlightened individuals could have been translated effectively into concrete association, especially in view of the strong desires of each country to regain its prosperity as quickly as possible without outside interference and without having to cooperate in helping others to reconstruct. Evidence of the soundness of this doubt exists also in the variety of means by which each country pursued its goals, in the reluctant fashion in which the ERP-countries grasped the idea of economic integration, in the slow process of their "study" of a customs union (see the voluminous work of the European Customs Union Study Group on the single, and technical, problem of tariff nomenclature and classification), and in the faltering steps toward a Benelux union and in unsuccessful efforts to form a union between France and Italy. See the report of progress in *Survey of United States International Finance, 1949* (cited in n. 14), pp. 144-46.

terminated on the basis of a summation of individual countries' estimates of their needs for foreign assistance and then scaled to fit what the Administration thought it could get through Congress. On the question of reduction of monetary barriers to intra-European trade and payments, however, the United States met with some success in urging a regional approach.⁵⁶ In 1947 the European countries agreed to set up an intra-European clearing scheme and did so with the blessing of the United States; subsequent years saw the revision of the initial scheme and the institution in 1950 of a European Payments Union. The point to be emphasized here is that the United States had adopted a different approach to international cooperation from that which it had originally espoused. Previous efforts at internationalism were along the functional line—each organization dealing with a specific problem facing the world as a whole, supposedly without the influence of national or regional considerations of power. Under the ERP, the United States turned to regionalism in an effort to meet pressing political problems and to concentrate on a variety of intractable economic problems within a more closely defined geographic area. The concentration on Europe as a region was because of a supposed interdependence of European economies and a desire to reduce duplication of reconstruction projects among the recipient nations. The concentration on the region of Europe rather than another area or areas was due to Russian opposition to European recovery, the belief that Europe was of primary importance in the fight against communism, and the necessity to husband scarce United States resources.⁵⁷ The adoption of the regional approach was not, therefore, due to any inherent advantage of that type of cooperation over the "world-wide" organization in performing the functions given to each; rather, the new approach was adopted because political conditions made it desirable to consolidate Western power against Russian opposition at the most dangerous point. The consolidation of effort was facilitated by placing all functions under one agency rather than by trying to coordinate the operations of all world-wide agencies so as to concentrate assistance in one area—especially in view of the fact that political differences existed as to the importance of one area compared with another.

The programs of foreign aid made political considerations increasingly significant in international financial cooperation, since the process of aiding one region more than another left some areas relatively less well cared for. For example, aid was not available to consolidate inter-American relations through assistance in economic development or to assist certain Asiatic countries in at-

⁵⁶ J. W. Beyen and others pressed during 1944 for just such an approach to the problems for which the International Monetary Fund was created, on the ground that it would facilitate a gradual movement to the world-wide convertibility of currencies sought by the Fund. See his *Money in a Maelstrom* (New York, 1949), pp. 147-51, 158-61, 175, 204.

⁵⁷ Under-Secretary Acheson stated on May 8, 1947, that the United States would have to concentrate its "emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United States." (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, pp. 993-94.)

tempts to establish free and independent governments. Although the United States had long supported a regional approach to the problems of Latin (and North) America, it did not extend any significant amount of financial aid to Latin America in the postwar period. The necessity of meeting what it considered to be first problems first and of conserving its resources at a time of world-wide inflation required the United States to direct its extraordinary assistance, in the main, to the area which was most crucial in the maintenance of political stability and which could contribute most to the attainment of the goal of liberal trading systems. Prior to 1950-51, therefore, there was little interest on Capitol Hill in extending to Latin America aid other than technical assistance in small amounts through the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It is probable that the dollar balances which the Latin American countries held at the end of the war were the overt reason why there was little congressional or private interest in assistance to these republics. However, Latin America had a legitimate complaint that it was unable to use its dollar balances effectively during the immediate postwar period because of U. S. export controls, inflation, and shortages. Latin American countries considered that since they had cooperated with the United States during the war (at the cost of rising prices and depletion of some material resources), they had a claim to extraordinary assistance. Individually and as a group they made such requests, but U. S. officials argued that the International Bank and Export-Import Bank should be the sources tapped for capital needs of the American Republics. However, the International Bank did not consider the projects presented to it by the developing countries well enough prepared or thought out; therefore, it extended only a few million dollars of loans to Latin America prior to 1949.⁵⁸

In an attempt to placate the South American countries, who "demanded" an Inter-American Development Bank with \$5 billion capital at the Bogota Conference of the American Republics in early 1948,⁵⁹ the United States announced dramatically⁶⁰ that it was proposing to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by \$500 million. This announcement, however,

⁵⁸ Since the International Bank does not publish data on loan requests rejected, it would be difficult to determine the number of applicants turned down. The Bank does announce the receipt of applications for some loans, but it is not certain that all applications are reported. Furthermore, as stated above, requests are presented to the U. S. executive director for an opinion even before they are considered by the Bank's directors as a group, and some may be rejected at this juncture. Finally, applications which are in effect rejected may be reported as "still pending investigation."

⁵⁹ For an excellent examination of the policies and practices required of the Latin-American countries to make effective any assistance in development and for an indictment of their attitude that the United States had a responsibility to help, see Acierto (pen-name necessitated by the "official duties of the author"), "A Marshall Plan for Latin America," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 1, pp. 3-20 (Sept., 1947).

⁶⁰ The announcement was translated in advance into Spanish for additional effect. See W. L. Neumann, "Bogota and The Marshall Plan," *American Perspective*, Vol. 2, p. 69 (May, 1948).

was received in a stony silence—"one of the coldest and most unanimous rebuffs in the history of Pan-Americanism," according to a United States correspondent on the scene.⁶¹ Former Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that "the feeling against this country at the Bogota Conference was more bitter than at any inter-American meeting since the Havana Conference in 1928."⁶² As it turned out, not even this \$500 million from the EIB was made available, because of the unwillingness of Congress to approve the increased lending authority.

The only "extraordinary" assistance from the United States of which Latin America had been definitely assured was through the use of ERP dollars in "offshore" purchases. The Administration had asserted that some 30 to 40 percent of total purchases might be made outside the United States, and Latin American countries were expected to be large recipients of dollars from this source.⁶³ In reality, the vaunted assistance through ERP did not materialize, largely because of the release of pressure on United States production by bumper agricultural crops and the improvement of European production of items purchasable in South America. Moreover, many Latin Americans expected that ERP aid might have the effect that United States capital goods desired by Latin America would be in even shorter supply and that investment funds otherwise available to Latin America would be channeled into domestic production in the United States.⁶⁴

Some United States officials, "led by former Under-Secretary of State Sumner

⁶¹ *Washington Post*, April 9, 1948, cited by Neumann, *loc. cit.*

⁶² "Bogota's Lesson," *Washington Post*, April 20, 1948, cited by Neumann, *loc. cit.*

⁶³ See *Latin America and the European Recovery Program*, Preliminary Report No. 23, House of Rep., Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 80th Congr., 2nd sess., March 13, 1948; also for typical news stories stressing ERP gains for Latin America, see *New York Times*, April 4, 1948; *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1947; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1948; *Washington Post*, February 5, 1948; and H. H. Hutcheson and S. Matthews, "ERP and the Underdeveloped Areas," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 24, October 1, 1948. A Latin American view on large-scale aid from the United States was given later by Herman Max, "Significado de un plan Marshall para países Latin-americanos," *Panorama Económico*, Vol. 3, pp. 18-19 (June, 1949).

⁶⁴ Henry C. Wallich listed this among several complaints by the Latin American countries in 1948: "Chief among their complaints are these: (1) wartime exchange accumulations, derived from exports to the United States at OPA ceiling prices, have melted under the heat of American inflation; (2) development loans, which at Bretton Woods were intended to have equal priority with reconstruction loans, have not been forthcoming in any volume; (3) international monetary conditions, which were to be straightened out by the Monetary Fund, continue in disorder; (4) attempts to free international trade through the ITO Charter, appear to be aimed primarily at depriving growing countries of their protective devices instead of securing broader markets for them; (5) nothing at all has been done for long-run commodity price stabilization; and (6) the recent development of the European Recovery Program threatens to perpetuate the shortage of investment goods as well as of investment funds available to Latin America." ("Some Aspects of Latin American Economic Relations with the United States," in *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States*, ed. Seymour E. Harris [Cambridge, Mass., 1948], p. 156.)

Welles, defended the view that the other American republics were entitled to large-scale economic support and that their demands could not be ignored without incurring their lasting ill will and jeopardizing [United States] leadership in the hemisphere."⁶⁵ In spite of these considerations, the official policy of the United States was that since its resources were not unlimited first priority had to be given to European recovery. Secretary of State Marshall stated (at Bogota) that the United States was prepared to assist Latin America but that it could finance "no more than a small portion of the vast development needed."⁶⁶ Further, the United States emphasized the desirability of the creation by Latin American countries of a "favorable climate" for private foreign investment and the presentation of carefully considered developmental projects to the International Bank. The Latin American countries were not receptive, in the main, to the "favorable climate" idea; but the International Bank did make a few more loans to the republics in 1949 and 1950.

Thus, though the United States had a long-standing tradition of regional cooperation with the Latin American republics, it made little effort to implement it in the financial field.⁶⁷ So long as all financial assistance was channeled through "functional" international organizations (those related to a single problem, world-wide in scope) there was little thought of "favoritism" to other countries outside South America, but when a concerted effort was made to help Europe (on a regional basis), jealousies arose immediately, and the United States did not make any comparable effort to dispel them. These results are further evidence of the impact of political considerations on international cooperation, especially when the latter is tied to financial aid distributed on regional lines.

Problems in international financial cooperation with the Far East arose in quite a different manner. Whereas Latin America had a close association with the United States but did not receive much economic assistance, some of the Far East countries received economic assistance even though there was no regional cooperation among those receiving aid nor any consideration by the United States of "regional" problems. Asiatic countries (chiefly China, Japan,

⁶⁵ J. C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), p. 372. See also Wallich, *op. cit.*, p. 157: "For the United States, however, this lull in relations with Latin America, temporary though it may be, poses a rather serious question of principle. If the attitudes of our own public and the policies of our government are subject to considerable short-run fluctuations, how will it be possible to find international acceptance of American world leadership which circumstances seem to impose upon this nation? Clearly, there can be no confidence in any country's leadership unless its policies, whatever they may be, are clearly defined and reasonably stable."

⁶⁶ Quoted by Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 368. For comment on U. S. policy see *The Economist*, March 27, 1948, p. 505; May 18, 1948, p. 762; and June 12, 1948, pp. 958-59.

⁶⁷ For a report that anti-American feeling is still growing in Latin America as a result of the slighting of Pan-American cooperation (and aid), see *New York Times*, June 17, 1952.

and Korea) received the second largest amount of American economic aid provided any region during the period 1945-1950. But the Administration argued, correctly, that the Far Eastern nations were not developed sufficiently to profit by the type of economic cooperation facilitated by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). It did, however, make a token effort at a "regional" approach to aid in 1950 when it combined aid to Korea and China in one measure at the insistence of those members of Congress who were particularly interested in the Far East. The Administration was not enthusiastic over this approach, since it apparently thought that the elevation of assistance to Asia to a "regional" basis would be cause for greater insistence that aid be extended, and it was of the firm belief that, as a bulwark against Communism, Europe should be taken care of first. In addition, aid was not on a sufficiently large scale to make regional coordination worthwhile. The total volume of aid was less than one-ninth of that going to Europe after the initiation of ERP. U.S. economic cooperation with the nations of the Far East continued to be on a bilateral basis or through the international organizations established in the immediate postwar period although officials did state that regional association⁶⁸ would be looked on with favor by the United States.

The United States adopted a different approach to international financial cooperation in the case of Europe than with respect to Latin America and the Far East mainly because of its high estimate of the importance of aiding Europe, as compared to the developing areas of the world, in combatting Communism. This view is borne out by the increased interest of the United States in a regional grouping in Southeast Asia after the Communist attack on South Korea. There is, of course, nothing inherently contradictory in following a policy of international cooperation through "world-wide" agencies responsible for single problems and at the same time through regional associations directed at broader economic and political relations. However, the absence of a consistent policy toward a region (as with Latin America) and the probability that some members of a region will feel slighted (especially if the cooperation is tied to U. S. aid)⁶⁹ are important limitations on the regional approach, if an effort is to be made to reduce political forces in the decisions of the agencies involved. Experience also indicates that regionalism tied to aid has no geograph-

⁶⁸ For a review of efforts at cooperation, see C. H. Schaaf, "Economic Cooperation in Asia," *International Conciliation* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April, 1950); and *Survey of United States International Finance, 1950* (cited in n. 14), pp. 61-64.

⁶⁹ Just such jealousy arose pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, in which equal amounts of aid were allocated to Israel and all the Arab states combined. Nationalistic elements in the latter called for a rejection of the aid on the ground that the distribution was "an insult" and was based on a "dangerous principle" of equality of importance of five Arab states with Israel. (See *New York Times*, June 26, 1951.) The U. S. government was reported in early 1953 as reconsidering its distribution of aid to the Middle East, with the intent of wooing the Arab states from Russian influence by equalizing aid to each nation in the area.

ical stopping point. Just as no nation within a region can be neglected, so must no area of the world be left out.⁷⁰

The regional approach to financial cooperation under the Mutual Security Program was adopted not only to treat similar economic and financial problems more effectively but also to support political and strategic objectives. The inclusion of all regions outside the Soviet orbit was largely justified by the political purpose of containing the spread of Communism. The United States, by 1951, had travelled a long way from its early anticipations of international financial cooperation on the purely technical level. Due partly to the East-West split and partly to the inherently political nature of intergovernmental decisions, international financial cooperation and foreign aid policies were directed at political, strategic, economic and financial problems of the various non-Soviet regions, thus integrating questions and considerations which should never have been separated.

V. SOME QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

The experience of the postwar period shows clearly that political factors cannot be divorced from economic and financial policies and problems among nations, and there is an increasing recognition among governmental and private circles that problems in international relations must be faced on several fronts at once and through overall programs and policies. The marriage of political forces with financial and economic factors is difficult, however, because it must be done on two scenes successfully at the same time—the domestic and the international. Success in the former requires, for the United States, close cooperation among Congress, the Administration and official and private experts. Difficult problems arise in getting the public, in general, and Congress and the Administration, in particular, to see the problems in an inclusive context and to act in a fairly consistent fashion in both the political and economic realms. Success in the latter scene requires coordination of domestic policies of nations in the pursuit of agreed-upon ends. A major problem here is what institutional form the cooperation should take. Should it be of the early postwar “world-wide” character, with the institutions employing “constitutions” and criteria of action supposedly applicable to each and every member despite the widely diverse political and economic systems in each? Should it take the form of associations based on regional proximity, despite the ideological and economic conflicts within the regions as well as among them? Should it take any form which requires “ranking” of nations under common criteria or through voting schemes? Or, should it take the form of bilateral diplomacy or diplomatic bargaining (more or less on an *ad hoc* and flexible basis) among ideologically similar nations which have expressed a desire to pursue the same long-run principles of economic and political action?

⁷⁰ Witness the 1951-1953 presentation and justification of the Mutual Security Program by four regions covering the entire non-Soviet world.

Intergovernmental cooperation is required now more than during the nineteenth century because of the absence of the "automatic" mechanisms of commercial and financial adjustment and the former inducements to flow of goods and capital which were largely divorced from political positions of governments. Governments now act readily as buffers for the domestic economies and must take on a larger responsibility for coordination of their economies internationally. The problem of what is the most effective form of international financial (and economic) cooperation to gain the politico-economic goals of the Western nations is a crucial and as yet unanswered one.

NATURE OVER ART: NO MORE LOCAL FINANCE*

ROWLAND EGGER

University of Virginia

In 1866 an uncommonly knowledgeable gentleman, Alexis de Tocqueville by name, wrote as follows: "Je pense que dans les siècles démocratiques qui vont s'ouvrir l'indépendance individuelle et les libertés locales seront toujours un produit de l'art. La centralisation sera le gouvernement naturel." Four score and five years later a distinguished compatriot documented the triumph of nature over art which de Tocqueville contemplated as a possibility, and analyzed at some length the instrumentality through which *le gouvernement naturel* has established its primacy over *les libertés locales*. Professor Jean Boulouis has recently pronounced a plaintive requiem for French local self-government culminating in these words: "On pourrait presque avancer, sans beaucoup d'exagération, qu'il n'existe plus de finances locales, mais tout au plus une localisation des finances nationales."

The two most striking phenomena of local government finance in recent decades are, first, the absolute increase in the amount of money disbursed by local governments, and second, the substantial expansion in the proportion of local government disbursements financed from intergovernmental transfers of funds—grants-in-aid, shared taxes, and various other devices by which money is shifted from one level of government to another.

Before we get too far into the highly debatable notions and concepts to which discourse about local government finance inevitably gives rise, perhaps it would be just as well to suggest some of the areas that are reasonably non-controversial. It is, I take it, possible to approach this problem with a purely pragmatic attitude toward the proper level of municipal expenditure—to assume that local governments should spend whatever is needed efficiently and economically to perform the functions assigned to them. It is likewise reasonably clear that all our governments—national, state and local—belong eventually to the same shareholders, although the equities of some shareholders appear to be larger than others. It should also be possible to agree that even in a society embracing pluralistic values and highly complex aspirations it is desirable to keep the lines of responsibility and authority of our political institutions as clear and unequivocal as those commonly thought to be salutary in administrative organization.

I

Local government, as has been pointed out many times, is the institution which accommodates the special and the differentiating geographical elements in political life. The superior governments, operating over relatively large areas and relatively large populations, must function within a context of uniformity

* Adapted from a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Buffalo, New York, in August, 1952.

and of equal protection of the laws. They are unable to adapt themselves directly to the special and unique characteristics which local conditions and community organization produce. Local communities are different, both as to the type of services they require, and the amount of service. Some communities, for example, insist upon topping their primary and secondary educational systems with full-blown municipal universities. Others, equally wealthy and equally populous, settle for the more customary public school system involving eleven or twelve years of instruction. Sometimes private or sectarian educational institutions fill the need for local higher education; frequently, the need remains unfilled and even unfelt. Equally drastic differences in the felt and unfelt needs of communities exist in other functional areas—streets and highways, public safety, public welfare, sanitation, public health, recreation, and a dozen more.

However much variation in the standards at which services are maintained, there is a clearly evident uniformity in the services in which the center of gravity as far as actual operation is concerned is centered at the local level. While certain striking exceptions are in every category apparent, five functions are in overwhelming preponderance locally administered by local employees reporting to locally responsible governing bodies. These are (1) education, (2) welfare, (3) safety, (4) sanitation, health and hospitals, and (5) highways and public works. There are, except in a small number of states in which virtually complete financial responsibility for education, welfare, preventive public health, and highways has been assumed by the superior government, few localities in which these five activities are not locally administered and for which the aggregate operating cost amounts to less than 85 per cent of total expenditures for operations.¹

There are many reasons, not all of them based upon dispassionate analyses of relative efficiency and economy, for the maintenance of at least nominal local administrative responsibility. Part of the national bias in favor of local administration of certain of these services undoubtedly stems from the political philosophy enunciated by Mr. Jefferson, although it may be noted that Mr. Jefferson's ideas are most often honored in the breach in the very region of which he is the most distinguished and ornamental flower, and the most frequently quoted as well as the least adequately understood prophet. Partly it stems from historical accidents which became precedents which tend quickly to be identified with the eternal and immutable American Way. When we consider the relatively short time in which there has been any significant assertion of national and state interest in some of these functions which have been the concern of local communities for centuries, the apparently instinctive, or at least visceral, resistance to centralization becomes understandable. With respect to some of these functions it is still true that they seem to confer benefits only in the immediate area of performance and are thus logically a local re-

¹ See International City Managers Association, *Municipal Year Book 1952* (Chicago, 1952); U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Survey of City Government Finances in 1951* (Washington, 1952).

sponsibility. And in large part the preservation of local administration through which state and federal governments exert indirect influence on citizens is explained by the way in which political power is organized in the United States. Assertions of national or state interest must be made by legislatures whose locally-elected members seek to minimize disturbances in the political power structure of their districts and insist on channeling central government activity through local instrumentalities which they understand, or think they understand, how to control.²

Education. Let us examine first the factors which have served as the basis for at least nominally centering the control of public education at the local level. An educational historian who looks upon the fleshpots of federal subsidies for education and finds them beautiful, gives an historical explanation:

From its early days in seventeenth century Massachusetts American education has enjoyed a substantial measure of local autonomy. Although the Puritan theocracy, and later the state, enacted laws requiring localities to maintain schools, the details of carrying out such statutes were left almost entirely to the discretion of the community. As the country expanded and more settlements came into being—often at scattered points and at a distance from the older communities—school districts were established to minister to the educational needs of the new localities. Out of these arose the district school system, which still has its lingering survivors in many parts of the nation. Under the conditions that produced the district school system, the local government enjoyed a virtually unhampered freedom of action in education.³

Throughout the country, the local government, or school district (which is merely a special sort of local government) remains in immediate charge of public education. Although in a few states the district for school administration is the county, most schools remain neighborhood or community affairs. As recently as 1948, there were eleven states in which over 75 per cent of the school districts employed less than ten teachers. At that time, twenty-three states had more than 1,000 school districts, eleven had more than 4,000 districts, and five Midwestern states reported over 6,000 each.⁴

Although in most parts of the country the one-teacher school district seems to be passing, few Americans appear to be interested in more than minor con-

² David B. Truman's chapter, "The Web of Relationships in the Administrative Process," in *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951) is especially illuminating on this latter point. Using as one example the conflict over the U. S. Department of Agriculture's attempts to carry on its newer activities in direct relationship with the farmer, rather than through the land grant colleges and their agricultural extension services, Truman analyzes not only the legislative but also the bureaucratic and interest group opposition to new administrative organization that threatens existing political relationships at the grass roots. This aspect of the power struggle is probably not the least consequential factor in Secretary Benson's program for the reorganization of the USDA.

³ Adolph E. Meyer, *The Development of Education in The Twentieth Century* (New York, 1949), p. 349.

⁴ Council of State Governments, *The Forty-Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 54-55. In view of these data it seems a little premature to dismiss the district school system as a "lingering survivor."

solidations at the local level. The report of a Hoover Commission task force undoubtedly mirrors the prevailing sentiment:

The American people have evolved a system of schools which make educational opportunities available on a scale unknown elsewhere in the world. This system is testimony to our belief in the worth of the individual, and the priority of the individual over the State. It is founded on the view that the development of individual intellect and understanding is essential to the health and development of our democracy. Historically, this program has been largely initiated and developed through energy and vision in local communities and the several States, by public and private enterprise. Because of our national cultural homogeneity we have developed a national type of education without the rigidity imposed by a uniform national system.

Our tradition of local control of education, an outgrowth of the isolation of the pioneer community, still exists, supported by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and by our basic belief that the local community and State must be the cornerstone for all matters concerning the welfare of the individual and his participation in democratic society. This tradition has been strengthened by our zeal for freedom and individual liberty. We have a compelling desire to keep power decentralized in all matters which concern influence over the thinking of the individual; we abhor deeply anything savoring of centralized or totalitarian control of thinking through education. Among the varied and numerous activities of government, there is none closer guarded from excessive Federal control than education. The decentralization of administration and control of public education should be maintained.⁵

Welfare. In the field of public welfare the doctrine of local control, although not local government control, is of equal dignity and long-standing to the principle of locally-centered administrative responsibility for education.⁶ Curiously enough, the Covenanter theologian and Edinburgh professor who is given credit for the "theory of locality," the Reverend Thomas Chalmers, was also an implacable enemy of governmental responsibility, which at the turn of the seventeenth century was local governmental responsibility in accordance with the Elizabethan Poor Law. His notions concerning the parochial organization of charity and care for the poor, and the philosophy of a small "geographical vineyard" as the area for the mutual assistance of human beings persisted and dominated thinking about and organization for welfare administration for centuries after the context of economic and social organization within which they might have had some validity had disappeared completely. Despite the phenomenal development of private philanthropy in the United States, and the piecemeal attempts to meet larger emerging problems of social welfare by state action, such as the passage of workmen's compensation legislation and other social insurance laws, virtually the entirety of public welfare responsibility remained in the hands of private and religious organizations and agencies, with local governments providing a modicum of institutional care at or slightly above the level of the poorhouse, until the depression beginning in 1929.

Even the depression did not shake the belief that interest in and administrative responsibility for public welfare should be essentially local. As the re-

⁵ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Public Welfare* (Washington, 1949), p. 277.

⁶ Arthur P. Miles, *An Introduction to Public Welfare* (Boston, 1949), pp. 131 *et seq.*

sources of private charity and philanthropy were exhausted, the local governments assumed the responsibility and increased their expenditures and expanded their welfare organizations. Not until late 1931 did any of the states undertake any poor relief programs, and even these were in the form of grants or loans to local relief agencies. In mid-1932, when the federal government signified its loss of faith in exhortation, public works, and predictions of prosperity "just around the corner" as depression stoppers by making funds available for direct relief, it chose the method of making RFC loans to state agencies with the clear understanding that these funds were to be merely supplemental but not in lieu of state and local financing. In the Roosevelt administration the funds available were drastically increased, and provided as grants rather than loans, but the theory of ultimate local responsibility was never officially abandoned. It seemed wholly natural that the federal government should not operate directly but work through the states, and that the state governments would in turn work through the local agencies; even Harry Hopkins had come to the federal government from a temporary job granting New York state funds to localities for relief, after many years of welfare activity in New York City.

Relief administration was built up in the United States in pyramid formation with thousands of local units covering the whole country tied together in forty-eight state administrations and through them to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.⁷

This type of administrative experience was one of the ingredients in the thinking which led to the Social Security Act of 1935. The idea of a federal policy state and locally administered was thoroughly familiar and was adopted as the basic means of implementing the Act. Regardless of where the policies and the funds originate, it is the local welfare agency, in most cases, which takes them to the client.

It is not inaccurate to say that the Social Security Act changed in a very fundamental way the pattern of financing of public welfare costs, and universalized a minimum standard of benefits and subsequently a minimum standard of administration. It did not result generally in any considerable change in popular attitudes toward, or affect the continued acceptance of, the essential principles of the poor laws.⁸ As one writer points out:

The longevity of the poor laws has been phenomenal. While many of the Elizabethan principles are deterrents in a modern society one cannot ignore the fact that one of the basic principles—public responsibility for the care of dependent persons—is compatible with the democratic way of life. But along with this principle we have also been forced to continue others that are regressive and, from a social point of view, undesirable . . .

It was quite natural in the days of Queen Elizabeth that the localities should assume responsibility for the administration of public assistance. Local government was at that time the only area of government that directly reached the people . . .

Another Elizabethan principle that is unsuited to an industrial society is family responsibility. The poor laws in most of our states still specify that parents are to support their children and grandchildren and vice versa . . .

⁷ Marietta Stevenson, *Public Welfare Administration* (New York, 1938), p. 30.

⁸ The popular success of recent attacks on the confidentiality of the names of public assistance recipients is fresh evidence on this point.

The principle of legal settlement which was enacted in England in 1662 as a logical corollary of the principle of local responsibility makes each community responsible for the care of its own poor . . .

. . . the Elizabethan poor law principles with emphasis upon local responsibility, legal settlement as an eligibility requirement for public aid, and family responsibility are still with us . . . The "poor law mentality," as the Webbs characterized it, is still the guiding star of our general assistance programs in the various states; indeed, very few states have legislated the poor laws completely out of existence.⁹

Public Safety. The police and fire protection functions are deeply rooted in local communities and remain essentially local, in almost all aspects. The urban fire protection function is so obviously directly related to the protection of lives and property within the environment which urban conditions create that its performance by local quasi-public organizations or by the municipal governments themselves requires no elaborate explanation. It is interesting to note, however, that to the extent rural fire protection, which is 99.44 per cent forest fire protection, is available, it is in general organized under state supervision with an important part of the cost borne by the federal government.

The bias in favor of local control of the police function is likewise deeply rooted in American politics. After contrasting the development of local police institutions in England and America following their transplantation to the colonies, which led to a high degree of centralization in England and an equally high degree of localization in the United States, Bruce Smith points out:

All of the federal forces are controlled by the constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction over crimes, and for the most part are concerned with the enforcement of special groups of federal statutes directly relating to the governmental department within which each force operates. Thus through constitutional limitations and a series of historical accidents, the federal police system is rather closely limited . . .

Likewise in the sphere of state police there has been no real centralizing tendency. On the contrary, general police authority has been denied to many of the state forces, and when granted by statute in some jurisdictions it is exercised only within carefully defined limits. Even in those states which have conferred full police powers, severe restrictions upon the numerical strength of the state force sometimes have prevented application of a really vigorous law enforcement policy, while the evident antipathy of a considerable number of county, township, village and city police units operates to impose geographical limitations upon state police which were not contemplated by law.¹⁰

Smith tells us that in terms of the personnel available for performing the police function, the distribution is as follows: 120,000 local urban police, 14,000 state police, and 20,000 federal police.¹¹ No data seem to be available on the aggregate number of employees of sheriffs' offices, rural county police forces, and rural constables.

Local administration and control of the police function has been so seldom challenged that it is hard to find ringing declarations of the doctrine. It may be noted, however, that despite the histrionic successes of Senator Kefauver's

⁹ Arthur P. Miles, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁰ Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States* (New York, 1949), pp. 164-65.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 174, 193.

investigations, his committee's suggestion of a federal commission to assist local crime watchdog commissions was not taken seriously.

Public Health. In the field of sanitation, preventive medicine, and hospitals the history of localization has been somewhat mixed. It seems essentially accurate to say that environmental sanitation has from the beginning been a matter of state law locally administered. In its inception, of course, it amounted to nothing more than legislation providing for the abatement of sanitary nuisances, such as the 1692 laws of the Province of South Carolina and of the Massachusetts Bay Colony for the prevention of infection associated with polluted air from garbage and slaughterhouses. Latterly more subtle approaches to environmental sanitation, involving the approval of water supplies and waste disposal systems and other types of regulatory and inspectional operations, have been added, but the locus of the administrative responsibility has in the main continued to rest with local health officers responsible to local boards of health or local governing bodies.¹²

With respect to hospitals, as Dr. Harry S. Mustard indicates, the beginnings of local government activity in this field were corollary to the establishment of almshouses and jails. In the early days almshouses, pesthouses and jails served relatively undifferentiated social functions in the American scene. In 1717 the Boston Selectmen were authorized to lease an acre of land for a contagious hospital. Philadelphia purchased Fisher's Island for a pesthouse in 1743. Charleston built an isolation hospital in 1752. These institutions were used mainly as refuges for shipboard victims of contagious diseases, rather than for the inhabitants of the localities in which they were situated.¹³

Although there are many exceptions, the report of the Commission on Hospital Care seems clearly to indicate that in the course of the years, state governments have assumed primary responsibility for the provision of hospital facilities for the mentally ill and for the tuberculous. The state governments ordinarily maintain general hospitals only as a necessary adjunct of their medical colleges, and do not attempt to provide comprehensive, statewide general hospital service. Local general hospital service remains an obligation of the local governments or of private organizations.¹⁴

Local activity in the field of preventive medicine is likewise sanctioned by long historical precedent. As Dr. Mustard points out:

There were two principal situations that precipitated early action in the interest of the public health. The first of these was the epidemic, the second the necessity for providing some sort of medical care for those who through age, poverty, or misbehavior had become wards of the community. Epidemics brought brisk but temporary action in the nature of a board of health. The need for medical care was met by a fairly continuing but limited and somewhat grudgingly provided physician for the poorhouse and jail.¹⁵

¹² Harry S. Mustard, *Government in Public Health* (New York, 1945), Ch. 4.

¹³ Commission on Hospital Care, *Hospital Care in the United States* (New York, 1947) Ch. 21.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-65.

¹⁵ Harry S. Mustard, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

Baltimore appears to have been the first city to establish a health department, as distinguished from the sporadic *ad hoc* boards of health that were set up in times of epidemic. The Baltimore City Health Department was organized in 1798. Although a substantial amount of direct state and federal administrative machinery has since been established to deal with various aspects of preventive public health work, the burden continues mainly to be borne by local health officers responsible to local boards of health or local governing bodies. As the Hoover Commission Task Force phrased it:

The local unit is the ultimate health service agency and without it our ever-growing knowledge about health and disease would be of little practical use. When our entire population has available to it adequate local health services, then the framework of good health for all the people will have been established.¹⁶

In the field of public health, the local health agency seems to enjoy a sanctified status similar to that of the local school district. Congressional hearings in 1951 on a bill to authorize the Public Health Service to make grants to states for the purpose of bolstering up local health agencies produced surprisingly parallel statements from such varied sources as Oscar Ewing and the representatives of the state public health agencies, the American Public Health Association, and the American Medical Association, although there was the inevitable disagreement over the extent and nature of the controls which would go with the grants. On this occasion, Mr. Ewing said:

Many of the communicable diseases which endangered life in the past have been conquered, but the attack upon the principal disease enemies of the present . . . has just begun. The public is demanding protection against such hazards, and science is providing the methods. Local health units are essential mechanisms in bringing these methods to the people.¹⁷

In a presidential address before the American Public Health Association several years ago, a working public health officer commented in the following vein about one of the essential aspects of public health work:

. . . it has been said that public health is the sum total of the health of individuals . . . The education which produces it is therefore something which cannot be supplied to the populace in carload or truckload lots from National or State capitals. It must be dispensed to individuals in ounces, drams, and drops, and its dispensing to those who need it must be insured. This must be done by the local agency who can know how, when, and where individuals can be reached, and who can inspire the local community to want and to support facilities necessary to its general health preservation. It cannot be done in strict accord with any set pattern, for each community has its own characteristics and customs which no transcendentalism or government fiat may affect. It must come from local, voluntary reaction.¹⁸

Highways and Public Works. The long historical association between local government and roads, which is closely linked to the benefits conferred upon

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁷ U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., *Hearings on Local Public Health Units* (Washington, 1951), p. 19.

¹⁸ John J. Sippy, "Local Responsibility in Public Health Administration," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 34, pp. 1139-41, at p. 1140 (Nov., 1944).

the type of wealth traditionally relied upon for local taxation, hardly needs comment. Despite the movement toward highway centralization in the states, almost 85 per cent of total rural road mileage in the United States is still under local control and, for all practical purposes, 100 per cent of total urban mileage.¹⁹ Less than 8 per cent of all the nation's local or secondary road mileage currently receives federal aid.²⁰ Although the roads under direct state control are the most important and most costly ones, local governments still disburse almost half of our total expenditures on highways and actually raise themselves about half of what they spend.²¹

With respect to non-highway aspects of public works activities, the responsibility is predominantly local; indices of contracts let for public works, although fluctuating considerably from year to year, reveal on an average a rate of expenditure by local governments over twice that of the state governments.²² Of course, as contracting "owners" neither state nor local governments are in the running with the Army Engineers, the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Reclamation.

II

It would take a very naive person indeed to be much impressed with the substance of "local" responsibility in many of the various aspects of these functions nominally carried on at the local level. It is not the aim, nor is it essential to the purpose of this discussion, to attempt an appraisal of the extent of local self-determination in the performance of any of the functions. Of much more importance is an understanding of the political and administrative rationale of developments which have admittedly shifted the center of policy and standards to a superior governmental level, but which have meticulously maintained doctrinal adherence to local self-government and continued almost exclusively to utilize the local governments as operating instrumentalities.

The history of contemporary public education in the United States is marked by a number of significant facts. One is the substantial elevation of standards in the public school system—the elevation of professional requirements for teachers, the lengthening and standardization of the school term, the enrichment of the curriculum, the expansion of the mission of the public schools, and the leveling-up of educational facilities in the underdeveloped areas. These changes may or may not be productive of improvements of note in the manners, morals or perceptions of the boys and girls, but as professional educators rate

¹⁹ Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, *Table RM-200*. This is an annual tabulation; the data for 1952 upon which citations in the text were based have not yet been printed.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ See testimony of Thomas H. McDonald, U. S. Commissioner of Public Roads, in U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st sess., *Study of Domestic Land and Water Transportation* (Washington, 1951), pp. 927 *et seq.*

²² International City Managers Association, *Municipal Year Book 1951* (Chicago, 1951), p. 319.

progress, we have progressed. Another significant fact is the absolute increase in expenditures for public schools. A third significant fact is the shift in the pattern of school support.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that all of these things are interrelated. The elevation of standards in the public school system is, in part, a consequence of the profound conviction of education, which in most of the United States has been at least as strong as the conviction of sin, and about which we have managed to do a good deal more. In larger part, however, the elevation of standards in the public school system is due to the fact that it has gotten almost completely into the hands of the educational bureaucracy. There is no sector of American social organization in which, for all practical purposes, the separation of powers has so completely disappeared.

In elevating the standards of the public school system, the prophets of progress have wisely refrained from tampering with the ark of the covenant. The symbols have been preserved, and the rituals carefully respected. But the substance of authority has passed out of the hands of local school boards, local governing boards, and even out of the hands of local school administrators. The means by which this end has been achieved is the grant-in-aid. In the last thirty years expenditures for public schools have increased five-fold, and in the last five years they have virtually doubled—perhaps the only civil function to keep pace with the consumer price index. The more significant change, however, has been in the pattern of finance. Twenty years ago the states paid about 20 per cent of the total cost of public education; ten years ago they paid about 30 per cent; now they pay about 40 per cent. And the end is nowhere in sight. Local contributions have declined proportionately, since all this has been achieved entirely without the assistance of the federal government.²³

Viewed in the large, it seems that the professional educators have undertaken, with a remarkable degree of success, to push up the standards of the public school system at a rate somewhat beyond either the present fiscal ability or the social and political sophistication of the local governments. The fact that the grant-in-aid systems almost universally emphasize standards of expenditure rather than standards of achievement, and contain virtually no elements of equalization, suggests that what is being overcome at the local level is a certain social and political backwardness rather than actual inability to meet the costs of better public school systems from local funds, although it must be remembered that limitations upon local taxing power frequently prevent local governments from doing as much as they are able and willing to call upon their constituencies to support.

The situation in the field of public welfare is generally similar, except that the federal government is readily at hand for those seeking a whipping-boy to blame for the erosion of the substance of local responsibility and local control. However, it is interesting to note that no less than in public education the symbols and rituals have been carefully preserved. The Social Security Act itself actually centralizes the administration of only one of the categories—

²³ Council of State Governments, *op. cit.*, p. 112 and Table 48, p. 224.

Old Age and Survivors Insurance—while the other instrumentality in which the administrative arguments for federal operations are overwhelming—the Employment Service—was hastily returned to the states despite the fact that its operation by the federal government during the war clearly demonstrated the superiority of national administration. Its corollary categorical assistance—Unemployment Compensation—has of course never been nationally administered, although the completeness of national control reduces state authority to a very gossamer thread. Nevertheless, in practically all the states local welfare officials responsible to local boards of public welfare or local governing bodies bear the burden of administering old age assistance, aid to dependent children, and aid to the blind, in addition to those welfare functions not provided for in the Social Security Act.

The Social Security Act was, of course, the great national instrumentality for the establishment of minimum standards throughout the country for the alleviation of a number of the most important causes of human suffering and maladjustment. While its sponsors were politically sagacious enough to preserve the symbols, the purpose of the Act was such as inherently to limit the amount of free play which could be permitted in local administration. The Act was far in advance of the political and social sophistication of large parts of the country. And within limits, the standards it prescribed were likewise standards not of achievement but of expenditure. Up to a point, the more you spend the more you get. As in other efforts to persuade state and local governments to operate beyond their current condition of political enlightenment, the grant-in-aid proved to be a necessary part of the plan. By definition, its purpose in such cases is to promote expenditure, not to equalize the burden.

The situation in public health, despite the influence of federal grants and expenditures under certain titles of the Social Security Act and other authorities, is quite the reverse. In the last decade public health expenditures have more than quadrupled, but in the process the federal proportion has declined from about 46 per cent to 29 per cent, while state and local expenditures, principally local, have increased from 54 to 71 per cent. The local governments are, in fact, financing from local sources almost half of the total operating costs of public health departments, exclusive of sanatoria and hospitals. It is interesting to note that public health expenditures from local sources have increased eight-fold in the last decade.²⁴

The factors which have produced a reasonable degree of integration in health administration are apparently professional rather than financial. Most of the state health departments are organized to provide special services to local health departments or to local governments, or to deal with special aspects of public health work, such as industrial hygiene, etc. The relationships of staff and command in such circumstances tend to become somewhat blurred, but in their essence they tend to rest on the authority of ideas rather than the authority either of men or of money.

²⁴ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

In the field of highways, which represents the major share of local public works, it seems likewise clear that the major integrative factor is technological rather than financial. The percentage of federal money involved in aggregate federal-state-local expenditures for the construction of highways is hardly large enough to conclude major issues of policy or management at either state or local levels. On the other hand, the practical utility of maintaining uniform standards of engineering and design on connecting segments of the national highway network is an argument solid enough to overcome the rugged individualism of almost any state or local public works engineer or governing body. There have been times, and indeed there are and have been certain areas, in which this observation is not valid, but (made-work construction in time of depression and road construction for defense access in time of national emergency aside) it is clear that federal grants-in-aid have not been primary determinants in highway development. Moreover, when we come to the sharing of moneys for highway purposes between state and local governments, it is equally significant to note that in the vast majority of states the funds come to the localities in terms which give the state authorities very little control over engineering and design standards, and in many cases little control over whether shared motor-fuel taxes, for example, are even devoted to highway purposes.²⁵

As to other public works, the extent of supervision and control has varied enormously with circumstances. During the period when the federal government was promoting construction projects with grants and loans, federal approval of engineering and design specifications was relatively extensive and meticulous. In many states today, state supervision and control of local school construction plans is common, whether or not state financial assistance is extended.²⁶ Hospital construction under the Hill-Burton Act is generally subject to supervision by the state hospital construction agencies which the Act makes mandatory, although the amount of actual federal control over plans and specifications appears to be nominal. In the main, however, local public works operations appear to be free of significant external controls.

We have now examined in a general way the political and administrative folklore which has produced patterns of apparently accepted thought about the proper geographical level for the performance of certain important public services. We have also examined the way in which such factors as technological development, professionalization of administration, up-grading of standards, and other influences have affected the real locus of authority and responsibility in these services. We have had opportunity to observe that popular stereotypes in federal-state-local fiscal relations apply with a good deal less

²⁵ Council of State Governments, *State-Local Relations* (Chicago, 1946) points out, at p. 27: "In a number of states, for example, highway grants are not audited by state officials; funds received by counties 'for maintenance and construction of roads' are merged into general county funds and their expenditure for highway purposes is not assured." On the general subject of diversion, see Council of State Governments, *Federal Grants in Aid* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 227-29.

²⁶ Council of State Governments, *The Forty Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 99-101 and Table 44, p. 219.

than complete uniformity—that grants-in-aid do not inevitably produce shifts in policy control in direct proportion which the amount of the grant bears to the total cost of the function, and that in some cases a rather high degree of integration of policy has come about in consequence of factors only indirectly associated with the availability of grants. On the whole, the stars in the federal-state-local fiscal and administrative firmament seem rather remarkably movable.

III

Let us briefly turn our attention to the political and administrative folklore of revenue source allocation. The cardinal principle in local taxation in the United States is apparently the article of faith relating to the appropriateness of property taxation for local purposes. In some states this has been carried to the extent of constitutional and exclusive allocation of this source to the uses of local governing bodies. In other states, by custom the central government has vacated property taxation in order to permit its unobstructed occupation by the local governments. In part this has been based upon the obvious administrative suitability of property taxation, especially real property taxation, to an area of limited geographical jurisdiction. Land and houses stay put. In part it has been based upon the contribution which many of the municipal services make to the improvement in the value of property. In part it has resulted from the desire of many state tax authorities to eliminate or minimize state-local stresses incident upon equalization. But whatever the motivation, property is principally taxed by local governments, and property forms the principal tax revenue source of local governments.

Latterly, local revenue sources have in many sections of the country been liberalized, or at least changed. Broader—indeed, in some cases, as subsequent experience proved, entirely too broad—powers with respect to the levy of various sorts of excise, income, and license taxes have been extended to local governments, especially urban local governments. In part this broadening of the base of local taxation has been necessitated by the relative decline of property as a significant index of taxpaying capacity. In the modern world, there are too many other forms of wealth, and too many more productive forms of wealth, to justify the large degree of reliance upon property taxation which had come to be placed upon it in the local tax structure. In part it must be regarded as due to the political effectiveness of the organized real estate interests in the determination of local tax policy; local governments, not unnaturally, have always been sensitive to this segment of the local economy, and a great many local governments tend normally to be caudal appendages of the real estate business. In any case, a fairly effective halt on further expansion of property taxation in any measure even remotely adequate to meet rising costs in the established local services, and fiscal requirements for new services, appears to have been called.

In general, the results of the extension of local taxing power have been disappointing. In some states authorities were conferred upon localities clearly

beyond the ability of any local government effectively to administer. Municipal net income taxes, to take an example, appear to be of this character; municipalities do not have access to the records of many persons and corporations doing business and deriving profits from activities within the municipality which are required effectively to enforce a net income tax. Business and occupational licenses, to take another example, in the absence of records available usually only to the state, must utilize indicators so crude—gross receipts, as a general rule—that rates must be kept at purely nominal levels to avoid confiscation in particular cases. Many excise taxes can be levied only at nominal rates in areas of small geographical jurisdiction if wholesale avoidance or evasion is to be forestalled.

There can be little quarrel with the generally accepted bias favoring the preponderant or exclusive taxation of property, particularly real property by local governments, although as long as intergovernmental transfer of funds continues to be practiced in any significant degree it is clearly impossible for superior governments to divest themselves of responsibility for assuring that the necessary preconditions for effective taxation of property are maintained in the localities, and that this source is in fact called upon to bear a just portion—whatever that essentially political determination shall be—of the costs of local government. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that property taxes, however effectively and equitably utilized, cannot support the entirety of the increase in local government costs, to say nothing of contributing anything to the development of relative fiscal self-sufficiency at the local level.

On the other hand, as experience has demonstrated, there are limits upon the possibility of strengthening, without the support of technical assistance, the revenue positions of local governments through the introduction of more sensitive newer local taxes, because of the special need which local government has for fiscal stability, because of the restrictions on administrative efficacy inherent in relatively small size as well as limited geographical jurisdiction, and because of the lack of ancillary regulatory powers essential to the enforcement of many of the newer types of taxes.

Faced with these facts, the states have been confronted with two alternatives: (1) technical assistance could be provided to the localities in an attempt to maximize the effectiveness of local sources, or of sources which might legitimately be made available locally if such technical assistance were available; or (2) raising the necessary funds from state sources and distributing them to the localities in the form of grants-in-aid or shared taxes. In fact, both types of action have been embraced. The work of many of the state tax commissions in the field of property taxation has been, and is, of the nature of technical assistance to the localities in the improvement of property assessment, and some states give the localities a limited amount of technical assistance in connection with non-property taxes. In the main, as is clearly indicated by the expansion of intergovernmental transfers of funds, grants-in-aid and shared taxes have been relied upon instead.

IV

Truth, like virtue, seems to be as relative in the field of public affairs, including public finance, as it is almost everywhere else. "There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so," is as true of subsidies, grants and shared taxes as it was of manners and morals at Elsinore. And this is certainly not the place to reargue the case for and against grants-in-aid.²⁷ All of the logic adduced in support of intergovernmental transfers of funds has been valid and invalid at certain times in history and with respect to certain types of grants. All of the arguments made in opposition to grants-in-aid have been true and untrue under certain circumstances and with respect to certain sorts of subsidies. In general, it is true that the legal situation confronted by a federal government engenders resort to and continuance of grants-in-aid for the stimulation of programs that must, for constitutional or over-riding political reasons, be carried out by state and local instrumentalities in order to establish and maintain national minimal service standards. What the federal government cannot command it must purchase, and the grant-in-aid is the technique by which state and local concurrent and coordinate action is bought.

The legal situation with respect to state persuasion and coercion of local activity is, of course, quite different, but the political climate has many points of similarity. Few state legislatures would venture to impose mandatory duties involving substantial expenditure upon local governments without at the same time sweetening the pot with additional state funds. Indeed, almost every session of every state legislature is confronted with very steep demands from local government for funds merely to offset the effects of inflation on current programs. And governorships, formerly bought and sold in the smoke-filled back rooms, it is alleged by malefactors of great wealth, are now more likely to be openly and unashamedly bargained for at the state-local relations counter, with wampum made up of intricate old plans and imaginative new programs for pumping more and more state money into local coffers.

So it is probably not very realistic to think of anything like a drastic reversal of public policy which would eliminate intergovernmental transfers of funds and which would establish each level of government on its own discrete financial bottom. It is worth while, however, to take a brief look at the nature of prevailing grant-in-aid programs and their administrative consequences. In the first place, most grants are essentially stimulative of expenditure; as has been pointed out before, the standards they erect are standards of money matched, not missions accomplished. It is of some interest that the only federal grant-in-aid proposal which significantly related its payments to local ability and local effort was the ill-fated Taft bill for federal assistance to education. At the state level the situation is somewhat better, although in the field of educational subsidies the Council of State Governments reports that in 1948

²⁷ The debate is handily summarized in Council of State Governments, *Federal Grants in Aid* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 41-50.

only ten states distributed as much as 75 per cent of educational grants on general-purpose equalization formulae,²⁸ and that 25 states utilized crude assessed values for educational grant equalization,²⁹ which is worse than no equalization at all. In most other state grant systems, and obviously in shared-tax systems, there is no element of equalization visible to the naked eye.

In these circumstances it is not to be wondered that functional pressures have been set up in local government which effectively nullify integrated and responsible local administration. When it comes to budgetary matters, most local governing bodies are currently little more than trustees in bankruptcy for a small group of residual local functions. The major decisions have already been made in the light of the compelling argument not of local community needs, but of optimum possibilities in securing matching state and federal funds. Since no premium is set upon efficiency, most grant systems have in effect underwritten the continuance of archaic local governmental jurisdictions and irresponsible local administrative structure and procedures.

Frustrating as is the experience of living in and working with community institutions in which responsibility is as difficult to fix, and influence as difficult to exert, as it is in most of the local school systems and welfare departments with which I am acquainted, it is still true that in the aggregate the present allocation of functions offers a better opportunity of achieving a reasonably satisfactory community life than if functional operations had been kicked upstairs along with a large part of the financial burden. It may be sometimes difficult to find our way around in our untidy and illogical county and municipal household, but it is also true that most of the furniture and utensils we need, and for that matter a fair stock of vittles, are there when we are able eventually to find them.

Let us admit that we may, in the future, desire to utilize grants-in-aid for stimulative purposes, and even to distribute them on the basis of expenditure standards. We may even wish on occasion to play fast and loose with principles of equalization. The problem is not one of inviolate adherence to a particular doctrine of intergovernmental fiscal relations, but of intelligent use and modification of systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations in accord with reasonably well agreed general social and political objectives. In short, when stimulation is required, then grants-in-aid, along with interest rates and all other suitable and available forms of social control, should be utilized to stimulate. When stimulation is not required, the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations should be adapted and modified to support consolidation, economy and equalization of administrative services and costs. The fact that in many of the social services, and in other local services as well in the target areas, there are standards below which the nation and the states cannot permit the local government to fall should not imply that these exigencies cannot be met without losing integrity, unity and self-reliance within the institutions of local adminis-

²⁸ Council of State Governments, *The Forty Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 128-31 and Table 55, p. 231.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Table 60, p. 236.

tration. Let me suggest a few of the ways in which we might face ourselves in the right direction for achieving this end.

First, with respect to those services in which minimum state-wide or national standards must be maintained, let the superior governments state the requirements in terms of objective service standards, rather than standards of expenditure which are in reality not performance standards at all.

Second, let the states provide technical assistance for assuring, and in fact assure, that proper and equitable use is being made of property taxes by local governments.

Third, let the states provide technical assistance and, in appropriate cases, legal and enforcement support, which will permit effective utilization of newer local taxes, such as business taxes and excises at rates and with economic indicators which will assure progressivity and at the same time secure the just and equitable utilization of these revenue sources.

Fourth, in the event that property taxes at a true rate which defines the equitable state-wide sacrifice, and the additional local taxes at the standard prescribed rates, will not produce a sum equal to the cost of maintaining at the prescribed state-wide or nation-wide standards the essential services; then a local supplemental tax, up to a specified percentage, against the state personal net income tax collected in the locality should be permitted.

Fifth, in the event that all of these measures do not produce funds sufficient to operate the essential services at the prescribed standards, block grants should be made in an amount sufficient when added to locally raised revenues to operate the essential services at the prescribed standards. Such block grants from state to local governments, and from federal to state governments, should seek to equalize, within minimum standards, the resources available for the operation of the essential services.

Sixth, standards for the use of property taxes, as well as standards for the use of the newer local taxes, should be stated in terms definitive of the general equitable rate of sacrifice, but not in terms of maxima. Localities which desire to operate essential services above the prescribed standards, or to undertake other services, should be permitted and encouraged to develop and expand their operations in accordance with the demands made upon them by their constituencies.

STATE ADMINISTRATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE WEST*

VINCENT OSTROM
University of Oregon

West of the one hundredth meridian, the average annual rainfall is generally less than twenty inches except for higher mountainous areas and the humid area west of the Cascade range in western Washington and Oregon and an area west of the Coast range in northwestern California. With less than twenty inches of rainfall, irrigation and dry-farming methods are required to supplement and conserve the native moisture if successful crops are to be produced. At twenty inches of rainfall successful agriculture is subject to extreme hazards from frequent droughts that call to mind the tragedy of crop failure and dust storms. In the humid Pacific Northwest the dry summer climate introduces another variable limiting successful agricultural production without supplementary water.

American institutional arrangements, sustenance patterns and resource policies were conceived in humid England and developed in the humid regions of the United States. However, the general aridity of the West stands in marked contrast to the humidity that prevailed in the physical environment where American social institutions and traditions were formed. This alteration of the physical environment has caused an important shift in the balance of human ecology requiring significant modification in institutional arrangements and social policy, especially in regard to the control and development of natural resources.¹

This paper is concerned primarily with an analysis of the role that state governments have played in meeting the peculiar requirements of western resources development. At the outset, however, it must be recognized that the states have operated under a fundamental handicap. While the control and development of water resources is the critical factor in the resources policies of the West, little consideration seems to have been given to structuring the area of the states so as to permit effective control of watershed areas. The rectangular shape of most western states reflects the surveyor's defiance of land forms in drawing state boundaries. Where state boundaries do respond to land forms, the channel of a major river most frequently provides the boundary marker,

* This paper was prepared for the panel on state administration of natural resources at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Buffalo, New York, August 26, 1962. New developments, especially in state legislation during the 1953 session of state legislatures, are not reported in this paper. However, the few changes which might be made in factual observation do not alter the analyses and conclusions.

¹ Early studies of the aridity of the West and its implications for public policy include John W. Powell, *Reports on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States . . .* (2nd. ed., Washington, 1879); William E. Smythe, *The Conquest of Arid America* (New York, 1900); Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1921); Elwood Mead, *Irrigation Institutions* (New York, 1903).

thereby eliminating the possibility of development by a single state. The Central Valley of California is the only major hydrologic unit in the West that is confined to the jurisdiction of a single state. Otherwise only an occasional tributary, such as the Willamette River in Oregon or the Gila River in Arizona, affords opportunity for systematic development on a comprehensive basis by the state as a unit of government.

Despite the lack of attention given to the shaping of an adequate political instrument for the control of the critical factor in the ecology of the West, major responsibilities in the development of water resources were relegated to the states. Subtle differences in the common law, such as distinctions between a usufruct and title-in-fee-simple, resulted in a differentiation between water and land in the administration of the public domain. Title to land and the authority to control the land in the public domain have generally been recognized as inhering in the federal government. On the other hand, control over the acquisition and administration of water rights has generally been recognized as a function of the state governments. Consequently a significant dichotomy of state and federal responsibilities was permitted to develop that has ramified through every aspect of land and water resources administration in the West.

I

The first major change wrought by the western states in the traditional American institutions to control water resources was the abandonment of the common law doctrine of riparian rights and its replacement by the new doctrine of prior appropriation rights. Significantly, the new doctrine was derived from the practice of miners, who, in making claims to precious metals, vested rights on the basis of first come, first served.

The prior appropriation doctrine of water rights permits full utilization of a stream with an assured supply to prior appropriators without the threat of new competitors gaining rights to the water supply simply by the circumstances of location in relation to the course of a stream. The use of water under appropriation is not restricted to lands adjacent to water courses as established in riparian laws. Except for California, all of the western states rely primarily upon the system of prior appropriation in the determination of water rights to surface waters. However, California is still confronted with serious problems arising from conflicts over riparian rights in the development of water exchange arrangements in the Central Valley and in some of the basins of Southern California.²

Shortly after the prior appropriation doctrine had been firmly established in

² Litigation may be instituted to adjudicate water rights in the entire Sacramento River basin as a result of conflicts over diversion into the San Joaquin basin. In the development of the California Water Plan, sensitivity over water rights is unquestionably a motive for plans to divert Feather River water south across the Tehachapi Mountains with a pump lift of approximately 3,000 feet instead of diverting the Kern River on the Sierra Nevada at an elevation high enough to reduce pumping greatly, or perhaps even permit a gravity system.

the law of western states as a basis for determining water rights, new devices were invented to permit careful control over the actual appropriation of water by water users. Instead of relying exclusively upon the courts as instruments for resolving conflicts over water rights, western states, beginning with Wyoming, placed administrative responsibility for the supervision and regulation of appropriations with the state engineer. Appropriation claims were filed with the state engineer instead of the county recorder. The amount of the appropriation was subject to review in terms of the beneficial use of the water, the actual needs for water, diligence in utilization of water, and the amount of water subject to potential appropriation. By the elimination of paper claims to water, the control of appropriations to prevent filings beyond the potential supplies, and the control of unreasonable waste by prior appropriators, the state was able to avoid open warfare among water appropriators and to establish orderly relationships among water users without their having to resort constantly to expensive litigation.³

With the increased efficiency of pumping and the greater demand for agricultural production, the western states have been confronted with a new problem of water rights to underground water supplies. Underground waters are more difficult to administer because of the difficulty of measuring safe yield and determining the nature of the underground water supply. Consequently some of the western states, instead of relying upon the appropriation principle, have permitted rights to vest in owners of overlying lands. In some areas, notably in Arizona, users have pumped water substantially beyond the permanent safe yield of the underground basins.⁴ Unless the federal pork-barrel is used to "rescue" users making overdrafts on underground basins, serious human tragedies can be expected.

Utilization of water resources required the development of new social agencies in the West. As Frederick Jackson Turner has observed, "... no conquest was possible by the old individual pioneer method ... expensive irrigation works must be constructed, cooperative activity was demanded in the utilization of water supply, and capital beyond the reach of the farmer was required."⁵ Although many early irrigation projects were undertaken by individual entrepreneurs, cooperatives and local public organizations have generally served as the agencies to provide the necessary "cooperative labor and capital" for local irrigation works.

Mutual water companies were organized by early settlers in Utah and Southern California as semi-public agencies to provide irrigation water to farming communities on a cooperative basis. Similar cooperatives have been developed

³ Mead, *op. cit.* Mead was one of the pioneers in the development of the doctrines of prior appropriation rights, and as consultant to the Wyoming constitutional convention and as Wyoming state engineer he was generally credited with the development of the "Wyoming system" of administration of water rights.

⁴ Paul Kelso, "The Arizona Ground Water Act," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 1, pp. 178-82 (June, 1948).

⁵ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

in other states. Beginning in 1887 with the Wright Act of California, western states organized public irrigation districts as special agencies with powers of taxation and eminent domain to provide for the construction and operation of irrigation works. Local government agencies for water resources administration have multiplied until most western states have irrigation, flood control, drainage, water, and utility districts.

The organization of these new local public agencies for the development of water resources and the new system for the appropriation of water permitted people to pool their wealth to develop the country. However, the lack of adequate skill and competent advice in the design of waterworks and the development of irrigation systems produced many poorly conceived projects planned without adequate consideration of either physical or economic feasibility. Consequently many irrigation districts defaulted on the repayment of their bonded indebtedness, creating serious doubt as to the soundness of local resources development. On the other hand, many local irrigation districts have been efficiently managed and operate as successful agencies today.

II

By the early part of the twentieth century most of the water projects susceptible of development on a small scale by local organizations of irrigators and water users had been undertaken. To undertake large-scale projects which these groups were not able to handle, the Reclamation Service, a federal agency, was established in 1902. Most western states have not advanced far beyond the function of providing the permissive conditions for the development of federal waterworks projects and serving as special pleaders before federal agencies to undertake local development.⁶ In some states, notably California, the state government has served as the agency within which resource planners have tried to come to grips with problems of comprehensive planning for multiple-purpose water resources development. California's efforts in this direction provide an interesting chapter in natural resources administration by a state government, since that state has the necessary conditions—wealth and control over a large integral hydrologic unit—for active state participation in the construction and operation of its water resources.

In 1919, Robert B. Marshall, who for many years was the Chief Geographer in charge of the Topographic Branch of the U. S. Geological Survey, proposed a plan for the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Rivers in the Central Valley by capturing the flood discharge in a number of large reservoirs on tributary streams and on the upper Sacramento River.⁷ By a system of canals along the edge of the foothills skirting

⁶ An interesting venture of state government in the development of reclamation projects occurred under the provisions of the Carey Act of 1894, which permitted each state in the arid West to select one million acres of land and plan for its irrigation and settlement. Some of the largest irrigation projects in Idaho, Montana and Wyoming were developed under these arrangements.

⁷ The Marshall Plan was preceded by important preliminary investigations by William

the valley floor it would be possible to divert surplus waters to fertile valley lands for irrigation. The Marshall Plan anticipated the irrigation of 12,000,000 acres of land. In addition water would be used to generate electrical power to help establish the feasibility of the total project.⁸

After an intensive effort supported by public power groups, the League of California Municipalities, and farm and labor organizations, the Marshall Plan was rejected by the California legislature. Instead, legislation was enacted and \$200,000 appropriated to initiate an investigation of California water resources. The supporters of the Marshall Plan carried the measure to the people at three different elections as an initiative proposal for a California Water and Power Act to create a state Water and Power Commission, modeled after the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission. These efforts were defeated after some of "the most bitterly contested political struggles ever staged in California."⁹

The water investigations inaugurated in 1921 by the state engineer were continued by private subscription after the legislature failed to renew the appropriation in 1923. In 1925, during an increasingly serious drought, an additional \$150,000 was appropriated. By 1927 the broad features of a state water plan began to take form; and in 1931 the State Water Plan, together with plans for undertaking the Central Valley Project as the initial unit of the plan, were completed.

In a background of drought and depression, and following the inauguration of the Boulder Canyon Project by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Colorado River Aqueduct by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the California legislature authorized the Central Valley Project by enactment of the Central Valley Project Act of 1933.¹⁰ The legislation was upheld by the voters of California over opposition by the power companies and sectional interests at a special referendum election on December 17, 1933.

The Central Valley Project Act provided for the creation of a Water Project Authority to construct, operate and administer the project. Revenue bonds to the maximum amount of \$170,000,000 were authorized for the construction of (1) the Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, (2) the San Joaquin Pumping System to transport water from the lower Sacramento in the San Joaquin delta, with canals to Fresno Slough for the irrigation of lands in the northwestern portion of San Joaquin Valley, and (3) Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River

Hammond Hall, state engineer, and Elwood Mead, then professor of irrigation at the University of California. See Hall, *Irrigation in California* (Sacramento, 1888); and Mead, *Report of Irrigation Investigation in California*, Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 100 (Washington, 1901).

⁸ Arthur D. Angel, "Political and Administrative Aspects of the Central Valley Project of California," unpub. diss. (UCLA, June, 1944), pp. 40-45.

⁹ Rudolph Spreckels, "How the 1922 Water and Power Act Was Defeated," *Public Ownership*, Vol. 6, p. 163 (August, 1929). While Marshall later opposed the Water and Power Act, those who led the fight for the measure took the Marshall Plan as the basis for their conception of the development of the water resources of the Central Valley.

¹⁰ California, *Statutes*, 1933, Ch. 1042.

with canals diverting water south to the Bakersfield area for the irrigation of lands in southern and eastern San Joaquin Valley.

Instead of utilizing the revenue bonds to undertake the Central Valley Project as a state venture in water resources administration, the California Water Project Authority turned to the United States government to secure federal financing and construction. In 1935 the Central Valley Project was authorized as a federal project with administrative responsibility for construction and operation vested in the Bureau of Reclamation. The Central Valley Project has since been pursued as a federal undertaking.

Early contracts between the California Water Project Authority and the Bureau of Reclamation contemplated an agreement upon a new contract to provide for:

- (a) The operation and maintenance by the authority of useful units of the project, upon presenting assurance of payment satisfactory to the United States of the cost thereof.
- (b) Appropriate payment by the authority to the United States for expenditures in construction of the project.¹¹

By 1939 the Secretary of Interior was rejecting overtures by the Water Project Authority for negotiation of such a contract with the observation that "the Central Valley Project is a federal undertaking to be administered in accordance with Reclamation Law."¹²

After nearly a half-century of effort, California had planned a well integrated program of multiple-purpose water resource development but withdrew from financial, construction and operating responsibilities in favor of federal action. Dissatisfaction with federal administration and control of the Central Valley Project was soon indicated by state officials, including C. A. Griffith, chairman of the California Water Resources Board, who observed:

At first it was hoped that the interest of these federal agencies in California's water problems would relieve the state of much of its responsibility in that connection.

Unfortunately, these hopes did not materialize. Piecemeal planning at the federal level neither solved our problems nor pleased the people of our state. In fact, it only further complicated an already complex and confusing situation.

We have made costly mistakes by taking half measures. In the light of history we are convinced that our basic planning must be done by our own state engineer's staff, men who know our basic requirements, our California water laws, and have a clear understanding of our water rights.¹³

In 1945, the California legislature adopted the State Water Resources Act to authorize a state-wide investigation of water resources as the basis for the formulation of a plan for the full development of the state's water resources,

¹¹ California, Water Project Authority, *Feasibility of State Ownership and Operation of the Central Valley Project of California* (Sacramento, 1952), p. 22.

¹² Quoted in U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, *History of Legislation and Policy Formation of the Central Valley Project*, by Mary Montgomery and Marion Clawson (Berkeley, 1948), p. 10.

¹³ Los Angeles *Daily News*, December 2, 1949.

"to meet present and future needs for all beneficial purposes and uses in all areas of the state."¹⁴ In the meantime, action has been taken which points toward state assumption of a more active role in water resources administration in California. The Feather River Project and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Diversion Projects have been authorized as a part of the state Central Valley Project, "separate and apart from all or any other units thereof."¹⁵ Limitations on the amount of revenue bonds that may be issued for the development of the Central Valley Project were repealed. Finally the Water Project Authority was requested to report on the feasibility of state ownership and operation of the Central Valley Project.

No one can predict the outcome of these developments. This may be the beginning of a systematic effort by a state government to undertake multiple-purpose development of its water resources; or it may be simply another chapter in the struggle of those opposing such federal policies as the 160-acre limitation on reclamation projects and preference for public agencies in the sale of federally-generated hydro-electric power, and the introduction of an additional agency in the Sacramento-San Joaquin watershed operating "separate and apart from all or any other units."

Other western states have been even less inclined than California to undertake multiple-purpose development of water resources. In the Willamette River basin, an integral hydrologic unit within the state of Oregon, the legislature of Oregon has created a Willamette River Basin Commission. However, this agency was created at the instigation of the Army Corps of Engineers with authority to act for the state of Oregon in the promotion of the Willamette River Project *as a federal project*. The nature of its program of action is indicated by the statement:

If we are to make this great river valley the garden spot it should be with all of the benefits we have been promised, we are going to be obliged to keep up a continued fire of messages to our senators and congressmen and others in Washington.¹⁶

In Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, state governments have been the center of important deliberation on public policies regarding state development of water power. In both Oregon and Washington, the state Granges spearheaded movements to establish a comprehensive program, similar to the California Water and Power Act, for the development of hydro-electric power during the late 1920's and the early 1930's. Initial efforts in Oregon to secure the adoption of a comprehensive initiative proposal in 1926 were unsuccessful. But public power advocates in both states succeeded in winning approval for initiative measures authorizing the creation of local utility districts during the early

¹⁴ California, State Water Resources Board, *Report on Feasibility of Feather River Project and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Diversion Projects Proposed as Features of the California Water Plan* (Sacramento, 1961), p. 7.

¹⁵ California, Water Project Authority, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Oregon, Willamette River Basin Commission, *Bulletin, Willamette Valley Project*, Salem, January, 1947 (mimeo), p. 5.

1930's. In 1932, Oregon adopted a constitutional amendment which permitted state development of water power with authority for both the generation and transmission of electrical energy.

With the advent of the New Deal in 1933, Bonneville Dam and Grand Coulee Dam were authorized by the federal government as multiple-purpose projects on the Columbia River. This gave new impetus to public power groups to secure public transmission facilities for the new power potentials being created by these federal projects. In Oregon legislation was adopted creating a state power commission with authority to undertake the generation, transmission, and distribution of hydro-electric power. The power companies had the Grange Power Bill referred to the people at the 1934 general election. It was defeated by a narrow margin. Efforts in 1935 and 1936 to secure approval of a state power commission were vetoed by the governor and defeated as an initiative proposal. In Washington, the efforts of the Grange in 1936 to secure an amendment to the state constitution authorizing the state to construct and operate a power transmission system were defeated at the polls. The problem of providing transmission facilities from Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams was finally solved by the establishment of Bonneville Power Administration, a federal agency with general responsibility for the development of regional transmission facilities in the Pacific Northwest.¹⁷

The public utility district laws authorized by the states of Oregon and Washington continue to serve as the basis of public power policies in those states. In Oregon, a state Hydro-Electric Commission was created, but as a regulatory agency without operating responsibilities. The Peoples Utility Districts have been organized in only eight instances in Oregon. Only four exist as operating agencies today. The Peoples Utility District Act requires that a district tender a deposit in the amount of the value claimed *together with attorney fees* in any condemnation proceedings to acquire a utility system.¹⁸ This practically precludes use of the power of eminent domain in the acquisition of an existing utility.

In Washington, thirty-two public utility districts have been organized and twenty-one are active operating units. The organic act provides ample authority for the public utility district to condemn existing utility systems, but the comparatively small size of the districts, which do not extend beyond county boundaries, has created problems through the piecemeal "cannibalization" of the large private utility systems, which causes excessive severance charges.¹⁹ Efforts of Skagit County Public Utility District No. 1 to purchase the entire power system of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company and to contract for re-sale of facilities to other public utility districts were set aside by the

¹⁷ Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "The Federal Power Disposal Decisions of 1937." (Paper presented at Conference on Research on the Policy and Administration of Natural Resources, University of Oregon, August 8-9, 1952.)

¹⁸ President's Water Policy Commission, "Water Resource Policy and State Law," Bonneville Power Administration (Staff reports, mimeo), pp. 166-74.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*

Supreme Court of Washington as exceeding the authority of a public utility district to operate outside its boundaries.²⁰

In response to this situation the Washington legislature in 1949 authorized two or more public utility districts to exercise jointly all power granted to any district. At the same time the Washington Water Power Commission was created with ample authority to investigate and undertake projects for hydro-electric power development.²¹ Through one pretext or another, the governor has declined to make any appointments to the commission and the statute remains inoperative.

In contrast to power developments in the northwest states, Arizona in 1944 created a state agency, the Arizona Power Authority, to receive and wholesale the electrical energy allocated to the state of Arizona from Hoover Dam and other federal hydro-electric projects on the Colorado River.²² The authority is given ample power to construct and operate transmission facilities with the use of revenue bonds to finance improvements. In conformity with federal policies, the Arizona Power Authority Act gives preference to public bodies and co-operatives and requires that the price benefits of low-cost power be passed on to the ultimate consumers in the sale of Colorado River power.

The results of Arizona's experience will be interesting to observe as the state develops its program. The private power companies have vigorously opposed policies of public preference and rate controls. As a possible effort to circumvent these policies, N. D. Houghton, a commissioner of the Arizona Power Authority, has reported the execution of a contract between an electrical district and one of the private power companies in which the company will serve as the operating agency for the district. Counsel for the district challenged the competence of the Arizona Power Authority to exercise any control over these contractual relations. Since public utilities districts are exempt from the utility regulations of the Arizona Corporation Commission there is a legal question:

If private utility companies can, by contract with such districts, become in recognized legal contemplation, agents of the regulation-exempt districts, then conceivably the companies might be entirely exempt from any state regulations in their sale of district power within these areas.²³

III

State administration of land resources reflects much the same order of activities and policies as are found in the administration of water resources. Under the American constitutional system title and control over lands in the public domain has been clearly recognized as vesting in the federal government.

²⁰ *State ex rel. Public Utility District No. 1 of Skagit County v. Wylie*, 192 Pac. 2d. 806.

²¹ Washington, *Session Laws*, 1949, Ch. 227. This legislation was repealed and re-enacted in modified form in the 1953 session of the legislature. Governor Langlie has declared his intention of activating the Water Power Commission when the new legislation becomes effective in June, 1953.

²² N. D. Houghton, "Problems of Public Power Administration in the Southwest—Some Arizona Applications," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 4, pp. 116-29 (March, 1951).

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

Through continued reliance upon homestead policies that were never modified adequately to meet the conditions of the West, lands controlling water-holes and streams were homesteaded and conveyed to private ownership, but large portions of the public domain, approximately 150,000,000 acres in area, remained in federal control for want of takers. As a part of federal policy for the conservation of timber and the protection of watersheds and recreational resources of the West, many of the mountainous areas were reserved as national forests, national parks, or national monuments. In total, the federal government owns approximately fifty-four per cent of the land in the eleven western states, which includes eighty-five per cent of the land in Nevada, seventy-one per cent in Utah and sixty-nine per cent in Arizona.

As a part of federal land policy the states were granted substantial areas of public land for the support of public education and other public activities. These state lands have generally been administered as ordinary real estate transactions between private parties without regard to sound land-use and conservation practices. Some of the states admitted to the Union prior to the 1890's squandered this realty by conveying it to private ownership as a means of stimulating local economic development or as political spoils. As a result some states have relatively small quantities of land remaining in state ownership and control.

Other states, such as Montana and Wyoming, have administered their public lands as important potential sources of wealth for the support of public education. With the discovery of oil these state lands are returning substantial sums for the public schools. In Montana, for example, a single transaction recently brought \$3,317,428 to school funds for the lease of 260,000 acres of state land for oil development.²⁴ Montana educators anticipate the time when revenues from school land and the permanent school fund may meet the costs of the state-supported Foundation Program in the public schools.

Even the states that continue to retain large tracts of state land give little attention to the control of land utilization. In his study of public land administration in New Mexico, Holmes concluded that, "Of the three major agencies dealing with land in New Mexico, the state land office gives to those using its land the largest property and imposes the least control."²⁵

The western states never developed public instrumentalities to permit stockmen to take public action to manage and improve the range. Actions necessary for the regulation of grazing upon the open range, including the registration and control of livestock brands, have been organized through stock growers' associations. Following the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, grazing districts were established as the basis for the field organization of federal administration of the unreserved public domain. These grazing districts have come to fill the role of a local-government-type agency for range im-

²⁴ A. R. Oja, "The Oil Boom—What It Means to Montana's Youngsters," *Montana Education*, Vol. 28, p. 6 (Feb., 1952).

²⁵ Jack E. Holmes, *The Public Land Question in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1947), p. 36.

provements, with the advisory board exercising certain controls over local policies and over the expenditure of funds allocated for range improvement.

As the mecca of sportsmen, the West has developed state agencies to conserve the fish and game resources of the region. In their dedication to more fish and more game for the sportsman's delight these agencies sought and gained substantial statutory and administrative independence. In many instances, the fish and game commissions have secured control over license fees through earmarked funds free from legislative control over appropriations. Serious questions have been raised as to the consequences of the limited missions served by the sportsman's interests in relation to land resources:

The Utah State Fish and Game Department, . . . very boastfully points with pride to a record 20-year deer increase from 10,000 head in 1920 to 200,000 head in 1940, but on whose land and at what cost to already depleted ranges? And one might well ask by what scientific authority can the director of our State Fish and Game Department declare that the deer population in Utah is "close to the optimum number." Does it seem possible that the mere purchase for reasons of appeasement of private lands seriously damaged by deer will solve the rehabilitation problem of these depleted areas? Does it not seem a bit incongruous that land once purchased by the Game Department passes to the control of the state Land Board?²²

Several western states maintain an extensive system of state parks, which are becoming increasingly popular as recreational centers. In some states, the state parks have been used to preserve the beauty of the primeval vegetation as among the redwoods of California or the beauty of the landscape as in part of the Columbia River Gorge. However, little has been done to develop scenic and recreation resources in private or public control, outside the bounds of state parks, except to advertise their virtues in national magazines.

As timber resources become increasingly scarce, the states have been developing more extensive forestry programs. Today, state forestry departments operate effective fire prevention programs with organized fire-fighting forces to control the menace of fire to standing timber. By-product laboratories have been established to experiment with the economic development of forest by-products to reduce the waste of forest resources. The development of reforestation programs on private timber lands has been stimulated by the exemption of reforestation lands from the general property tax in return for a tax on the value of the timber when harvested. In Oregon, the state forestry board can control the harvesting of reforestation lands through a system of licenses and sets the unit value of the timber to be harvested. However this *quid pro quo* includes no arrangement for taxing the harvest of virgin timber, or timber on public lands. Little progress has been made in the regulation of logging practices and no efforts have been made to control logging entrepreneurs to assure responsible operations. The word "gyppo" has an established place in the language of western lumbermen, denoting the small operator whose marginal operations tend to determine the nature of competitive practices in the lumber industry.

²² Walter P. Cottam, "Is Utah Sahara Bound?", *Bulletin of the University of Utah*, Vol. 37, p. 37 (Feb. 19, 1947).

IV

Since river systems generally exceed the boundaries of a single state and the land is held largely by the federal government, extra-state factors are important in the development of the natural resources of the West. The role of the states in resource administration is in part determined by the way the states relate themselves to these extra-state influences.

As the first effort of the western states to cooperate in the development of a major river system, the experience of the Colorado River Compact was a serious disappointment for those who foresaw a "new principle of a regional problem, regionally administered." Arizona refused to ratify the compact until 1944 and then only on the basis of an interpretation contrary to that accepted by earlier contracting parties. The lack of unanimity among the "sovereign" states has provided the consent necessary for federal action but has destroyed any possibilities of effective cooperation among the states in the development of the Colorado River.

In the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress authorized additional arrangements among the states that might have served as a basis for interesting experimentation in regional cooperation by providing consent for the Colorado River basin states to:

... negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements, supplemental to and in conformity with the Colorado River compact and consistent with this Act for a comprehensive plan for the development of the Colorado River and providing for the storage, diversion, and use of the waters of said river. *Any such compact or agreement may provide for the construction of dams, headworks, and other diversion works or structures for flood control, reclamation, improvement of navigation, division of water, or other purposes and/or the construction of power houses or other structures for the purpose of the development of water power and the financing of the same; and for such purposes may authorize the creation of interstate commissions and/or the creation of corporations, authorities, or other instrumentalities.*²⁷

However, no development has been undertaken in pursuance of this authority.

In the Columbia River basin, the states for many years have discussed compact arrangements to allocate the water of the Columbia River, without any success except for a minor compact involving the upper Snake River. Demands for a compact have recently been revived, and Congress in its last session again authorized the Columbia basin states to negotiate an interstate compact.

The principal movers for an interstate compact on the Columbia seem to be concerned with "state rights." The original compact bill contained the proviso that "... electric power generated from waters impounded must be so allocated as to meet existing and potential needs of the upstream states."²⁸ If such a provision had been enacted into law, the domains of the Montana Power Company and the Idaho Power Company would have had priority over the rest of the Pacific Northwest for the consumption of low-cost hydro-electric power.

²⁷ 45 Stat. 1065. Italics added.

²⁸ S. 817 (82nd Cong., 1st sess.).

In opposition to the Bonneville Power Administration policy of providing power anywhere in the Pacific Northwest at a uniform rate, representatives of the basin states are constantly seeking to secure an allocation of power on a state basis. One of the items listed for study in preparation for compact negotiations includes "establishing authority for allocation of power to the states."²⁹ Reservation of power development for Idaho in Hell's Canyon on the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon is one of the principal objectives sought by Idaho's opposition to the proposed Hell's Canyon Dam. According to the governor of Idaho, the Snake River is "our river," and "we're going to fight all the way for our sovereignty."³⁰

The barriers to effective cooperation on an interstate basis are indicated by intervention of the legislature of Idaho to save the Washington Water Power Company from the condemnation proceedings of three Washington public utility districts by prohibiting a public utility district or any public agency of another state from acquiring any property of an electrical utility in the state of Idaho and making it a criminal offense for anyone to negotiate such a transfer of property.³¹ Important generating facilities of the Washington Water Power Company were located in Idaho and substantial severance charges caused by inability to secure the Idaho properties would be an additional impediment to condemnation.

Since so much western real estate is owned by the federal government, tax exemption of federal property is constantly raised as an issue of western resources administration. As a result of pressure from state and local governments, provision has been made for the sharing of income derived from federal lands in lieu of taxes. Federal payments in lieu of taxes are made largely from the sale of timber on national forests and reverted railroad grant lands in Oregon, and from royalties on minerals being extracted from the public domain.

On *O and C* lands in Oregon, seventy-five per cent of the income from the sale of timber is returnable to the counties in which these lands are located. Only twenty-five per cent is retained for administration by the Bureau of Land Management. In 1952, income from these lands was estimated at one million dollars for Lane County, Oregon, alone.³² Since *O and C* lands represent alternating sections of scattered parcels, the availability of access roads to facilitate competitive bidding is considered important to the administration of these lands by the Bureau of Land Management. Yet the counties have failed to relate their road construction program to the requirements for *O and C* lands to such an extent that Congress has authorized the Bureau of Land Management to initiate an access road program to be reimbursed from the county fund.³³

Timber sold from the national forests is subject to a twenty-five per cent

²⁹ George D. Dysart, memorandum, June 23, 1952.

³⁰ *The Oregonian*, March 4, 1951.

³¹ Idaho, *Session Laws*, 1951, Ch. 3.

³² *Eugene Register-Guard*, July 31, 1952.

³³ *Ibid.*, July 19 and 31, 1952.

payment in lieu of taxes. By comparison, reforestation land in Oregon is subject to only a 12½ per cent tax on the sale value of the timber at the time of harvest after being exempt from the general property tax during the period of reforestation.

It is possible for the states to tax the wealth that is being extracted from public lands, as well as private lands, since extraction under sale or lease involves the conversion of the property into private ownership. Yet taxes on the extraction of natural resources are largely undeveloped among the western states, in comparison to the states of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. Most taxes on minerals in the western states are nominal charges to defray the costs of inspection programs for mines and oil fields. Forest product taxes, in Oregon for example, are limited to timber harvested on private reforestation lands and a nominal fee to support the forest by-products research program. Western states have never experimented with a tax on the harvesting of grass by a charge upon the animal unit in place of the conventional general property tax upon private lands.

In addition to the loss of revenue potentialities, the reluctance of state governments to tax natural resources has deprived them of the opportunity to exercise fiscal control over the extraction of natural resources, a powerful instrument in the administration of conservation programs. The nominal charges made for inspectional programs generally follow the pattern of ear-marked funds that serve to make the agency a captive of the groups paying the money and prevent effective legislative and executive control in relation to the broader public interest in an inter-related resource program.

Another aspect of federal-state fiscal relations in the resource programs of the western states is the extent of federal aid to state administrative activities and the use of federal funds for public improvements in the West. Through programs in stream pollution abatement, fish and wild life, reforestation and fire control, soil conservation, agricultural extension, and public roads, the federal government makes substantial grants to finance state resource administration. In addition, federal research programs, such as the work done by the U.S. Geological Survey, provide the essential data about western resources which no western state, with the possible exception of California, could provide as a basis for resource planning.

The availability of non-reimbursable federal funds for flood control, navigation, recreation, and fish and wild life is another important influence on state activities in resources administration. Pursuit of this pork-barrel is one of the principal activities of state and local resource agencies. As a result, the Corps of Engineers' concept of project planning has dominated much of the thinking in state resource planning, and state agencies have become thoroughly committed to playing the Engineers' game of "grass roots" politics in an endeavor to establish project feasibility, authorization, and finally appropriation.

Few of the champions of state rights in resources administration are willing to include state responsibility for financing the development and control of natural resources, or even independent research and investigation into resource

problems and potentialities.³⁴ Rather, new ways are sought to gain access to federal finance. In the last session of Congress, for example, a bill was introduced authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make non-interest-bearing loans to states for the development of small reclamation projects involving areas of not more than 5,000 acres of irrigable land. Any item in a small project involving "public benefits" might be made non-reimbursable as provided under existing law and the states would be exempt from repayment of these costs.³⁵

CONCLUSION

As units of government, the states were not conceived in terms that are relevant to resources administration. Only California constitutes an adequate hydrologic unit permitting multiple-purpose administration of an integral watershed area. Major land-use patterns transcend state boundaries and cause the states to determine the nature of their resource programs by a standard of competitive relationships with each other.

The states as constitutional units within the American federal system of government are inclined to conceive of their relationships with one another and, to some extent, with the federal government on the basis of concepts of sovereignty and states' rights which presume inherent authority and power to decide without compulsion to come to agreement in the interest of a transcending public concern. "Interstate action is in the stage of international relations before the League of Nations,"³⁶ except that force is not resorted to when these relations come to an impasse. Yet the major problems of resource administration require regional solutions that transcend state boundaries.

The nature of our federal system necessarily restricts the usefulness of the state governments in providing the institutional arrangements and changes in resource policies that the people of the West require to meet the challenge posed by circumstances of their environment. As Eldon L. Johnson has observed:

It is folly to expect the administrative problems of a particular governmental level to be solved by a concatenation of the powers of many units at a lower governmental level. Just as international problems are not solved by adding together the separate national powers or state problems solved by adding together local powers, so regional problems will not be solved by appeals to the cooperative instincts of the states. The appeal has to be made to the next level of authority, which is the federal government at the present; or if such a level does not exist, it must be created. Tasks requiring day-to-day attention

³⁴ A correspondent active in the affairs of local public utility district and municipal utilities has made the interesting observation: "Significantly these lobbyists in their anti-federal tirades frequently plead for 'state rights' in order to obtain home rule or local autonomy but they bitterly fight any home rule at the county, city or power district level or other real local control."

³⁵ H.R. 7084 (82nd Cong., 2nd sess.).

³⁶ Eldon L. Johnson, "The Pacific Northwest States and the Development of the Columbia," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, December, 1949.

cannot be handled by conferences, resolutions, voluntary quotas, and treaties and entreaties."³⁷

Despite these limitations, the states, quite as much as water courses and land forms, are realities. However inadequate as basic units, the states have provided political instrumentalities through which westerners have sought to develop and control their natural resources. Through the states the necessary permissive opportunities were provided for individuals or local groups of persons organized as public agencies to undertake resource development. On the other hand, the states have not become important operating agencies in the utilization and development of natural resources when compared with either the federal government or with local government agencies such as the cities of Los Angeles, Seattle, Tacoma or Denver, the East Bay Municipal Utility District, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, or numerous irrigation and utility districts.

In most states some resource agencies are doing an effective job on some phases of resources administration, such as the development of state parks, the management of state lands, forest fire prevention and the conservation of wild life; but no state is carrying on a well coordinated multiple-purpose program of resource administration. It is questionable whether the states have either a legislative or administrative arrangement competent to define or to satisfy the public interest in the effective control and utilization of all natural resources. Rather, the states seem best organized to serve the purposes of groups of users relating to a particular resource utilization. Separate resource agencies with their constellation of user groups have multiplied in the state administration of Oregon, for example, until the commercial fishermen have their Fish Commission and the sports fishermen their separate Game Commission. Some resource agencies, through ear-marked funds, are practically removed from legislative control over appropriations. No manner of councils and committees in which each of the constituents retains its particular value orientation and operating assumptions can develop an integrated resource program.

If the western states are to assume a greater role in the conservation and development of natural resources, they must first put their own houses in order. Resource programs need to be developed in terms of a comprehensive review and re-definition of agencies, values, assumptions and policies. There are a few signs on the horizon which indicate that possibly some states, California for example, may lead the way in an effort to redefine the role of the western states in natural resources administration. Otherwise, so far as resource development is concerned, the states are apt to become anachronisms like counties, to be tolerated as they muddle through.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN COLOMBIA

LYNTON K. CALDWELL

Syracuse University

A public administrative system is the product of its environment—particularly of its political environment. It is not discrete, but is an aspect of this same environment, affecting and affected by the tendencies of the society of which it is a part. In the rapidly changing present, the complex of social pressures and tensions have created over large areas of the globe an unsettled environment for public service. At a time when effective public administration is more than ever needed to reduce areas of social conflict by achieving generally acceptable solutions to accumulating social problems, the public service in many countries lacks the unity of purpose and technical skill to meet the challenge.

This is notably true where nations, undergoing rapid social transition and attempting uncertainly through democratic government to bring traditional values and practices into line with contemporary needs, must mediate amidst a variety of pressures and counter-pressures. Democratic administration is never easy, even in countries with long histories of democratic government and with well-developed techniques of organization and management. Where the spirit and practice of democratic self-government have not become a living part of the environment and where the political tendencies of the community are contradictory or obscure, the situation of the democratic public official is truly difficult.

Finding no clear direction in which to move, the public administrator sometimes seeks safety in inaction—maneuvering for the security of authority, but evading a responsibility fraught with unpredictable personal consequences. If, rather than risk responsible decision-making, the public administrator bogs down into a state of semi-paralysis or seeks protection through administration by legal rote, he cannot work effectively to reduce instabilities, and his ineffectiveness may further weaken the political order in a cycle of deterioration.

In many parts of the world where there is no well-developed tradition of voluntary community self-help, or few organized means apart from government for the initiation of social or political reform, the public service holds the chief hope for checking the course of social disintegration. To the extent that the administrative system can be developed into a stable, competent and confidence-winning instrument for democratic public action, this achievement will itself influence the environment in a direction favorable to further constructive public effort. For better or for worse, the public service unavoidably will modify its own environment. For this reason public administrators, whatever they may prefer, cannot confine their influence merely to execution of the law. They may reinforce environmental factors resisting change, or their action may—even inadvertently—promote change. But if the public service

is to provide leadership in constructive social effort, its administrators must somehow surmount some of the environmental limitations and learn to maximize environmental advantages.

A means increasingly employed toward this end is the enlisting of technical assistance from outside the immediate environment—usually from international organizations or technically advanced nations. The primary task of technical assistance in public administration is to introduce certain catalytic factors into the public service which will strengthen and stimulate innate constructive tendencies. Technical assistance is not in itself administrative reform (which is essentially political in nature); it may indeed be an instrument of administrative reform, but its functions are analytic and advisory rather than policy-deciding.

The acceptance and success of technical assistance depends, therefore, upon the preservation of its proper character. Even though disinterested, assistance toward administrative reform can never be hermetically sealed from political controversy. But to the extent that it becomes diverted into direct administrative reform efforts, it becomes unavoidably involved in the politics of personality, party and administration. Becoming immersed in the cross-currents of the political environment, it hazards its unique purpose: to stimulate and assist the constructive tendencies in the environment through analysis, demonstration and interchange of ideas and experience. This does not preclude the installation of new organizations, procedures or techniques which the assisted government has made up its mind to adopt. Assistance in practical application may be of educative value. And this is perhaps its greatest value; for effective, long-run administration of innovations will depend in large measure on their being understood and accepted throughout the public service.

Because maladministration is often the outgrowth of unfavorable political conditions, public administrative reform is usually a delicate business. It frequently must deal with arrangements and practices that are direct consequences of political ambitions, fears, and controversies. Administrative reform almost inevitably will favor some persons and policies over others. Yet if the reform is to promote enlarged areas of cooperation and to win acceptance for new ideas and methods, the reform measures ought not unnecessarily to intensify resistance to these objectives.

Technical assistance in public administration therefore requires most careful consideration in relation to its effect upon administrative reform. How much and what kind of technical assistance will assist constructive reform efforts cannot be determined without consideration of the environment within which the administrative reforms will be attempted. Thus some insight into the politics of administration in the particular environment is needed to determine what forms of technical assistance may prove useful, and to forecast the probable consequences of their application.

Because all of the possible effects of administrative reform never can be foreseen, the ultimate success of technical assistance in public administration cannot safely be assumed. Accumulating experience—reported and evaluated—

should, however, make it possible to avoid the more obvious errors and to widen the margin of predictability. Insofar as this may be true, the following description of the political circumstances affecting public administration in Colombia and of the character and course of recent administrative reform efforts may be instructive.

I. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A comparative approach to the study of public administration presupposes certain similarities or parallel situations in the processes of administration wherever they occur. The unsettled political environment of Colombia, whatever its particular or local circumstances, is generically characteristic of many other places in which technical assistance in public administration has been undertaken. Our concern is therefore with those aspects of Colombian government which illustrate the difficulties and problems encountered in administrative technical assistance under comparable conditions in other countries and on other continents. Within the limited scope of a single article one obviously cannot deal adequately with all relevant environmental factors nor give a really comprehensive picture of Colombian government. Emphasis falls logically upon the difficulties of Colombian public administration rather than upon its successes, since it is the difficult areas with which technical assistance is concerned.

For five years Colombians have lived in a state of latent civil war punctuated by sporadic outbursts of violence. The Conservative party, deeply divided against itself, maintains an uneasy hold upon the political machinery of the state. The Liberal party, ostensibly tolerated, has in fact been driven underground and its leaders proscribed—with those of its adherents who remain in public office maintaining a precarious tenure.

Levels of Political Conflict. The issues between the parties are ambiguous. On the surface the conflict appears to be a matter of "ins" versus "outs." But beneath the surface of partisan recrimination are the seldom articulated and often emotional differences among Colombians as to how their hitherto dominant traditions (cultural, religious, economic and political) should be related to the rapidly changing conditions of the contemporary world. The technological and social changes which many Colombians embrace (even while some of them reject the consequences) have not grown out of Colombia's past. In common with much of the rest of the world, the Colombians are confronted with the difficult and dangerous task of reconciling deep-rooted traditionalism with the dynamism of contemporary industrialized democratic society, and with not easily assimilated ideas and methods brought into Colombia from abroad. It is this basically unsettling political situation, rather than the particular issues and personalities in the Colombian political conflict that has long-range significance for public administrative reform. In the several administrative reform efforts described later in this article, particular and local factors frequently had to be taken into account. But it is the general relation of the political environment to reform of the administrative system that has

the wider instructive value and therefore deserves the focus of attention.

Architecture of Mistrust. Although Colombia has enjoyed extended periods of political tranquillity, its history and the experience of its neighbors prompted the establishment of a governmental structure designed to make difficult the usurpation of political power. Reversing the maxim *divide ut regnes* the Colombians have subdivided and balanced their governmental structure so that it cannot readily be made the instrument of an aggressive, purposeful and determined minority. Even under the pressures of the present civil conflict, dictatorship has not been established in Colombia—nor could it be without a far more drastic modification of the constitution than has allegedly occurred since the ninth of April, 1948, when commenced the chain of disorders leading to the unhappy present.

The Colombian constitution, in common with the formalized fundamental law of many other countries, reflects the uncertainties, compromises and contradictions that attended its framing. A document of idealistic social and civil guarantees, the constitution provides, through state of siege, for the suspension of certain of these guarantees when need for them may be greatest. Colombians, mindful of the Gran Colombia of Simon Bolivar, which fell apart to form four separate nations, have established a unitary republic. But administrative convenience, combined with difficulties of communication and strong feelings of local pride, has required the maintenance of regional subdivisions called departments, which enjoy certain semi-autonomous powers specified by the constitution.

Governors of the departments are appointed by the President of the Republic, but each department (there are currently sixteen) has an independent popularly-elected assembly which, however, may be indefinitely prorogued during a national state of siege. The departmental governors are therefore not necessarily popular leaders in their communities (although some are). They appoint the mayors (*alcaldes*) of the municipalities into which each department is divided, but municipal councils are elective bodies and, except under state of siege, may frustrate an unpopular mayor by removing from his jurisdiction a substantial portion of the local administration.

The constitution of the Republic prescribes for the national government the classical tripartite division of public power—legislative, executive, and judicial—but declares hopefully that although the congress, the government, and the judges have separate functions, they are to collaborate harmoniously in the realization of the ends of the state.

The congress of Colombia consists of two houses, a senate and a chamber of representatives, both popularly elected from districts established on a basis of population. However, since November of 1949 the nation has been governed under a state of siege and the congress has been convened only in extraordinary session. Although the government possesses discretionary power to assemble the congress in regular session, it has not done so, and during the past three years has governed by decree.

The President of the Republic is popularly elected for a term of four years

and is ineligible to succeed himself directly. He names the ministers who preside over the principal administrative agencies of the central government and may re-group the various units of the administration and reassign functions under the several ministries without recourse to the congress. But the President does not enjoy the exclusive executive power of the President of the United States—for the executive power of government in Colombia belongs collectively to the President *and* to the ministers of state.

The heads of the thirteen ministries¹ constitute the Council of Ministers, with which on certain matters the President is required to act in concert, and which under state of siege must approve certain acts of the departmental governors. Except in exercise of his power to nominate and to remove official personnel, no action may be taken by the President with respect to any of the administrative agencies of the national government without the collaboration of the minister concerned. The ministers are required to report to the congress at each general session and thus do not owe an exclusive responsibility to the President.

The authority of both President and ministers is substantially diminished by the placing of many important public functions (presently to be described) in semi-independent agencies outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Some of these agencies are subject to only nominal public administrative control.

Two principal officers of the national government (the controller-general and the attorney-general) are independent of the President. The controller-general is elected by the chamber of representatives for a two-year term and is neither nominated nor removable by the President. The attorney-general, elected by the representatives for a term of four years from a list of three (*terna*) submitted by the President, heads the *Ministerio Publico*, which defends the jurisdiction and interests of the nation and prosecutes and enforces the laws governing official conduct.

Court of final appeal on the legality of administrative acts at all levels of government is the Council of State, with subsidiary administrative tribunals in each department. Councillors are selected by congress from *terna* submitted by the President. Supreme consultative body to the government in matters of administration, its purpose and functions reflect the influence of French administrative law.

II. DESIGN FOR INEFFECTIVENESS

The foregoing paragraphs describe a government contrived primarily to prevent abuse of administrative power—not to secure energetic or coordinated action. The customary machinery and methods, intended to prevent officials from overtly doing harm, frequently prevent them from doing much good, and in any case from doing it very fast. Cumbersome constitutional machinery

¹ Government; Foreign Relations; Justice; War; Finance; Agriculture; Labor; Health; Commerce and Industry; Education; Mines and Petroleum; Posts and Telegraph; and Public Works.

does not inevitably cause ineffectual administration, as the experience of the United States has demonstrated. But this is largely because in an environment of confidence, the checks and balances are rarely applied in a jealous and literal manner. In an environment in which the spirit of democratic give-and-take has not become natural, technicalities of legal procedure may be observed more in the letter of the document and less in the spirit of the broader objective. This is the situation in Colombia.

The following paragraphs illustrate the manner in which the environment of political instability and mistrust has given rise to administrative arrangements which reduce the government's effectiveness for constructive public service. These are among the defects which technical assistance in administration has found most difficult to remedy and they are recognized by Colombians of all political persuasion as detrimental to effective public service. Actually these impediments to public administrative reform—federalism by expediency, diffused executive power, legalistic accountability, politics of office-holding, and confusion in public enterprise—lie mostly beyond the reach of technical administrative assistance. Each of them represents primarily political rather than technical aspects of administration. But they so directly condition the application of technical reforms that they must be recognized and reckoned with in any effort to improve the existing administrative machinery.

Federalism by Expediency. The theory of unitary national administration has substantially given way in Colombia to a species of *ad hoc* federalism. There is no consistent pattern of relationship between the nation, the departments and the municipalities. The so-called "national" police, for example, are supported and administered by the departmental governments. Registration and licensing of motor vehicles, originally national functions, were turned over to departmental and municipal administration in 1950. Public education in theory is organized as a single national system with functions divided among the three levels of government; but neither nation, department, nor municipality adheres consistently to its respective functions—and confusion, waste and inequity have resulted. Public health and agricultural programs are separately administered at national and departmental levels, but a measure of coordination is provided for health programs by intergovernmental contracts, and for agriculture by intergovernmental councils. National and departmental public works and highway programs operate independently without benefit of effective coordination.

Although there has been some nationalization of departmental and local functions—for example, railways and certain local secondary schools—the recent trend has been for Bogotá to push responsibilities onto the departments and for the departments in turn to shift their burdens onto the municipalities—this devolution, however, seldom being accompanied by financial assistance. In 1945 the national congress established a comprehensive system of social security for employees of larger private enterprises and for all public agencies. No adequate calculation of the total cost of the system was made, but employee contributions were limited to a low fixed percentage of income, the employer

to provide the balance. The departments and municipalities have thus been required to provide benefits which may cost as much as 20% of their annual payrolls. This obligation was irresponsibly mandated by national law, but no assistance (even by allowing additional sources of revenue) was forthcoming from the national government.

Failure to develop a consistent pattern of national, departmental and municipal relations has resulted in confusion and uncertainty in the public administration of Colombia. As departments cannot foresee in which areas national action may next be taken, they are reluctant to initiate programs of their own, or to commit themselves to expenditures for facilities which the nation may presently provide. Concurrent action at all levels of government is most effective if skillfully coordinated; but coordination premises order of some kind—and one could argue that the inconsistencies in Colombian intergovernmental relations have resulted in a confusion that cannot be coordinated.

Political expediency rather than administrative logic or a consistent theory of federalism has shaped the general course of intergovernmental relations. Technical reforms in many areas (notably in public education) are delayed or prevented by the unwillingness or inability of any level of government to assume a role of leadership and initiative. Nevertheless, in specific areas of administration (notably in health and agriculture) the basis for an orderly distribution of responsibilities is being developed. In time a rational compromise between unitary theory and federal practice may emerge.

Executive Power Diffused. Government by *junta* is a characteristic feature of public affairs in Colombia. There is a pervasive distrust of the individual administrator, and even the President of the Republic is not free to exercise many of his executive powers without the cooperation of the Council of Ministers or of the particular ministers most concerned. Great powers, particularly under state of siege, are vested in the President, the governors, and the mayors; but the practical effect of many of these powers is reduced by the administrative arrangements through which they are exercised.

At no level of government do principal public officers possess the resources of information, personnel and finance to enable them effectively to use the powers at their disposal. Particularly is this true of the departmental governors, who, bereft of budget officers, personnel administrators, competent statisticians and management experts, are in effect "power poor"—unable adequately to fulfill the important role which is theirs by law. Moreover certain programs administered at the departmental level are so tied into national policies and programs (as in education, public health and social security) that there is relatively little a governor can actually do about them.

The mayor might play a more significant part in the administration of local affairs were not many of the municipal services removed from direct municipal supervision and placed under special *juntas* of which the mayor may not even be a member. Moreover, several important local officials are named by the municipal council, which often places strategic administrative functions under its own appointees independent of control by the mayor. Thus the actual scope

for exercise of the powers of mayor is narrowed and no official body exists which can coordinate municipal policies and programs.

A consequence of government by *junta* and of the many circumstances requiring concurrent action by the President, governors, mayors, and their administrative colleagues, has been a system of multiple management. Its characteristic feature is collective irresponsibility. Most clearly responsible of all public officials is the President of the Republic, who, however, is subject to certain constitutional provisions which restrict his administrative authority especially in relation to the ministers of state—and, potentially at least, subject his administrative acts to reversal by adjudications of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts, as well as by the Council of State. In Colombia, as in other countries, party politics sometimes enables the government to bridge the gap between constitutional formalities and administrative objectives. Quite as often, however, political tension and mistrust have accentuated constitutional checks and accelerated the divisive tendencies encouraged by the structure of government. But whatever the case, Colombian officials are provided with abundant opportunity for avoiding responsibility. There are always others to whom they may point in extenuation of their own conduct.

Legalistic Accountability. Encouragement of collective irresponsibility in Colombian government also in part derives from holding public officials accountable not for the effective administration of their programs, but rather for conformance to detailed and often time-consuming legal formalities. Obviously by no means unique to Colombia, accountability for conformance rather than for performance slows the operations of all public agencies, occasions bureaucratic pettifoggery over minor legal provisions, discourages energy and initiative in public office, and encourages time-serving. Methods of accounting and control are cumbersome and complicated, inspired it would seem by deep-seated mutual mistrust and going beyond the ordinary precautions required to prevent misuse of public funds. Sound principles of accountability are thus distorted by excessive legalism and consequently are badly applied in practice.

Relatively simple transactions become unnecessarily involved. Multiple approvals, seals, and signatures are personally required of high-ranking officials for matters which might appropriately be delegated to subordinate levels. Authorization of a single scholarship of 40 pesos per month for secondary school attendance may involve as many as eleven official signatures in duplicate, including those of the departmental director of education, secretary of finance, budget officer, controller-general, and treasurer. Correction of a fiscal error of four cents may require promulgation of an official decree signed personally by the governor and all of his top departmental administrators.

The making of contracts is particularly time-consuming, requiring extensive consultation, multiple signatures, and review. Responsibility for contracts is thereby so widely diffused as frequently to prevent any one officer or agency from being held accountable for performance of the contractual provisions. Where all are responsible each may more easily disclaim responsibility. Purchasing procedures are likewise encumbered by numerous approvals of dubious

utility. Purchase vouchers in one Colombian city must be authorized by the mayor, attested by the *personero*, authenticated by the head of the department making the purchase, approved by the treasurer, and finally must be audited and recorded by a revisor and an accountant.

The waste of time involved in these procedures is not an inevitable concomitant of official accountability. And after attempting to guard against all eventualities of official carelessness or misconduct, the government of Colombia still lacks many of the most useful records and procedures for genuine control—particularly for managerial control. Absence of valid historical series on many statistical matters, incomparability of related statistical and financial records, insufficiency of data to support findings, unevenness in the accuracy of component parts of cumulated public records such as vital statistics, agricultural reporting and school attendance—all these deficiencies in tools of managerial control make difficult any ready appraisal of the Colombian public service.

Means for measuring effective management do not exist within Colombian government. Their absence is not explained by lack of knowledge of their availability but rather by fear of their political consequences. The tools of scientific management might strengthen the coercive potential of the officials who possess them, but they might likewise (as in personnel reform) restrict personal or party manipulation of the public service. The “successful” administrator, therefore, signs innumerable documents, conforms to all the technicalities of the law (usually sufficiently complex to permit some measure of flexibility through adroit maneuvering) and seldom concerns himself with the degree to which the public may benefit from his performance.

Politics of Office-holding. Frustrating legalism induces devious administration; diffused responsibility discourages individual initiative. Both make public service in Colombia a matter of routine office-holding rather than of effective management. Public officials of exceptional energy and insight do attempt to accomplish something, but they are likely to incur distrust to a degree discouraging to all but the most persevering.

There may be as much faithful and disinterested devotion to the public service in Colombia as in many other countries; but public service as an ideal appears to arouse little popular enthusiasm. The concept of public office as a public trust and the sense of dedication to public service have not become ingrained in the national political ideology. Holding high office is traditional among many of the prominent families—but the practice belongs rather to the Latin sense of *noblesse oblige* than to the Jeffersonian notion of a tour of duty. Tenure of public office is brief at all levels of responsibility and officials are not inclined to undertake long-range reforms of benefit primarily to their successors and of inconvenience and disagreeable difficulty to themselves.

Merit system and career service ideas are generally conceded by Colombians to be impractical in the present national state of development, and nearly all appointive positions are frankly filled by patronage. Changes in top officialdom even within the same party are likely to be followed by a sweep through the ranks. Moreover, in comparison with private opportunities, the financial re-

wards lawfully pertaining to public office are not great; filling the more responsible positions with suitable incumbents is not easy. In Caldas—one of the most prosperous and best governed departments—the number of mayors in its forty-five municipalities has averaged 2.6 per year since 1949, with some municipalities having as many as four, five, and six mayors per annum. Inexperienced and untrained personnel are consequently too numerous for the efficient operation of the public services. Top officials, unacquainted with their own offices and duties, and only vaguely aware of their relation to the total structure of government, cannot direct the work of their subordinates more effectively than the blind can lead the blind.

Among the practical consequences of uncertain and ineffectual management is easy-going indifference among the rank and file employees. In many public offices there is evidence either of too many employees and too little work, or of inadequate planning and direction. Conspicuous numbers of employees do not appear to be engaged at useful tasks with sufficient regularity to justify the present organization of their duties. Their days are passed in intra-office visiting, reading newspapers, drinking coffee, and looking out of the windows. Criticism of this state of affairs is not wanting within as well as without the public service, but effective corrective measures have been slow to win acceptance because they entail changes in points of view and practices (such as adoption of civil service reform) for which most Colombians appear to be unprepared.

Confusion in Public Enterprise. Well-defined distinctions between public functions and private interests do not exist in Colombia. The relation of government to economic enterprise is, for example, determined more by convenience and expediency than by theory or logic. Influences of laissez-faire capitalism and trade union socialism have been insignificant in shaping the economic role of government. The most consistent practice in the organization of public services of an economic character is to place their control in agencies not directly amenable to political pressure.

Because personal or partisan patronage rather than technical competence has been the primary criterion for appointment to public office, the public service generally does not enjoy a high degree of popular confidence. Popular distrust of "political" administration has led to the establishment of a large number of semi-public agencies outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Some of these are virtually private organizations which have secured official status and support and to which important public administrative functions have been delegated.

At the national level there are at least nineteen of these semi-autonomous privately managed public enterprises—more if one counts their affiliates. With a few exceptions, such as the National University, they may be divided into three groups: (1) financial, (2) developmental, and (3) agricultural. Although certain of these organizations are administered under single managers, most of them are directed by boards or *juntas* which undertake to decide detailed questions of policy and management.

Chief among the financial agencies is the powerful *Banco de la Republica*, which is in many respects the central fiscal and monetary agent of the government, and which holds, among numerous auxiliary enterprises, concessions to operate the state-owned salt and emerald mines. Other semi-autonomous fiscal enterprises include the Farm Loan Bank, Exchange Control, Stabilization Fund, Central Mortgage Bank, and the *Instituto de Credito Territorial*, which is the chief national public housing agency.

Developmental enterprises at the national level include the Industrial Development Institute, the Institute of Water Resources and Power Development, the national hydroelectric plants, the Paz de Rio Steel Company and the National Navigation Company.

Among the agricultural agencies, by far the most important is the National Coffee Federation, which is the principal organization concerned with coffee economics and production, the national and departmental agricultural agencies having almost nothing to do with the chief national agricultural product. The federation is financed primarily by a national tax on coffee shipments, the proceeds of which are turned over to the federation-controlled *Fondo Nacional del Cafe*. Other semi-public agencies established and controlled by agricultural producer groups are the National Cotton Institute, the Cattle-raisers Association, and tax-supported funds for the protection or development of tobacco, wool, cocoa, and wheat. Closely related to agricultural production and entirely apart from the Ministry of Agriculture is the National Institute of Supplies, concerned with price support for agricultural products and the importation of foods, and the *Instituto de Parcelaciones, Colonizacion y Defensa Forestal* which controls colonization of public lands, provides credits and supplies to settlers, and is now beginning work in forestry and reforestation.

There are at least seventeen additional agencies which perform functions germane to certain of the regular national ministries, but which for various reasons (again chiefly distrust of political administration) have been placed outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Seven of these are public-employee retirement systems. Others include such important enterprises as the National Railways Administrative Board and the National Telecommunications Company.

The officialization of privately controlled enterprise at the national level has been paralleled by the privatization of certain public services at the municipal level—a consequence of the invincible tendency of government in Colombia to surmount all difficulties by the easy expedient of borrowing money. The banks and other lenders have been understandably reluctant to rely upon the good intentions of a transitory officialdom to redeem the public debts when due. To protect their loans the banks have required municipalities to pledge for debt redemption the revenues of certain self-supporting public services. To ensure that these revenues will be available when due, the banks have further insisted that the revenue-yielding municipal enterprises be separated from direct municipal control and be reorganized under special boards (*juntas de las empresas delegadas*) consisting of three members, two of whom are in effect representatives of the lending agencies.

Characteristically these *empresas delegadas* include water-works, sewers, refuse disposal, street lighting, public markets, slaughterhouses, and sometimes municipal telephone companies. Servicing of the debt is a first charge on revenues; thereafter the *junta* at its discretion may provide for operation, maintenance, improvement or expansion of the services—and the funds remaining may then be turned over to the municipality. Actually, in spite of what appears to be an unfavorable arrangement, the Colombian municipalities derive substantial revenues from the *empresas*, which under professional management and with stability of employment usually provide better service and more revenue than comparable enterprises under direct municipal administration.

In spite of this segregation of delegated enterprises there is commonly widespread confusion between the fiscal operations of revenue-yielding services and of municipal services generally. As a matter of both official and public convenience the delegated enterprises have sometimes been designated as official agencies for the collection of the municipal real estate, street lighting, and industrial and commercial taxes. In principle this suggests tax farming, as the agent must be allowed something to cover the cost of collection. But the terms of collection are subject to at least periodic public control by means of contract, and the public has greater confidence in the impartial application of the tax laws than it would have under "political" administration.

The foregoing characteristics of Colombian government (and others which might be added) almost ensure the ineffectuality of public administration. There are, of course, public programs such as the national system of real estate evaluation which in spite of environmental handicaps apparently provide a high quality of public service. But in general the conventional administrative attitudes—exacerbated by current political disorders—have laid a profound malaise upon the public service. These are conditions which must be changed if the Colombian public service is to become a more effective instrument of the public welfare. Each of the five characteristics of Colombian public administration which have just been described have grown out of a political environment which technical assistance cannot alter directly or at once. Yet these are the kinds of conditions which will prevent or frustrate administrative reform efforts. They afford a most stubborn challenge to technical assistance in public administration, and in the Colombian experience to date are areas in which administrative reform has moved most slowly.

III. INTERNATIONAL BANK AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MISSIONS

Administrative conventions institutionalized in the structure and procedures of government persist with great tenacity in Colombia as elsewhere. But not all Colombians view their administrative difficulties as trials to be forever endured. In the past, Colombians who have considered public questions from other than positions of personal self-interest, have inclined toward theoretical and juristic analysis. During the past three years, however, interest in a critical and concrete approach to problems of public administration has developed. Since 1949 at least four major economic and administrative studies have been

sponsored by Colombian governments with technical direction or assistance from abroad.²

The first of these studies was undertaken by an economic mission organized in 1949 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the invitation of the Colombian government. The purpose of the Bank mission was to recommend "a comprehensive integrated development program for Colombia."³ Although its concern lay primarily with economic matters, the International Bank could not disregard the relevant influences of the public services and public finance. Commenting on the organization of the government for planning and administration, the mission observed "that the Government at its various levels is not now well adapted either for comprehensive economic planning or for the efficient implementation of such planning."⁴ The limited effectiveness of previous foreign technical missions to Colombia was in part attributed to these deficiencies. "A continuation of this situation," the Bank report declared, "raises serious questions as to the extent to which Colombia might effectively take advantage of the international technical assistance program."⁵

Following the report of the International Bank Mission, the Colombian government sponsored two supplementary studies. One of these was undertaken by the Committee for Economic Development, a group of six prominent Colombians appointed by the President of the Republic for the purpose of reviewing the report and recommendations of the Bank mission. Although the committee, on the basis of further studies and changed conditions, revised some of the details contained in the Bank report, it adopted the recommended program and endorsed the majority of its specific proposals. The findings of the committee were submitted to the government through a series of reports to the various ministries concerned and the final comprehensive report was printed by the *Banco de la Republica*.⁶

The second and more extensive follow-up on the Bank report was the Public Administration Mission headed by the former chief of the International Bank Mission, who also acted as consultant to the Committee on Economic Development—thus providing coordination for all three efforts. Work of the Public Administration Mission extended from June, 1950 to March, 1951 and was conducted concurrently with the studies of the Committee on Economic Development, to which it was in large measure complementary. The task of the Public Administration Mission was to study the administrative organization and procedures of the Colombian government and to recommend to the

² This development is not entirely novel. As early as 1923 the Colombian government adopted certain financial and monetary measures recommended by a mission from the United States headed by Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University.

³ *The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia* (Washington, D. C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1950), p. xv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Comité de Desarrollo Económico, Informe Final—Septiembre 1950—Agosto 1951* (Bogotá, 1951).

President proposals for its improvement, particularly improvements required for the success of the basic economic program. The Bank report had pointed out certain areas in which more efficient production and utilization of resources were contingent upon improvements in the organization, personnel and procedures of the government. Attention of the Public Administration Mission was concentrated on these areas. The studies and final report of the mission dealt largely with the overall organization and central top-level management of the principal ministries and agencies of the government concerned with internal economic affairs.⁷

The fourth study followed from the first three, but did not relate directly to the work of the International Bank Mission. In 1952 the Governor of Caldas sponsored an economic and public administrative study of the third most populous department of Colombia. A small technical staff of Americans and Colombians undertook the basic survey work in the capital city of Manizales, with extensive field observation throughout the department.⁸

As in the national public administration study, attention in the Caldas report was directed first to the economic and social needs of the department, and second to the organizational, financial and procedural changes in the government which were necessary to enable public administrators better to meet these economic and social needs. The Caldas mission, with the background of the earlier studies, in many ways came closest to the immediate needs and problems of Colombia. It required extensive and first-hand acquaintance with local budgets and office-holders, with local institutions and with popular hopes, prejudices, and inclinations. Only through this detailed analysis considered in relation to comprehensive long-range objectives was the mission able to develop recommendations that would answer current needs and provide a basis for future administrative reforms.

IV. PROSPECTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Administrative practices in common with all human institutions are products of the mind—and minds must be changed if administrative reforms are to be accomplished. Thus, although the economic and administrative studies in Colombia have been perforce concerned with material, structural, and legal problems, the real source of Colombia's difficulties is in the habits of mind associated with the cultural environment. The traditional patterns of social behavior dominant in Colombia have given rise to political and administrative practices that under changing conditions of the present are often inconsistent

⁷ *Reorganización de la Rama Ejecutiva del Gobierno de Colombia* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1952).

⁸ See Horst Mendershausen, "Economic and Fiscal Problems of a Colombian Department," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 6, pp. 49-89 (Spring, 1953); also *Caldas en 1952: Informe de la Misión Currie al Gobernador del Departamento* (Manizales, Imprenta Departamental, 1952). Since the Caldas study several departmental surveys have been projected by the National Planning Council and a five-year development program for Atlántico has been completed.

with effective government. The bitter political struggle between the Conservative and Liberal parties is destroying old relationships without providing a new orientation for the nation's public service.

Public administration in Colombia operates today in an environment of political instability. Although there is widespread genuine desire for administrative reform, there is also general skepticism about the survival of reform following a change in government—even under the same political party. But if the present partisan disorders could be terminated, Colombia would still face the difficult and painful adjustment of long-established methods of government and administration to new circumstances and new demands—a process of transition that has become the characteristic condition of government over most of the world.

The course of this adjustment in any given country depends in some measure upon the strength and adaptability of its public administrative system. And the ultimate effectiveness of efforts toward improvement of that system will depend in large measure upon early practical accomplishments that will advance the achievement of long-term reforms. In appraising the accomplishments of technical assistance for public administration in Colombia, distinction should be drawn, therefore, between immediate results and long-range consequences.

The interrelatedness of governmental processes often makes one reform contingent upon another, and a sequence of administrative changes inevitably encounters an area of administration which for political reasons cannot be touched. Such measures as are at first adopted therefore tend to be isolated or fragmentary. The recommendations of the economic and public administration missions which were most readily accepted related closely to pressing economic needs and were tied into specific action programs: notably in transportation, exchange control, and agriculture. Administrative reforms in these areas gained political acceptance as they could be shown to enhance the prosperity and well-being of the Republic.

Recommendations for reform of administrative organization and of personnel, accounting and management procedures have been less enthusiastically received, although the need for reform is widely admitted. But even when reforms in these areas have won approval in principle, desire for improvement does not easily overcome doubt regarding the wisdom of attempting to put them into practice. Unlike the measures clearly necessary to economic development, there is no present compelling pressure for their adoption.

That which may be accomplished very soon is not always readily distinguishable from that which requires the assistance of time. Foreign experts themselves need time to acquire a sense of the receptivity of a people toward change. Although both the earlier and more recent economic and public administration reports in Colombia propose broadly comprehensive programs, there is a perceptible difference of emphasis in the national public administration survey and the program subsequently recommended for Caldas. Both reports considered the long-range future. The national report recommended in consider-

able detail reforms which in retrospect appear to be realizable only at some future date when environmental factors are more propitious. The Caldas report tended to emphasize reforms of more immediate probability, but its recommendations took into account the effects of short-term progress on long-term objectives.

Thus the Caldas report, unlike the national public administration report, did not make comprehensive recommendations for non-partisan reform of the public personnel system. Clearly, improved personnel practices are needed both in the national and departmental governments; but present political circumstances preclude any early adoption of merit-system principles. Accordingly the Caldas report, after urging consideration for the ultimate establishment of a permanent non-partisan system of public employment, concentrated upon specific improvements of personnel organization and procedures under existing conditions. But the measures proposed (a central personnel office; establishment of job descriptions and minimum qualifications for positions; employee training) could be put into effect at the present time and would provide a foundation upon which a workable non-partisan career service might in time be based.

If it is asked what may be learned from the Colombian administrative reform efforts, no simple answer can suffice. Insight into the processes of technical assistance in public administration is more likely to be gained from the comparative study of numbers of experiences reported from different places (under both similar and contrasting circumstances) than from an account limited to a specific country. The Colombian experience briefly described in this article has been used to illustrate some of the difficulties and problems of technical assistance in public administration under unsettled political conditions. Although certain conclusions have been drawn upon the basis of Colombian experience as it appears to the author, the article has proceeded upon the level of illustration rather than of generalization.

What may be learned from Colombian experience depends in part upon what may be learned from administrative reform efforts under comparable circumstances elsewhere. Thus the value of a particular experience is not necessarily to be found solely in the experience itself, but rather in relation to other events which taken together afford a basis for valid generalization. Implicit in the comparative approach to the study of administration is the accumulation of descriptive data which in time may afford a basis for generalization.

What has technical assistance in Colombia accomplished in overcoming the impediments which political conditions have placed in the way of administrative reform? This paper has dealt with five "political" aspects of Colombian administration which obstructed administrative reform efforts, and their disadvantage to the Colombian public service was pointed out in the economic and public administration reports. But it is questionable whether the proper role of technical assistance is the launching of a headlong attack upon them within the public service; nor are these conditions of a character which may be exorcised by official command. They can be removed only as they can be

replaced by institutions and practices more consonant with effective administration. Specific recommendations of the missions which might be realized promptly through administrative action did, however, get at some of the roots of maladministration. Realistic accounting procedures, reliable statistical methods, improved personnel machinery—each can contribute indirectly toward at least a partial modification of the political environment of the public service.

Essential to an evaluation of the Colombian experience with administrative reform is the factor of time. One cannot with finality assess contemporaneous efforts to reform a public service system. One must see how the efforts work out in practice. But neither can one safely wait until an indefinite future to begin the appraisal of these efforts, for some may take effect at once, others at differing rates over an extended period of years. The proper question would therefore seem not to be: What can one learn from administrative reform efforts in (for example) Colombia? One may better ask: How much may we fail to learn in the future if we do not now secure adequate data regarding the course of many different attempts at technical assistance in public administration?

Adequate data includes more than mission reports. It requires study of the circumstances leading to the enlistment of outside aid, and it requires follow-up studies on the ultimate results of technical assistance efforts. The problem of implementation of the technical assistance report becomes relevant from the very inception of the intention to seek outside aid. Decisions taken at the beginning of a technical assistance project may fundamentally affect the final outcome of the effort.⁹ Thus the comparative study of technical assistance requires a comprehensive approach which takes into consideration all relevant ecological factors; and this approach demands not only depth in detail, but also breadth in time.

In Colombia time will be needed for the more comprehensive recommendations of the economic and public administration missions to win substantial acceptance. But in this respect Colombia, even if relieved of her internal political difficulties, would hardly be unique. In the United States basic reforms in budgeting, departmental organization, accounting and personnel practices were proposed years—even decades—in advance of their adoption. These reforms in the idea stage, like leaven, slowly worked changes in the political environment. Assisted by collateral developments, they prepared a public opinion favorable to their ultimate adoption. Given the unsettled political conditions in Colombia, the results of the economic and public administration missions have already been considerable. The larger plans for the reform of public administrative organization and procedure remain yet to be fulfilled; tokens of hopes that may one day be realized as Colombia achieves a political environment more favorable to public service.

⁹ The inter-related character of the several aspects of technical assistance was discussed by Roscoe C. Martin, "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12; pp. 258-66 (Autumn, 1952).

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

MAJID KHADDURI

*School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University*

I

During the past four years several Middle Eastern countries have experienced governmental changes in which the army took an active part. In Syria and Egypt the army deliberately intervened to overthrow discredited regimes and to depose the heads of state. In Lebanon and Iraq the heads of state, themselves alarmed by an intense struggle among rival political parties, invited the army to intervene in order to maintain order. In Lebanon the army refused to crush the opposition, acting only as a caretaker; in Iraq the army agreed to support authority against disorder and the effect of its intervention cannot yet be foreseen.

This control of government by the military is indicative both of serious defects in democratic processes in the Middle East and of the eagerness with which Middle Eastern leaders seek high political office. In Western democratic countries, traditions have developed which tend to keep the army isolated from domestic politics, although military advice has often been sought on foreign policy, and persons whose careers have been in the military service are not infrequently elected, or appointed, to high political positions. This is a quite different matter, however, from the military's choosing to occupy high political office through the weapons of its own profession.

There is an almost nostalgic longing in the Middle East, common to all political groups, for a "strong" regime which will tolerate neither multiplicity of political parties nor anarchy of ideas. This is due in part to the failure of democracy to provide agreement on fundamentals. Beyond this, however, the forces set in motion since the First World War have artificially speeded up the process of Westernization beyond the ability of the people to adapt the imported ideas to their social needs. Such abstract concepts as sovereignty, self-determination, and democracy were thrust upon the people of the Middle East without their having been prepared for them. If the Western powers, in taking an active part in the re-organization of the Middle East after World War I, had known the Eastern countries better and had had a greater appreciation of the historical process that had been going on, the Eastern peoples might have been given an opportunity to adapt Western political concepts and institutions more slowly and would probably have developed their own form or forms of democracy to fit their own needs and aspirations. It did not help that the Middle Eastern leaders who cooperated with the Western powers never tried to reconcile Western concepts and institutions with existing institutions so as to avoid conflict with religious and conservative groups. As a result, democracy from its very inception failed to command general respect, and when adequate re-

forms were not achieved democracy had to bear the blame. Opposition to democracy came from the right (religious) as well as from the left (socialist and communist) parties and groupings; and when neither side could muster sufficient support to achieve power, the army intervened to carry out a moderate program of reform by force.

II

For centuries Islam provided for the believers a way of life, the validity and perfection of which no pious Muslim ever questioned. As a divine system, Islam set up the principle that authority belongs to God; but the caliph, though enthroned by the people to enforce God's law, was not constitutionally responsible to the electorate. However, the caliph and his subjects were both bound by the divine law, the violation of which would make them equally liable for punishment. Such a theory of the state, placing ultimate responsibility in God, is not inherently democratic. However, since Islam is regarded as the embodiment of God's will and justice, its believers derive satisfaction from the moral conviction that their political system, though authoritarian in nature, could not possibly be matched by any other system. Further, Islam is regarded as immune from foreign encroachment or attack, for, as the power of Islam is God's power, no other community could successfully launch an attack on it: failure would certainly be on the side of the infidels, since success could not be divorced from Islam.¹

The pious Muslim, witnessing the change of Islam under the impact of Western ideas and institutions, is undergoing a moral crisis. Not only is he shocked that Islam should be divorced from the caliphate and the divine law replaced by secular legislation, but also that the West should be encroaching upon Islam with impunity. The challenge of Westernization has been responded to differently by the various shades of opinion. The agnostic new generation, attracted by the positivistic philosophy of the West, advocated a complete break with the past and the adoption of Western secular institutions. Following the First World War, when democracy had become fashionable, the new generation accepted democracy without trying to adapt it to existing conditions. The learned doctors of the divine law, supported by the older generation, objected to the introduction of Western institutions because of their incompatibility with Islamic institutions. Apart from the slogan "go back to Islam," however, they had little to offer in the way of a constructive program of reform which might have combined the best of Islam and Western institutions. Thus the conflict that ensued was between two extreme schools; the new denounced the old as incompatible with modern life, and the old, witnessing a sudden break with the past, emptied the vials of its wrath upon those in authority for permitting this change.

Nor was the experiment of the new generation with democracy a happy one.

¹ For a more detailed statement on the nature of the Islamic state, see M. Khadduri, "The Juridical Theory of the Islamic State," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 41, pp. 181-85 (July, 1951).

For no sooner had democracy begun to operate, with its complicated procedural problems of electioneering and parliamentary debates (to say nothing of the endless quarrels that developed among rival parties and politicians), than the people began to learn how scandalously its processes could be misused by unscrupulous leaders. To the old school, democracy failed to command the respect or allegiance of the people in the same way as God's law had done in the past. The activist character of democratic politics appeared too vulgar and too worldly in the eyes of pious Muslims who have habitually revered the awe-inspiring traditional institutions. Further, democracy as practiced in the West seemed to emphasize liberty, not equality. But to peoples who for centuries have been accustomed to authoritarian regimes, liberty could not possibly be as much appreciated as equality, since it permitted the enrichment of the few at the expense of exploited masses. What rendered the situation more difficult was, of course, the absence of any significant middle class with interests intermediate to those of the few rich or of the many poor. Such a middle class would have championed democracy against autocracy and feudalism as did the middle classes of Western Europe. But a sudden rise of the middle class is hardly to be looked for in predominantly agricultural countries where feudalism has persisted for a long time. In such countries the freedom permitted under democracy only rendered competition more acute, and the desperate masses, bent on improving their economic condition, were bound to fall under the influence of radical ideas. The people of the Middle East, not unnaturally, judged democracy by the results achieved rather than by its theoretical soundness. The judgment to which they have come is that they have been deceived by those in authority and that democracy has failed them.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, a good start in Islamic reforms was made by a number of enlightened teachers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who saw no harm to Islam if the believers borrowed Western ideas and concepts. Muhammad Abduh offered a formula of reform which advocated the "modernization," not the "secularization," of Islam. Although he was opposed at the outset by the Azhar University of Cairo, Abduh's approach gradually gained the support of Muslim opinion, and the Azhar graduates were eventually dominated by the Abduh school.² After the introduction of democracy, however, the Azhar, without carrying the constructive reforms of Abduh forward, supported the existing regime and hence could no longer attract liberal Muslims; these consequently preferred to go to the Westernized schools and thus lost touch with Islamic learning. As a result, there is no moderate Muslim reformer such as Abduh who can offer a reform program combining the best of Islam and Western civilization.

This situation gave an opening to lay religious leaders, who revived the traditional religious zeal combined with intense nationalism. The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) may be cited as probably the best expression of this lay religious revival. Contemporary critics still differ on the signifi-

² See Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933); and H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1946).

cance of the Brotherhood's contribution to the modernization of Islam. While it is true that Western technological inventions have been readily accepted, the Brotherhood could hardly be credited with having improved on Abduh's contribution in the realm of non-material values. One could even discern in the Brotherhood a falling away from Abduh's religious toleration by arousing religious fanaticism mixed with nationalism. Moreover, since the Brotherhood derived popular support by its opposition to the existing regime, it was critical of democracy. Lacking the constructive approach of Abduh, it was unwilling to attempt the reconciliation of democracy with Islam, and instead advocated the re-establishment of theocracy. Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, leader of the Brotherhood, came very near to achieving power during the Palestine war, but he came out into the open too soon and clashed with the ruling oligarchy. He was criticized for having resorted to violence and terrorism and the government used this as an excuse (after he was treacherously assassinated) to close the headquarters of his organization. The Egyptian government could not completely suppress the movement, which has been permitted to resume its activities, but the movement suffered seriously from the blunders committed by its leaders.³

Even if the Brotherhood had achieved power (with the consequence that similar moves might have been attempted in Syria and Iraq), it is unlikely that its members would have enjoyed a long term of office. The Brotherhood's program was too Calvinistic in spirit to be tolerated for any length of time. The re-establishment of a theocracy, regarding all other states as inferior, would have been incompatible with the new international order. Furthermore, the theocratic emphasis on the solidarity of the faith and the strict enforcement of the divine law, an emphasis which disregarded the medieval methods by which these objectives might be achieved, would have been strenuously opposed. The Brotherhood and other religious movements overlooked the fact that in a modern society, under the impact of a world-wide trend to regard religion as a matter of individual conscience, no such solidarity is achievable.⁴

It has become a popular slogan, repeated again and again by Muslim as well as Western publicists, that the one power which is equipped to serve as a barrier to communism in the Middle East is Islam. On purely doctrinal grounds Islam, probably more than any other religion, is hard to reconcile with communism. As a system which evaluates all values of life in terms of a divine juridico-theological code, it is opposed to dialectical materialism and, of course, to atheism. To the pious Muslim performing the daily prayer and conforming strictly to the rules of the divine law, communism appears to reduce life to a mere mechanical process, stressing earthly rather than spiritual values. Further, Islam recognizes the institution of private property and free enterprise, and the divine law regulates all kinds of possession and disposal of property, including its transmission to the owner's children and the near kin by inheri-

³ For a discussion of the origins and ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, see J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950).

⁴ See Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London, 1951), p. 132.

tance. Even the rights of the state to own or to dispose of property are limited by the divine law during both war and peace.⁵

Yet there are a few Muslim thinkers, witnessing the present plight of the poor and the exploitation of the landlords, who argue that Islam is equally opposed to the great disparity between rich and poor. They cite traditions to the effect that the Prophet Muhammad often expressed his aversion to poverty. From early Islam the doctors of law and theology often have advised the caliphs to pay proper attention to the poor, since the law required the distribution of alms among them. Modern Muslim thinkers, regarding Islam as an ideal system of social justice, argue that Islam is inherently opposed to exploitation and poverty and that it is the duty of the community to regulate its economic life on an equitable basis. "Social justice," said one of them, "is like the *jihād* [holy war], a collective duty upon all Muslims," i.e., its enforcement is required by the law; if it is not fulfilled, all the Muslim community, including those in authority, fall in error and become liable for punishment.⁶ But these moderate Muslim thinkers had little influence on the ruling oligarchy or the Azhar, who seemed to be satisfied that the oft-quoted sacred citations, and the sermons given in the Friday prayers in support of property rights and capitalism, would provide moral strength against poverty and unemployment.

Such attitudes quickly gave an opening to the rise of militant leftist groups who either argued that Islam could be reconciled with socialism or tried to turn their faces completely against Islam in favor of communism. The moderately leftist groups maintain that Islam is not opposed to socialism, arguing that the early Islamic creed, divorced from later accretions, was in accord with socialist ideas. Their socialism is based on the Islamic principle of equality, which recognizes no differences in society on the basis of wealth. No social or economic distinctions, they maintain, were imposed by God upon the believers; although, as revealed in the *Qur'an*, He "created you of male and female, and made you races and tribes," He recognized no differences among them save on the basis of "piety" and "Godfearing."⁷ The socialists cited as evidence for their argument the case of a companion of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu-Dhar al-Ghifari (whom they regard as the first Muslim socialist), who criticized the caliph for his departure from Muhammad's puritanical life by acquiring wealth and ignoring the interests of the masses.

Communists, deriving their ideas from the teachings of Marx and Lenin, repudiate almost all national and religious institutions as the bulwark of the reactionary classes. The Middle East extremists, who argue with Marx that religion is the opium of the people, attack Islam and its teaching with an anti-religious religiosity. Their program, advocating a complete reorganization of society based on the doctrine of world communism, is probably the most con-

⁵ For further details on the relations between persons and property, see my *Law of War and Peace in Islam* (London, 1941), Ch. 9.

⁶ See Muhammad al-Ghazzali, *Islam and Socialist Programs* (Cairo, 1951), pp. 35-37. See also Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Cairo, 1950). (Both in Arabic.)

⁷ See *Qur'an*, XLIX, 12-13. (Palmer's translation.)

structive (as well as destructive in its sweeping denunciation of existing conditions) so far offered by any Middle East group in opposition to the ruling class. Its appeal to the masses and malcontents, who have not grasped the most elementary principles of communism, is due to the persuasive ability of the local leaders, who present communism as the panacea for all social ills. The discipline and solidarity displayed by the communists (though they often quarrel on procedural matters) and their tenacity in fighting repression have rendered their work effective and enhanced their prestige among the masses. However, despite their outcry against exploitation, graft, and corruption, they still have a long way to go before they can claim active support from all the masses. Except perhaps for those who are regular members of secret communist parties (all Middle East countries have either refused to permit, or have suppressed, communist organizations), most of their followers may be classed as sympathizers who probably have certain mental reservations about the doctrine. Communism's opposition to religion and its disdain for other mores, to say nothing of its affiliation with a foreign power, are but a few of the factors which still make many hesitate to accept *in toto* the communist creed. If, however, these sympathizers were forced to choose between the existing regimes and communism, it is not unlikely that their choice would fall on communism.

The failure of any of these platforms to gain full support from the masses, as well as the vulnerability of the democratic regimes, made the people look elsewhere for leadership—toward the army.

III

The interest of the Middle Eastern countries in building up strong armed forces probably goes back to antiquity when the power of the monarch was dependent on two pillars—the clergy and the army. The king, in addition to proclaiming himself god or the son of a god, was the army chief and often took the field as the actual commander of the army. This tradition of the close association of rulers with the army persisted down through the centuries under Arab and Ottoman rule. So closely connected were the army chiefs with the caliphs and sultans that often the viziers and grand viziers were chosen from among the army officers who served in the royal courts. Not infrequently they established matrimonial relationships with the reigning dynasties. The Arab and Ottoman armies, at times when the army chiefs had become more powerful than their masters, often deposed one ruler after another at their pleasure. Just as the Praetorian guard dethroned one Emperor after another, so the Arab legion and Ottoman Janissary put to death one sovereign after another, replacing them by their own nominees. The struggle between army officers and sovereigns degenerated to the throat-cutting level, so that either the army or the dynasty had to be liquidated. When society was subjected to this kind of internal struggle, the very foundation of its political organization reached a breaking point and a radical change in the regime became inevitable. This significant feature in the history of Eastern societies, which often recurred (it

is not suggested that it is inherently cyclic in nature), indicates that recent events in the modern Middle East should not be surprising.

In the modern Middle East, following the old established military tradition, keen interest has been shown in organizing well-disciplined national armies along European lines. Even such new countries as Iraq and Syria, when they were under a Mandate and there was no real need for armed forces, aspired to organize small national armies for future enlargement. When both Iraq and Syria had attained independence, special care was given to reorganize and enlarge the national forces, which were deemed necessary to act as guardians of the newly won independence. In countries which had an earlier independent status, the army figured even more largely in national life; in the case of Turkey and Iran, the Kemalist and Pahlevi regimes owed probably as much to the army in their establishment as to the strength of character and the statesmanship of their founders. In Egypt, from the time of Muhammad Ali, founder of the ruling dynasty, the army proved to be the chief personal preoccupation of the viceroys, who spent on it lavishly for the consolidation of their power. From the British occupation (1882), however, to the declaration of independence (1922) the army was reduced almost to a police force. But the interest in reorganizing a national army was revived, especially after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, not only to repel foreign aggression, but also in order that the army should become the symbol of the new national life.

Most of the Middle East army officers are drawn from the middle class or the ruling oligarchy: very few have come from the poorer classes. The soldiers, as a rule, are drawn from the peasant and working classes, and most of them have been recruited on the basis of national conscription. The majority of the soldiers are illiterate, but many of them who have remained in the service long enough have received elementary education in addition to military training. It is the officers, rather than the soldiers, who have been instrumental in involving the army in politics. Elementary and high school education carries with it indoctrination with a spirit of intense nationalism. Moved by patriotism as well as by personal ambition, many high school graduates enter the law colleges or military academies with the idea that a career in law or military service is a stepping-stone to high government position. Not infrequently high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions or believing their ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service. General Najib is not the only one who had a background in law before he entered military training, and those who for a short time served as teachers may be counted in the hundreds.

Even in military training, where discipline and the military profession require the isolation of the army from politics, nationalist indoctrination is continued. Army officers often play an active part in the decision of national issues. A case in point is the Assyrian uprising in Iraq. The army officers moved to suppress the uprising not only because they were bound to do so by military order, but also because they had their own views on the matter and decided to solve the problem in a manner satisfactory to their own national conscious-

ness. This explains why certain excesses were committed by the Iraqi army officers in handling this problem. The Palestine war, by far the most important issue and one which had a far-reaching effect on almost all the Arab countries, may be cited as another case in point. The views of the army officers, we now know, differed on many points from those of the politicians in power. Not only was the advice of the military regarding purely technical matters (such as the general command and the supply of weapons) not heeded by the politicians, but also the military had disagreed with their governments regarding the conduct and the prosecution of the war. In this, it is true, the army was under the influence of opposition parties (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), but the army officers also had their own political ideas, which differed from those of their governments. Thus it is clear why, after the Arabs lost the war, the Arab army officers and the politicians in power blamed each other for the blunders committed, and when the army felt it had unjustifiably been selected as the scapegoat, the officers reacted (to mention here only one specific reason) by overthrowing the politicians and punishing them for their mistakes. The recent military intervention in Lebanon has been temporary because of the relatively minor military role played by this country in the war. In Iraq, however, the army has already staged seven military coups, and its recent invitation to carry on the administration may be so tempting that it will once again dominate the political scene. The Jordanian army has long been under rigid British tutelage and therefore no move could be expected. But in the case of the Syrian and Egyptian armies, which were seriously beaten and had had a great deal to suffer on account of their governments' failure to supply weapons (in the case of Egypt the government supplied defective weapons), the army's intervention in politics may be regarded as a vindication of the army's role in the Palestine war and the failure of the politicians to support them.

Occupying such a high position in the national life of the Middle Eastern countries, the army officers were approached by various ideological and political groups (except perhaps the communists, who were severely punished if they did so) trying to win them to their side. Owing to the conservative and intensely nationalistic background of most of the army officers, it is not surprising that in the Iraqi and Egyptian armies the ultra-nationalistic and religious movements were the most influential, especially the Pan-Arab groups in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Syrian army, emphasizing liberalism before anything else, has paid only lip service to religion and proved to be lukewarm to conservative and religious groups.

The elements which showed intense interest in political activities were the younger rather than the older army officers. Older men occupying high military positions and winning the favors of the heads of states and governments were likely to be more concerned with their own interests than with national reform. Some of these older officers held their positions not because of personal merit but for the purpose of insuring that the army would remain loyal to those in authority. Not infrequently some of them were related to the king or cabinet

ministers and their interests thus became identified with those of the ruling oligarchy. As a result the younger army officers often organized themselves into small groups (either at informal friendly gatherings or in secret meetings) to discuss national issues. Not infrequently they broached the idea of the necessity of the army's intervention in order to overhaul the political machine, if not to establish a military dictatorship. The young army officers always chose their leaders from among the older army officers whom they could trust and whose records were clean. Such leaders were often chosen on the basis of seniority in military service, provided that their military integrity was beyond reproach and that they were not self-seeking. Thus Bakr Sidqi rose in Iraq, Husni Za'yim (replaced by Hinnawi and later by Shishakli) in Syria, and Muhammad Najib in Egypt. Their leadership and able command, recognized by all, had been tested in war: Bakr Sidqi in his operations against the Assyrian and Middle Euphrates tribal revolts; Za'yim, Shishakli and Najib in the Palestine war.

The underlying motive which prompted the army officers to engage actively in politics was, of course, the need for a social revolution which it was not possible to achieve by democratic procedures. The army seems to hold relatively moderate views acceptable to the majority of the people and is able to provide strong leadership capable of enforcing social reforms with celerity and a minimum of opposition. The people, ready to give the army officers an opportunity to try their approach to reform, have as a rule initially responded jubilantly to the change, though their enthusiasm, judging by the Iraqi and Syrian experiences, soon cools off, owing to the ruthless methods and continual repression which are likely to follow when reform measures are carried out by force.

The Palestine war has been singled out as the principal reason for the sudden military coups in Syria and Egypt. A state of intense fermentation, however, had long been in existence. Criticism of existing conditions had frequently been voiced, but no better occasion than the defeat suffered in Palestine had yet presented itself. It gave the critics an opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction and to pour out their angry criticism of everything they considered wrong. Books and pamphlets, as well as newspaper articles, were published in an ever-increasing number; some of them—as had rarely happened in the past—went into several editions and were widely read all over the Arabic-speaking countries. Such pamphleteering, a novelty in the Middle East, released many dynamic forces. In his *Meaning of the Tragedy*,⁸ Costi Zurayk, then President of the Syrian University, was the first to discuss in a booklet the profound national frustration caused by the Palestine war. He called upon the people to press their rulers for reform. This was followed by another booklet, *The Lesson of Palestine*,⁹ written by a Palestinian lawyer, offering a constructive plan of social reform, including a Fertile Crescent unity scheme, and calling for immediate action. Most devastating of all, perhaps, is

⁸ Costi Zurayk, *Ma'na al-Nukba* (Beirut, 1948).

⁹ Musa al-Alami, *Ibrat Filastin* (Beirut, 1949). This book has been summarized and translated in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 373-405 (Oct., 1949).

Khalid's *From Here We Start*,¹⁰ written by an Egyptian religious teacher, in which the whole religious system, as interpreted and practiced by Muslims today, is shown to be incompatible with modern life. Khalid rejected the restoration of a theocratic state and advocated the re-interpretation of Islam on a socialistic basis. In another book, entitled *Citizens, Not Cattle*,¹¹ Khalid attacked the oligarchic regime of Egypt and strongly defended the individual's rights to equality, liberty, education and work. His earlier book was at first suppressed by the government, but upon its release it went into several editions and was read all over the Arab world. Neither the government's opposition nor the severe and even vulgar criticism of his opponents could discourage Khalid from publishing his second book, which is even more trenchant than the first in its sweeping criticism of social conditions. These, as well as other less significant books, have been widely read and have had a far-reaching influence on public opinion.

The Palestine war brought matters to a head, since it directly involved the army in a struggle with the civilian politicians. The ruling oligarchy watched carefully lest it lose its hold over the army. When the Arab governments lost the war, the military, in spite of public statements that the war was satisfactorily conducted, were blamed for the defeat. This set in motion the movement, both in Syria and Egypt, to investigate the causes of defeat; but before investigations could reveal the malefactors, the politicians tried to influence the investigators. This aroused the army officers—who feared that the responsible politicians might escape punishment—and prompted them to act.

IV

Four Middle Eastern countries may be specifically cited as having experienced military coups d'état: Turkey under late Ottoman rule, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Two military coups took place in Turkey (1908, 1909); seven in Iraq (1936–1941); four in Syria (1949–1952); and two in Egypt (1881, 1952). (In Iraq the army has once more come into the picture in 1952, but this time by the invitation of the head of the state to maintain public order; in Lebanon the army acted only as a caretaker during the interim of a governmental change.) These fifteen military coups by no means exhaust the list. They have been selected as instances where the army has clearly taken control of the actual conduct of government, not merely where former army officers—as Kemal Atatürk and Shah Reza Pahlavi—played the role of the politician.¹²

¹⁰ Khalid Muhammad Khalid, *Min Huna Nabda'* (Cairo, 1950). For a short summary of this book see Nicola A. Ziadeh, "Recent Books on the Interpretation of Islam," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 506–8 (Autumn, 1951).

¹¹ *Muwatinun La Ra'aya* (Cairo, 1951).

¹² It is not the writer's purpose in this article to give the history of the various Middle Eastern military coups, but rather to discuss the general character of military rule as well as its impact on politics. For the history of military rule, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 4, (Jan., 1950), pp. 1–12; Rashid al-Barrawi, *The Military Coup in Egypt* (Cairo, 1952), in Arabic; M. Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (London, 1951).

All of these military coups took place either with the avowed purpose of re-establishing a constitutional regime (as in the case of Turkey) or of "cleansing" an already established democracy of evil influences which paralyzed its working. The military sought the active cooperation of nationalist elements and at the outset their rule was conducted in close cooperation with and was supported by the liberals. Later on the military dominated the scene and the liberals (if not the nationalists) were either pushed to the background or dropped from power. The religious groups have as a rule been reluctant to support military rule (except perhaps in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood gave its blessing to General Najib), either because they had come to terms with former regimes (as in Turkey) or because their ideas proved to be too reactionary to be tolerated by the army (as in Iraq). In Syria the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it opposed the pre-military regime, failed to give support to the military because of their active cooperation with liberal elements.

The military pretended that they had assumed power either to prepare the way for liberal reforms or to carry out the reforms themselves. In reality they seized power without having been prepared for, or having had practical experience in, carrying out reforms. Their move to clean the Augean stables met universal approval, but this is a negative approach to reform. The Herculean task would be to carry out real social reform in a manner satisfactory to all. At best the reform program of the military was eclectic; it included various ideas and proposals that had become popular among the people, but these have rarely been integrated into a broad reform program, and plans for their implementation were lacking. A few liberal thinkers, such as Zia Gok Alp in Turkey and the Ahali group in Iraq, tried to formulate broad social programs for the movements they supported, but such philosophical apologiae had little or no influence on the minds of the military.¹³ Probably more serious attempts at agrarian reform have been considered, though not actually undertaken, under the military regimes of Syria and Egypt (the distribution of state-owned land among the peasants in Syria and the limitation of land-ownership to a legal maximum of two hundred acres in Egypt).¹⁴ But though these platforms have become popular among the masses, it would seem that the improvement of economic conditions depends primarily on finding new means of increasing agricultural production, not on merely distributing (as in the case of Syria) or re-distributing (as in Egypt) the land among a larger number of people. Syria needs both the capital and know-how—which she has refused to receive under the Point IV program—for the exploitation of its vast undeveloped territory, and Egypt, an already over-populated country, needs new means for increasing production, agricultural or otherwise, to make possible the achievement of social reform.

¹³ For an evaluation of Zia Gok Alp's ideas and influence on the Committee of Union and Progress and the military, see Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1950).

¹⁴ See texts of the Syrian land decrees and the Egyptian Land Reform Law in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, pp. 69-81 (Winter, 1953).

The suspension of democratic life in favor of military rule, although greeted with almost universal approval, has its own weaknesses and evil influences. Most dangerous of all seems to be the difficulty in persuading the army, once the job of overhauling is done, to withdraw from politics or relinquish power. In spite of repeated assurances by leading army officers that their intervention was only temporary, the lessons of history are not reassuring. Military rule in Egypt (1881-1882), Turkey (1908-1918) and Iraq (1936-1941), showing no signs of withdrawal in favor of civil government, persisted until it was overthrown, in all the foregoing instances, as a result of war with foreign countries. In Syria the military have survived a period of four years and no indication has yet been given as to when military rule will end. They have avoided fighting with a neighboring country, which is still technically at war with Syria. Such a contest would test their strength and ability to survive. Their silence about war with Israel, a war which originally had given them an excuse to overthrow civilian rule, as well as their alignment with one Arab country against another, reflects their apprehension lest the military regime collapse from within or be overthrown by an attack from without. In the circumstances, military rule is likely to continue for an indefinite period in Syria as well as in other Arab countries, so long as public opinion remains dissatisfied with the civilian politicians and the army officers can maintain their reputation as the guardians of national interests. If, on the other hand, the army leaders should engage in an internecine struggle for power, as has happened in the past, there is a possibility that the military regime might eventually collapse from within.

Nor is the effect of politics on the military a happy one. "A general has only one aim," said Müffling, "a general who is also a sovereign must have two; his actions as a soldier will always be subordinate to politics."¹⁵ Politics imposes restraints upon sovereigns who, in their careers as generals, should not submit to political forces in order to achieve the highest military success. If the general ever proved to be a successful sovereign, he must have submitted to restraints which no successful general would tolerate. Sudden rise to power seldom permits its victims, except perhaps in exceptional cases, to adjust themselves to the new positions they occupy. The all-powerful leader is tempted to assume a charismatic character which often alienates his supporters and admirers. The Middle East experience with army rule demonstrates again the truth of the saying that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." New leaders who swept to power to rid their people of arbitrary rule and corruption often could not avoid developing in themselves what they hated in their enemies.¹⁶ And this seems to have been true of Husni al-Za'iyim and

¹⁵ Müffling, *Die Feldzüge der Schlesiischen Armee*, p. 52, cited by Yorek von Wartenburg, *Napoleon As a General*, trans. W. G. James, Vol. 1, p. 151.

¹⁶ An Arab poet once remarked on the arbitrary rule of the military regime of the Young Turks who had overthrown Sultan Abdul-Hamid's regime in 1909:

"There was only one Hamid a few days ago,
But today of Hamid there's a thousand or so."
(Translation done in verse by Miss Katherine Parker.)

Shishakli in Syria no less than of Bakr Sidqi in Iraq. It is to be hoped that General Najib will be an exception to the rule.

Finally, a word may be said about the opinion prevalent among the Arabs, both military and civilians—comparing the progress made under the Kemalist regime with the state of anarchy and confusion in their countries—that each Arab country needs its own Kemal Ataturk to carry out reform with a strong hand. They often quote with approval the saying of Sayyid Jamal al-Din, a Muslim leader who advocated Pan-Islamism during the latter part of the nineteenth century, that the East cannot possibly be reformed save by a benevolent despot. When the Kemalist regime, after Ataturk's death, was transformed into a working democracy, it bolstered the army's argument that a great deal of spade work had to be done in the way of "cleansing" before the civilian politicians could be permitted to govern along democratic lines. The military, however, failed to understand that the Kemalist regime was not established overnight by entrusting power to the military, but that Kemal from the beginning made it clear to his fellow army officers that they had to choose between the army and politics. He launched his social reforms in the formative period by democratic methods, spending endless hours in trying to persuade his opponents, displaying patience and tolerance rarely to be found among statesmen with a military background. It was not until the Kurdish rebellion of 1925, when Kemal's prestige and power had already been established, that certain repressive measures were employed. The so-called loyalty trials, purging the regime of obstinate opponents, represented the only purge in the history of modern Turkey.

Ataturk's imitators in the neighboring Arab countries, misunderstanding the nature of Kemalism, tried at first to influence political decisions from behind the scenes, only to discover (facing non-cooperation or opposition from civilian politicians) that they had to take over the control of government themselves. In so doing, under the pretext of purging the regime of dangerous or corrupt personalities, they inaugurated a regime of repression which aroused anxiety and fear instead of inspiring order and security. General Bakr Sidqi not only exiled the leading ministers of the Cabinet he overthrew but also ordered the assassination of General Ja'far al-Askari and persecuted a dozen others; Colonels Za'yim and Shishakli arrested and exiled honest as well as corrupt people; and General Najib, following the same pattern, after forcing King Faruq to abdicate, arrested the King's entourage as well as other politicians on the grounds of corruption. There can hardly be an end to repression once it starts and it soon involves persons of integrity. The control of government by the military, ruling according to their light with no direct public restraint, creates a governmental problem no less difficult than the problem which prompted the army to seize power.

V

The basic factor underlying the passing of authority from civilian to military hands is the assumption that democracy has "failed." The people of the Middle

East, without handing over authority to either right or left (the religious or the communistic) elements—though both of them came very near to seizing power—resorted to an old trick, which has now become fashionable, of removing the undesirable sovereign by turning his own Praetorian guard against him. While the military has reduced the danger of right or left rule, a greater difficulty has arisen. Once the army officers were firmly installed in the saddle, how could they be removed from their newly won positions? This seems to be—at least in the writer's opinion—the greatest of the dangers of military rule; for, conceding the valuable contribution of the army in carrying out certain reform measures quickly, the experiment may not be worth trying at the expense of suspending for an indefinite period the democratic processes of government. It is true that the operation of democracy has met with dissatisfaction in almost all Middle Eastern countries. This does not necessarily negate the generally accepted principle that government belongs to the people and, therefore, must be controlled by the people. If democracy has failed in the Middle East, it has failed only because it was transplanted into a social milieu unprepared for it.

The return to democracy, whatever the means to be employed for its restoration, seems to be the safest way towards ultimate stability and progress. In countries where the force of the old local traditions is still strong, it is not to be expected that the working of democratic institutions would admit of comparison with their operation in Western countries accustomed to democratic traditions. As Aristotle often affirms in the *Politics*, the citizen must be educated in the spirit of the constitution under which he lives. At present, the value of democracy must be regarded as mainly educational: that is, it must help to develop democratic habits and traditions necessary for the functioning of democratic machinery.¹⁷ If democracy has "failed" at all, it has failed because in a shrinking world the Middle Eastern people have become aware of their backwardness in comparison with the West; but it is not the fault of democracy that they did not catch up with the West. The fault lies with the people themselves. Not until the people are cured from within—socially and economically no less than politically—can they live a salutary democratic way of life. And this approach is not new to the Middle East. The Prophet Muhammad, in a Qur'anic injunction, reminded his people "Verily God changeth not that which is in a people until they change that which is in themselves." This change from within can be achieved only by sound education—which is lacking among the great majority of the people—an education which will provide them with the spirit of the constitution under which they live.

¹⁷ See my *Independent Iraq* (London, 1951), pp. 34–35.

PARTISANSHIP AND COUNTY OFFICE: THE CASE OF OHIO

V. O. KEY, JR.

Harvard University

The textbooks contain singularly little systematic analysis of the role of party in local government. They abstract the relevant statutes. They expound more or less orthodox suppositions. Voting on local candidates corresponds closely with presidential voting. Party groups compete for control of local government more or less as they do on the national level. Or, the contrary notion is argued that party has little place in local politics. Personal followings or essentially non-party courthouse cliques determine all. This paper represents a modest attempt, by analysis of Ohio data, to test a few of the standard suppositions and to suggest lines of inquiry that might be fruitful in the study of local politics.¹

Relation of voting for county and presidential candidates. Contrary to the belief that the presidential tide almost invariably carries with it the local candidates of the winning party, the Ohio record indicates a fairly high degree of independence of national party trends in the selection of county officers. Although in most instances a Republican county presidentially chooses Republican county officers and a Democratic county, Democratic county officers, the departures from this consistency are of sufficient magnitude to excite attention. Figure 1 charts the proportions of the state's counties with Democratic presidential pluralities and the proportions of county offices won by Democratic candidates in presidential years from 1916 to 1948.² If the presidential candidate pulled all his fellow partisans into office with him, the two graphs would coincide. In fact, the cycle of party control of county office fluctuates over a considerably narrower range than does the cycle of county presidential pluralities. In periods of ascending Republican presidential strength, a goodly number of Democratic county candidates withstand the storm. At times of ascending Democratic presidential strength, Republican county candidates demonstrate staying power.

Although Figure 1 indicates the broad relationship of presidential and county polling, Table I on the 1948 election permits a more complete analysis. In that year in those counties at the extremes of party strength, as measured by the presidential vote, nearly all county offices went as did the presidential plurality. Counties with over 60 per cent of their vote for Dewey filled almost all their

¹ I wish to acknowledge helpful criticisms of several Ohio colleagues: Ben A. Arneson, Wilfred E. Binkley, E. Allen Helms, and Howard White. While their comments were most beneficial to me, they should not be taxed with any responsibility for the content of this article.

² The county offices included in the computations underlying the graph were those listed as "county offices" in *Ohio Election Statistics*; legislators and judges are not so listed. Over the period covered by the graph there was change from time to time in the offices filled in presidential years.




FIG. 1. Percentage of Ohio Counties with Democratic Presidential Pluralities and Percentage of Ohio County Offices Won by Democrats in Presidential Election Years, 1916-1948.

local offices with Republicans. Counties at the other end of the spectrum gave their votes generally to local Democrats as well as to Truman. As the presidential margin narrowed, the correspondence between presidential and local preferences declined sharply. Dewey carried 26 counties with 50-54.9 per cent of the vote but in these counties Republicans managed to capture only a few more than one-half of the county offices. In the close counties, a small amount of ticket splitting, of course, has a maximum effect.

The data of the table also permit a measurement of the gross local independence of presidential trends, while the spread between the curves on the chart indicates only the net difference between presidential and local voting. The Republican local winners in Democratic presidential counties and the Democratic local winners in Republican presidential counties accounted for a little more than one out of five county officers chosen in 1948. About the same ratio prevailed in 1944.³

³ Just prior to the 1940 election the ballot form was changed from a straight party-column ballot to a double ballot with one ballot containing the presidential candidates and another the remainder of the candidates. The move was a stratagem to deprive state and local candidates of the benefit of the Roosevelt popularity. From Figure 1 it would seem unlikely that the change in ballot form had a great immediate effect.

TABLE I
RELATION BETWEEN COUNTY VOTE ON PRESIDENT AND ON COUNTY OFFICES: PARTISAN
DIVISION OF OHIO COUNTY OFFICERS ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE
OF MAJOR-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, 1948

Democratic Percentage Presidential Vote, 1948	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
0-39.9	14	125 ^a	7	5.6	118	94.4
40-44.9	26	234	36	15.4	198	84.6
45-49.9	26	234	102	43.6	132	56.4
50-54.9	11	98 ^b	75	76.5	23	23.5
55 and over	11	99	97	98.0	2	2.0
	88	790	317	40.1	473	59.9

^a One office filled by an independent not included in tabulation.

^b No election to one office in this group.

Short-term resistances to presidential trends. Closer inspection may permit identification of types of situations in which local candidates and party groups are able to retain power despite a presidential trend to the opposite party. It is commonly thought that local candidates, especially in less populous counties, depend for success on the ties of friendship and personal acquaintance rather than the vote-pulling power of party. Such an explanation does not account for the regularities apparent in Figure 1. Evidently local candidates share in high degree the fate of the head of their ticket yet some local candidates of both parties resist the swing of popular sentiment against their national ticket.

One type of resistance to national trends may be of a short term nature. Those counties with an increasing Republican presidential strength may tend to retain for a time some local Democratic officials while those counties moving toward the Democratic party nationally by the same token may keep in office Republicans for a time. Various factors probably contribute to this effect. At times local organizations may knife the presidential candidate or at least drag their feet in the campaign. At other times the boosters of a presidential candidate may deem it inexpedient to say much about their local ticket. In some instances inter-party understandings may mitigate the hazards of party competition. Personal followings of individual local candidates may remain loyal despite the trend.

No simple test can be made of the supposition that there is a tendency for local candidates to overcome the effects of a short-term presidential trend toward the other party, for it is difficult to measure simply such a trend. Yet Table II represents an attempt to test the matter by an analysis of those counties Republican by a narrow margin in the 1948 presidential voting. It was assumed that the greater the number of times such a 1948 Republican county

had gone Democratic in the four preceding presidential elections, the greater would be the likelihood that local Democratic officers and candidates had established a claim on the support of the community. Save for the exception of a category containing a single county, the distribution in Table II supports the assumption. In those counties narrowly for Dewey, Democratic county candidates had about seven chances out of ten to win if the county had given FDR pluralities at three of the four preceding elections. In those that had given a plurality to FDR only once in the four preceding elections, the Democratic local candidates had only about two chances out of ten to win.⁴

TABLE II

LOCAL RESISTANCE TO PRESIDENTIAL TRENDS: PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN COUNTIES NARROWLY REPUBLICAN (45-49.9% DEMOCRATIC) IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN RELATION TO COUNTY VOTE IN PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Times Democratic in 4 Preceding Presidential Elections	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
4	1*	9	2	22.2	7	77.8
3	7	63	43	68.3	20	31.7
2	12	108	49	45.4	59	54.6
1	4	36	7	19.4	29	80.6
0	2	18	1	5.6	17	94.4
	26	234	102	43.6	132	56.4

* The deviate county is Ross.

The same test, applied to those counties Democratic presidentially in 1948, yields the results shown in Table III. Those 1948 Democratic counties that had found no occasion to vote Republican in the preceding four elections had little use for Republican county candidates, although this ungenerous view came in part from the fact that some of them had quite high Democratic presidential percentages. On the other hand, 1948 Democratic counties that had taken advantage of two of the preceding four chances to vote Republican filled nearly one-fourth of their county offices with Republicans.

If these statistical manipulations give us a measure of short-term presidential trends, they indicate that the factors of friendship and personal acquaintance operate within a range of opportunity fixed by the general party trend. Sometimes that trend makes it easier for local Democrats to make friends; at other moments, the facility of Republicans in these matters appears to be superior. Yet it seems apparent that these local factors, be they "personal" or "party" in nature, operate to keep the fluctuations in party control of local office in a

⁴ These calculations are on the assumption that all local offices were contested. In 1944 almost 30 per cent of Ohio county offices were filled without contest in either the primary or the general election. The proportion filled without contest, however, declined as the presidential voting became closer.

narrower range than would be the case if the tie between local and national party were closer.

Roots of local party groupings. Although some of the local-presidential differential in close counties may be a result of a short-term lag, it seems possible that in some counties the power groupings underpinning Democratic local success in counties Republican presidentially may be social structures of extraordinary durability rather than friable alliances susceptible of erosion by the storms of a national campaign or two. Clues pointing toward such a conclusion come from a closer examination of the 26 counties for Dewey in 1948 by 50-54.9 per cent

TABLE III

LOCAL RESISTANCE TO PRESIDENTIAL TRENDS: PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN COUNTIES OVER 50 PER CENT DEMOCRATIC IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN RELATION TO COUNTY VOTE IN PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Times Republican in 4 Preceding Presidential Elections	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
2	8	71	55	77.5	16	22.5
1	5	45	39	86.7	6	13.3
0	9	81	78	96.3	3	3.7
	22	197	172	87.3	25	12.7

of the vote. These counties elected Democrats to 43.6 per cent of their county offices. Some counties in the group elected the entire local Democratic slate; others chose some Democrats and some Republicans; a few elected only Republicans. Crawford, Fairfield, and Holmes put Democrats into all their county offices. These counties had gained some notoriety for Copperhead activity in the Civil War. Crawford County went Democratic in the gubernatorial elections of 1859, 1861, and 1863. In 1863 troops had to be sent into the county to complete the draft enrollment.⁵ Fairfield County, Democratic in 1859, 1861, and 1863, was the home of Edson B. Olds, a political leader whose outspoken reservations about Lincoln's war in 1862 led to his arrest and detention on a charge of discouraging enlistments in the Union Army.⁶ Holmes County had been the scene of Copperhead disturbances that succeeding generations reminisced about in the journals of the historical societies.⁷ Ancestral peccadilloes are minimized but the descendants seem to continue electing Democratic county officials.

⁵ Wood Gray, *The Hidden Civil War, The Story of the Copperheads* (New York, 1942), p. 137.

⁶ G. H. Porter, *Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period* (New York, 1911), pp. 106, 157.

⁷ W. W. Pennell and J. R. Vance, "Holmes County Rebellion—Fort Fizzle," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 40, pp. 23-51 (Jan., 1931).

Such specific examples suggest that at least under certain circumstances local party structures may have extremely strong powers of self-perpetuation. Differences between presidential and local voting are not solely short-term lags but may be, in part at least, the product of local power groupings that persist for almost a century. To test this notion the rural counties, Republican in 1948 by 50-54.9 per cent, were extracted from Table II, on the assumption that in rural counties party groupings would have been least disturbed through time by such factors as immigration and urbanization. Of such 1948 Dewey counties, those that had been Democratic⁸ in the gubernatorial election of 1861 gave more than one-half of their 1948 county offices to Democrats; those that had been Unionist⁹ in 1861 gave only one-fourth of their county offices to the Democrats. The details are set out in Table IV.¹⁰

These data suggest that once a structure of power develops to link the local government with the community and to provide channels to positions of leadership, that structure, in the absence of inundation by migration or other external solvents, has a capacity to perpetuate itself over long periods of time even in resistance to national party trends. All of which points to the need for a better understanding of the socio-political structure of the community as it relates to local government, perhaps in particular to local rural government. The apparent durability of these community structures may be at the bottom of the frustrations of generations of reformers of county government as well as the immalleable quality of institutions of rural government.

Explanations of the durability of local party groupings must be sought in their historical development. In most of the 1861 Democratic counties in Table IV, for example, German settlers formed the core of the Democratic party.¹¹ In other rural Democratic strongholds the principal sources of settlement were southern. The faithful Republicanism of areas settled by New Englanders is well known. Detailed examination of voting in the state suggests the relevance of a political geology, an analysis of electoral behavior in terms of the strata of

⁸ Adams, Auglaize, Clermont, Darke, Fairfield, Holmes, and Perry.

⁹ Athens, Coshocton, Greene, Guernsey, Highland, Jackson, Lake, Ross, Vinton.

¹⁰ A similar analysis of those counties Republican in 1944 by 50-54.9 per cent and under 50 per cent urban showed that in 1944 the 1861 Democratic counties filled 71.1 per cent of the county posts with Democrats; the 1861 Unionist counties gave 22.2 per cent of their county offices to the Democrats. Of the twelve counties under 50 per cent urban and 50-54.9 per cent Republican in 1940, the 1861 Democratic counties filled 80.6 per cent of their county offices with Democrats; the 1861 Unionist counties gave only 25.0 per cent of their local offices to the Democrats.

¹¹ Lest "Germanism" and the peculiar behavior of counties of German origin in the presidential voting of the 1940's be accepted as accounting for the success of Democratic local candidates in these counties in resisting the presidential tide, it is in order to examine those counties whose local Republican candidates withstood the great upsurge in Democratic presidential strength in 1936. Fourteen counties under 50 per cent urban in 1940 gave Roosevelt in 1936 a plurality by between 50-54.9 per cent of the two-party vote. The nine 1867 Unionist counties of this group filled 72.8 per cent of their county offices with Republicans; the five 1867 Democratic counties filled 46.7 per cent of their county offices with Republicans.

attitudes and loyalties precipitated by different waves of settlement and of structures of attitude crystallized by great cataclysms such as the Civil War.¹² This sort of theory may seem to rest on an assumption that contemporary political groupings may have a ghostly family tree reaching deep into a politico-historical subconscious.¹³ Be that as it may, the relationships between past and present partisan behavior do not seem to be a matter of chance. To understand the mechanism by which local party groups are constructed and maintained through time might provide a better basis for comprehension of broader questions about the nature of party.

TABLE IV

PERSISTENCE OF PARTY LOYALTIES: 1948 PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN OHIO COUNTIES 45-49 PER CENT DEMOCRATIC IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING AND UNDER 50 PER CENT URBAN ACCORDING TO COUNTY PLURALITY IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1861

	Democratic 1861	Unionist 1861
Number of counties	7	9
Number of county offices	63	81
Offices Democratic 1948	33	21
Per Cent Democratic	52.4	25.9
Offices Republican 1948	30	60
Per Cent Republican	47.6	74.1

Comments. While these bits of evidence point to no earthshaking conclusions, they do pin down a few propositions and suggest lines for further inquiry.

1. While the trend in party control of county government moves with the presidential trend, local candidates of both parties in considerable degree withstand the tides that batter their presidential ticket. This differential points to a relatively high stability of partisan attitudes of electors with respect to local government, especially local rural government; it also points to the obverse

¹² Local histories constitute a source that remains to be exploited by students of politics. Although the production of local chronologies does not seem to attract first rate historical talent, local histories, perhaps fortuitously, record data that are often most revealing when viewed through an appropriate analytical framework.

¹³ In fact, it also seems that ghostly descendants remain of partisan groups that once were far more corporeal. In 1944 Ohio had 28 rural counties that were predominantly Republican in the presidential voting in that year, that is, less than 40 per cent Democratic. Of the 28 counties 21 had been Unionist in 1867. In the seven 1867 Democratic counties, the Democrats in 1944 had nominees for 68.2 per cent of the county posts; in the twenty-one 1867 Unionist counties the Democrats had nominees for only 35.4 per cent of the county posts. In the seven 1867 Democratic counties some sort of Democratic group or tradition must have lingered on to produce competition for county office in spite of the fact that the counties had long since moved over to the Republican side of the fence.

phenomenon, perhaps more significant, of a relatively high volatility in the presidential vote.¹⁴

2. Local resistance to presidential tides seems to be based on local party groupings or loyalties with impressive capacities of survival. The analysis throws no light on the nature or mechanisms of these groupings save that they seem to maintain themselves over extremely long periods of time.

3. The success of local party groups, Republican and Democratic, in resisting swings against them in the presidential vote indicates that ticket splitting or "independence" represents not solely the chance differentiation of the merits of particular candidates or the random distribution of individual skill in cultivating the electors but in large measure a systematic resistance to the drag of the presidential trend. Local political competition seems to occur within a framework fixed by the presidential trend and the balance between local groups with roots in the far past. That is, the chances for the local candidate to separate himself from the presidential trend depend, perhaps at times unbeknownst to himself, on long established characteristics of the structure and behavior of his community as well as on the stage in the political cycle at which an election occurs.

4. The evidence gives some empirical basis for the old maxim that realistic state and local leaders should concern themselves chiefly with getting a presidential nominee able to pull their own slate into office. The systematic lag between local and presidential shifts supports the inference that, at least in rural counties, presidential candidates receive little help from their fellow partisans in county organizations. County cliques save themselves rather than stem the tide against their presidential candidate. County candidates of the local outs probably benefit from, rather than push along, a presidential tide toward the head of their ticket. All of which may contain implications of some importance for the nature of presidential politics and for the place of local organizations in the national party structure.

5. Even this sketchy analysis provides clues that could be followed up in the intensive study of individual counties. This suggests that comparative statistical analysis might be a means for elevating the case study of the specific local political situation from the human interest and anecdotal level to a status of usefulness in the general study of the political process. Differential statistical analysis may both aid in the perception of salient characteristics of particular situations and facilitate the production of pieces of research susceptible of being added together to enlarge the meager store of systematic knowledge about local politics.

¹⁴ The relationships shown in Figure 1 probably reflect the peculiar circumstances of Ohio, yet somewhat similar relationships appear in the Iowa data. That may be seen by placing on a chart the following series, in which the Democratic percentage of county offices is listed first after the date and then the percentage of counties with Democratic presidential pluralities: 1920, 12.0, 0.0; 1924, 15.4, 0.0; 1928, 12.9, 6.1; 1932, 36.5, 93.9; 1936, 34.8, 81.8; 1940, 21.9, 35.4; 1944, 16.7, 33.3; 1948, 20.3, 53.6. The figures were built up from the listing of county officials in the Iowa bluebook. The 1928 and 1932 figures may not be exactly comparable with those of other years as the bluebook did not list county supervisors for those years.

BRITISH BY-ELECTIONS, 1952

RICHARD M. SCAMMON

Department of State

In October, 1951 Winston Churchill returned to head Britain's government; the Labor ministry which had held power since the summer of 1945 had been narrowly defeated in a general election and Clement Attlee's six years as Britain's first Minister were ended. But this change of leadership marked no change in the British political wars—and one of the most interesting, and most revealing, of the areas of these wars has been that of the by-elections.

These by-elections, special votes to fill vacancies in the House of Commons, took place in ten widely separated districts during the fourteen months from the general election of October, 1951 to the end of 1952. Four of the vacancies they were held to fill were caused by the death of a sitting MP, two by resignation, and the other four by elevation or succession of the incumbent to the House of Lords.

Of the elections, seven were held in England, one in Scotland (East Dundee) and two in Northern Ireland. Though six of the ten constituencies involved are so-called "borough" seats and four "county" seats, eight were, in fact, urban, two of the "county" seats (Cleveland and Farnworth) being actually urban areas despite their legal designation. With two of these urban constituencies strongly Tory seaside towns (Southport and Bournemouth), the percentage totals for the parties shown in Table I are slightly more inclined to the Conservative side than the national percentages for the last general election.¹

To fill these ten vacancies only nine actual contests were held. In the North Antrim district, the then "Father" of the House, Sir Hugh O'Neill, resigned

TABLE I. VOTE FOR CANDIDATES IN CONTESTED 1951 GENERAL AND 1952 BY-ELECTION CONSTITUENCIES, UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF COMMONS

Candidates	October, 1951 General Election	1952 By-Elections
Nine Conservative candidates	221,820 (50.5%)	167,209 (49.4%)
Nine Labor candidates	201,441 (45.9%)	158,778 (46.9%)
Liberal candidates (three at GE, two at 1952 by-elections)	15,693 (3.6%)	7,449 (2.2%)
All other candidates (none at GE, three at 1952 by-elections)	—	4,914 (1.5%)
Totals	438,954	338,350

The totals above exclude the uncontested North Antrim seat; the Conservative figures include the Ulster Unionist candidate at South Belfast and the "Conservative and National Liberal" candidate at East Dundee.

¹ The percentage division of the 1951 general election popular vote was 48.77 for Labor, 47.98 Conservative, 2.55 Liberal, and .70 for all other candidates.

his seat after 37 years of parliamentary service, to be succeeded by his son—Phelim O'Neill. At the general election and at the by-election the return of the Ulster Unionist O'Neills was unopposed. The politics of Ulster, mixed as they are with strong religious feelings, change little. Unopposed returns are not uncommon in this area and the North Antrim seat (and the double-member Antrim constituency preceding it) has been without contest in six of the nine general elections since 1922.

As has been generally the case with parliamentary by-elections, voter interest fell below that of the general election in October, 1951. Without exception the participation was lower at the by-elections than at the general vote, the average decline being around 11,200 votes. Only in the Wycombe division did the participation even approach that of the general election. In this constituency, won by the Conservatives with a narrow 1753 vote majority in 1951, the drop in total vote was only 1015, but in all other seats it ran much higher.

Politically the majority of these ten districts must be regarded as "safe"—Leeds and Small Heath for Labor, Bournemouth, Southport, North Antrim, and South Belfast for the Conservatives. Two others have substantial Labor majorities—Farnworth and East Dundee. Only two could be regarded as peripheral—Cleveland and Wycombe. Given this political complexion, it is not surprising that there were no changes in the party loyalties of the constituencies involved—five remained Labor, five remained Conservative. Moreover, the percentage shifts represented in Table I (overall) and Table II (constituency-by-constituency) are small indeed. For the whole United Kingdom the shift is but a single vote in a hundred, this single elector moving from Conservative over to Labor.

This shift appears to have been somewhat stronger in the first half of the year as represented by Leeds, Southport, and the single summer by-election—East Dundee. In the Fall, however, the balance appears to have been almost equal, with no one of the by-elections in October and November showing shifts of as much as a single percentage point, save at Small Heath, where the absence of a Liberal candidate made the circumstances non-comparable. In the four Fall by-elections excluding Small Heath and North Antrim (unopposed), Labor gained in two (seven-tenths of a percentage point at Farnworth and eight-tenths at South Belfast) and the Tories in two (seven-tenths of a point at Cleveland, three-tenths at Wycombe).

Of all the by-elections, Labor bettered its position in six, the Conservatives in two, with the circumstances of two not comparable. At South-East Leeds, South Belfast, and Farnworth, Labor polled a higher percentage vote in a straight fight. At Southport and at Small Heath, Labor gained more from the Liberals' lowered poll or failure to fight than did the Conservatives.² At East Dundee in July Scottish Nationalist and Independent candidates polled

² This is to be especially noted in the light of the generally accepted proposition that Liberals forced to choose between Labor and Conservative tend to vote in the ratio of 2:1 or 5:3 for the Conservative candidate.

TABLE II. COMPARATIVE POLLING PERCENTAGES

Class A. Constituencies with straight Labor-Conservative contests at both the General Election and the By-Election:

		<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labor</i>
South-East Leeds (February)	GE	39.5	60.5
	By	36.8	63.2
Cleveland (October)	GE	45.2	54.8
	By	45.9	54.1
Wycombe (November)	GE	51.7	48.3
	By	52.0	48.0
Farnworth (November)	GE	40.8	59.2
	By	40.1	59.9

Class B. Constituencies with Liberal candidates at the General Election, the By-Election, or both:

		<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labor</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Independent</i>
East Bournemouth and Christchurch (February)	GE	63.3	25.1	11.6	—
	By	61.8	23.4	10.1	4.7
Southport (February)	GE	60.2	24.8	15.0	—
	By	62.0	28.5	9.5	—
Small Heath (November)	GE	30.9	63.4	5.7	—
	By	33.0	67.0	—	—

Class C. Constituencies with multi-partite contests at either the General Election or the By-Election, but uncontested by Liberals:

		<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labor</i>	<i>Independent</i>
East Dundee (July)	GE	46.2	53.8	—
	By	35.6	56.2	8.2

Class D. Constituencies in Northern Ireland:

		<i>Ulster Unionist (Conservative)</i>	<i>Labor</i>
North Antrim (October)	GE	Unopposed	—
	By	Unopposed	—
South Belfast (November)	GE	75.8	24.2
	By	75.1	24.9

8.1 per cent of the vote, but Labor still managed to increase its 1951 strength by 2.5 percentage points while the Conservatives lost the difference—10.6.

At Cleveland and Farnworth the Conservatives made their only gains—small percentage increases in straight fights with Labor—and in two constituencies the circumstances of the by-election made comparison with the October, 1951 vote of no value. In one of these—North Antrim—an Ulster

Unionist (Conservative) was returned unopposed at both elections; in the other—Bournemouth—a by-election Independent polled 4.7 per cent of the votes, drawing about equally from Conservative, Labor, and Liberal, and leaving no definable trend for the division.

Given the small shifts involved in these by-elections of 1952 it would be impossible to predict the course of the next British general election with any surety, the more so since the later by-elections have not small, but tiny, changes. However, past by-elections have been very sound in predicting at least the general trend of subsequent general elections and there is no reason to believe the future will be any less reliable than the past. For those concerned with the results of the next British general election, the by-elections of 1953 and 1954 should prove most revealing.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS..... 538

- UNESCO*, Contemporary Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching; *Gee*, Social Science Research Methods; *Lewin*, Field Theory in Social Science. C. J. FRIEDRICH..... 538
- Voegelin*, The New Science of Politics: An Introductory Essay. FRANCIS G. WILSON..... 542
- Humphrey*, Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor: A Study in Anti-Intellectualism; *Meisel*, The Genesis of Georges Sorel: An Account of His Formative Period Followed by a Study of His Influence. ARNAUD B. LEAVELLE..... 543
- Hamburger*, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory. HARRY V. JAFFA..... 546
- Douglas*, Ethics in Government; *Graham*, Morality in American Politics; *Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare*, Ethical Standards in Government [Report]; and Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government [Hearings]. WALLACE S. SAYRE..... 548
- Joint Committee on the Economic Report*, Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt. MORGAN THOMAS..... 549
- Redford*, Administration of National Economic Control. MERLE FAINSD..... 553
- Robson (ed.)*, Problems of Nationalized Industry. MARSHALL E. DIMOCK..... 555
- Moos*, Politics, Presidents, and Coattails. LOUIS BEAN..... 557
- Cottrell and Associates*, Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration. CHARLES M. KNEIER..... 559
- Money-Kyrle*, Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of Politics and Morals. CARLTON C. RODEE..... 561
- International Political Science Abstracts. ROWLAND EGGER..... 563

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS..... 565
- FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT..... 579
- INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS..... 585
- POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY..... 597

BOOK REVIEWS

Contemporary Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching.
A SYMPOSIUM DEVELOPED BY UNESCO. (Paris: UNESCO. 1950. Pp. 714.
\$5.00.)

Social Science Research Methods. BY WILSON GEE. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1950. Pp. vii, 391. \$4.00.)

Field Theory in Social Science. SELECTED PAPERS BY KURT LEWIN, EDITED BY DORWIN CARTWRIGHT. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1951. Pp. xx, 346. \$5.00.)

One of the first projects UNESCO undertook, so we are told in the introduction to the volume *Contemporary Political Science*, was a review of "methods in Political Science." Among the reasons there given are its "newness," the "uneven character of its present development," and the "distinct trends to be observed." The author of this introduction, Massimo Salvadori, thinks that "certainly" political science is more recent than law, political economy and sociology. This seems a strange assertion in view of the fact that the Greeks, who started many of the modern sciences, recognized a distinct political science of high sophistication, while they did not initiate a science of law, and did not recognize a distinct science of either political economy or sociology. As to the scientific claims of sociology, the world of scholarship is divided to this day. But the view expressed by the writer of the introduction does not seem to be shared by many of the contributors to the volume, who variously trace political science back to the sixteenth century or to antiquity. Salvadori himself speaks of the foundation of the chair of politics at the University of Upsala in the seventeenth century. (The date is not 1662, as here given, but 1622, as correctly stated by Hastad on page 150.) The only reason for mentioning this matter is that there would be little basis for undertaking such a review, if political science were so recent a newcomer; actually it is probably one of the oldest of all sciences. As for the other two reasons, we know of no field of research in which development is not uneven, if by that vague phrase is meant that some aspects of it are more fully developed than others, nor do we know of one in which there are not various distinct trends. In short, we conclude that UNESCO had no particular reason for starting with political science, except that those in charge are interested in it, as indeed they well might be. As regards this point, one is tempted to quote from Thomas I. Cook's able paper: "... political science in the United States has grown rapidly as an independent discipline, but ... is more independent than disciplined, has revolted unduly against its progenitors, and has become as rootless as it is active."

UNESCO's report is divided into two major parts, one presenting individual papers on political science in the various countries; the other, papers on specific fields. The second part is subdivided into four chapters, dealing with

political institutions; parties, groups and public opinion; international relations; and the organization of teaching and research. However, these latter topical divisions are actually organized according to the country pattern also, resulting inevitably in a good deal of overlapping. Part One is rather ambitiously entitled: "Political Science: Object, Methodology, Theory and Surveys." Austria, India, France, Switzerland, Uruguay, Sweden, the Middle East, Canada, Poland, Argentina, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, the USSR, Belgium and China are dealt with, and in this order. Why in this order? Because the editors—unfortunately—decided to print the papers in accordance with the alphabetical order of the authors. The haphazard nature of the compilation could not have been more vividly portrayed than by this device. Actually, the United States is represented by three and France by two papers; no explanation is given for this plethora of material. The most striking omission is Germany; it is brought in by the back door, so to speak, in an undistinguished and obsolete paper by Adamovitch, the venerable Austrian judge whose old-fashioned notions are further mangled by a poor translation. The omission is the more astonishing, since a number of the other papers refer again and again to the fact that political science in their countries follows the German tradition, or insist upon the basic importance of such German authors as Max Weber, Hegel or Marx. Yet the editors evidently never caught on.

It is manifestly impossible to do justice to the many interesting perspectives that the several country reports open up. Suffice it to say that the best ones among them avoid the unfortunate tendency of many to present essentially a selected bibliography of recent writings in the broad field of politics. Would it not have been wiser to organize an appendix in which a selected bibliography covering all the countries might have been compiled, thus freeing the authors of these papers for more penetrating analysis? Would it not also have been wiser to group these papers in accordance with such broader regional patterns as Latin America, Scandinavia, and the British Dominions? Surely the report would have gained in both lucidity and comprehensibility from such a procedure.

R. Aron's paper on political science in France and that of B. S. Keirstead and F. M. Watkins on Canada are perhaps the best, with W. A. Robson's on Great Britain following closely. In these three studies there emerges a clear picture of how political science is placed within the totality of the social sciences. Robson's paper, while reviewing particular works, still manages to bring out the vital empirical pattern of British political science; he notes that in spite of fine work in theory and its history, there is an insufficient link between political theory and practice which is perhaps not unrelated to another defect, namely that "political theory in Great Britain has proceeded on the assumption that men are rational beings." A theory cast into such a rationalistic frame cannot but remain remote from studies of political reality. Canadian political science appears to be suffering from the same defect, reinforced by the close association with and subordination to economics which has been Canada's

special tradition. France, by contrast, has neither the realistic and empirical studies of Great Britain and Canada, nor the rationalistic theory, but instead "has clung desperately to its inherited ideologies; it has continued the out-moded debate between the ancient monarchy and the revolution; it has concentrated only on the peculiar treasures of her own political arrangements." But even as regards the latter, Aron's paper is filled with questions rather than reviews of work accomplished and he grimly notes that this may be due to the French preference for discussion rather than investigation. What he considers the twofold indifference to fact and theory alike, while certainly noticeable in France, is equally characteristic of most of Europe, with few exceptions.

Needless to say, it is impossible to enter here into a discussion of the numerous substantive papers in the sections dealing with specific fields, such as comparative institutions, local government, parties and public opinion, and international relations. While a number of the individual papers are interesting, the total effect is a considerable hodge-podge, with no attempt to establish any sort of coordination or interrelation. I found the paper by M. Duverger on the study of political institutions in France interesting, though it too is largely bibliographical. The author's bias is revealed in, for example, his firm praise of Charles Maurras. Such praise is, of course, traditional with French intellectuals, and shows their tendency to overvalue brilliance as contrasted with soundness, and literary merit above scientific breadth and thoroughness. Another good paper is contributed by Merle Fainsod on the study of government and economic life. The author's established competence in the field and methodological sophistication oblige him to recognize the limitations of political science in the field of public economic policy, yet he is right in insisting that "the political scientist has an important contribution to make to the analysis of public economic policy." Unfortunately, it remains somewhat uncertain just what this specific contribution might be.

Papers by F. Goguel, Peter Odegard and D. Thomson on the state of research on parties and public opinion in France, the United States, and Britain, respectively, reflect the professional quality of their authors; yet one wonders whether an exchange of the papers among them and eventual consolidation into one comprehensive and comparative analysis would not have been more revealing. For even the basic referents, such as the party, are at variance, and no attempt is made to correlate the several analyses with some of the leading definitions. Similar general comments might be made about the section on international relations. Here we find five papers, dealing with international relations in the Soviet Union, France, Britain, the United States, and "German-speaking countries." The last, by Verdross of Vienna, deals only with international law. The greatest defect in this section is the failure to take adequate account of the very considerable contribution diplomatic historians have made to the field of international relations in Europe; the whole section is rather juridical in its orientation.

All in all, it is very doubtful, in the opinion of this reviewer, whether the approach followed in this volume was the wise one, if an assessment of contemporary political science was desired. For the broader lines of development

are obscured, the relations with the other social sciences are dealt with incidentally and inconsistently, and the future course of the field is left obscure. The attempt to bring the Soviet Union into such an appraisal is of dubious value, since no political science worthy of the name does or can exist in totalitarian dictatorships; the virtual omission of Germany gives the whole the quality of a torso.

Two fairly recent studies in method may serve as a contrast to the UNESCO report. One, Wilson Gee's *Social Science Research Methods*, demonstrates that treating the methodological issues of all the social sciences together has distinct advantages. The author, after some rather pedestrian introductory comments on the social sciences and current trends, and on the meaning of research, takes up what he calls the "logical methods," and follows this with a chapter each on the case method, the statistical method, the historical method, the survey method, and the experimental method. Since the book is intended as a teaching aid, each chapter is rounded out by some questions and suggested readings. Yet, curiously, the treatment does not touch upon Max Weber or Pareto, upon Lasswell, Kluckhohn or Mead, in short upon the sharp controversies raging at present. It is, however, built upon certain particular works, e.g., A. Wolf's, the entire treatment proceeding in the form of extended quotations and connecting comment.

Very different is the approach of Kurt Lewin's *Field Theory in Social Science*. For here we have expounded, in a series of papers, the brilliant methodological approach of the late author, one of the outstanding psychologists of our time. Lewin does not actually deal with political science, but the bearing is clear. He asserts that "power does not have the same dimension as psychological force." For that reason, Lewin would not identify the "power field" with the "force field." The greater power of A may not mean pressure upon the lesser power of B. Interestingly enough, Lewin suggests further that values are constructs which have the same psychological dimension as power fields. These are intriguing suggestive generalizations which certainly deserve further exploration by political scientists.

If Gee's is a general survey, and Lewin's is a specific challenge, they yet both have more significance in connection with any discussion of methodology in political science than the vague, inchoate, and contradictory suggestions on the subject contained in the UNESCO volume. It seems very clear that if UNESCO wishes to make real contributions to the international cooperation of researchers and intellectuals, it will have to free itself of the tendency to international kowtowing, of the tendency to avoid conflict and controversy, and of the fear of "taking a stand." This reviewer cannot help feeling that three or four group reports, made after a sufficient number of get-togethers by individuals outstanding in three or four countries where something is happening, and implemented by a discriminating annotated bibliography, would have told the reader a great deal more about contemporary political science than does the volume here reviewed.

C. J. FRIEDRICH.

Harvard University.

The New Science of Politics: An Introductory Essay. BY ERIC VOEGELIN.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 193. \$3.00.)

Professor Voegelin occupies an unusual place in American political science. He is one of the most distinguished interpreters to Americans of the non-liberal streams of European thought. To this professional vocation he brings a remarkable breadth of knowledge, and a historical imagination that ranges frequently into brilliant insights and generalizations. With such a peculiar excellence, he reduces the shock to the average political scientist when he is led outside of the presuppositions of liberalism, a shock that is a part both of the process of self-interpretation and self-education.

The current volume thinks of a new political science as the body of theory that is emerging from the obsolescence of positivist liberalism (pp. 8 ff.). A new science of politics will theorize until its principles meet the philosophy of history, and until there is a return to consciousness of principle. According to Voegelin, "the attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge" (p. 20). The author develops his case almost entirely outside of the vocabulary of traditional political science, but this is probably the only way by which the alternative interpretation can be stated with effectiveness. Every society, the author believes, is seeking a principle of self-interpretation and a statement of what it represents. Three levels are offered on which this objective may be stated: the elemental, the existential, and the transcendental. At the elemental level, one may describe the structural articulation of modern representative government; at the existential, one reaches a symbolism or a statement of meaning of the political truth that a society embodies (pp. 59 ff.); and at the transcendental level the great dualisms of human experience return, in which theory at its best may explain death, love, and justice.

It is, of course, the transcendental level and its relation to the science of politics that concern the author. Between 800 B.C. and 300 B.C. the human mind opened; it became conscious of philosophy in the Greek sense, and the idea of the "theory" of politics was born. However, the philosopher was the true type, as he sought the explication of the transcendental experience of men, while the intellectual or the sophist failed to become a "mature man" in the Aristotelian meaning of the word. Likewise, the philosopher was concerned with the relation of man to God, and the judgment of social relations in this light. The psyche became the sensorium of transcendent truth, while society became in measure a representative of it as well. In essence, Voegelin seeks to demonstrate that the maximum differentiation of human experience is to be found in philosophy and in Christianity; here is the orbit of theory; it is here that the emergence of a new science of politics is to be observed; and it is here that the *doxai* or ideologies of liberal revolt attack with desperate but failing hope.

Voegelin describes various historical situations. He deals with the struggle within the Roman Empire between the old representation and the new Chris-

tian force; the Puritan ideology, and the caustic analysis offered by Richard Hooker of the new mass movement; and the Hobbesian statement of a civil theology, ending in the totalitarian movements of our time. But what he is concerned with primarily is that the effort to divinize the here and now, the temporal order, means the suppression of the truth of the soul in favor of a civil theology. Modernity in essence began in the ninth century of our era, and it was and has been precisely the effort through knowledge to make society imminent and divine. This Voegelin calls the "Gnostic Revolution," that gained force with Joachim of Flora's "Third Realm" and ends in the present, for the totalitarianism of our time is the "journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology" (p. 163). Modernity is simply the growth of Gnosticism.

The author takes his stand with the truth of the soul and against the civil theology that seeks to unite the existential with the transcendental. During the last half century the reconstruction of a science of man on such a basis has made its advances. Its exponents see that the Gnostic dream world is not the real world, and for them there is no sliding transition from liberalism to communism that may be observed in a modern writer like Harold Laski. Its exponents show no intellectual paralysis before either National Socialism or communism, that is, before modernity without restraint. Among the English and the Americans, thinks Voegelin, one finds the greatest restraint, and here perhaps in the end the truth of soul can resist the modern Gnostic and liberal revolution. Voegelin would insist, and this is surely part of his achievement, that there can be a science of politics that is not mere elemental analysis of power or the group process, and which is likewise not merely the mythology of a total nation; it will not be the currently conventional liberal or secular science of politics, for it will rest on the Greek and Christian vision of philosophy.

FRANCIS G. WILSON.

University of Illinois.

Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor: A Study in Anti-Intellectualism. BY RICHARD HUMPHREY. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. 246. \$4.00.)

The Genesis of Georges Sorel: An Account of His Formative Period Followed by a Study of His Influence. BY JAMES H. MEISEL. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr Publishing Company. 1951. Pp. 320. \$5.00.)

These two studies (together with Scott H. Lytle's succinct essay in *Modern France*, edited by E. M. Earle, Princeton, 1951) represent the most ambitious efforts yet made in English to interpret the thought of the "baffling, misunderstood, and maligned" Georges Sorel. It is sometimes a minor catastrophe in scholarship when two texts on the same subject appear simultaneously, but such is not the case here. Each author has his own purpose and viewpoint, and each sheds much new light on a complex personality and the intellectual environment in which he lived. Humphrey's work is the slighter of the two,

yet stands as a model of well arranged, if not always conclusive, analysis. Professor Meisel's study suffers from loose organization, and incidentally from a distracting lithoprint crawling with mechanical errors; but these deficiencies are more than compensated by his penetrating insights and the richness of his documentation. Of particular interest is his presentation of Sorel's relationships with Croce, Pareto, and Michels, and his discussion of Sorel's influence.

Humphrey starts from the essential point that the "unity of Sorel's work, and its real impetus, are to be found in his unremitting search for some new ethical principle that might bring about a rejuvenation of modern society" (p. 9). This moral impulse was joined to a pessimistic belief that all cultures are subject through history to the forces of entropy and decadence, stayed only by occasional moments of grandeur in which a new faith, an ideology reflecting material conditions yet also the result of individual and social will, recreates a dynamic unity. For his own day Sorel concluded (at least in his *Reflections on Violence*, 1908) that a new morality must be sought in the discipline of creative, autonomous, industrial labor; while a new faith could be borne only through the myth of the general strike, which would bring into play the essential idealism, the sense of personal significance and responsibility, of the proletariat. Violence must be threatened, if not actually invoked, to produce a sharp division between the classes and a decisive result. Finally, from the feelings aroused by the challenge of the syndicalist strike would come the motivations for a substantial advance in the quality and quantity of the industrial product.

What are we to make of this ingenious hypothesis, put together in Sorel's book-cluttered garret in Boulogne-sur-Seine, and flashing the facets of Rousseau's general will, Hegel's free spirit, Proudhon's morality of labor, Marx's class struggle, and Bergson's *élan vital*? Humphrey's thesis is that while Sorel's formula is a disappointment as a description of the actual course of the syndicalist movement, it nonetheless reveals a profound understanding of the causes and the necessary cure of the sickness of industrial civilization. He suggests that Sorel is to be grouped with Nietzsche and Freud. "All three of them saw that the system of organization that was giving man unparalleled power over his environment could at the same time create such an intolerable burden that the individual might well be crushed by it. Whether they set as their ideal the superman, the whole man, or the creatively free workingman, they were seeking in the best tradition of humanism for a set of values that might permit man to express himself in responsible action with his fellows" (p. 218). "All of these images represent . . . man freely conscious of his power and exercising it without fear in the control of his environment" (pp. 220-221).

Humphrey has found the right company for Sorel, but his generosity in concluding that "the basic problem remains as he stated it" (p. 223), strikes one as excessive. It is now too late to admire the glittering paradox involved in verbalizations that assert that the power drive in individuals and in groups must be freed rather than repressed as the condition for the realization of creative harmony. With Sorel the myth of syndicalist violence swallows up any criteria of "humanism" or "responsible action" that might inform the

search for a "set of values." The ultimate premise of Sorel's system was stated in his early work, *Le procès de Socrate* (Paris, 1889, p. 44): "According to a law of our nature we wish to have something indemonstrable to believe." Even if one accepts this metaphysic (Humphrey apparently does; this reviewer does not), the difficulties of showing how socially useful indemonstrable values, apart from the value of conflict as an end in itself, can emerge from a context of social violence are not resolved by an appreciation of the poetic character of Sorel's imagery.

Meisel's researches probe beneath the surface of this problem. One key to the puzzle of Sorel he finds in Croce's criticism of Sorel's methodology. Croce had pointed out (in a preface to the Italian edition of the *Reflections*) that Sorel attempts to separate scientific history and religious faith, making the former simply a factual description of the impact of the latter on human institutions. But this is impossible. All history includes a judgment of the causes and consequences of faith, because all history is an interpretation of reality conducted more or less consciously in terms of philosophical categories. Meisel observes: "The most dangerous character of this thrust is obvious; Sorel's rejection of psychologic history, on the surface of it a defense of theology, is also, and perhaps primarily, the vindication of his doctrine of the social Myth as a force impervious to all factual inquiry. If religious faith has to 'show cause' as to its scientific value, then the secularized faith that mirrors itself in a myth, likewise becomes subject to the pragmatic test; in losing its charmed character it preserves little if anything of its usefulness as a suggestive doctrine of political action" (p. 285). Clearly, it is this device of holding the content of the myth sacrosanct that enables Sorel to indulge in the illogic of deriving from it the union of individual creativity with mass action, faith and heroism with material objectives, and increased production with industrial strife.

Meanwhile the prediction of the impact of the myth proved to be something less than scientifically accurate. Meisel traces the present irrelevance of syndicalist theory to the simple fact that "time has run out on the proletariat, heroism or no heroism" (p. 279). It was necessary to Sorel's theory that the capitalist power remain in force. But the shift from a capitalist dominated economy to a state socialism friendly to the workers happened before the proletariat had sufficient time to develop its full strength or its new morality. However, the possibility must be recognized that syndicalist theory may still have its influence in a context not conceived by Sorel; perhaps, as Meisel suggests, as part of a reaction to the bureaucratization of democratic socialism, more probably among those peoples where the workers' interest has become the touchstone of political ideology and where there yet exists some desire to escape the totalitarian impasse reached by Marxism in Russia.

To read these two important treatises is to become aware that Sorel reveals, as few other thinkers, the preoccupations, the subtleties, and the torments of contemporary French politics. His defense of the myth of syndicalist violence as an adequate secular response to a deeply felt need for a unifying ethic illustrates the French capacity for making the rejection of faith a faith in itself.

His ability to project hypotheses unhindered by empirical considerations suggests the gulf that exists between thought and action in French political life. His pessimism is the natural consequence of the fact that every French revolution has ended in a disappointment. He was not so much the prophet of the modern age as the victim of his country's history.

ARNAUD B. LEAVELLE.

Stanford University.

Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory. BY MAX HAMBURGER.
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. Pp. xvi, 191. \$3.75.)

The commendable purpose of the present work is to determine "What theories [of jurisprudence] of enduring value" are to be found in Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Rhetoric* (p. xiii). The author is severely critical of the "super-historicism" that confuses the account of "the historical and genetic development of Aristotle's mind and work" with the "essence of his teachings" (pp. xi, xii). This would seem to promise an interpretation and evaluation of Aristotle's legal theory, with the genetic method used only as an instrument to establish the meaning of Aristotle's text. Unfortunately, however, much of the book is a polemic against Werner Jaeger and "his pupil Walzer." The weight of the attack, moreover, bears not on the genetic method, as abused by historicism, but on a specific application of that method by Jaeger. Jaeger had maintained that the *Magna Moralia* was a short manual compiled by a late peripatetic, out of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Hamburger asserts that it is an early and authentic work of Aristotle. In the opinion of this reviewer, the method employed by Hamburger is not fundamentally different from that of Jaeger, and is insufficient to decide the question.

It is to the author's credit that he himself states the most telling objection to this method: "Jaeger, in his startling theory, had arranged the eight books of the *Politics* in a genetic sequence III, II, VII, VIII, IV, V, VI, I, supposedly corresponding to diverse 'strata' in Aristotle's development. In the introduction to his recent translation of the *Politics* [Sir Ernest] Barker restores the original order I-VIII. Here the crucial question is whether a 'realistic' method can be distinguished from an earlier 'idealistic' one belonging to a time when Aristotle was still under the influence of Plato. According to Barker—and the present writer concurs—the only conclusion warranted in this connection is that Aristotle handled different themes in different ways" (p. 3). Barker's critique of Jaeger pointed out that the problem of explaining the diverse "strata" exists only if one assumes that the different parts of the *Politics* are mutually inconsistent. And Barker has shown convincingly, I think, that this assumption is untenable.

Hamburger's chronology, like Jaeger's, is determined by the interpretation of the texts it is meant to fit. He takes up a number of juridical topics, then summarizes or paraphrases successively the arguments of *Magna Moralia*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There follows a comparison of the several accounts "with regard to their perfection in relation to pre-Aristotelian thought and to the degree of their perfection" as representations

of Aristotelian thought (p. 5). It will be seen from this that everything depends upon how Aristotelian thought in its perfection is conceived. This decided, the chronology follows, so that, e.g., if it is discovered that the formulations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are generally the longest of the three, this can be held to represent the fullness of maturity; but when that work happens to be the briefest on a given point, the superiority of conciseness is acclaimed. It is unfortunate for his general chronological thesis that the author agrees with von Arnim that "the crowning word of Peripatetic Ethics, for which we wait in vain in EN [*Nicomachean Ethics*] or even in EE [*Eudemian Ethics*]" is a passage in *Magna Moralia*. This should make it a late work. Since, however, *Magna Moralia* is held to be immature in comparison with the other works, someone might have concluded that Jaeger was right in regarding this immaturity as a sign of spuriousness. Therefore a passage from *Magna Moralia* was needed, rising "to such heights of lucidity in formulating the leitmotiv of Aristotelian Ethic" that it would be "hard to believe that a Peripatetic of Theophrastus' day, so indifferent to precise definition" could have written it (p. 6). This passage, which is held to represent "the quintessence of Aristotelian ethics strikingly opposed to Socratic-Platonic rationalism," reads: "Speaking generally, it is not the case . . . that reason is the principle of and guide to virtue, but rather the feelings." This opposition is much less striking, however, when the passage is read along with the immediately preceding sentence. There it is asserted that virtue requires *both* right reason and disciplined passions, and that neither alone is sufficient. Similarly, when the author paraphrases Aristotle to say, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that "All virtues are a mean between two extremes" he neglects the important qualification that "what is intermediate is [also] an extreme," and hence that virtue is an extreme "with regard to what is best and right" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a9). Finally, the author is so impressed by Aristotle's repeated asseverations that ethics and politics are the sphere of probable, rather than necessary reasoning, that he does not consider that the general context within which they occur might affect their meaning. Accordingly, at the end of the book he identifies Aristotle with John Dewey in the view that "there is no absolute certainty within the domain of morals and law," and with Bertrand Russell in the view that " 'ultimate questions of value . . . are legitimately matters of feeling' " (pp. 164, 165). Yet is there, according to Aristotle, anything more certain than the superiority of the philosophic life to, e.g., the political life? Or that those who feel otherwise are simply wrong? (Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a18 and b15 ff.)

These objections suggest the kind of problems which would have to be resolved before the author's interpretation of Aristotle's ethical writings could be taken as authoritative. Without such resolution, his discussion of the chronology of the texts seems destined to be as inconclusive as Jaeger's discussion of the order of the books of the *Politics* appears in the light of Barker's critique.

HARRY V. JAFFA.

Ohio State University.

Ethics in Government. BY PAUL H. DOUGLAS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 114. \$2.25.)

Morality in American Politics. BY GEORGE A. GRAHAM. (New York: Random House. 1952. Pp. xiii, 337. \$3.50.)

Ethical Standards in Government. (REPORT OF A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82nd Cong., 1st session. 1951. Pp. iii, 89.)

Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government. (HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. 1951. Pp. v, 577.)

Senator Douglas and Professor Graham were associated in the work of the Douglas subcommittee on ethics in government which made its report in 1951, the Senator as chairman and the professor as a consultant. Each of them has now set forth his own additional reflections upon the troublesome problems of ethics and morality in American government and politics. In the main, they agree in their interpretation of the great wealth of data produced in the hearings before the subcommittee and there is a basic consistency in their proposals for improvement. Senator Douglas concentrates his diagnosis within a narrower range of problems and emerges with recommendations which are more concrete. Professor Graham probes more widely and deeply (in three times as many pages) and is more cautious in his prescriptions.

The most striking characteristic of these three commentaries on governmental ethics is the consensus among them concerning major premises (an agreement shared in considerable part also with Paul H. Appleby's *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*). This consensus may be summarized as follows: Governmental ethics are a product of and can be understood only within the context of the moral climate of American life. Public ethics have steadily if not dramatically improved. The ethical standards of American public life are today markedly higher than the standards of yesterday; one item of proof is the widely felt outrage following recent disclosures which our grandfathers would have taken for granted. The ethics of public life are generally, and must continue to be, above the level of some practices tolerated in non-governmental activities (item: the bribe-giver seldom shares the odium or the punishment of the bribe-taker). There are comparatively few corrupt public officials in the United States; however, they manage not only to do considerable damage to the fabric of public policy but also to tarnish the reputation and prestige of the whole public service. Among the sinners, the bureaucrat is neither the most prominent nor the most frequent offender; there is also considerable ground for believing that the permanent bureaucracy has a record of ethics superior to that of the patronage staffs (although local police seem to supply the notable exception that proves the rule). The severest strictures of the observers are reserved for the legislators.

On causes and remedies there is basic agreement but considerable divergence

in emphasis. The Senator sees violations of ethical standards as being concentrated in the "action-laden" areas of governmental activities; he would welcome a swing back toward a free market economy as one remedy, and he urges the development of codes of conduct and procedure as another important solution. The professor does not disagree, but he emphasizes as deeper causes certain habits and attitudes among the American people and persistent weaknesses in our political institutions. His prescription is a broad restatement of the goals which American political scientists have worked out over many years of study for the improvement of our methods of governance. These goals, which the Senator also endorses explicitly or implicitly, boil down in principle to ways of clarifying and sharpening the assignments of authority in our governmental system, of tightening the lines of responsibility in the executive hierarchy, of increasing the visibility of all those who make decisions and of the ways in which decisions are made, and of developing and using standards of good conduct in public life. These standards and their potentialities are a subject of recurrent preoccupation not only for the Senator and the professor but also for most of the witnesses before the subcommittee. Codes of ethics, whether fixed in statutes or in less formal terms, are seen as serving several purposes: providing new aspiration levels for public officials, providing the basis for sanctions and penalties against unethical practices, and introducing new certainties concerning proper conduct where ambiguities now flourish.

These volumes represent not the full diagnosis and solution but a promising beginning of the task of meeting the problem posed by Senator Douglas: "What could be tolerated when government was small cannot be endured when government is big. For its consequences, if not its causes, can be relatively worse."

WALLACE S. SAYRE.

City College, New York.

Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL CREDIT CONTROL AND DEBT MANAGEMENT. (82nd Congress, 2nd Session. 1952.)

(1) *Replies to Questions and Other Material for the Use of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management.* (Joint Committee Print, Parts 1 and 2.)

(2) *Hearings Pursuant to Section 5(A) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress), March 10-31, 1952.*

These volumes present the results of a congressional investigation into the conflict over monetary policy between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board in late 1950. Representative Wright Patman's Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, with the staff assistance of economist Henry C. Murphy, has elicited points of view and factual data from all official and nonofficial groups concerned. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and other less

directly affected government agencies have been put on the record concerning their recommendations not only about the substantive content of monetary, credit and public debt policy but also about the process of, and organization for, policy formulation in this field. Questions directed to these officials included the extent of policy guidance from Congress, the powers of policy formulation in the executive branch, the ways of settling policy conflicts among governmental agencies, and recommendations for modifications in existing interagency relationships. The official replies to these questions are printed in the two volumes of the *Joint Committee Print*.

More valuable to political scientists because of the greater degree of attention focused on the process of policy formulation in this important aspect of national economic planning are the *Hearings* before the Subcommittee. The political scientists called to testify were Paul Appleby, James K. Pollock, Harold Stein and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr. Collectively they made a substantial contribution to the theory of political organization for economic planning.

The Subcommittee held several panel discussions. The one entitled "How should our monetary and debt management policy be determined?" produced extremely provocative theoretical discussions of policy development in the federal government. The participants in this panel were G. L. Bach, E. A. Goldenweiser, Jacob Viner, Harold Stein and Lucius Wilmerding.

The economists testifying unanimously supported an arrangement in which the central banking system should be a little outside of the regular policy-making process and have a degree of independence from the political pressures being exerted through the President and the Congress. In general, the economists start with their desired monetary policy, which they recognize is an unpopular policy in inflationary periods but which they regard as crucial for national welfare. Next they see our pressure group democracy bearing down on their sound policy. As a result they support organizational arrangements deemed to be conducive to the formation of "good" monetary policy. Dr. Goldenweiser stated this clearly on page 766 of the *Hearings*: "And so, I think that independence of the Federal Reserve . . . holds out the best promise of correct decisions in this very vital matter." The President and his Secretary of the Treasury are potential violators of the good policy of credit restrictions and stable money, because these public officials are under pressures from inflationary forces and because they face the great problem of managing the public debt. Moreover, Congress itself should be partially checked from interfering with monetary policy as worked out by the Federal Reserve Board. Again Dr. Goldenweiser expresses it clearly: "I would like to add . . . something that may be rude, but it ought to be in the record, and that is that Congress is an inflationary body because the groups in the population that are in favor of inflation are vastly better organized than many millions who suffer from inflation and are not organized, and I think that it is very wise for Congress to have a few hurdles between itself and direct influence on current credit policies" (*Hearings*, p. 776). Thus an independent agency staffed by and thinking along the lines of economists and bankers who possess the motivation for sound mone-

tary policy is a helpful way to achieve the national interest. It is a way of aiding our democratic system to take unpleasant but necessary economic policies.

Political scientists Pollock and Appleby begin with the desirability of having policy conflicts settled by means of the hierarchy of the executive branch for the sake of unified responsibility. They see independent agencies like the Federal Reserve Board as clientele agencies with supporting clusters of special interests. Any policy-making agency should be brought under hierarchical controls so that at each successive level broader responsibility, knowledge and judgment can be brought to bear in behalf of more general public policy. Hierarchical controls provide a channel for general concern by relating conflicting policies to each other and moving toward general public policy. The independence of the Federal Reserve Board derogates from the hierarchical working out of public policy, and it should gradually be converted to a more responsible relationship to the Chief Executive. A central banking system must be integrated with larger governmental administrative machinery in order that its narrow, special point of view may be refined with broader considerations of national public policy with which monetary policy must be reconciled.

The economists and the political scientists, starting with different premises, make appropriate and logical deductions therefrom. There is no meeting point for their arguments.

However, one economist—George L. Bach—and one political scientist—Harold Stein—reveal in the hearings very similar analyses of the way to organize for the achievement of a monetary policy best adapted to the objectives of maximum employment and production for the nation. Both see advantage in having a separate agency which can contribute the greatest influence for a policy of economic and monetary stability and prosperity. A central banking agency to them has the advantage of being trusted to maintain monetary stability. Furthermore, it serves a valuable political function in that its decisions are accepted by bankers and other investors more readily than are the Treasury's.

These men see inflation control as one of the most difficult undertakings facing democratic government. The viewpoint that credit must be tightened in times of threatened inflation will not be adequately represented unless special arrangements are made. The Treasury is naturally impressed by the cost of the interest on the public debt, and the Congress and the President are under pressure from the demands of groups who desire easy credit. The problem, then, to which Mr. Bach and Mr. Stein turn is the design of an organization which will provide a built-in will to resist inflationary tendencies in the governmental process and will give this point of view as much influence as possible in the negotiation of public policy. In so doing they are not disturbed by the theoretical dilemma that, on the one hand, weighting the scales in favor of one point of view appears to violate the political equality of democracy, whereas eliminating the weighting threatens the economic results upon which democracy's survival is partially dependent. With refreshing realism, they admit (without saying it) that our whole governmental system is replete with built-in weight-

ings and they do not even argue the rationale of adding another one. Furthermore, they imply (again without saying so) that a general theory of hierarchical control is not of great use in organizing for policy results in this field (or any other field). Organization is dependent on what policy influences one wishes to stress. The Hoover Commission's top-to-bottom hierarchical control blueprint does not suffice unless one is devoid of policy objectives, and these gentlemen are not.

Operating then on the principle that it is desirable to increase the influence and voice of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board permanently in the process of policy development, they both propose that the independence of the Board be reduced so that its influence can be increased. Previously the Federal Reserve Board, they conclude, has not made its position sufficiently felt in federal negotiations on anti-inflationary policy. Its weakness in policy councils has been the result not of a lack of independence, but rather of too much independence. It is not true (as is commonly assumed) that a commission derives strength from its independence when it operates in an area in which other agencies have major responsibilities. Congress wanted "to impose on itself, and on the President, a kind of barrier, if you like, to too quick response to the electorate, to the way the wind blows today and tomorrow" (Bach, *Hearings*, p. 782). But Congress made an "overadjustment" to the problem. It set up an agency so independent that it is outside of policy negotiation and hence has been weak in its influence in general credit control and debt policy.

Messrs. Stein and Bach reach a high degree of agreement about the way to give the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board more influence with the President and Congress. They point out that as a pure matter of informal organization the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has come to have in the last two years much more influence in policy formulation in the executive branch. This was first due to the assumption of the post of Chairman by Mr. William Martin, who was respected and trusted by both President Truman and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder. Under the Eisenhower Administration, the Treasury is largely staffed in its top echelon with men who accept the Reserve System's point of view or formerly worked in it.

What is needed is formal organization to make this Federal Reserve influence possible as a regular matter, namely, by means of closer working relations for the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board with the President's family of top financial advisers. The President would naturally have more confidence in him if he were designated to serve as Chairman at the pleasure of the President. Shorter terms for Board members would bring the President and the Board into closer relations. Finally, creation of a top-level monetary-fiscal advisory council in which the Federal Reserve Chairman sat would strengthen the voice of the Federal Reserve. As can be seen, these views are quite at variance with the traditional concept that the more independent an agency is from the political branches of government, the more influence it will have.

These gentlemen have then set forth an "operational theory" (although they do not say so) concerning the influence on public policy which different organi-

zational relationships produce. It was derived by examining the relative weights of various groups in this particular area of policy making. When elaborated, this theory enabled them to penetrate beyond the overgeneralized theories about commissions deriving greater strength from greater independence, about independent commissions being closer to Congress than regular executive departments, and about the value of hierarchial controls as the solution of all policy problems and conflicts.

The similarity of the analyses of these two consultants from allied fields perhaps stems from the fact that each has probed the other's discipline. Abstraction of either "economics" or "politics" from the process of formation of public policy is apt to give distortions of viewpoint. The new area of the study of the development of public policy requires a bridging of the disciplinary lines. For this purpose a reading of the *Hearings* and the *Joint Committee Print* of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management is a rewarding experience.

MORGAN THOMAS.

University of Michigan.

Administration of National Economic Control. By EMMETTE S. REDFORD. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xvii, 403. \$5.50.)

This solid, thoughtful book fills an important gap in the literature of government regulation of business. Its concern is not with issues of substantive public policy but with the administrative processes by which policy is formulated and elaborated and with the instruments and techniques through which it is refined and executed. Professor Redford has provided a comprehensive and unique inventory and synthesis of the kit of tools which has been developed in regulatory administration in recent decades.

While the major emphasis of the study is placed on mechanism and procedure, the political environment in which the regulatory bureaucracy functions is not neglected. One of the most suggestive chapters is devoted to an analysis of relations with interest groups and an exploration of ways in which "publicly-conditioned expertness" can guide and direct pressure politics toward a realization of "community purpose." Here, as elsewhere, the author reveals an awareness of the limits as well as of the potentialities of administrative initiative. His experience with the OPA during World War II has left a residue of lively respect for the obstructive capacities of pressure groups.

Insofar as this volume has a central thesis, it is that the major danger in the field of national economic control lies in the fragmentation and dispersal of regulatory authority rather than in the overweening arbitrary power of bureaucrats. "In our opinion," the author states, "the most serious present deficiency in the system of administrative control is the particularism of the administrative agencies and the claims made on their behalf for autonomy from overhead controls. . . . At the higher level of responsibility, where the President and Congress share authority, control over administration is weakened and dissipated. . . . The separation between the executive and Congress,

the weakness of party controls within the Congress, the disintegration of the party system in the country, and the organization and persistence of functional and sectional interests, overextend the power of particularistic influences and weaken the ability of Congress and the President, acting together, to evaluate administrative performance and to use the legislative power as a means of giving new directives to administration."

Implicit in this analysis is a diagnosis of trends which the author never completely articulates but which nevertheless forms the basis of his argument. Put succinctly, it is that government unavoidably and necessarily plays an increasingly crucial role in the management and control of the economy and that this managerial responsibility cannot be efficiently discharged unless more effective means are found to coordinate and direct the autonomous islands of power in Congress and the executive establishment. This conviction leads the author to tilt a lance with the protagonists of the independent regulatory commissions and to advocate that Congress authorize the President to issue policy directives to the commissions in order to integrate their activities with those of other agencies subject to his control.

The author is not unaware of the factors which make for congressional reluctance to deposit such power in the presidency. But his sense of the dimensions and complexities of the problem of economic control impels him to consider the achievement of executive coordination as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of administrative reform. To those who see the role of government in less positive and promising terms and who view the plurality of action centers in administration as a safeguard against excessive concentration of political power, Professor Redford's argument will not be persuasive. On this issue, as in so many other debates on government organization, conflicting conceptions of proper structure grow out of fundamental differences of interest and political philosophy.

Whatever be the ultimate prospect for the strengthening of the President's directive power, the immediate likelihood that Professor Redford's suggestion will be adopted is not bright. Given the hard fact that power is dispersed in the autonomous principalities of the departments as well as in the independent commissions and the congressional committees, one would wish that the author had devoted more attention to the techniques of inter-agency and executive-legislative negotiation. The search for the creative compromise is not merely a negative virtue. It may represent the most fruitful approach to coordination. But this caveat aside, Professor Redford has written a valuable and informative book. The views with which he disagrees are stated with scrupulous fairness and demolished courteously and effectively. His own modest program of reform is carefully worked out and buttressed by evidence which will be difficult to refute. He has cut a new furrow in regulatory administration and brought together a wealth of material which all students in the field will eagerly welcome.

MERLE FAINSD.

Harvard University.

Problems of Nationalized Industry. EDITED BY WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 390. \$5.00.)

This book, written by fourteen authors, deals penetratingly and authoritatively with the main issues of British socialization during the five year period, 1945-1950, when the Labour Government was putting through its major nationalization measures. In addition, Professor Robson contributes an essay formerly published in this REVIEW (June, 1950) dealing with the similarities and differences between British and French socialization during the same period. The book justifies its claim to its broad title by dealing topically, instead of programmatically, with subjects of universal interest, such as forms of organization, parliamentary control, and methods of judging efficiency. It achieves a new high as a unified, practical, and yet significantly theoretical contribution to the literature of public ownership. And it achieves what is usually so difficult in a symposium: a cohesiveness and completeness that is refreshing. The editor deserves credit for this result, which is doubtless also due in part to the fact that the book grew out of two previous publications: *Public Enterprise*, which Mr. Robson edited in 1937, and a special issue of the *Political Quarterly*, which appeared in 1950. However, of the fourteen essays found in the present publication, only six were included in the *Political Quarterly*-symposium; and since the method in *Public Enterprise* was programmatic, while in the present one it is functional, most of the present material is new.

Students of political science and economics on this side of the Atlantic can be thankful for the many studies that have recently appeared on various aspects of British nationalization. John Longhurst's *Nationalisation in Practice* (1950) was largely a case study of civil aviation, but in concluding chapters he dealt broadly with generic problems; Ernest Davies wrote *National Enterprise* in 1946 and D. N. Chester, *The Nationalized Industries: An Analysis of the Statutory Provisions* (revised edition) in 1951; the Acton Society Trust performed a monumental service in sponsoring a series of research papers, *Nationalized Industry*, in 1950-51; and Ben W. Lewis, sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, has recently (1952) published *British Planning and Nationalization*. The Robson volume differs from Lewis' treatment in that it does not include planning; it gives more emphasis to the governmental aspect and to evaluation; and the outline is topical rather than programmatic.

Problems of Nationalized Industry is divided into two parts. In the first, consisting of 14 chapters, the subjects dealt with are the public corporation in Great Britain, compensation in the nationalized industries, the governing boards of public corporations, ministerial control and parliamentary responsibility, labor and staff problems under nationalization, and nationalized industries in Britain and France. The respective authors form a balanced team, having been recruited from Parliament, ministerial offices, chairs of political science and economics, and the nationalized industries themselves. Most of them, like G. D. H. Cole, Sir Arthur Salter, and Ernest Davies, are already well known for their scholarship and administrative accomplishments.

The second part of the book, consisting of almost 100 pages, is the editor's own analysis and evaluation. He examines all of the subjects that have previously been considered, in order to draw all of the threads together, integrate them, and try to indicate what tendencies and problems are likely to be important in the future. This he does with considerable skill and insight, taking pains to point out that most of the subjects dealt with are controversial and that full agreement on all of them cannot be expected. This last point is brought sharply to focus in Sir Arthur Salter's essay entitled, "The Crux of Nationalization," where he takes a generally dim view of Britain's readiness, even now, for experiments in nationalization as extensive as those described in this book.

If in the following I emphasize the highlights of the Robson evaluation more than the excellent chapters contributed by others, it is only because the editor's thesis is brought together in one place and hence lends itself more readily to summarization. The public utility stage of British economic development is over, the country is now in the nationalization era, and real socialization lies ahead. Socialization, interestingly discussed on pp. 346-348, involves "a genuine spirit of democracy." Professor Robson believes that "the outlook for Britain's nationalized industries is generally favourable" and he says on the concluding page that nationalization "has sprung from a great popular revolt against the ethics, the incentives, and the results of capitalist enterprise." I gather, however, that Sir Arthur Salter, and possibly other contributors, would not subscribe to so sweeping a statement. Percentages, says Professor Robson, do not give a true index of changes in the business-government relationship that have taken place. It is not enough to state that one-fifth to one-fourth of the economy has been nationalized and that one person out of four is in public employment. These are the key industries. And it is the spirit and motivation, more than the structure and the administrative method, that have been changed.

Professor Robson makes it clear, however, that a study of nationalization is essentially a study of the public corporation. Prior to 1945, only broadcasting was nationalized in the sense herein described. Since then, large, nation-wide monopolies have been created for electricity and gas, transportation, banking (central, not commercial), coal mining, and in other fields. The local governments, which previously owned two-thirds of electricity supply and rather more than a third of the gas industry, have now been divested of their properties and nineteenth-century municipal socialism of the Joseph Chamberlain variety is passé. The compensation of former owners, private as well as governmental, has been fair or more than fair. The corporate board is the hub of policy and administrative matters. Syndicalism has lost ground. Parliamentary control over public corporations increased under the Labour Government, but not so much as to interfere with corporate autonomy. Public relations is now considered so important that it has been accorded formal departmentation and the public is sometimes critical because the function is emphasized too much.

Among the problems on which further, intensive research is needed, the

following stand out: First, as Professor Robson is the first to agree, more reliable and possibly more imaginative methods must be invented for judging the efficiency of enterprises, although I must admit considerable skepticism about the possibility, as suggested, of having a single commission created for this purpose. Second, pricing policies and financial policies generally appear to be in need of careful scrutiny. Third, and in many ways the most important and baffling problem of all, nationalization has brought about so much centralization and accompanying bureaucracy that management problems put the British administrative tradition, which fortunately is one of the best, to a severe test. Growing out of this development, and fourth, is the effect on local government generally, about which Professor Robson expresses serious concern. Fifth is the problem underscored in Sir Arthur Salter's essay, the effect of nationalization on Britain's overseas trade and her general competitive situation. A sixth problem is that of adequate technical and scientific research to support the nationalized industries, a difficulty which the author of an excellent chapter on that subject makes clear is far from being adequately solved. A seventh area involves the relation of claimant groups, and especially labor and consumers, to the nationalized industries, for doubt may arise, and in some cases has arisen, as to whether management can continue to be an impartial "broker of influence." And, finally, there is the whole problem of planning and policy and the relation of Parliament and the Government of the day to the powerful public corporations which are now the British analogues to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

The authors of *Problems of Nationalized Industries* make it clear that Britain may be grateful for a series of studies dealing with the public corporation going back to Herbert Morrison's *Specialization and Transport* in 1933. The intensities of some problems are greater than could be foretold, and a few unanticipated ones have cropped out, but the basic ones such as concentration, monopoly, bureaucracy, and human relations are inherent in technological culture, our own no less than the British or the French.

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK.

Bethel, Vermont.

Politics, Presidents, and Coattails. BY MALCOLM MOOS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. xxi, 237. \$4.00.)

Malcolm Moos has added a useful volume to the still small but gradually growing number of factual studies in American political behavior. *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails* is a study in congressional elections with special emphasis on the interaction of congressional and presidential elections. The main body of statistical material relates to the seven congressional and three presidential elections, by districts, for the period 1938 to 1950. An appendix gives the voting percentages by districts for congressmen and president, and also the percentages for the senatorial elections.

In the first chapter Moos deals with presidential-congressional voting and makes the point that since World War I presidential candidates have received

on the average about 12% more votes than the congressional candidates, compared with about 5% before 1916. The second chapter is a regional description of marginal districts—those where candidates receive 45% to 55% of the votes cast. The third chapter, on "Coattail Chasing," compares for a few selected districts the percentages of votes cast for Republican congressmen in the seven elections from 1938 to 1950 with those received by Republican presidential candidates in 1940, 1944 and 1948. The last two chapters deal with the "Politics of Electoral Leadership" and "Congressional Elections and the Politics of Tomorrow."

The statistical part of this study is on the "Coattails." Moos concludes that "Presidential Coattails, apart from the tides of their parties, do not boost significant numbers of congressional candidates into office." He finds 115 marginal districts (60 Republican and 45 Democratic), and only 42 critical districts (25 Republican and 17 Democratic), where the voting range is from 48.5% to 51.5%. Were he writing today, he would undoubtedly add that the difference between Truman's coattails of 1948 when 262 Democratic congressmen were elected and Eisenhower's coattails when 222 Republican congressmen were elected is only about 10% of the total number of seats in the lower house. My own studies show that on the average the difference between party strength in Congress in presidential election years and in mid-term years is the equivalent of only about 25 to 30 seats—about 7% of the total membership.

Nevertheless, the coattail problem is more important than Moos thinks. He tends to emphasize the vote received by the presidential candidate and by the congressional candidate in the same election. This may be a good measure of relative popularity. What is more instructive and significant is the contrast between the vote received by congressional candidates when no presidential candidate is in the field and when there is one. This is a more direct measure of the pulling power of the presidential coattails. Moos's tables, fortunately, give the names of the congressional candidates as well as their percentages, which should facilitate studies in the popularity of particular candidates over several elections with and without benefit of presidential coattails.

Moos recognizes but does not develop the real significance of elections with and without presidential coattails, i.e., the difference between party results in presidential and mid-term election years that may spell trouble for the party in power. I need only cite the Democratic losses in 1938, 1942 and 1950 and point to the troubles the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had because mid-term apathy cut down their working margin and therefore party legislative effectiveness in Congress. The fact that more than a third of the voters are unfamiliar with their congressmen and by not voting cut down the strength of the party in power in mid-term election years is to me the real coattail problem.

In the last chapter Moos deals with the great sectional differences that make for diversity in congressional policy and for conflict between the executive and legislative branches of our government. He presents the various views and proposals for improving our political structure. But he concludes that "our system

of congressional elections, conducted though it is astride the contradictions and incongruities of our major parties—has served us well,” and that “out of the healthy interaction of presidential leadership and congressional attitudes comes the gradualist tempo of change in public policy that has served us well.” Moos does not define what he means by “well.”

It is unfortunate that this book was not scheduled for publication six months later than it was. We would have had the benefit of Moos's views on how the 1952 election results fit into his statistical analyses and political judgments.

LOUIS BEAN.

U. S. Department of Agriculture.

Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration. BY EDWIN A. COTTRELL AND ASSOCIATES. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation.)

- I. *Characteristics of the Metropolis.* BY EDWIN A. COTTRELL AND HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. xi, 120. Paper \$1.75, cloth \$2.25.)
- II. *How the Cities Grew.* BY RICHARD BIGGER AND JAMES D. KITCHEN. (1952. Pp. xii, 256. Paper \$2.50, cloth \$3.00.)
- III. *Regional Planning.* BY JUDITH NORVELL JAMISON. (1952. Pp. v, 103. Paper \$1.25, cloth \$1.75.)
- X. *Personnel Management.* BY HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. vi, 69. Paper \$1.25, cloth \$1.75.)
- XI. *Governmental Purchasing.* BY PAUL BECKETT, MORRIS PLOTKIN AND GEORGE POLLAK. (1952. Pp. vi, 134. Paper \$1.50, cloth \$2.00.)
- XII. *Schools.* BY HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. xi, 103. Paper \$1.25, cloth \$1.75.)

One of the challenging problems in the field of local government is subjected to detailed study and analysis in a series of sixteen monographs under the general title *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration*. The series will include, in addition to the monographs here reviewed, studies of law enforcement, health and sanitation, fire protection, highways, water supply, parks and recreation, libraries, finance and taxation, and intergovernmental relations, with a concluding volume entitled *The Metropolis: Is Integration Possible?* *Characteristics of the Metropolis* and *How the Cities Grew* serve as basic studies which lay the foundation for the other fourteen monographs. One-third of *Characteristics of the Metropolis* is devoted to what has been done in twelve American and three foreign cities towards integration. With this background of experience elsewhere, the physical, social, economic and political picture in the Los Angeles region is presented, and comprehensive proposals thus far made for governmental integration in the region are discussed. The problem and the challenge are clearly presented. One gets the feeling that something needs to be done; the remedy is left to the studies which follow in the series. In *How the Cities Grew* we have a detailed historical analysis of how the situation developed, when new cities were incorporated and why, annexation and consolidation experience, and the record of disincorporation. The authors reject, or at

least qualify, the standard of efficiency and economy as the test for solving the metropolitan area problem. They question the wisdom of the Virginia plan of placing decisions as to annexation in the courts since this tends to deny the doctrine of home rule. They believe that if a city grows too large in physical size and population there is a loss of sense of community, and they prefer a "confused but healthy pattern of local government than a simple and efficient but impersonal and regimenting metropolitan-wide bureaucracy." This is carrying the principle of local self-determination further than many persons would accept. The authors do recognize the desirability of basing administration on a larger area and would accomplish this by greater use of intergovernmental contracts or joint boards for administration of municipal services.

Regional Planning sets forth, on the basis of the experience in Los Angeles, the obstacles that must be overcome before any complete coordination of planning in a metropolitan region can be attained. Since the City of Los Angeles comprises only 11 per cent of the total county area but furnishes 55 per cent of the property tax base for Los Angeles County, the taxpayers of the city object to the county's furnishing urban-planning services to the unincorporated areas and smaller cities at the expense of the City of Los Angeles. The difficult task facing a regional planning agency which serves merely as a means of coordination of the activities of many local governmental agencies is shown in the Los Angeles experience. The variation from other metropolitan areas is one of degree rather than of kind.

The results of cooperative efforts by local governments in the Los Angeles area in the field of personnel administration are reported in *Personnel Management*. It is both an interesting and encouraging story, showing how much can be accomplished by cooperative effort to reduce the duplication, the conflicts and the lack of economy in public personnel administration resulting from many separate governments operating in the same area. Extensive use is made of intergovernmental contracts—between local governments, and between local governments and the state—where personnel services are handled by one government for another on a contractual basis. The City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, and the Los Angeles Board of Education cooperate in testing candidates for certain positions and in other aspects of personnel administration. While some suggestions are made for further cooperative action, the study deals primarily with what has been done.

In *Governmental Purchasing* it is shown that only limited progress has been made in cooperative purchasing by local governments in the Los Angeles region; a chapter on "Co-operative Purchasing Outside the Los Angeles Area" is more encouraging. The authors believe that "some form of functional coordination in governmental procurement is imperative" in metropolitan areas and recommend steps in this direction in Los Angeles. The report on *Schools* will be of limited interest to persons outside the Los Angeles area.

A detailed study of metropolitan government in one community, as contrasted with a comparative study in many areas, may not only disclose what is wrong and what needs to be done in the region studied, but may also result in

conclusions of general applicability. *Metropolitan Los Angeles* has the improvement of conditions in Los Angeles as its principal goal. The findings and the conclusions will, however, be of general interest and value, and all persons interested in metropolitan government will be grateful for this study.

CHARLES M. KNEIER.

University of Illinois.

Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of Politics and Morals. BY R. E. MONEY-KYRLE. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1951. Pp. 183. \$3.00.)

With sharp intellectual and literary discipline, the author of this solid little book succeeds admirably in accomplishing the purpose specified in the subtitle. Insofar as the quality of thought is concerned, the content remains constructively provocative throughout, though some of the conclusions reached are highly debatable. Despite the incomplete development of some ideas and the unsatisfactory documentation of others, the author sets forth his views directly and clearly, without the cumbersome and self-conscious apparatus of scholarship which our American profession seems increasingly to affect; moreover, this is accomplished without the extremes in overgeneralization and subjective judgment which occasionally characterize British books.

In certain specifics, the book is a series of reflections on the author's experience as a member of the German Personnel Research Branch of the Control Commission created at the end of the war and concerned with two aims: a social survey and the selection of "suitable Germans" as leaders for a democratic society. More broadly, however, it involves the application of a generalized synthesis of psychoanalytic theory to the roots of certain political phenomena. In this latter aspect, the contents provide a fruitful basis for comparison and contrast with similar efforts, particularly those by Franz Alexander and Harold Lasswell.

The formal organization follows two closely related paths of development: first, the establishment of "A Theoretical Basis for a Psychological Approach to Politics"; second, an examination of "Some Aspects of the Psychology of Politics" with chief reference to inter-group relations, group-individual relations, and the state as an influence upon the development of moral character. Perhaps the most interesting and central feature of the book from the political science viewpoint is this latter topic, for the author produces a universal, systematic and functional definition of both the "good state" and "normal character," and then seeks to defend them on entirely empirical grounds. This attempt is but one illustration of the plain implication throughout the book that the "moral relativism" which has so largely characterized social science in this century is a doctrine of diminishing returns and that its utility has been largely, if not entirely, exhausted.

The numerous points at which functional definitions of "authoritarian" personal and social character are developed in contrast to "humanist" tendencies should be of special interest to those pursuing the lines of inquiry pioneered

by Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and others. The contents are also useful in comparison with such current studies as the supervision projects under Likert at Michigan and others elsewhere.

In his German personnel studies, the author found that the two conscience types which he defines—humanist and authoritarian—correlated both with home and occupational types. In the later consideration of group-individual relations, a detailed comparison of German "authoritarian" and English "humanist" movements broadens the above conclusion by providing "clear evidence of a causal link between two types of state and two types of character. In both, a change in the nature of the state, either towards the authoritarian or the humanist end of the scale, tended to be reproduced in the home and school, and so favoured the development of a character that modified the concept of the state still further in the same direction" (p. 122).

The "good state" defined by the author embodies "a high degree of freedom, a wide choice of creative sublimation, and the sympathetic, rather than mechanical, provision of security and welfare" (p. 137). The author claims no originality for this concept, beyond asserting that it "has been arrived at by new arguments that, perhaps for the first time, permit it to be defended empirically" (p. 137). Considerable stress is placed, however, on the point that psychoanalysis provides no magic formula for resolving political tensions, for the approach "presupposes that they [authoritarians] are at least prepared to listen" (p. 178).

The concept of "normality" in individual character is summarized as the integration of a person "whose mind has nothing permanently hidden from itself, and who is rational in the sense that the belief-systems governing his behavior are true within the range of his experience because they have been consciously tested" (p. 44). This is said to be "the kind of standard needed if we are to get beyond the relativist position in either politics or morals" (p. 45). The ultimate problem arising in the development of Money-Kyrle's arguments is, of course, the definition of "truth." Much depends on whether the reader accepts the "reality test" and the "test of consistency" (p. 40) as valid and adequate.

A most interesting line of inquiry in regard to party politics may be derived from the observation that "without the paranoid disturbances in thought produced by the mechanisms of splitting and projection, the party system as we know it would not itself be possible. Differences of opinion and differences of loyalty would of course remain to divide us into parties. But since each new issue would produce a new alignment, the parties would not stay the same" (p. 163).

Three points in the book are particularly questionable, notably the unqualified assertion that "political activity is designed to make widespread changes in the structure of society and of the state" (p. 123). Obviously, it may as often be devoted to the preservation of existing conditions. Secondly, the repeated equation of consciousness with insight and the asserted automaticity with which such equation occurs is not adequately supported. The comments

on prejudice (pp. 27 ff.) are especially subject to this fault. Thirdly, in the correlation of authoritarianism and political immaturity (p. 135), the author fails to account for the fact that in the long course of history mankind has attained what freedom exists despite authoritarian systems.

CARLTON C. RODEE.

University of Southern California.

International Political Science Abstracts (with alternate title: *Documentation Politique Internationale*). BY THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CONFERENCE. (Paris: UNESCO. Distributor in the U.S.A.: Columbia University Press, N. Y. \$4.00 per year.)

Since the untimely demise in 1932 of the short-lived *Social Science Abstracts* political scientists have lacked an important tool of teaching and research. Within the United States the deficiency has been somewhat ameliorated by reason of the large number and comprehensive bibliographical coverage of our domestic professional journals. Even so, none of them pretends to anything approaching systematic analysis or even notation of all significant foreign material, especially that appearing in periodical publications. The initiative of the International Political Science Association, with the collaboration of the International Studies Conference and the financial underwriting of UNESCO, in establishing the *International Political Science Abstracts* as a quarterly review of world-wide coverage of the significant periodical literature in the field of political science, goes a long way toward correcting this deficiency.

Six issues of the quarterly have appeared to date, abstracting on a selective basis the literature of the field which has been published since the beginning of 1950. Volume I, which attempted the ambitious task of abstracting the literature of 1950 as well as the first nine months of 1951, contains summaries of 1447 articles, which appeared in 84 different periodicals. As a matter of policy, all articles in ten leading political science journals were abstracted, while selections were made from 74 other periodicals. Of the ten journals completely abstracted six were of American publication. Of the 74 selectively abstracted 14 were of American publication. However, the *Abstracts* even go behind the Curtain, with items from *Voprosi Filosofii* and *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* from Moscow, *Sprawy miedzynarodowe* and *Państwo i Prawo* from Warsaw, and *Társadalmi Szemle* from Budapest. The two issues of Volume II which have appeared to date cover the fourth quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952. They contain digests of 683 articles which appeared in 97 periodical publications, of which ten, as in the previous volume, were completely abstracted.

The quarterly is published in French and English. In the first two volumes, articles of French or English origin were abstracted in the language other than that of origin, while articles in all other languages were abstracted in the language chosen by the writer of the abstract. Beginning in 1953, however, all articles appearing originally in English will be abstracted in English, and all

articles appearing originally in other languages will be abstracted in French. Each number is comprehensively indexed in English as well as in French, and a cumulative annual index is provided in the final number of each volume.

There is inevitable variation in the standards of the abstracts, but in the main they appear to be of an extremely high order of reportorial conciseness. It is, of course, possible to quarrel with the conceptual structure within which the editorial policy was erected, and even to question the validity, especially at the international level, of abstracts in a field less comprehensive than the totality of the social sciences. But when all the criticisms and comments have been made, there remains the monumental and imaginative achievement of the editors of *International Political Science Abstracts* in planning and executing a veritable *tour de force* in behalf of better teaching and research and closer international professional relations—all on a shoestring. The profession has ample reason for profound gratitude to the editorial board—Jean Meynaud, Saul Rose (recently succeeded by H. R. G. Greaves), and Bruce L. Smith—and especially to Jean Meyriat, the managing editor, as well as to the International Political Science Association and to UNESCO, for a significant contribution to the improvement of the tools of our trade.

ROWLAND EGGER.

University of Virginia.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Primary Elections in the South: A Study in Uniparty Politics. By CORTES A. M. EWING. (Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 112. \$2.75.)

This statistical study of southern primaries is based on the returns of 3,843 primary elections in eleven southern states between 1900 and 1948. These returns are processed into 36 tables in order "to determine . . . whether the intra-party struggle produces results that are at variance with the demands of democratic procedure."

Ewing varies the usual definition of the southern states by substituting Oklahoma for Virginia. Although the 3,843 primary returns do not comprise a complete collection of all primaries in the last half-century, anyone who has attempted to collect primary returns will realize that accumulating that many is a remarkable feat. Included are Democratic state, district, and local races plus a handful of Republican primaries.

The author examines the number of candidates who enter the primaries, the number of unopposed nominations, the advantages enjoyed by the incumbents, the closeness of the races, the variation in voter interest among offices, the frequency of runoffs, and the relation of top place in the first primary to victory in the runoff. In treating each subject the analysis covers the variations among states, among types of office (legislative, executive), among levels of government (local, district, statewide offices), and between the single- and the double-primary systems. Among his more important findings are that 40% of all nominations are unopposed; that incumbents, who are involved in three-fourths of all races, are virtually impossible to beat in non-local races; that most races are won by lopsided margins; and that in the double-primary system 84% of nominations are settled in the first primary. The last chapter, dealing with participation, has a somewhat different statistical basis and offers less new material.

The author's interpretations of his findings are not always as convincing as the basic statistical findings. No one will quarrel with the IBM machine's conclusions as to the average number of Democratic candidates for governor

in each state. Yet when the author gives his explanation of why the average number is 7.38 in one state and only 3.56 in another, he resorts sometimes to broad generalizations about southern politics. Most of these generalizations coincide with my own prejudices, yet they are unsupported by arguments that would convince a skeptic.

The study attempts no startlingly new interpretation of southern politics. However, it gives us much new and detailed information on the workings of the Democratic primary and provides statistical proof that a one-party system is a feeble mechanism for democracy.—DONALD S. STRONG, *University of Alabama*.

Soil Conservation Districts in Action. By ROBERT W. PARKS. (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 242. \$3.50.)

The American people have come to realize the complexity as well as the importance of their conservation job. Recognition of the need for action to preserve the nation's soils has been followed by realization that the matter cannot be left entirely to the whim of the individual farmer. Governmental guidance, persuasion, and assistance are required, but no one level of government is equipped to do the job singlehandedly. A pooling of the peculiar competencies, energies, and resources of each level is indicated. Out of these conditions and needs, Professor Parks points out, grew the concept of the soil conservation district and an attempt to secure through it a new working arrangement which could merge in its operating process the values of both national and state programming and local democratic determination.

Over 2,400 districts have been established, and the number is growing. Some twelve thousand farmers now act as district supervisors—governors of their districts. Professor Parks records with competent scholarship and with objectivity the results of his six years of study and observation of the districts in operation. The district is analyzed and appraised as a governmental arrangement which has taken precedence over national, state, and county government as the administrative device for assisting farmers in getting conservation on the

land. The critical question identified and considered by the author is: "Has the district so met the two large tests of effectiveness and democracy that its creation in addition to the traditional units of government has been justified?" The conclusion set out in an excellent final chapter on the future of the districts is hopeful but cautious: "The soil conservation district has not yet been sufficiently weathered by time for its value in future agricultural administration to be projected. Thus far, however, the district has demonstrated promising potentialities in developing a new working integration between national and local government as well as between the lay citizen and his government."

Soil Conservation Districts in Action should be widely read by participants in the affairs of these new units of local government, by others concerned with problems of agriculture and conservation, and generally by students of government and administration. The book will reassure those who fear that the federal government through its agricultural agencies has gained too much control over the farmers of America. Legal coercion and administrative standards have been less important in the affairs of the districts than the persuasiveness of the technical personnel of the Soil Conservation Service, skilled in both conservation and human relations, and working with supervisors and farmers. The significant information on operating relationships which Professor Parks presents deserves a great deal of consideration as methods and machinery for administering agricultural programs are restudied.—LAWRENCE L. DURISON, *Tennessee Valley Authority*.

Civic Victories. By RICHARD S. CHILDS. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xvii, 350. \$3.50.)

It must be recorded that the most remarkable thing about this volume is the insight it gives about its author. For Richard S. Childs is the grand man of all local government reform in the United States. And this is the story of reform at the grass roots—its philosophy, the evils needing remedy, its proposed cures, its success—as Richard S. Childs sees it. *Civic Victories* will undoubtedly serve as an inspiration to those who are working the fields of reform; but to the systematic political scientist its most valuable function is that it reveals something of the nature of the reasoning, the scope of activity, and the vitality, conviction, and emotion of the reformer.

Most of the philosophy, evils, remedies, and successes will be quite familiar to political scientists, although at a number of points Mr. Childs presents reasoning or facts that are refreshingly new. The author is given to making sweeping generalizations about human nature and behavior which go largely unproved and sometimes seem to be 100 per cent correct and at other times 100 per cent wrong. Thus we read (p. xiv), "Human nature being much the same everywhere. . . ." This assumption about the uniformity of human nature leads him into several curious statements. After reviewing Cincinnati's fight for better government he says: "The governmental mechanism changed, but Cincinnatians remained the same people before and after!" (p. 4). Is this really true? Most reformers seem to feel that it is, but they do themselves an injustice in making this point because one of the most salutary effects of a successful reform movement is the change in human behavior that takes place in the process. The local citizens behave in a different manner than formerly—their motivations, their values, their responses are all likely to change. This may not be altering human "nature," but it comes very close to doing it. Along the same line of thought, the author (p. 79) apparently believes that our parties can be made to function much like the English parties if only we simplify governmental structure. Logical enough if human nature is everywhere the same. Consistent with the idea that human nature is uniform is the contention that partisan politics tends to follow the pattern of the most notorious bosses and machines of the large cities such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. This is difficult to accept, and it is to be regretted that Mr. Childs did not spend more of his life outside the confining atmosphere of New York politics.

While the argument pursued is not always consistent, while adequate proof is often lacking, and while the book is poorly organized and the style somewhat awkward, *Civic Victories* remains an important and worth-while volume. It is the best statement of local reform politics to date, and it will be an invaluable guide to reformers as well as an instructive case study for the scientist. The breadth of political understanding of the author, who has been employed in business most of his life, as well as the extent of his activity in behalf of reform, will be something that no reader will soon forget.—EDWARD W. WEIDNER, *Michigan State College*.

Gentlemen Freeholders: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia. BY CHARLES S. SYDOR. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 180. \$3.50.)

Gentlemen Freeholders is a comprehensive, scholarly, and well-written portrayal of the organization and operation of practical politics in Virginia during the last half of the eighteenth century, a period which saw the transition from colonial to state and national politics and during which the Virginia political system underwent little change and produced more than its share of outstanding political leaders. The whole political and elective process is described: the leadership of the gentry in the county oligarchies, the role of the ordinary voter, the conduct and control of elections, and the operation of the system in the House of Burgesses. Prominent political personages are frequently mentioned. A unique blending of aristocratic and democratic elements and a quasi-federalism characterized the system, and these, the author feels, had an effect upon the original nature and spirit of our federal constitution.—O. DOUGLAS WEEKS, *University of Texas*.

Appointed Executive Local Government: The California Experience. BY JOHN C. BOLLENS. (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation. 1952. Pp. xi, 233. Paper: \$3.00; Cloth: \$3.75.)

A study of California city and county experience with appointive chief administrators, which directs attention to the manager plan and the chief administrative officer plan. Extensive data are presented in a variety of ways, including several brief case reports.

How Human Rights Got Into the Constitution. BY ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. (Boston:

Boston University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 81. \$2.50.)

Three lectures in which the inquiry moves backward, first to "The American Background," then to "The English Background," and finally to the special story, told inspirationally, of the English background of "The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution"—Habeas Corpus.

Frontiers for Freedom. EDITED BY R. GORDON HOXIE. (Denver: The University of Denver Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 327. \$3.75.)

A representative collection of papers, presented at a symposium marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver, exploring prospects for meeting basic issues of freedom on various challenging frontiers of human development.

Conduct of Judges and Lawyers: A Study of Professional Ethics, Discipline and Disbarment. BY ORIE L. PHILLIPS AND PHILBRICK MCCOY. (Los Angeles: Parker and Company. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 247.)

Some years ago the American Bar Association undertook the sponsorship of a project which came to be known as *The Survey of the Legal Profession*. This book is one of the reports which have resulted from this undertaking. The report is confined to a study of professional ethics, discipline and disbarment based upon a survey of the practices now in operation in the United States. The conclusions reached are that there is a need for the restatement of professional ethics, a tightening up of disciplinary procedures, and an improvement in relations between the bar and the citizenry.

NOTE ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TEXTBOOKS

Since January, 1950 some thirty books have been published expressly for use in American government courses. With greatly expanded student enrollment and growing interest in government, beginning courses—most often courses in American government—have offered a lucrative market. Coincidentally, increasing discussion of teaching goals and methods has stimulated in many a desire to produce a textbook with a "new approach." Thus the college teacher faces an unprecedented range of choice in selecting a text for his beginning course.

One of the complicating problems in making this selection is that for many of this greatly expanded and expanding body of students, professional requirements so fill their class schedules that this one course will be their sole college contact with political science. Hence for the greater number of participants the course is regularly both introductory and terminal. How the needs of this body of students are to be reconciled with the needs of the smaller number who take the course as the first of many in the field is a question that has not

yet been resolved to the satisfaction of anyone, though many authors have been willing to make the attempt with their proffered publications.

Political scientists frequently say they are training their students for "citizenship," and usually preface the term with the adjective "good." This objective is rather fully discussed in Chapters II and VII of *Goals for Political Science* (1951), the Report of the American Political Science Association Committee for the Advancement of Teaching. This survey indicated that the most friendly disputants fail to agree on what subject matter should be included or excluded in citizenship education. One group, in trying to reach some conclusions on course content, presents the point of view that the beginning course in American government should train young people for active participation in political party affairs and procedures. Thomas H. and Doris D. Reed have ably and vigorously sustained this contention in two publications recently issued by the Citizenship Clearing House of New York. The first, *Evaluation of Citizenship Training and Incentive in American Colleges and Universities*, appeared in 1950, and the second, *Preparing College Men and Women for Politics*, in 1952.

This approach has met with a good deal of criticism. Participation does not necessarily lead to understanding, and action without understanding may have disastrous consequences. There is no question as to the ease with which action may be started. Millions of deluded Germans actively participated in the politics fostered by Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, *et al.*, seemingly without any comprehension or understanding of what it all meant. The tragic consequences of that active and strenuous "participation" in politics without understanding have not yet run their course. Evidently something more is needed.

Teachers of political science have attempted to furnish this necessary "something more" through courses which give background and understanding to the student. Once the student has learned the nature of the problems which have been present in times of crisis in the past and how they have been solved, current difficulties which bring the old problems up again in a new disguise no longer seem insuperable. It was study of this general nature which nurtured such eminent practitioners of the art of politics as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.

In this broad context there have traditionally been used three general approaches to the teaching of American government. The older approach emphasized a factual presentation of the structure of the governmental system. The second is the functional approach, in which the functions exercised by government agencies are stressed, with federal, state, and local activities being shown in each functional area. A third emphasizes the concepts underlying the functions performed by government and de-emphasizes the presentation of detailed factual material.

In the structural approach, the usual procedure is to start off with the structure of the federal government, whose foundations were thoroughly laid in the Constitution, and then to proceed through most of the year at this level leaving only the last few class periods for a quick and cursory glance at local problems. It may be that a more vital approach would be to devote some time to principles and theories of political forms and then to apply them to the seeable, known, and understandable issues of local government. From that point it would be logical to progress to and through state problems, interstate relations, state-federal matters, and then to talk about the federal government and its operations. The terms concerning government as they would appear in this arrangement of subject matter might become intelligible to the student and the subject matter more vital. Since, however, such an approach would mean revising whole reams of lecture notes and the rewriting or writing of textbooks in a new manner, it is usually considered impractical.

In reviewing a textbook, or in using it, anyone can find errors; but in a majority of cases these are not really significant. What is important is the organization of the volume and the kind of presentation which the author has made of his material. In discussing these points a reviewer should not be pedantically critical and should keep in mind the differences in preferences among teachers. Some persons prefer one kind of presentation, some another. No cursory examination and no statement based upon it can give a true picture of any text; it must be used in class work before comment has complete validity; hence the frequent question of the value of reviews. Even when there is close affinity, the author and the user will rarely agree in all points. It is not meet then to condemn a text out of hand. Thus, when this reviewer reads the volume by

Professors Carter and Rohlfing, he finds a greater emphasis upon business and economic activities and upon legal decisions than he likes, but understanding the value of this type of presentation to many teachers he can commend it to them on this ground. The purpose of a textbook is to stimulate thinking and to integrate materials, and here, as is so often true, "what is one man's meat is another man's poison."

Turning to the twenty or so texts prepared for American government courses which have appeared during the past three years, we find in the first group seven volumes using the traditional approach through a structural or institutional discussion of the national, state, and local governments, with from two-thirds to three-fourths of the space devoted to the federal government alone. The volumes tend to approach or exceed a thousand pages, and usually suffice as a text for a year course. Brief comments on each of the seven texts follow.

Introduction to American Government. BY FREDERIC A. OGG AND P. ORMAN RAY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 10th edition. 1951. Pp. viii, 1063. \$5.50.)

This is the last revision of the famous production issued by Professor Ogg before his death. It is a monumental work, though strongly criticized by many because of its encyclopedic nature. It is a volume which has been used for years by teachers of American government as containing a mine of information and as a source to which they could turn for accurate information when they needed it in a hurry. It is an excellent volume to use as a springboard for subjective interpretations of the processes of government, since the student can always weigh the instructor's words against the accumulation of data in the text. This publication is also the epitome of careful scholarship constantly striving to check every point in order that it may be accurate and in the right context.

Essentials of American Government. BY FREDERIC A. OGG AND P. ORMAN RAY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 7th edition. 1952. Pp. x, 774. \$5.00.)

This is a rewritten short form of the text above, designed for those who do not care for such a heavy dose of government as is offered in the larger volume. The book was entirely rewritten by Professor Ogg and had been

completed, except for the proofreading, before his death. It is of the same high caliber as the text described above.

The American System of Government. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND DEAN E. McHENRY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 2nd edition. 1950. Pp. xii, 1042. \$5.00.)

This, like "Ogg and Ray," is completely traditional in its organization of material, but makes considerable use of charts and maps as illustrative matter. It is well written and covers the field of government structure. There are also film strips which are designed to accompany the text, and are available for use when the proper payment is proffered. They provide an interesting correlation of older lecture methods with newer audio-visual teaching aids prepared under the direction of the same individuals.

A Grammar of American Politics. BY WILFRED E. BINKLEY AND MALCOLM C. MOOS. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2nd edition. Revised and enlarged. 1952. Pp. xix, 1059, xxiv. \$6.00.)

The enlargement of this text results for the most part from tacking on a section on state and local government to make it conform in organization and length with the other standard texts. As in the first edition there has been a conscious attempt to make the writing more of a narration than an exposition. There is a particularly good section on pressure groups with an excellent transition to political parties. Though the style of writing is different this is a traditional textbook in approach and organization.

American Government, National, State and Local. BY CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company. 1951. Pp. xx, 1068. \$5.00.)

Here the reader finds a rewriting and rearrangement of Professor Johnson's *Government in the United States*, 5th edition, mentioned below. In his preface the author says that he dare not say that the students may read his text "with pleasure," but this reviewer believes that they might do just that. The style is interesting and there is a profusion of charts, graphs, and figures to lighten the presentation. The book is deliberately arranged in the traditional manner for purposes of competition, but the personality of the

author stands out and the functional approach in his other works colors this excellent text.

Government and Politics in the United States.

BY HAROLD ZINK. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 3rd edition. 1951. Pp. x, 1008. \$5.50.)

Professor Zink attempts to explain the structure of American government on the three levels in terms of the functions performed and their effects upon the citizens. The section on national administrative activities and that on citizenship and its responsibilities are especially good.

The American Government and Its Work. BY EDWARD W. CARTER AND CHARLES C. ROHLFING. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xv, 875. \$6.00.)

This is based upon the older text, *The New American Government and Its Work*, by JAMES T. YOUNG, and in most respects is a new edition of that work. In this revision the organization is generally traditional, with some slight rearrangement in the federal section. Legal decisions are extensively used to illustrate the authors' points; and the relationship of government and business is heavily stressed, with a tendency toward a conservative interpretation on all such matters. There is considerable repetition in the organization, and too little stress is placed upon local government, which is discussed in one chapter only.

A second group of texts follows the traditional approach found in the series above, but limits the material to the federal government. The textbook may have been specially written for this form of presentation, but usually the federal government section is lifted bodily from a larger study and given a separate binding. This is particularly true of the first two listings below where no further comments are needed in addition to those made for the full volume.

Introduction to American Government, the National Government. BY FREDERIC A. OGG AND P. ORMAN RAY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 10th edition, 1951. Pp. 771. \$5.00.)

The American Federal Government. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND DEAN E. MCHENRY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 2nd edition. 1950. Pp. 816. \$5.50.)

American National Government. BY CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1951. 3rd edition. Pp. xix, 810. \$4.25.)

Interestingly written, this third edition of Professor Johnson's text brings the material up to date, revises the organization to some extent and has a new chapter on "The Conduct of Foreign Relations." Charts and graphs are used to clarify points touched upon in the printed pages.

Principles and Problems of American National Government. BY JAMES M. SWARTHOUT AND ERNEST R. BARTLEY. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xl, 700. \$4.25.)

This text is organized in the traditional manner to a greater degree than usually found today. Only 135 pages of material on "line functions" of the government are included, a rather cursory treatment of a most important part of the government activity of the United States. This was deliberately planned because the authors wanted to explain the principles which underlie the American political system. The authors have done an excellent job in writing, presenting the material in an interesting style, and the product is a good example of the newer shorter form of text devised for classroom use.

American National Government. BY HAROLD R. BRUCE. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 836. \$5.50.)

This is the only newly written study in this group, and marks Professor Bruce's first effort in this particular field. The writing is well done, and the organization is traditional. Every chapter is keyed with several standard collections of "readings," thus making it easier for the instructor and the student alike to find supplementary information. Good use is made of cartoons, graphs, maps, illustrations of ballots, and other aids. This increasing trend toward the use of visual-aid material seems to be a part of the trend toward "picture" books that is so evident in our culture today. A careful perusal of all the volumes noted will show that somewhat greater use of illustrations of all kinds can be discerned in the newer books as compared with those that were issued during the first year covered in this survey. This type of material livens up the appearance of the publication, and perhaps makes it more interesting to many students, but its real value may have to wait the test of time.

Somewhere between the two categories listed above comes a new presentation of American government on a very much simplified scale.

American Federal Government, A General View.

By HERMAN C. NIXON. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1952. Pp. x, 476. \$4.00.)

Deliberately designed to give the essential outline of the material and yet permit the instructor to go out on his own paths, the use of the book shows that this concept has certain values. All three levels of government are treated from the usual outline, but with merely a nod given to the state and local levels. Here too, much use is made of visual-aid materials. For a one-semester course this text will meet with much favorable comment. For a backward class, it is the best volume in the field to get the material across.

A third category is composed of those texts which, for lack of a better term, can be called a "composite" type. Their approach has been called the functional one, but this is not fully descriptive. All of the books in this class are strongly traditional in that they cover the three levels of government, but the state and local discussions are merely tacked on to a full discussion of federal activities.

Our American Government, the Citizen's Approach. By HELEN MILLER BAILEY, EUGENE L. LAZARE, AND CONRAD H. HAWKINS. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1951. Pp. ix, 566. \$4.25.)

The three authors have obviously attempted to bridge the gap between the secondary school and the junior college, and have produced a book that is not quite satisfactory for the latter. It certainly is not of the caliber that is usually associated with college work. The style is lucid and one enjoys reading the chapters, but in so doing one gains the impression that the work is designedly "corny," if one may be permitted to use the language of the group for which the book is intended. The illustrations are in line with the age level of the proposed reader. The authors are to be commended for their effort to write a government text for younger readers, but the product should be retained there.

Government in the United States. By CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 5th edition. 1951. Pp. xviii, 1064. \$5.00.)

In this fifth edition of an already widely known and used text Professor Johnson has continued the approach which he has formerly used. There is much use of illustrative material all through the text. It is interesting to note that the material is so arranged that the author was able to lift chapters, and sections of chapters, bodily from this volume, do a little rewriting in some cases, and then by reorganizing this collection of unattached writing produce the traditional "structural" volume commented on above. To this reviewer this rearrangement seems to prove that what is often acclaimed new and different may be merely a better and more effective method of presenting the old material. In this instance it makes little difference in what form the material is organized: the results are still interesting reading.

In connection with his texts, Prof. Johnson has prepared two pamphlets which are available from the publisher. The first is titled, *Teaching Suggestions to Accompany Textbooks by Claudius O. Johnson*. It contains some pertinent suggestions from a long-time teacher to newcomers in the profession. It also contains a few sample objective questions taken from the second pamphlet, whose title is *Objective Tests to Accompany Textbooks by Claudius O. Johnson*. This pamphlet contains 440 multiple-choice questions and an objective examination on the Constitution. Together these publications represent a worthwhile attempt on the part of an author to make his brainchildren more useful to teachers.

American Government in Action. By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK AND GLADYS O. DIMOCK. (New York: Rinehart & Company. Revised edition. 1951. Pp. xvi, 1004. \$5.00.)

This interesting product of joint family authorship marks a decided break with the usual presentation. While it organizes the material in relatively the same sequence as any other text, it is deliberately designed to explain government from the functional approach. Its chapters have to stand on their own merits and cannot be rearranged into a traditional textbook. The reviewer's criticism here is that the state and local discussions are tacked on at the end of the federal material. It may be that this is an inherent difficulty that cannot be overcome, but it will be interesting to see if someone will be able to weave all the functions of all governments into a single narrative in such a manner that the reader may be led through the full story without having to adjust

to the abrupt transitions that now mark the presentations. Visual-aid material appears throughout the pages of the Dimocks' text.

Closely related to the above group is the composite type of textbook which is concerned only with the national government. The production of each author varies markedly from the other volumes in this category, and the freshness of approach makes each one stand out by itself. These three attempts may well mark the beginning of a new trend in textbook writing, since they are in many ways traditional and yet make new paths plain.

American Democracy in Theory and Practice.

BY ROBERT K. CARR, DONALD H. MORRISON, MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, AND RICHARD C. SNYDER. (New York: Rinehart & Company. 1951. Pp. xiii, 1094. \$5.00.)

The outstanding feature of this work is the treatment given to civil liberties and the rights of citizens in this nation. This might be expected because of the first author listed, and is a good illustration of the way in which an author's major interest can color his whole interpretation. Excellent bibliographical material is presented for each chapter, a matter of some importance both for the teacher and for the student.

The Theory and Practice of American National Government. BY CARL B. SWISHER. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1951. Pp. viii, 949, xix. \$5.00.)

Because of Professor Swisher's well known interest in legal matters it is somewhat surprising to find that the treatment of civil rights and the judiciary receive less space here than in many other texts. There is, however, much reliance upon legal decisions, and there are few of the leading cases in constitutional matters that are not cited at least in the footnotes. The material is well presented. The approach is one which should develop much interest, in that students are made to feel a relationship with what they read.

Government by the People; The Dynamics of American National Government. BY JAMES M. BURNS AND JACK W. PELTASON. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. xvii, 946. \$5.50.)

Few of the current crop of proffered adoptions for American government read better

than this product of two newcomers to the field. The chapter headings are intriguing. Once in them, the chapters lead one on and on. That is probably the chief difficulty with using this book as a textbook. All the interesting materials are presented by the text. This leaves to the instructor the task of supplying the oftentimes dry, but necessary facts with which the student must be furnished if he is to understand what he reads. From the teacher's standpoint it is far better to have the textual material furnish the skeletal basis of a course. This permits the lecturer to direct his students into the most interesting and intriguing bypaths of the subject matter. Accordingly, a good many instructors may find Burns and Peltason a bit "thin" because they frequently interest the student and do not inform him.

A paper-covered brochure by the same authors, called *Government by the People: The Dynamics of American State and Local Government*, has recently appeared. It is a short printing of 158 pages, and will probably make its later appearance bound in at the back of the larger volume above. It is obviously an effort to meet requests for a coverage of American government through a more standard form of publication.

This review would not be complete unless some attention were paid to the several collections of "readings" which have appeared simultaneously as companion pieces for classroom texts. The "readings" more clearly even than the textbooks show the predilections of the authors, and one can almost watch the mind of the compiler work as the collection is studied. No two of these works are the same, and yet each to some extent follows the same basic pattern. Every one fills a need, and the only trouble is that it is impossible to use them all. There is of necessity some overlapping, but the remarkable thing is that the selections vary as much as they do, since they must relate to the same subject matter.

It is as time-saving devices that the "readings" appeal most to teachers. There is such a mass of good illustrative material in current periodicals, government reports, and literary offerings that most instructors become lost in the forest; hence the value of these collections. In an effort to assist students to find pertinent data for themselves and thereby gain the thrill of discovery a new type of supplementary volume has appeared.

A Guide to the Study of Public Affairs. By E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, VICTOR JONES, AND STEPHEN K. BAILEY. (New York: William Sloane Associates. 1952. Pp. v, 135. \$1.50.)

Government documents, court decisions, and directories are reproduced, together with newspaper clippings and facsimile headlines. On each there are to be found the penciled notations of explanation by the editors. Every illustration with its notations is an integral part of a discussion on "How to use ———." Together with explanations from the teacher this handy guide should make clear to every student what has too often been a mere collection of terms. It could prove to be the most important time-saver at the disposal of the instructor. The illustrations showing how to study the work of the real estate lobby, and the record of a congressman, are classics in themselves.

American Government; Basic Documents and Materials. By ROBERT G. DIXON AND ELMER PLISCHKE. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company. 1950. Pp. xx, 420. \$2.90.)

There is probably no record of the number of times any given teacher has said that he wished he could put his hands on that copy of a legal warrant, or other document, which he had been saving to use in class but which is out of the file. That complaint need not arise again, for here in a compact form is the answer to the problem of filing such illustrative displays. All that are needed are included, and when used to supplement any standard textbook no student need ever say he has never seen an example of a legal document. The inclusion of statistical charts and graphs adds to the coverage, since they are usually related to the official forms reproduced.

The five collections noted below follow the sequence of the traditional structural textbooks and each one presents a good series of excerpts.

Outside Readings in American Government. EDITED BY H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, WILFRED D. WEBB, EDWARD G. LEWIS, AND WILLIAM L. STRAUSS. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 2nd edition. 1952. Pp. x, 884. \$2.95.)

In the revision of their excellent collection the collaborators have removed some illustra-

tions which were out of date or otherwise not as acceptable as when first included, and have added newer ones of current significance. The editors are to be commended for using complete articles or chapters in most of the selections.

Readings in American National and State Government. By DAVID FELLMAN, LANE W. LANCASTER, AND A. C. BRECKENRIDGE. (New York: Rinehart & Co. 1950. Pp. xi, 399 and ix, 347. \$2.40.)

There are more Supreme Court decisions here than in most collections of readings and this gives the student an approach he might not get otherwise. The selections are well chosen but the reviewer would have preferred shorter articles so that less excerpting would have been required.

Materials on American National Government. By JOHN M. SWARTHOUT AND ERNEST R. BARTLEY. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 571. \$2.95.)

Designed to be used with the textbook written by the same authors. The reviewer would have been better satisfied if there had been less use of short extracts which, while well chosen and meaningful, still leave the reader wondering what came next.

The People, Politics, and the Politician. By A. N. CHRISTENSEN AND EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. Revised edition. 1951. Pp. xiv, 1042. Cloth \$4.50, paper \$3.25.)

While considered as supplementary material, this volume is almost a textbook in itself. It has been extensively revised in illustrations used, but remains as challenging as ever. It represents the work of two collaborators who have a flair for choosing the dramatic in presenting material representing their personal opinions. There are many excellent lengthy readings which give the student the point of view of the writer chosen. Since there are only 120 articles it is easily seen that the average length is well above the normal presentation.

Basic Issues of American Democracy. By HILLMAN M. BISHOP AND SAMUEL HENDEL. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Second edition. 1951. Pp. xiii, 449. \$2.25.)

The collaborators have taken 32 topics, and arranged them in sections which follow the

normal pattern of textbook organization. Each topic ordinarily includes two authors who are frequently antagonistic. This technique, plus the quality of the selections, excites students and elicits immediate reaction and discussion. In some instances, however, the selection suffers from lack of originality.

Two final volumes reflect a different approach. While both are labelled "problems" the Lane publication is an attempt to use cases in presenting the material, whereas the Riemer volume presents a pro and con argument followed in each case by leading questions.

Problems in American Government; An Introduction to Political Analysis. By ROBERT E. LANE. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. viii, 373.)

Here is a disposable workbook. The pages are perforated for easy removal. Thirty-seven cases are posed by presentation of the material; there is an answer sheet to be filled out and a sheet for criticising "propositions for discussion." Presumably a case would be assigned, discussed and the answer sheets filled out and turned in for a grade. The cases are well chosen and give rise to varying interpretations. This reviewer does not like the use of answer sheets which by their form seem to imply that the correct answer can be given in a fixed number of words in a uniform blank area. If the answer sheets were being used only to help direct the student's analysis of the case and to marshal his answers much of the criticism would vanish. The workbook ought to be widely used to see if it is really a new technique for teaching or if particular men and the schools in which they teach are the major reason for the success which the case method has so far had.

Problems of American Government. By NEAL RIEMER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952. Pp. xi, 356. Cloth \$3.75, paper \$2.75.)

Professor Riemer has chosen seventeen problems for his contribution to supplementary texts. Each has a subject which is highly controversial and is guaranteed to cause disagreement even before the material is read. Problem 12, for example, is entitled, "Administration: Does Big Government Mean an Irresponsible, Tyrannical, and Wasteful Bureaucracy?" The selections from three authors and the ten leading questions which follow them will almost certainly bring forth an animated classroom discussion, which in turn will cause closer scrutiny of the textbook for more ammunition.

This discussion of textbooks for American government has not touched at all upon another long series which has appeared during the same calendar interval. These are the publications for use in courses covering state government, state and local government, local government, and municipal government. When these are added to the texts noted above, we have a total production that exceeds anything that has gone before. Perhaps the time has come to insist that no new book in this crowded field shall appear until it has been shown by a judgment of a jury of the profession to be sufficiently new in approach and notable in presentation to make a real contribution. While this might affect the publication rule for promotion of teachers, it would save much wear and tear on the teacher looking for some new way to approach a standard field.—ANDREW E. NUQUIST, *University of Vermont and State Agricultural College.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Cable, Sydney W. The General Accounting Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Officers. *New York University Law Review.* November, 1952.

Developments in the Law—Immigration and Nationality. *Harvard Law Review.* February, 1953.

Galloway, George B. Next Steps in Congressional Reform. Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois. 1952.

Ginnane, Robert W. The Control of Federal

Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees. *Harvard Law Review*. February, 1953.

McCoy, Jean R. Growing Executive Power and the Constitution. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

Riddick, Floyd M. The Eighty-Second Congress: Second Session. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Territories

Fliess, Peter J. Puerto Rico's Political Status under Its New Constitution. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Hansen, Millard, and Henry Wells, eds. Puerto Rico: A Study in Democratic Development. [Symposium]. *The Annals*. January, 1953.

Lewis, Gordon K. Puerto Rico: A New Constitution in American Government. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.

State Government

Adrian, Charles R. The Origin of Minnesota's Nonpartisan Legislature. *Minnesota History*. Winter, 1952.

Ford, Pamela, and Stanley Scott. Inventory of Public Affairs and Social Science Research in the Western States, 1951 and 1952. Western Governmental Research Association, and Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Hamilton, Howard D. Why State Cost Has Gone Up. *National Municipal Review*. March, 1953.

Mauck, Elwyn A. Some Problems in State Budgetary Administration. *State Government*. February, 1953.

Owen, Kimbrough. 1952 Amendments to the Louisiana Constitution. *Louisiana Law Review*. January, 1953.

Steetle, Ralph. The States and Educational Television. *State Government*. February, 1953.

Richards, Allan R. Legislative Services: With Special Emphasis upon the Problems in New Mexico. Division of Research, Department of Government, University of New Mexico. 1953.

Underwood, Cecil H. The Legislative Process in West Virginia. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. 1953.

Local Government

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. Tax

Rates of American Cities. *National Municipal Review*. January, 1953.

Collier, James M. County Government in New Jersey. Rutgers University Press. 1952.

Hudson, Barbara J. The Urban Fringe Problem: A Bibliography. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1952.

Lanham, Elizabeth. Job Evaluation in Municipalities. *Public Personnel Review*. January, 1953.

Posey, Rollin B. Handling City Employee Grievances. *Public Management*. March, 1953.

Intergovernmental Relations

Metcalfe, William K. The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

State Taxation of Vehicles Moving Interstate: The Intervention of the Supreme Court. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Corwin, Edward S. The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick without Straw. *Columbia Law Review*. January, 1953.

Dession, George H., Lawrence Z. Freedman, Richard C. Donnelly, and Frederick C. Redlich. Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation. *Yale Law Journal*. February, 1953.

Edwards, Richard A. Seasonable Protests against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. *Minnesota Law Review*. February, 1953.

——— Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence. *Northwestern University Law Review*. September-October, 1952.

Graham, Howard Jay. Procedure to Substance—Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860. *California Law Review*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Laurent, Francis W. Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal Cases. *Wisconsin Law Review*. January, 1953.

Mendelson, Wallace. Clandestine Speech and the First Amendment—A Reappraisal of the Dennis Case. *Michigan Law Review*. February, 1953.

——— Smyth v. Ames in State Courts, 1942 to 1952. *Minnesota Law Review*. February, 1953.

Right of Privacy vs. Free Press: Suggested Resolution of Conflicting Values. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Roche, John P. Executive Power and Do-

mestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Sandblom, Robert L. Right to Bail. *Michigan Law Review*. January, 1953.

Scott, Austin W., Jr. Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud. *Minnesota Law Review*. January, 1953.

Sigmund, Elwin W. The Granger Cases: 1877 or 1876? *American Historical Review*. April, 1953.

Smith, James Morton. The Aurora and the Alien and Sedition Laws. Part I. *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*. January, 1953.

Waite, Edward F. How "Eccentric" Was Mr. Justice Harlan? *Minnesota Law Review*. February, 1953.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Hall, Jerome. Police and Law in a Democratic Society. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Lederle, Arthur F. Abolish Unnecessary Court Appendages to Improve the Administration of Justice. *Journal of the American Judicature Society*. December, 1952.

Mishkin, Paul J. The Federal "Question" in the District Courts. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1953.

Van Hecke, M. T. Trial by Jury in Equity Cases. *North Carolina Law Review*. February, 1953.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Cleaveland, Frederic N. Administrative Decentralization in the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation. *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1953.

Cohen, Felix S. The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy. *Yale Law Journal*. February, 1953.

Grundstein, Nathan D. Law and the Morality of Administration. *George Washington Law Review*. January, 1953.

Monypenny, Phillip. A Code of Ethics for Public Administration. *George Washington Law Review*. March, 1953.

Newman, Frank C. Should Official Advice Be Reliable?—Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law. *Columbia Law Review*. March, 1953.

Seckler-Hudson, Catheryn. Performance Budgeting in Government. *Advanced Management*. March, 1953.

——— Performance Budgeting in the Government of the United States. *Public Finance*. December, 1952.

Segal, Robert M. Administrative Procedure in Massachusetts: Rule Making and Judicial Review. *Boston University Law Review*. January, 1953.

Watson, James R. What's in Store for Public Employees? *Good Government*. January-February, 1953.

Weiss, Tobias. Inequity and Rent Regulation: A Study in the Control of Administrative Action. *Columbia Law Review*. January, 1953.

Willcox, Alanson W. The Lawyer in the Administration of Nonregulatory Programs. *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1953.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Buchanan, William. The Mississippi Electorate. Social Science Research Center, Mississippi State College. 1953.

Canham, Erwin D. The American Press and the 1952 Presidential Election. *Confluence*. March, 1953.

Judah, Charles B. The Presidential Primary. Division of Research, Department of Government, University of New Mexico. 1953.

Miller, Mungo. The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout Prediction. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court. *Harvard Law Review*. January, 1953.

Sears, Kenneth C. Methods of Reapportionment. University of Chicago Law School. 1952.

Showel, Morris. Political Independence in Washington State. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Westin, Alan Furman. The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement and the Campaign of 1896. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.

Williams, Frank B., Jr. The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in the South, 1870-1901. *Journal of Southern History*. November, 1952.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Bach, G. L. The Economics and Politics of Money. *Harvard Business Review*. March-April, 1953.

Viner, Jacob. The New Deal under Republican Management. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1953.

Business and Labor

Alderman, Joseph. Parallelism between Price Controls and Wage Controls. *George Washington Law Review*. October, 1952.

Baseball Players and the Antitrust Laws. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1953.

Burt, William C., and William F. Kennedy. Congressional Review of Price Control. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. December, 1952.

Diminishing Applicability of the Antitrust Laws in Regulated Industry: Congress, the Courts and the Agencies. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Federal and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1953.

Freidin, Jesse. Labor Arbitration and the Courts. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1952.

Kelley, Richard S. Functional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act. *California Law Review*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Kuhn, Alfred. Arbitration in Transit. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1952.

Morgan, Charles S. A Critique of "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest." *Yale Law Journal*. January, 1953.

Posey, Rollin B. How to Negotiate with Labor Unions. *Public Personnel Review*. January, 1953.

Sagle, Robert F. The Nature and Effect of Major Sports' Restrictions on Radio and Television Broadcasting Rights under the Sherman Act. *George Washington Law Review*. March, 1953.

Spindelman, Norman M., and William K. Davenport. Legality of Employer's Use of Lockout. *Michigan Law Review*. January, 1953.

Witte, Edwin E. Historical Survey of Labor Arbitration. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1952.

Agriculture

Frischknecht, Reed L. Farm Price and Income Support Programs, 1933-1950. Institute of Government, University of Utah. 1953.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Greenfield, Margaret. Permanent and Total Disability Aid. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Improving Public Assistance. The Tax Foundation. 1953.

Military Affairs and National Security

Fink, Norman S. That Pierced Veil—Friendly Stockholders and Enemy Corporations. *Michigan Law Review*. March, 1953.

Ford, Alan W. Protection of Nonenemy Interests in Enemy Corporations. *California Law Review*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Habeas Corpus and Judicial Review of Draft Classifications. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Mullally, Mandeville, Jr. Military Justice: The Uniform Code in Action. *Columbia Law Review*. January, 1953.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congress

House. Committee on Banking and Currency. National Housing Act Amendment. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Education and Labor. Labor-Management Relations. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Government Operations. Creating a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. House Report No. 166. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— To Amend the Reorganization Act of 1949. Hearing. Also House Report No. 6. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Enabling the People of Hawaii to Form a Constitution and State Government. . . . House Report No. 109. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Study of Securities and Exchange Commission. Hearings before a Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2508. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. Committee Print. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

——— Investigation of the Department of Justice. Hearings before Special Subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

——— Committee on Un-American Activities. Communist Methods of Infiltration (Education). Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Ways and Means. Coordination of Federal, State, and Local Taxes. House Report No. 2519. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1953.

——— Internal Revenue Investiga-

tion. House Report No. 2518. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1953.

——— Select Committee on Current Pornographic Materials. House Report No. 2510. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

——— Select Committee on Small Business. Review of Small Business, Eighty-Second Congress. House Report No. 2513. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

——— Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations. . . . Hearings. Also House Report No. 2514. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1953.

——— Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 1952. Hearings. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952. Also House Report No. 2517, same sess. 1953.

House and Senate. Committees on Government Operations. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953. Joint Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Atomic Power and Private Enterprise. Joint Committee Print. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Pensions in the United States. Study prepared by National Planning Association. Joint Committee Print. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. General Farm Situation. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Armed Services. Ammunition Supplies in the Far East. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— First Report of the Defense Supply Management Agency. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Overseas Construction in North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas. Report of Subcommittee on Military Public Works, Eighty-Second Congress. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Sarnoff Commission Report; Final Report of the Citizens Advisory Commission on Manpower Utilization in the Armed Services. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Banking and Currency. Standby Economic Controls. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953. Hearing before Subcommittee on Reorganization. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Senate Action on Hoover

Commission Reports. Senate Report No. 4. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Statehood for Hawaii. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Subversive Influence in the Educational Process. Hearings before Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952. Also, Report of Subcommittee, same sess. Committee Print. 1953.

——— Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Employment and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States. Staff Report to Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. Senate Doc. No. 14. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Public Policy and Communist Domination of Certain Unions. Report of Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations. Senate Doc. No. 26. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— State and Municipal Fair Employment Legislation. Staff Report to Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. Senate Doc. No. 15. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Committee on Rules and Administration. Investigation of Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and William Benton. Report of Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. Committee Print. 1952.

——— Proposed Amendments to Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Report of Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. Subcommittee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

——— Senate Rules and the Senate as a Continuing Body. Senate Doc. No. 4. 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 1953.

Other Federal

Department of the Interior. Years of Progress, 1945-1952. [1953].

Executive Office of the President. National Security Resources Board. The Objectives of United States Materials Resources Policy and Suggested Initial Steps in Their Accomplishment. 1952.

Federal Security Agency. Social Security Administration. Division of Research and Statistics. Social Security Financing, by Ida C. Merriam. [1953].

——— Social Security in the United States. New Edition, 1952. 1953.

Missouri Basin Survey Commission. Missouri: Land and Water. Report. 1953.

President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation. Building America's Health. Report to the President. Vol. 1. [1952]. Vols. 2-5. [1953].

President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. Whom We Shall Welcome. Report. 1953.

President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance. Equal Economic Opportunity. Report. 1953.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

France under the Fourth Republic. By FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 198. \$3.00.)

This book is the third of a series on postwar problems of France and Italy undertaken at Cornell University. Written by one of the best French political scientists, it is a useful addition to the growing literature on postwar France. The title of the book is misleading since more space is given to the electoral reform and the election of 1951 than to the whole history of the past five years of the Republic.

A stimulating last chapter on the "fundamental problems of French political life" attempts to redress the balance. Up to that point, however, the book, while satisfying the specialists, may well have confused the less sophisticated students of French affairs. A different organization and particularly the addition of a section on political parties would have helped. This is not to detract from the value of the book: particularly helpful is the section on electoral geography illustrated with many maps. There is, incidentally, no bibliography.

"It is important to understand," Mr. Goguel wisely states, "that the dissensions which make the French political situation so confusing have their roots in specific historical and social circumstances and are not simply the reflection of a sort of congenital French incapacity to adopt a reasonable and effective political conduct" (p. 146). He succeeds in clearly stating some of these factors, particularly the coexistence of pre-industrial and modern France. His analysis of the problem of institutions and of the chronic weakness of democratic government in France is rewarding, as are his interesting suggestions for institutional and electoral reform.

Some questionable assumptions of the author have led him to mistaken prognostics as to the immediate evolution of French politics. Among them is the assumed impossibility for the Center parties to form a lasting

coalition due to dividing issues, including the religious one, and to the rigidity of the new party system. This assumption coupled with the belief that the Gaullist R.P.F. is a democratic party interested above all in governmental effectiveness and in social progress led him to look upon a probable alliance of the R.P.F., the Catholic M.R.P., and the Socialists, as the only way to escape the impasse into which the Republic had strayed. But the Pinay Government upset this prediction and led M. Goguel to explain the "miracle" in the epilogue of the book. Of course, the miracle continued after Pinay gave way to Mayer, supported as the latter was by a conservative coalition including the R.P.F. and the M.R.P. However desirable it might prove to be, the "progressive" coalition of Socialists, Catholics, and Gaullists is still not in sight.—CHARLES MICAUD, *University of Virginia*.

The Civil Service Today. By T. A. CRITCHLEY. (New York: John de Graff, Inc. Pp. 150. \$3.00.)

How the Civil Service Works. By BOSWORTH MONCK. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1952. Pp. vi, 258. \$5.00.)

Modern Staff Training: A Survey of Training Needs and Methods of Today. By F. J. TICKNER. (London: University of London Press Ltd. 1952. Pp. 159. 12/6 net.)

The books by Mr. Critchley and Mr. Monck are valuable for their information about changes introduced in the British public service during the war and reconstruction periods. We learn that the essential character of the Civil Service has remained the same but that there have been important modifications in past practices in order to adapt the administrative machine to changing political and social conditions. Mr. Critchley's well-written volume very adequately fulfills his purpose "to describe as accurately as possible the Civil Service as it exists today." The author deals in considerable detail with the organization

of the Service and with the conditions governing public employment in Britain. He also takes his reader into the government offices and gives something of the atmosphere that can seldom be gained from the reading of command papers, annual reports, or Treasury circulars. He discusses the use of precedent books, which have almost the sanctity with civil servants that the reported cases have with the judges; the work of the departmental registries; the handling of the great volume of correspondence coming to government offices; and the practice of minuting. We learn how official rank is indicated by carpets, armchairs, one-piece telephone sets, and grate fires. Mr. Critchley's comments on the Service and its problems are temperate and judicious, as befits his position as a civil servant.

Mr. Monck also writes from experience. He was a war-time civil servant, and he was chairman of a group which prepared a Fabian Society report entitled *The Reform of the Higher Civil Service*. His purpose is not only to describe but to challenge. "Efficiency in administration," he says, "concerns everyone, and I believe that in a democratic society, people should be encouraged to say their piece on it." Saying his piece takes Mr. Monck a good bit beyond the Civil Service, for he discusses practically the whole organization and the total processes of the central government. In his introduction he proposes some changes which would have important effects upon long-established Civil Service principles. It is disappointing that he does not discuss these proposals at more length, for their merits cannot be judged in the summary form in which they are presented. In Part IV, entitled "The Public Service and the Government of the Day," he considers some ways in which the Civil Service could, in his view, be made a more effective instrument to carry out the policies of a cabinet and those of individual ministers. He rejects "large scale alterations on the American model" and instead proposes dynamic leadership by ministers, careful appointments and promotions to key departmental positions, more contacts between members of Parliament and civil servants, and occasional appointments from outside the Civil Service. None of these is revolutionary in character. Part V, about half of the book, is a useful summary of the functions and activities of the administrative departments of British government.

Since the last war the British government

has paid a great deal more attention than formerly to the post-entry training of its employees. One sign of this new interest has been the appointment in the Treasury of a Director of Training and Education to stimulate and guide training activities throughout the Civil Service. *Modern Staff Training*, by the present occupant of this position, F. J. Tickner, is an excellent survey of the whole subject of employee-training. It deals with training problems and methods in both the public service and private industry and for the executive as well as the clerical worker. For the most part the book is as applicable to American organizations as to British. Every page of this volume reflects common sense, and it is highly recommended to all persons interested in personnel administration.—H. M. STOUT, *Washington, D. C.*

Contemporary Foreign Governments. By HERMAN BEUKEMA AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Rinehart & Company. 1953. Pp. xx, 610. \$5.50.)

Third edition of a textbook written by members of the department of social sciences of the U. S. Military Academy. The new edition leaves out Italy, but adds a short introductory chapter on some essentials of political science and goals of the comparative study of governments. Other useful innovations are: a glossary of terms; lists of questions after each chapter; and an appendix with texts of the constitutions of countries discussed. Because of its relative brevity and concentration upon essentials it is a very useful text for beginners' courses in foreign governments at the lower division level.

British Government. By HIRAM MILLER STOUT. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 433. \$5.00.)

An adequate and up-to-date description of the British system. Despite a seeming preference for administrative detail over the processes of policy formation, the book is on the whole well rounded and the account is presented in a clear and straightforward manner.

The British General Election of 1951. By D. E. BUTLER. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 289. \$4.25.)

The third in the excellent series of Nuffield College studies of recent general elections by an Oxford scholar who also assisted in the preparation of the other two.

Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict with Special Reference to British Experience between 1911 and 1947. By K. G. J. C. KNOWLES. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xiv, 330. \$8.75.)

An extended analysis of strikes, drawn primarily from British experience. Deals first with the concept, sources of labor union militancy, and legal controls, then with causes and consequences, with emphasis on the use of statistical techniques.

The Choice before South Africa. By E. S. SACHS. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. ix, 220. \$5.75.)

Written by the vigorous and controversial labor leader "Solly" Sachs, this book is addressed primarily to South Africans.

The Peoples and Policies of South Africa. By LEO MARQUARD. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 257. \$3.50.)

Also written by a South African, this volume deals more broadly with the historical background and with current problems. Like Sachs, Marquard pleads for a reintegrating racial partnership.

Assemblée Nationale. *Recueil des textes authentiques des programmes et engagements électoraux des députés proclamés élus à la suite des élections générales du 17 juin 1951, dressé par les soins du Secrétaire général de l'Assemblée Nationale.* (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale. 1952. Pp. 1045.)

The compilation of the party programs of the deputies elected to the French National Assembly on June 17, 1951, is arranged alphabetically by departments from Ain to Yonne, with Algeria, the overseas departments and constituencies at the end. This continues a similar publication of the Chambre des députés, from 1881 to 1936, commonly referred to under the name of its founder, Barodet. Work on the compilation for the first legislature of the National Assembly was undertaken at such a late date that the material when assembled was not printed but left in the Archives of the National Assembly. The present volume, which is the first of the new series of the *Barodet*, is indispensable to an understanding of the French political scene.—J.B.C.

Le Conseil d'Etat: livre jubilaire, publié pour commémorer son cent cinquantième anni-

versaire, 4 Nivose an VIII-24 décembre 1949. (Paris: Recueil Sirey. 1952. Pp. 693, plates.)

The book of essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Council of State contains a section devoted to its legislative and administrative activity (pp. 377-477). The second part consists of papers from seventeen different countries dealing with administrative law in each and tracing any and all patterns stemming from the French Council of State.—J.B.C.

Wahlkampf und Machtverschiebung: Geschichte und Analyse der Berliner Wahlen vom 3. Dezember 1950. By DR. STEPHANIE MÜNKE WITH A. R. L. GURLAND, EDITOR AND COLLABORATOR. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1952. Pp. xix, 282.)

An exhaustive analysis of the Berlin elections of December, 1950, overpacked with masses of minute detail. Voters, candidates, parties, the electoral campaign and results, and many other related items are discussed in an encyclopedic manner.

Verslag van de toestand van het eilandgebied Aruba over 1951. (Oranjestad, Gezaghebber van het eilandgebied Aruba. 1952. 135 leaves, mimeographed.)

Under the Eilandregeling Nederlandse Antillen of March 3, 1951, promulgated in the Dutch *Staatsblad*, 1951, no. 64, concerning autonomous government given to the West Indian colony formerly known as Curaçao under the name of Netherlands Antilles, provision was made for special self-government of the island of Aruba. An elective Island Council (Eilandsraad) was installed on July 2, 1951. The report begins with a statement on the election, and includes the details of the new administration. The ordinances (legislation) for Aruba are printed in small octavo format under the title *Aankondigingsblad Aruba*.—J.B.C.

Jammu and Kashmir Government. *Rules of business and procedure (Legislative Assembly).* (Jammu: The Ranbir Government Press. 2009 [i.e. 1952]. Pp. 40.)

The rules regulate the business and procedure of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly while functioning as the Legislative Assembly, under the authority of the Constitution Act, 1996, as amended by Act XVII of 2008. At the end of each session,

the debates on the floor of the house are printed in both English and Urdu (Hindustani). The State of Jammu and Kashmir has a peculiar importance owing to the continuing discussion between India and Pakistan as to its status.—J.B.C.

República de Cuba. *Reglamento del Consejo Consultivo*. (La Habana: Editorial Atalaya, S. A. 1952. Pp. 27.)

When the 1940 Constitution of Cuba was suspended in the early part of 1952, the bicameral Congress was dissolved, and an Advisory Council was set up. The rules of Council as approved by the Council of Ministers, on May 9, 1952, were first printed in the *Gaceta oficial*, May 14. The *Diario de sesiones* of the two chambers of the Cuban Congress were usually a year or two late in appearing, and it seems likely that the *Diario de sesiones* of the Council will also not appear very promptly.—J.B.C.

Corte electoral. *Elecciones uruguayas (Elecciones del 16 de Diciembre de 1951). Plebiscito de la Ley constitucional de 26 de Octubre de 1951*. BY JULIO T. FABREGAT. (Montevideo. 1952. Pp. 13.)

The publication of the Uruguayan National Electoral Board contains the text of the constitutional amendments approved by the plebiscite of December 16, 1951. It also presents a table showing the total registered voters as of that date to be 1,158,939, and another showing the results of the vote of December 16, 1951, when only a total of 429,760 votes were cast, the amendments being approved by a vote of 237,076 to 197,684. Other tables give electoral statistics, 1925-50, percentages by party, by departments, total votes by party for president and for representatives.—J.B.C.

República Portuguesa. *Constituição política da República Portuguesa actualizada de harmonia com a Lei n.º 2:048 de 11 de Junho de 1951*. (Lisboa: Assembleia Nacional. 1952. Pp. 170.)

The text of the 1951 amendment relating to the Acto Colonial among other things refers to colonies as "provincias ultramarinas" and changes the name of the Ministério das Colónias to the Ministério do Ultramar. Texts of previous amendments are included as notes. The volume has an index by topic.—J.B.C.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea. (Pusan: Office of Public Information. 1952. Pp. 33.)

The English text of the 1948 Constitution as amended in July, 1952, was prepared by the Office of Public Information of the Republic of Korea. The unicameral National Assembly is transformed into a bicameral body under the same name with a House of Councilors and a House of Representatives. Members of the National Assembly holding office at the time of amendment are to function as members of the House of Representatives. The President and Vice-President are to be elected by direct vote, and not by the National Assembly.—J.B.C.

Federation of Malaya. *Report of Select Committee appointed on the 11th day of July, 1951, to examine and report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title of which is The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951*. (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press. 1952. Pp. 35.)

The report of the committee on the Federation of Malaya citizenship act, which became effective on Sept. 15, 1952, was presented in the summer of 1952, and contains the technical statement in reference to the drafting of the measure as well as the draft for consideration.—J.B.C.

Israel. BY NORMAN BENTWICH. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1953. Pp. 224. \$3.75.)

From long experience with the British administration in Palestine and as a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the author provides a concise introduction to modern Israel: the physical setting, recent political history, the Arab problem, and an especially valuable description of government, law, and social and economic organization within the state today.

Russia and Her Colonies. BY WALTER KOLARZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. xiv, 334. \$6.00.)

A critical analysis of Soviet policy in relation to non-Russian peoples within the U.S.S.R., based on a variety of Soviet sources—from textbooks and newspapers to novels and poetry. The author's conclusion can be summed up in the following sentence from the concluding chapter of the book: "If the Soviet régime continues in its present form

there is no future for the peoples of Russia in the sense of a genuine political and cultural development."

My Uncle Joseph Stalin. By BUDU SVANIDZE. TRANSLATED BY WAVERLY ROOT. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. xviii, 235. \$3.00.)

An intimate and mostly non-political biography by a Georgian relative who escaped to the West. The period covered extends from around 1903-4 to November, 1945. Includes also some sidelights on Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov and other well-known Soviet figures.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

General

Berelson, B. Democratic Theory and Public Opinion. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.
da Silva Pereira, C.M. Direito Comparado. *Revista da Faculdade de Direito*. Universidade de Minas Gerais. October, 1952.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Brand, C. F. The British General Election, 1951. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. January, 1953.
Finer, S. E. Patronage and Public Service. *Public Administration*. Winter, 1952.
Grove, J. W. Grants-in-Aid to Public Bodies. *Public Administration*. Winter, 1952.
The Labour Party. *Political Quarterly*. January-March, 1953.
MacLennan, R. D. The Scottish National Movement. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1953.
Robinson, M. R. The Lynskey Tribunal: The British Method of Dealing with Political Corruption. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1953.
Roche, J. P. The Crisis in British Socialism. *Antioch Review*. December, 1952.
Sallet, R. Wie das Foreign Office Arbeitet. *Aussenpolitik*. March, 1953.
Webbe, H. The First Year of Conservative Government. *Quarterly Review*. January, 1953.

Colonial Areas

Bailey, S. D. Une Fédération des Caraïbes Britanniques. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. July, 1952.
Great Britain. Colonial Office. Introducing the British Caribbean Colonies. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1952.
Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report on

the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya for the Year 1951. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1952.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Trinidad and Tobago for the Year 1951. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953.

Jones, J. D. R. The Effects of Urbanisation in South and Central Africa. *African Affairs*. January, 1953.

McKee, H. K. Northern Rhodesia and Federation. *African Affairs*. October, 1952.

Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Special issue. Winter, 1952-53.

The State of Research in British Africa. *African Affairs*. January, 1953.

Trouble in Kenya. *Fortnightly*. December, 1952.

Commonwealth of Nations

Australia: the Price of Growth. *Economist*. March 7, 1953.

Dantwala, M. L. Agricultural Credit in India—the Missing Link. *Pacific Affairs*. December, 1952.

Dantwala, M. L. Land Reforms in India. *International Labour Review*. November-December, 1952.

Developing Dominions. *Economist*. March 7, 1953.

Goodall, M. R. Administration and Planning for Economic Development. Occasional Papers No. 5. Delhi School of Economics. Delhi, 1952.

Namasivayam, S. Aspects of Ceylonese Parliamentary Government. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Narasimhan, P. S. Labour Reforms in Contemporary India. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Swansy, H. South African Tragedy. *Twentieth Century*. December, 1952.

Western Europe

Bondioli, P. Die Monarchische Frage in Italien. *Aussenpolitik*. March, 1953.

Caratsch, R. Problems of Constitutional Reform in France. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. March, 1953.

Jones, P. M. The National System of Education in France. *Universities Quarterly*. February, 1953.

Rich, C. A. L. The Permanent Crisis of Italian Democracy. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1952.

Streiff, E. After the Saar Elections. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. January, 1953.

Tuetsch, H. E. Italy's Liberals. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. March, 1953.

U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin No. 1038. Labor-Management Relations in Scandinavia. Washington, 1951.

Williams, P. M. Stable Government in France. *Fortnightly*. December, 1952.

Central Europe

Menger, C. F. Zur Verfassungsrechtlichen Stellung der deutschen politischen Parteien. *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*. December, 1952.

Pilgert, H. P. Community and Group Life in West Germany. Historical Division. Office of the Executive Secretary. HICOG, 1952.

Rabus, G. Die innere Ordnung der politischen Parteien im gegenwaertigen deutschen Staatsrecht. *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*. December, 1952.

Roeper, B. The Realization of Democratic Ideals in Germany. *Confluence*. June, 1952.

R. S. The West German Political Parties and Rearmament. *World Today*. February, 1953.

Weber, W. Die Vereinbarkeit des Verteidigungsbeitrages mit dem Grundgesetz. *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*. December, 1952.

Westphalen, F. A. Sociology and Economics in Austria. Library of Congress. Reference Department. European Affairs Division. Washington, 1953.

Wolff, B. Die Ermaechtigung zum Erlass von Rechtsverordnungen nach dem Grundgesetz. *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*. December, 1952.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

P. B. Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy. *World Today*. February, 1953.

Benes, V. The New Legal System of Czechoslovakia. *Journal of Central European Affairs*. October, 1952.

Brzezinski, Z. Party Controls in the Soviet Army. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1952.

Deutscher, I. The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *International Affairs*. April, 1953.

Dolapchiev, N. Law and Human Rights in Bulgaria. *International Affairs*. January, 1953.

Fedynskyi, J. Sovietization of an Occupied Area Through the Medium of Courts. *American Slavic and East European Review*. February, 1953.

Halperin, E. Yugoslav Agrarian Policy. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. January, 1953.

Hazard, J. N. Soviet Property Law and Social Change. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.

Colonel Ivan. Development of the Satellite Armed Forces. *Review of International Affairs*. January 16, 1953.

Maurach, R. Zur Rechtsnatur des Ostblocks. *Zeitschrift fuer Ostforschung*. 1952, No. 1.

Joras, D. The Soviet Judge and the American Judge. *Baylor Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

Meissner, F. The Socialization Process in Czechoslovak Agriculture. *Journal of Farm Economics*. February, 1953.

Mosely, P. The Nineteenth Party Congress. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1953.

Neumann, R. Soziologische Strukturwandlungen in Ost-Mittleuropa. *Zeitschrift fuer Ostforschung*. 1952, No. 1.

Rossi, P. H. Some Patterns of Soviet Communications Behavior. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1952-53.

Schuchmann, H. E. Yugoslavia, Laboratory of our Times. *Midwest Journal*, Summer, 1952.

Strem, G. G. Cultural Life in Satellite Hungary. *Pacific Spectator*. Winter, 1953.

Towster, J. Presidium replaces Politburo. *Current History*. January, 1953.

U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin No. 1026. Elements of Soviet Labor Law. Washington, 1951.

Vucinik, W. S. Moslems of the Soviet Union. *Current History*. January, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Aksin, B. Political Parties in Israel. *Internationale Spectator*. February 4, 1953.

Baer, G. The Agrarian Problem in Iraq. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. December, 1952.

Bentwich, N. Ethiopia's Federal Union. *Quarterly Review*. January, 1953.

Britt, G. Lebanon's Popular Revolution. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Cumming, D. C. The Disposal of Eritrea. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Fischer, A. J. Israel nach 4 Jahren. *Aussenpolitik*. January, 1953.

Gaitskell, A. The Sudan Gezire Scheme. *African Affairs*. October, 1952.

Hartal, P. Changes in Living Standards in Israel. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. February, 1953.

Hourani, A. The Decline of the West in the Middle East. *International Affairs*. January and April, 1953.

Hyslop, J. The Sudan Treaty. *Contemporary Review*. April, 1953.

Kidwai, M. H. Islam and the Abolition of Personal Ownership of Property. *Pakistan Law Review*, August, 1952.

Reed, H. A. The New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Turkish Information Office. Self Government in Turkey. New York, 1952.

Warriner, D. Land Reform in Egypt and its Repercussions. *International Affairs*. January 1953.

Wilber, D. N. Afghanistan, Independent and Encircled. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Yin'am, S. Iraqi Politics—1948—1952. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. December, 1952.

Southeast Asia

Coughlin, R. J. The Status of the Chinese Minority in Thailand. *Pacific Affairs*. December, 1952.

Embres, J. F. Situations of Strength in Southeast Asia. *United Asia*. 1952, No. 4.

Furnivall, J. S. Burma, Past and Present. *Far Eastern Survey*. February 25, 1953.

Guillon, R. J. Indochina. *Europa Archiv*. January 20, 1953.

van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. Broadening Indonesian Horizons. *Pacific Affairs*. December, 1952.

Pacific and Far East

Chen, T. Hsi-Ten. The 'Three-Anti' and 'Five-Anti' Movements in Communist China. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Haring, D. G. Speculations on Japanese Communism. *Far Eastern Survey*. January 14, 1953.

Kawamura, M. The Japanese Judiciary: a Step toward Democracy. *American Bar Association Journal*. March, 1953.

King, J. K. Rice Politics. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

McNelly, T. American Influence and Japan's No-War Constitution. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Nai-jui, Ling. Three Years of Communist Rule in China. *Review of Politics*. January, 1953.

Robson, N. French Oceania Takes Stock. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Schwantes, R. S. and others. Religion and Modernization in the Far East. A Symposium. *The Far Eastern Quarterly*. February, 1953.

Smythe, H. H. Democracy in Japan: Survival or Decay? *Midwest Journal*. Summer, 1952.

Smythe, H. H. The Japanese Emperor System. *Social Research*. December, 1952.

Steiner, H. A. Maoism or Stalinism for Asia? *Far Eastern Survey*. January 14, 1953.

Latin America

Beals, R. L. Social Stratification in Latin America. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

G. J. B. Politics and Economics in Chile. *World Today*. February, 1953.

Christensen, A. N. Government in Latin America. *Current History*. March, 1953.

Jorin, M. Political Instability in Latin America. Division of Research. Department of Government. University of New Mexico. Albuquerque. March, 1953.

Kantor, H. The Aprista Search for a Program Applicable to Latin America. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Collective Security: A Progress Report. By ANDREW MARTIN. (Paris: UNESCO. 1952. Pp. 244. \$1.25.)

By commission from UNESCO, Dr. Martin, of Ruskin College, Oxford, has undertaken to analyze perceptively the present state of

"progress" toward collective security. Realizing that "collective security" is a concept on which there is no formal agreement, and that it remains undefined as a technical term in international law, Dr. Martin looks upon it as a "state of affairs"—distinguishable from

"world government" or the "organizational product of a network of treaties"—in which, in the proximate sense, "attempts to change the *status quo* by violence are unlawful and doomed to frustration through opposition in overwhelming force" (p. 14). He thus frees himself from the limitations of the purely legalistic approach, and is enabled to appraise the many ingredients—political, social, and military, as well as legal—that enter into this state of affairs. Dr. Martin expresses the optimistic viewpoint that might be expected from the sponsorship of his work: "The system of the United Nations, though by no means perfect, is viable in the long run, and, given sufficient moral cohesion among the majority of Members, it is even in the short run capable of curing the ill-effects of imperfect implementation" (p. 26). He balances the "over-optimistic" assumptions of 1945 against the "over-pessimistic" assumption that the United Nations would collapse as soon as the peace was broken or seriously threatened by one of the principal powers: "The system has survived both the severe shock of the open breach and the attrition of continuing threat" (*ibid.*).

Dr. Martin focusses his argument around the development of three principal sets of policies: (1) the regulation of armaments (pp. 27–86); (2) the pacific settlement of disputes (pp. 87–105); and (3) collective action (pp. 106–78). These principal policy-complexes are separately explored, with consideration, in each case, of early modern precedents, of the program of the League of Nations, and of the evolving experiences of the United Nations. A comprehensive "postscript" carries the story from May, 1951 through February, 1952. In his anxiety to develop a consistent argument, Dr. Martin occasionally makes assertions of facts which this reviewer considers questionable and draws some conclusions which might have been examined more closely. On the whole, however, the volume is stimulating to the imagination, challenging to the mind, and provocative of reflection on the course we have traversed since 1945. The viewpoint is fresh; the data are current; and such problems as the relationship of law to politics, and of universal to regional security, are examined in a cogent and realistic manner.
—H. ARTHUR STEINER, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A

Study in Economic Cooperation, 1947–51.
By WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xi, 488. \$4.50.)

Diebold discusses the various attempts since 1947 to integrate the economies of Western Europe. His book grew out of a chapter he contributed to Howard Ellis's volume, *The Economics of Freedom* (1950). Both books are publications of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Integration means creating—or at least progressing towards—a single economy for Western Europe in which goods can move as freely as within the United States. It would enable European producers to get greater benefits from mass production and would concentrate output of all articles where they can be produced most cheaply. Although as Diebold warns, "there is no adequate basis for judging how great an increase in production . . . Western Europe could expect" (p. 406), many informed people have been enthusiastic about the possibilities.

The logical first step towards integration was to create a method for paying for intra-European trade. Part One deals with the European Payments Union and its predecessors. EPU is a kind of clearinghouse in which trading debits and credits of a member get balanced against each other (or cleared) irrespective of the fact that they were incurred in different currencies. Thus, if a country earns money by exporting to one member, EPU enables it to spend the proceeds in any of the others. EPU is a creaking, unsatisfactory piece of machinery if compared to the pre-1914 gold standard, but it is a great improvement over what immediately preceded it.

A clearing union creates only the opportunity to trade. It must be followed by removing barriers such as quotas, tariffs, and cartels. On paper, a good deal of progress was achieved in breaking down the worst obstacles, but Diebold shows in Part Two why the progress was less than it appeared.

Part Three takes up the various attempts to form customs unions, the most notable being Benelux. It had been hoped that integration of the economies of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg would be easy at the end of the war because all three would be starting from scratch. The problem of vested interests demanding protection from foreign competition would be at a minimum. Unfortunately, the ruined Netherlands was liberated only

ter Belgium had made a substantial start towards recovery. Hence, Benelux was unable to commence with all three economies at zero. Progress towards a full customs union has been slow and disappointing.

Diebold's economics is sophisticated rather than profound. For a book dealing with complex economic problems, it is comparatively easy reading. The author was concerned with what has been, not with what might have been; though he gives the pros and cons of the various proposals discussed, he refrains from giving advice, deals more with what governments did than with what they said, and ignores the esoteric proposals of his brother economists. He pays little attention to the Schuman Plan, which he promises to take up in a subsequent volume.—RENDIGS FELS, *Vanderbilt University*.

The Commonwealth of Man: An Inquiry into Power Politics and World Government. BY FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xi, 494. \$5.00.)

After six months on a grant from the Foundation for World Government, Professor Schuman has reassessed the "times in which we have the misfortune to live" (p. 252) and has found a "mad America" (p. 275) in a "demented world" (p. 281). Directly or by implication, he declares repeatedly that those who do not accept world government as the one road to salvation are fools, blind, or dishonest.

The Commonwealth of Man starts out as an inquiry into the validity of the proposition that world anarchy threatens man with destruction from which only world government can save him (p. 19). The inquiry soon becomes special pleading in elaboration of the argument which the author introduced into the fourth edition of his *International Politics*. Once again, where we might have profited from a theoretical and philosophical approach to the problem or from a comprehensive report on the federalist movement, we are subjected to a jeremiad on the state of world politics.

Behind a screen of confusing titles, Schuman first reexamines the nature of war and of the state, the unity of mankind, tribalism, and the origin of the brotherhood of man concept. What he calls the "world states" of the past are then analyzed with reference to the four "preconditions of all government and therefore of world government": myth, adaptation,

authority, and a ruling class (p. 118). The same treatment, but at greater length, is given the two "world states" of today, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., neither of which, the author concludes, can achieve world mastery and hence world peace. He passes on to such means to peace as functionalism (principally the international unions, both public and private) and collective security and attempts to demolish the claims made for both. The latter is "futile . . . beyond reasonable doubt in the minds of reasonable men" (p. 369), and the United Nations receives some of his most savage attacks.

Only after four hundred pages of power politics do we get to consider world government. A somewhat conventional treatment of federalism is followed by an all too sketchy account of the federalist movement. Here for a space the darkness recedes before a small flame of hope only to close in again as the author, *adagio lamentoso*, describes the failure which thus far has beset the Cause. The failure is ascribed largely to the want of a Myth by which to bring substantial numbers of men to embrace the Cause (p. 475).

Professor Schuman's argument leaves him with little hope. More faith in man and less in "the most recent findings of the social sciences" (see the jacket blurb), a more balanced view of this country's role, a more accurate analysis of history, and he might face a less dismal future.

The Commonwealth of Man has been written in anguish and passion born of deep conviction. But so prejudiced is the author's handling of his material and so extreme are his views that his argument loses much of its force. Moreover we must wade through purple passages, alliterative allusions, catalogues of instance and example, and long-winded digressions whose effect is to deter all but the hardy and the converted. Nor is the going made pleasanter by the author's weakness for sweeping or extravagant statements: "All statesmen by nature crave power" (p. 15); "War is a habit which men enjoy as they enjoy drunkenness . . . fornication . . . and crime" (p. 45); "the dismal hypothesis that the American course is primarily a phenomenon of psychopathology" (p. 230); and for diction such as in the following: "Thus far all federations . . . have not been the offspring of any process of political parthenogenesis but have been the polygamously conceived progeny of the coupling of the federal concept with . . . na-

tional patriotism" (p. 474). But perhaps most trying are the denunciations with which the book abounds. Schuman lays about him with the vigor, if not the happy effect, of Samson at Lehi. He will hardly expect his philistines to get up and applaud.—JAMES T. WATKINS IV, *Stanford University*.

Free India in Asia. BY WERNER LEVI. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1952. Pp. 161. \$2.75.)

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India and chief formulator of his country's foreign policy, places "independence" in approach at the apex of his hierarchy of guides to international affairs. Those for whom the communist issue dominates all others experience perplexity, if not annoyance and hostility, at this introduction of a confusing element in a situation which seems so clearly a two-sided affair. The communists (Indian and otherwise) and the Free World join in questioning India's ideological position—on differing grounds and with contrary sympathies, but with equal vigor. The result is that a Cold War is being fought with unique persistence in India, the reluctant host playing referee at the same time that he gropes for a domestic and external policy that will best serve the rising demands of the Indian people. It is to this dramatic and powerful issue that Werner Levi has addressed himself in *Free India in Asia*.

The author wisely chose to concentrate his analysis upon one major aspect of the total problem. India's interest in Asian affairs has a history of thousands of years. More recently British rule and the impact of Western ideas and institutions have obscured an older Asian relationship. With independence it is natural to observe the redefining of India's interests in which her immediate neighbors (minus Pakistan) take a goodly measure of friendly priority. But, as Levi observes, Asia is a continent in which differences and conflicts, *inter se*, are as formidable as common interests are obvious.

Having chosen an historically fundamental theme, the author has been able to write a book of lasting significance in which topics of timely importance find their roots in the more basic traditions and circumstances. This reviewer would have appreciated greater emphasis upon the external implications of India's domestic policy, an interrelationship that seems particularly pertinent in India's case. The chapters on communism, im-

perialism and democracy, on the other hand, represent a most excellent presentation of the ideological issues posed in Indian perspective. More than an American's critique of Indian foreign policy, this book is a series of reflections by a careful student of international affairs on India's underlying motivations in the conduct of her foreign relations.

The few typographical errors are minor defects; excellent references and a full index add immeasurably to the value of this book for classroom use.—RICHARD L. PARK, *University of California, Berkeley*.

Woodrow Wilson and The Far East. BY RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1952. Pp. xv, 383. \$5.00.)

Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1918-1917. BY TIEN-YI LI. (New York: University of Kansas City Press—Twayne Publishers. 1952. Pp. 268. \$4.50.)

As their titles indicate, the two volumes on the Far East under review do not touch directly upon the present grave international crisis across the Pacific. They deal with American policy in the Far East under the Wilson Administration, one covering both presidential terms, the other the first, and to that extent they are complementary. But they are both exceedingly valuable and timely studies: for (1) they augment significantly our growing fund of accurate and detailed knowledge of a recent period of American diplomacy relating to the Far East, each predicated upon pertinent and trustworthy documentary sources and containing an excellent working bibliography; and (2) they provide at the same time highly instructive object lessons from which the United States, as the leader in world affairs today, could profit in any move to resolve the extremely critical situation in the Far East. To scholars and students of American diplomatic history and to all who are interested in an efficacious American Far Eastern policy in these parlous times, they are unreservedly recommended.

When President Wilson assumed office in 1913, the United States was confronted with another assault of Western financial imperialism in China as the infant Chinese Republic was struggling to stand on its feet. He decided that the United States should have no part in it. At the same time he sought to bolster the strength of the young republic by according it the recognition of a major power. But

before much good could be accomplished by this policy, Japan, on the outbreak of war in Europe, and therefore relatively free of international restraints, launched a determined attempt to dominate China, following the expulsion of Germany from the Far East. With Manchuria in possession, she was on her way. Wilson resorted to diplomacy to curb her. But, as the United States became inexorably drawn into the European conflict, and the Far East thereby receded in importance, Japan met little or no opposition. Nor at the Paris Peace Conference did Wilson find success in thwarting Japan, for Britain and France were on Japan's side, and he had also to submit to the compromising of his principles in order to bring to birth the League of Nations. Although Japan seemingly suffered a reversal at the subsequent Washington Conference of 1921-22, convened by the Harding Administration, Japanese imperialism had reaped enough substantial gains to encourage Japan to undertake the bold and reckless outburst of conquest of the Far East a decade or so later.

President Wilson fell regrettably short in his efforts to head off the imperialism of Japan. The host of causes and circumstances that accounted for his failure is admirably discussed and analyzed by the two authors. Today it is Soviet imperialism in the Far East, more masterful and powerful, against which the United States has taken the leadership. The United States is faced with a situation which is comparable and analogous in a great variety of ways. Will there again be failure?—N. WING MAH, *University of California, Berkeley*.

The Korea Story. BY JOHN C. CALDWELL IN COLLABORATION WITH LESLEY FROST. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. 180. \$3.00.)

This short volume is the highly personal account of Mr. Caldwell's experience, first as an information officer, and then as a would-be businessman, in Korea between 1948 and 1950. It is bitterly critical of the State Department, and its standards of documentation and fairness leave much to be desired.

Yet the book is not worthless. When Mr. Caldwell resists the temptation to pass judgments beyond his knowledge, and when he is not engaged in over-arguing his own controversial case (he resigned under pressure in 1949), his observations are often of real interest. There is a sound of sour truth in his

general description of the American colony in Seoul, and his own work as an information officer, especially at the time of the 1948 elections, is described with real skill and enthusiasm; even in his clearly embittered account of his battle with Washington, he scores some telling points. The student who discounts for bias and weighs lightly for lack of evidence will find useful raw material in this book. He will also look for other and better sources.—McGEORGE BUNDY, *Harvard University*.

Democracy and Foreign Policy: A Case History: The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-33. By R. BASSETT. (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 654. 42/-net.)

An extraordinarily detailed study of what was said and done in Great Britain about the "Manchurian crisis" of 1931-33, by a Lecturer at the London School who is interested in determining how much what was done was really affected by what was said. In what is in many respects a public opinion study, the author succeeds admirably in pointing out how the passage of a few years has brought a very complex and controversial issue to be treated simply as a matter of "Japanese aggression," and he appears to have left no newspaper, Parliamentary report, or public document unturned in building his case.

Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy. BY JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1952. Pp. xi, 218. \$2.75.)

Here Formosa is given the typical Brookings "problem paper" treatment by a former Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department. An introduction describes the physical setting and summarizes the history of Japanese rule, the second section traces developments on and affecting Formosa since 1945, and the conclusion poses the unresolved questions of U. S. policy toward Formosa. Included is an estimate of the viability of the Nationalist government, the place of Formosa in Far Eastern and United Nations affairs, and the position of Formosa in any long-run approach to a new China policy.

Our Love Affair with Germany. BY HANS HARE. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. 247. \$3.00.)

A veteran reporter of the European scene, who watched the occupation from both

official and private posts in Germany after the war, concludes that the whole affair has been mishandled since the first demand for "unconditional surrender." If there is war Germany will be overrun by the Russians and will opportunistically support the occupiers; if there is peace German governments will move progressively nearer National Socialism, although probably under another name.

Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill. BY PAUL A. VARG. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 141. Cloth. \$3.50; paper \$2.50.)

A brief study of the diplomatic career of W. W. Rockhill, who is best remembered for his part in drafting the Open Door note at the turn of the century, and who subsequently served as Minister to China, Ambassador to Russia, Ambassador to Turkey, and closed his career as adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai of the new Chinese Republic. There is no revision of history here, but interesting use has been made of the Rockhill papers.

United States Treaties and Other International Agreements; Vol. 1, 1950. BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. ix, 932, ix. \$5.75.)

Reorganization Plan No. 20 of 1950 transferred the editing of the *Statutes at large* from the Department of State to the Federal Register Division of the National Archives and Record Service, with the exception of treaties. The Act of Sept. 23, 1950, authorized the Secretary of State to edit an annual volume of treaties, which are no longer included in the *Statutes at large*. Arrangement is in the numerical order of the publication in pamphlet form as *Treaties and other international acts series*, cited as TIAS. Treaty texts are reproduced in all languages in which they were concluded. The Department recommends that the annual volume be cited as UST.—J.B.C.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1934. Vol. V, The American Republic. COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. lxii, 674. \$2.75.)

Papers concerning Latin-American relations in an uneventful year, marked mainly by the withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti, the opening of conversations regarding trade

agreements with several governments, and an interesting exchange concerning payment of the Panama Canal annuity in gold or "devalued dollars."

Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study. BY FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. xvi, 196. \$3.95.)

A brief, readable, and reasonably familiar approach to the problem of modern nationalism, by a University of Illinois sociologist who suggests that cultural nationalism is a greater force than political nationalism, that the former often persists without the latter, and that hope for a peaceful future more probably lies in cultural cooperation and the development of a world culture than in any world government.

The Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries. BY NORBERT MUHLEN. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. 310. \$4.50.)

A current journalistic report on how people are thinking and living, and what their leaders are saying and doing, in the two Germanies. The tentative conclusion is that the Soviet experiment is failing in the East, that the democratic experiment in the West has not yet succeeded, and that Germany still remains a central problem for both sides in the world struggle.

World Without End: The Middle East. BY EMIL LENGYEL. (New York: The John Day Company. 1953. Pp. 374. \$3.75.)

Avoiding the usual country-by-country approach of similar surveys, this is a useful introduction to the entire region—people, geography, cultures, internal problems, and the interaction of domestic politics and world events. The author urges greater direct participation in the area by the United States.

The International Labour Code, 1951. (Geneva: International Labour Office. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. clv, 1181; xxxix, 1220. \$10.00.)

A two volume codification of the Conventions (intended as creating international obligations) and Recommendations (intended as defining standards for member countries) adopted by the International Labour Conference from 1919 to 1951. Usefully arranged by subject matter, and preceded by a valuable introduction and explanatory notes as to the

nature of the code and procedures involved in its development.

Economic Stability in a Changing World: Essays in Economic Theory and Policy. BY JOHN H. WILLIAMS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. vi, 284. \$5.00.)

A collection of previously published papers and essays by an outstanding economist, heavily oriented toward policy making and empiricism. The central section consists of six "Marshall Plan Papers," preceded and followed by more recent and earlier papers on the policy implications of Keynes' work and issues in international trade policy.

Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation. (New York: United Nations Publica-

tions, Department of Social Affairs. 1952. Pp. v, 180. \$1.75.)

An ambitious attempt to reach some general conclusions and to point up some of the most pressing problems concerning population trends, health conditions, food supplies, housing, education, income levels, and living standards. Three concluding chapters deal more specifically with Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

India, Pakistan, and the West. BY PERCIVAL SPEAR. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 251. \$2.00.)

Second edition of a useful introductory volume, with an additional chapter briefly tracing political events since partition.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Arminjon, Pierre. La Patriotisme et sa Crise Actuelle. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. November, 1952.

Corbett, P. E. The Individual and World Society. Center for Research on World Political Institutions (Princeton), Pub. No. 2 (1953).

Del Vecchio, Giorgio. On the Various Conceptions of the Ideal of Peace. *New York University Law Review*. November, 1952.

Haas, Ernest B. The Impact of Modern Weapons on Diplomacy. *World Affairs Interpreter*. Winter, 1953.

Lerner, Daniel. International Coalitions and Communications Content: the Case of Neutrality. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1952-53.

Niemeyer, Gerhart. The Balance Sheet of the League Experiment. *International Organization*. November, 1952.

Wolfers, Arnold. National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. John H. Schaar.

United States

Ballis, William B. The Power Struggle in Asia and American Far Eastern Policy. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. January, 1953.

Byroade, Henry A. U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 15, 1952.

Cleveland, Harlan. The Dynamics of Mutual Security. *Department of State Field Reporter*. November-December, 1952.

Content Analysis of the Voice of America: A Symposium. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1952-53.

Coulter, Eliot B. Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. . . . *Department of State Bulletin*. February 2 and 9, 1953.

Cook, Thomas I. and Moos, Malcolm. Hindrances to Foreign Policy: Individualism and Legalism. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.

Kennan, George F. Can We Avoid War with Russia? *New Republic*. February 2, 1953.

Masland, John W. The National War College and the Administration of Foreign Affairs. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1952.

McKay, Vernon. The United States, the United Nations, and Africa. *Department of State Bulletin*. February 16, 1953.

Meyers, Howard. The Importance of the

United Nations to the United States. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 29, 1952.

Perkins, E. R. "Foreign Relations of the United States": 91 Years of American Foreign Policy. *Department of State Bulletin*. December 22, 1952.

Spain, August O. International Federalism in Recent American Thought. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Latin America

Rippy, J. Fred. Argentina: Late Major Field of British Overseas Investment. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Winter, 1952. Rainbow Chasing in the Tropics: British Economic Activities in Northern South America. *Idem*.

Santa Cruz, Hernan. New Problems of Panamericanism. *World Affairs*. Winter, 1952.

Sierra, Manuel J. Unidad Interamericana. *Cuadernos Americanos*. January-February, 1953.

Commonwealth of Nations

Alexandrowicz, C. H. India and the Tibetan Tragedy. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Birdwood, Lt. Col. Lord. Impact of India and Pakistan on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. *United Empire*. January-February, 1953.

Harvey, Heather Joan. The British Commonwealth: A Pattern of Cooperation. *International Conciliation*. January, 1953.

Khan, Fazlur R. The Geographical Basis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. *Pakistan Geographical Review* (Lahore). Vol. 7 (1952).

McAuley, James. Australia's Future in New Guinea. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

McInnis, Edgar. Canada at the United Nations. *Behind the Headlines* (Toronto). February, 1953.

Pezet, Ernest. Les Rapports Anglo-Soviétiques dans les deux Après-Guerres. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. November and December, 1952.

Ross, A. E. India: Destruction through Partition. *Contemporary Issues*. February-March, 1953.

Western and Central Europe

Adenauer, Konrad. Germany and Europe. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Coombs, G. M. Russo-Scandinavian Relations. *International Journal*. Winter, 1952-53.

Freymond, Jacques. Switzerland's Position in the World Peace Structure. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Houston, John A. The United Nations and Spain. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1952.

Kragh, Maj. Gen. E. Denmark and the Atlantic Union. *Military Review*. January, 1953.

Rose, Arnold M. Anti-Americanism in France. *Antioch Review*. Winter, 1952-53.

Schuman, Robert. France and Europe. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Sethur, Frederick. The Schuman Plan and Ruhr Coal. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Taylor, A. J. P. France, Germany and the Saar. *International Journal*. Winter, 1952-53.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. France and Germany in West European Defense. *Editorial Research Reports*. November 15, 1952. Harassed Berlin. *Ibid*. March 12, 1953.

Vérités sur l'Union Française. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. October, 1952.

The West German Political Parties and Rearmament. *World Today*. February, 1953.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

Anthem, Thomas. Balkan Prospects. *Contemporary Review*. January, 1953.

Campbell, James W. What the Russians Have Learned in Korea. *Yale Review*. December, 1952.

Honti, François. La Politique Soviétique en Autriche. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January, 1953.

Kardelj, Edvard. Yugoslav Foreign Policy. *Yugoslav Review*. December, 1952.

Mendelsohn, Harold and Cahnman, Werner J. Communist Broadcasts to Italy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1952-53.

On the Nature of Soviet Imperialism: I. Rudin, Harry R. The Continuity of Russian Imperialism; II. Dallin, David J. Communist Innovations. *Yale Review*. March, 1953.

Otto d'Autriche, S. A. R. l'Archiduc. L'Édification de l'Europe et le Rôle du Bassin Danubien. *Politique Étrangère*. August-October, 1952.

Seton-Watson, H. Eastern Europe and the German Problem. *Twentieth Century*. March, 1953.

Viereck, Peter. The Trojan Dove. *Russian Review*. January, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Bullard, Sir Reader. Behind the Oil Dispute in Iran: A British View. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Catroux, Général. Les États Arabes et

l'Occident. *Politique Étrangère*. August-October, 1952.

Cook, J. M. Syria and the West Today. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*. January, 1953.

Cumming, Duncan Cameron. The Disposal of Eritrea. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Hashimi, Sayed El. Islam and Communism in the Middle East. *Contemporary Review*. February, 1953.

Hourani, Albert. The Decline of the West in the Middle East, I. *International Affairs*. January, 1953.

Howard, Harry N. The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 9, 1953.

Leahem, Moshe. Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. January, 1953.

Michaelis, Alfred. The German Trade Position in the Middle East. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. November, 1952.

Monroe, Elizabeth. Has France a Case in Tunisia? *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1953.

Persia; the Keystone. *Round Table*. December, 1952.

Point Four Aid to the Middle East 1951-1953. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. February, 1953.

Rondot, Jean. Les Intérêts Pétroliers Français dans le Proche-Orient. *Politique Étrangère*. August-October, 1952.

Schwadran, Benjamin. The Oil of Iraq. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. December, 1952.

United States Aid to the Middle East 1940-1951. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. February, 1953.

Wilber, Donald N. Afghanistan, Independent and Encircled. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Worthington, E. B. Science in African International Relations. *International Affairs*. January, 1953.

Pacific and Far East

Brenchley, T. F. The Work of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. January, 1953.

Cheek, Lt. Col. L. B., Jr. Korea—Decisive Battle of the World. *Military Review*. March, 1953.

Cohen, Jerome B. Japan's Foreign Trade Problems. *Far Eastern Survey*. November 19, 1952.

DeConde, Alexander. Is China a Great Power? *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. January, 1953.

Goold-Adams, Richard. The Pacific Pact and Britain. *United Empire*. January-February, 1953.

Irvine, Reed J. Japan's Balance of Payments Prospects. *Far Eastern Survey*. December 31, 1952.

King, John Kerry. Rice Politics. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

McNelly, Theodore. American Influence and Japan's No-War Constitution. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Robson, Nancy. French Oceania Takes Stock. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Roy, M. N. The Crisis of Our Time: An Asian View. *Pacific Spectator*. Winter, 1953.

Steiner, H. Arthur. Maoism or Stalinism for Asia? *Far Eastern Survey*. January 14, 1953.

"Titoism" and the Chinese Communist Regime: An American View. *World Today*. December, 1952.

Southeast Asia

Hatta, Mohammad. Indonesia's Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Huyck, Earl E. The Colombo Plan: Progress on the Subcontinent. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Colonial Areas

Cumming, D. C. British Stewardship of the Italian Colonies: An Account Rendered. *International Affairs*. January, 1953.

Haas, Ernst B. The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System. *International Organization*. November, 1952.

Jaray, Gabriel-Louis. Une Expérience Coloniale des États-Unis: Les Philippines. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January, 1953.

International Economic Policy and Relations

Allen, W. R. International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull. *American Economic Review*. March, 1953.

Altschul, Frank. America's New Economic Role. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Aschinger, Franz. The Sterling Problem. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. January, 1953.

Developments in Trade between Eastern and Western Europe from 1950 to mid-1952. *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva). Vol. 4, Second Quarter (1952).

Die Entwicklung des Ost-West Handels 1950-1952. *Osteuropa*. February, 1953.

Hanson, Simon G. The Press Looks at

Point IV. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Autumn, 1952.

Hunter, John. Long-term Foreign Investment and Underdeveloped Countries. *Journal of Political Economy*. February, 1953.

Legatte, Paul. L'Organisation Économique du Monde Libre. *Politique Étrangère*. August-October, 1952.

McDougall, Frank Ligett. Food and Population. *International Conciliation*. December, 1952.

Patch, Buel W. Trade Policy and Foreign Aid. *Editorial Research Reports*. February 4, 1953.

Thorp, Willard L. The Problem of Our Trade Balance. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

International Law

Benton, W. E. The Continental Shelf: International Aspects. *Southwestern Law Journal*. Fall, 1952.

Bingham, Joseph W. Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf. *Southern California Law Review*. December, 1952.

Brandon, Michael. An Analysis of the Terms "Treaty" and "International Agreement" for Purposes of Registration under Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1953.

Charmatz, Jan P. and Wit, Harold M. Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention. *Yale Law Journal*. February, 1953.

Delaume, Georges R. Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed Abroad: French and American Law. *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1952.

Developments in the Law—Immigration and Nationality. *Harvard Law Review*. February, 1953.

Edwards, Richard A. The Constitution, the Treaty Power, and Juridical Isolationism. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*. Winter, 1953.

Fitzmaurice, G. G. Reservations to Multilateral Conventions. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. January, 1953.

Hudson, Manley O. The Thirty-first Year of the World Court. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1953.

Kronstein, Heinrich. The Nationality of International Enterprises. *Columbia Law Review*. December, 1952.

Lesser, Stanley T. Treaty Provisions Dealing with the Status of Pre-war Bilateral Treaties. *Michigan Law Review*. February, 1953.

Metcalfe, William K. The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1952.

Northrop, F. C. S. Obstacles to a World Legal Order and Their Removal. *Brooklyn Law Review*. December, 1952.

Phillips, C. P. Air Warfare and Law, I. *George Washington Law Review*. January, 1953.

Pordea, G. A. L'Agression, ses Critères Déterminatifs et sa Définition. *Revue de Droit International des Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. October-December, 1952.

Wilson, Robert R. Access-to-Courts Provisions in U. S. Commercial Treaties. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1953.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Clements, F. W. The World Health Organization in Southern Asia and the Western Pacific. *Pacific Affairs*. December, 1952.

Friedmann, W. G. The United Nations and National Loyalties. *International Journal*. Winter, 1952-53.

Gozard, Gilles. La Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. November, 1952.

Gross, Ernest A. The Cold War and the United Nations. *Department of State Bulletin*. February 23, 1953.

Hill, Norman. Law and Procedure of the United Nations on the Calling of Conferences. *Georgetown Law Journal*. November, 1952.

The International Labour Organisation since the War. *International Labour Review*. February, 1953.

Jebb, Sir Gladwyn. The Free World and the United Nations. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953. The Role of the United Nations. *International Organization*. November, 1952.

Krout, John A. (ed.). United Nations: Success or Failure? *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*. January, 1953.

Neal, Marian. The United Nations and Human Rights. *International Conciliation*. March, 1953.

The Universal Postal Congress of Brussels. *Union Postale* (Berne). December, 1952.

Military and Security Questions

Atkinson, James D. The Communist Revolution in Warfare. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. March, 1953.

La Communauté Européenne de Défense.

Chronique de Politique Étrangère. September–November, 1952.

de Monsabert, General. North Africa in Atlantic Strategy. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Legaret, Jean. La Défense de l'Europe: les Trois Solutions. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January, 1953.

Middleton, Drew. NATO Changes Direction. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1953.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. Pacific Defense. *Editorial Research Reports*. January 29, 1953.

Williams, Lt. Col. R. C. The Allied Command, Atlantic. *Military Review*. January, 1953.

Regional Organizations

Goormaghtigh, John. European Integration. *International Conciliation*. February, 1953.

Ledermann, L. Considérations Actuelles sur la Fédération Internationale. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. December, 1952.

Luethy, Herbert. The First Step Toward "One Europe." *Commentary*. January, 1953.

Nicholas, H. G. America Scrutinizes European Union. *Fortnightly*. March, 1953.

Townaley, W. A. The British Attitude to European Union. *Australian Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Wolff, Salomon. The Coal and Steel Pool in Operation. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. February, 1953.

DOCUMENTS

General and Miscellaneous

Council of Europe. Documentation on the European Question in General. Strasbourg, 1952.

——— A Few Aspects of Population and Economy . . . of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1952.

Food and Agriculture Organization. The Work of FAO 1951–1952. Report of the Director-General. Rome, FAO, 1952.

Great Britain. British Information Services. Reference Division. Britain's Colonial Policy and Record. I.D. 1157. New York, BIS, 1952.

——— The Organization of the British Foreign Service. I.D. 938 revised. New York, BIS, 1952.

——— Conservative Party. Research Department. The World Scene. London, Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1953.

International Court of Justice. Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco; Judgement of August 27, 1952. The Hague, 1952.

Organisation for European Economic Co-

operation. Europe—The Way Ahead. . . . Fourth Annual Report of the OEEC. Paris, OEEC, 1952. (OEEC C(52)365.)

The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions; Reports and Speeches. Supp. to *People's China* (Peking), October 16, 1952.

UNESCO. Report of the Director-General on the Activities . . . from April to July 1952. Presented to the General Conference at its Seventh Session. . . . Paris, UNESCO, 1952.

United Nations

Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Committee on the Organization and Operation of the Council and Its Commissions. Economic Commission for Latin America June 1948–March 1951; Statement prepared by the Executive Secretary. UN, 1952. (Doc. E/AC.34/6, 15 March 1951.)

——— Twelfth Report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination to the Economic and Social Council. UN, 1952. (Doc. E/2340, 11 November 1952.)

General Assembly. Question of South West Africa. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee. . . . UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2261, 21 November 1952.)

——— Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session, during the Period from 14 October to 21 December 1952. UN, 1953. (Doc. A/2361.)

——— Commission for Eritrea. Final Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2188, 18 December 1952.)

Secretariat. Teaching About the UN and the Specialized Agencies. Report . . . Covering the Period 1950–1952. UN, 1952. (Sales No. 1952.I.32.)

——— Department of Economic Affairs. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East. UN, 1953. (Also Doc. E/CN.11/362.)

——— Study of the Trade Between Latin American and Europe. UN [Geneva], 1953. (Doc. E/CN.12/225.)

——— Department of Public Information. Background Papers. No. 71: The Greek Question (Doc. ST/DPI/SER.A/71, 6 January 1953); No. 73: Non-Self-Governing Territories (Doc. ST/DPI/SER.A/73, 6 January 1953); No. 74: UN Technical Assistance (Doc. ST/DPI/SER.A/74, 12 January 1953).

Secretary-General. Opinion of the Commission of Jurists on Certain Issues Arising Out of the Hearings of the U. S. Senate . . . ; and a Statement . . . concerning the Use of that Opinion. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/INF/51, 5 December 1952.)

——— Question of Defining Aggression. Report by the Secretary-General. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2211, 3 October 1952.)

——— Report . . . on Personnel Policy. UN, 1953. (Doc. A/2364, 30 January 1953.)
Trusteeship Council. Special Report . . . on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem. UN, 1952. (Doc. T.1034, 7 November 1952.)

United States

Administrator, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act [W. A. Harriman]. Problems of Economic Defense. . . . Second Report to Congress [January 16, 1953]. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Joining with the President of the United States in a Declaration Regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union. Hearing . . . H. J. Res. 200. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Providing for an Under Secretary of State for Administration. Hearing . . . on S. 243 and H.R. 1377. . . . January 28, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings Before President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, September 30 . . . October 29, 1952. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Select Committee . . . Katyn Forest Massacre. Final Report. . . . 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, H. Report No. 2505. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen. Hearings . . . March 2 and 18, 1953. Nomination of James B. Conant to be United States High Commissioner for Germany. Hearings . . . February 2 and 3, 1953. Nomination of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State-Designate. Hearing . . . January 15, 1953. Nomination of Harold E. Stassen to be Director for Mutual Security. Hearing . . . January 21, 1953. All 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Hearings . . . November 20 and 21, 1952. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. Re-

port. . . . S. Report No. 30. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Activities of United States Citizens Employed by the United Nations. Hearings before the Subcommittee . . . October 13 . . . December 17, 1952. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

Department of State. IIA: Ninth Semiannual Report of the Secretary . . . on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program. January 1952 to June 1952. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. No. 4867.)

——— Military Assistance to Latin America. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4917.)

——— Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. Fourth Meeting at Karachi, Pakistan, March, 1952. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Pub. No. 4650.)

——— Together We Are Strong. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4614.)

——— United States Efforts Toward Disarmament. Report to the President by the Deputy U. S. Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission [Benjamin V. Cohen]. January 12, 1953. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4902.)

International Development Advisory Board. Pacific Coast Conference on Private Investment in International Development [San Francisco, September 24-25, 1952]. . . . Summary of the Discussions. Washington, G.P.O., 1952. (Department of State Pub. No. 4795.)

Mutual Security Agency. Second Report. . . . Supplement (Statistical Data). Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

——— Third Report to Congress . . . for the Six Months Ended December 31, 1952. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

National Commission for UNESCO. Informal Report of the U. S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, November 12-December 11, 1952. Paris [1952].

National Security Resources Board. The Objectives of United States Materials Resources Policy and Suggested Initial Steps in Their Accomplishment. . . . Report by the Chairman [December 10, 1952]. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Communist Doctrine and the Free World. By MARGUERITE J. FISHER. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 288. \$4.50.)

In seventeen chapters and nearly 300 pages, Mrs. M. J. Fisher, professor at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, attempts to give—not in her own words, but in the words of the main prophets (Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin)—a summary of the ideological framework of communism. There is also a running commentary, lively and concise, and in the last chapter an able refutation of some basic communist tenets. Quotations and comments are kept strictly separate.

The collected works of the prophets include scores of volumes. Most of their content is of course repetitious and an application of the basic creed to specific problems and situations. Having ploughed through the volumes (at least those available in the English language), Mrs. Fisher has condensed the fundamentals so as to give a clear picture of the whole ideological system. Her book should be read by all those needing a clear notion of what modern communism is.

Mrs. Fisher rightly stresses the importance attributed to theory by the communists. In the current conflict the realm of reason plays a role which is too often ignored on our side. It is an unpleasant paradox that we who stress freedom because we believe in man's responsibility based on his rational powers, are often more ignorant of the reasoning underlying our position than the communists are of the reasoning underlying theirs. They seem to realize more than we do that clear ideas are a necessary preliminary to clear action. We may laugh at times at the rather scholastic discussions taking place among communists, on the fine points of distinction between one faction and another—but we should not laugh too much. Communists are dogmatic in their thinking but theirs is a dogmatic rationalism; they call themselves materialists but in practice they recognize the importance of the mind and keep a close connection between mind and action.

It would have helped the readers if it had been made clearer that the book deals with one school only of communism, specifically with the Marxist-Leninist school. Of the 150-odd

quotations which form the bulk of the volume, more than half are Lenin's; the rest are from Marx, Engels and Stalin. Through the efforts of Lenin and of the Stalin who wrote the *Foundations of Leninism* and the *Problems of Leninism*, there is a body of doctrine to which the term "Marxism-Leninism" rightly applies. Not even Marx can be identified entirely with this type of communism: whatever his stress on a scientific method (which he used most clumsily), Marx remained basically a utopian socialist endowed with only a vague notion of what a socialist or a communist society would be. Lenin belonged to a different world. Many maintain that Marx would have been horrified by what Lenin did in 1918–22. Possibly they are right.

In consulting the book, the reader should be aware that there is a danger in describing an ideology on the basis of quotations only; often the letter of the doctrine may not correspond to the interpretation given by those who are inspired by that doctrine. Moreover the mass of written evidence is such that a quotation can be found to prove practically any point; which quotations then should be selected? Mrs. Fisher has an understanding of Marxism-Leninism which I believe to be correct. She has chosen her quotations to substantiate her understanding. But millions of communists, many in good faith, would refute that understanding and could bring as many quotations to substantiate a different interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The book gives us a picture of Marxism-Leninism as we see it. However, the movement can be evaluated correctly only if we know what picture is seen by those who belong to it.

An immediate and important problem is raised by Mrs. Fisher's book: To what extent does the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism (indispensable for the correct appreciation of the policies of Lenin, and of Stalin during the early years of his rule) help us to understand the movement with which are identified at least ten of the twelve communist-governed states of today, six million party members in non-communist countries, and about twenty million voters in states where free elections take place? Most quotations in *Communist Doctrine and the Free World* are taken from books written before 1928. We know that in the Soviet Union and in the satellite states of Europe and

Asia, the official doctrine is called Marxism-Leninism. Actually, today's Soviet communism may be as far, in practice and in theory, from Marxism-Leninism as this was from Marxism. In spite of plentiful evidence, not enough attention has been paid in the free countries to the revision of Marxism-Leninism which has taken place since the middle thirties and its gradual replacement with what, for lack of a better term, may be called Stalinism. The doctrine of Stalinism is at present in the state in which Marxism-Leninism was before Stalin himself crystallized the doctrine of his predecessor in *Foundations of Leninism* and in *Problems of Leninism*. There is already available, however, enough material to complete Mrs. Fisher's book and to present the arguments supporting the foremost twentieth century doctrine devised for the rational justification of despotism.—MASSIMO SALVADORI, *Smith College*.

The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom. By ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. ix, 303. \$5.00.)

The role of liberal values in present-day democratic societies has become a question of mounting concern to many Western intellectuals, as the liberal creed has gradually declined in favor, and as totalitarian movements have steadily gained. The question is central in this book, written by a sociologist.

The author's apparent purpose is to sound a warning for all democrats: If you do not want to slip into a totalitarian morass, you must deliberately build a pluralist society. Only in a pluralist society can we have both freedom and democracy. The author elaborates his plea for "pluralist democracy" in the now familiar sociological terms of "community."

Professor Nisbet claims that prior to the advent of liberalism, Western societies abounded in local associations like the family, guild, church, and village. These intimate associations performed meaningful functions in men's lives, and they satisfied the psychological need for "community." But during the 19th century the ties holding men together in these associations were cut by rampant individualism. The prime liberal values were the free individual and the sovereign people. With the realization of these values, the state became the sole association for achieving the goals of individuals, as well as the single locus of allegiance and

authority. Standing alone as just one of the masses, the individual was confronted by the impersonal, centralized nation state. But in the context of the mass state, liberal values ceased to have meaning, for even these values depended upon the context of local associations. So we find 20th century man in quest of "community." Yet the only remaining link between the atomized mass of individuals and the total state is the ideology of the absolute political community.

What is to be done? We must regard the "individual" as a member of free associations, and we must regard the "people" as an arrangement of quasi-sovereign groups, with the state merely one of many associations. We must revive the intimate "intermediate" associations by vesting them with functions meaningful in the lives of men today. For it is these plural communities which must curb the authority of the state, if that essential balance between order and freedom is to be maintained in democratic societies. So endeth the lesson.

This thesis—which is familiar to those acquainted with recent political thought of Christian inspiration—is no doubt plausible. Yet the argument has a hollow ring. Perhaps it is because the discourse is admittedly within the realm of morals, and because moral arguments have that unfortunate quality of being unconvincing if you do not agree at the outset, and superfluous if you do. Or perhaps it is because the argument remains throughout at a level of abstraction which approximates pure sound. Such generality may be required to get at the big picture, and the big picture may be important to understand. But to be significant the big picture must portray what it represents, and ten thousand words are no assurance of this.

Beyond these reasons, however, the argument rings hollow because it is almost entirely an enterprise in logic. Logic has its uses, but it is a poor substitute for experience in political analysis. Perhaps individualistic liberalism does logically develop into the absolute political community. But Professor Nisbet has prepared his lesson for warm-bodied democrats, and they must perforce ask: Does our experience show that "individualistic liberalism" was ever more than a dream, or nightmare? Does our experience show that "intermediate associations" were destroyed in democratic societies? Does our experience show that associative life, say in America, is now sparse and sterile? Or does our experience show instead

the inadequacy of Professor Nisbet's assumptions?

Though the author fails, in the opinion of this reviewer, to make a convincing case for his thesis, this book is still rewarding. Not only is it written in a lively style, but there are many stimulating insights and interesting observations. These passing thoughts, taken altogether, furnish a provocative if deficient discussion of the role of liberal values in democratic societies.—CURRIN V. SHIELDS, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

Human Problems in Technological Change: A Casebook. EDITED BY EDWARD H. SPICER. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952. Pp. 301. \$4.00.)

Technological innovations are being rapidly introduced into many backward areas of the world, usually with serious consequences in social disintegration and loss of morale to the communities concerned. Fifteen such cases ranging from simple to complex in the problem presented are analyzed from the point of view of finding basic concepts and principles which would be of value to the innovator attempting to direct such cultural changes. The book is primarily a text, making suggestions, provoking thought, and attempting to analyze the nature of technological change.

Faktoren der Machtbildung: Wissenschaftliche Studien zur Politik. EDITED BY A. R. L. GURLAND. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1952. Pp. 200.)

A collection of five political studies on varied topics touching upon the problem of power in politics. Written by German political scientists, mostly members of the Institute for Political Science in Berlin. A brief concluding article deals with American polls of public opinion and related topics.

Henri Comte De Saint-Simon (1760-1825): Selected Writings. EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY F. M. H. MARKHAM. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. Pp. li, 116. \$2.00.)

Selections designed to give a picture of the development of St. Simon's thought from 1803 to 1825, including, among others, excerpts from *Letters from an Inhabitant of Geneva*, *Essay on the Science of Man*, *Reorganization of the European Community*, *On Social Organization*, and *The New Christianity*. The volume represents the only available English translation of St. Simon's work and therefore fills a definite gap

in the literature dealing with French Utopian Socialists.

Bentham and the Ethics of Today. BY DAVID BAUMGARDT. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. xiv, 584. \$9.00.)

A reexamination of Bentham's ethical ideas expressed in his publications and unpublished manuscripts with a view to correcting misinterpretations and reassessing the fundamental importance of these ideas for the ethics of today.

Political Tracts of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley. EDITED BY R. J. WHITE. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Pp. xlv, 303. \$6.00.)

Edited reproductions of Coleridge's *Statesman's Manual* and *A Lay Sermon*, Wordsworth's *The Convention of Cintra* and Shelley's *A Defence of Poetry* and *A Philosophical View of Reform*, all originally published between 1809 and 1821 and most of them not hitherto easily available. Some non-political passages have been omitted. An introduction by the editor is included.

Selections from Bayle's Dictionary. EDITED BY E. A. BELLER AND M. DUP. LEE, JR. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. xxxiv, 312. \$6.00.)

A reproduction of eighteen articles from Pierre Bayle's *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, first published in French in 1697, with an excellent introduction by the editors in which they assess Bayle's rightful place as a seventeenth-century thinker and his significant influence on eighteenth-century liberal thought.

Planning for Freedom: And Other Essays and Addresses. BY LUDWIG VON MISES. (South Holland, Illinois: Libertarian Press, 1952.)

A series of essays and addresses by Ludwig von Mises during the period 1945-1951. Collectively they express the well-known economic and sociological views for which Professor von Mises has become famous and serve to underscore the positions taken by him in his *Theory of Money and Credit*, *Omnipotent Government*, and *Bureaucracy*.

A Christian Commentary on Communism. BY EDWARD ROGERS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. x, 238. \$3.50.)

Originally appearing in England under the title *A Commentary on Communism*, the pres-

ent work constitutes the Rev. Edward Rogers' Femly-Hartley Lectures for 1951. The author traces the evolution of the communist ideal from its classic beginnings through modern communism and concludes that modern communism fails to take into consideration the full nature of man. He finds a solution to the problem in the broader philosophy of Christian supernaturalism.

The Quaker Approach. EDITED BY JOHN KAVANAUGH. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. vi, 243. \$4.00.)

A collection of essays by leading Quakers of Europe and the U. S., eloquently explaining the Quaker "point of view" on thirteen subjects, as diverse as peace and war, economic life, crime and punishment, science, Quakers and the Russians. The volume commemorates the 300th anniversary of the Society of Friends.

Errors of Psychotherapy. BY SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1952. Pp. 288. \$3.00.)

In a book which through most of its pages seems to be unrelated to political science, the argument is finally advanced that "mental disorder and psychotherapy" are "problems of morality and law," and that the "heal-the-breach method" of psychotherapy for the inner man must be supplemented with a vision of order in the outer world, which becomes the responsibility of religion and political science.

Survey of the Social Sciences in Western Germany. BY MAX HORKHEIMER. (Washington: Library of Congress. 1952. Pp. ix, 225. \$1.00.)

A list of various Western German institutions, professional organizations, periodicals and books (published and under preparation) dealing with social sciences, mainly sociology and anthropology. The period covered extends from October, 1950 to September, 1951.

Introduction to Government. BY ROBERT RIE-
NOW. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1952. Pp. xxxii, 583. \$5.00.)

An introductory textbook, designed for a general course in principles and practices. Major emphasis is on the American system but chapters are included on Britain, France and Russia.

Democracy Is You: A Guide to Citizen Action. BY RICHARD WAVERLY POSTON. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. xi, 312. \$3.00.)

Richard Poston, director of the Bureau of Community Development at the University of Washington, envisions democracy as being rooted in citizen concern with, and participation in, community life. This book seeks to indicate the organizational methods that can be employed to stimulate community cooperation in the solution of local problems at the local level.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL THEORY

FRANCIS G. WILSON
University of Illinois

History and Criticism

Abraham, Henry J. Was Machiavelli a "Machiavellian?" *Social Science*. January, 1953.

Alciatore, Jules C. Stendhal et Brissot de Warville. *Modern Philology*. November, 1952.

Annoni, Ada. L'Idea dell'Unità d'Europa negli Scrittori Italiani del Settecento. *Humanitas*. November, 1952.

Arnold, Paul. La Notion de Souveraineté chez les Indo-Européens. *Cahiers du Sud*. No. 314, 1952.

Baron, Hans. A Struggle for Liberty in the Renaissance: Florence, Venice, and Milan in

the Early Quattrocento (Part One). *American Historical Review*. January, 1953.

Bénichou, Paul. Confessions Nouvelles de Benjamin Constant. *Critique*. December, 1952.

Blackmur, R. P. The Harmony of True Liberalism: Henry Adams' Mont-St.-Michel and Chartres. *Sewanee Review*. January-March 1952.

Boobyer, G. H. New Testament Perfectionism and Christian Citizenship. *Hibbert Journal*. January, 1953.

Cairns, John C. Acton: A Portrait. *University of Toronto Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Cameron, J. M. Catholic Myths and French Politics. *Dublin Review*. Fourth Quarter, 1952.

- Chapuisat, E. Les États-Unis et la Constitution Suisse de 1848. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. July-September, 1952.
- Chevallier, Jean Jacques. Un Libro Muy Extraño: *Les Considerations sur la France*, de José de Maistre (1797). *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. July-August, 1952.
- Chroust, Anton-Hermann. The Philosophy of Law of the Epicureans. *Thomist*. January, 1953.
- Collins, John H. Cicero and Catullus. *Classical Journal*. October, 1952.
- Conde, Francisco Javier. Sociología de Sociología. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1952.
- Dansette, Adrien. The Rejuvenation of French Catholicism: Marc Sanguier's Sillon. *Review of Politics*. January, 1953.
- Derathé, Robert. La Philosophie des Lumières en France: Raison et Modération selon Montesquieu. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*. Fas. 3, 1952.
- Deutsch, Karl W. The Growth of Nations. *World Politics*. January, 1953.
- d'Ors, Alvaro. Santayana, Sobre Dominación y Poder. *Arbor*. December, 1952.
- Dörpalen, Andreas. The German Historians and Bismarck. *Review of Politics*. January, 1953.
- Dover, Cedric. The Racial Philosophy of Jehuda Halevi. *Phylon*. Fourth Quarter, 1952.
- Dziewanowski, M. K. The Revolution of 1904-1905 and the Marxist Movement in Poland. *Journal of Central European Affairs*. October, 1952.
- Fasnacht, G. E. Acton's Notes for a Romanes Lecture. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1952.
- Fraiberg, Louis. The Westminster Review and American Literature, 1824-1885. *American Literature*. November, 1952.
- Gilbert, Felix. The Composition and Structure of Machiavelli's *Discorsi*. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January, 1953.
- Giusso, Lorenzo. Campanella y España. *Clavileño*. September-October, 1952.
- Godel, R. De Socrate au Sage Indien. *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*. December, 1952.
- Goguel de Labrousse, Elizabeth. Sobre el Socinianismo en Inglaterra en el Siglo XVII. *Notas y Estudios de Filosofía*. July-September, 1953.
- Gómez Arboleya, Enrique. La Polis y el Saber Social de los Helenos. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1952.
- Gramp, William D. The Liberal Element in English Mercantilism. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. November, 1952.
- Grimsley, Ronald. Subjective and Objective Elements in Rousseau's *Rêveries*. *French Studies*. January, 1953.
- Hayes, William C. Notes on the Government of Egypt in the Late Middle Kingdom. *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*. January, 1953.
- Heintel, E. Epikur und die Angst vor dem Tode. *Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Psychologie, Pädagogik*. IV/1. 1952.
- Hill, Christopher. Puritans and the Poor. *Past and Present*. November, 1952.
- Holborn, Hajo. History and the Study of the Classics. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January, 1953.
- Hutchison, T. W. Some Questions About Ricardo. *Economica*. November, 1952.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst H. Deus per Naturam, Deus per Gratiam, A Note on Medieval Political Theology. *Harvard Theological Review*. October, 1952.
- Kirk, Russell. The Foreboding Conservatism of Stephen. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- The Moral Conservatism of Hawthorne. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1952.
- The Politics of George Santayana. *Pacific Spectator*. Winter, 1953.
- Scott and Bentham. *Fortnightly*. December, 1952.
- The Thought of Sir Henry Maine. *Review of Politics*. January, 1953.
- Leach, Richard H. Benjamin Robbins Curtis: Judicial Misfit. *New England Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Lewis, H. D. Individualism and Collectivism: A Study of T. H. Green. *Ethics*. October, 1952.
- Maeztu, Ramiro de. [Various Articles in Homage.] *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*. September-October, 1953.
- Markus, R. I. Hume: Reason and Moral Sense. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. December, 1952.
- McCoy, Charles N. R. Note on the Problem of the Origin of Political Authority. *Thomist*. January, 1953.
- McGuire, Martin R. P. Medieval Humanism. *Catholic Historical Review*. January, 1953.
- Meyer, Paul H. The Manuscript of Hume's Account of His Dispute with Rousseau. *Comparative Literature*. Fall, 1952.
- Newman, Franklin B. Emerson and Buonar-

- roti. *New England Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Niederer, Francis J. Early Medieval Charity. *Church History*. December, 1952.
- Niel, Henri. La Théologie des Pre-Socrates. [Werner Jaeger]. *Critique*. December, 1952.
- Noyes, Alfred. The Centrality of Chesterton. *Quarterly Review*. January, 1953.
- Pankhurst, Richard K. P. Saint-Simonism in England (II). *Twentieth Century*. January, 1953.
- Passerin, Ettore. Gaetano Filangieri e Benjamin Constant. *Humanitas*. December, 1952.
- Peterson, Merrill D. Parrington and the Jeffersonian Tradition. *Modern Review*. December, 1952.
- Philippe, M.-D. Réflexions Sur la Nature et l'Importance de la Liberté dans la Philosophie de Descartes. *Revue Thomiste*. LII/3. 1952.
- Rio Corrêa, M. O Bem-Estar Social na Antiguidade. *Revista do Serviço Público*. May, 1952.
- Preyer, Robert. The Utilitarian Poetics: John Stuart Mill. *University of Kansas City Review*. Winter, 1952.
- Quadri, G. L'Esigenza di Autorità nel Romanticismo Socialista Francese. *Studi Senesi*. LXIII/2. 1951.
- Rabun, James Z. Alexander H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis. *American Historical Review*. January, 1953.
- Randall, John Herman. John Dewey, 1859-1952. *Journal of Philosophy*. January 1, 1953.
- Ranft, B. McL. The Significance of the Political Career of Samuel Pepys. *Journal of Modern History*. December, 1952.
- Raumer, Kurt von. Saint-Pierre und Rousseau. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 108/4. 1952.
- Remenyi, Joseph. Two 19th Century Hungarian Men of Letters: János Arany and Baron Joseph Eötvös. *Symposium*. May, 1952.
- Roggerone, G. A. Il Machiavellismo di Rousseau. *Sophia*. XXI/1. 1953.
- Rossiter, Clinton. The Political Theory of the American Revolution. *Review of Politics*. January, 1953.
- Richard Bland: The Whig in America. *William and Mary Quarterly*. January, 1953.
- Thomas Hooker. *New England Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Russell, Edwin S. Fitzgerald's Brave New World. *ELH*. December, 1952.
- Saunders, Richard M. Voltaire's View of the Meaning of History. *University of Toronto Quarterly*. October, 1952.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. Liberty Tree: A Genealogy. *New England Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime. Les Premières Étapes de la Philosophie Biologique. *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences*. July-September, 1952.
- Sellers, Charles Grier. Walter Hines Page and the Spirit of the New South. *North Carolina Historical Review*. October, 1952.
- Soler, William G. A Reattribution: John Dickinson's Authorship of the Pamphlet "A Caution," 1798. *Pennsylvania Magazine*. January, 1953.
- Solmsen, Friedrich. Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos. *American Journal of Philology*. January, 1953.
- Sperber, H. and Trittschuh, T. Words and Phrases in American Politics: Hunting Terms. *American Speech*. October, 1952.
- Stadtmüller, Georg. Das Liberale Jahrhundert. *Neues Abendland*. December, 1952.
- Stenerson, Douglas C. Emerson and the Agrarian Tradition. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January, 1953.
- Stewart, Zeph. Sejanus, Gaetulicus, and Seneca. *American Journal of Philology*. January, 1953.
- Urmson, J. O. The Interpretation of the Philosophy of J. S. Mill. *Philosophical Quarterly*. January, 1953.
- Varley, H. L. Imperialism and Rudyard Kipling. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January, 1953.
- Wheeler, Mortimer. Archaeology and the Transmission of Ideas. *Antiquity*. December, 1952.
- Wolff, Hans M. Die Deutsche Aufklärung. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*. Fas. 3, 1952.
- Legal Theory and Public Law Issues
- Byse, Clark. A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. January, 1953.
- Dolapchiev, N. Law and Human Rights in Bulgaria. *International Affairs*. January, 1953.
- Fisch, Edith L. The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies. *Michigan Law Review*. January, 1953.
- Gray, Hamish. The History and Development in England of the Cy-Près Principle in Charities. *Boston University Law Review*. January, 1953.
- Hall, Jerome. Police and Law in a Democratic Society. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1953.
- Martin, Andrew C. Human Rights: Some

Problems of Interpretation and Codification. *Journal du Droit International*. July-August, 1952.

Santa Cruz Teijeiro, José. Notas para un Estudio Expositivo sobre el Influjo de Retórica en el Derecho Romano. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. July-August, 1952.

Stoljar, Samuel J. The Logical Status of a Legal Principle. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Winter, 1953.

Tausch, Carl F. Freedom of Assembly. *Ethics*. October, 1952.

Vecchio, Giorgio del. On the Various Conceptions of the Ideal of Peace. *New York University Law Review*. November, 1952.

Wilson, Richard B. *Beauharnais v. Illinois*; Bulwark or Break? *Current Economic Comment*. November, 1952.

Special Study and Analysis

Agarwal, S. N. Gandhism and Communism. *Modern Review*. November, 1952.

Alfonso, Tesauro. Il Sistema Parlamentare nell'Ordinamento Inglese ed in quello Francese e Italiano. *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico*. May-August, 1952.

Azaola, J. M. de. Miguel de Unamuno et l'Existentialisme. *La Vie Intellectuelle*. January, 1953.

Bagolini, Luigi. El Tema del Hombre en la Filosofía Brasileña. *Estudios Americanos*. January, 1953.

Bain, Reed. What is this Crisis? *Philosophy of Science*. January, 1953.

Baker, Joseph E. Liberty and the Pursuit of Truth. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*. Autumn, 1952.

Banerjee, D. N. Political Ideologies and Political Behaviour. *Modern Review*. December, 1952.

Baron, Salo W. Impact of Wars on Religion. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

Benda, J. Defense du Rationalisme. *Les Études Philosophiques*. VII/3. 1952.

Berelson, Bernard. Democratic Theory and Public Opinion. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Boas, George. The New Authoritarianism. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*. Autumn, 1952.

Boyd, Julian P. The Relevance of Thomas Jefferson for the Twentieth Century. *American Scholar*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Brunello, Bruno. Democrazia ed Empirismo. *Sophia*. XXI/1. 1953.

Burdeau, Georges. Démocratie Classique ou

Démocratie Vivante. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. October-December, 1952.

Chen, Theodore Hsi-En. The Marxist Remolding of Chinese Society. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique. *Cahiers du Communisme*. November, 1952.

Dawson, Christopher. Christianity and the Humanist Tradition. *Dublin Review*. Fourth Quarter, 1952.

DeGrunne, Dominic. Culture and the Modern Democratic State. *Confluence*. December, 1952.

Del Estal, P. Gabriel. Derecho Natural y Teología. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1952.

Donahue, Charles. Freedom and Education. *Thought*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Ebbinghaus, J. The Law of Humanity and the Limits of State Power. *Philosophical Quarterly*. January, 1953.

Evans, Frederic. Whither Democracy? *Quarterly Review*. January, 1953.

Freundlich, R. Der Wissenschaftsbegriff der Philosophie. *Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Psychologie, Pädagogik*. IV/1. 1952.

Garaudy, Roger. Le Néo-Blanquisme de Contrebande et les Positions Antiléninistes d'André Marty. *Cahiers du Communisme*. January, 1953.

García Escudero, José M. Censura y Libertad. *Arbor*. November, 1952.

Gard, Richard A. Ideological Problems in Southeast Asia. *Philosophy East and West*. January, 1953.

Gilson, Etienne. Dogmatism and Tolerance. *International Journal*. Winter, 1952-53.

Greene, Murray. Schumpeter's Imperialism—A Critical Note. *Social Research*. December, 1952.

Holborn, H. Der Deutsche Idealismus in Sozialgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung. *Historische Zeitschrift*. October, 1952.

Hollis, Christopher. Political and Economic Power. *Politica*. IV/1. 1952.

Hook, Sidney. Does the Smith Act Threaten our Liberties? *Commentary*. January, 1953.

Horowitz, M. W. and Perlmutter, H. V. The Concept of the Social Group. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1953.

Howell, Ronald F. Political Philosophy on a Theological Foundation [Niebuhr]. *Ethics*. January, 1953.

Jacobson, N. P. The Problem of Civilization. *Ethics*. October, 1952.

- Jonas, Hans. Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism. *Social Research*. December, 1952.
- Jouvenal, Bertrand de. L'Essence de la Politique. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. October-December, 1952.
- Kantor, Harry. The Aprista Search for a Program Applicable to Latin America. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Kaufman, Adam. The Origin of "the Political Economy of Socialism." *Soviet Studies*. January, 1953.
- Kilpatrick, W. H. Dewey's Philosophy of Education. *Educational Forum*. January, 1953.
- Krugman, Herbert. The Appeal of Communism to American Middle Class Intellectuals and Trade Unionists. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.
- Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von. "Linkskatholiken" und "Reaktionäre." *Frankfurter Hefte*. January, 1953.
- Lacroix, Jean. La Promotion des Masses. *Esprit*. January, 1953.
- La Palombara, Joseph. Is the Press Too Free? *Pacific Spectator*. Winter, 1953.
- Larrabee, Eric. The Mass Media and the Intellectuals. *Confluence*. December, 1952.
- Lilge, Frederick. Reason and Ideology in Education. *Harvard Educational Review*. Fall, 1952.
- Long, Norton E. Patriotism for Partisans: A Responsible Opposition. *Antioch Review*. Winter, 1952-1953.
- Losada, Angel. La Cogestión en Alemania Occidental. *Cuadernos de Política Social*. No. 15, 1952.
- MacLennan, R. D. The Scottish National Movement. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1953.
- MacRae, Donald G. The Ideological Situation in the Labour Movement. *Political Quarterly*. January-March, 1953.
- Masur, G. Arnold Toynbees Philosophie der Geschichte. *Historische Zeitschrift*. October, 1952.
- Mayo, H. B. Marxist Theory and Scientific Methods. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. November, 1952.
- Montague, Joel B. Bureaucracy and British Socialism. *Sociology and Social Research*. January-February, 1953.
- Munch, Rudolf. Humanismus und Pragmatismus. *Neuphilologische Zeitschrift*. IV/6. 1952.
- Munilla, Octavio Gil. El Magisterio y las Massas. *Estudios Americanos*. September, 1952.
- Napolitano, Tomaso. La Questione del Comunismo. *Nuova Antologia*. December, 1952.
- Naville, Pierre. États-Unis et Contradictions Capitalistes. *Les Temps Modernes*. December, 1952.
- Newman, William J. Propaganda and the American Intellectual. *Twentieth Century*. January, 1953.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Anomaly of European Socialism. *Yale Review*. Winter, 1953.
- Ollero, Carlos. Radicalismo y Realismo en la Política. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. July-August, 1952.
- Ong, Walter J. American Catholicism and America. *Thought*. Winter, 1952-1953.
- Paniker, Raimundo. Christianidad y Cruz. *Arbor*. December, 1952.
- Plastrik, S. R. Sartre, De Duivel en de Almachtige God. *S & D*. December, 1952.
- Randall, J. G. Historianship. *American Historical Review*. January, 1953.
- Ravagnan, Luis M. Existencialismo y Caracterología. *Notas y Estudios de Filosofía*. July-September, 1952.
- Rees, J. C. Professor Oakeshott on Political Education. *Mind*. January, 1953.
- Rein'l, Robert L. Comparative Philosophy and Intellectual Tolerance. *Philosophy East and West*. January, 1953.
- Religion in the University. [Various Articles.] *Universities Quarterly*. November, 1952.
- Rey, W. H. The Destiny of Man in the Modern Utopian Novel. *Symposium*. May, 1952.
- Rich, Clifford A. L. The Permanent Crisis of Italian Democracy. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1952.
- Rieff, Philip. History, Psychoanalysis, and the Social Sciences. *Ethics*. January, 1953.
- Robinson, N. H. G. Natural Law, Morality and the Divine Will. *Philosophical Quarterly*. January, 1953.
- Schmaus, Michael. Die Christliche Auffassung der Geschichte. *Universitas*. January, 1953.
- Schull, William J. The Effect of Christianity on Consanguinity in Nagasaki. *American Anthropologist*. January-March, 1953.
- Sciacca, M. F. L'Esistenzialismo come "Crisi" e come "Critica" del Pensiero Moderno Immanentista. *Humanities*. November, 1952.
- Sciacca, M. F. Ortega y Gasset e la "Razón Vital." *Humanitas*. December, 1952.
- Smith, T. V. Democratic Apologetics. *Ethics*. January, 1953.

- Spain, August O. International Federalism in Recent American Thought. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.
- Steinen, Wolfram von den. Kritik und Wahrheit in der Geschichte. *Die Welt als Geschichte*. XII/3. 1952.
- Suffert, Georges. Masses et Pouvoir. *Esprit*. January, 1953.
- Tausch, Carl F. The Religious View of the Doctrine of Natural Rights. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January, 1953.
- Taylor, George E. The Intellectual Climate of Asia. *Yale Review*. Winter, 1953.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. El Nuevo Despertar de Asia. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1952.
- Walker, Margaret. The Nausea of Sartre. *Yale Review*. Winter, 1953.
- White, Lynn. Democracy and Private Education. *Pacific Spectator*. Winter, 1953.
- Wild, John. Natural Law and Modern Ethical Theory. *Ethics*. October, 1952.
- Wolfers, Arnold. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1952.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

- Aron, Raymond. Science et Politique chez Max Weber et Aujourd'hui. *Liberté de L'Esprit*. October and November, 1952.
- Kort, Fred. The Issue of a Science of Politics in Utilitarian Thought. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. December, 1952.
- Martin, Roscoe. Sobre a Natureza da Administração Publica. *Revista Do Serviço Público*. December, 1951.
- Sartori, Giovanni. Scienza Politica e Conoscenza Retrospettiva. *Studi Politici*. June-August, 1952.
- Swanson, G. E. The Approach to a General Theory of Action by Parsons and Shils. *American Sociological Review*. April, 1953.
- Thompson, Kenneth W. The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments. *Review of Politics*. October, 1952.

Research Methods and Organization

- Eysenck, H. J. The Logical Basis of Factor Analysis. *American Psychologist*. March, 1953.
- Lowenthal, Leo (Ed.). International Communications Research. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1952-53 (whole number).
- Thomas, Dorothy Swaine. Experiences in Interdisciplinary Research. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Motivation and Personality

- Bass, Bernard M.; McGehee, Charles R.; Hawkins, William C.; Young, Paul C.; and Gebel, Arnold S. Personality Variables Re-

lated to Leaderless Group Discussion Behavior. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Bruner, Jerome S. and Rodrigues, John S. Some Determinants of Apparent Size. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Davis, Norah M. The Hopes of Industrial Workers for Their Children. *Occupational Psychology*. January, 1953.

Hart, H. H. Masochism, Passivity, and Radicalism. *The Psychoanalytic Review*. October, 1952.

Riesman, David. Some Observations on the Study of American Character. *Psychiatry*. August, 1952.

Wallace, Anthony F. C. Individual Differences and Cultural Uniformities. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Westoff, Charles F. The Changing Focus of Differential Fertility Research: The Social Mobility Hypothesis. *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*. January, 1953.

Opinions and Attitudes

Bieri, James. Changes in Interpersonal Perceptions Following Social Interaction. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Bonham, J. The Middle Class Elector. *British Journal of Sociology*. September, 1952.

Case, Herman M. An Independent Test of the Interest-Group Theory of Social Class. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Fensterheim, Herbert and Tresselt, M. E. The Influence of Value Systems on the Perception of People. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Gorden, Raymond L. The Effect of Attitude Toward Russia on Logical Reasoning. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1953.

Inkeles, Alex and Geiger, Kent. Critical Letters to the Editors of the Soviet Press (in two parts). *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952 and February, 1953.

Janis, Irving L. and Fishback, Seymour. Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Jarrett, R. F. and Sheriffs, Alex C. Propaganda, Debate, and Impartial Presentation as Determiners of Attitude Change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Lang, Kurt and Lang, Gladys Engel. The Unique Perspective of Television and its Effect: A Pilot Study. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1953.

Parrish, Jack A. and Campbell, Donald T. Measuring Propaganda Effects with Direct and Indirect Attitude Tests. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Sherif, Muzafer and Hovland, Carl I. Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. January, 1953.

Group Behavior

Biondi, Pomptier. Potere e Classe Politica. *Studi Politici*. June-August, 1952.

Chowdhury, K. Ray. Psychological Analysis of Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Non-Cooperation and Non-Violence. *Modern Review*. September, 1952.

Darley, J. G.; Gross, N. and Martin, W. C. Studies of Group Behavior: Factors Associated with the Productivity of Groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. December, 1952.

DeFleur, Melvin L. and Rainboth, Edith Dyer. Testing Message Diffusion in Four Communities. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Eisenstadt, S. N. Institutionalization of Immigrant Behaviour. *Human Relations*. 1952, #4.

Festinger, Leon; Gerard, Harold B.; Hymovitch, Bernard; Kelley, Harold H.; and Raven, Bert. The Influence Process in the Presence of Extreme Deviates. *Human Relations*. 1952, #4.

Foote, Nelson N. The Professionalization of

Labor in Detroit. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Gitlow, A. L. Machine Politics in American Trade Unions. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1952.

Hatt, Paul K. and Ktsanes, Virginia. Patterns of American Stratification as Reflected in Selected Social Science Literature. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Heinicke, Cristoph and Bales, Robert F. Developmental Trends in the Structure of Small Groups. *Sociometry*. February, 1953.

Hollingshead, August B. Trends in Social Stratification: A Case Study. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Horowitz, Milton W. and Perlmutter, Howard V. The Concept of the Social Group. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1953.

Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Political Behavior. Research in Political Behavior. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. December, 1952.

Macrae, Duncan, Jr. The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. December, 1952.

Martin, F. M. Social Status and Electoral Choice in Two Constituencies. *British Journal of Sociology*. September, 1952.

Martin, Walter T. A Consideration of Differences in the Extent and Location of Formal Associational Activities of Rural-Urban Fringe Residents. *American Sociological Review*. December, 1952.

Maucorps, P. R. Moral Combatant et Cohésion Fonctionnelle. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. October, 1952.

Minnis, Mhyra S. Cleavage in Women's Organizations. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1953.

Moulin, Léo. Le Gouvernement des Communautés Religieuses comme Type de Gouvernement Mixte. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1952.

Nash, John. Two-Person Cooperative Games. *Econometrica*. January, 1953.

Pfautz, Harold W. The Current Literature on Social Stratification: Critique and Bibliography. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Rice, A. K. and Trist, E. L. Institutional and Sub-Institutional Determinants of Change in Labour Turnover. *Human Relations*. 1952, #4.

Rogoff, Natalie. Social Stratification in

France and in the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Ross, Aileen D. The Social Control of Philanthropy. *American Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.

Rubenstein, Albert H. Problems in the Measurement of Interpersonal Communication in an Ongoing Situation. *Sociometry*. February, 1953.

Ruesch, Jurgen; Block, Jack; and Bennett, Lillian. The Assessment of Communication: I. A Method for the Analysis of Social Interaction. *Journal of Psychology*. January, 1953.

Schachter, Stanley and Hall, Robert. Group-Derived Restraints and Audience Persuasion. *Human Relations*. 1952. #4.

Simon, Herbert A. Comments on the Theory of Organizations. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. December, 1952.

Stone, Robert C. Factory Organization and Vertical Mobility. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1953.

Urban Trends and Characteristics. *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (U.N.)*. March, 1953.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Allen, W. R. The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull, 1907-1933. *American Economic Review*. March, 1953.

Bach, G. L. The Economics and Politics of Money. *Harvard Business Review*. March-April, 1953.

Boulding, K. E. Implications for General

Economics of Moralistic Theories of the Firm. *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*. May, 1952.

Drucker, Peter F. The Employee Society. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Fisher, Jacob. Data for Measuring the Effectiveness of Public Income-Maintaining Programs. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. March, 1953.

Harris, Chauncey D. and Wüllser, Gabriele. The Refugee Problem of Germany. *Economic Geography*. January, 1953.

Hildebrand, George H. American Unionism, Social Stratification, and Power. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

McKee, James B. Status and Power in the Industrial Community: A Comment on Drucker's Thesis. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

McLuhan, H. M. Technology and Political Change. *International Journal*. Summer, 1952.

Scott, A. D. Federal Grants and Resource Allocation. *Journal of Political Economy*. December, 1952.

Siegel, Irving H. Labor Productivity in the Soviet Union. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. March, 1953.

Somers, Harold M. What Generally Happens During Business Cycles and Why. *Journal of Economic History*. Summer, 1952.

Sturmthal, Adolf. Nationalization and Workers' Control in Britain and France. *Journal of Political Economy*. February, 1953.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ALLEN, JACK (ED.). *The Teacher of the Social Studies*. Washington: National Education Association. 1952. Pp. vi, 248. Paper, \$3.00; cloth, \$3.50.

CELLER, EMANUEL. *You Never Leave Brooklyn: The Autobiography of Emanuel Celler*. New York: The John Day Company. 1953. Pp. viii, 280. \$3.75.

CZARNOMSKI, F. B. *Can Russia Survive? An Examination of the Facts and Figures of Soviet Reality*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. 128. \$2.75.

ELDRIDGE, SEBA. *The Dynamics of Social Action*. Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1952. Pp. v, 119. \$2.50.

ELLIS, CLARENCE. *Hubert de Burgh: A Study in Constancy*. London: Phoenix House Ltd. 1953. Pp. 240. \$5.50.

FAY, C. R. *Round about Industrial Britain: 1830-1860*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 227. \$5.50.

GEIGER, LOUIS G. *Joseph W. Folk of Missouri*. Columbia, Missouri: The Curators of the University of Missouri. 1953. Pp. 206. Paper, \$2.50; cloth, \$3.50.

HANSEN, ALVIN H. AND CLEMENCE, RICHARD V. (ED.). *Readings in Business Cycles and National Income*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1953. Pp. xi, 588. \$5.25.

HIGGS, HENRY. *The Physiocrats: Six Lectures on the French Economistes of the 18th Century*. New York: The Langland Press. 1952. Pp. x, 158. \$3.25.

HOFMEYER, JAN H. *South Africa*. Revised by J. C. Cope. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1953. Pp. x, 253. \$3.75.

- HORNER, HARLAN HOYT. *Lincoln and Greeley*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 432. \$6.00.
- INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. *Yearbook, 1951-1952*. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff's Publishing Co. 1952. Pp. 242.
- KUZNETS, SIMON. *Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business Cycles, National Income, and Economic Growth*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Pp. viii, 333. \$4.50.
- LAMONT, CORLISS. *Soviet Civilization*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. xviii, 433. \$5.00.
- L'Année Politique 1951: Revue Chronologique des Principaux Faits Politiques Économiques et Sociaux de la France et de L'Union Française du 1^{er} Janvier 1951 au 1^{er} Janvier 1952*. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. xv, 784.
- LEMMER, GEORGE F. *Norman J. Colman and Colman's Rural World: A Study in Agricultural Leadership*. Columbia, Missouri: The Curators of the University of Missouri. 1953. Pp. 174. \$2.50.
- LOWRY, WALKER. *Lope Aguirre: The Wanderer*. New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 78. \$2.25.
- McAULIFFE, W.-R. *Modern Asia Explained*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. viii, 163. \$3.25.
- McCLOY, SHELBY T. *French Inventions of the Eighteenth Century*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1952. Pp. 212. \$4.50.
- MACIVER, R. M. (ED.). *Moments of Personal Discovery*. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. ix, 170. \$2.00.
- MALLORY, WALTER H. AND BARBER, JOSEPH. (EDS.). *Political Handbook of the World, 1953 (26th year)*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 1953. Pp. v, 233. \$3.75.
- MARDER, ARTHUR J. (ED.). *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone*. Vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. 377. \$5.50.
- MARK, IRVING AND SCHWAAB, EUGENE L. (EDS.). *The Faith of Our Fathers: An Anthology Expressing the Aspirations of the American Common Man, 1790-1860*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xviii, 393. \$5.00.
- MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The Economic Development of Ceylon*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1953. Pp. xxxii, 829. \$7.50.
- MISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The Economic Development of Jamaica*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 288.
- MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The Economic Development of Nicaragua*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1953. Pp. xxxi, 424. \$5.00.
- NEWSOM, CARROLL V. (ED.). *A Television Policy for Education*. Washington: American Council on Education. 1952. Pp. xx, 266. \$3.50.
- SKINNER, B. F. *Science and Human Behavior*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1953. Pp. x, 461. \$4.00.
- SMITH, WILLARD H. *Schuyler Colfax: The Changing Fortunes of a Political Idol*. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau. 1952. Pp. xiii, 475. \$4.75.
- Sugar: Facts and Figures, 1952*. Washington: United States Cuban Sugar Council. 1953. Pp. 176.
- TALLMAN, MARJORIE. *Dictionary of Civics and Government*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. 289. \$5.00.
- TAX FOUNDATION. *Facts and Figures on Government Finance, 1952-1953*. New York: The Tax Foundation. 1952. Pp. xxii, 217.
- TOMPKINS, STUART RAMSAY. *The Russian Mind: From Peter the Great through the Enlightenment*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 291. \$4.00.
- TWITCHELL, K. S. WITH COLLABORATION OF JURJI, EDWARD J. *Saudi Arabia: With an Account of the Development of Its Natural Resources*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xxi, 231. \$5.00.
- WHITE, W. L. *Back Down the Ridge*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1953. Pp. ix, 182. \$3.00.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Indian Political Science Association was held at the Muslim University in Aligarh on December 25-27, 1952. The Conference opened with an address of welcome by Dr. Zakir Husain, Vice-Chancellor of the Muslim University, and the presidential address of Professor Haroon Khan Sherwani (retired) of Osmania University, Hyderabad. Three main topics were considered during the Conference: "Civil Liberties in India since 1947," "Public Administration in India," and "The General Elections in India." Two public lectures were given, both by American political scientists. Dr. Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and visiting Fulbright professor at the University of Delhi, read a paper on "Factors Shaping American Foreign Policy," and Mrs. Emily Ehle, of Philadelphia, cultural evaluation officer of the United States Information Service in New Delhi, discussed "Techniques of Public Opinion Analysis in the United States."

The following were elected as officers of the Association for 1953: Professor B. D. Sharma of Punjab University, president; Professor R. Bhaskaran of the University of Madras, general secretary; Professor S. V. Kogekar of Fergusson College, Poona, managing editor of the *Indian Journal of Political Science*. Professor D. N. Banerjee of Calcutta University and Professor S. V. Kogekar were designated as representatives to the International Political Science Association. The sixteenth session of the Indian Political Science Conference is to meet at Sangor University in December, 1953.—N.D.P.

On invitation from the Citizenship Clearing House, representatives of six colleges and universities met in an all-day session in the Law Center of New York University on November 8, 1952, to discuss their individual courses and methods to promote more effective preparation of college students for participation in politics after graduation. The group also discussed at length ways and means to measure the effectiveness of academic training for political participation. Colleges and universities represented were: Allegheny College, Pennsylvania College for Women, Ohio

Wesleyan University, Boston University, Hamline University, and Washington Square College. Each of these institutions, as well as the Citizenship Clearing House, is conducting programs under grants from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh to aid in the training of college students for political responsibilities.

The Grinnell College Institute of International Affairs, under the chairmanship of Joseph Dunner, held a spring session on the general theme, "Will There Be a United States of Europe?" The chief participants were: Gontran de Juniac, Minister Plenipotentiary of France; J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, U. S. Department of State; and Karl Loewenstein, of the Department of Political Science, Amherst College.

The Fourth National Conference sponsored by the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO will be held at the University of Minnesota, September 15-17, 1953, on the theme "America's Stake in World Affairs." The purpose of the Conference is to bring together a group of leaders, broadly representative of American life, to consider ways to improve our understanding of and participation in world affairs, particularly through the kinds of international cooperation represented by UNESCO. Invitations will be extended to national organizations and cultural institutions to send delegates.

The U. S. Section of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences met on March 8 in Washington, D. C. The forthcoming international Congress of the Institute, to be held in Istanbul, Turkey, September 6-14, 1953, was discussed. The tentative agenda of the Congress includes sessions on the administration of economic undertakings, international administrative jurisdiction, international administrative tribunals, grants-in-aid as techniques of administrative direction, training of public, including international employees, problems in the conduct of economic development programs, personal performance and ethics in government, case studies in the conduct of technical assistance programs, and

identification and correction of administrative deficiencies. Those interested in attending this Congress are invited to get in touch with Mr. Edwin T. Haeefe, Secretary, U. S. Section, 1313 East 60th St., Chicago 37, Ill., regarding travel arrangements, hotel accommodations and conference registration. Mr. Haeefe would also be glad to know of Americans planning to be in the Near East area next fall who should be invited to the Congress.

A UN-UNESCO Conference on *Social Aspects of Executing Technical Assistance Programs* was held at United Nations, New York from March 30 to April 4, 1953. Walter H. C. Laves, vice president of the Governmental Affairs Institute, served as Director and Chairman. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together a selected group of United Nations Technical Assistance Resident Representatives, experts who have served in Technical Assistance Programs, administrators of the program from headquarters and a few aca-

demic specialists in Technical Assistance Programs. The latter included Thomas C. Blaisdell, Bert Hoselitz, Wilbur E. Moore, Morris Opler and Anibal Buitron (Pan American Union). The Conference gave special attention to problems of timing and balance in technical assistance programs; the development of participation by governments and peoples of underdeveloped countries; the adjustment of technological knowledge to the needs of underdeveloped countries; the selection and training of experts for service in underdeveloped countries; problems of evaluation of technical assistance programs; and working relations with national and local officials. The Conference was limited to about 30 participants and 30 observers. It was opened by the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, Mr. David Owen. It is expected that a report on the Conference will be published later this year.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

At the annual meeting held in Berkeley, California on April 10, new officers were elected for the Northern California Political Science Association as follows:

President—Joseph P. Harris, University of California

Vice-President—John Selig, City College of San Francisco

Sec.-Treasurer—Robert McKenzie, University of San Francisco

The American University has announced plans for a second Washington Semester program paralleling the present program for a semester's study of government in action in Washington, D. C. Colleges and universities now participating in the Washington Semester are: Allegheny, American, Beloit, Birmingham Southern, Bucknell, Wooster, Denison, Dickinson, Hamline, Hiram, Hollins, Kenyon, Lake Erie, Lindenwood, Millsaps, Oberlin, Pennsylvania, Westminster, Willamette, and William Jewell.

The new program will emphasize the political dynamics of political parties, public policy making and administration in the national government. Programs are under the supervision of Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, chairman of the department of political science and public administration, and Lowell H. Hattery, associate professor of political science and

public administration at the American University.

The Carnegie Corporation of New York has made a grant to Princeton University and the Organizational Behavior Section for a three-year project of basic research in international politics. Known as the Foreign Policy Analysis Project, the operation will be under the direction of Professor Richard C. Snyder of the department of politics, in association with Mr. Burton Sapin (political scientist) and Mr. Henry Bruck (sociologist), both of whom have been members of the Section. Professor Harold Sprout will serve as general adviser to the project. An interdisciplinary seminar comprised of faculty members and pre-doctoral candidates meets regularly as part of the program. It is anticipated that the project will be executed in three stages: first, an attempt to classify and evaluate various approaches to the study of international politics on the basis of a conceptual scheme developed during the past two years in the Organizational Behavior Section; second, an attempt to build analytical bridges between international politics and other disciplines, particularly the social sciences; finally, an attempt to discuss research priorities and problems of research in this field. A publication series is contemplated.

The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh has made grants of funds to Yale University and the College of Wooster to promote the training of college men and women for participation in politics. Yale University received a grant of \$65,000 for a four-year program of graduate fellowships in political science. Falk Fellows will receive an average stipend of \$1800 and, subject to appraisal of the quality of their graduate work, may have their fellowships renewed for a second year and, in some cases, for a third year. Recipients of the fellowships will be expected to have a particular interest in politics and policy formation.

The College of Wooster was granted funds by the Falk Foundation to establish an Institute of Politics. Its primary objective will be to stimulate more active participation by college men and women in politics within the framework of the established political parties. The Institute will serve as a liaison agency between students and active participants in the political process.

A program to train students for city manager careers will be introduced at Cornell University next September. The two-year graduate course leading to a master's degree in public administration will be directed by Professor Albert M. Hillhouse of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, which will grant the degree. Students will spend more than half the time in business and public administration courses, but will also study such subjects as stream pollution and traffic engineering in the College of Engineering; housing, zoning principles, and regional planning in the College of Architecture; and the law of local government in the Law School.

The Graduate Student Round Table of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, as part of a new series of discussions concerning research problems in major areas of political science, heard the following speakers from other universities during the 1952-53 academic year: Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago (November 25); Professor Stephen K. Bailey of Wesleyan University (March 17); and Professor Herbert Simon of the Carnegie Institute of Technology (April 22).

The American Political Science Association was among the twenty-three national organi-

zations which won top awards in the 1952 Register and Vote Competition sponsored by the American Heritage Foundation. The Association was cited for "the most valuable research" in support of the campaign.

The Institute of Economics and Finance of the University of Rome has extended a special invitation to all American political scientists travelling or doing research in Italy to avail themselves of the library and other facilities of the Institute.

By recent action of the Board of Trustees, the name of Ohio Wesleyan's Institute of Practical Politics has been changed to "The Ben A. Arneson Institute of Practical Politics."

At New York University the Graduate Division of Public Service founded in 1938 has been renamed the Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service. Dr. William J. Ronan has been named Dean of the School.

Harold F. Alderfer, professor of political science and executive secretary of the Institute of Local Government at the Pennsylvania State College, was awarded the Cross of the Commander of the Royal Order of the Phoenix at the Greek Embassy in Washington, D. C., on January 30, 1953, in recognition of his services to Greece as a Mutual Security Agency representative from 1950 to 1952.

Walter Becker, of the Free University of Berlin and during the past academic year visiting professor of law at Columbia University, lectured on judicial review in Germany and related topics at the University of California (Berkeley) in February.

Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Tennessee Valley Authority, formally opened the Case Study on the TVA at Florida State University, on February 16-17, 1953. The new program of Case Studies of important federal agencies was begun last year by the School of Public Administration when the Case Study was held on the Department of Commerce and was formally opened by the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer.

During the past academic year, Professor Taylor Cole of Duke University, in Italy as a Fulbright Research Scholar, participated in the meetings of the Research Committee of the

International Political Science Association and of the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Teaching of the Social Sciences of UNESCO, and lectured at several European universities.

Edward S. Corwin, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus, Princeton University, gave a series of lectures during the fall term at the New York University Law School and at the New School for Social Research.

Dr. Martin B. Dworkin, assistant to the dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service at New York University, has been named Director of Research for the City Affairs Committee of the City of New York.

Professor Charles Hyneman of Northwestern University and Professor Lee Greene of the University of Tennessee were guest speakers at the University of Kansas in January and February. Professor Hyneman addressed a joint meeting of the Kansas-Missouri chapters of the American Society for Public Administration and the County Clerks of Kansas on January 27. Professor Greene, on February 18, spoke to the City Clerks and staff members of the Bureau of Government Research.

Grayson L. Kirk, professor of government, succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of Columbia University on January 19, 1953.

Kenneth P. Landon, Officer in Charge, Thai and Malay Affairs, United States Department of State, delivered the first of the Tiffany Memorial Lectures on World Affairs at Wheaton College, February 26, on the theme "The Importance of Southeast Asia in World Affairs." These lectures, sponsored annually by the Division of Social Science and the Wheaton College Alumni Association, are presented in honor of Orrin E. Tiffany, who served as professor of history at Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, from 1929 to 1945.

Edward H. Litchfield, executive director of the American Political Science Association, has been appointed Dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University.

Professors John W. Masland, Jr. and Laurence I. Radway of the department of government at Dartmouth College are under-

taking a study of civil-military relations. Their work, which is just getting under way and will require two years for completion, is being financed by a grant of \$45,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The main study areas are: (1) the utilization of career military officers in positions in which they participate in the formation of national policies, (2) the skills and attitudes that appear to be desirable in military officers who hold such positions, and (3) the extent to which cultivation of these skills and attitudes appears to be an objective in military education, training, and assignment processes.

Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, gave the Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States at Boston University on February 18-20, 1953. The subject of these lectures was "The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Revealed Truth or Power Group, 1930-1937." They will be published in the *Boston Law Review* and in book form.

John D. Millett, professor of political science at Columbia University, has been named President of Miami University. He will assume his new duties on July 1, 1953.

Saul K. Padover, of the New School for Social Research, was in Europe in August-September, 1952, under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association to study European integration. During the fall term, he addressed the Foreign Policy Association in New York, the International Conference on Asian Problems, the Adult Education Council and several other organizations.

Mohammad Tawfik Ramzi, assistant professor of political science at Fouad University in Cairo, who is serving as a visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Michigan, on March 5, 1953, addressed the staff members of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on the subject "Political Trends and Problems of the Middle East."

Dr. William J. Ronan, Dean of the School of Public Administration and Social Service at New York University, has been acting as Director of Studies for the New York State Temporary Commission on the Coordination of State Activities, the state's "Little Hoover Commission."

Professor Leonard D. White, of the University of Chicago, delivered the Edward Douglass White Lectures at Louisiana State University on March 3, 4, and 5, 1953. The general topic of the lectures was "The States and the Nation," and the specific subjects of the lectures were: "The March of Power to Washington," "Strength and Limitation of the States," and "The Next Quarter Century."

Francis G. Wilson, of the University of Illinois, University Center lecturer in the department of political science at Emory University during the spring quarter, delivered a lecture at Emory University on "Public Opinion and the Intellectuals" and one at Agnes Scott College on "The Secular Democracy."

THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE

The College of Europe at Bruges in Belgium, now in its third year, is a new venture in political education which should be of special interest to American political scientists. For here is no ordinary graduate school of public administration. Ambitious graduates of leading European universities do not go to Bruges merely in order to qualify more quickly for desirable appointments in the administrative services of their several countries, or even in the rising international agencies which are making an ever stronger appeal to the imaginations of talented young men and women in Western Europe. They are taking part in an experiment designed to show that the European Community, when duly organized, can depend on the aid of suitably trained lawyers, economists, political scientists, and other professional assistants in the management of its affairs. They are the harbingers of a new class of European administrators, capable doubtless of serving Western Europe with the requisite technical competence but also, what is more significant, with the necessary devotion to West European, instead of merely national, interests and in a proper West European spirit.

It was with this purpose in mind that the founders of the College chose Bruges for the scene of their experiment. Bruges is a city which still seems to be freshly out of the middle ages, when educated Europeans used Latin as their common language and were not divided against themselves by corrosive national sentiments and bitter memories of ruinous strife. It provides an atmosphere in which intelligent young men and women can try to feel like

Europeans again and learn to live with one another as members of a fair sample of a truly European community. In Bruges the members of the student body of the College of Europe reside under a common roof and take their meals together as if they belonged to some new European fraternity. The lectures and other formal academic exercises constitute only a part of the collegiate discipline offered to those in training at Bruges for the future public service of Europe. This intimate community life forms a marked contrast to the unorganized existence at many continental universities. It more than compensates for the imperfect library facilities of a small provincial capital without a university of its own.

The College was planned and organized by the same groups of European statesmen and scholars who sponsored the establishment of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe unanimously approved the foundation of the College and many of its members have taken a leading part in their several countries in promoting the recruitment of its students. Each of the member-states of the Council of Europe is entitled to send a limited quota of students to the College, and nominations for the quotas are made by the state educational authorities or committees of educators in the several countries. In the current year there are students from most of these member-states, together with a few selected refugees from countries behind the iron curtain. The non-European countries represented are Egypt, Indonesia, and the United States.

The faculty consists of a small number of permanent professors and a larger number of visiting lecturers drawn from the staffs of leading European universities and international organizations with European offices. Among the latter, besides the Council of Europe, are the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, several of the specialized agencies associated with the United Nations, notably the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Secretariat of the European Coal and Steel Organization. Besides attendance at lectures and seminars the students take several trips during the college year to places of special interest to students of public administration. These trips are planned also with a view to helping in the development of an esprit de corps suitable for the future admin-

istrators of European community organizations. In 1952 the year ended with a trip to Berlin, where the student body and several of the faculty spent three days as guests of the West German government. This was an experience well calculated to inspire a kind of European corporate sentiment transcending the traditional nationalism of the West European state universities.

The financial condition of the College is sound. The direct costs of instruction are allocated to the member-states of the Council of Europe in proportion to their contributions to the expenses of the Council itself. The costs of the students' subsistence are apportioned among the member-states in proportion to the numbers of students which they respectively send to the College. The overhead costs are assumed by the government of Belgium. The living and working quarters are furnished by the local government in Bruges. The total budget for the current year amounts to nearly six million Belgian francs. More income could be used to good advantage, especially for the improvement of the library, but the management has been vigorous and enterprising and has made good use of its limited facilities.

The first test of such a European civil service academy is doubtless the placing of its graduates. Hitherto the opportunities have been limited for employment in genuine European political institutions. A few graduates have found places with the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, and a greater number will doubtless be placed with the new Coal and Steel Community Organization, the Secretariat of which was located in Luxemburg after the close of the last college year. Others have been employed by various propagandist organizations, notably the European Cultural Center at Geneva, the European Youth Campaign, and Radio Free Europe at Munich. A larger number have entered the foreign services of their respective national governments or other branches of national public services. A few have entered the teaching profession.

More important of course than the first positions obtained by the graduates of the College of Europe will be the level of employment reached after ten, twenty, or thirty years. What this may be depends mainly upon the future development of the European community itself and of the institutions which may be organized for its service. From this viewpoint the current efforts of the special Constituent Assembly to organize a West Euro-

pean federal union are the greatest interest.—
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE.

UNESCO'S INVITATION TO ITS MEMBER
STATES REGARDING THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES

The 1953-54 program of UNESCO, authorized by the General Conference in December, 1952, contains resolutions directing the Director General to carry on certain programs and other resolutions inviting Member States to undertake certain related and supporting activities. American individuals, institutions, and associations in the social sciences will be contributing in the program evolving from both types of resolutions, which received the concurrence of many nations. But because the responsibility and initiative rests particularly with the Member States in vitalizing the resolutions which they have accepted and addressed to themselves, it is especially important that our social scientists be aware of those which are to be found in the Social Science Chapter of the 1953-54 program.

The resolutions invite Member States:

- (1) To encourage studies of the impact of technological changes upon the social and economic structure of communities and to take account of the results of these studies in the training of technicians (Resolution number 3.231).
- (2) To undertake surveys of the conditions governing the land reforms which they have already carried out or are contemplating, together with the effects of such reforms (Resolution number 3.241).
- (3) To pay increasing attention to the economic and social problems created by the demographic developments of the world as compared with the development of resources, and to facilitate scientific studies which contribute to an international examination of these problems (Resolution number 3.251).
- (4) To promote studies relating to the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to publicize the results of these studies and, in particular, by the dissemination of information and by teaching, to combat racial prejudice and discrimination (Resolution number 3.261).
- (5) To employ the methods and services of social scientists in an attempt to evaluate

objectively the results achieved through action undertaken in cooperation with international organizations and to report on the experiences gained (Resolution number 3.271).

- (6) To collect, in a regular and systematic manner, statistical information on their educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions and to forward such statistics periodically to the Director General (Resolution number 3.31).

Obviously, American social scientists are already contributing much to the understanding of these important problems, in both their domestic and foreign aspects, by research and discussion. We will benefit, along with Unesco, if these resolutions stimulate further expert analysis and action at home and abroad. In some areas of the world, where the social sciences as we know them have lagged, these resolutions may help to encourage local work which will enrich knowledge and inform policies.

If item (6), concerning the collection of statistics, is set aside for the present purposes as largely an ongoing governmental responsibility, each of the problems is receiving considerable attention by various individuals and institutions. If there is any lag it is possibly in item (5), evaluation of international cooperation programs, where, however, research programs have got under way in the past two years.

The question thus arises—What, if anything, can these resolutions mean to the United States? What do we do about them that we are not already doing? Since neither Unesco nor the staff of the U. S. National Commission for Unesco has funds to invest in vitalizing these resolutions, what additional voluntary action might be possible and worthwhile?

Correspondence on these questions would be

welcomed by Professor Peter Odegard, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Several suggestions have been made which seem feasible and likely to be helpful. (1) It would be useful if individuals and institutions made certain that their research on these problems reached the Department of Social Sciences, Unesco House, 19 Avenue Kleber, Paris, so that the reporting on relevant American research would be timely. (2) Professional correspondence can be a highly useful form of international cooperation. Already, no doubt, American scholars interested in these problems are in touch with at least some of their interested counterparts in foreign countries. The clearing-house in Unesco, which can also tap some of the data being collected by the field social sciences officers in New Delhi and Cairo, may upon inquiry be able to suggest additional key correspondents. (3) The pertinent associations in their annual meetings might take cognizance of these topics and plan for their discussion so that, ultimately, the results are brought to the attention of Unesco and other agencies.

The following social scientists are presently on the U. S. National Commission: Robert C. Angell (State and Local Government), Gordon Clapp (Federal Government), Frederick S. Dunn (Social Science Research Council), John Hope Franklin (Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools for Negroes), Lewis U. Hanke (State and Local Government), Grayson L. Kirk (Member at Large), Otto Klineberg (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues), Walter H. C. Laves (Member at Large), Rensis Likert (State and Local Government), C. Joseph Nuesse (National Catholic Welfare Conference), Peter H. Odegard (American Political Science Association), Ordway Tead (State and Local Government), and M. L. Wilson (Federal Government).—

RICHARD H. HEINDEL.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Elton Atwater, associate professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State College, has been named director of the Foreign Affairs Summer Institute at that institution.

Don L. Bowen, formerly of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed associate professor of government and politics and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research at the University of Maryland.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, recently of Kenyon College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Duke University, effective September, 1953.

A. C. Breckenridge was appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska, effective February 1, 1953.

Edward H. Buehrig, associate professor of political science at Indiana University, resumed his work in the department on February 1, after a leave of absence of one and one-half years to lecture at the National War College and to serve on the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.

Carl H. Chatters, executive director of the American Municipal Association, has been appointed faculty lecturer in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration.

Kenneth Colegrove, professor of political science, emeritus, Northwestern University, has accepted a position at Queens College.

John C. Corson, formerly an executive on the *Washington Post*, Director of the U. S. Employment Service, and Director of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors' Insurance, Federal Social Security Administration, will serve as Director of the Executive Development Programs in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration during the summer of 1953.

Marshall Dimock was a visiting professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico, during the spring semester. He will spend three months in England during the fall at the Administrative Staff College, Henley-on-Thames.

Joseph Dunner has resumed his duties as chairman of the political science department at Grinnell College after a year's leave of absence.

G. Homer Durham, director of the Institute of Government at the University of Utah, was elected Academic Vice President of the University by the Board of Regents on February 9, 1953.

Charles Fairman has resigned his position as professor of law and political science at Stanford University to accept the recently endowed Nagel Professorship in the School of Law, Washington University, St. Louis.

W. O. Farber, head of the department of government at the University of South Dakota, has been reappointed director of legislative research for the South Dakota Legislative Research Council.

Robert Y. Fluno, formerly of Mount Union

College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Whitman College and will teach courses in American government and administration.

Andrew Gyorgy has been appointed associate professor of government at Boston University and will assume his duties in September.

Philip S. Haring was a lecturer in political science at Northwestern University during the spring quarter.

John S. Harris has joined the department of government at Wayne University as an assistant professor.

Amos H. Hawley, of the University of Michigan, has been assigned for one year, beginning in June, 1953, to the staff of the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Ferrel Heady, associate professor of political science and assistant director of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan, has been assigned for approximately one year, beginning June, 1953, to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, where he will serve as director and chief adviser.

Richard H. Heindel, deputy director, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State, will return this summer to be consultant-lecturer for the second Institute of World Affairs at the Pennsylvania State College.

Francis Heller, on leave since May, 1951, from the University of Kansas, resumed his position as associate professor of political science in February.

Samuel Hendel has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at the City College of New York.

John Herz, of the City College of New York, was a visiting professor on the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research during the spring semester.

George A. Higgins, S.J., has been appointed chairman of the department of history and political science at the College of the Holy Cross.

Edward H. Hobbs was recently advanced to an associate professorship of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Louise W. Holborn, associate professor of government at Connecticut College, has been granted a leave of absence, effective April 1, 1953, to spend six months in Germany as a participant in the Educational Exchange Program.

Barna Horvath has been reappointed visiting professor of political science on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for 1953-1954.

John A. Houston was recently promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Erich Hula, of the New School for Social Research, was a visiting professor of international law in the department of government at Cornell University during the spring term of 1953.

Philip C. Jessup, former ambassador-at-large, has returned to the department of public law and government at Columbia University.

Hattie M. Kawahara, assistant professor of government at Wayne University, spent the past academic year studying in Japan under a Ford Foundation grant.

Lane W. Lancaster resigned the chairmanship of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska, effective February 1, 1953, but will continue his duties as a professor.

L. Larry Leonard has been appointed visiting professor on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for the summer term, 1953.

James C. Lien, assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester.

Alfred D. Low, associate professor of history and political science at Marietta College, served as visiting lecturer in political science at New York State Teachers College, Albany, during the second semester of the past academic year.

William L. Lucey, S.J., former chairman of the department of history and political science

at the College of the Holy Cross, has been appointed Librarian of the College.

Hugo V. Mailey has been advanced to a full professorship in the political science department at Wilkes College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

Robert Matteson, of the University of Pennsylvania, is serving as Assistant to the Federal Security Administrator, Harold Stassen.

Elwyn A. Mauck, formerly director of the State Fiscal Research Bureau of Maryland, has been appointed public administration consultant in the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. His first assignment is to serve as acting head of a newly created department of public administration at the University of Minas Gerais. Dr. Mauck will also serve as special adviser to the City of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in which the University is located, and to the State of Minas Gerais.

Joseph E. McLean, associate professor of politics at Princeton University, is serving as a member of the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, and is a consultant to the Public Administration Service in connection with a study of municipalities in Puerto Rico. He is also doing staff work for the Rockefeller Public Service Awards Program.

Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch has been reappointed visiting professor on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for the academic year 1953-1954.

Frank Neuber, formerly of the University of Oregon, has been appointed instructor in political science at Whitman College, where he will teach courses in international relations and comparative government.

Sigmund L. Neumann, of Wesleyan University, lectured one day a week at Columbia University during 1952-1953, as he did in the preceding year.

Richard E. Neustadt, formerly special assistant on the White House staff, has been appointed an assistant professor of administration in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration, effective June 1, 1952. Mr. Neustadt will also assume major responsibilities for the School's Executive Development Programs for both public officials and business administrators.

Richard Park, recently appointed assistant

professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley), has returned from New Delhi, India, to assume his teaching duties.

Rollin B. Posey has resigned as chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1953. He will continue as professor of political science.

Luis Racasens-Siches has been reappointed visiting professor in the fields of political science and philosophy at the New School for Social Research for 1953-1954.

Bennett M. Rich, associate professor of political science and director of the Bureau of Government Research at Rutgers University, will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1953-1954 serving as visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Stefan Riesenfeld, professor of law at the University of California (Berkeley), served as lecturer in political science during the spring term to offer graduate work in the international law field, upon the retirement of Professor Hans Kelsen.

Jack D. Rodgers, who formerly taught at Kansas State College, has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

George F. Rohrlich has been appointed Chief of the Division of Actuarial and Financial Services, Unemployment Insurance Service, Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor.

Allan F. Saunders returned in February from a year's service as Fulbright lecturer in the University of Oslo to resume his duties as professor and chairman of the department of government, University of Hawaii.

Richard M. Scammon, chief of the Division of Research for Western Europe in the U. S. Department of State, has served as professorial lecturer in the department of government of Howard University for the second semester of the current academic year.

Roger V. Shumate, professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, was a Nebraska delegate to the General Assembly of the States, which met in Chicago in December, 1952.

Estal E. Sparlin, formerly assistant director of the St. Louis Governmental Institute, has been appointed director of the Cleveland Citizens League and Bureau of Governmental Research, effective February 15.

George W. Spicer, of the University of Virginia, was a visiting professor of political science at Emory University during the spring quarter of 1953.

David Spitz has been advanced to an associate professorship at the Ohio State University. [Editor's note: In the last issue of the REVIEW, Professor Spitz's promotion was erroneously reported.]

Murray S. Stedman, Jr., associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College, has been granted a leave of absence to serve as political science programme specialist with UNESCO in Paris.

Leo Strauss, of the University of Chicago, spent the winter quarter, 1953, teaching at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles.

Shahid Svhrawardy, Chairman of the Public Service (Civil Service) Commission of Pakistan, was at Columbia University this spring as a visiting professor.

Sterling Tatsuji Takeuchi was a visiting lecturer in the East Asian Institute of Columbia University during 1952-1953.

David Thomson, of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, was a visiting professor of government at Columbia University during the spring session.

Garold W. Thumm has resumed his duties as instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania after completing a two-year tour of duty with the Army General Staff in Washington.

Hifai Timur, of the Faculty of Law at the University of Istanbul, was a visiting professor at Columbia University's Center of Turkish Studies during the spring session.

Daniel W. Tuttle, who has been serving part-time with the Legislative Reference Bureau of the University of Hawaii, will become a full-time assistant professor of government at that institution in September, 1953.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Report of Nominating Committee, 1953

At the coming meeting of the American Political Science Association to be held in Washington, the Committee on Nominations (Joseph P. Harris, Chairman, University of California, Berkeley) will propose the following officers for 1953-54: President-Elect, Charles McKinley (Reed College); Vice-Presidents, Taylor Cole (Duke University), J. A. C. Grant (University of California, Los Angeles), and Claudius Johnson (Washington State College); members of the Council for two years, Manning Dauer (University of Florida), Earl Latham (Amherst College), Arnaud Leavelle (Stanford University), Dayton McKean (University of Colorado), Roland Pennock (Swarthmore College), Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago), Wallace Sayre (Ford Foundation), and Dwight Waldo (University of California, Berkeley).

Program for the Annual Meeting, 1953

The Annual Meeting will be held in the Statler and Mayflower Hotels, Washington, D. C., September 10-12, 1953. The pattern of organization for the Meeting is essentially that followed last year with a few modifications. There will be twenty-seven or twenty-eight panel sections and each panel will have two sessions. In most of the panels there will be a different paper for each of the two sessions but both papers will deal with the single topic announced for each panel section. In each panel there will be a group of specially invited participants who will have read the papers for that panel in advance of the meeting and will, as a consequence, come prepared to discuss the paper, and closely related questions, under the leadership of the panel chairman. The "panel participants" (who will be identified as such in the Final Program) are not to be regarded as some sort of chorus organized to put on a show with the paper reader and the chairman. They are to be in a sense the spark plugs for the panel discussion which will, as usual, be open to all who attend and wish to participate.

The program will emphasize some of the problems which have been of concern to political scientists in recent years and several panels will raise questions on problems which lie ahead of the practitioner and the academic in political science. There is a fair

distribution of topics between (1) the activities of political scientists as teachers, researchers, and government officials; and (2) the subjects of study and major interest at all levels of government: local, state, national, and international.

The subdivision of political science into several broad categories has been followed again this year: national government, international relations, political parties and processes, comparative government, political theory, public administration, and state and local government. The order given above follows no presumed logical sequence but is a reflection of the alphabetical order of the seven men who have been responsible for organizing one category each for the program. These men are: Stephen K. Bailey, Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Avery Leiserson, Roy C. Macridis, J. Roland Pennock, William J. Ronan, and Edward W. Weidner.

Planning a program for an annual meeting of the Association is like preparing a dinner for a big crew of workers whose appetites are expected to be huge and whose critical faculties are known to be acute but whose specific likes and dislikes must in the main be imagined. A few good suggestions for panel topics were received before we had to go to press on our Preliminary Program. Every suggestion received was passed on to the appropriate member of the program committee and some suggestions have been embodied in the program. There is still time for members to write to panel chairmen with suggestions regarding the content of the announced panel discussions and to recommend people to be invited as special panel participants. Contrary to the usual dictum about "too many cooks" I believe that the annual meeting will be a better feast if more members contribute ideas and names for participants than if "cooking" is left to only a few hardy souls who are willing to put out this kind of effort for the Association. The members of the program committee have done their best to make the 1953 program appealing, stimulating and satisfying. "Come and get it" in September.—JOHN GANGE, *Program Chairman*.

1954 Annual Meeting of the Association

The 1954 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held at

the Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Illinois, on September 9-11.

Association Staff Changes

Edward H. Litchfield, who has served for three years as the first executive director of the Association, has resigned that position to devote full time to his new duties as dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University. On September 11, 1953, John Gange, director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, will become executive director for the period ending with the 1954 Annual Meeting.

Kenneth W. Hechler, formerly a special assistant on the White House staff, has joined the Washington office as associate director.

After two years as assistant to the director, Clifford P. Ketsel resigned as of April 1 and will return to the University of California in order to complete work on his doctorate.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, recently appointed to the faculty of Duke University, is in Washington this summer as assistant to the executive director, a position which he held in 1950-51.

Congressional Intern Program

Commencing September 1, the first group of Congressional Interns sponsored by the Association will start their work in Washington, D. C. Few programs sponsored by the Association in recent years have met such an enthusiastic response, not only from the academic profession, but also from Members of Congress and the general public. Many Senators and Representatives have inquired as to how they can secure the assignment of an Intern to their offices, and several congressional committees have likewise expressed an interest in having the Interns work with their committees.

The Chairman of each college and university department of political science was asked to nominate the best candidate available for the internship; despite this screening of applications at the university level, the Association

received over 100 applications of a very high caliber. Screening of applications and interviewing of candidates was for this reason extremely difficult. Through this means, however, the Association had brought to its attention an outstanding group of young political scientists who furnish grounds for optimism about the future of the political science profession.

The advisory committee for the Congressional Intern Program consists of Dr. Ernest Griffith, Chairman; Senator Irving M. Ives of New York; Representative Richard Bolling of Missouri; Merlo Pusey, Associate Editor of *The Washington Post*; and Prof. Stephen K. Bailey of Wesleyan University. The Advisory Committee held its first meeting on May 20, in the Senate Dining Room.

The Washington Post carried the following editorial on the Congressional Intern Program in its issue of May 10, 1953: "It would be difficult to devise a better program for acquainting a limited number of advanced students with the operations of Congress than that announced by the American Political Science Association. The five young political scientists to be selected as 'congressional interns' will spend two months studying Congress from the vantage point of the Library of Congress. Then each will become an active member of the staff of some Senator or Representative for four months and spend an additional four months on the staff of a congressional committee. The association will provide each 'intern' with a scholarship amounting to \$3500 to \$4000 to finance the 10 months of training.

No doubt the planning of these new scholarships was influenced by the success of the various exchange arrangements that are bringing foreign students to our shores and sending American students abroad. In any event students assigned to Congress can serve a national purpose of much wider scope than their own enlightenment. If these young men go into teaching, law or politics, their knowledge of how Congress operates will probably be widely diffused and thus add to public education on a subject of great importance to the success of our form of government."

IN MEMORIAM

Earl L. Shoup, Marcus Alonzo Hanna Professor of Political Science at Western Reserve University, died on January 29, after suffering a heart attack in Lakeside Hospital. He was 67 years of age, and was about to commence a leave of absence due to ill health.

Born in El Dorado, Kansas, he interrupted his college education in order to become one of the first settlers of Clovis, New Mexico, to homestead in that region. Living in a sod dugout, he witnessed one of the last "moving wagon" migrations of people to the free lands of the West, then frequented by the outlaw, Billy the Kid.

He received his A.B. degree from Washburn College in Topeka, Kansas, in 1911. After a brief high school teaching assignment in Kingman County, Kansas, Shoup accepted a position in political science at Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana. Later, he taught at Stanford University and at Kansas State Teachers College. Meanwhile, he received his Master's degree from the University of Chicago in 1919 and his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in 1923, where he was a teaching assistant in the department of government. His advanced studies included graduate work at Yale University where he served as university scholar and as an assistant in the department of history.

After coming to Western Reserve University in 1922, Shoup became assistant dean of Adelbert College, 1926-27, and in 1927 was appointed chairman of the department of political science, which position he held for twenty-four years until 1950. During this tenure, he gained recognition for the quality of young scholars he brought into his department, several of them later becoming presidents of outstanding institutions in the nation. He was named Marcus Alonzo Hanna Professor of Political Science in 1927 and, as a teacher, was known for the exacting standards of quality performance he expected of his students. He promoted political interest by his origination and development of the Annual Model General Assembly patterned after the United Nations, which brought outstanding Greater

Cleveland High School students to the University campus.

His scholarship was attested by his co-authorship, with Louis C. Hatch, of *A History of the Vice-Presidency of the United States*, published in 1934; and his widely known textbook, *The National Government of the American People*, published in 1947. He contributed authoritative articles to this REVIEW, the *National Municipal Review*, and the *Western Reserve Law Review*.

Professor Shoup was a prodigious worker and deeply committed to the concept of constitutional government with special reference to the local scene. Having viewed the London, Paris, and Berlin experience of the federation of local units, Shoup wrote: "In my judgment, the goal towards which we should work is a federated government. I should attempt to reach this by using the county as the central unit." In 1934, he was appointed Executive-Secretary of the Cuyahoga County Charter Commission, which was then headed by the present Supreme Court Justice, Harold Burton. The proposed County Charter, which he drafted, failed to be accepted by the voters. However, Shoup continued his interest in county government reform, as well as in the recent proposed changes in the Ohio Constitution, and lent his scholarly assistance freely to these reforms. His advancing age did not deter him from undertaking a trip to Europe last summer to study the workings of the London Municipal Council and other local administrations.

Shoup not only gave of his fullest measure to Western Reserve University as a teacher and scholar, but his deep interest in intercollegiate athletics led to his appointment as chairman of the University Council on Athletics. As a result of his imagination and driving energy there was established in 1946 the Mid-America Athletic Conference, over which he presided with distinction for a number of years. He was, of course, active in the American Political Science Association and was a member of the Masonic Order.—ALFRED J. HORTZ.

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President

PENDLETON HERRING
Social Science Research Council

President-Elect

RALPH J. BUNCHE
United Nations

Vice-Presidents

CHARLES AIKIN
University of California

CHARLES MCKINLEY
Reed College

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
Wesleyan University

Executive Director

EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD
1785 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Managing Editor

American Political Science Review
HUGH L. ELSBREE
Library of Congress

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officio*

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Pennsylvania State College
OLIVER GARCEAU
Bennington College
LEE S. GREENE
University of Tennessee
BOYD A. MARTIN
University of Idaho
DEAN E. MCHENRY
University of California (Los Angeles)
ROBERT S. RANKIN
Duke University
IVAN M. STONE
Beloit College
DAVID B. TRUMAN
Columbia University

WALTER H. BENNETT
University of Alabama
HUGH A. BONE
University of Washington
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University
DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin
VICTOR JONES
Wesleyan University
JACK W. PELTASON
University of Illinois
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
University of Texas
CLINTON L. ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNRO SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE

WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM
CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL

CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK



Books from Chicago

Politics and the Constitution In the History of the United States

By W. W. CROSSKEY. These volumes will be a bombshell to traditional historians, and an important new source for lawyers, judges, and political scientists. And they may produce important changes in the interpretation of our fundamental law. Boldly, eloquently, and with ample demonstration, the author shows that the Fathers of the Constitution intended a truly national government. Buttressed by a vast array of facts from legal and political history, he explains how the road to current misconstruction of the Constitution was taken, and shows that, with a real understanding of the Fathers' intentions, the Constitution emerges in an entirely new light.

1440 pages, 2 volumes, \$20.00

Perón's Argentina

By G. I. BLANKSTEN. An authoritative account of Perón's rise to power, the fundamental changes he has made in Argentine life, the long-standing duel between the U. S. and Argentina for diplomatic leadership, and a summary of the Argentine position between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in the cold war.

\$6.50

The Genius of American Politics

By D. J. BOORSTIN. A dramatic criticism of the foreign policy which seeks to make us crusaders to the world. Our propaganda fails and is bound to fail, argues the author, because American society and American political ideals are unique and therefore cannot be exported. Mr. Boorstin goes beyond current events to the real question of what is possible and what is impossible to duplicate abroad.

\$3.25

At all bookstores, or from

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.

European Political Systems

Edited by Taylor Cole, *Duke University*

This new text in *Comparative Government* has all the advantages of a collaborative work by eminent specialists, most of whom have lived and travelled widely in the regions of which they speak. The known caliber of the authors testifies to the intrinsic quality of this work. Equally unusual is its coverage.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

by Julian Towster

The "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe

by C. E. Black

Germany by Sigmund Neumann

Italy by Renzo Sereno

Great Britain and the Commonwealth

by Taylor Cole, David Deener, and
Alexander Brady

France by Gordon Wright

No other text in comparative government gives as much space as this to the Soviet Union. No other text gives an entire section to the "people's democracies." Some texts say nothing about England; here Great Britain and the Commonwealth are especially brilliantly treated. Some say nothing about Italy; here it is the subject of a revealing discussion. The section on France conveys an understanding of the bases of French political activity without getting snarled in the shifting fates of particular French governments. The section on Germany is a tense elaboration of the tensions of that riven land.

This new text is altogether up to date, but fundamental enough in its discussion so that it will not be easily dated.

Tables, bibliographies and other teaching aids abound. \$6.00 text

Examination copies on request

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

501 Madison Ave., New York 22

Introduction to Government

by Robert Rienow

A realistic introduction to government for the student whose work will end with the basic course, and a realistic introduction to the study of government for the student who will go on to advanced work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I. The Idea of Government

The study and nature of government . . .
The dynamics of government . . . The
choice and structure of government.

Part II. The Pattern of Governance

The Parliamentary System: British
model . . . The fourth French Republic:
A Parliamentary system with variations
. . . The presidential type of government:
The United States . . . Authoritarian gov-
ernment: The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

Part III. The Fountains of Government

Revolutions . . . Constitutions and consti-
tutionalism . . . Rights the world over . . .
Federal or unitary government . . . Sepa-
ration of powers.

Part IV. From Idea to Law

Public opinion and propaganda . . . Po-
litical parties . . . Nominations . . . Cam-
paigns . . . Citizenship . . . Suffrage . . .
Elections . . . Representation . . . Legisla-
tive Assemblies . . . Parliamentary pro-
cedure . . . Parliamentary controls and
influence.

Part V. From Statute to Police

The chief of state . . . Administration of
the law . . . Staffing and financing gov-
ernment . . . The judicial system.

Part VI. Local Government

Principles . . . Services . . . Structure . . .
Central control . . . Organization . . .
Summary.

Part VII. Global Government

Problems of world co-operation . . . The
idea of world government.

In this new text the student is introduced to the principles of governance by studying actual governments at work in actual societies. Throughout, Professor Rienow's emphasis is on government in the United States. His comparisons with other nations—a unique and valuable feature—serve to highlight (1) the characteristic features of the American political system, and (2) the idea that that system, in its operation and development, must take account of systems that differ from it.

Clothbound, 583 pages, 24 illustrations. \$5.00 text

Examination copies on request

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

501 Madison Ave., New York 22

AAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAK

A Grammar of American Politics

National, State, and Local Government

by W. E. Binkley and M. C. Moos

The first edition of this political *Grammar* was authoritative and comprehensive enough to be a successful college text, and lively enough to be popular with the general reader. The present revised and enlarged edition—with sixteen altogether new chapters on state and local government—retains the literary quality and political acumen of the earlier version and adds considerably to its scope and timeliness.

The author's discussion of the federal, state and local governments is preceded in each case by a history of the institutions through which government operates. And their analysis of these institutions themselves—of legislatures, executives, courts, and parties, and of new administrative agencies and administrative law—is informed by a constant concern with the relations of politics to the community at large.

This *Grammar* is a scholarly and thoughtful text, broad in its coverage and acute in its analysis of the realities of American politics in a troubled world. Both of the authors are themselves experienced in practical politics. Throughout, they stress the role of the informed citizen functioning in a democratic state.

6 $\frac{3}{8}$ x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, cloth, 1152 pages, \$6.00 text

The National Government edition of A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS is still among the most popular texts for courses on the federal government alone, and is still available.

788 pages, \$5.00 text

Examination copies on request

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

501 Madison Avenue, New York 22

AAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAKCBAAK

Princeton

UNIVERSITY PRESS

ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR THE PEACE

By *E. F. PENROSE*. If the end of war is not victory but peace, wartime plans for postwar peace assume importance beyond the war itself. This book shows how deeply the peace plans of World War II, beginning as early as 1941, were affected by political conditions, by wartime developments, and by personalities such as Roosevelt, Morgenthau, Keynes, Churchill, and Winant. It reveals how great successes were attained, saving Europe from immediate postwar disaster, while there were grievous errors which led to the crisis of 1947.

402 pages, \$7.50

CRETE

A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area

By *LELAND G. ALLBAUGH*. The report of a study carried out by the Rockefeller Foundation in an effort to discover what kinds of assistance can be usefully given to underdeveloped areas, and in what ways. It is hoped that the results will be useful to many kinds of specialists—government and foundation officials, foreign-aid missions, private investors, sociologists, etc.—whether or not they are concerned with the Mediterranean area.

592 pages, maps, illustrations, \$7.50

THE DIPLOMATS, 1919-1939

Edited by *GORDON CRAIG and FELIX GILBERT*. This diplomatic history of the 20 interwar years is the first book to examine that fateful period through the eyes of the men entrusted with the negotiations in the capitals of a darkening Europe. More than 30 of the most important diplomats of the time are covered by a group of distinguished contributors including Gordon Craig, Richard Challener, Paul Zinner, Hajo Holborn, Roderic Davison, Stuart Hughes, Theodore von Laue, Dexter Perkins, and many others.

720 pages, illustrated, \$9.00

Order from your bookstore

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS



**FOR YOUR COURSES
IN GOVERNMENT**

2 Outstanding Texts



The Governments of Continental Europe *rev. edn.*

*by James T. Shotwell, Robert K. Gooch, Arnold J. Zurcher,
Karl Lowenstein, Michael T. Florinsky*

With a section on each of the four major continental powers written by an expert on the area, the revised edition of this noted text brings to its readers a thoroughly up-to-date picture of the constitutional and political development of Europe. The sec-

tions on Germany and the U.S.S.R. have been enlarged in terms of the changes of the past twelve years, and there is much additional information on France and Italy.

1952 881pp. \$6.00

Democracy in the U.S.

by William H. Riker

This text on American government analyzes our political institutions in terms of a coherent political theory, and examines American government in terms of the question: How can it be made truly democratic? After an introductory chapter which de-

fines democracy in an internally consistent and philosophical way, the major political institutions are examined in order to show how the democratic ideal can be achieved in American practice.

1953 428pp. paperbound \$2.25

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11

• **Whither Russia after Stalin?**

• ***Is there no alternative to atomic war with Russia which will slaughter millions . . . and settle nothing?***

• **Malenkov says: "There is not one disputed or undecided question that cannot be decided by peaceful means."**

• ***Should we believe this . . . or must we suspect a Soviet trick?***



SOVIET CIVILIZATION

by **CORLISS LAMONT**

With an Introduction by
Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild,
N. Y. University

Distinguished author, lecturer and teacher of philosophy at Columbia University, Dr. Lamont has spent 20 years studying and observing Soviet society, including two trips to the U.S.S.R.

**Among the Vital Chapters
In This Timely Book—**

- The Soviet Constitution
- Soviet Ethnic Democracy
- Soviet Russia and Religion
- Contrasts between Soviet Socialism and Fascism
- Soviet Foreign Policy
- Co-Existence or Co-Destruction?

SHOWS OTHER SIDE

"An extreme contrast to the picture of Soviet Russia drawn by members of our own government and our press and radio."
—Bay City, Mich., Times

10 MILLION AMERICANS

"If this book were read by ten million Americans it could have a profound influence on the shape of human destiny."
—Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild

U.S. WAR MONGERS?

"Most shocking and stimulating is the sub-chapter 'Incitements to War against the U.S.S.R.' which contains well-documented evidence of the American attitude—both public and private—against the Soviet Union."
—Durham, N.C., Herald

INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY

"His reputation for intellectual integrity ought to be enough to earn him a hearing."
—Charlotte, N.C. News

THIS major new work is a searching study of Soviet Russia and its all-important relations with our country. It helps to explain the Soviet's puzzling actions in the U.N., Europe, the Far East and Inside Russia itself.

In 452 fact-packed, highly readable pages, Dr. Lamont draws a comprehensive, undistorted picture. He presents a soberly objective evaluation of Soviet affairs, foreign and domestic.

He shows not only the desirability (which almost everybody admits) but also the *feasibility* of lasting peace, far-reaching disarmament, and normal trade based on mutual self-interest.

Super-duper "patriots" who prefer to roundly condemn the Soviet Union won't like this book. Neither will leftists who view Russia as a Utopia of supermen. But Corliss Lamont's sound and practical program will be welcomed by millions of thoughtful Americans as a monumental contribution to the cause of peace.

452 pages \$5.00

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY

Publishers

15 EAST 40th STREET, Desk 282, NEW YORK 16, N.Y.

OXFORD BOOKS

British Government

By HIRAM MILLER STOUT. A complete picture of British government today by a prominent political scientist who surveys the present political system in the light of wartime and postwar changes. "Mr. Stout has done an admirable job . . . his pages are packed with information. He is particularly informative on the subject of the British Commonwealth and the mother country's relationships with her dominions and her colonies."—*Saturday Review Syndicate*

\$7.00. College edition, \$5.00

Problems of Nationalized Industry

Edited by WILLIAM A. ROBSON. A cross-section of opinion on Britain's nationalized industries presented by members of Parliament, government ministers, and professors of economics and political science. These specialists discuss, from varying points of view, many problems which are applicable to nationalized industry everywhere.

\$5.00

The Middle East in the War

By GEORGE KIRK. Introduction by ARNOLD TOYNBEE. This new volume in the Survey of International Affairs presents the first comprehensive study of the role played by the Middle East in the last war. Covering both political and economic developments from 1939 to 1946, it provides the all-important background to present-day problems arising in the Moslem world. *Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.*

\$10.00

The National Health Service in Great Britain

An Historical and Descriptive Study

By SIR JAMES STIRLING ROSS. Beginning with the Victorian period, the author surveys the conditions and events that led to the establishment of the National Health Service in 1948. The larger part of the book is devoted to the Service in action from 1948 to 1951. But it also includes special features of the Service in Scotland, developments up to June 1952, and the reports of qualified American observers.

\$7.00

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

114 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.

Publishers of Fine Books for over Four Centuries





Timely **McGRAW-HILL** Books

IDEAS AND ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By DWIGHT WALDO, University of California, Berkeley. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 462 pages, \$5.50

With lively and pungent introductory notes by the author, this volume focuses on the major issues expounded by the greatest authorities and finest writers in the field during the 20th Century. The book is designed primarily as a supplementary text for students of public administration, but may find use as a primary text.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. New Fifth Edition

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College. 577 pages, \$6.00

An authoritative restatement of the elements of international law, diplomatic practice, pacific settlement, and international organization. The text includes discussion of power politics, Nationalism, and Imperialism which contains in the discussion problems of Soviet aggrandizement, colonial unrest, the "Point Four" program, and the international economic dilemma confronting the Atlantic communities. Further topics considered are the Korean War, the United Nations, collective security, and global federation. It provides factual data necessary to the understanding of the present world scene.

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By L. LARRY LEONARD, New School of Social Research. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 611 pages, \$6.00

With a well integrated narrative which intertwines the author's writings with document and readings, this book offers much more than a recitation of contemporary diplomatic history. It gives the student an *understanding* of contemporary American policy by showing how it is made, its historical roots, and its basic tenets at the present time.

THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE: A Study in Social Combat

By BERTRAM N. GROSS. 472 pages, \$6.50

Scholarly, well-written, and realistic this exceptional new book offers the most penetrating analysis of the legislative process of Congress ever written. Comprehensive and thorough in its examination, it attempts to answer such questions as: How do laws really come into being? Why are some passed and others not? Does the national legislative process operate properly? How might it be improved?

Send for copies on approval



McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK 36, N. Y.



PRACTICAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The ICMA Municipal Management Series

Eight up-to-date texts that treat public affairs from the standpoint of the chief administrator. Written by men of broad management experience, they stress techniques and best administrative practice. They are broad in scope and widely used in the college classroom as well as in municipal in-service training.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 601pp

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION 458pp

MUNICIPAL RECREATION ADMINISTRATION 516pp

MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 435pp

MUNICIPAL FINANCE ADMINISTRATION 491pp

MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINISTRATION 468pp

LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 337pp

MUNICIPAL FIRE ADMINISTRATION 498pp

"My experience with the ICMA manuals in group training for municipal officials and in graduate courses at the University has demonstrated that the texts are authoritative, comprehensive, and stimulating. They train administrators and students how to think about municipal problems and how to solve them."—ARTHUR W. BROMAGE, *Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.*

Here are a few of the many educational institutions that have adopted these texts:

Columbia University
University of Kansas
Syracuse University

University of Denver
University of Michigan
New York University

University of California
University of Pennsylvania
Wayne University

*Single copies \$7.50. Discounts on classroom orders.
Order copies on 10-day approval.*

THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION

1313 East 60th Street

Chicago 37, Illinois

Announcing

The COMPLETE MADISON
His Basic Writings

Edited by SAUL K. PADOVER

Editor, "The Complete Jefferson"

This is the first book to embody the comprehensive political and social thought of one of the chief architects of American democracy. Here the noted Jefferson biographer has assembled and organized all of Madison's main writings, including several never before published, to illuminate a distinctly modern view of government which has a startling relevance to many controversial issues of our own day. Dr. Padover provides a discerning introduction to bring Madison's main strands of thought into contemporary perspective and to evaluate his importance in American history.

"Saul Padover has assembled the essence of the Madisonian political philosophy in one volume, to which he has prefixed a brilliant essay on the man. . . . We have here what Madison thought, not what he did; and his thought was powerful, direct, and accurate to an amazing degree. To become acquainted with that thought is imperatively necessary for every American who aspires to find a way through these labyrinthine times. . . ."—Gerald W. Johnson, *N. Y. Herald Tribune Book Review*. \$4.00

FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY
IN OUR TIME

Edited by *Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver and
Richard P. McKeon*

Seventy-five intellectual and religious leaders offer a brilliant analysis of the growing conflict between pressures for freedom and the demands of authority in many areas of modern society—in business and economic life, in national and international government, in the law, in cultural activity, and in personal life. \$6.00

At your bookstore or from

HARPER & BROTHERS, N. Y. 16

READY IN JUNE



The Third Edition of

Modern World Politics

By Thorsten V. Kalijarvi and Associates



This new edition—reorganized and reset—maintains the basic thesis of the original edition: world politics is a struggle for power. New chapters deal with the crisis of mankind, with the rise and development of the contemporary international world, people, and national power, and with foreign policy. Other chapters have been completely revised to re-

flect recent trends and developments. New maps, charts, and diagrams present visually each country, region, and topic covered in the text. The volume brings together the results of research and thought by specialists, all carefully edited to maintain a unified and orderly presentation.

CONTENTS

PART ONE: THE MOMENT OF DECISION. 1. The Crisis of Mankind. 2. The Rise and Development of Contemporary International Relations. 3. The Nature of Power Politics. 4. Foreign Policy.

PART TWO: FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 5. The Dynamics of State Existence. 6. People and National Power. 7. Geography and Boundaries. 8. World Economics. 9. The Growth of World Organization. 10. The United Nations. 11. International Law.

PART THREE: TECHNIQUES AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER POLITICS. 12. Diplomacy and Power Politics. 13. Ideopolitics. 14. The Press. 15. Education and World Politics. 16. Geopolitics. 17. Secret Movements, Espionage, and Treachery. 18. Science and Technology. 19. Economic Conflict. 20. Warfare and Military Organization. 21. Sea Power. 22. Aeropolitics. 23. Planning as a World Force.

PART FOUR: THE GREAT REGIONS IN WORLD POLITICS. 24. The United States. 25. The Soviet Union and Her Satellites. 26. The British Commonwealth of Nations. 27. The Continent of Europe. 28. The Near East and Africa. 29. Eastern Asia. 30. Eastern Asia (continued). 31. Latin America.

PART FIVE: PEACE IN OUR TIME? 32. The Quest for Peace.

THE AUTHORS

HERMAN BEUKEMA
BERNARD BRODIE
KARLIN CAPPER-JOHNSON
OLIVER CARLSON
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
C. C. FURNAS

LELAND M. GOODRICH
STANLEY K. HORNBECK
GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR
THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI
EMIL LENGVEL
AUSTIN F. MACDONALD

G. ETZEL PEARCY
ROY V. PEEL
STEFAN POSSONY
PITMAN B. POTTER
JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
HOWARD WILSON

June, 1953 • 656 pages • 152 maps and charts • \$6.00

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY

432 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.

Important **RONALD** Publications . . .

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, *University of Southern California;*
and R. Vance Presthus, *Michigan State College*

NEW, THIRD EDITION of this highly successful textbook realistically appraises public administration in America, and the role it plays in a democratic society. It fully relates formal organization and the routines of public administration to informal organization and the functioning of administrators. The authors consistently accent the human side of organization and management, drawing upon recent research in the social sciences that sheds light on the nature of group action, individual motivation, and leadership.

Throughout the book, public administration is viewed as part of a larger social process which includes legislatures, pressure groups, and the separation of powers. The book concludes with a discussion of the philosophy and goals of public administration. 394 pages.

\$6.00

FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edited by Ossip K. Flechthelm, Colby College,
with Seven Contributing Authorities

AN INTRODUCTORY textbook integrating the entire field of political science. Emphasizing historical, philosophical, psychological, and anthropological elements of government and politics, the book surveys, compares, and evaluates the ideas and practices of all major nations. Throughout, principles and problems are stressed, rather than institutions, and theories are illustrated with specific examples. Each area of the subject is covered by a specialist adding authority and breadth of viewpoint. 584 pages.

\$5.50

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Rinehart John Swenson, New York University

THOROUGH, up-to-date study of administrative law in the United States. Emphasizing the various forms of administrative action and the means of their enforcement, the book analyzes the development of the administrative process and shows the need for formalizing administrative action into a coherent body of law supervised by special courts of limited jurisdiction. Important consideration is given to the review of administrative action by the regular courts, and the role of Congress in controlling administration. 376 pages.

\$6.00

The Legislative Process

Lawmaking in the United States
Harvey Walker, *Ohio State University*

DESIGNED for college courses in Legislation, or the Legislative Process, this comprehensive textbook describes and evaluates the machinery set up in the United States for determining and declaring the will of the people. Considers the legislator, the party member, the pressure group, and the inventor of political techniques on all levels of government. Gives special attention to the legislative functions of the executive and the judiciary. Includes suggested assignments, bibliography by chapter topics. 482 pages.

\$5.00

Judicial Legislation

A Study in American Legal Theory
Fred V. Cahill, Jr., *Yale University*

ANALYZES modern theories of judicial legislative power, and examines arguments for modifying the lawmaking function of judges, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. Discusses these decisions in terms of their possible effect upon social legislation, civil liberties. The author presents a balanced survey of legal thought over the past 200 years, illustrating the shift from a rigid, literal interpretation to a dynamic, realistic application of the law. Incorporates the views of leading thinkers.

\$4.00

THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY
fifteen East Twenty-Sixth Street New York 10, N. Y.

**JUST
PUBLISHED**

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**Norman D. Palmer
Howard C. Perkins**

*Wharton School of Finance and Commerce
University of Pennsylvania*

**IMPARTIAL
UP-TO-DATE
COMPREHENSIVE**

OFFERS

*a sensible amount of attention to principles, to historical background, to international organization, and to recent developments.

*an objective, impartial study of the international scene without urging a specific thesis or a formula for curing the troubles of the world.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

Boston 7 New York 16 Chicago 16 Dallas 1 San Francisco 5

Two New Books

The International Law Standard in Treaties of the United States

By Robert Renbert Wilson. Since the earliest days of American independence, the United States has implicitly or explicitly invoked the law of nations in its treaties. This book traces the development of the international law standard in treaties of the United States, showing what the American government has done toward applying or otherwise utilizing that standard; by his examination of one country's use of the standard, the author helps to define the whole scope of international law. **\$4.50**

The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia

By Reinhold August Dorwart. The first full-length account in English of the administrative institutions which emerged during the reign of Frederick William I. A penetrating study of the system which changed Brandenburg-Prussia from an obscure collection of feudal principalities to the leading state in the Holy Roman Empire.

Coming August 17, \$4.00

At your bookseller, or



**HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT Fourth Edition

by W. BROOKE GRAVES

All users of the earlier editions are familiar with the plan and character of this standard text which has long been regarded as *the* text for students taking a college course in state government. The Fourth Edition, containing the same wealth of material as characterized the first three editions, is a complete revision which brings all the material up-to-date. All the type has been reset, making possible some reorganization at desirable points. Bibliographies at the ends of chapters have been shortened to selected reading lists. The text is ready now.

960 pages

Probable price, \$6.25

**D. C. HEATH
AND COMPANY**

SALES OFFICES: NEW YORK CHICAGO SAN FRANCISCO ATLANTA DALLAS

HOME OFFICE: BOSTON

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS



A bilingual quarterly. (English-French) Publishes abstracts of articles from major political science journals. Provides a valuable medium for the diffusion of information on an international level. Published by "UNESCO" with the support of the "International Political Science Association" and the "International Studies Conference."

Annual rate: \$4.00; single copy: \$1.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS - 2960 Broadway, N.Y. 27 - N.Y.



Researcher Forbes had bicary orbe,
Cramped digits, inflamed pleura;
Until a friend, who feared the end,
Tipped him off to CONTOURA*

***The Portable PHOTO-COPIER**

★ SAVES 80% OF COPYING TIME.

Saves money, energy, errors... and nerves! Makes permanent copies of the various background material you need for your writing... magazine articles, excerpts from books, diagrams, charts, graphs, reports... anything printed, written, typed or drawn.

★ **LIGHT, COMPACT** for ease of carrying. Fits in briefcase; stores in desk drawer. Take wherever your material-to-be-copied is... library, study or office. Copy anything, anywhere!

★ **CONVENIENT**—No need to lug heavy volumes. Contoura copies on-the-spot... even copies curved text near binding of thick volumes. Rids complications of working with books that can't be taken from library.

★ **SIMPLE**—No experience nor dark-room needed. Use under normal incandescent lighting.


★ **GUARANTEED** accurate or your money back. Efficient, economical... indispensable to researchers. Order your Contoura to-day. *Research Model* (copies up to 8" x 10") only \$39. *Legal Model* (copies up to 8½" x 14") only \$59.

WRITE FOR FREE FOLDER

F. G. LUDWIG Inc.

412 High St.,

Deep River, Conn.



The Portable PHOTO-COPIER

POLITICS, PRESIDENTS and COATTAILS

by MALCOLM MOOS

Professor of Political Science at the
Johns Hopkins University and co-author
of *A Grammar of American Politics*

"THIS is a book which deserves the attention of all serious students of American politics, both amateur and professional.

"Professor Moos's conclusion, from an impressive array of statistical evidence, is that coattail influence is not a critical factor in national elections.

"More important to most students of American politics will be Professor Moos's conclusions concerning the nature and tendency of the American party system. . . . [His] argument in support of his opinion is vigorous and is supported with fresh evidence derived from the election returns. It is also set forth in a more lively style than is generally found in statistical treatments of political questions."—ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, *The Annals of the American Academy*

"... based on the most complete array of individual congressional election returns and studies this reviewer has ever had the pleasure of mulling over. . . . Students of political science can draw much from these views and data."—Baltimore Sun

"From the standpoint of technique, it marks a real milepost in the development of approaches of *how* to study political behavior. Here is an adaptation of statistical method which has substance. One is impressed by the amount of statistical re-

search which was done, but far more by the excellent fashion in which those materials are handled and interpreted."—ERNEST L. BARTLEY, *The Western Political Quarterly*

"... a timely and fascinating book."—New York Times

"To a very readable, reportorial account of political behavior he adds the well-documented touch to give a real assist to the close follower of the American political scene."—*Christian Science Monitor*

\$4.50

From your bookseller, or

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Maryland

**VAN NOSTRAND
FOR COLLEGE TEXTS**



From Our Political Science Series

Edited By Dr. Franklin L. Burdette

GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA

By MIGUEL JORRÍN

This important new book, by a man who has taught this course for over ten years and who has practiced law for more than fifteen years in these countries, offers an understanding of the complexities of the phenomena of government in this increasingly important area. It gives an excellent description and interpretation of the political institutions and practices of the Republics of the South. Topical treatment of subject matter facilitates study.

385 pages (1953) \$4.50

PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

By WILLIAM G. TORPEY

This new text provides a realistic treatment of the processes, procedures and problems of personnel administration in the executive branches of federal, state and local governments. Book is filled with a wealth of actual existing problems, up-to-date concepts, and interesting historical accounts showing how present statutes and procedures were derived.

431 pages (1953) \$5.00

New 2nd Edition—Lancaster's

GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA

By LANE W. LANCASTER

Considerable changes have been made to bring this widely used book up-to-date, although the original plan of the first edition has been retained. Special attention is given to the new federal financial aid programs. The influence of urban and industrial forces on rural life and thought bears an important part in the early chapters.

375 pages (1952) \$3.75

**IF YOU TEACH OR DIRECT THESE COURSES, EXAMINATION COPIES
ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S.A.
AND U.S. POSSESSIONS**




D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

PUBLISHERS SINCE 1848

250 FOURTH AVENUE

NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK



The American Political Science Review

VOL. XLVII

SEPTEMBER, 1953

NO. 3

RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Report that follows embodies the general conclusions of the members of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Research Seminar on Comparative Politics, held at Northwestern University in the summer of 1952. It is a detailed summarization of the daily conferences held as well as of individual papers prepared by the participants. The Report was jointly prepared by Roy Macridis and Richard Cox. Members of the Seminar were: Samuel H. Beer and Harry Eckstein, Harvard University; George I. Blanksten and Roy Macridis (Chairman), Northwestern University; Karl W. Deutsch, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Kenneth W. Thompson, University of Chicago, and Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; Richard Cox of the University of Chicago acted as rapporteur. Several other persons participated in some of the meetings, but responsibility for the Report is assumed by the authors and members of the Seminar.

The comments by Carl J. Friedrich, Harold D. Lasswell, Herbert A. Simon, Ralph J. D. Braibanti, G. Lowell Field, and Dwight Waldo were prepared at the invitation of the editors. (*Ed.*)

SEMINAR REPORT*

The study of comparative politics has been primarily concerned thus far with the study of the formal institutions of governments—particularly the governments of Western Europe. It has been in this sense not only parochial but also primarily descriptive and formalistic. Its place in the field of political science, while suffering from all the ambiguities and methodological inadequacies of the field in general, has been ill-defined. Is the student of comparative politics primarily concerned with the meticulous description of the formal institutions of various polities or is it his role to undertake comparison? If the latter, what is the meaning of comparison? Is it confined simply to the description of *differences* among various institutional arrangements? Does comparison stop when we note that England has had a two-party system whereas France has had a multi-party system? Does a description of the institutional arrangements of the Soviet Union reveal in any sense the most relevant factors that account for the differences between it and Western democracies? If comparison is to be something more than the descriptive portrait of formal institutional differences, what should be its aim, scope, and method? Should the student of comparative

* A Summary of the Report appeared in *Items*, Vol. 8, pp. 45-49 (Dec., 1952)

politics attempt to compare total configurations? If not, then he has to develop a precise notion of what can be isolated from the total configuration of a system or systems and compared, i.e., understood and explained with reference to similar patterns wrenched from the total configuration of another system.

The above questions illustrate the difficulties and the challenge confronting the student of comparative politics. His scope of observation and the data available to him exceed by far in richness and variety the materials in the laboratory of any chemist or physicist. His drawback, on the other hand, has been primarily intellectual. He does not know what to do with his material. He may not know under what categories to classify it and, insofar as he does, he is confronted with the further task of drawing meaningful relations between observable phenomena and testing these relationships. When he attempts to draw such relationships in the form of hypotheses he is confronted with grave questions. Can a hypothesis be verified or disproved? Here the admonition of the natural scientists that strictly speaking one cannot verify a hypothesis but only falsify it gives us no comfort. What we are primarily concerned with is our ability to find analogous patterns of relationships on the basis of which we may, with assurance, state that such and such a hypothesis is disproved. A second source of concern, very similar to the first, is our notion of causality. Is it possible to isolate a single variable, or even a series of variables, and consider them as being conditioning factors or causal factors with respect to a particular consequence? It may well be, for instance, that a series of factors comprised of figures on marriage, cost of living, and literacy can be related in two or more systems with the number of votes cast in a series of national elections. Is the relationship causal or purely fortuitous? How can we find out?

The problem of comparative method revolves around the discovery of uniformities, i.e., the analytical formulation of concepts and problems under which real institutional forms can be compared. But if so, what are the particular clusters of states that have the desired degree of "uniformity" that makes comparison and understanding of variations possible? Does the concept of area, as used by cultural anthropologists, provide us with such hunting ground for the study of differences against a background of uniformity? Or does the similarity of certain social elements (i.e., similar kinship systems) or economic elements (i.e., similar occupational structures) give us a better chance to compare and understand variations? What degree of homogeneity is required for comparison and, by the same token, are comparisons impossible between systems which do not show the desired degree of homogeneity? How similar ought systems to be and in what special respects (either in a real or in an analytical sense), if we are meaningfully to compare their institutions and political processes?

It was with questions such as these that the Seminar members were primarily concerned. To begin with, it was generally admitted that comparative politics as conceived today, in research as well as in teaching, fails to raise—let alone answer—such questions. It has been primarily parochial in its emphasis upon Western systems. It has been descriptive in depicting, as accurately as possible, only formal institutions of the Western states, and, with rare excep-

tions, it has been insensitive to hypothesizing. Even its descriptive emphasis has been misplaced. For it has stressed primarily the formal legal institutions, such as constitutions, legislatures, judicial systems, and the like, which in a majority of the non-Western political systems yield no insights into the realities of political processes.

On the other hand, it was readily admitted that it would be extremely ambitious in a short period of time to attempt to answer in detail the methodological questions involved in the study of comparative politics and *at the same time* to make a beginning in coming to grips with the substantive work of empirical research. It was felt that if we could do some spade-work on the methodological issues we would achieve something significant in two respects: First, by raising the methodological questions we would invite comments and suggestions from the members of the profession and thus hope to raise the general level of methodological sophistication and speculation; secondly, by stating our own position or positions with reference to method we hoped, even at the expense of having our point of view sharply challenged, to make a definite contribution to methodological reflection in the field and to increase the awareness of the need for taking some kind of methodological position *prior to or along with the collection and descriptive enumeration of facts*.

In the 19th century students of politics indulged primarily in theories and normative speculations. Today we have many facts but we do not know why we have them and we are unable to decide what to do with them. By agreeing on a scheme of inquiry, or upon alternative schemes of inquiry, therefore, we hope to *elicit empirical research and investigation which will be systematically oriented* to the major problems of the field.

I. COMPARABILITY VS. UNIQUENESS

A number of meetings were devoted to the general theoretical problem of "comparability" and its relations to "uniqueness." The question was raised as to the proper way in which valid comparisons between different political systems can be made. Is it possible to make comparisons between various elements abstracted from their respective political systems? Or can the political scientist "understand" an institution or process *only* within the total context (social, economic, and cultural) in which it occurs? If the latter is the case, does it not make questionable—or perhaps even impossible—any real "comparative" politics? On the other hand, granting the possibility of making at least limited comparisons, what is the best manner in which to proceed? At what *levels* of comparison are political scientists equipped to proceed today?

It was suggested, for one thing, that the general problem of comparison is extraordinarily difficult for political science, since it is unlikely that we will ever find a true "experimental" situation, that is, two or more societies which are identical in all respects except for a single, variable factor. Consequently, the possibility of comparing one variable or even a set of variables against identical conditions is illusory. It would seem that we must resort to comparison—at different levels of abstraction and complexity—of wider or narrower segments of the political process.

In the area of actual *comparison*, a tentative classification of *levels* of comparative analysis was suggested:

1. Comparison of a single problem limited to political systems which are 'sufficiently' homogeneous in character and operation.
2. Comparison of several elements or clusters of elements in relation to political systems which are 'fairly' homogeneous.
3. Comparison of institutions or segments of the political process irrespective of homogeneity.
4. Comparison of political systems as such.

These four levels of comparison require increasingly high levels of abstraction as one moves towards a general comparison of political systems. In the latter case, some such conceptual approach as that of "ideal types" would seem to be called for.

Approaching the question of comparability and uniqueness from a somewhat different angle, it was suggested that a general theory for comparison would have to (1) make explicit the criteria of relevance and interest by which one is to determine "What questions shall I ask about political systems?" and "What hypotheses shall I elaborate?", and (2) provide techniques for testing and extrapolation, on the basis of the generally comparable elements of different systems.

In essence such criteria would call for the formulation of an adequate set of problems, the elaboration of useful hypotheses about them, the development of techniques for testing these hypotheses, and, finally, the development of techniques for applying the test to actual material. Comparative study here will help point to the bearing one concrete fact may have upon others.

A discussion related to the "criteria of relevance" elicited two points of view: On the one hand, it was suggested that in order to determine in a systematic way (a) what problems should be studied; (b) the "depth" of investigation necessary for their field study; and (c) the general area within which comparability was possible—"criteria of relevance" should be decided on the basis of a general theory of a conceptual scheme. On the other hand, it was argued that the criteria of relevance can be decided only in terms of formulations of *ad hoc* problems.

It should be made clear, however, that in both cases relevance will be decided by the investigator. In the first case relevance arises from the *a priori* formulations for relations. The investigator is looking for some relations and not for others. In the second case, relevance is derived from the need to solve concrete problems.

This question of "criteria of relevance" was felt to be especially acute in the relation of political factors to social, economic, or religious factors. By what method can the political scientist determine how far to go in *depth* when dealing with the interrelations of these various factors, either generally or in terms of specific problems? Once again, one viewpoint expressed was the necessity to devise a general "typological" scheme by which to delimit the number and depth of criteria to be considered; on the other hand, it was pointed out that there is no general formula of a scientific nature by which to decide this ques-

tion. It was felt that criteria of relevance can be established through a "pragmatic" approach, and this, in turn, depends on (1) the scope and the type of the problem involved; (2) the purpose for which one wants the information to be obtained; and (3) the investigator's experience, general knowledge, and feeling ('scientific intuition') for the problem.

One factor which was said to complicate the problem of comparability is the contention that the concept of "causality" for the physical sciences appears to be applicable only in a limited and modified way when dealing with social phenomena. In this connection, it was pointed out that statistical correlations, for instance, can be helpful or meaningless, depending on the type of factors being analyzed, and on the degree to which the analysis proceeds to relate statistical patterns to "qualitative" factors and "degrees" of relevance—such as the nature of the motivations which have produced a statistically observable pattern of actions.

An alternative suggestion was that instead of referring to causality or looking for causality, it might be adequate simply to *interrelate* various social and political factors. This in essence means that appropriate relationships, if discoverable because of their frequent recurrence, entitle us to refer to causality simply in terms of statistical probability.

Another approach suggested as a general method of comparing political systems was the following: The initial stage of investigation may proceed by the "dismemberment" of each system under comparison, in order to isolate and analyze the important elements within each system (i.e., political parties, the bureaucracy, the legislature). Then follows the attempt to compare them. By a detailed examination of the separate elements within the system, the attention of the investigator is drawn to the specific differences between the elements in different systems as well as to the similarities. A further extension of this approach consists in relating the specific character of an institution to the historical background and psychological traits of the people concerned. Having examined in detail the specific elements of the different systems, the next step is to "reintegrate" the dismembered elements into a functioning, interrelated whole. This calls for an analysis of the relationships of the main organs and institutions to each other. The analysis may proceed on the basis of the following *check-points*, to be modified according to the conditions brought to light by empirical investigation:

1. The religious character of the society.
2. The political value patterns of the society.
3. The history of authority types in the political system.
4. Evaluation of the groups or types which are honored, and of the actions and manners of acquiring prestige.
5. Geographic conditions and their impact on the policy and its operations
 - a. size
 - b. communications
 - c. population: density, distribution
6. Class composition and social structure, especially in relation to their impact on politics.
7. Educational system.

8. Nature of the economy.

9. The general "ethos" of the people, as discovered in its literature, etc.

The Problem of Comparability in Relation to the Study of Values. One important facet of the study of comparative government is the study of the values or value-systems held by various societies. One possible mode of comparison between political systems is that of discovering uniformities in values (national ethos or national character) first, and then comparing the differences of political institutions. However, it was pointed out: (1) that the existence of an integrated national ethos is doubtful, and (2) that even if such an ethos exists it does not have an operational value for the study of comparative politics.

One example cited as an attempt to deal with this problem of value-systems and national character was a study made of the reaction of five different culture groups to constitutional forms of government. These groups were located in New Mexico. The specific question under investigation was this: How are the constitutional forms of government *reinterpreted* in terms of the culture of the group which comes into contact with these forms? The actual results of field work showed, in the case of all five groups, that no really integrated pattern of values appeared. There appeared to be only *clusters* of values within each group, which would seem to negate the idea of discovering a general "national character" or "ethos" on the basis of which high-level comparisons could be made possible. This result brought into question the reliability of any attempt to plot the total impact of constitutional forms on the "ethos" of each group. Instead, a more modest approach was suggested, namely, the examination of the reaction to selective, limited, and fairly concrete institutions and processes, such as legislatures, parties, and elective systems. In other words, instead of looking for an ethos and then relating it to processes and institutions, one should compare the reactions to limited and concrete values in each one of the selected societies.

On the question of examining "values," the same kind of contrasting viewpoints regarding the setting of the problems and "criteria of relevance" appeared as had appeared in other discussions of the general problem of comparability. Some members of the group held that the value-problems to be studied should be set in terms of specific *problems*, and that the criteria of relevance for the study can be set only in terms of the scope and nature of the value to be examined, in its relationship to the specific cultural setting. Here again, doubt was expressed as to the possibility and desirability of deriving the approach to the study of values from a general conceptual framework. An intermediate view suggested the possibility of operating not on the basis of a general scheme or single values, but rather on the basis of a "configuration" approach which would deal with the reaction of societies to selected interrelated value patterns.

The number of points of view expressed and the apparent inconclusiveness of the discussion on the question of comparability and uniqueness indicate, if nothing else, the complexity of the problem and the lack of any existing systematic treatment. Two major points of view were expressed: one arguing in favor of the need of a conceptual scheme which not only spells out the cate-

gories under which data may be collected, but also indicates the criteria of relevance to be adopted and the variables which are to be related hypothetically for the purpose of comparison and ultimately for the development of a theory; the other arguing that, given the present state of comparative studies, comparability ought to be derived primarily from the formulation of problems within limited and manageable proportions. The extent of this disagreement should not, however, obscure the area of agreement reached by the members of the Seminar. It was agreed:

1. That comparison involves abstraction and that concrete situations or processes can never be compared as such. Every phenomenon is unique; every manifestation is unique; every process, every nation, like every individual, is in a sense unique. To compare them means to select certain types or concepts, and in so doing we have to "distort" the unique and the concrete.

2. That prior to any comparison it is necessary not only to establish categories and concepts but also to determine criteria of relevance of the particular components of a social and political situation to the problem under analysis (i.e., relevance of social stratification to family system, or sun spots to political instability).

3. That it is necessary to establish criteria for the adequate representation of the particular components that enter into a general analysis or the analysis of a problem.

4. That it is necessary in attempting to develop ultimately a theory of politics to formulate hypotheses emerging either from the context of a conceptual scheme or from the formulation of a problem.

5. That the formulation of hypothetical relations and their investigation against empirical data can never lead to proof. A hypothesis or a series of hypothetical relations would be considered proven, i.e., verified, only as long as it withstands falsification.

6. That hypothetical series rather than single-hypotheses should be formulated. In each case the connecting link between general hypothetical series and the particular social relations should be provided by the specification of conditions under which any or all the possibilities enumerated in this series are expected to take place.

The formulation of hypothetical series, it should be pointed out, unlike a single hypothesis (which states what consequence will flow from a given antecedent state X), states series of consequences which will flow from state X or several states X, Y, Z under particular conditions. It is designed to deal with the problem of verification in social sciences, where the absence of experimental situations prevents us from having sufficiently constant situations to determine the role played in them by specified variables. Under such circumstances we can only state hypotheses for varying conditions, i.e., hypothetical series. The specification of such conditions is what gives us a meaningful element of regularity in the absence of experimental situations and allows us to test our hypotheses by finding not only similar but also dissimilar consequences ensuing from given antecedent conditions.

7. That comparative study, even if it falls short of providing a general theory of politics, can pave the way to the gradual and cumulative development of theory by (a) enriching our imaginative ability to formulate hypotheses, in the same sense that any "outsidedness" enhances our ability to understand a social system; (b) providing a means for the testing of hypotheses, and (c) making us aware that something we have taken for granted requires explanation.

8. Finally, that one of the greatest dangers in hypothesizing in connection with comparative study is the projection of possible relationships ad infinitum. This can be avoided by the orderly collection of data prior to hypothesizing. Such collection may in itself

lead us to the recognition of irrelevant relations (climate and the electoral system, language and industrial technology, etc.). Such a recognition in itself makes for a more manageable study of data. *Hence the importance attached by the members of the Seminar to the development of some rough classificatory scheme prior to the formulation of hypotheses.*

The members of the Seminar generally rejected the arguments made in favor of uniqueness, and argued that comparison between institutions not only can be made, but also may eventually provide—through types of approach to be indicated presently—a general theory of politics as well as a general theory of political change. Before such general theories can be developed, however, research along the following lines must be undertaken in as orderly a way as possible:

- (1) Elaboration of a tentative classificatory scheme, however rough;
- (2) Conceptualization at various levels of abstraction (preferably at the more modest and manageable level of the problem-oriented approach);
- (3) Hypothesizing, i.e., the formulation of single hypotheses or hypothetical series suggested either by the data ordered under a classificatory scheme or by the formulation of sets of problems; and
- (4) Finally, the constant testing of hypotheses by empirical data in order to eliminate untenable hypotheses by falsification, making possible the formulation of new and more valid ones.

It is regrettable that none of these approaches have been seriously and methodically used by political scientists. Classification is spotty, and, in most cases, of descriptive, formal character. Conceptualization and hypothesizing have not moved beyond the narrow-gauge problem-approach state—and this with reference to the Western European countries primarily. As for a systematic process for the verification and falsification of hypotheses, it remains practically unknown in our literature.

II. APPROACH SUGGESTED

Formulation of a Conceptual Scheme. Concern with systematic formulation of a scheme for empirical inquiry led the Seminar members to a discussion of the need of a conceptual scheme for the comparative study of politics as an introduction to a general, i.e., comparative theory of politics. It was felt that the formulation of such a scheme would (a) help provide classificatory concepts, and (b) make the ordered elaboration of hypotheses possible. Such a conceptual scheme, it was agreed, was not designed to spell out a "theory"—an objective too ambitious indeed to be accomplished in the seven weeks that the Seminar members had at their disposal. We simply wanted to indicate the role of such a scheme in the formulation of a theory in the future—i.e., in the elaboration of relationships in the form of hypotheses and ultimately the systematic formulation of a series of hypotheses that can be tested comparatively against various political systems.

Comparison, it was agreed, must proceed on the basis of a definition which views politics as a universally discoverable social function or activity. The function of politics, in the total social system, is to provide society with social decisions having the force and status of legitimacy. A social decision has the

"force of legitimacy" if the collective regularized power of the society is brought to bear against deviations and if there is a predominant disposition among those subject to the decision to comply. As for the means of enforcing decisions, every society, generally speaking, has a determinate organization which enjoys a monopoly of legitimate authority (or *political ultimacy*). Moreover, the distinguishing characteristic between political relationships and other will relationships is the existence of this framework of legitimacy. Concepts of legitimacy or "legitimacy myths" are the highly varied ways in which people justify coercion, conformity, and the loss of political ultimacy to some superior groups or persons, as well as the ways by which a society rationalizes its ascription of political ultimacy and the beliefs which account for a predisposition to compliance with social decisions.

But the legitimacy myth only defines the conditions of obedience. Within its framework, there is the political process itself, through which numerous political aspirations (policy aspiration groups and power aspiration groups) strive for recognition and elevation to the position of legitimacy. The factors which determine *which* power aspiration group is to be invested with legitimacy, to the exclusion of all others, are the effective power factors of the system. This, in brief, was the general conception of "politics" on which we worked.

It was suggested, then, that on the basis of the terms and framework here outlined the general modes of politics, for the purpose of analysis, would be as follows: political processes are the struggles among power aspiration and policy aspiration groups competing for the status of legitimacy; the outcome of such struggles is determined by the society's structure of effective power; and the end state, legitimacy, is the political reflection of its general value system.

The major components of the political process which should provide a fairly coherent classification scheme as well as the possibility of formulating hypothetical relations are the following:

1. The 'elective' process of the system, both formal and informal.
2. Its 'formal' deliberative process.
3. Its 'informal' deliberative process.
4. Its structure of 'influence.'
5. Its structure of 'power.'

Finally, the major tasks (as they are envisioned under this scheme) in the analysis of political systems are these:

1. To analyze the legitimacy myth of the society, in terms of its specific content and its relationship to the society's general myth structure.
2. To inquire into the system's
 - a. political aspirations
 - b. political processes
 - c. effective power factors
3. To analyze both the complexity and ultimacy of decision-making systems in any given society:
 - a. the conditions under which political ultimacy is either diffused or concentrated.
 - b. the relationships between subsidiary and ultimate decision-making systems.
4. To formulate general hypotheses about this aspect of politics and the relationship between them.

5. To provide for a theory of change through the study of tension between 'formal' and 'informal' processes.

Criticism of the Concepts Involved in the Scheme. Following the presentation of this introduction to a conceptual scheme, a series of meetings was devoted to discussions of the main concepts; criticisms were offered, and alternative definitions or methods of analysis were suggested by the various members of the Seminar group.

1. The definition of politics in terms of decision-making and legitimacy myths was questioned. It was felt by some of the members that the emphasis upon decision-making as the most significant and uniform aspect of politics meant a narrowing of the accepted meaning of politics.

2. It was also pointed out that the concept of decision-making failed to cover adequately traditional subjects which are generally considered to be part of politics, i.e., international politics, war, colonial and military government. Moreover, it was felt by some that the concept of decision-making does not deal adequately with such modes of political behavior as (a) sheer coercive power relations; (b) fear and its attending consequences in politics; and (c) apathy to the political sphere of social activity.

3. Some of the group were of the opinion that the concept of the legitimacy myth needed some clarification in order to be made operationally useful. It was suggested therefore that the legitimacy myth concept be viewed as an amalgam of four operational concepts: (a) habitual acquiescence; (b) the partial internalization of command; (c) self-involvement; and (d) structural transfer to other social stereotypes.

4. Another general criticism made was to the effect that the concepts of decision-making and of legitimacy myths are primarily applicable to Western political systems. In order to provide a rough test of the general applicability of the scheme, a number of areas and problems were selected for examination.

III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The general agreement on the usefulness and desirability of a conceptual scheme was coupled with an equally strong emphasis on the need of alternative approaches. It was felt that the conceptual scheme presented and discussed in the Seminar was adequate for *purposes of illustration* and that the present state of comparative politics called for a "pluralistic" rather than unitary approach.

From here on the Seminar decided to develop and discuss alternative approaches to the study of comparative politics. It was agreed, however, that for each one of the alternative approaches to be suggested, the same or at least comparable precision as that involved in the development of a conceptual scheme or a classificatory scheme should be insisted upon. Any and all of the alternative approaches, it was pointed out, should establish at lower levels of abstraction and comprehensiveness a conceptual categorization for the compilation of data and should also lead to the elaboration of meaningful hypotheses. If our concerns are similar, we can develop a common language, we may begin to look for facts under common headings and concepts, and we may start asking for or pointing to hypothetical relations and attempt to apply them in different contexts, in various countries, and at different levels of abstraction and inclusiveness.

The alternative approaches on which we agreed were: (1) the *problem approach* to comparative politics; (2) the *area approach* to the study of comparative politics; (3) an amplification of the classificatory scheme approach in the form of a *check-list* to aid us in the more coherent and more systematic compilation of data.

The "Problem Approach" to Comparative Politics. Comparative politics cannot wait for the development of a general, i.e., comparative theory and of a general comprehensive conceptual scheme. Therefore, instead of making claims of comprehensiveness and universality, would it not be preferable to suggest a more modest and manageable approach? The members of the Seminar agreed that the problem approach could perform such a function. It was pointed out that the formulation of a problem has in itself some of the characteristics of a conceptual scheme. The presentation and the formulation of problems requires an ordering of empirical data and calls for the formulation of hypotheses or series of hypothetical relations. Furthermore, the problem approach is flexible enough so that it can lead the research worker to an examination of problems with a varying degree of comprehensiveness both in terms of theory and in terms of empirical orientation and investigation. Three types of problem approaches were suggested and discussed:

1. The area of narrow-range theory. Narrow-range theory involves a relatively low degree of abstraction, i.e., it applies to homogeneous cultural contexts, and deals with a limited number of variables.

2. The area of middle-range theory. Middle-range theory is conceived to include problems of fairly general importance, involving a relatively high degree of generalization, but which remain below the level of a truly general theory of politics.

The subject matter of problems included within these two ranges should *ultimately* be integrated into a general political theory. They are resorted to for the sake of making problems manageable in terms of existing data and techniques we can hope to acquire.

3. Policy-oriented theory and problems. Policy-oriented theory is that area which deals with the immediate practical solution of important problems and is consequently focused on problems derived from pressing conflict situations or any overwhelming need for action at the governmental level. Naturally the question arose as to what criteria should be used to select the problems. Four such criteria were suggested: (a) The intrinsic interest of the problem to members of the profession; (b) the relevance of the problem to the elimination of certain key difficulties in the comparative method and the analytical utility of comparison; (c) the ability of the problem to take us beyond the current level of inquiry in the field; (d) the probable and eventual significance of the problem in leading us to the formation of a general theory of comparative politics.

It was agreed that the formulation of the problem should be as clear and logically coherent as possible. A problem selected should be presented in the following form:

- (1) The statement and structure of the problem: The problem must be stated precisely; it must be stated in such a form as to lead immediately to hypotheses; it must be analyzed into its component elements; its variables and the relations between them must be spelled out; and all this must be done in operationally meaningful terms.

- (2) Its relations to a possible general theory of politics: that is, how would the problem

fit into a more general theoretical orientation, and what more general questions can illuminate its solution.

(3) Demonstration of the manner in which the problem calls for the use of comparative method, and analysis of the level of abstraction which comparison would involve.

(4) The enumeration of a recommended research technique for dealing with the problem and justification of the recommendation.

(5) The enumeration of possible alternative research techniques.

Though it was generally agreed that it was not the function of our Seminar to state exhaustively narrow-range, middle-range, and policy-oriented problems, a few typical ones were suggested for the purpose of illustration:

1. In the realm of narrow-range theory—an analysis of the relations between the power of dissolution and ministerial stability in parliamentary systems.

2. In the realm of middle-range theory—a study of the political consequences of rapid industrialization in underdeveloped areas of the world.

3. In the realm of policy-oriented problems:

a. The development of constitutional governments in colonial areas.

b. How to deal with political instability in France.

c. How to dissociate colonial nationalism from Soviet-inspired leadership and ideology.

d. What should the policy of constitutional regimes be toward the totalitarian parties, e.g., the Communist party?

It was, however, felt very strongly by all members of the group that extensive cooperative research should be undertaken for the purpose of formulating as systematically as possible various sets of problems of the middle-range, narrow-range, and policy-oriented types before undertaking cooperative empirical investigation. If the problems are set in an interrelated fashion and if the narrow-gauge problems are made to fit into the middle-range problems, the research carried out in the future not only will have the advantage of being coherent but may also pave the way to the elaboration of more comprehensive problematic approaches and ultimately to the tentative formulation of conceptual schemes and theories.

Classificatory Scheme and a Check-List of Politics. The discussion of the need for a classificatory scheme and the existence of check-lists in related social sciences led the members of the Seminar to the conclusion that a political check-list may fill a very serious gap in the literature today. Such a list may provide for a clear and coherent table of classification under which data can be assembled in an orderly fashion under commonly formulated concepts.

A detailed elaboration of such a check-list and the arrangement of data under it is, however, an immense task. The members of the Seminar felt, as was the case with the problem approach, that such an undertaking requires a cooperative effort among groups of social scientists. Nevertheless, we decided to develop, for purposes of illustration only and in brief outline form, such a check-list. The following broad categories and subdivisions were included:

1. The setting of politics (an enumeration of the most significant contextual factors of all political systems, i.e., geographic patterning, economic structure, transportation and communication patterns, sociological structure and minorities, cultural patterns, values and value systems, and the record of social change).

2. The sphere of politics: the actual and potential sphere of political decisions (conditions determining the sphere of decision-making; limits on political decisions; major types of decision-making; and potential changes in the sphere of decision-making).

3. Who makes decisions—the elite. (Who are they supposed to be? To whom does the community impute prestige and what are the prevalent prestige images and symbols? Forms of selection of political elites—ascriptive, achievement. Who actually makes the effective political decisions if they differ from those who are supposed to make them? By what means? The breakdown of elites: regional, etc. Stability of the elite. Types of personal participation in the decision-making process.)

4. How decisions are made (formulation of problems; agencies and channels of decision-making; decision-making procedure; some major characteristics of decision-making procedure.)

5. Why are decisions obeyed? (The enforcement of decisions; compliance; consent; types of consent; the sociology of compliance; some check-points for the measurement of compliance.)

6. Practical politics: policy aspiration groups and power aspiration groups. (Policy aspiration groups: types, purpose, organization, techniques. Power aspiration groups: types, goals, organization, techniques, influence and effectiveness.)

7. The performance of the system: stability, adjustment, and change.

a. Conditions of stability and change (legitimacy myth, relationship between formal and informal processes). Manifestations of instability and stability (legitimacy myth, formal or informal processes). Allocation of decision-making power (leadership); some check points for stability and instability.

b. Change (conditions of; manifestation; types; check-points for assessing conditions for potential change).

The Area Study and Comparative Politics. A third alternative approach to the study of comparative politics is the more systematic and precise use of the *area concept*. The members of the group felt that the concept has been abused in the organization of university studies. The expression "world areas," though of some use, lacks operational clarity and consistency. It was agreed also that the concept of area has been somewhat indiscriminately associated with the following concepts either separately or in combination: (1) geographic: the definition of an area simply because of the geographic propinquity of certain states, i.e., Western Europe, or the Far East; (2) historical: the definition of an area in the light of a common historical task and common historical experience; (3) economic: the definition of an area in the light of comparable economic conditions and needs; and (4) cultural: the definition of an area in the light of common cultural heritage or common experience of cultural inter-actions between two or more cultures.

It was generally felt that all of the above definitions are for the political scientist unsatisfactory. Neither geographic, historical, economic, nor cultural similarities constitute *prima facie* evidence of the existence of similar political characteristics. But if the concept of an area is to be operationally meaningful for the purpose of comparison, it should correspond to some uniform political patterns against which differences may be studied comparatively and explained.

The definition of an area on the basis of culture was considered to be worth detailed discussion. It was suggested that though primarily used by the an-

thropologists it might be adapted to the needs of the political scientists. Its use promises the following advantages for the political scientist:

1. A greatly heightened awareness of the multiple connections between the sphere of politics and other aspects of a culture, which may be described as a feeling for total context and for the overall integration and patterning of cultures.
2. An incentive to the adoption of an inter-disciplinary approach and the utmost possible utilization of the knowledge and skills of allied disciplines. It thus attempts to raise the student's methodological equipment to a level and potency more compatible with the dimensions of his problems.
3. A framework for political comparison across national and cultural boundaries far more realistic and meaningful than that supplied by the partial and out-of-context institutional framework generally utilized.
4. An awareness of the shortcomings of political explanations couched in terms of single-factor and proximate level causality and an impulsion to go more deeply into the complex ranges of social causality.
5. Some aid in avoiding the purely descriptive approach to political institutions and some incentive towards its replacement by a problem-oriented approach.
6. As effective a counterbalance to the irrational effects of ethnocentrism as a determinant of "proper" areas of interest and terms of appraisal as has been discovered.

Granting these advantages, however, it was pointed out that the concept of culture has been used by anthropologists as a static device for classifying cultural types and arranging data primarily in respect to primitive cultural units over a large and disparate geographic area. Furthermore, the concept of culture as used by other social scientists, e.g., ethnographers, becomes ambiguous and comes perilously close to being identifiable with the national characteristic or the "gestalt" or "ethos" approaches, which are operationally unacceptable to political scientists.

To make the concept operationally meaningful, therefore, for political science, it was suggested that an attempt be made to define areas with reference to "political traits" or "trait complexes" or "problem configuration patterns," in terms analogous to those used by the anthropologists when they break down the concept of culture into "traits" or "trait complexes." Such an approach to the definition of an area has not, as yet, been undertaken, despite its promise for comparative study. First, the very search for common political traits and problem configuration patterns will call for classification and conceptualization. Secondly, once similar traits or patterns have been distinguished and have been related to certain geographically delimited units, the area concept will be of great value, since certain political processes will be compared between units within the area against a common background of similar trait configuration. In this sense it was felt that future research should be directed towards developing in great detail classificatory schemes within areas. With the help of such a scheme the study of differences would be made far more manageable. For instance, it was felt that in Latin America the following problems offer the prospect of a fruitful intra-area comparison:

1. Political instability and "revolution."
2. Constitutional problems—the relation of written constitution to the actual operation of government in Latin American states.

3. Dictatorship—the typical character of Latin American dictatorships, and their differences from the European brand of totalitarianism.
4. Militarism—the extent and nature of military rule in Latin American politics.
5. Regionalism and particularism—the reasons underlying politically centrifugal tendencies.
6. International politics—the major factors which affect the role played by Latin American states in world politics and in international organizations.

Similar types of problems could easily be suggested for the Middle East, Scandinavia, and Western Europe.

Another general definition of an area which might be of use to political scientists included five operational criteria: (1) inter-action of values and ideas (culture); (2) physical proximity; (3) economic relations; (4) political inter-action of power relations and power groups; and (5) strategic considerations. These criteria have the advantage of pointing to the most important factors that enter into the area concept. The political scientist, however, has to relate them to similarities and dissimilarities in the observable political processes and attempt to explain them through the formulation of hypotheses.

IV. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The last topic discussed by the group was the relationship between comparative politics and international politics. The contemporary study of international politics, it was pointed out, has actually entered a new stage. Prior to and during the First World War, the predominant emphasis was on diplomatic history. There followed a popularizing or “current events” phase, in which the attempt was made to treat every aspect of international affairs as an important segment of the study of international relations. The third stage has been that of the study—and it is a vast one—of international law and organization. But only in the later inter-war period, and since World War II, has there been an explicit attempt to formulate a general theory of *international politics*.

In this latest phase, there have been three significant developments: First, we have witnessed the evolution and development of a point of focus or core in the field; secondly, there have been the first faint and feeble beginnings of attempts to create an appropriate methodology for the field, or at least to determine those related methodologies in the social sciences whose methods and techniques could most usefully be appropriated for the study of persistent international issues; thirdly, inventories have been drawn up by individual scholars, universities and institutes, of topics and concrete projects which would best serve in the development of general principles in the field, and the validation of them through systematic inquiry. Today, the threefold concern of international politics is with (1) the forces and influences which bear on the conduct of foreign policy everywhere; (2) the technique and machinery by which foreign policy is executed; and (3) the institutions and practices whereby the conflicts among nations are adjusted and accommodated.

The central operative device for the analysis of the conduct of foreign policy

is the concept of the national interest. This concept is, in turn, based on the analysis of power and political conflict among the political systems we call national states. In this sense, then, foreign policy in practice is said to be the outgrowth of particular objective conditions which set limits to what any nation can do. There are clusters or aggregates of power and interests that, when viewed by statesmen schooled in a common tradition of national policy, tend to produce foreign policies that have similar patterns. Thus the study of international politics has come to focus on the political behavior of states. Consequently, it is possible to ask the same questions about international politics one would ask about politics in general.

It was pointed out, therefore, that students of international politics should inquire into what is common to the behavior of all states instead of merely deciding what is unique in the conduct of states. It was suggested that the political scientist who abstracts from international relations that aspect of behavior which involves the response of a nation in its conduct of foreign policy to a certain objective political situation involving both *external* and *internal* factors is thereby enabled to make comparisons when those factors are repeated. Indeed, it is precisely in comparisons of this kind that the principles of international politics must be sought.

Since a central concept of international politics is that of the national interest, the question was raised as to what tests or criteria are to be used in determining what are the interests (both vital and secondary) which shape the foreign policy of any state. Is the student of international politics to accept, at face value, the definition of national interests given by the statesmen of a particular state? Or does the examination of power factors, geography, historical development, and the like, offer the student of international politics certain rough tests for defining the "objective" interests of the state? Discussion of this led to a suggestion that we assume the concept of national interest as a focal point for investigation. Two approaches seem possible, to be used separately or in combination:

1. Determine analytically what the national interest "ought to be" (i.e., determine what, according to certain objective criteria, such as national power, vital interests, etc., the "objective" national interest appears to be to the investigator), given certain conditions. One could then compare this evaluation of the national interest with the "actual" definition as provided by the actions and pronouncements of the particular nation.

2. Describe, under the following categories, the reasons why nations define their national interest in certain terms and not in others:

- a. Survival prerequisites.
- b. Objective physical conditions—geography, resources, tradition, past historical decisions, values systems, etc.
- c. Institutional channels through which the national interest is defined and set—i.e., policies and interest images. How are they defined in the political process of the state?
- d. Policy interplay between independent political units and their respective interests, including the pattern of reaction within each.
- e. The subjective pluralism of the society by which the *content* of the interest images is set.

- f. Why and how the definitions of interest of particular groups differ from or correspond with the criteria of "objective" national interests.

Categories *a-d* are in the nature of factors which set *limits* on the definition of the national interest. Category (*e*) is the factor which defines the possibilities in substantive terms.

On the basis of this scheme, it was suggested, there might be a useful "division of labor" or cooperation between students of international politics and students of comparative politics. Categories (*b*) and (*d*) could best be handled by students of international politics; the other categories could best be handled by specialists in comparative government.

More generally, a cooperative effort between students of international politics and comparative politics should be centered around the following general areas of mutual interest:

1. The process of decision-making has in itself become a function in international politics through the existing various organizations and agencies. How does this decision-making take place? Through what channels? Is it accompanied by any broad legitimacy ideas or myths that transcend the national states?

2. The concept of "national interest" provides us with some meaningful concepts for the study of foreign policy. As was pointed out, the concept will have to be broken down into a number of component parts, some of which would be studied by the student of comparative politics, while others will remain within the domain of international politics. Given, for instance, generally analogous conditions, the definition of national interest by individual states varies. What accounts for this variation? Is it due to the composition of elites? The character of communications within a given state? The type of the political system? These seem to be proper questions for the comparative politics specialist.

3. The study of the focal point at which the states meet—diplomacy and negotiations through which conflicts are resolved or common objectives realized—is a cooperative task which admits of no arbitrary allocation of duties. For the action of each state depends upon domestic conditions and internal images, as well as traditional forces. Relations between states, on the other hand, have repercussions upon domestic myths, images, authority symbols and institutions. Domestic and international politics are in that sense not opposite poles in a continuum of political behavior, but rather complementary factors.

4. The student of international politics may also join hands with the student of comparative politics in attempting to define and study an area. For it is evident that certain uniform outlooks and behavior patterns may be due to similar experiences commonly shared by a number of states vis-à-vis the other states. Here again, the study of uniformities and differences is primarily a joint task.

5. Finally, goals of foreign policy may again be jointly studied. Foreign policy is, in the context of national interest, to be conceived as a dynamic interplay of (a) the given or chosen goals, (b) the organic elements that set limiting conditions upon the selection of goals, and (c) the selection of strategy or means for the achievement of the given or chosen goals.

COMMENTS ON THE SEMINAR REPORT

I

The basic hypothesis of the Report is no doubt the one in which the "legitimacy myth" is described as a "framework" within which the political process takes place (p. 649). This process is in turn characterized as one "through which numerous political aspirations," as represented by groups interested in policy or power, "strive for recognition and elevation to the position of legitimacy." And the factors which determine the outcome are called "the effective power factors of the system."

There can be little doubt that "legitimacy" is an important aspect of power, and that make-beliefs ("myths") associated with making power legitimate are of key interest to political science. It is another question whether they should be stressed to the extent they are in the Report. It is well-known that the problem of legitimacy came to the fore in connection with the French revolution. Rousseau, in the famous opening passages of his *Contrat Social*, stated that he could explain what might make legitimate the chains in which man found himself as a member of organized society. But unlike the members of the Seminar, he did not think of this problem exclusively as one of "mythology." Since his time, historical research has clearly revealed that the problem of legitimacy achieved its predominant place in modern Western thought as a result of the extreme stress laid upon law as a foundation of society. It seems questionable whether a realistic appraisal of other societies will reveal this issue as the central one of all government, even though it may occupy a not insignificant place.

Some of what follows this statement of the central issue of comparative politics seems to suffer from excessive abstraction and formalism. This seems curious in view of the Report's avowed hostility to formal approaches. What seems to have received inadequate attention is the fact that any systematic scheme is bound to be both formal and abstract.

A great part of the history of political thought, both past and present, seems in point of fact to be dominated by the *problems* which an emergent, that is to say constantly evolving, society throws into the face of the student of these matters.¹ Whether it be the decline of the city state or the emergence of the Soviet Union and its totalitarianism, there always seem to be novel problems calling for thought and action. These problems are usually the result not of abstract ratiocination but of the actual evolution of human society. It is this fact, well-known to be sure, which forces social studies to be oriented in concrete terms toward concrete problems in a way alien to the natural sciences.

The present Report gets around to this aspect of the matter when it takes up those problems which it calls "policy-oriented," in contrast to "narrow-range" and "middle-range" problems. However, it seems questionable to insist upon this trichotomy. For policy-oriented problems are typically problems

¹ The importance of the problem approach is explicitly recognized in one part of the Report, pp. 651-52.

which may be either narrow-range or middle-range or contain some characteristics of both. This may be illustrated by reference to problems encountered in studies of federalism in which the author (with a group of others) recently engaged. These studies (since published as *Études sur le Fédéralisme* by the *Mouvement Européen*) were undertaken at the request of policy-makers in Europe who are confronted with the question of what policies to adopt regarding a potential federal constitution for a European political community. To assist them in this policy problem, they desired a comparative survey of practices in existing federal states; of these, Australia, Canada, and the United States, besides Switzerland and Germany, seemed of especial interest. Since the existing literature was lacking in precision and scope, an assessment was undertaken. But the terms of reference for this assessment were set by the policy-makers who had to deal with definite issues, such as how to organize the executive of such a federation, or to what extent to transfer to it fiscal competencies hitherto exercised by the existing states.

According to the Report, these are "formal" problems of little interest to comparative politics; but it would seem that the policy-makers concerned would have found the Report's approach "formal," because unsuited to the concrete and specific problems confronting them. It may be objected that the making of a constitution is in itself a "formal" task and that therefore research in order to assist it must also be "formal." Yet in view of the realities of politics, the drafting of a constitution appears to be one of the most concrete tasks which political science may be asked to contribute toward.

The Report seems to imply that no theory or theoretical hypotheses have been advanced to date. Is this really tenable? Even the particular theory of politics to which the drafters of the Report are committed is not lacking in exponents. In this connection, the Report's use of the word "empirical" is subject to criticism. For one thing, the meaning is not made clear; moreover, the connection with the position of the Report is not shown. "Empirical" data are presumably data of experience, but it belongs among the most important and difficult tasks of political science to determine whose experiences, and what kind of experiences are to be taken into account.² To this task the Report ought to have addressed itself, even if only in summary form. It might then have discovered that a good many of the problems of structure which the Report gainsays as "formal" are the very ones on which significant empirical evidence can be gathered and employed for the development of useful and probably valid hypotheses.

Not only are both the problem approach and the issues involved in area studies explicitly recognized, but at least one highly significant strand of emer-

² The Report employs the word "falsification," presumably an analogy to "verification," to designate a procedure by which a certain hypothesis is disproved or proved false. This is not a very fortunate term; but apart from that, it is important to recognize that in any ultimate sense, none of the significant hypotheses of political science can ever be proven or disproven; we are dealing only with degrees of probability on account of the nature of the evidence at our disposal.

gent thought has been elaborated, namely, the problem of decision-making.³ Perhaps it is inevitable that in such a context earlier work is slighted or neglected. Some of the most valid propositions set forth in the Report are in fact those which have been recognized for a long time. It may be well at this point to recur once again to the problem approach and its relation to policy. The Report alleges that much policy-oriented theory "deals with the immediate practical solution of important problems and is consequently focused on problems derived from pressing conflict situations or an overwhelming need for action at the governmental level." This way of putting the matter misstates the crucial issues. Not only do problems suggested by such situations and policy issues very frequently lead to a solution not of practical, but rather of theoretical problems—the practical ones having proved insoluble—but also it is characteristically the task of the student of comparative politics to show how a variety of solutions have been attempted, each working with some degree of success, but none without corresponding difficulties. This type of situation was strikingly illustrated in our studies on federalism. Whether in the institutional or the functional fields, each federation had adopted different solutions to the same problems. These different solutions tended on the whole to fit into the particular system of federalism—though with some significant exceptions. Evolutionary factors and historical antecedents also play their role. But from all this variety there nonetheless arises a common core of typically federal solutions which must be seen in terms not only of static inter-relationships of power and structure, but also in terms of emergent developmental patterns or constructs.

The same point may be made with reference to an issue taken up in the Report, namely that of national interest. "Interest theory" is one of the more familiar hunting grounds of jurisprudence, to which a great deal of ingenuity has been applied by past generations. Of this discussion, too little evidence is contained in the Report. Instead it relates national interest too exclusively to problems of power and the competition for it. Interest is vitally related to what people want (to put it very simply) and the range is therefore most extensive. The list given (p. 656) offers a rather abstract and formless approach to the matter. In view of such studies as Beard's, it lacks precision, if not also scope. If there is such a thing as "objective national interest" (what national interest "ought to be" according to the Report), it surely resembles the proverbial metaphysical black hat.

In conclusion, it might be said that the Report confirms an earlier conclusion of the author:

... Modern political science is largely a critical examination of common-sense notions concerning the working of political institutions and procedures. . . . Most of the materials of this political science are taken from history and law, and the common-sense notions are examined in the light of this historical experience, as if they were scientific hypotheses

³ Lasswell, in his contribution to *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), which he edited with Daniel Lerner, has recently claimed "decision-making" to be properly the problem of other social sciences, rather than political science. This appears more than doubtful.

formulated for the purpose of discovering general rules or "laws" of politics. Since most of the common-sense notions regarding the working of political institutions and procedures are at least partially inaccurate, different and strictly scientific hypotheses should be developed by the political scientist . . . modern political science is not concerned with the forms of government . . . it is concerned with the instruments or techniques of political action in terms of the objectives they are supposed to serve. It is, therefore, to some extent concerned with prediction, even though conditional. . . .⁴

The Report is right in saying that as these more scientific hypotheses develop, they will in turn be subjected to further analysis and testing. And it is to be hoped that the evolving verified generalizations will be correlated in the future, as they have been in the past, not only in descriptive, scientific systems, but also in terms of the values that are a meaningful part of the society to which these generalizations refer. In these efforts and aspirations political science, through comparative politics, ought to cooperate with the other social sciences and disciplines. Such cooperation will be facilitated if political science remains focused upon its primary task, the study and understanding of governmental processes, and does not allow itself to be sidetracked into the more misty realms of a sociology whose claim to scientific value is compounded of hopes and pretenses, rather than solid accomplishments of a scientific and scholarly certainty beyond dispute.

CARL J. FRIEDRICH.

Harvard University.

II

The Seminar is on sound ground in lamenting the degree to which the study of comparative politics has been water-logged with the formalistic details of a parochial choice of cases. It is not entirely clear from the highly condensed Report how successful the participants were in divesting themselves of all the traditional blinders that have held back progress in the field. At the risk of belaboring the obvious I shall underline some implications of the configurative method when it is taken with the seriousness that it richly deserves.

The scope of comparative politics is to demonstrate the *equivalency* of diverse patterns as well as the occurrence of *identical* patterns. There is no basis for assuming that any specific political pattern invariably has the same results, or that its occurrence is invariably conditioned by the same factors. At the same time there is ground for the assumption that a given pattern may occasionally appear with identical consequences and conditions.

The position affirmed here is that any myth (or part myth) may be found in all conceivable relations with any pattern of operation. It is therefore no surprise to find that the doctrines and formulas of human dignity may be interwoven with observances that extend from perfect compatibility to the direct opposite. Similarly, we expect to discover that any party system may come into existence or continue to endure as a function of factors that are either identical in various situations, or on the contrary, afford many points of contrast from

⁴ Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1941), pp. 593-94.

case to case. The same range is to be expected when the *consequences* of a party system are made subject to investigation.

If the political scientist makes up his mind in advance that the only results that will satisfy him are the discovery of identical cases, he is destined to waver between the disappointments that arise from the inconclusiveness of most of his results, and the disappointments that come from the obviousness of the instances in which such relatively rare identities are brought to light. If on the contrary the political scientist becomes fully cognizant of the importance of the phenomenon of equivalence, he will have made an important advance in method. The phenomenon teaches him to respect the diversity of the configurations that may produce the results which from his point of view are the "same." The investigator will hunt the new and differentiating factor with the same sense of contribution that he experiences when he comes across examples of the "nickel in the slot" relationship.

The scholar is liberated from the temptation to "over-interpret" his data in the hope of fitting their diverse features into a few procrustean beds of theory. As a policy advisor he may turn his creative imagination to the problem of inventing patterns of action that may "make all the difference" and yet may be much simpler or more daring than are conventionally thought of by political scientists. If in an industrializing country an objective sought by policy is to encourage honesty in administration, and confidence in the integrity of the public service, the advisor may think of such "trivial" ideas as the introduction of cash registers under the supervision of outsiders. This innovation may dispense with efforts to think up gruesome penalties in the criminal code, or to multiply the number of platform declarations in favor of decency and of speeches extolling virtue.

The Report is well justified in advocating field work on the contemporary scene as it unrolls into the future. What is said along this line would be strengthened if it were linked with prediction and experiment. Political scientists do well to test their mastery of the dynamisms of a political and social system by predicting immediate, middle-range, and long-range futures. The technique of prediction is to specify change x and to state the conditions ($y' \dots$) in which it is anticipated. Such a systematic structure is not to be confused with forecasting in the sense of asserting that party X will win at the polls tomorrow by 50,000. Predictions are families of hypotheses; forecasts are not. (You know no more by studying the forecast in relation to outcome than you knew before.)

Political scientists intervene in the developing situation when they give currency to predictions. This fact opens the way for the systematic planning and control of interventions by the scholar and the scientist. Matched situations may be subject to different methods of treatment, as when no predictions are made in some, predictions are limited to a few leaders in others, and general predictions are made in a third group. The countries now undergoing industrialization afford a fertile field for systematic prediction during the next few years.

The Report lays insufficient emphasis upon the crucial role in comparative studies of the maximization postulate. Comparative studies have usually given a conglomerate rather than a disciplined and integrated impression because of

the absence of systematic use of this postulate. By maximization is meant the general expectation concerning human conduct that the alternative of response is chosen that is expected by the chooser to yield more advantages than the recognized alternatives. Describing a political situation in this perspective makes it essential to treat the patterns that are accepted or rejected in the same terms. That is, it is necessary to demonstrate that the data about expectation enable us to predict the result in all cases. If a two-party system is followed by a single-party set-up, or if any other system-succession occurs, it is essential to obtain the following data: (1) Who was for or against which pattern? (2) On the basis of what values did the individuals or groups concerned make their estimates? (3) On the basis of what information did they arrive at their estimates?

The data required about politics by the maximization postulate is more refined than can be obtained in many research studies, especially of historical situations, and of many top elites in the contemporary scene. But it is far from out of the question in all cases, since the volume of private minutes, diaries, and related sources (to say nothing of interviews) provide all the materials needed.

Whenever a new depth of intensiveness is added to the requirements of research, the magnitude of the undertaking suddenly zooms to new and formidable heights. If political scientists think only in terms of demonstrating identical cases, they are doomed to the frustrations that come from finding only a few cases of the most important systems they want to study. The contextual approach on the other hand, by raising the evaluation of the discovery of equivalences, gives a new zest to inquiry. It does so by directing attention to the finer structure of the support groups active in political situations, and to the values, expectations and sources of information on the basis of which evaluations are made. Very often the significant result will be to show how a given political pattern is kept the "same" throughout a given period by varying constellations of support elements; how the values that enter into the calculation of these elements manage to compensate for shifts in the role of any value; and how the expectations that remain steady depend upon compensating sources of information.

Only studies of this degree of refinement are contributory in dealing with the technical and detailed questions that are the appropriate concern of political scientists who concentrate upon the exploration of comparative politics. It is to be hoped that the Report will prove to have provided an incentive to the consideration of political systems with the full equipment of the modern configurative approach.¹

HAROLD D. LASSWELL.

Yale University.

¹ The attention of political scientists may be called to a methodological statement in an overlapping field: Myres S. McDougal, "The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 915-46 (June-July, 1952), published concurrently in the first number of the *American Journal of Comparative Law*.

III

The Seminar has outlined in admirable fashion the issues that have to be faced in pursuing research in this important field. Rather than survey again the ground they have covered so well, I should like to develop further three of the points the Seminar has raised.

Intercultural Comparisons. Trouble begins for the researcher with the word "comparative." What are we comparing, and why? To pursue the question, let us indulge in a bit of comparative speculation and consider what "comparative" means in the sciences of comparative anatomy and physiology.

To take a crude example, the anatomist might be interested in the comparative weights of the brain in two vertebrate species. In order to make the comparison, he must first identify in each of the two species a structure that is sufficiently similar that he is willing to give it the same name ("the brain"). Then, having identified this common structure, he must describe in what ways it is the same, in what ways different, in the two species. For example, the ratio of brain weight to body weight turns out to be a significant statistic for the comparison of species.

Notice that *two* elements are essential to the comparison: (1) a fundamental similarity (technically, an "isomorphism") between the two objects to be compared; and (2) a description of resemblances and differences between the similar elements in the two objects compared. Without the first element, the second is meaningless. There is a famous story about a debate between two eminent comparative anatomists as to the relative size of the spleen in the rabbit and the whale. Their heated conversation was overheard by a classical scholar who turned to them and said: "But Gentlemen! Aristotle says that the whale *has* no spleen." He turned out to be right, and this ended the discussion of the comparative anatomy of spleens.

The similarity, or isomorphism, that provides the basis for comparison need not be *structural*. If we wish to compare a bird with a mammal, the wings of the former are isomorphic (in certain important respects) with the forelegs of the latter. But what if we wish to compare the bird with an insect equipped with six legs and four wings? In this case we might still be interested in a comparison of *functionally* similar elements—wings with wings. In other cases we are interested in *phylogenetic* similarity—for example, between the feathers of a bird and the fur of a bear. Many of the propositions of the comparative biologist are concerned with the relation among these three kinds of similarity: structural, functional, and phylogenetic. How have two structures that are phylogenetically similar changed in the course of evolution? Is a similar function in two species performed by similar or dissimilar structures?

I have drawn out the analogy at some length, because I believe it carries many lessons for the researcher in comparative politics. Let us consider a commonplace proposition like: "France has a multi-party system, the United States a two-party system." The similar element being compared in the two systems is the "party." But is the French party structurally similar to the

American, functionally, phylogenetically—or similar in some other respect? Perhaps a more significant correspondent to the French party is the American “faction”—of which there are at least four—and to the American party, the French *groupement*. Until we decide which structural element in the American system is to be compared with which element in the French, the original statement is meaningless. My own suspicion is that what we are really interested in here is not so much a counting of parties as a comparative analysis of the function of forming legislative majorities in the two governments, including the steps leading up to the selection of legislators. Then the similar element that provides the basis for the comparison is not the “party” structure, but the function of “forming majorities.”

One final example will further illuminate the problem. I have seen hardly anything written in comparison of Japanese and American government that did not stress the wider acceptance of authority by subordinates in the former than in the latter government. One of my graduate students, Takehiko Matsuda, and I have tried to formulate a procedure for testing operationally this generally accepted proposition. The obvious way to do it is to specify some similar situations in the two cultures, and then to see in which situation there is a greater acceptance of authority. Only when he undertakes to do it explicitly does the researcher become aware of the formidable difficulties in defining the “similar situations.” I do not mean to imply that it is impossible to test the proposition in question, but merely to point to some of the difficulties that have to be met in designing the test.

Causality and Correlation. A second problem with which the Seminar wrestled concerned the ways in which the researcher could distinguish, when he had noticed an association between two or more factors in several cultures, between genuine causal connections and fortuitous associations. Before this distinction can be made, the term “cause” has to be restored to scientific respectability. The impact of Hume, together with the kinds of mathematical methods that are used by the natural sciences, have led to wide acceptance of the slogan: “There is no causation, only functional interdependence.”

Of course, deep down in our hearts we have never believed this (and a few brave souls, e.g., MacIver, have said so). Even though we accept the critique of Hume, we find it hard to think that there is no difference between a “spurious” and a “genuine” correlation. Fortunately, recent advances in statistical theory have clarified the issue and have indicated a way—consistent with Hume—of defining causal relations. The story is a lengthy one, which I will not try to tell here. The interested reader can refer to the sources mentioned in the footnote.¹

These developments deserve particular attention from political scientists because they cast a great deal of light on the kinds of asymmetrical relations with which he is accustomed to deal—e.g., power and authority relations. The

¹ See Herbert A. Simon, “On the Definition of the Causal Relation,” *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 49, pp. 517–28 (July 31, 1952); and Chapter 3 of *Studies in Econometric Methods*, ed. W. Hood and T. Koopmans (New York, 1953).

causal relation is also asymmetric, and the clarification of that relation turns out to be fundamental to the definition of power and authority.

National Interest. Unless we define national interest in terms of "ultimate" goals—the good, the true, and the beautiful, so to speak—goals and strategies become very much intermingled. This kind of situation seems to me best clarified by the decision-making framework of analysis. What we are concerned with are the premisses that enter into political decisions of national states. What are the values that are weighed in reaching such decisions? What factual premisses are taken into account? The important factual premisses include both the kinds listed under *2b* and *d* in the Report (p. 656). In particular, those under *d* are vitally important. I don't think one could define the current American "national interest" without reference to American expectations and estimates of the Soviet national interest and the Soviet strategy—and vice versa.

We are confronted with all the complexities and perplexities of game theory in which the behavior of each party depends critically upon his expectations of the behavior and strategies of the others. If we are to avoid the vacuity of defining national interest in such terms as "prosperity and freedom," then what we are really concerned with is the "national strategy." This is much more than a statement of national goals; it is actually a statement of conditions that the national policy must satisfy in order to achieve the national goals.

HERBERT A. SIMON.

Carnegie Institute of Technology.

IV

The condition which the Report seeks to correct is one in which the sterile description of gadgets has long eclipsed a more complex kind of analysis which regards government in the context of its society. The chief merit of the study is that it may help restore the study of foreign governments to its proper relationship with the cultures from which they have been rudely extracted. It seems clear from perusal of texts and research that we have been busy describing other peoples' gadgets and have paid little attention to beliefs and ideals which lie under the externals. To compare externals without profound understanding of their cultural context is to invite the accumulation of half-baked hypotheses which will place the study of governments in an even more unsatisfactory state.

The Seminar apparently devoted much time to this problem both in its discussion of the methodological difficulties of comparison, and in its specific mention of treating government in relation to what it called "the total configuration." In this respect it reaffirmed the similar concern of a different committee which stated in 1944:

The methodological—or should one say the transcendental—interest of the group was focused on the position and function of comparative government in relation to the general culture-pattern of the state. From the stale routine of dissecting and describing foreign political institutions there emerged a blueprint of a branch of human knowledge which, "catholic" in the literal sense of the word, should become the coordinator and integrator of much that heretofore has been kept apart by narrow compartmentalization into iso-

lated and unrelated disciplines. . . . Research should be conducted in such a way as to make it a tool for the understanding of our political civilization as a whole rather than as an accumulation of unrelated information on individual political systems.¹

Yet for all its concern over the relation of government to its milieu, the Seminar deals with this approach merely as one of several alternatives rather than as an indispensable prerequisite to further comparative studies. It is, of course, no new idea to view government against the background of its society.² Nonetheless, we seem to have lost sight of this requirement. American political science is oriented strongly toward Europe, with which we share a common philosophical heritage. Hence we take for granted that the American analyst of European governments understands the foundations of the governments he sets out to study. For the most part this assumption is true, or at least was true before the fragmentation of knowledge which now characterizes most American scholarship. Yet when we come to the study of non-European governments, those of Asia, for instance, this assumption must be reconsidered. In studying Oriental politics we deal not only with totally strange societies but also with ideas and values often incompatible with those of the West. To study the governments of Asia without prior intimacy with the ideas of Asia is to catalog but not to understand. The study of Oriental governments is crucial because it must deal with the issue of comparability in its sharpest terms. This problem requires, I suspect, somewhat more attention than the Seminar gave it, and to it my subsequent comments will be directed.

Other factors have helped divorce the study of government from the study of culture. The first relates to the internal development of our discipline; the second to the external relations of political science with higher learning. The division of our discipline into allegedly unrelated segments (particularly public administration and international relations) has separated us from the life-giving base of theory. We can hardly call American political science the same study of politics which Aristotle described as the master science. This separation has been transferred to our study of foreign governments and we are displeased with the results, as the Seminar makes obvious. There is evidence to indicate that our discipline is becoming more intellectually integrated—that we are returning to the broader Aristotelian concept of politics.³ As we recast the pieces of politics into a mosaic, we will approach comparative government from quite a different point of view. Another factor is that political science as a study has become divorced from the intellectual (particularly literary, theo-

¹ Karl Loewenstein, "Report of the Research Panel on Comparative Government," this *Review*, Vol. 38, pp. 542-43 (June, 1944).

² Bacon, Bryce, Montesquieu (to cite but a few sages of our cult) discussed the matter brilliantly. Even some of our contemporaries, borrowing from our white-coated colleagues, have talked of the "ecology" of government. And, of course, F. S. C. Northrop has developed the concept extensively in his *The Taming of the Nations* (New York, 1952).

³ One piece of evidence is the fact that two recent presidential addresses at the annual meetings of our Association dealt with this problem. See James K. Pollock, "The Primacy of Politics," this *Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 1-18 (March, 1951) and Peter Odegard, "Variations on a Familiar Theme," this *Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 961-74 (Dec., 1951).

logical, and philosophical) currents of our time. This isolation is understandably reflected in our methods of studying other governments. In this respect there is a relationship between our approach to comparative politics and the development of American higher education. As there is integration and breadth in higher learning, so will there be a greater inclination to look at "the total configuration" when we study other forms of government.

There is no doubt that the recent work of cultural anthropologists, the development of area studies since the Second World War, and extended contact with Asia are factors which have directed our attention to the need for knowledge of the total culture in studying foreign governments. Yet we seem to handle this idea with timidity rather than confidence, as I think is indicated when the Seminar makes it optional along with "conceptual approach" and "problem approach." Granted there are problems in defining what we mean by "area." These are summarized in the Report (pp. 653-54). But these problems are not impossible to surmount, at least for purposes of developing a systematic method of examining other governments. Common historical experience, common acceptance of religious and philosophical values, and a noticeable degree of stable and mature homogeneity: these would make a reasonable basis for delineating a cultural area for further study. Certainly the Far East is not such an area. Asia would have to be divided into three or four regions. As each region is studied in historical perspective, the sphere of validity will change. It is possible, for example, to regard China, Japan, Korea and the Ryukyus as one fairly homogenous culture during one period of Far Eastern history. Yet though these nations share a common Taoist-Confucianist base, there were historical factors sufficiently powerful to change the quality of each national culture: in the case of Japan, 300 years of Tokugawa domination; in the case of China, rule by Mongol and Manchu; and in the case of Korea and the Ryukyus, the influence of China and Japan. Pursuing this kind of cultural analysis, the student of Asian governments is likely to find himself comparing various facets within the changing cultural orbits. It is conceivable that under the circumstances he may never reach the point at which he can project his comparison to a Western culture. While this may delay the development of a sophisticated and mature methodology designed to discover universals, it is delay which is essential for validity.

The Seminar poses the problem (p. 642) of distinguishing between causal and fortuitous relationships of factors taken out of different governments for purposes of comparison. I do not see how the distinction can be made without analysis of all the causal factors within the cultures being considered. If we were to compare the literacy figures of Japan and the United States (to develop an example used in the Report) with the votes cast in Japanese and American national elections—what significance would mere columns of figures have? The relationship of the factors may well be fortuitous; the only way we can tell if it is causal is to examine the total cultural context of literacy and voting in both societies. This would involve, at the minimum, an analysis of attitudes toward government, toward authority, knowledge of the nature of measuring

literacy, extent of non-literate sources of public information, party activity, kinship structure. The analysis would spiral outward and downward until it encompassed the total range of observable culture. The result would be a pattern of relations between certain causes in both societies. Only after this pattern is determined can real comparability result.

There is another reason why any study of Asia which ignores the total fabric of society is likely to be unproductive. This is simply the uniqueness of many of the externals of Asian government. The problem does not arise in quite the same way when governments of the West are compared. France has its *Conseil d'État*, it is true, but both England and the United States have highly developed bodies of administrative law even though they lack an independent juridical structure for its administration. Often the distinctions of the West are distinctions of degree rather than kind. But where in the West (aside from the *mir* of Russia, which itself probably has Asiatic antecedents) can we find anything remotely similar to the system of collective neighborhood responsibility found in the *chia-pao* of China, or the *tonari-gumi* of Japan? There is nothing in our own system to which these institutions can be compared. But careful analysis of the factors giving rise to these institutions may lead to significant hypotheses. Certainly the idea of the Chinese censorate (found in the Chinese constitution and reflected in Japanese government) cannot be productively compared to anything in the West (notwithstanding the fact that both Vermont and Pennsylvania had councils of censors for a brief period). Risking facile generalization, analysis of the culture would probably reveal that censors were necessary because of the broad discretion allowed Chinese and Japanese administrators. This trust of the administrator in turn is probably due to Confucian optimism about the essential goodness of man and the particular virtue of the educated official. This kind of analysis requires intimacy with the writings of Confucius, Lao-tze, Mencius and others. Thus the spiral spreads to include the ideas held sacred by the people.

A Chinese poet once expressed the Taoist concept of oneness by saying that only when the artist was inside a bamboo stalk could he really paint the whole grove. This is a formula for total cultural immersion which I believe to be requisite to any analysis of Asian governments.

RALPH J. D. BRAIBANTI.

Duke University.

V

The Report is a valuable collection of techniques for the advancement of comparative government. My disagreements with it are mostly matters of emphasis. They are, however, generalized in a belief that levels and stages of desirable development and alternative techniques for handling different sorts of material need to be much more clearly differentiated.

As to emphasis, I think the Report gives far too much weight to further systematic classification as a *preliminary stage* preceding the extensive formulation of hypotheses. While I grant that a good deal of useful ordering of data can still

be accomplished, I see no way of attaining *agreement* on any particular classificatory scheme as preferable to others in advance of the partial verification of hypotheses which successfully make use of its categories. Once a certain sophistication has been attained in the handling of a body of materials, meticulous attention to pure classification is an intellectually sterile pursuit. Political science, I think, has already fairly adequately pursued its "natural history" stage of development. I therefore deprecate any serious growth of cooperative projects which aim primarily at forming classifications, or checklists, or mere definitions of problems. The originality and boldness required in developing the new concepts out of which, as will be shown, hypotheses need to be constructed could be seriously impeded by the etiquette imposed by team-work if the latter were applied, as has been suggested, to the process of vocabulary construction. In other words, I see as the primary need for rapid advance a familiarity not now present with the technique of advancing useful hypotheses. Much more valuable checklists and classification tables can be made later on than now. They can then use the concepts that will have proved useful in successful hypotheses and their formulators will not, as they now would, feel impelled to include the bulk of our present stock of loosely applicable philosophic abstractions and aesthetic configurations.

As to levels or stages of development, many of the questions raised in the Report and in current discussions of methodology are unanswerable when submitted as universal alternatives ignoring time and circumstance. The answers, however, are often fairly obvious with respect to some given stage of research development. I have in mind something undoubtedly similar to what the Report intends by the problem of "degrees of abstraction" to which it repeatedly refers. I think, however, that there is little clarity in this formulation. To me the attainment of true science involves the successful passing over from the use of broad aesthetic concepts of large configurations to very narrowly defined variables rigidly abstracted from the aesthetic contexts in which they appear. I doubt that there is much intervening variation between these two kinds of concepts, certainly nothing accurately scalable. The only "degree of abstraction" which I regard as relevant in this context refers to the extent to which concepts of the second type (narrowly defined variables) are in use in a given subject-matter.

Now the way to handle broad aesthetic concepts to aid intuitive understanding is one thing and the way to handle isolated variables as tools of scientific explanation is another. We now possess mainly concepts of the former (broad aesthetic) type and unless we are to sit back and make no judgments until someday we may attain "full scientific stature" as a discipline, we must continue to use these concepts prudently. What must be realized is that no reasoning, however prudent and responsible, involving the type of concepts now generally in use in our field, will ever yield objectively verifiable generalizations of the type associated with the successfully developed sciences. Rather we may anticipate, with good fortune, the gradual building up of scientific knowledge of particular aspects of politics by the use of concepts of a type now unfamiliar

to us and in their nature foreign to our present habits of broad aesthetic description. For a long time, and I would presume forever, political scientists must be prepared to think alternatively (1) as responsible artists and philosophers in handling the many vital problems which existing scientific knowledge does not conclusively settle, and (2) as scientists with respect to those matters for which identifiable and measurable variables have been successfully isolated. In the first role they must maintain the cultivated tolerance of humanism which does not expect that by argument all scholars will ever be convinced of the validity of some single point of view. In the second role they may expect to see develop a gradual unanimity of competent scholars on many points which will have been successfully analyzed in terms of measurable variables.

To me the road to science is a development from aesthetically defined and intuitively reasoned concepts of broad and somewhat loose reference to highly abstract isolated variables linked by rigidly stated hypotheses that have been at least partially verified. This cannot, however, be a uniform development of the whole field of political science as at present known, and passage from one stage to the next can therefore refer only to some particular matter of investigation. Broad aesthetic definition and intuitive reasoning cannot at any foreseeable point be abandoned by the practitioners of our subject-matter, for pressing problems will still require this method of argument. It will, however, be superseded in each particular matter for which a true scientific explanation is attained.

As a preliminary step toward genuine scientific comparison, practitioners must be prepared on occasion to reject rich contextual wholes and to concentrate attention upon aesthetically minor elements that recur in many different situations. These elements must be such as can in some sense be measured, at least to the extent of an unambiguous determination that an item is present or absent in a situation. Thus a student of cabinet-systems (a broad aesthetic concept) might profitably turn his entire research attention for a time to some such matters as the ages, the educational levels attained, or the prior occupational experience of cabinet members, on the basis of some hunch that variations in these data may be correlated with some more obviously significant variables. The difficulty of this first step and the reason for much of the flirtatious behavior of political scientists when confronted with the question of becoming scientists, is that at the present time it can be recommended for no other purpose than the possible building of a future scientific system. From any other standpoint, since such a scientific system does not now exist, the person who expects to have to make responsible explanations and evaluations will be poorly advised to neglect any part of the general context in which his material lies.

The passing over to science in any phase or aspect of politics will be marked by the coming into use of certain concepts in the nature of operationally defined variables, for the presence or for the values of which in situations for which data have been assembled there will no longer be protracted and wordy disputes among practitioners. We will all know, for instance, that Ruritania shows a

current rating of +5 and Liliputia -1 on the alpha-ocracy scale and of 2 and 6 respectively on the beta-ology scale and that consequently (under accepted hypotheses) their gamma-ometry rating must necessarily be +1 and -7 respectively. This will be considered relevant information that would necessarily have to be taken into account in forming policy with respect to these countries, though in all probability it will hardly be sufficient to settle conclusively just what the best policies should be. We shall still presumably be disputing to some extent just what we or Ruritania or Liliputia should do about conditions in Ruritania or Liliputia, but we shall not be plagued by "schools of thought" as to just what the alpha, beta, or gamma ratings of those countries actually are.

Accompanying the introduction of operationally defined concepts will be the increasing use of *rigid statements* of the relations thought to prevail among them. These will be hypotheses and some of them will become more and more firmly established as their repeated usage fails to encounter refutation in experience. In fact there can be little interest in the isolation of measurable variables except insofar as hypotheses are advanced in which they are to be used. Since the interest in explanation obviously lies at this point rather than in a mere enumeration and classification of data it is highly unlikely that much progress toward science will be made until the technique of advancing hypotheses becomes moderately familiar. Here also the breaking of habits will be demanded, because hypotheses likely to be successful in stimulating the accumulation of knowledge will bear little resemblance to the prudent and responsible generalizations we are accustomed to make about our present data. The useful hypothesis must be a rigid and little qualified assertion. Otherwise it (like most prudent writing) could hardly be conclusively refuted by any conceivable evidence; however, the only initial purpose of an hypothesis is to invite the accumulation of evidence to see if it can be disproved. Moreover, it will be impossible for useful hypotheses to refer to the sort of concepts which we most like to talk about and which we normally make propositions about in policy discussions. This is because practically all our stock of political concepts (constitutions, executives, cabinet systems, etc.) refer to such broadly aesthetic configurations that in many cases they are practically unique historically and not strictly comparable with anything else, and at most allow the comparison of a handful of similar cases. Aside from the limitation imposed on scientific treatment by the smallness of the number of cases, these aesthetic configurations could not be provided with unambiguous operational definitions without completely changing their meanings by greatly narrowing their reference to phenomena. Thus it is inconceivable that "democracy" or "liberalism" as ordinarily conceived, with all their richness of historical association, could ever appear in a scientific (i.e., objectively refutable) hypothesis, but quite possibly some operational rating for some aspect of their reference, like decisiveness of popular elections or degree of individual independence in decision-making, might be constructed.

What is the intellectual responsibility of one who advances a significant hypothesis or system of related hypotheses? The implications of this question

are largely unfamiliar in a field which has been largely literary and philosophical. Now the formulator of a new theory or the revisor of an old one gets out a book as soon as he has accumulated an impressive body of data, and the book purports to prove the truth of his assertions on the basis of the particular collection of data which he or his project have collected. Actually, such "proof" is relatively ineffective since adherents of other "schools of thought" are practically never convinced but continue to rely upon other treatises which to them "prove" a different viewpoint. In the case of hypotheses which are based on operationally defined variables and which can contribute to the furtherance of scientific investigation, publication is desirable long before there is any complete or definitive accumulation of the evidence needed for their ultimate validation. It is quite unlikely that the formulator will be in a position to conduct any serious proportion of the investigations that will be necessary before the new hypotheses can be considered to be tentatively confirmed. It is therefore desirable that other interested scholars be invited at an early stage to make contributions to the validation process.

The foregoing seem to me to be the basic conceptual requirements for a serious start toward a science of politics or a genuine comparative government. Certain other comments as to where these starts are likely to lead seem highly probable: (1) Because so many political configurations are uniquely defined by locally prevailing belief-systems, it is probable that the genuine variables (historically repetitive elements) derived from the strictly political context of society will be relatively few and that successful explanatory political theory will involve the relation of these few political elements with other variables now regarded as in the provinces of other disciplines; (2) because of the requirements of intelligibility in group work and because any really new theoretical formulation appears more or less absurd before it has to some extent been used in research, a division of labor (as in physics) is likely to come about in which individual scholars in the main contribute the new hypothetical formulations while the work of testing such formulae and modifying them in terms of actual data falls to organized teams; and (3) the development of a science of politics will in no sense provide a complete substitute for the art and philosophy of politics, though much of the content of these activities may be expected to be modified in the light of an accumulation of verified scientific knowledge.

G. LOWELL FIELD.

University of Connecticut.

VI

This is patently a stimulating document, evidencing creative vitality and promising important new developments. I shall therefore not note the many aspects that seem to me meritorious, but direct attention instead to some points which might warrant adverse comment.

1. The word "state" and the expression "comparative government" appear but once each in the Report (if I have observed correctly). Presumably the

single and only incidental—perhaps accidental—use of these expressions is significant. An almost certain surmise, based on the tone and tenor of the Report, is that “state” is not regarded as a meaningful, certainly not as an “operational” concept; and we may guess that “comparative politics” was used instead of “comparative government” because the latter seemed too restricted, too static and institutional in its connotations. This is a legitimate, probably commendable, choice of terminology. But it is not beyond argument and certainly not beyond explanation. Even if one wishes to discard “state” entirely, a reference to its use is helpful in accounting for the parochial emphasis on Western institutions which is deplored. No doubt the conceptualization which has been promoted by the term “state” has sensitized students to look for Western institutions, and to feel lost where they do not exist, or to make false generalizations based upon superficial similarities.

2. In spite of the high level of methodological sophistication of the conferees, the Report conveys the impression in a number of ways (“dismemberment” technique, “checklist,” etc.) that data collection is a step logically precedent to hypothesizing. To the extent it does so it falsifies or at least distorts the relationship between data collection and hypothesis. One does not know what to “dismember” or what to “check” unless by some sort of hypothesis the chosen phenomena are significant. While to be sure by a chicken-or-the-egg chain some sort of data lies back of the hypothesis, the Report should not (on other evidence, such as the “problem” approach) be construed to advocate a great program of fact-gathering which must be completed before we can hypothesize.

By the way, I think the conferees underestimate the extent to which the deplored “descriptive” treatments of Western institutions have been, in their time and at their level of conceptualization, “problem” treatments in which hypothesizing played a role. Paradoxically, the present realization of their inadequacy is in part a reflection of their success.

3. “National character” and “ethos” are rejected as tools because they are not “operational.” Not mentioned in the Report but also certainly relevant is the fact that they have lent themselves to abuse in “racist” theory. Nevertheless, I suggest that the curt dismissal of these terms is a little arbitrary and somewhat unfair.

In the first place, few if any of the other concepts which receive the approval of the conferees are operational without a great deal of reduction and refinement. Even the four “operational concepts” into which “legitimacy myth” is resolved need a great deal of further sharpening before they are really ready to “operate.” On the other hand, no attempt is made to see what “ethos” (which is certainly little more ethereal than “legitimacy myth”) could be made to mean in operational terms. I regard the New Mexico study cited as meaningless in this context—whatever else it may illumine. Certainly it should be obvious without demonstration that the interpretation of “constitutional forms of government” would widely vary among the widely varied cultural groups of New Mexico. It is equally obvious that there are important congruencies in

interpretation of these concepts among millions of citizens of the United States. If there were not such congruencies in societies, the conferees' proposals to study legitimacy myths and political "trait complexes" would be meaningless. Incidentally, what is meant by the conferees when they speak of "the West," if not an "ethos"? Assuredly not a geographical location.

In the second place, the more careful studies of such things as "legitimacy myths" and "political trait complexes" will not be done for some time. In the meantime we must make do with what materials are available in the learning and teaching process, and for the present it seems to me highly desirable to supplement the more formal and descriptive materials with existing impressionistic treatments of "national character." These must, of course, be selected with care, "balanced" with regard to the national perspectives of their authors, and assigned with strong caveats. The image which emerges still may be blurred and distorted, but it is better than no image.

4. The conferees do not merely suggest, they urge, that "politics" cannot be understood apart from the total configuration—including economic system, social structure, and culture. I concur. And because I concur I wish the conferees had addressed themselves directly to the meaning and implications of this proposition. How do the various "social sciences" fit together in a pattern that gives meaning to each and unity and coherence to the whole? Should we all become students of sociology (or whatever the most general term is) first, and students of politics second? What, for example, of the place assigned politics in the schemata of Talcott Parsons in *The Social System*? We need to address ourselves to such questions without academic parochialism or imperialism. If true comparability exists only if the same "function" is performed, how can we be sure we are comparing "likes" until we have a conceptual apparatus that fits all societies, and then data under the concepts for each society compared?

DWIGHT WALDO.

University of California, Berkeley.

THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION*

JOSEPH G. LA PALOMBARA

Michigan State College

Contemporary political science assumes that the representative system, in addition to its influence on the formal structure of government, is functionally related to the internal cohesiveness and equilibrium of society itself. This fact takes on the greatest significance in the modern democratic state, in which the size of the population requires that the representation be indirect. For the political scientist, therefore, a challenging situation arises out of the following question: how can the modern democratic state insure the most adequate and accurate political expression of the elements and currents within it, while still maintaining a government which can function and a safe margin of stability for the society?

That there are no simple formulae for resolving this problem is attested by the many theories of representation which have been propounded and tried during the last century. That a formula is almost desperately needed is demonstrated by postwar European experience.¹ Italy is one of several countries in which the question of representation not only is significant but threatens to divide important segments of the society. The recent Italian elections point up this danger. But the elections, and the parliamentary experience which preceded them, also offer the political scientist a rich store of analytical raw material concerning the process of government and the group behavior which characterizes it.

I

With the unification of Italy, the Charles-Albert Constitution of 1848 was extended to all of the regions which had been incorporated into the new state. The Constitution provided for a uninominal-majoritarian electoral system under which the suffrage was extended to a very restricted segment of the population.²

* The research on which this article is based was made possible by a Fulbright grant and by financial assistance from the Social Science Research Council and the University of Pennsylvania (Penfield Scholarship Fund).

¹ See James K. Pollock, "The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany—A Study in Representative Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 1056-68 (Dec., 1952).

² Until 1870 the vote was granted to males of 25 years or more who could read and write and who had paid at least 40 lire annually in direct taxes. See the selection on Italy by Salvo Mastellone in M. Duverger, *L'influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique* (Paris, 1950), p. 153.

For general background in the history of Italy's electoral and representative system, consult the following: G. Ambrosini, *Sistemi elettorali* (Florence, 1946); C. Montalcini and A. Alberti, *Legge elettorale politica* (Bologna, 1919); Vittore Bonfigli, *La legge elettorale italiana* (Florence, 1946); *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Documenti—Disegni di legge e relazioni*, 1953, No. 2971-A, pp. 35-100. The last item provides an excellent brief survey of the evolution of Italian electoral legislation.

This tight, oligarchical system prevailed throughout the latter period of the Risorgimento and was to provide the Historical Left with an excellent weapon against the Liberal heirs of Cavour. Indeed, as late as 1880 Italy enjoyed the unenviable distinction of holding last place among the countries of Western Europe regarding the ratio of electors to the total population.³

Upon the rise to power of the Historical Left in 1876, the country moved in the direction of electoral reform. Following a period of procrastination, two laws were enacted in 1882 which reduced the literacy and property requirements⁴ and established a system of limited voting in plurinomial districts. This system, which guaranteed a minimum representation to the strongest minority party, remained in force for only a decade. In 1892, confronted by a fast-growing Socialist movement, the conservative elements of the Historical Right and Left reconsidered their progressivism and shifted back to the old system. Thus, except for a brief interval, the uninominal-majoritarian system prevailed in Italy from 1848 to 1919, when the ascendancy of the mass parties brought about Italy's first experience with P.R.

With the growth of Socialism and the gradual formation of genuine political parties in Italy, major changes in the mechanism of elections were to be expected. The minimum demands centered on an extension of the suffrage. But it was also natural, in a country which had been exposed to Thomas Hare's *The Machinery of Government* shortly after its publication in 1859, that the proposals should eventually come to include P.R.⁵ Thus, as the matter of unification was replaced by other more important issues, and as *trasformismo*, which characterized Italy's parliamentary system under a DePretis or Giolitti, began to give way to clear-cut party clusters, the matter of P.R. took its place as one of the most widely and avidly debated subjects of the day.⁶

³ In 1871 only 535,000 (1.98%) of 27,000,000 inhabitants enjoyed the suffrage. The property requirement, plus an illiteracy rate which hovered about 75%, effectively restricted the vote to an infinitesimal elite. See Duverger, pp. 153-55. By 1880, 2.4% of the population participated in elections; the figure rose to 7.4% in 1882, 24.4% in 1913, 30.9% in 1919, and 60% in 1946, with the extension of direct universal suffrage to male and female alike. See Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Le elezioni politiche del 1948: elezione della Camera dei Deputati* (Rome, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 29.

⁴ The Law of January 22, 1882 admitted any male citizen over 21 to the suffrage if he could meet either of the following qualifications: (1) present evidence of having completed the elementary grades, or (2) present evidence of having paid at least 19.80 lire annually in direct taxes. The law establishing limited voting also made the provinces the basis of all electoral districts, a system which has remained intact to the present time. See Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁵ Hare's system was discussed in the Universities of Parma and Padova as early as 1862. By 1872, an Association for the Study of P.R. had been created at Milan, and it was to make an important contribution—technically and propagandistically—to the successful campaign to institute P.R. in the country. See Bonfigli, *La legge elettorale italiana* (cited in n. 2), pp. 5-11.

⁶ Italy has a rich literature on P.R., and the following must therefore be considered a limited selection of a few of the more significant treatises: G. Ambrosini, *La Proporzionale* (Rome, 1946); A. Oxila, *Il problema elettorale* (Florence, 1946); R. Lucifero, *Introduzione alla libertà* (Rome, 1945); F. Squarsina, *La rappresentanza proporzionale* (Rome,

The First World War brought a temporary suspension of the drive for fundamental electoral reform, but this served merely to make the postwar effort that much more pronounced. A liberal extension of the suffrage in 1918 strengthened the base of the mass parties, and the pressure in Parliament began to tell on the opponents of change. Socialists and Catholics alike were agreed on the need for and the superiority of P.R. as an electoral system. Socialists like Filippo Turati and Claudio Treves and Liberals such as Vittorio E. Orlando and Francesco Nitti brought to the debates in Parliament all of the classic arguments in favor of P.R. In the aftermath of war, with labor on the rampage and the mass parties feeling a new-found strength, the defenders of the traditional majoritarian system gave way before the P.R. onslaught.⁷ On August 15, 1919, Parliament, after a long and often bitter debate, passed the Nitti Law which established a system of P.R. patterned after the method of d'Hondt. In addition, the voter was given the opportunity to mitigate the influence of the parties by expressing a limited number of preferences on the ballot.⁸

Only two elections—those of November, 1919, and May, 1921—were held under this law. The first returned a greatly strengthened Socialist party and an impressive number of deputies of the Catholic Popular party. The latter election took place in the midst of the disorder and chaos which followed the aborted occupation of the factories in 1920, and it was to be the last free election in Italy until the present postwar era. Although Giolitti's attempt to destroy the Left at the polls had failed, the unwillingness of the Socialists to assume responsibility, coupled with the hysteria of the middle class over the rise of popular power, permitted the Fascists to step in and to take the first major step in the destruction of democracy with the passage of the Acerbo Law of 1923.

The echo of the Blackshirts marching into Rome had not subsided before Mussolini revealed his intention to do away with P.R. Interestingly, the Fascists advanced essentially the same major premises in justification of their law that the Christian Democrats used in favor of the changes which they sought to enact in 1953. Both laws were introduced following a brief experience

1945); R. Drago, *La proporzionale nel rispetto della volontà popolare* (Rome, 1946); G. Bandini, *La riforma elettorale con la rappresentanza proporzionale nelle elezioni politiche* (Rome, 1910); G. Bonelli, *Studio sulla rappresentanza proporzionale delle minoranze* (Florence, 1880); S. Sonnino, *Sulla rappresentanza proporzionale in Italia* (Florence, 1872); F. Genala, *Della libertà ed equivalenza dei suffragi—ovvero della proporzionale rappresentanza delle minoranze* (Milan, 1871).

⁷ It is interesting that the anti-P.R. elements in 1919 attacked the system on the grounds that it would create a permanent and inflexible majority consisting of the Socialist and Popular parties, since these were said to be better organized through the chambers of labor and cooperatives which they controlled. These same elements were later to argue, with just as much vehemence, that P.R. made a stable majority impossible and thus served to weaken parliamentary institutions. See Bonfigli, *La legge elettorale italiana*, p. 22.

⁸ For a close analysis of the 1919 law, see Montalcini and Alberti, *Legge elettorale politica* (cited in n. 2).

with P.R.; both provided for a "premium" designed to guarantee a specific deviation from purely proportional results⁹; both were intended, according to their advocates, to save democracy by insuring a stable majority which could govern effectively. The idea of the right of the minority to an accurate representation in the legislature was accepted in 1953 as it was thirty years ago. On both occasions, however, the corresponding right of the majority to govern was asserted, and was said to have precedence in the event that the two rights should clash.

The opposition to the 1923 legislation was led by Socialists and Catholics alike. De Gasperi himself, on a number of occasions, gave expression to the Popular party's objections to the Fascist proposal.¹⁰ But when the Popular party shifted its position from one of opposition to that of compromise, and the Socialists insisted on maintaining a doctrinaire, suicidal attitude toward participation in government, Mussolini had his way without encountering serious difficulties. The Acerbo Law passed in November, 1923, and the elections of the following year returned to Parliament a Fascist party fattened by the premium out of all proportion to its electoral strength.

Most of what followed has been told many times in treatises regarding the nature of Mussolini's state. Suffice it to say here that by 1928 the Fascists had established their own idea of representation based on corporations, and by 1939 had suppressed the Chamber of Deputies completely and replaced it with the Chamber of Fasci in which all notions of an election—even of the Fascist brand—had disappeared. The rubber stamp created in 1939 was the last legislature under Fascism.

The fall of Fascism was followed by a widespread reaction against the Monarchy, which had cooperated with the old regime, and by a general feeling that the new order should be democratically created. It was natural, therefore, that the "institutional question" should be made a matter of public referendum and that a Constituent Assembly should be created to translate the popular will into a new fundamental law. As is well known, on June 2, 1946, the voters

⁹ The Christian Democrats justifiably insisted that the Left was wrong in calling the recent law a carbon copy of the Acerbo Law. While the latter granted two-thirds of the seats to the party receiving a plurality of the vote, the former demanded that a group of joined parties get at least 50% plus one of the valid votes cast before it could benefit by the premium.

On the other hand, it is a sophism to speak of the Scelba Law as an "integrated" or "corrected" system of P.R., since most of what has been traditionally accepted as going into the meaning of P.R. is destroyed in the application of the system.

¹⁰ A De Gasperi motion, approved at the Fourth Congress of the Popular party, pledged the party's cooperation with the Fascist Government, but also bound the membership to a rigid defense of P.R. A few days later, De Gasperi criticized the Acerbo Law with the comment that political rights and principles were not to be based on the "opportunism of a political moment." See *La proporzionale in Italia* (Rome, 1953), pp. 3-11 (a left-wing propaganda pamphlet with no other bibliographical data, available at *Liberia Rinascita*, Via delle Botteghe Oscure, Rome; the pamphlet is useful in that it contains quotations concerning P.R. and the Acerbo Law from many of Italy's most prominent past and present statesmen).

rejected the Monarchy and created such an Assembly to draft the new republic's constitution and to govern the country during the interim. The delegates to the Constituent were chosen under a simple-quotient system of P.R., which included a national college for purposes of utilizing remainders. For the first time in Italy's history, a constitution was to be drafted by popular representatives. Also novel for the country was the fact that all male and female citizens, 21 years or older, were given the suffrage.¹¹

The Constituent Assembly may well have set the pattern for postwar parliamentary behavior in Italy. Where there should have been cooperation, serious division—which often took the form of physical combat among the delegates—became apparent almost immediately. Aside from the normal ideological differences which separated the major parties in the Assembly, the harsh peace terms which were being hammered out by the Allies in 1946 did not help to create an atmosphere of calm deliberation within the Assembly. Given the important nature of these divisions, it is remarkable that the Draft Commission of 75 members could put together the terms of the new Constitution as quickly as it did, albeit that document has now become notorious for the neutralizing compromises which it contains in many critical areas.

As for the future electoral system, there was general agreement that the lower chamber should be chosen by P.R. Even the Christian Democratic party, already under fire from the Communists and the Socialists, did not see fit to depart from the P.R. tradition of its forerunner, the Popular party. The only issue on which there occurred a notable discussion concerned the embodiment of the P.R. principle into the Constitution. In the final balloting, however, the Assembly agreed to accept a recommendation of the sub-committee which had dealt with the electoral problem. The committee's resolution bound the Assembly to draft a P.R. law for the next elections but, for technical and other reasons, left future legislatures free to modify the electoral regulations without having to amend the Constitution.¹² The law which was finally adopted was similar to the 1946 legislation governing the elections to the Constituent Assembly.¹³

¹¹ Certain classes of ex-Fascists were excluded, as they are today, from complete political privileges. For an account of the precise regulations governing this election, see Bonfigli, *La legge elettorale italiana*, pp. 39–46. Although the present Monarchist party periodically demands an investigation of the 1946 balloting on the grounds that the results were fraudulent and invalid, there is no reason for believing that the majority vote was not cast against the Monarchy. Umberto II, when he accused the government of assuming power arbitrarily and then made his precipitous departure from Italy, did not render a service to his country.

¹² See *Atti Parlamentari* (cited in n. 2), pp. 95–96. In view of this decision, it would appear that the Communist-Socialist claim that the spirit of the Constitution enshrines P.R. is a stretched and wishful interpretation of the document. The Constitution specifically provides only that "The Chamber of Deputies is elected by direct, universal suffrage in the ratio of one deputy for every 80,000 inhabitants, or fraction thereof exceeding 40,000." *Constitution*, 1948, Article 56.

¹³ The law provides for a list system of P.R. with a preference of three or four votes, depending on the number of deputies to be elected within a district. Seats are assigned to 31 districts on the basis of the population ratio provided by the Constitution. In 30 of

Drafting a law for the Senate did not prove as simple. More time was consumed in connection with this problem than with any other confronting the Assembly. The Left generally supported the theory that there should be no great difference between the upper and lower chambers and opposed the idea of two different electoral laws. At the most, the Communist and Socialist parties were willing to recognize only the distinctions in voting and eligibility ages which were eventually incorporated into the law.¹⁴ On the other hand, there were many who wanted to avoid a Senate which would be nothing more than a duplicate of the Chamber of Deputies, and the age and eligibility differences were not considered sufficient to create the marked contrast which was sought.

In the early phases of the discussion the Christian Democrats came forward with a plan which was essentially corporative in nature, in that representation was to be based on professional categories of the society, including the non-economic. Having met with defeat on this proposal, they joined forces with the Republicans and were successful in forcing the opposition to accept a law which takes the major regions of Italy into consideration in apportioning seats and which attempts a fusion of the uninominal and P.R. principles.¹⁵ The uninominal system, however, applies only in the event that a candidate receives 65 per cent or more of the votes cast in the college in which he presents himself. Barring this, the college is combined with all the others in the region in which the 65 per cent rule has not been applied, and the d'Hondt method of P.R. is used for apportioning the seats among the lists or groups of allied candidates.¹⁶

these districts, a simple-quotient method is used for purposes of distributing the seats among the competing lists. The 31st district is the Valle d'Aosta, for which a special uninominal system has been established. Remainders from the 30 districts are gathered in a National College in which seats are assigned on the basis of a national quotient. No party which has failed to elect at least one deputy in a normal constituency can profit from the operation of the National College.

All citizens 21 years or older can vote, and any citizen 25 or older can be a candidate, except for certain classes of diplomats, public officials and ex-Fascists who are excluded. See *Testo unico delle leggi per la elezione della Camera dei Deputati, 6 febbraio 1948, n. 26, Gazzetta ufficiale*, No. 30, February 6, 1948, Articles 1-3, 5, 7-8, 10-11, 42, 59-60 and Title VI.

¹⁴ A candidate for the Senate must have reached his fortieth birthday, while the voting age for this body was raised from 21 to 25 years. *Constitution*, 1948, Article 58.

¹⁵ The regional principle was written into the Constitution and provides that seats shall be apportioned in the ratio of one to every 200,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof exceeding 100,000. Each region, however, is entitled to at least six senators, except for the Valle d'Aosta which is assigned one. *Constitution*, 1948, Article 57.

¹⁶ The law permits candidates of different parties to combine for purposes of the P.R. system. In addition to applying the d'Hondt method, the regional Electoral Office must prepare a graduated list of the candidates in each group in order to make the actual assignments. This is done by multiplying the individual candidate's total vote by 100 and dividing the result by the total number of registered voters of the college in which the candidacy occurred.

If the 65% rule has been applied to all but one college within a region, the remaining college is treated as a uninominal system, and the candidate with the greatest number of votes is declared elected. In case of a tie, the seat goes to the eldest candidate. The Valle d'Aosta is also treated as a uninominal district. See *Legge 6 febbraio 1948, n. 29*, in *Ministero dell'Interno, Le Leggi elettorali* (Rome, 1963), Articles 17-19, 22-23.

In the senatorial elections of 1948, only 15 of the 237 elected were able to take advantage of the uninominal provision, so that for all intents and purposes a P.R. system prevailed for this chamber as well. Nevertheless, the differences between the laws were important and resulted in a Senate party division which differed from that of the Chamber. Adding to this difference was the fact that the Senate also included 107 "Senators by right," who were appointed under various provisions of the Constitution.¹⁷

II

In the elections of 1948 the Christian Democrats returned absolute majorities to both chambers under the electoral legislation passed by the Constituent Assembly. Although no serious complaints were voiced against the system in the early years of the last legislature, the atmosphere of acceptance or acquiescence was to be short lived. Early in 1952 rumors began to circulate regarding a move on the part of the Government to introduce fundamental modifications in the P.R. law governing the Chamber of Deputies. By late summer the Government had spelled out both the mechanics of the new proposal and the rationale which lay behind it.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze in great detail the arguments presented by the competing factions in and out of Parliament. I do wish to emphasize, however, that what transpired in Italy during the six-month period preceding the June elections would make invaluable material for a first-rate study in political behavior. I would suggest that behind the façade of emotion-provoking words such as liberty, democracy, freedom, dictatorship, clerical government, the general interest, etc., lay a very fundamental group struggle in Italian society which was basically responsible for the introduction of the new legislation and for the reaction of the parties who opposed it. A careful analysis of what took place would quickly reveal that much more than a theory of representation was involved in the long debate of the Christian Democratic proposal. Political theory was more often used as a gloss and rarely revealed, for example, the impact of present international conditions on the domestic policy of the Italian Government.

As far as the center parties were concerned, their official justification for change can be summarized as follows: The threat to Italian democracy from

¹⁷ Those who are Senators "by right" under Article 58 of the Constitution hold the position for life. These include ex-Presidents of the Republic and five citizens, of high social, scientific, literary, or artistic merit, who are named by the President of the Republic. The others held office only for the duration of the first Senate and consisted of those who had been members of the postwar Consultative Assembly, or members of the Constituent Assembly who could meet one of the following additional requirements: (1) a former President of the Assembly or of the Council of Ministers; (2) an ex-member of the Senate dissolved under Fascism; (3) a person elected to three legislatures, including the Constituent Assembly; and (4) a person imprisoned for five or more years by the special Fascist tribunal for the defense of the state. *Constitution, 1948, Transitory Provisions, I.*

the Left was still as great as it had been in 1948. Moreover, the administrative elections of 1951-52 had revealed a frightening resurgence of the political Right (the National Monarchists and the Italian Social Movement) with a consequent reduction of the Center's margin of security. If the trends of these elections were to prevail in 1953, it was obvious that the Parliament chosen under P.R. would be characterized by three power blocs, with the Center just able to muster a majority of the votes. This would mean unstable and disorderly government from which only the extremes could profit. And the fact that neither extreme really accepted the idea of a democratic state would naturally lead to attempts to destroy democracy by capitalizing on its weaknesses. In the light of this situation, the Center parties intended to enact a law which would guarantee a strong and stable majority in Parliament in the event that the Center managed to get at least 50 per cent of the total vote cast in 1953. They hoped to correct the defects of P.R. which appear in close elections by providing a "premium" of seats to the majority group. It was obvious, the Center concluded, that the only motivation which lay behind the legislation was that of saving democracy by avoiding a repetition of what had occurred in the years 1919-22.¹⁸

The Left and Right replied that the Christian Democrats sought not only a stable government but also a means of insuring itself a majority in Parliament when it did not have one in the country. Nor was P.R. really at issue, since the Government had not raised objections to it so long as it had worked in favor of the Christian Democrats, as in 1948. The eleventh-hour changes were viewed as an immoral, undemocratic tactic whereby undue obstacles were being placed in the way of the minority in order to deprive it of the opportunity of coming to power peacefully. Above all, to scuttle P.R. was held to be in violation of both the spirit of the Constitution which embodied it and the specific sections of the fundamental law which provide that a man's vote shall be direct and equal.

These were essentially the major themes which were repeated with slight variation throughout what turned out to be the longest, bitterest, and most indecorous parliamentary debate in Italy's history as a Republic.¹⁹ What tran-

¹⁸ The four-party accord on the law indicated that the legislation was designed "to insure the stability and efficiency of parliamentary institutions and the government, and to guarantee the ascension of the Italian people to a higher level of social justice. . . ." See Italian Democratic Socialist Party, *I socialisti democratici e la legge elettorale* (Rome, 1953), p. 5. This document also contains the party's justification for its adherence to the Christian Democratic scheme. See also *Atti Parlamentari* (cited in n. 2), pp. 2-11; *Il Popolo*, April 4-5, 1953, for major Christian Democratic arguments in favor of the modifications. For an excellent summary of the Opposition's objections to the law, see *Atti Parlamentari* (cited in n. 2), pp. 13-31, 96-122, 148-73.

¹⁹ *Legge 31 marzo 1953, n. 148, Gazzetta ufficiale*. No. 75, March 31, 1953, occupied the Italian Parliament from October 22, 1952, to March 30, 1953. For most of this period all other legislation was tied up. Since the law was introduced by Minister Scelba, it is referred to as the Scelba Law in this paper.

spired, in and out of Parliament, made a mockery of democratic institutions.²⁰ The Left obstructed the legislative process to the limit in the name of saving democracy against a "clerical dictatorship." The Government stretched to the breaking point both the Constitution and the procedural regulations of Parliament in order to force through the law in time for the 1953 elections. It justified some of its questionable tactics in the name of democracy, insisting that it was compelled to employ them by the dilatory activities and violence which had been provoked by the opposition in Parliament.²¹ The public propaganda of the Left focussed on the idea that the Center proposal was a *legge truffa*—a swindle law—while the Center parties called the project a *legge anti-forca*—an anti-gallows law.

It is of course too early to gauge the precise impact which the parliamentary wrangling has had on free institutions in Italy. On the other hand, it would appear to be clear that the reputation of democracy has suffered in a country which for more than two decades had been exposed to the Fascist attitude of disdain and scorn toward free government. Indeed, the comments on the debate in Parliament which appeared in the anti-Communist newspapers were reminiscent of the press attitude toward democratic institutions during the 1920–1922 period. There were frequent references to the political immaturity of the Italians, to the need for order (*ordine* is a magic word for Italians and has sinister connotations for democracy), and to the desirability of disciplining the more "unruly" elements of Italian society.²²

The Government must have realized that the debate on its proposal would be heated and the opposition rigid, although later developments indicated that

²⁰ An objective view of what transpired can best be gleaned from a reading of the Parliamentary record, and of the following party newspapers over the period beginning in May, 1952, and extending through the elections of June 7–8, 1953: *Il Popolo* (DC); *La Giustizia* (PSDI); *La Voce Repubblicana* (PRI); *Il Giornale d'Italia* (PLI); *L'Unità* (PCI); *Avanti!* (PSI); *Lotta Politica* (MSI). The so-called independent newspapers, including *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, are not independent at all and distort fact as much as the party organs do. With the latter, however, one knows in advance what to expect.

²¹ See *Il Popolo*, January 17, 1953, p. 1; *La Giustizia*, January 22, 1953, p. 1. De Gasperi himself recognized that it was abnormal for the Government to make a law a matter of confidence when it was absolutely certain of a majority in Parliament. Moreover, there was something incongruous in the Christian Democratic position that the facts that the law finally passed and that it was designed to save Italy against Togliatti made it constitutional. See *Il Popolo*, January 22, 1953, p. 1. For specific examples of the kind of pressure applied by the majority in Parliament, see *Il Popolo*, January 12, February 13, and March 22, 1953; *L'Unità*, February 12, March 25, and April 1, 1953; *Corriere della Sera*, March 30, 1953.

²² Typical of this attitude was a mid-March comment by *Tempo*, one of Rome's more conservative organs. "In fact," ran the paper's argument, "if the present democratic state has safeguarded the public order, in the sense that it has prevented a conflict of armed forces, preventing armed bands and audacity on the part of the people, De Gasperi however finds himself today in the same conditions which confronted Mussolini in 1923: faced with the necessity of stabilizing and perpetuating a situation of order by relying more on the energy, courage and decisions of men than on the equilibrium and harmony of things."

it had had no idea how successful the Left would be in delaying the legislation. In fact, the Communists and the Socialists gave advance notice that they would use all the legal means at their disposal in Parliament in order to prevent the law's passage.²³ One is led to wonder, therefore, what it was that caused the Christian Democrats to go ahead with the law's introduction, and to take this action so late in the term of the outgoing Chamber. The answer to the late introduction appears to lie in the initial hostility to the proposal which existed not only within the minor parties, with which the Christian Democrats were forced to negotiate for three months before reaching an agreement, but also within the ranks of the Government party itself.²⁴

The cause of the introduction itself must be sought in the administrative elections of 1951 and 1952. The former elections, which were confined almost entirely to the northern provinces, undoubtedly created some concern in the Christian Democratic hierarchy, since they revealed significant reductions in the party vote even in such Catholic strongholds as the regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. But the figures were not excessively ominous and the Christian Democrats might have been counting on retaining the major part of its strength in the South where, in 1948, it had received over 50 per cent of the total vote cast while the Left just managed to get over the 20 per cent mark. But when the results were in for the twenty-five central and southern provinces which chose administrative councils in 1952, the concern of 1951 turned into hysteria in several quarters. The Left had made some gains almost everywhere; the Right, and especially the Italian Social Movement, had jumped markedly; the Christian Democrats had experienced a serious electoral defeat.²⁵ In provinces such as Naples, Salerno, Rome, Perugia and Terni, the vote loss ranged from 40 to 62 per cent of the 1948 totals. Even in Sicily the party lost 337,000 votes, or 37 per cent of its 1948 strength. The comparative figures for the 1948 and 1951-52 elections are shown in Table I.

In light of the above figures, one can appreciate the Christian Democratic compulsion to stop and, if possible, to reverse the trend. Less understandable, given the fact that the Republican party was the only minor party to record a decrease (and it was slight) in 1951-52, was the participation of the Liberal, Democratic and Republican parties in the Christian Democratic plan

²³ See *Corriere della Sera*, October 29, 1952, p. 1.

²⁴ As late as June 24, 1952, there was division in the National Council of the DC party over the advisability of modifying P.R. See an account of the disposition of a De Gasperi motion expressing the need for a new electoral law in *Avanti!*, June 25, 1952, p. 1. The minor parties, in addition to their own internal divisions over the proposed change, were interested in guaranteeing that whatever scheme was finally adopted would not give the DC an absolute majority in the new Chamber. *Corriere della Sera*, November 1, 1952, p. 1, carries a good analysis of the reason for delay.

²⁵ In the 25 provinces involved, the Social Movement jumped from 3.53% of the total vote in 1948 to 13.7% in 1952. For the National Monarchists, the figures were 3.24% and 8.81% respectively. See Vol. 2 of the election statistics cited in n. 3. These figures were procured from data which the Ministry of Interior has not yet released for public consumption.

TABLE I. PARTY STRENGTH AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST

Party	General Elections 1948	Administrative Elections 1951-1952
Center		
Christian Democrat	48.5	35.5
Democratic Socialist	7.1	7.3
Liberal	3.8	3.8
Republican	2.5	2.3
Center Independent*		1.0
	61.9	49.9
Left		
Communist-Socialist	31.0	32.7
Left Independent†		1.9
	31.0	34.6
Right		
Social Movement	2.0	6.9
- National Monarchist	2.8	4.5
	4.8	11.4
Others	2.3	4.1

* Allied with one or more of the Center parties.

† Allied with Communists, Socialists, or both.

Source: Election statistics cited in note 3, pp. 128-35; Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Bollettino Mensile di Statistica*, Vol. 26, pp. 33-35 (Sept., 1951), and Vol. 26, p. 27 (Oct., 1951).

The methods whereby certain leaders within these parties managed to bring their groups into the Christian Democratic camp would make for a most interesting and revealing study. The documentation for such a project would be materially assisted by the fact that there were differences of opinion regarding the electoral reform which were publicly expressed and which led to resignations and/or schisms in all of the minor parties prior to the elections. Even a cursory reading of the press leads one to the conclusion that more was involved than governmental stability and the preservation of democracy. Seats in Parliament, patronage, internal struggles for power, personal friendships or animosities, tactical party strategy and myriad other inarticulated but vitally important factors helped to shape the decisions which were eventually reached. Only when these factors have been adequately catalogued and analyzed can one begin to make meaningful statements about the behavior of these complex organizations.

The one completely unexpected development—one which threatened to wipe out the minor party advantages under the Scelba Law—occurred with the dissolution of the Senate shortly after the new electoral law was finally approved by the upper house. The Government and “independent” press had rumored and favored this development on the theory that the debate in the Senate had created a permanent rift which would make its functioning in the future extremely difficult. This argument was manifestly weak, since a close election, which would necessarily take place under the 1948 law, would result in a precarious Center majority. The other reason put forward was that a Senate election within another year would be both wasteful and unwanted by the electorate.²⁶

The matter of dissolution raised two problems for the minor parties. In the first place, they faced the loss of their “Senators by right,” the number of which had equalled or exceeded the number of Senators they had elected in 1948. This in turn could lead to the possibility of a future Senate in which the Center majority would be so narrow that the Christian Democrats would be compelled to cooperate with the Monarchists, and perhaps the neo-Fascists, in order to govern. Although the minor parties split internally on the question, the leaders in favor of going along with the Christian Democrats prevailed. Theoretically, the latter are supposed to have promised to settle the “Senators by right” question as soon as possible after the elections. In addition, there was optimistic talk about cooperation among the Center parties in the distribution of uncontested Senate candidacies. The latter hope turned out to be an illusion, and little cooperation took place in fact. Strong factions in the Christian Democratic party were opposed to making Senate seats available to the minor allies in order to keep their favor. These elements were in a strong position since the Scelba Law was already a matter of record.

The dissolution was viewed as a tactical error in many quarters because of its manifest tendency to create animosities among the Center parties. More important was the possibility that the step would nullify the effect of the Scelba Law, in the sense that Parliament would be just as easily paralyzed in the Senate should the elections be close. It was felt that such an eventuality would lead either to another dissolution of the Senate or to a Right coalition in Parliament, with all of the negative consequences for the four-party agreement which the latter step would surely involve.²⁷ It may well be that Alcide De Gasperi took the step because of a sincere conviction that the institutions of democracy had been too blatantly attacked and insulted in the Senate to permit that body to live out its term. It is also possible that the Prime Minister's decision was based on the consideration that the simultaneous elections of both chambers would keep the polling places open for two full days instead of the single day

²⁶ See *Giornale d'Italia*, April 1, 1953, p. 1. As early as December 6, 1952, *Mondo Economico* posed the problem of maintaining staggered terms for the two houses, holding that there was little logic in having the Senate recess for almost four months during the 1953 campaign and the Chamber for a like period during 1954. Suspending legislation over such lengthy periods was considered to be dangerous by this journal.

²⁷ See *La Nazione* (Florence), April 26, 1953, p. 1; April 30, 1953, p. 1.

authorized by the Scelba Law. The assumption which the Christian Democrats have always made is that a large vote operates in their favor. This and some of the other theories and assumptions suggested above can now be subjected to an empirical analysis in the light of what actually transpired at the polls.

III

Over twenty-seven million Italians went to the polls in 1953, and they upset a number of theories which had been suggested regarding the anticipated results. In the first place, contrary to many predictions, an extraordinarily high level of participation did not insure a victory for the Center. Tables II and III, which summarize the election returns of 1948 and 1953, show that the Center parties did not do as well in 1953 as they had done in 1948 in spite of the higher percentage turnout (93.7 per cent in 1953 as compared with 92.5 per cent in 1948). Conceivably the losses might have been greater if large numbers of electors had neglected the ballot boxes, since the Christian Democrats obtained a surprisingly low 35.5 per cent of the votes cast in 1951-52 (Table I), when only 89 per cent of the eligible voters participated. On the basis of available data, however, it is not possible to test the validity of this hypothesis.

TABLE II. RESULTS OF THE CHAMBER ELECTIONS OF 1948 AND 1953

	Total Valid Votes					Deputies Elected				
	1948		1953		% Change	1948		1953		% Change
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
DC	12,712,562	48.5	10,859,554	40.09	-8.41	304	53.1	262	44.4	-8.7
PRI	652,477	2.5	437,889	1.6	-0.9	9	1.6	5	0.8	-0.8
PSDI	1,858,346	7.1	1,223,870	4.5	-2.6	33	5.8	19	3.2	-2.6
PLI	1,004,889	3.8	815,681	3.0	-0.8	19	3.3	14	2.4	-0.9
PCI*	8,137,047	31.0	6,122,638	22.6	-4.3	183	31.9	143	24.2	-6.0
PSI*			3,440,222	12.7				75	12.7	
UP			171,177	0.6						
IS			225,410	0.8						
PNM	729,174	2.8	1,856,661	6.9	+4.1	14	2.4	40	6.8	+4.4
MSI	526,870	2.0	1,580,395	5.8	+3.8	6	1.0	29	5.0	+4.0
ADN			120,555	0.5						
PEASANT	96,025	0.4				1	0.2			
PPST	124,385	0.5	122,810	0.5		3	0.5	3	0.5	
PSDA	61,919	0.2	27,324	0.01	-0.19	1	0.2	0	0	-0.2
OTHERS	316,656	1.2	85,088	0.4	-0.8					
Totals:	26,220,150	100.0	27,089,184	100.0		573	100.0	590	100.0	

* PCI and PSI were combined in all constituencies under the label "Democratic Popular Front."

The heading "OTHERS" includes 32 minor parties in 1948, and 18 minor parties in 1953.

Valle d'Aosta, with uninominal system, excluded in 1948 totals.

KEY TO NAMES OF PARTIES (TABLES II-IX):

DC:	Christian Democratic Party	PNM:	National Monarchist Party
PCI:	Italian Communist Party	MSI:	Italian Social Movement
PSI:	Italian Socialist Party (Pietro Nenni)	ADN:	Democratic Alliance
PSDI:	Italian Democratic Socialist Party (Giuseppe Saragat)	IS:	Independent Socialists
PLI:	Italian Liberal Party	UP:	Popular Unity
PRI:	Italian Republican Party	PSDA:	Sardinian Action Party
		PPST:	South Tyrol Popular Party

TABLE III. RESULTS OF THE SENATE ELECTIONS OF 1948 AND 1953

	Total Valid Votes					Senators Elected				
	1948		1953		% Change	1948		1953		% Change
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
DC	10,899,640	48.0	9,854,754	40.7	-7.3	131	55.3	116	48.9	-6.4
PRI	594,178	2.6	225,611	0.9	-1.7	4	1.7	0	0	-1.7
PSDI	943,219	4.2	988,778	4.1	-0.1	6	2.5	4	1.7	-0.8
PRI-PSDI	610,660	2.7				6	2.5			
PLI	1,216,934	5.4	720,698	3.0	-2.4	10	4.2	3	1.3	-1.1
PCI			5,080,143	20.9				54	22.7	
PSI			2,929,908	12.1				28	11.8	
PCI-PSI*	6,982,601	30.9	418,940	1.7	+8.8	72	30.4	4	1.7	+5.8
UP			230,370	1.0						
PNM	393,510	1.7	1,734,275	7.1	+5.4	4	1.7	16	6.8	+5.1
MSI	164,092	0.7	1,482,101	6.1	+5.4	1	0.4	9	3.8	+3.4
ADN			197,482	0.8				1	0.4	
OTHERS†	852,456	3.8	396,438	1.6	-2.2	3	1.3	2	0.9	-0.4
Totals:	22,657,290	100.0	24,299,546	100.0		237	100.0	237	100.0	

* PCI and PSI were combined in all constituencies under the label "Democratic Popular Front" in 1948, but in 1953 they were combined in only three regions.

† The heading "OTHERS" includes 32 minor parties in 1948, and 18 minor parties in 1953.

Secondly, it should be noted that the Center parties won in the Senate and lost in the Chamber elections by very narrow margins. A shift of only 57,000 votes (0.2 per cent) in favor of the Center would have caused the premium provisions of the Scelba Law to go into operation. Under such circumstances the makeup of the Chamber would have differed markedly from what it turned out to be under the operation of the 1948 P.R. system which remained in effect.²⁸ In addition, the distribution of the national majority seats among the various constituencies would have resulted in the Center parties' receiving a majority of the seats in many constituencies in which they constituted the minority.²⁹ Such a consequence could be averted only if the entire country were treated as a single constituency, with no effort being made to assign representatives geographically on the basis of population.

Thirdly, although the Right made impressive gains over 1948, the decline of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) from 6.9 per cent in 1951-52 (Table I)

²⁸ If the Center parties had just managed to squeeze through with a majority, the 380 seats assigned to the majority group under the Scelba Law would have been distributed as follows: DC, 306; PSDI, 34; PLI, 23; PRI, 12; South Tyrol Popular Party, 4; Sardinian Action Party, 1. For the minority parties, the 209 seats would have been assigned as follows: PCI, 93; PSI, 53; PNM, 29; MSI, 24; IS, 4; UP, 3; ADN, 2. Cf. the actual distribution under P.R. in Table II.

²⁹ This tendency to distort arbitrarily the constituency situation becomes pronounced under the Scelba Law in a close election. The complicated mathematics of the law need not be demonstrated in order to prove this. One need only bear in mind that distortion resulting from the distribution of a premium of 380 seats varies in inverse proportion to the gap which separates the majority and minority groups. This was only one of many bad features which the legislation contained.

to 5.0 per cent in 1953 should be underlined. Major internal divisions within the party, which became pronounced before the elections, affected its performance adversely. On the other hand, the National Monarchist party secured more support than had been generally expected. An almost purely local situation which will be explained below accounts for the strong showing of the Monarchy. (See Tables II and III.)

Contrary to many prognostications, the Left was not hurt by its determined obstruction of the Scelba Law or by the many political strikes which it called as a method of parliamentary coercion. The Communists and Socialists made gains everywhere, even in some of the most important Catholic Christian Democratic strongholds in the country. In a sense, the Left is correct in claiming that the elections constituted a popular referendum on the new electoral law. The electoral campaign was fought largely on the issue of P.R., and the voters rendered a somewhat surprising although not entirely unexpected judgment.

Lastly, the most striking aspect of the returns lay in the poor performances of the minor Center parties. The extent of the setbacks suffered is best seen in Tables I, II, and III. The Liberal and Democratic Socialist parties, which had either maintained or improved their positions in 1951-52 over 1948, were weakened significantly in 1953. In the case of the Republican party, the defeat was so overwhelming as to raise the question whether it remains a significant party in contemporary Italy.

Let us now turn to the interesting geographic variations in strength among the major parties. Tables IV and V provide a general picture of the positions of the respective political groupings within the major subdivisions of the country. One important observation to be made at the outset is that the position of the Christian Democrats in the Senate contests is not consistently superior to that of the lower house. On the other hand, both the Communists and the Socialists generally bring more voters into their columns in the Chamber races than in those for the Senate. Nevertheless, it does not appear justifiable to argue, as do many persons in Italy, that the voters in the age group 21-25 are inclined to be more extremist in their political thinking than are their elder co-nationals. The Center would have had to enjoy more superior advantages in the Senate races before credence could be ascribed to this theory. Instead, in the case of the extreme Right, the 1953 results clearly point up the fact that both the Italian Social Movement and the National Monarchists achieved better results in the Senate races, in which the vote is extended only to those who are 25 years of age or older. Italian youth, then, does not appear to deviate radically in its political thinking and behavior from the pattern established by the older age groups. It would of course be much more valuable for analytical purposes to have a picture of the voting patterns of all age groups in Italy, but the data for this are not available. The subjection of a carefully controlled sample of the population to intensive depth interviews would be one way of testing this hypothesis.

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY VOTES BY MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISIONS
Chamber of Deputies

	North			Central			South			Insular			Italy		
	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change
DC	49.3	43.1	-6.2	44.5	36.3	-8.2	50.2	38.6	-11.6	47.8	36.4	-11.4	48.5	40.1	-8.4
PRI	1.6	1.3	-0.3	5.7	3.0	-2.7	1.7	1.2	-0.5	3.0	1.6	-1.4	2.5	1.6	-0.9
PSDI	10.0	6.4	-3.6	5.2	3.5	-1.7	3.5	2.4	-1.1	4.9	2.5	-2.4	7.1	4.5	-2.6
PLI	1.5	2.8	+1.3	1.7	2.1	+0.4	8.7	3.6	-5.1	7.9	4.6	-3.3	3.8	3.0	-0.8
PCI	21.2	21.2	0.0	28.3	21.2	-7.1	21.2	21.2	0.0	21.8	21.8	0.0	23.6	23.6	0.0
PSI	15.4	15.4	0.0	14.1	14.1	0.0	8.4	8.4	0.0	7.5	7.5	0.0	12.7	12.7	0.0
PCI-PSI*	33.8	33.8	0.0	33.4	33.4	0.0	23.7	23.7	0.0	20.9	20.9	0.0	31.0	31.0	0.0
UP	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.0
IS	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.0	1.1	1.1	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0
PNM	0.6	3.2	+2.6	1.1	3.7	+2.6	6.9	15.4	+8.5	8.9	11.6	+2.7	2.8	6.9	+4.1
MSI	0.9	3.5	+2.6	2.4	7.3	+4.9	3.5	7.3	+3.8	3.2	11.8	+8.6	2.0	5.8	+3.8
ADN	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0
FRASANT	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0
OTHERS†	1.6	1.2	-0.4	0.9	0.1	-0.8	1.7	0.4	-1.3	3.4	0.2	-3.2	1.9	0.9	-1.0

* PCI and PSI were combined in all constituencies under the label "Democratic Popular Front."

† The heading "OTHERS" includes 34 minor parties in 1948, and 18 minor parties in 1953.

TABLE V. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY VOTES BY MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISIONS
Senate

	North			Central			South			Insular			Italy		
	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change	1948	1953	% Change
DC	49.5	42.8	-6.7	45.7	37.3	-8.4	47.1	38.3	-8.8	46.7	35.4	-11.3	48.0	40.7	-7.3
PRI	1.1	1.0	-0.1	7.7	3.6	-4.1	1.4	0.6	-0.8	4.0	2.4	-1.6	2.6	0.9	-1.7
PSDI	4.6	6.4	+1.8	3.7	2.8	-0.9	2.9	2.7	-0.2	5.7	2.6	-3.1	4.2	4.1	-0.1
PRI-PSDI	5.5												2.7		
PLI	3.0	2.9	-0.1	2.8	1.8	-1.0	12.0	4.2	-7.8	6.5	6.4	-1.1	5.4	3.0	-2.4
PCI	22.7														
PSI	14.5						20.5	6.7		19.5			22.6		
PCI-PSI*	33.9									7.2			12.1		
PNM	0.1	3.0	+2.9	0.6	4.0	+3.4	23.9	16.3	+7.6	20.4	13.3	+6.3	30.9	+3.8	
MSI		3.4	+3.4	1.1	7.4	+6.3	3.6	8.3	+4.7	9.6	13.8	+3.7	1.7	7.1	+5.4
ADN		0.5			0.3		1.2	2.2		3.0	12.7	+9.7	0.7	6.1	+5.4
OTHERS	2.3	2.8	+0.5	1.7	0.8	-0.9	7.9	0.3	-7.6	4.1	1.5	-4.1	3.8	2.6	-1.2

* PCI and PSI were combined in all constituencies under the label "Democratic Popular Front."

† PLI and DC combined.

In interpreting the geographic variations in party strength, the reader should bear in mind that a regional percentage is only an average made up of the figures pertaining to each party within the specific and smaller districts comprising a region. For example, while the Christian Democratic performance illustrated by Tables IV and V is impressive for all regions, this strength is far from uniform among the electoral subdivisions. In the Chamber elections, the Christians received absolute majorities of the total votes cast in the northern districts of Como-Sondrio-Varese (51.2%), Brescia-Bergamo (59.1%), Verona-Padova-Vicenza-Rovigo (55.2%), Venezia-Treviso (50.4%), Udine-Belluno-Gorizia (50.6%), and Valle d'Aosta (53.4%).³⁰ On the other hand, the party fell to lows of 27.1 per cent in the district of Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forlì, and 30.3 per cent in the senatorial region of Emilia-Romagna. Thus the heavy concentration of its forces in the areas singled out above has a decided impact on the general data regarding the North as a whole which is reported in Tables IV and V. The heavy Catholic vote of the centers in which it is the majority party tends to obscure its weaknesses in the northern industrial regions. In no other major regional division is the gap between the highest and lowest returns as great as it is in the North.

Some interesting observations can also be made concerning the Left. While the forces of the Communist party are generally evenly divided among the major sectors of the country (Tables IV, V), its greatest power is concentrated in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria. (The same is true of the Socialist party.) The significance of this fact becomes clear when one recalls the popular belief that the Left in Italy draws its greatest support from the highly industrialized North. In the four Chamber districts encompassed by the region of Tuscany, the Communists alone received from 30.2 to 39.9 per cent of the total votes cast. In addition, the Communist and Socialist parties combined obtained absolute majorities in the districts of Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forlì (51.6%), Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio nell'Emilia (50.4%), Firenze-Pistoia (51.5%), and Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto (56.6%). Thus not Milan, Turin and Genoa, but the smaller, basically agricultural centers listed above appear as the most revolutionary communities in Italy. And the most radical of the revolutionaries is the *mezzadro*, the humble sharecropper who inhabits these regions! A long history of social consciousness engendered by a feudal owning class, and an ardent spirit of anti-clericalism are the reasons usually advanced in explanation of this interesting phenomenon. Here is another problem well worth serious research, for the ability of the Italian extreme Left to maintain its position in these areas and to penetrate the agricultural South promises to have a marked impact on Italian society. In fact the gains of the Left in the

³⁰ The Christian Democrats were the victims of significant losses even in these "safe" districts. In 1948 the percentages for the Chamber districts cited above were 57.6%, 66.8%, 62.3%, 57.3%, 57.8% and 59.0%, respectively. Moreover, in 1948 there were seven other districts in which they went over the 50 per cent mark but which in 1953 did not return more than 45.2 per cent, and in most cases much less than this. Essentially the same pattern emerges from a comparison of the Senate results for the two elections.

South—universally impressive in the last elections—were registered primarily by the Communist party. The abrupt manner in which the strength of the Nenni Socialists falls off in the provinces south of Rome means that they have not been able to equal the proselytizing efforts of their Communist allies in these places. The extent to which the ratio of power between the two parties becomes modified in the South is attested to by the fact that in many cases the Communists alone received percentages in 1953 which were as high or higher than the combined Communist-Socialist returns in 1948. Finally, it is worth remarking that the Left made gains over 1948 in all senatorial regions except Abruzzi-Molise and in all Chamber electoral districts except one in which the loss was only 0.4 per cent. By way of contrast, the Christian Democrats sustained losses in every region and district in Italy.

On the basis of local returns there can be no doubt that the resurgence of the political Right is overwhelmingly a southern phenomenon. The concentrations of both the Monarchist and neo-Fascist forces are located primarily in the provinces south of the capital city. The only important exceptions occur in Piedmont, where the House of Savoy still commands some sentimental attraction, and in Umbria, where the neo-Fascists have experienced a certain revival. It is to be noted that both the extreme Left and Right made important gains in the South in 1953 at the expense of the Christian Democrats primarily and of the political Center as a whole. In no other section of the country was the trend away from the Center so pronounced, and this might well be an index to widespread dissatisfaction with the Government's program, or lack of one. As a possible explanation for the growth of both extremes in the South, I would suggest the hypothesis that those Italians who are the most strongly tied to the Catholic Church express a protest vote by joining the ranks of the Monarchist or neo-Fascist parties, whereas those not so emotionally identified incline toward the Socialist and Communist parties.

The Nationalist Monarchist party looms as a much more regional or local movement than the Italian Social Movement. The former received almost 25 per cent of its total national vote in the region of Campania, more specifically, in the cities of Naples, Caserta, Benevento, Avellino and Salerno. Evidently the paternalistic symbol of the monarchy continues to have a certain attraction for the southern Italians. And although it would appear that the leaders of the party are not really agreed on the return of a monarch, they used the symbol very adroitly throughout the electoral campaign. However unless important segments of the northern and central regions can be persuaded that the popular decision of 1946 should be reversed, the monarchist movement is not likely to become a serious threat to the Italian Republic. Nevertheless, the adherence which this party was able to encourage in the South is sufficiently important to warrant some serious contemplation and action on the part of those in Italy who see in this revival something more profound than mere nostalgic reminiscing.

The Liberal party was also affected adversely by the gains made by the political extremes in the South. The chief Liberal support had come from the re-

gions beginning with Abruzzi and extending throughout the South. The party leadership realized that the major threat would come precisely in these areas, since the Monarchists had been aiming their propaganda efforts primarily at those Liberals who also were favorable to the monarchy or who had become somewhat confused and disoriented by the lack of program and policy which had characterized the Liberal party for some time. The extent to which the Monarchists succeeded is starkly revealed by the losses which the Liberals suffered in the regions of Campania, Puglia and Calabria—62.5, 70.7 and 77.8 per cent, respectively, of the percentages obtained in 1948. Only in Abruzzi was the party able to check the ebbing tide of Italian liberalism. In general the depletion was nearly catastrophic, and only some small gains which were achieved in the North saved the party from complete destruction.

The exodus from the Republican party took place throughout the country. At Rome and the Marches, two of its previously strongest sectors, the party's 1953 percentages, as compared with those of 1948, were inferior to the extent of 59.1 and 54.4 per cent, respectively. Ground was lost even in the provinces of Ravenna and Forlì, where a long tradition of Garabaldian republicanism had served to furnish the party with enough votes to give it national status. The fact that it did not receive many more votes in 1953 than did either the Democratic Alliance or Popular Unity, neither of which had been in existence as parties prior to the spring of the year, is testimony to its near demise. It is entirely possible that, with the establishment of the Republic in 1946, the Republican party's *raison d'être* ceased to exist. An upsurge of the monarchist movement all over Italy might be the source of new life-blood for the Republicans, but if the issue of the Republic is the only positive program with which they can confront the electorate in the future, it is difficult to imagine how the party can regain its lost ground.

The Democratic Socialist party presents a somewhat different problem. The last of many schisms within this group took place over the Scelba Law and resulted in the creation of the Popular Unity party. The direct competition of this splinter group undoubtedly accounts for a portion of the Social Democratic losses, but since those who bolted received only 0.6 per cent of the total vote cast for the Chamber, and never more than 1.9 per cent of the total in any district, it is obvious that many of those who had previously supported the Democratic Socialists went elsewhere in 1953. The data available at this time suggest that in the North the shift was to the Nenni Socialists. The latter made much of their formal separation from the Communists in the elections, and it is possible that many Democratic Socialists saw more in Pietro Nenni's promises of a "Socialist alternative" than in the negative, policyless campaign conducted by Giuseppe Saragat and his followers. Conceivably, there were also many Democratic Socialists who did not approve of carrying political pragmatism to the point where the party's former rigid stand in favor of P.R. was argued away in favor of its support of the Scelba Law. In the South the situation is not as easily susceptible of analysis, since the Right made gains here equal or superior to those of the Communists and Socialists. In the region of Basilicata, for

example, Democratic Socialist strength fell from 12.4 per cent in 1948 to 2.5 per cent in 1953. A portion of these votes were absorbed by the Communists and Socialists (they advanced from 25.2% to 32.7%), but others must have moved into the Monarchist and Italian Social Movement columns. Or one might offer the hypothesis that the right-wing Democratic Socialists voted for the Christian Democrats, whereas the conservatives within the latter group moved a step or two over toward the Right. In any event, it is clear that Democratic Socialism in Italy, for many reasons—complex and simple—was the object of a serious reversal, even in the central and northern provinces, where it drew on a long and highly favorable historical tradition.

From the standpoint of representation, Italy's P.R. laws operate so as to provide expression for all of the main currents in Italian political thought (see Tables II and III). An analysis of the seat distribution in both houses further amplifies the operation of P.R. in Italy, and shows that, at least in the Chamber, Italy's P.R. method is sensitive to the political differences which exist at the district levels (see Tables VI and VII). For example, the Democratic Socialist seats are largely concentrated in the northern districts, while the Liberal party depends on the southern provinces for over 70 per cent of its representation in the lower house. Still more pronounced is the concentration of the Monarchist and Social Movement deputies in the South. The Christian Democrats and the Communists are obviously the strongest parties in both houses. The former obtained some representation in all of the electoral constituencies for both houses in 1953, while the latter failed completely only in one Chamber district (VIII) and in the senatorial region of Trentino-Alto-Adige. In addition Valle d'Aosta, where a plurality system prevails, was won by the Christian Democrats in both instances.

In the Senate there were ten different parties represented in 1953, but for all intents and purposes the number is eight, since the two South Tyrol Popular party senators vote consistently with the Christian Democrats, and the single Senator representing the Democratic Alliance from Campania owes his seat to the support received from the Left parties. The same number of parties is found in the present Chamber, the South Tyrol Popular Party having secured three deputies in District VIII and the Sardinian Peoples party one deputy in District XXX. All of the major parties returned at least one deputy only in District XIX, which includes the city of Rome, while in the Senate only in the regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Campania and Sicily are six parties or more represented. On the whole, a greater atomization of the vote takes place in the South than in any other part of the country. The average number of parties represented from the thirty Chamber districts is 4.6 in 1953, compared to 3.4 in 1948. This difference, however, stems largely from the fact that the Communists and the Socialists entered the lists as separate parties in 1953. Lastly, one should note the tendency toward a two-party system which exists in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria. These are areas in which the level of political maturity is considered to be very high, and where the battle lines between the Christian Democrats and the Left are clearly and rigidly drawn.

TABLE VI. SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE CHAMBER BY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS, 1948 AND 1953

District:	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII																	
Year:	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53																
DC	13	11	9	8	9	8	18	16	9	9	14	12	5	5	5	7	6	3	3	9	8													
POI*	10	7	4	3	8	5	14	8	4	2	4	2	5	2	1	7	4	4	3	2	13	10	8	7	6	7	5	6	5	6	4			
PSI	—	4	—	2	—	3	—	7	—	3	—	3	—	4	—	4	—	4	—	3	—	2	—	3	—	2	—	2	—	2	—	3		
PNM	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
MSI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
PLI	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
PSDI	3	2	2	1	2	1	4	2	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
PRI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
OTHERS	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Totals:	26	26	16	16	10	17	36	86	14	15	19	18	10	10	9	8	28	28	16	16	14	15	24	22	10	19	13	13	15	13	9	10	17	15

TABLE VI (continued)

District:	XVIII	XIX	XX	XXI	XXII	XXIII	XXIV	XXV	XXVI	XXVII	XXVIII	XXIX	XXX	XXXI	N.C.	Totals																		
Year:	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	1948 1953	1948 1953																		
DC	5	4	20	15	10	7	5	3	17	12	11	8	12	9	9	8	4	4	13	11	15	10	13	11	9	7	1	1	4	6	306	202		
PCI	6	3	10	10	6	4	—	1	7	7	3	4	7	6	4	4	2	2	8	6	5	6	6	6	3	4	—	—	4	5	183	143		
PSI	—	3	—	3	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	3	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	5	—	75	—
PNM	—	—	—	8	—	1	—	—	4	7	2	5	1	4	1	2	—	1	—	—	2	2	3	2	3	—	1	—	—	2	5	14	40	—
MSI	—	1	—	4	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	3	1	3	—	1	—	—	—	2	6	6	29	—
PLI	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	4	19	14	—	
PSDI	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	83	19	—	
PRI	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	9	5	—	
OTHERS	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	5	8	—	
Totals:	11	11	35	38	16	14	6	5	31	31	18	20	22	22	16	16	6	7	24	25	26	25	26	25	14	14	1	1	21	39	574	690	—	

* PCI-PSI combined in 1948.

TABLE VII. SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE SENATE BY REGION, 1948 AND 1953

	Piedmont		Valle d'Aosta		Lombardy		Trentino-Alto Adige		Veneto		Friuli Venezia Giulia		Liguria		Emilia Romagna		Tuscany		Umbria		Marches		Lazio		Abruzzi		Molise		Campania		Puglia		Basilicata		Calabria		Sicily		Sardinia				
	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	48	53	
DC	8	8	1	1	18	16	4	4	14	12	4	4	4	4	4	6	6	7	6	3	2	4	4	10	8	4	5	3	—	11	9	8	7	3	3	5	5	12	8	3	4		
PCI	4	—	—	—	6	—	—	3	—	3	1	—	3	—	7	—	7	—	6	—	2	—	2	—	4	—	4	—	—	—	3	—	4	—	2	—	2	—	2	—	5	—	
PSI	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	3	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	3	—	3	—	2	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	2	—		
PCI-PSI†	6	—	—	—	10	—	—	4	—	—	—	1	—	3	—	9	—	7	—	8	—	2	—	5	—	3	2	—	—	4	—	2	—	5	—	3	—	3	—	5	—	1	2
PNM	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	5	—	2	—	1	—	1	—	2	3	—	—	
MSI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	3	—	—	
PLI	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	
PSDI	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
PRI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
PSDI-PRI	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
OTHERS	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Totals:	17	17	1	1	31	31	6	6	19	19	6	6	6	8	8	17	17	15	15	6	6	7	7	16	16	6	8	2	—	21	21	15	15	6	6	10	10	22	22	5	5	6	6

* Abruzzi and Molise constituted one region in 1948.

† POL-PSI combined in 1948.

Some distortion of the results occurs under both electoral laws, and to a greater degree in the Senate where the d'Hondt method, which favors the strongest parties, is used. Further distortion results in the Senate from the application of the 65 per cent uninominal rule, which cancels out the votes of the minority parties in the colleges where it is applied.²¹ In the Chamber the distortion was not as great, although a completely equitable system of utilizing remainders under P.R. has yet to be devised. The requirement of the Italian system that a party must have elected at least one deputy in a normal constituency before it can take advantage of the distribution of remainders in the National College, left without any seats the Democratic Alliance, Popular Unity, and Independent Socialist parties—all of which helped to defeat the Scelba Law, under the application of which they would have received a few places in the Chamber. In spite of this the system is not subject to serious criticism from a P.R. standpoint, albeit the advocates of a majoritarian structure may deplore the tendency of any P.R. device to reflect too accurately the political nuances which divide the electorate.

One major criticism which has been raised regarding the Senate system has to do with the provision which takes into consideration the relative performance of each candidate within the college in which he ran. Thus, after the seats to be distributed have been ascribed to the various party groups according to the method of d'Hondt, the actual assignments are made on the basis of a graduated list of candidates within each group which is not based on total votes alone. Thus if Candidate "A" with 15,000 votes received a greater percentage of the total vote cast within his college than Candidate "B" who obtained 60,000 votes within his college, the former will appear higher on the graduated list than the latter. It is said that this system penalizes the man who runs within a district where the turnout is high. Fortunately the instances of its application are so rare as to warrant press and other comment when it does occur.

The deviations from a pure P.R. distribution become much more pronounced when the results within each district are observed. An analysis of the percentage vote and seat distribution among the parties which competed in the Chamber elections of 1948 and 1953 makes two things immediately apparent: the strongest parties (Christian Democrats and Communists) enjoy a decided advantage in the distribution of seats; and the National College does not remove the deficiency which the minor parties suffer unless a minor party has some strong regional strength, as is the case of the Social Movement and the Monarchists. Except for two districts in 1948 (XII and XIII) in which the Christian Democrats received a higher vote than seat percentage, their seat advantage in both elections never falls below 0.8 per cent and is usually much

²¹ In 1948, 15 Senators were elected under this provision. The 1953 results reflect the decline of the Christian Democrats, for they were able to take advantage of the rule in only four colleges as compared to fourteen in 1948. These four Senators came from the regions of Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige (2) and Veneto. In another Trentino college, the South Tyrol Popular party elected a Senator with 83.4% of the total vote!

above that. If the votes and seats of the Christian Democrats and the Communists are added together, the extent of the distortion is pointed up most clearly. Yet if seats are to be apportioned on the basis of population within specific districts, this kind of deviation from pure P.R. is to be expected. It is well known that a proportional assignment of seats on the basis of a single national district comes closest to giving a perfectly accurate reflection of the votes which have been cast for competing parties. Table VIII compares the present Italian system with what the results would have been under such a pure form of P.R.

TABLE VIII. COMPARISON OF SEAT DISTRIBUTION UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM AND PURE P.R.

Party	Votes	Remainder	Seats Now	Seats P.P.R.	Difference
DC	10,859,554	43,850*	262	237	-25
PCI	6,122,638	44,248*	143	136	-7
PSI	3,440,222	43,586*	75	75	
PNM	1,856,661	20,100	40	40	
MSI	1,580,395	39,319*	29	35	+6
PLI	815,681	35,143*	14	18	+4
PSDI	1,223,870	30,186	19	26	+7
PRI	437,889	24,663	5	9	+4
IS	225,410	41,754*	0	5	+5
UP	171,177	35,435*	0	4	+4
ADN	120,555	28,727	0	2	+2
PPST	122,810	30,298	3	3	

* Seat assigned on basis of remainder.

An entirely different result would have obtained if a plurality system had been applied to the Italian elections. It is of course difficult to draw up single-member constituencies where they do not exist in fact. If the thirty-one electoral districts had been used for this purpose, the Christian Democrats in 1953 would have won in all but three districts (XII, XIV, XVI). Adding the votes of the Socialists to those of the Communists would make the races close in many places, but would actually change the results in favor of the Left in only six more districts (I, III, VII, XIII, XV, XVIII). Or, if one were to make Italy's 91 provinces the basis of determining representation in the lower chamber, the Christian Democrats in 1953 would have had a plurality in all but fifteen of them. Of the latter, fourteen would have gone to the Communists and one to the Socialists.¹² Although the Christian Democrats are far and away the strongest single party in Italy, it would not be safe to draw conclusions about its strength under a plurality system unless the districts for electing the present 590 members of the Chamber were actually drawn and the votes within them analyzed.

¹² Because the official figures on the 1953 elections were not yet available at the time of writing, these statistics were taken from numerous Italian newspapers. Thus this conclusion may be slightly in error.

TABLE IX. RURAL-URBAN NATURE OF THE VOTE, 1948: PERCENTAGE PARTY VOTE ON BASIS OF SIZE OF COMMUNITIES
CHAMBER AND SENATE

Communities (By thousands of inhabitants)																				Provincial Capitals		Other Places		Italy	
0-1		1-3		3-5		5-10		10-30		30-100		100-250		250-500		Over 500		Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.		
Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.	Ch.	Sen.		
DC	57.9	55.6	55.1	54.1	52.6	52.6	49.9	50.1	48.1	45.4	44.4	44.0	41.8	41.0	45.1	40.2	46.3	47.0	45.0	44.3	49.9	—	48.5	48.0	
PCI-PSI	20.3	20.1	23.6	23.7	27.9	27.9	31.3	31.2	34.7	34.2	33.9	32.9	37.6	37.6	29.4	28.8	31.5	31.9	32.0	31.7	80.6	—	31.0	30.9	
PSDI	9.3	5.1	7.2	3.4	6.4	3.3	6.7	4.1	6.0	4.2	6.8	4.2	7.6	6.8	8.7	7.3	9.3	3.5	8.6	4.8	6.5	—	7.1	4.2	
PRI-PSDI	—	3.0	—	2.7	—	2.5	—	2.1	—	1.5	—	2.6	—	1.3	—	1.7	—	6.6	—	—	—	—	—	2.7	
PLI	3.2	5.5	4.2	6.6	4.1	6.1	4.0	5.6	4.2	5.6	3.7	5.8	4.6	7.0	4.2	2.6	2.1	2.9	3.3	4.5	4.1	—	3.8	5.4	
PRI	0.8	0.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.8	4.7	5.6	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.0	3.0	3.1	2.3	—	2.5	2.6	
PNM	0.9	0.3	1.9	0.8	2.3	0.8	2.4	1.2	2.9	1.9	2.8	1.7	3.2	2.5	6.6	6.2	3.5	2.6	3.8	2.9	2.4	—	2.8	1.7	
MSI	0.9	—	1.6	—	1.8	—	1.5	—	1.8	—	2.2	—	2.2	—	2.4	—	3.5	—	2.9	—	1.6	—	2.0	—	
OTHERS	6.6	9.6	4.7	7.3	3.1	5.0	2.1	3.6	1.6	4.4	1.5	3.2	1.1	1.8	1.8	10.9	1.2	3.5	1.4	4.6	2.6	—	2.3	4.5	

For example, there is strong reason for believing that the Christian Democrats would not carry as many districts in the urban areas as they would in the countryside. Table IX demonstrates that there are important differences between the urban and rural strength of the parties in Italy. Note particularly the striking contrast between the relative strength of the Christian Democrats and the Left in communities up to 5,000 inhabitants. It is in places such as these, which are legion in Italy, that the Christian Democrats draw the most from the electoral cooperation of prelates and the Catholic Action Civic Committees. Interesting too is the revelation that the strength of the Left is at its maximum in cities within the 100,000-250,000 group rather than in the largest metropolises and that, in general, its strength is evenly distributed in all categories. Although Table IX is based on the 1948 elections, it does not appear that the situation has been modified significantly in 1953. Whenever the opportunity to compare Christian Democratic strength in the province as contrasted to the provincial capital presented itself, it was found that the vote was consistently lower in the city. In fact, if any striking departures from the 1948 results are eventually revealed, they will doubtless occur in the rural areas where the Left has been concentrating its efforts in recent years.

IV

In conclusion, I should like briefly to consider the question whether P.R. is a logical and workable system for Italy. As far as the particular P.R. methods employed for each house of the Italian Parliament are concerned, the foregoing section demonstrated that both are mathematically equitable and give adequate representation to the major Italian political constellations. But those who are wary of P.R. might well point out that the recent elections substantiate the claim that P.R. encourages the formation of ungovernable legislatures. It is perfectly valid, for example, to conclude that the Christian Democrats will encounter major difficulties in the formation and maintenance of governments unless they are to make serious political concessions to either the Monarchists or the Socialists. To the extent that they are compelled or elect to deal exclusively with the minor Center parties, their ability to provide Italy with the internal order characteristic of the first postwar Parliament will be decreased.

Yet it would not be correct to suggest that P.R. is a cause of this situation. Multi-parties existed in the country before P.R. was introduced for the first time in 1919. The uninominal, majoritarian system which prevailed for most of the years from unification of the peninsula to 1919 did not result in a two-party society in the American or British sense. Immediately upon liberation of the country in 1945, six and not two major parties reappeared on the Italian political scene, and all were agreed that P.R. would provide the best means of reflecting the differences within the country.

In dealing with P.R., the emphasis should be placed on its tendency to *reflect* and not to *cause* whatever political atomization may exist. In a country such as Italy it is highly questionable whether the majoritarian system can be defended either ideologically or technically. The theory of representation which insists

that the candidate elected represents *all* of the voters within his constituency would not be accepted by many of the Italian political parties, and assuredly by fewer of the electors themselves. Where, as in Italy, political issues are usually clear-cut, and radically divergent socio-economic views separate large segments of the population, the defeat of one's candidate is construed as meaning not only a lack of effective representation, but also that the opponent elected will do everything possible to act against the interests of the defeated group.

I would call this attitude more realistic than it is cynical. If some mythical concept often labelled the "general interest" does motivate Italian representatives, it would appear that this is true only when the myth does not seriously conflict with much more immediate and tangible interests. To the extent that this hypothesis is valid, I would say that P.R. operates as a critical escape valve rather than as an incentive to instability in Italy. One need not ponder for long the potential negative impact of a majoritarian system on Italian society. Those in Parliament might all be cut from the same political vine, but the unrepresented would not be pacified by glowing speeches on what is best for the national or general interest. More than anything else, elections by plurality would so distort the political complexion of the country as to leave the unrepresented minorities no alternative to seeking new and perhaps violent means of achieving expression.

It is significant that not even the ill-fated Scelba Law aimed at a complete destruction of P.R., the Christian Democrats having publicly admitted that a system similar to what Italy had prior to 1919 could not be considered logical for the country. The Scelba Law, which endeavoured to incorporate the advantages of both the P.R. and majoritarian approaches to representation, was an attempt to gloss over certain realities of Italian society which tended to be reflected in the realm of politics. For a society in which social equilibrium is basically stable, such a device might have merit. In Italy, however, it is quite probable that the legislation would have aggravated existing divisions. It would therefore have fallen short of the prerequisite of a sound representative system suggested by James Pollock and Alfred de Grazia—i.e., that the method of representation tend to harmonize the various competing and/or conflicting elements in society.

It seems to me that this prerequisite—which is fundamental—can best be met only if electoral systems are devised and evaluated not abstractly but in terms of the concrete facts and needs apparent in each society. The Italian version of P.R. would, in this sense, appear to satisfy this requirement better than any other which has been suggested.

I would add as a word of caution that stability for Italian institutions is not, in the final analysis, to be sought in the mechanics of electoral legislation but in the removal or modification of the conditions which have led to the armed peace which currently prevails among socio-political-economic groups of the society. Doubtless, the system of choosing representatives has bearing on this problem, and a presumption in favor of P.R. should exist so long as it can be demonstrated that P.R., more than any other method, facilitates social compromise in the legislature.

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION: THE FARMER COMMITTEE SYSTEM*

REED L. FRISCHKNECHT

University of Utah

The emergence in full flower, during the past twenty years, of the "positive state" has meant a great extension of administrative activity. This activity has been attacked as undemocratic by some persons whose concern was primarily with the programs carried out rather than with the means used to execute the programs. But the friends and even the originators of the programs have sometimes had an uncomfortable feeling that the traditional administrative mechanism has undemocratic tendencies. They have sought some means of democratizing the administrative process.

The most ambitious—indeed, the only thoroughgoing—attempt has been the use by the United States Department of Agriculture of the farmer committee system for the field service administration of agricultural price and income support programs, begun in 1933, and, since 1936, of the Agricultural Conservation Programs.¹ This farmer committee system comprises over 100,000 farmers elected or appointed to serve on approximately 48 state, 3,000 county, and 29,000 community committees. The champions of this system believe that it decentralizes administration, putting authority and responsibility in the hands of those immediately affected by the programs. Further, it supplies new vitality to administration by drawing the clientele into the administrative processes. These objectives have imposed a significant structural requirement upon decentralized administration—the use of the committee system, a plural executive, in preference to a single administrator.

The major units comprising the national administrative agency's² field service have always been the state and county offices under the direction of appointed state and elected county farmer committees. Regional field offices in the role of "filtering plants" or coordinating units for program operations between the national administrative agency and the forty-eight state field offices have never been maintained. However, control and coordination of these offices for general program administration have been effectuated, since 1936, by dividing the country into regions or areas under the supervision of regional or area directors in the Washington office.

* The author makes acknowledgment to the Research Committee of the University of Utah for assistance in the preparation of this study.

¹ For a description and analysis of these programs, see Reed L. Frischknecht, *Farm Price and Income Support Programs, 1933-1950*, Research Monograph Series: Number One, Institute of Government, University of Utah (Salt Lake City, 1953).

² Herein the phrase "national administrative agency" refers to the agency responsible for the execution of the price and income support programs and Agricultural Conservation Programs, that is, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1933-1942; the Agricultural Adjustment Agency, 1942-1945; and the Production and Marketing Administration, 1945 to the present.

The farmer committee system has been pronounced a great success. Secretary Brannan called it "the most representative, efficient and democratic mechanism that has ever been developed for the administration of farm programs"³; the national administrative agency has called it "the strong backbone of . . . operations in the field"⁴; and a leading scholar in agricultural administration has said that "the farmer administrators of the program are members of an administrative organization which creates its *esprit de corps* out of its services to the farmers in pursuit of justice."⁵ Farmers also have applauded the plan.⁶ If this testimony is accurate, practical decisions are taken at the state and local levels in a democratic way by groups of farmers who directly represent active and interested constituencies.

Yet the teachings of public administration would cause one to anticipate quite different results. Is it feasible to decentralize administrative control over a program which by its nature requires national uniformity? Is it possible to engender active interest in administration on the part of the citizens affected? Can a plural executive effectively carry on day-to-day administration? After twenty years of experience with the farmer committee system, it is possible to supply provisional answers to these questions.

I

This field service composed of state, county, and community farmer administrative committees had its origin in the 1932 pre-election pronouncements of the Democratic party (later developed into a concrete organizational structure), and in the exigencies of the time.

In his Topeka address of September 14, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the new farm program would be decentralized and would make use of existing organizations as far as possible in order to avoid the development of a large bureaucracy in Washington. This promise was elaborated into a concept of "agricultural democracy" by Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, M. L. Wilson, then a professor at Montana State College, and Chester C. Davis, later the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, with the assistance of certain outside advisors.⁷

³ Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, "Democracy Must Go Forward: Address, PMA Annual Conference, 1950" (Washington: Office of the Secretary, Mimeographed, 1950), p. 16.

⁴ Production and Marketing Administration, *Report of the Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration 1947* (Washington, 1948), p. 8.

⁵ Charles M. Hardin, "The Politics of Agriculture in the United States," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 32, pp. 541-83 (Nov., 1950), at p. 573.

⁶ See *Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 82d Cong., 1st sess., on S. Bill 1149, August 28, 1951 (1951), p. 463, where one farmer said: "The abolition of this committee system . . . would deal a crippling blow to the effective administration of our farm programs."

⁷ Letter from Henry A. Wallace, April 5, 1952: "My recollection is that M. L. Wilson, Chester Davis, and myself worked out the 'farmer committee system.' I was very proud of this because I looked on these committees as more nearly democracy in action, meeting

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 said little about administration, although it did authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to use state and local committees at his discretion for field administration. The problem of establishing an administrative organization capable of putting the program into operation was pressing, for the act passed on May 12, 1933, and crop plantings were already in advanced stages. The only organization at hand adequate to the task was the Federal-State Cooperative Agricultural Extension Service, which had county agents in more than two-thirds of the counties in the United States. This agency was pressed into service and it remained, in most states, the nucleus of the field service until 1942.

A variety of state committee organizations was employed under the Agricultural Adjustment Act during the period 1933-36. At the one extreme the director of the state extension service, as the state administrator, often appointed a separate state advisory committee of farmers to help him administer the program for each basic crop for which a program was operative in that state.⁸ At the other extreme the Secretary of Agriculture appointed the state director of extension, who would serve as chairman of the several committees, and appointed also the farmer members of a distinct committee for each of the several basic crops for which programs were in effect in the state. This complex system of state committees confused the farmer administrators, many of whom served on more than one committee, and also confused the farmers, who were required to sign a separate contract for each commodity on which they agreed to reduce production under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

a national problem at the local level, than anything in the entire national set-up." See also Russell Lord, *The Agrarian Revival* (New York, 1939), p. 147: "[Critics] . . . liked the contract feature but . . . [were] not sure the plan could be made democratic with the control decentralized and with the workers, for the most part, unpaid. Wilson persuaded . . . [many] that it could be done, and . . . formed a small supporting committee—Henry A. Wallace of Iowa; Louis Clark of Nebraska, a mortgage broker; W. R. Ronald, a small city newspaperman; and R. R. Rogers of New Jersey, a life insurance man. This committee worked without funds or pay." See also Donald C. Blaisdell, *Government and Agriculture* (New York, 1940), pp. 166-67: "Among the striking features of the farm program is the marked extent to which farmers and their representatives have become working parts of its operating mechanism. In large measure this development reflects the democratic philosophy of former Secretary Wallace and of former Undersecretary M. L. Wilson. . . . Mr. Wilson has shown unusual inventiveness. Farmer associations for administering agricultural adjustment . . . are all based on ideas originally conceived by Mr. Wilson.

"Probably no body of legislation comparable in scope to the farm program goes further in providing effective tools of economic self-government."

⁸ Gladys Baker, *The County Agent* (Chicago, 1939), p. 94: "The southern state extension leaders . . . were generally more willing to assume a position of substantial responsibility in their programs than extension leaders in other states." See also Lord, *The Agrarian Revival*, p. 162: "Field action suggestions and orders were wired from Washington to the state directors of extension, partly as a test. Amid the ensuing flare-back a circular letter, bluntly drawn, was sent to the governors of the states. It told what was proposed for the alleviation of agricultural distress there, and added that the extension service would probably lead the program in each state; but, if not, a separate state AAA field setup would have to be considered."

The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 contemplated a system that was never put into effect. The program was to be state-administered with the support of grants-in-aid awarded to states which submitted plans which met the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. The act required that the state agency be approved by the Secretary and that it employ county and community committees of elected farmers. No such plan was ever approved by the Secretary, although Congress, six months after the act's passage, clearly anticipating such action, extended only until 1942 the Secretary's authority to administer the program as he saw fit.⁹

The act provided that in the meantime the Secretary of Agriculture might provide for its administration through the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The Secretary under this interim authority established in each state a State Soil Conservation Committee composed of five farmer members, with the director of the state agricultural extension service also generally a member. The appropriate regional director (located in Washington) of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration designated the chairman of the committee.

Two general patterns of operation were followed by state committees throughout the United States. The board-agent formula was the standard set-up adopted in the North Central Region; the state committee functioned as the policy-determining board with the chairman serving as the state executive officer. He had direct charge of and responsibility for the administration of all programs operative in his state under policies set up by the state committee, within the regulations established by the regional directors. In the other four regions, the state committee served merely as an advisory body to a state executive officer appointed by and responsible to the appropriate regional director for program administration in his state.

Under this administrative arrangement, the state extension service directors and their staffs played varied roles. In most states they retained full responsibility only for the educational phases of the programs. In many states outside the North Central Region, the director of extension remained as chairman. As such, he still carried most of the administrative responsibility, in many cases by sheer domination of other committee members, in other cases from absolute necessity if the job was to be done. In the remainder, including the North Central Region, the state director of extension served only as a committee member, the chairman being appointed from among the farmer members of the committee.

There were two principal reasons for this more restricted role of extension: (1) the interference with traditional extension activities created a desire on the

⁹ *Public Law 170*, 75th Cong., June 28, 1937. Several state plans were proposed but all were disapproved by the Secretary. Proposals have recently been made for making grants-in-aid to the states for carrying out the Class II or soil building practices under the Agricultural Conservation Programs. See *Agricultural Act of 1948*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th Cong., 2d sess. on S. Bill 2318, April 12-14, 1948 (1948), pp. 1-468. Since these hearings, one state plan has been proposed for administering the Agricultural Conservation Program in Mississippi. (Letter from Clay Lyle, Director, Mississippi State Agricultural Experiment Station and Extension Service, Jan. 3, 1953.)

part of many directors to relinquish responsibility for the administration of these programs which they had assumed in an emergency¹⁰; and (2) the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration found it necessary to maintain clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility for the administration of a national program, a program not susceptible of being administered by grants-in-aid.¹¹

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 gave a statutory basis to the state committee system adopted under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. It directed the Secretary to establish in each state a farmer committee of three to five members, with the director of the extension service serving as *ex officio* member. The chairman is now a farmer member of the committee. Since 1938 most state committees have attempted to assume collective responsibility for administration. In many states the committee has functioned like a commission, with each member actually administering a single phase of program operations but with collective responsibility in the whole committee for the totality of program operations.

The next level of administrative organization has been the county. Two major considerations dictated its choice as the basic unit for local administration. First, the county was a familiar political unit; second, the county agricultural agents, who played such an important role in the initial administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, were organized on that basis.¹²

The first step in organization involved the holding of educational meetings by the county agricultural agent, assisted by a temporary county educational campaign committee, in each of some 2,500 rural counties in the United States. This emergency activity of thoroughly acquainting farmers with the various production adjustment programs, in addition to the work involved in organizing community and county production control associations, occupied most of the time of state extension services during 1934-35.¹³ After the educational

¹⁰ *General Farm Legislation*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 75th Cong., 2d sess., on S. R. 158, October 4, 1937, Part II (1937), p. 1919.

¹¹ The real core of the problem at that time has been ably described as follows: "Give us the money; we'll run our own program. We know this part of the country and these people. You don't." This, as ever, was the cry of the state leaders.

"And Washington, retorting: 'Do you as a state leader put a man in a county, hand him public funds, and simply turn him loose? You don't. And we can't, and won't, take responsibility for the dispersal of all this federal money without a degree of authority as to programs and methods.'

"Lawyers examining the Smith-Lever Act (1914) in Washington found that it gave the Secretary of Agriculture no real authority over the state and county extension forces. Specialists in organization, examining the betangled wildwood of Departmental organization charts, threw up their hands. They called for a New Deal as to organization within the Department." (Lord, *The Agrarian Revival*, p. 163.)

¹² John D. Lewis, "Democratic Planning in Agriculture," this REVIEW, Vol. 35, p. 232-49 (April, 1941), at p. 240.

¹³ Federal Extension Service, *Serving American Agriculture, A Report of Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics in 1953*, p. 5: "County Agents devoted a total of 191,346 days to the promotion of the various emergency campaigns." See also Lord,

meetings, the directors of state extension services or the state committees appointed temporary county committees for the purpose of conducting elections for permanent community committeemen.

Each producer of a basic commodity was required to execute an application for membership, in the form of a contract to limit his planted acreage or production for the years 1933-35, in a county production-control association.¹⁴ These production-control associations, one of which was established in each county for every basic commodity for which a program was operative¹⁵ in that county, were the basic administrative units. Thus a farmer might belong, as thousands did, to county wheat, corn-hog, sugar beet, and other production-control associations all at the same time. It was not intended that such associations should replace any farm organization or usurp their functions; they were created for one purpose only—to administer the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in their counties.

The formal internal organization of each production-control association consisted of five offices. First, the general governing body of the association was its board of directors, composed of the chairmen of the several community committees in the county. At its annual meeting this board elected from among its membership a president and a secretary—the latter usually the county agricultural agent of the extension service—and also a treasurer, who was not required to be a board member. It also elected from its membership a county allotment committee of three members; the president of the association was *ex officio* a member and chairman of this committee.

A district production-control association which included several counties was established when the production of the particular basic commodity was not sufficient in those counties to warrant setting up separate county associations, and also in those cases where counties did not have county agricultural agents. Each county in the district association was considered to be a community, or, if it embraced a large area, several communities. The formal organization of the district association was the same as that of the county association.

As early as 1934, particularly in diversified crop areas, farmers complained

The Agrarian Revival, p. 171: "After great adjustment drives in one-crop areas, as many as six or a dozen members of a state extension staff will be temporarily incapacitated by physical and nervous exhaustion. Kansas sent four men to the hospital after the initial drive for wheat reduction in 1934." William Peterson, Director, Utah State Agricultural Extension Service, reported: "One of the weaknesses of the Extension work in Utah is that the staff, in general, has been driven so hard with the multiplicity of duties, that many are just at the breaking point. . . . The personnel of the Service has been crowded and driven in a greater urgency than in any other period within my experience." "Annual Report of Director of Extension, Utah 1935," typewritten (Logan, 1935), p. 9.

¹⁴ For example, see Wheat Section, Production Division, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, *Articles of Association of the Wheat Production Control Association* (Washington, 1933), p. 1.

¹⁵ During the period 1933-34, there were 4,706 production-control associations in operation for the wheat, cotton, corn-hog, and tobacco adjustment programs. See "Summary of the 1934 Agricultural Adjustment Program," *Extension Service Review*, Vol. 6, p. 15 (Jan.-Feb., 1935).

about the number of production-control associations in a single county. The principal complaint was that the administrative cost of maintaining so many different production-control associations was excessive. After the decision of the Supreme Court invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,¹⁶ and subsequent passage of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act in 1936,¹⁷ the various commodity adjustment programs were replaced by a single program—the Agricultural Conservation Program—open to all farmers. The production-control associations were dissolved, and were replaced, by administrative action of the Secretary of Agriculture, with a single agricultural conservation association in each county.

Farmers participating in the Agricultural Conservation Program were automatically members of the new association in their respective counties. In 1936, over 2,700 county agricultural conservation associations replaced the more than 4,000 county and district production-control associations. These new county administrative units were formed under Articles of Association approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, since no state plan for administering the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 had been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture as the Congress had intended.

The organizational structure of the county agricultural conservation association was very similar to that of its predecessor, the county production-control association. Chairmen of the community committees constituted the board of directors. This board elected all officers of the association, including a president and vice-president, who had to be board members, and a county executive committee.¹⁸ The county executive committee, composed of the president, the vice-president, and one other board member, was charged with the county administration of price and income support programs as well as of the Agricultural Conservation Program.¹⁹

During this period the responsibilities of the state extension services and their county agricultural agents were twofold. Their first efforts were educational in nature. In 1937 county agents spent about one-fourth of their time in acquainting farmers with the Agricultural Conservation Programs. Their second major responsibility was that of directing the administration of the Agricultural Conservation Program by the county executive committee, or "county committee," as the farmers called it. In both respects, and for much the same reasons, extension activity varied considerably throughout the United States under this administrative arrangement.

¹⁶ *United States v. Butler*, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

¹⁷ *Public Law 461*, 74th Cong., Feb. 29, 1936.

¹⁸ In the Southern states, the county agricultural agent served as secretary, a member of his staff as treasurer. In other regions, the county agent was usually elected secretary by the board of directors. See Agricultural Adjustment Administration, *Agricultural Conservation 1936, A Report of the Activities of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration* (Washington, 1936), p. 60.

¹⁹ In the Northeast Region, the third member did not have to be a board member; in the North Central Region, the county agent served *ex officio* as a committee member without vote.

With the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the county committee system acquired a specific statutory basis. The act specified the composition and structure of the county committee and directed that it be used for local administration of price and income support programs and the Agricultural Conservation Program. Actually, the act merely gave statutory effect to the use made of this device for administrative purposes since 1933 under the broad provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936.

The act provided for a county agricultural conservation committee of three members, who had to be farmers, and a secretary. In September, 1949, effective with the 1950 elections, Secretary Brannan, acting under the provisions of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 as amended by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, provided for the expansion of the committee to consist of a chairman, a vice-chairman, a third regular member, and first and second alternates who should serve as acting or regular members, in the order elected, under specified conditions.²⁰ On that occasion also the name of the county agricultural conservation committee was changed to production and marketing administration county committee.

Since 1938 county committee members have been indirectly elected at a county convention for a year's term, with no limit upon the number of terms. Delegates to this convention, one from each community administrative area, are elected directly at the time of the annual election of community committeemen.

The lowest level of administrative organization is the community. When the Triple-A was launched in 1933, the county agricultural agent or a temporary county committee of farmers districted each rural county into administrative areas called communities. Distinct systems of communities were established for each production-adjustment program operative in the county. The number of communities depended upon the size of the county, the number of producers of the commodity concerned, and the county's acreage or production record in the particular commodity. Geographical considerations and political boundaries such as those of voting districts or precincts were taken into account in fixing the boundaries.

The temporary county committee or the county agent established temporary community campaign committees of three or more members by direct appointment. These temporary community committees helped conduct educational meetings and the preliminary contract sign-up campaigns in their respective communities or administrative areas. Upon the completion of the educational and sign-up campaigns, those producers who signed contracts, and thereby became eligible voting members of the county production-control association for the commodity in question, elected permanent community committees. Each community committee consisted of from three to five members. The chair-

²⁰ Production and Marketing Administration, *Regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture Governing PMA County and Community Committees 1949* (Washington, 1949), p. 1.

man of each committee represented the community as a member of the board of directors of the county production-control association.²¹

In most cases the temporary committeemen were elected to the permanent community committee. The separate adjustment program for each commodity made for a multitude of local committees. Often a farmer was a member of four or more community committees—one for each commodity for which a program was operative in his county and under which he had signed a contract. Cooperating farmers also voted in as many community elections as they had signed separate commodity adjustment contracts. Since administrative expenses were deducted from growers' benefit payments, agitation for a simplified structural organization soon developed. Most important, from an administrative point of view, was the fact that this situation stretched the county agent's or county committee's "span of control" to the point where adequate administrative supervision was impossible.

With the passage of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, and the creation of a single county agricultural conservation association, each county was districted into new community administrative areas. Once again a temporary county agricultural conservation committee was appointed in each county, and with the county agent's help conducted educational meetings. These were followed by the election of permanent community committees consisting of a chairman, two members, and an alternate committeeman.²² The cooperating farmer was now a member of only one committee, eligible to vote in a single community election and to hold a position on the community committee if elected.

Two years later the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which provided for an enlarged farm program, made mandatory the use of community committees.²³ During the years 1936-38 these administrative units had been authorized by law, but the statute left to the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture the extent of their use. Since the 1938 Agricultural Conservation Program was already in effect when the Act of 1938 became law and committeemen for that year had already been elected, the community committees established under the authority of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 functioned through that year.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 provided that no community administrative area could include more than one county, or parts of different counties.²⁴ The farmers in such an administrative area, and participating in

²¹ Agricultural Adjustment Administration, *Agricultural Adjustment, A Report of Administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act May, 1933, to February, 1934*, p. 135.

²² Agricultural Adjustment Administration, *Agricultural Conservation 1936* (cited in n. 18), p. 59.

²³ *Public Law 430*, 75th Cong., Feb. 16, 1938. See Section 388 (a): "The provisions of section 8(b) and section 11 of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, relating to the utilization of . . . local committees . . . shall apply in the administration of this Act; and the Secretary shall, for such purposes, utilize the same local . . . committees. . . ."

²⁴ *Public Law 430*, 75th Cong., Feb. 16, 1938, Section 101(b). However, unique arrangements were made between state committees for the administration of programs in

the various programs administered in the area, are eligible to vote in the direct election of community committeemen and of a delegate to the annual county convention for the purpose of electing the county committee.²⁵ During the past fourteen years such committees have existed in most counties in the United States.²⁶

From 1938 to 1950 the community committee was composed of three members. Effective with the 1950 elections, committee membership was expanded to include first and second alternates, who serve as committee members in case of the temporary absence of a member or in the case of the death, resignation, removal, or disqualification of a regular member.²⁷

II

In spite of the numerous official commendations of the farmer committee system, these committees have not in fact operated efficiently: indeed, there are many cases in which they cannot be said in any real sense to have operated at all.

The state committees have demonstrated the weaknesses of the plural executive in administration, and have developed other weaknesses of their own. Of necessity, committees meet infrequently, and cannot carry on the day-to-day administration for which they are responsible. Individual state committeemen charged with supervision of particular programs often give direct orders to state office personnel. This factor alone has made for much confusion and the lack of "unity of command," because the office personnel look to the state executive officer for direction but he has no final authority and cannot always establish firm priorities for work completion. In addition, it is regrettably true that most committeemen are not trained to discharge responsibilities in management and administration.²⁸ Committeemen have demonstrated sincerity, earnestness, and integrity, but these qualities are not enough.

inaccessible areas. For example, see Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, July 9, 1942," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1942), p. 3: "The ACP supervision work of the Goshute Indian Reservation in Juab County, Utah, has been handled up to date by Nevada through the White Pine County Office. . . . It was the decision of the Utah State Committee that inasmuch as they are willing to continue the work, it should be handled from there." See also Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, March 18, 1942," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1942), p. 3: "The Executive Assistant read a letter from Summit County requesting approval of the State Committee for the transfer of farms and ranches in the Lone Tree area in Summit County to Sweetwater County, Wyoming, in order to facilitate supervision. This letter was written upon request of the farmers and ranchers. An explanation was given that it would be more economical to supervise this area from Wyoming than from Utah."

²⁵ *Public Law 480*, 75th Cong., Feb. 16, 1938, Section 101(b). See also the *Regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture* cited in n. 20, p. 1.

²⁶ In the sparsely settled, or mainly urban, counties, community committees are not utilized. For example, Nevada has no community committees. See *Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture*, Senate Hearings, August 28, 1951, p. 420.

²⁷ *Regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture*, cited in n. 20.

²⁸ This fact is certainly implied in former Secretary Anderson's response to repeated questions from members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry as to why the national administrative agency had not utilized state committees more and in the

Evidence on such a topic must be anecdotal. The following examples are solely from Utah, but experienced agricultural administrators have agreed that they are representative. In 1942 a member of the Utah state committee noted that the committeemen "have handled only the emergency work that had to be done and have given very little thought to the entire job."²⁹ Three years later the state committee was called to account by the Director of the Western Region of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency because the state had not completed its 1944 program operations; it "had no definite explanation to give Washington."³⁰ The Director had had this experience before:

Speaking of delinquent states, Director Geissler said that he had never seen a change in the status of work where either county or state committees got too far behind. . . . He thought that there was need for more definite and quick action.³¹

These episodes are representative of the experience in many states, and well illustrate a major defect inherent in administration by plural executive bodies—the lack of a definite center of responsibility.

Fortunately the difficulties to which administration by committees gives rise have led to the practical abdication of this function by the committees. In most states the state executive officer has assumed the responsibility for making decisions on daily program operations in areas of both administration and program policy. This has been necessary in order to maintain unity of command within the state office and clear lines of authority and responsibility between the national administrative agency and the field service. In states where this has not occurred, the executive officer functions as the agent of the state committee, which determines administrative policy and is collectively responsible for administration but has delegated the responsibility for day-to-day operations to the executive officer.

The actual functioning of administration at the county level was³² determined, during the period 1933–42, not by the formal regulations issued by the national administrative agency, but rather by other factors. The most important of these was the policy adopted by the directors of individual state extension services. In a few states this policy was one which considered the county agent as a staff advisor to the county committee. In this case the county committees were the important administrative agencies in fact as well as in theory. In most states, however, the prevailing attitude and adopted policy was that actual administrative control should be exercised directly by the county agent. In part this is attributable to the desire of state extension service directors to dominate

manner some witnesses claimed they did: "As we in the Department have indicated on many occasions, we favor giving State Committees as much authority and responsibility as may be practicable and feasible in carrying out the . . . programs." See *Agricultural Act of 1948* (Senate hearings cited in n. 9), p. 40.

²⁹ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, July 9, 1942," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1942), p. 3.

³⁰ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, July 20, 1945," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1945), p. 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*

all governmental contacts with the farmers. However, there were sound reasons as well. Farmer administrative experience was almost non-existent. The county agent, on the other hand, not only was generally respected and trusted by farmers but also was capable of directing the execution of the necessary "paper work" involved. Moreover, the administrative cost of the programs was an important consideration. At the county level, administrative expenses were deducted from benefit payments the farmers received. The more the administrative work was assumed by the county agent and his office staff, the smaller were the expenses of the county association. During these years the office of the county agent was in fact the office of the county committee, which paid a portion of the expense involved.

In 1942, however, there came a sharp break. The national administrative agency desired to place full responsibility upon county committeemen, since it could not maintain clear lines of authority and responsibility without control over the county agents. The extension service directors, on the other hand, wished to retain control of the county agents, and they saw them falling under the influence of the national administrative agency.²² In addition, many directors desired to return to their traditional educational and demonstrational work. Since 1942, therefore, the agents have in general served merely as *ex officio* committee members.

How have county committees operated since this divorcement? What does the record indicate about the efficiency of county committees? Where committees have attempted to carry on the work themselves, the result has been delay and confusion. In 1945 the Utah state committee inquired into administration in one county:

Messrs. Hopkins and Larsen [members of state committee] stated that few meetings were held in the county and that committee action was not taken on any of the problems that arose. They stated that Mr. _____ [member of county committee] would come into the office and outline things as he wanted them and generally upset the routine of work already being followed. . . . Mr. George [member of state committee] said that the county office force did not like to have Mr. _____ come to the office because he confused them on procedure and generally disrupted their work. . . .²³

²² William Peterson, former director of the Utah State Agricultural Extension Service, said in an interview on August 20, 1951: "The people from Washington wanted to take over the county agents to administer the Act; I would not stand for that. Beginning then [1942] the county agent had little to do with administration, but did carry on some educational work."

²³ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, July 20, 1945," typewritten (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1945), pp. 1-4. Conditions in this county at that time are revealed by the following comment: "Mr. Allred [State Executive Officer] reported to the committee the results of the visit . . . at _____ County. He explained that approximately 300, 1944 applications for payment had been prepared in the office prior to the visit, [and that] County personnel were having difficulty in completing the work because of lack of organization. He explained that . . . instructions were given for completing the applications. He said that a schedule of work had been set up and assignments made to the County personnel for completing the work." Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, April 5, 1945," typewritten (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1945), pp. 1-2.

The chairman of the county committee replied:

... that he still understood that it was the whole committee's responsibility to see that a job was done. Mr. Lee [chairman, State Committee] said that the State Committee held the chairman of the County committee responsible to see that other members of the County committee carried out assignments made to them. E. H. Anderson, member of the County committee, explained that he did not know the condition that compliance and application work [delegated to a member of the County committee] was in until it was too late.³⁴

The same problem arose again in 1949:

Mr. Coombs [state farmer fieldman] reported that work was not progressing too satisfactorily in _____ County and that Mr. _____, Chairman, was having some difficulty in keeping things moving. . . . He reported [also] that they were not getting much accomplished in _____ County because the County Committee was too busy on their own farm work to devote time to the job.³⁵

Unfortunately these are not isolated instances, but are fair examples of the operation of an administrative body which structurally defies the fundamental rules of public administration.

It was necessary to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the county agent. In general this has been done by the employment of full-time office managers and clerical help. The Department of Agriculture has been reluctant to admit that this development has occurred. However, Mr. Gus F. Geissler, PMA Administrator 1951-53, conceded it:

Mr. Geissler: We use the term "State and county committees" all the time. But that does not mean that part-time county committeemen actually are doing the job. They have the over-all, general responsibility, but, as you know, they have full-time employees in their county offices and we have full-time employees in our State offices.

The folks that are actually inspecting these bin sites and doing the work on the policy laid down by the State Committee are generally full-time employees. That is true in county offices, too.

Mr. Whitten [Democratic Representative, Mississippi]: In other words, it is under the supervision of the county committee.

Mr. Geissler: We probably say county officer or state officer, but we just follow the terminology whereby we say state and county committee. But it does not mean they actually do all this work themselves.³⁶

Departmental spokesmen are not usually so candid on this matter of county committee administration. On another occasion, Administrator Geissler testified:

Mr. Geissler: I think a great deal of misunderstanding arises in the failure to recognize that these folks perform administrative work. And when you take the three county committeemen which averages about \$1,200 per county, and add to that the 30 community

³⁴ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, August 1, 1945," typewritten (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1945), pp. 2-3.

³⁵ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, September 8, 1949," typewritten (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1949), p. 3.

³⁶ *Warehousing Practices, Commodity Credit Corporation, Department of Agriculture*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agriculture of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 4, 1952 (Washington, 1952), p. 256.

committeemen in the average county with an average of about \$50, it would be less than the equivalent of one constant administrative person that you could hire in a county office for a year. . . .³⁷

This gives a false impression. The evidence is in the budget. During the fiscal year 1950-51, the salaries of county committeemen were given by the Department of Agriculture as \$3,786,588.³⁸ During the same year, 3,128 full-time county office personnel were paid \$11,621,275.³⁹ In fact, therefore, the actual cost of county administrative services during this fiscal year was \$15,407,863, not \$3,786,588. The minutes of state committee meetings also show the reliance that is placed on the full-time employees. Within a few months after the county agents were removed from administrative responsibility, county committees flooded state committees with requests for permission to hire county office managers.⁴⁰ Of the several reasons advanced by a state AAA committee for failure to complete its 1943 and 1944 wartime program operations on time, two of the most important listed were rapid turnover of county office personnel, and the limited number of employees.⁴¹

Consequently we have a dual set of officials. One set is the county committee, legally responsible and highly praised as democratic and efficient, but doing little of the administrative work. The other is an office force (headed by a county office manager who is poorly paid and ignored) which does the actual work. This is not the result sought by the originators of the farmer committee system, but it was implicit in the structure.

Seven years after the initiation of the first acreage-adjustment program, a spokesman for the Department of Agriculture observed that it is ridiculous "to assume that such involved administrative work can be carried on indefinitely by relying solely on the native sense of these committeemen," and that such a view "was counter . . . to the best judgment of those who realize the complexities of the problem."⁴² Shortly thereafter, the Department set up "schools of philosophy" for farmers to equip them for administration. However, little improvement in committee administration followed. More recently the Department has merely shut its eyes to the problem. A former vice-president of

³⁷ *Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture* (Senate hearings cited in n. 6), pp. 334-35.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

³⁹ *Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 1952*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agriculture of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Part I, Feb., 1951 (Washington, 1951), p. 599.

⁴⁰ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, November 10, 1943," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1943), p. 3; Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, May 3, 1944," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1944), p. 3; and Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, June 29, 1944," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1944), p. 3.

⁴¹ Utah State AAA Committee, "Minutes of State Committee Meeting, April 25, 1944," typewritten (Logan: State Office, 1944), p. 5.

⁴² Carl Taeusch, "Schools of Philosophy," in *Yearbook of Agriculture 1940*, ed. Gove Hambidge (Washington, 1940), p. 1122.

the American Farm Bureau Federation, Earl Smith, however, is willing to throw in the sponge:

I will be very frank in saying that . . . I think at the county level the so-called county administrators, elected by farmers should move by statute into a position of what a directorate is to business institutions, rather than administrators.

I don't believe by popular election you can select men peculiarly qualified in the matter of mathematics and so forth to carry out this act.⁴³

It should be realized that mere decentralization of governmental operations and public participation in the administrative processes do not guarantee better administration.⁴⁴

There remain the community committeemen. Their administrative duties vary from year to year and from program to program. For example, when acreage allotments are in effect, committeemen are generally assigned to the job of compliance determination; when commodity loan programs are operative, committeemen make inspections of stored commodities; and they serve as crop insurance salesmen for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.

The number of community committeemen has averaged, during the years 1933-52, approximately 90,000. They have served on about 29,000 community committees in over 3,000 counties.⁴⁵ Their tenure has been somewhat less stable than that of county committeemen. This fact, however, has not been due to any increase in farmer participation in annual elections, or a desire on the part of farmers to seek election to committee membership. The rather high turnover is attributed by committee members to inadequate compensation and the failure of the county committee to establish a definite policy with regard to utilization of community committeemen. The average community committeeman has worked approximately 7.7 days annually, for which he has received an average per diem salary of \$5.37. The average annual salary for the period 1933-52 was \$41.34.⁴⁶ As to the indecision of the county committee, one complaint ran in these terms:

Community committeemen need to be taken into the county committee's confidence. Our committee came to the only county meeting called last year. We couldn't help much in one meeting. We don't know what the county's policy is, but general policy meetings should be called so that the community committees and the county committee can establish one. There's no sense in having so-called community committeemen if they're never used during the year, except to reelect a county committee whose activities they don't know much about. It's pure nonsense the way it works now, and farmers are tired of it.⁴⁷

⁴³ *Long-Range Agricultural Policy and Program*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. R. 147, Part II, Oct. 20, 1947 (Washington, 1947), p. 360.

⁴⁴ One scholar has observed that "the beginning and the end of wisdom in the development of democratic theory [in administration] may lie in the recognition of inevitable limitations of the human material." See Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," this *Review*, Vol. 46, pp. 81-103 (March, 1952), at p. 99.

⁴⁵ Data derived from an analysis of the Annual Reports of the national administrative agency, 1933-52.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Statement made by a delegate to the Cache County, Utah, Election Convention, Dec. 8, 1950.

In response to such criticism, the Utah state committee has directed its county committees to develop an affirmative policy:

We must bring community committeemen into a strong position in our administration. . . . It must become the established attitude of all County Committeemen that they desire to share their own decisions on program policies with their community committeemen. It is the most effective way in which the County Committee can stay in close contact with the thinking of all farmers in the county and be in the best position to contribute the most to the development of practicable and effective programs.⁴⁸

Except for their role in electing annually the county committeemen, community committeemen, in general, have not performed, on a continuous basis, other significant activities. For all intent and purpose, they have served a few days a year as the paid employees of the county office. In this capacity, they have performed various activities when found qualified to do so; when not so qualified, county offices have been disposed to hire other personnel to perform these activities. This latter situation is by no means infrequent.

III

Despite what was said above, the farmer committee system has not been an insignificant excrescence on line operations. It has developed an unexpected character and significance—a character and significance unintended by its framers and indeed in marked contrast with their intentions. At the state and county level, there has emerged a “hard core” of professional farmer committeemen who dominate the system. These professionals, although their importance in administration has been slight, have played a highly significant political role. These developments have in part been the consequence of the passivity of the farmer clientele; in part, they have resulted from a deliberate policy of the U. S. Department of Agriculture.

The hard core of professional farmer committeemen has developed as a result of the method of election relied upon, and the lack of extensive farmer participation in annual community elections. Departmental spokesmen have made much of the fact that price and income support programs as well as the Agricultural Conservation Program are administered by elected farmer committees. It is true that both county and community committeemen are elected, but there are important differences. Direct elections are held for community committeemen, but never for county committeemen; yet the implication of Department officials has been that all committeemen are directly elected by those farmers eligible to participate in annual elections. The facts are these: (1) from 1933 to 1936 county committeemen were chosen by the boards of directors of the county production-control associations, and from 1936 to 1938 by the boards of directors of the county agricultural conservation associations; (2) from 1938 to date they have been chosen at an annual county convention, by delegates elected at community elections. In addition, administrative rulings to the effect that delegates to the county convention may not be elected members of county committees have eliminated a possible source of farmer

⁴⁸ Utah State PMA Committee, “Importance of Community Committeemen in PMA Activities,” mimeographed (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1951), p. 1.

leadership and administrative ability, since community committeemen have generally been delegates to the county conventions.

Participation in community elections was relatively good during the first year or two after the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, although not all that might have been expected.⁴⁹ By 1940, participation not only had not improved but had actually declined in most states. A survey of twelve representative counties in 1941 by the Department of Agriculture indicated that participation was "very slight" and that "only 25 percent of those eligible to vote in the twelve counties actually did vote."⁵⁰ The situation had become so bad by 1947 that farm organizations themselves took a hand in bringing the facts before Congress. The National Farmers Union at its 40th Annual Convention in 1946 adopted a resolution recommending that elections be void unless at least 50 per cent of the eligible farmers in the community voted.⁵¹ In an appearance before the House Committee on Agriculture, Albert Goss, then Grand Master of the National Grange, observed that "just a few vote. Many times 15 or 20 vote or even 10. . . . Those elections out in the townships [communities] just don't express the sentiments of the farmers."⁵² More recently, official spokesmen of the national administrative agency have also recognized the situation, although nothing of a concrete nature has been done to excite more interest among farmers.⁵³

⁴⁹ A former state executive officer recently told this writer that "participation was fairly good during the early years. Even good crowds of between 20 and 40 came out. Most of them, however, were not too interested in elections but came out to make sure that nothing happened to decrease their acreage allotments. Sometimes the payment checks were held until election time and given to the farmers at the election meetings, but most farmers came and got their checks and then left. This scheme to get more farmers out to elections didn't work very well. If ten came out to elections between 1937 and 1943, when I left the AAA, it was a good meeting." See also W. W. Owens, Assistant Director, Utah State Agricultural Extension Service, "Annual Report 1934," typewritten (Logan: 1934), p. 9. After noting the good attendance at community educational meetings, Mr. Owens observed: "It was not possible to get as many out to subsequent meetings . . . even for the organization meetings."

⁵⁰ See *Agriculture Department Appropriation Bill 1943*, House Hearings, Part II, Jan. 24, 1942, p. 727. See also Carl T. Schmidt, *American Farmers in the World Crisis* (New York, 1941), p. 271: "Despite heavy participation in AAA programs and apparent acceptance of the AAA . . . the elections of local committeemen are frequently neglected . . . , in many . . . no more than fifteen or twenty farmers will turn out for a meeting."

⁵¹ National Farmers Union, *Agriculture in the Service of Mankind, The Program of the National Farmers Union Adopted by Delegates to the 40th Annual Convention* (Denver, 1946), p. 6.

⁵² See *Long-Range Agricultural Policy*, House Hearings, Part III, May 3, 1947, p. 383. See also Goss' statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in 1948 on S. 2318, which provided for a single county-elected committee to administer all departmental programs in each county: "Our general impression is that the proposal presupposes enough interest on the part of farmers to assure widespread participation in elections and selection of men thereby who are trained in meeting technical administrative responsibilities. We are not convinced that the results would be all that we might desire." *Agricultural Act of 1948*, Senate hearings (cited in n. 9), p. 141.

⁵³ Elmer Kruse, Manager, Commodity Credit Corporation, "Problems of the Commodity Credit Corporation and Their Relation to the Production and Marketing Ad-

This lack of interest, coupled with indirect election of county committeemen, has resulted in prolonged tenure for county committeemen and the subsequent development of a hard core of farmer committeemen. One state has reported that during the years 1933-36, with but few exceptions, "the officers of the control associations were reelected at the annual organizational meetings."⁵⁴ Gladys Baker observed that in the mid-west states "the change from the commodity to the conservation program did not result in a large turnover in the personnel of county committees" and that "a considerable number of committeemen appointed to the first temporary committees in 1933-1934 are now serving on agricultural conservation committees."⁵⁵ The largest turnover of county committeemen took place during the war years, 1943-45, when an average turnover of twenty per cent was reported.⁵⁶

The question must now be considered as to why such a bureaucracy of professional farmer committeemen, having little to do with administration, has developed. One possible answer, and the one suggested here, is that committeemen have occupied a significant political position. The word "political" is not used here in the narrow sense of direct party activity.⁵⁷ Rather, the political role that committeemen have played has been that of promoters and defenders of the past Administration's agricultural policy. The solidarity of the farmer committeemen and the Administration is suggested by the statement of Ralph Trigg, PMA Administrator, that a deliberate policy of recruiting top level ad-

ministration," mimeographed (Washington: Production and Marketing Administration, 1948), pp. 2-5: "Ts farmer thinking being reflected adequately in the administration of the price support program, especially with regard to local administration . . . ? I can tell you that it is a question that has been receiving very careful consideration . . . , nothing is gained . . . by assuming that operations, because they have always been handled a certain way, must continue to be handled that way. . . . I would like to suggest that you [state, county, and community committeemen] give particular consideration to the matter of bringing about greater farmer participation."

⁵⁴ W. W. Owens, Assistant Director, Utah State Agricultural Extension Service, "Annual Report 1935," typewritten (Logan, 1935), p. 1.

⁵⁵ *The County Agent*, p. 78. See also *Agriculture Department Appropriation Bill 1948*, House Hearings, Part II, Jan. 24, 1942, p. 727. A survey by the Department of Agriculture in twelve representative counties showed that of the 33 regular county committeemen in eleven counties, 61 per cent had been on the job five years or more; 12 per cent, four years; 12 per cent, three years; 3 per cent, two years; of the rest—about 12 per cent—one year or less. In four counties, all of the committeemen had served five years.

⁵⁶ See Annual Reports of the Chief of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency, 1943, 1944, 1945, pages 19, 20, and 19, respectively.

⁵⁷ See Charles M. Hardin, "The Politics of Conservation: An Illustration," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 13, pp. 461-81 (Aug., 1951), at p. 473: "Has the PMA and the AAA before it been employed to further the ends of the Democratic Party? Allegations have been made that the committee system was used to support the Democratic Party organization as early as 1934. . . . One story which could probably be authenticated has it that a Washington AAA official attempted to use the committee system to collect Democratic campaign contributions in 1942 . . . , committeemen were given a choice 'between the hatchet and the Hatch Act.' In some PMA meetings after the 1948 elections, there was a disposition to claim credit for a share in President Truman's victory. PMA Committeemen were much in evidence at the midwestern Democratic rally in Des Moines, May, 1949. . . ."

ministrative officials from the farmer committee system had been followed not only in PMA but also by the Department of Agriculture.⁵⁸

This political role of the farmer committee system appears to have been encouraged by the Department of Agriculture by means of two techniques: (1) the use of annual national conferences of state and county committeemen, and (2) the establishment of qualification requirements for state committeemen and county office personnel having little to do with technical competence.

Annual conferences were begun in the early 1930's. These conferences were ostensibly for the purpose of securing definite recommendations from committeemen on specific administrative problems relating to daily program operations as experienced in the field. For a number of years recommendations were earnestly sought and just as seriously given on detailed and specific problems by delegates.⁵⁹ The evidence indicates, however, that in recent years the major purpose of such conferences has been that of advancing the Administration's agricultural policy or proposed policy.⁶⁰

For example, Ralph Trigg, then PMA Administrator, speaking at the 1948 PMA Conference, observed:

A year ago at our Colorado Springs Conference, we tried the plan of having a number of specific committees to consider and report on all phases of our programs and operations. Looking back on the results of this effort, I can now report that it was successful beyond our most optimistic expectations. Every delegate at the conference sat with one of these working committees . . . the suggestions and recommendations were carefully tabulated and given direct and full consideration.

In total, the conference committees last year submitted 180 rather definite recommendations. Many of the specific ones were put into effect at once. . . . Many of them were reflected in subsequent decisions and developments. . . . No one is going to tell you how to handle your discussions—what to discuss or what conclusions to reach. We want to hear from you. We want the benefit of your experience and judgment.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ralph Trigg, "The Job Ahead," in the "Report of Proceedings of PMA National Conference 1948," mimeographed (Washington: Office of the Administrator, 1948), p. 5. See also United States Department of Agriculture, *Family Farm Policy Review* (Washington, 1951), p. 38: "Most county committeemen have been community committeemen and most State committeemen [appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture] have been county committeemen. Many of those in administrative positions in the Department in Washington have come up through the ranks."

⁵⁹ Interviews with former and present state and county committeemen who attended these conferences indicate that committee sessions were devoted in earnest to consideration of these matters. This is significant, since many of those interviewed were at that time and still are critics of the Democratic administration's policy.

⁶⁰ In general the addresses given by top level officials of the Department of Agriculture have not been concerned with problems of administration but with (1) problems of economic distress within agriculture, and (2) possible solutions for such problems. The major role that committeemen should play in providing these solutions has always been emphasized. In this respect, see the addresses by Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan and William B. Crowley, Assistant Administrator for Production, Production and Marketing Administration, in *Report of Proceedings of PMA National Conference 1948*.

⁶¹ Ralph Trigg, "The Job Ahead" (cited in n. 58), pp. 7-8. Mr. Trigg reported the process of converting the recommendations into concrete policy as follows: "I asked each PMA Branch Director to study and analyze the reports carefully . . . [which] relate to the

This may be compared with Mr. Trigg's instructions for delegates to the 1949 National Conference:

The return of crop surpluses has brought back the old problems of production adjustment and controls. The Congress, administrative agencies, farm organizations and farmers themselves are greatly concerned over the development of the soundest possible system of price supports to protect farm income. . . .

These are all matters of direct concern to PMA. The job of developing and carrying out needed action programs will fall to us in large measure. . . . That's why it is a very good thing that we are meeting in conference at this time—to . . . agree upon general blueprints for the direction of our efforts. . . .

In this connection, I want to explain why we have suggested a somewhat different plan with regard to committee reports or resolutions. We feel that we can accomplish more in getting at the fundamental thinking and broad recommendations of the conference if the committees are relieved of the task of trying to spell out exact details of program and policy recommendations. It is not possible to do this thoroughly in a large conference anyway, and too much of our limited time is spent in trying to reach agreement on specific points. . . .²²

Why the change on the part of the Production and Marketing Administration as to (1) encouraging specific recommendations, and (2) not dictating procedures to be followed by the conference committees? The 1949 PMA Conference was political, not in a partisan but in a policy sense. It actually served as the first sounding board for the so-called Brannan Plan. It was expected that committeemen would serve as the "shock troops" to create a favorable attitude among farmers and their congressional representatives for the plan. It seems doubtful that such an obvious change in the purpose of the national conference, and the presentation of the Brannan Plan to the Congress four months later, were purely coincidental.

Concurrence with this view is found in recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The Chairman of this committee, Democratic Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas, observed:

Well, it is a very doubtful procedure, I think, when you call the State Committee and all members of county committees in a State on some occasion to hear the Secretary of Agriculture speak, for instance, or someone representing the Department of Agriculture, you pay them for their attendance, their expenses, and then the discussion revolves around a highly controversial issue, some program sponsored by the administration that is very much opposed maybe, by some other political factions. Then the question arises: Is that politics . . . ? Certainly the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretaries within the Department, any member of the administration on a high level, a policy-making level, should have absolute freedom to go before the people and espouse that program and talk about its virtues and its advantages, and the benefits that flow from it, and everything else. But the only question I raise is when they pay the audience out of taxpayers' money

programs on administration of his Branch. I also appointed an over-all committee under the chairmanship of [the] . . . Director of the Budget and Management Branch. . . . Their job will be the tabulation and coordination of all recommendations, and the initiation of necessary steps to implement them as fully as possible."

²² Ralph Trigg, "Address 1949 National PMA Conference," mimeographed (Washington: Office of the Administrator, 1949).

to come to hear them speak. I raise that question. I think it is serious. I do not approve of it."⁶³

The Secretary of Agriculture, however, in an address before the 1949 National PMA Conference, instructed the assembled committeemen that political activity was their duty.⁶⁴ Correctly or not, this is the way in which the farmer committeemen's participation in annual conferences has been directed and utilized:

In addition to annual conferences, the technique of imposing special and subjective qualification requirements for employment has also been relied upon in order to insure an organization team "correctly" oriented toward advancing proposed Administration agricultural policy. Appointment as state committeemen, and full-time employees at county levels, only of those individuals who have a sympathetic or at least neutral attitude toward the program seems at first glance to be a normal requirement rightly insisted upon by all administrators. However, in a situation such as we have here, where state and county committees which administered the programs are the exception, there seems to be another reason for such requirements, namely that of maintaining a hard core of personnel capable of espousing departmental policy.

At the state level, continuity of support of departmental policy is insured by providing that "no person may be appointed to a State Committee unless he receives the endorsement of the present State Committee."⁶⁵ At the county level, the objective is achieved by requiring that "applicants should believe in the Agricultural Conservation Program . . . , should be sympathetic with the program, and should have a farm background."⁶⁶

Charles M. Hardin, however, has concluded that:

. . . in certain administrative programs such as [those] of . . . PMA . . . , a superficial appearance of centralization and subsequent decentralization, subject to the organizing control of the USDA, veils significant developments. Thus real control over personnel and policies . . . tends to slip away from the Secretary of Agriculture and to become vested

⁶³ See *Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture* (Senate hearings cited in n. 6), pp. 44-45.

⁶⁴ The Secretary said: "The work of the committees is intensifying as farm income drops from postwar peaks and as production adjustments become necessary. Under these circumstances the Nation has reason to be thankful for the existence of a firmly established, democratic system of program administration and development. . . . All of us will not be 100 per cent satisfied with any legislation and will continue working for improvements—you by submitting recommendations to me through the PMA Administrator and I by working with the Congress . . . we are going to go right on working to improve the farm program and adapt it to the needs of our day," "Summary of Remarks, Annual Conference of PMA, Memphis, Tennessee, December 6, 1949," mimeographed (Washington: Office of the Secretary, 1949), pp. 2-3.

⁶⁵ Production and Marketing Administration, "Selection, Appointment, and Removal of State PMA Committeemen," mimeographed (Washington: Office of the Administrator, 1948), p. 1.

⁶⁶ For example, see Utah State PMA Committee, "Directive to PMA County Committee Chairmen Concerning Employment Procedure for County Offices," mimeographed (Salt Lake City: State Office, 1950), pp. 1-4.

in chairmen (and others) of state PMA committees, who appear to be in a sufficiently strong position independently to modify departmental control. Again the question is pertinent: To whom are the state and local PMA committees responsible?

The upshot of these questions as to controllability suggests that [it] . . . is quite conceivable that we will emerge with an agricultural field organization built upon a network of state and local farmer-elected committees which effectively interlock with influential persons in state and local farm organizations. Such organization would be responsible neither to the Secretary of Agriculture nor to any effective general electorate.⁶⁷

It appears that the Department has adequately safeguarded against this possibility. In addition, Professor Hardin's view overlooks other facts which render it implausible. First, PMA state committeemen serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Agriculture under one-year appointments.⁶⁸ Second, state committeemen have been chosen almost exclusively from county committeemen and state farmer fieldmen after a number of years of loyal service in such capacity.⁶⁹ In practice, how have state committeemen supported the Secretary and departmental proposals which have been opposed by the leaders of the general farm organizations? The answer: nearly 100 per cent. For example, PMA committeemen ardently pushed the Family Farm Policy Review and the proposed Brannan Plan, both of which were vigorously opposed by the American Farm Bureau Federation.⁷⁰

The general farm organizations feel that policy formation of this type is their business—not that of people and governmental agencies given formal responsibility, at least, for the administration of public agricultural programs. The president of a midwestern state Farm Bureau Federation recently voiced their stand as follows:

The job of determining the farmers' opinion of needed changes in law or policy should be left to the Congress. Independent farm organizations such as the Farm Bureau, the Grange, and the Farmers Union all have procedures for determining farm opinion and for advising the Congress of the consensus of farm opinion. . . . We should point out to our members the dangers involved in taking this method of collecting "grass-roots" opinion

⁶⁷ "Reflections on Agricultural Policy Formation in the United States," this REVIEW, Vol. 42, pp. 881-905 (Oct., 1948), at p. 884.

⁶⁸ See "Selection, Appointment, and Removal of State PMA Committeemen" (cited in n. 65), p. 1.

⁶⁹ United States Department of Agriculture, *Family Farm Policy Review*, p. 38. Professor Hardin himself has observed elsewhere: "Promotions from county committees to the state PMA committees in one mid-western state, at least, were based not only upon one's Democratic regularity but upon one's belonging to the right faction in the Democratic party—according to the declarations of a number of persons to the writer in 1948-50." See "The Politics of Conservation: An Illustration" (cited in n. 57), p. 473.

⁷⁰ One state Farm Bureau Federation urged its members not to participate in the Family Farm Policy Review and concluded: "We have many well-meaning and sincere people on local PMA and County Mobilization Committees throughout the state. I hope you can help them to understand the kind of cloth this thing is made of and the danger of misusing agricultural agencies this way." See E. Howard Hill, President, Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, "Letter to Farm Bureau Presidents, County Voting Delegates and County Women's Chairmen," mimeographed (Des Moines: IFBF, Aug. 16, 1951), p. 1.

through biased governmental agencies. . . . The function of federal agencies is to administer programs, not to make policy. . . .⁷¹

It should be observed, however, that congressional committees, whether their members will admit it or not, are dependent to a large extent upon the recommendations of administrative agencies. A careful reading of the congressional hearings on every piece of major price support legislation indicates that recommendations of the Department of Agriculture form the basis of most such legislative enactments. Congressmen are reluctant to proceed to enact new legislation without departmental recommendations, based upon past administrative experience.⁷² Only within this framework have farmer committees been given opportunity for local participation—and then their role has usually not been one of initiation but of loyal support of decisions taken at a higher level.

IV

The farmer committee system undertook to democratize administration. But it is necessary to distinguish between substantive participation and mere lip service to the ideal. Philip Selznick's warning concerning cooptation,⁷³ developed in his analysis of the use of local groups in the TVA programs, could well be applied to the use made of the farmer committee system in the administration of the price support and Agricultural Conservation Programs by the national administrative agency:

Formal cooptation ostensibly shares authority, but in doing so is involved in a dilemma. The real point is the sharing of the public symbols or administrative burdens of authority, and consequently public responsibility, without the transfer of substantive power; it, therefore, becomes necessary to insure that the coopted elements do not get out of hand, do not take advantage of their formal position to encroach upon the actual arena of decision. Consequently, formal cooptation requires informal control over the coopted elements lest unity of command and decision be imperiled. This paradox is one of the sources

⁷¹ *Ibid.* A realistic analysis of the controversy concerning who speaks for the farmers was made in 1949 by Secretary Brannan: "The leaders of some organizations apparently take the view that they and they alone speak for the farmers. They seem to feel that farmers and the Secretary of Agriculture should be gagged and muzzled unless their voices are filtered through the purifying plants of a particular organization.

"Let me tell you how I feel about that. First, we are not in competition with any farm organization. . . . The organizations have work to do that we can't do. We have work to do that they can't do. Farm people need both kinds of work done. Second, it is useless to argue about who speaks for the farmer. No person can honestly claim that he alone or his organization alone has that privilege. To do so is to sneer at democracy." "Summary of Remarks, Annual Conference of PMA" (cited in n. 64), pp. 2-3.

⁷² A leading political scientist has observed: "Laws must be constantly adjusted to meet changed conditions and to reflect experience in their application. The administration in power must inevitably have an important share in the formulation of legislative measures. In our executive-legislative relationships, we have made little provision for an honest recognition of this necessity." V. O. Key, Jr., "Legislative Control," in *Elements of Public Administration*, ed. Fritz Morstein Marx (New York, 1946), pp. 349-50.

⁷³ *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), p. 13: "Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threat to, or increasing its stability or existence."

of persistent tension between theory and practice in organizational behavior. The leadership, by the very nature of its position, is committed to two conflicting goals; if it ignores the need for participation, the goal of cooperation may be jeopardized; if participation is allowed to go too far, the continuity of leadership and policy may be threatened.¹⁴

This explains the manner in which the national administrative agency has maneuvered in its use of state, county, and community farmer committees.

The national administrative agency has been charged with a set of program responsibilities over the years which cannot be readily changed. It cannot escape the necessity of maintaining continuity of policy and definite lines of authority and responsibility. In practice, therefore, the forms of participation have been observed, but action has been so channeled as to fulfill the necessary administrative functions, with committeemen undertaking political rather than administrative activities. At the state level, the administrative responsibility has devolved to an executive officer; at the county level, to an office manager. The real lines of authority and responsibility have been maintained between these full-time appointed officials at state and county levels on the one hand and regional or area directors in Washington on the other. This development of informal lines of authority and responsibility has occurred because of the need of finding a method of accomplishing the national administrative agency's major purpose, one which the farmer committee, as an administrative device, could not supply. Indeed, it is doubtful if the outcome could have been otherwise.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

REFLECTIONS OF A LAW PROFESSOR ON INSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*

KENNETH CULP DAVIS

University of Minnesota

Both political scientists and lawyers are in quest of better understanding of the same problems about the same processes of the same administrative agencies carrying out the same programs. Yet the two professional groups characteristically work quite independently of each other. Acting in the belief that both lawyers and political scientists should benefit by increased mutual criticism,¹ I propose to record my impressions of that area of political science which overlaps with and is contiguous to administrative law. The point of view will be that of one who is concerned primarily with law and legal education.

This paper is designed (1) to evaluate the case studies edited by Harold Stein, entitled *Public Administration and Policy Development*,² (2) to contrast with the case studies the basic method of instruction marked out by some of the conventional texts on public administration, (3) to criticize the undue emphasis upon broad perspective at the expense of detailed facts in the literature of public administration, (4) to call attention to the inordinate amount of misinformation about administrative law in some of the texts on public administration, (5) to express doubts about the choice of subject matter for some of the texts on public administration, and (6) to attempt constructive suggestions for further research on political science aspects of administrative law problems.

I. THE CASE STUDY METHOD

Each of the twenty-six case studies of the Stein collection is a high-fidelity recording of a governmental episode—something surprisingly rare in the literature of public administration. The actors are neither institutions nor departments nor agencies but individual human beings. They are confronted with down-to-earth details of today and tomorrow, of writing a letter or a memorandum, of participating in a conference, of immediate action. The people are real and are given their real names. The events are real events. The problems are in real contexts—the disorderly contexts of politics, of pressures, of personal ambitions mixed with altruistic ideals and high-minded conceptions of the public interest, of personalities as well as principles, of emotions as well as

* Especially helpful suggestions have been made by Professors Marshall Dimock, Emmette Redford, William Anderson, Lloyd Short, George Warp, William Lockhart, and Monrad Paulsen. The usual remark that the responsibility is solely that of the writer has more than the usual significance.

¹ For significant criticisms of lawyers by political scientists in this field, see John Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (University, Alabama, 1947), pp. 107-8; George A. Graham, "Trends in Teaching of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 69-70 (Spring, 1950).

² (New York, 1952).

intellects. Most of the problems are at such a level that able administrators have found them challenging or even frustrating.

The main ingredient of each case study is facts—facts about individuals, facts about practices, facts about institutional arrangements, facts about political influences, and facts about the problems themselves. The facts are predominantly concrete, purposefully selected and deftly marshalled. Some of the studies include prefatory remarks to assist the reader's appreciation of central problems, organizing sections clarifying issues or pointing up alternative courses of action, and something by way of epilogue or afterthoughts. When the writers move from narrative to solutions, they always stay close to the facts; they never wander off into abstractions or unsupported generalizations. They apply constant pressure on the reader to do his own thinking, to struggle with the dilemmas the administrators have faced, and to discover limited lessons that are supported in whole or in part by the recorded experience.²

Altogether, the case studies in this volume are an extraordinary achievement. Their essential merit lies in the richness of the educational rewards inherent in the study of concrete problems on an adequate background of detailed facts. Although others may have tapped some portions of those riches, this may be the first time the rewards have been reaped with substantial fullness in treating this type of subject matter.

The achievement is all the more impressive, in comparison with the conventional texts on public administration. To that we now turn.

II. THE CONVENTIONAL METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

In contrast with the Stein case studies, in which the emphasis is so strongly upon the particularism of concrete problems, the conventional teaching materials in the field of public administration aim to give the student a selection of conclusions about the law and the governmental arrangements. The usual method is plain exposition in summary form, mostly abstract and general. Problems are almost entirely absent. Even the occasional illustrations tend to be abstract or general.

No professor in any leading law school of the United States would agree either with this primary objective or with this usual method. Perhaps in part

² Case studies like those of the Stein collection are unknown to legal education. The case method of law schools is limited almost altogether to study of opinions of appellate courts. Indeed, the appellate opinion is the obsession of today's legal education.

Yet lawyers are devoting their time less and less to litigation and more and more to avoiding litigation—advising, planning, managing, negotiating, transacting, drafting. Legal education needs a basic shift toward lawyers' problems that are unrelated to litigation; problems of what-to-do instead of problems of who-should-win; problems of choosing among practical policies, not further exercises in analytical refinements; problems involving the kind of facts that lawyers must consider in advising businessmen, not merely neat summaries of facts in appellate opinions; problems intertwined with business or politics or technology, not merely interpreting statutes or applying judge-made law. The precise need of legal education seems to me to be the successful application of the Stein method to that part of the business of a law office that never goes to court. Such a project would be exceedingly difficult. But it can be done, and it should be done.

because of so much experience with the case system, perhaps in part because of the inductive method of the common law, and perhaps in part because a familiarity with the nature of law produces distrust of abstractions and generalities, law professors quite uniformly are likely to commend the particularity of the Stein approach.

Furthermore, the educational goal, in the opinion of law professors, should be to impart understanding, not information. Understanding is developed less by exposure to the conclusions of others than by participating in the solution of problems. Our governmental system is the sum of the choices that have been made in the past; the student must be made to see each crucial problem, the alternative courses of action, the reasons for the decisions that society has made, the reasons for the rejected views, and the consequences of the decisions. A mere statement of conclusions may give information, but it can seldom produce understanding.

These remarks seem to me peculiarly applicable to the treatments of legal problems in the texts on public administration. I shall make my point with one example.

One of the best of the conventional texts on public administration is the third edition of the book by Leonard D. White.⁴ At p. 575 the student is told: "The foundation of judicial control over administrative acts rests in the Anglo-American doctrine of the rule of law. The classic concept is that of Dicey." Then Dicey is quoted as saying that "every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen." White asserts: "This rule was brought to the United States as a part of the common law heritage and has been universally accepted."

Now what does the diligent student have, from the standpoint of educational values, when he has mastered these various assertions of conclusions about the law? It seems to me that at best the student can derive nothing but a few bits of information or misinformation from these assertions.

How can the same subject be presented to provide understanding instead of mere information, and at the same time to protect against misinformation? The answer is by using some method resembling either the Stein method or that of the usual law school casebook. The student must be led to participate in the thinking. Exposition must be supplanted by problems. Generalities have to give way to, or at least be preceded by, particulars. Abstractions have to yield to or be supported by concrete examples.

This way: Anthrax is a contagious disease that kills cattle. Mr. Conroy, a livestock inspector for Wisconsin, looks over a herd of cattle owned by farmer Lowe. He discovers a sick cow. Fearing anthrax, he examines a smear of the cow's blood under a microscope, finds anthrax, and orders the herd destroyed. Mr. Lowe thus loses his life's savings, cattle worth \$10,000. But Lowe can't

⁴ Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1948).

sue the state because long tradition has made it immune to liability in tort. If Lowe sues Conroy and proves that Conroy was mistaken, but if Conroy shows that the mistake was a reasonable one that a careful officer might make in the circumstances, should Conroy be liable? Conroy's salary is \$5,000 a year, he has three children, and he has made a down payment on a \$10,000 home. The student must struggle with the problem: Would it be a good idea to have a "rule of law" like Dicey's? If liability is imposed, what will be the probable effect on the future spread of anthrax?

After the student has been led to think through the problem of *Lowe v. Conroy*,⁵ he is then prepared for his own critical examination of Dicey's so-called "rule of law." He may quickly appreciate the serious error of White's statement that Dicey's rule of law is "a part of the common law heritage and . . . universally accepted."

But here again, the best road to this conclusion may be by way of concrete problems. If a judge of a regular court makes a decision in bad faith, should the losing party be allowed to sue the judge for damages? If losing parties can sue judges and allege bad faith, will that be destructive of judicial responsibility? Will financially responsible men accept judicial office if they are to be subjected to that kind of suit? Almost any clear-minded student will answer these questions the way the United States Supreme Court answered them in 1871 in the leading case of *Bradley v. Fisher*:⁶ "It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself . . . the principle obtains in all countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence."

The next step is to decide whether the immunity that judges enjoy should be extended to administrative adjudicators. The Supreme Court has given the answer most alert students will give: an officer who performs a judicial function has to be immune to personal liability for the decision made, whether the officer is a judge or an administrator.⁷ Then the student may be given specific information about the immunity principle and how far it has been carried.

The student will now be prepared to learn more about Dicey—perhaps through a problem involving the Prime Minister, who according to Dicey, is under the same responsibility as any other citizen, for every act done without justification. The student will quickly see how utterly impracticable it would be to impose personal liability upon the Prime Minister on account of performance of his official duties. Then the student will be ready to appraise the views of Dicey's fellow Englishmen, who have rejected Dicey's rule of law, just as Americans have generally rejected it, and just as both English and American courts have generally rejected it. Mr. E. C. S. Wade, who wrote the introduc-

⁵ I have altered somewhat the facts of *Lowe v. Conroy*, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904). Contra: *Raymond v. Fish*, 51 Conn. 80 (1883).

⁶ 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1871).

⁷ *Kendall v. Stokes*, 3 How. 87, 97 (1845); *Spalding v. Vilas*, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).

tion to the ninth edition of Dicey's book, published in 1939, acknowledged that Dicey "seems . . . not sufficiently to have regarded the immunities . . . [of] Crown servants. . . ." ⁸

Although White is seriously mistaken in his statement about the rule of law, my point does not concern the rule of law, but relates to the method of instruction. The conventional texts on public administration seem to me unsound in assuming that primary educational values inhere in mere knowledge. I believe the proper objective is not to teach someone's conclusions but to provide experience in thinking processes, to demonstrate how conclusions are reached, to consider pros and cons, to weigh alternatives. The goal is understanding, and no one can develop understanding of human institutions without thinking through the problems that have demanded solution. This can seldom be accomplished on a level of abstraction. A principal tool must be concrete and particular problems.

In his twentieth and last annual report as President of Harvard University, Dr. James Bryant Conant calls the Graduate School of Public Administration a "complete failure . . . in interfaculty cooperation." Then he says: "The great success of the Business School during the war years in training supply officers for the armed services and analyzing many logistic problems might be said to justify those who see this faculty of the University as the one academic group which knows how to teach 'administration.' . . . I suggest the key to the success has been the insistent and persistent use of the highly expensive case method of instruction." ⁹

Of course, I do not mean that the case method should be the exclusive method for teaching public administration. I do mean that the merits of the case method may be insufficiently appreciated by most teachers of public administration. True, the case method is time-consuming, and much subject matter can be covered far more rapidly by straight exposition. But what have we accomplished when we have "covered" subject matter? What is our objective? Which student comes closer to the desired educational values—the one who thinks through a series of problems about liability of government officers for their torts, or the one who memorizes a batch of abstract and erroneous generalizations like Dicey's rule of law? ¹⁰

⁸ Pp. xcii, lxxviii. For other rejections of Dicey's rule of law, see W. A. Robson, *Justice and Administrative Law*, 3d ed. (London, 1951), pp. 437-44; Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*, 2d ed. (London, 1939), pp. 285-97.

⁹ Pp. 19-20.

¹⁰ A reviewer of the Stein book exalts "the rich, though more traditional, literature of public administration" and declares: "The cases so far collected do not lead toward the kind of generalizations about the administrative process that would contribute significantly toward expanding the part of public administration that might be thought of as science rather than art. Cases are necessarily particularistic." James W. Fesler, book review, *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, p. 1238 (1952). I wonder whether the literature of public administration can be either "rich" or "science" unless it is solidly based upon "particularistic" studies.

III. PERSPECTIVE VERSUS DETAIL

An outstanding virtue of the Stein case studies is that the authors do not stand off at a distance and discuss the forests as patches of green on the hill-sides. The case studies concentrate upon the trees, the trunks, the branches, the bark, the roots. The trees are even laid bare, and the texture of the wood is seen and felt.

A dominant characteristic of the conventional literature of public administration is such preoccupation with the patches of green that too little effort is made to dig into the wood. Of course I do not ignore the occasional factual studies. Nor do I deny the utility of perspective or of theory, or of hypothesis based upon perspective. But perspective and theory should not be used as a substitute for detailed facts which a little investigation will make available.

For illustration, let us examine one of the seminal works—the influential report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. I propose to demonstrate that this committee relied primarily upon theory and perspective even though an investigation of the detailed facts would have led to sharply different conclusions. And—what is more significant—the report did not inspire other political scientists to rush in with the needed facts.

A fair sample of the Committee's method is found in that part of the report dealing with the independent regulatory commissions. The Committee does not start with the details of experience and then cautiously extract factual conclusions as a basis for discovery of theory or principle. Instead, it begins with theory. After an introductory paragraph, the Committee immediately announces that the independent regulatory commissions "do violence to the basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be three major branches of the Government and only three."¹¹ Where does the theory come from? The Committee does not tell us. The source is not the Constitution, for although the Constitution sets up three branches, it says nothing about "only three." The source is not the men who have in fact molded our governmental system, for we do have the independent agencies. The source is not the Supreme Court, for the Supreme Court probably would not even listen to an argument that establishment of independent agencies is unconstitutional. Above all, the source is not an investigation of experience.

The Committee's only facts in support of its theory are generalizations—indeed, grossly exaggerated generalizations: "The Congress has found no effective way of supervising [the independent agencies], they cannot be controlled by the President, and they are answerable to the courts only in respect to the legality of their activities."¹² But where are the facts? How much supervision have congressional committees in fact provided? What are the detailed relations between, say, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission? What is the meaning of the

¹¹ Report of the President's Committee, p. 40 (1937).

¹² *Ibid.*

large number of amendments of the Interstate Commerce Act during the past sixty-five years? What do appropriations committees and subcommittees do by way of supervising? What does experience show as to how much congressional supervision is desirable, and on what subjects? Has congressional supervision been excessive in some instances? On problems calling for exercise of professional skills, does experience show the need of some degree of independence? The President's Committee ignores such questions as these. It sees only patches of green on the hillsides. If it had cut into some wood, its conclusions might well have been radically different.¹³

The Committee's broad generalizations were not based upon staff studies containing the supporting factual materials, even though the Committee was assisted by a staff of twenty-seven. The staff study of the independent regulatory commissions was directed by Professor Robert E. Cushman. The Cushman report begins with abstract generalizations, not with facts; on the first page appears the unsupported generalization that "the multiplication of these independent bodies tends inevitably toward a decentralized and chaotic administrative system."¹⁴ This is the foliage seen at a distance; where is the wood? What, if any, are the facts about chaos? On what specific occasions, if any, has the system proved itself to be chaotic, and in connection with what programs?¹⁵ The Cushman report does not answer such questions as these.¹⁶ The method is to glance at the perspective and to announce that the system of the independent agencies is "... inevitably ... chaotic. ..."

¹³ Commissioner Eastman of the ICC knew the particulars about these questions. See his testimony, *Hearings before the Select Committee on Government Organization, on S. 2700*, 75th Cong., 1st sess., p. 180 (1937). Commissioner Eastman's testimony sharply contrasts with the factual conclusions of the President's Committee.

¹⁴ Report, p. 207.

¹⁵ The closest approach in the Cushman report to factual detail is an account in a few sentences of a statement by President Hoover in 1930 which, according to Cushman, "was intended to influence them [the ICC] on a matter of policy so important that it was bound to obtrude itself upon the President's broad economic program" (p. 221). But this is still only foliage. For what was President Hoover's "broad economic program"? If it existed, did it differ from ICC policies? Did the ICC do something that impaired the President's program? Were effective means available for producing whatever coordination was needed? Wherein, if at all, would the result have been different if the ICC functions had been performed by an executive department headed by a cabinet officer?

Cushman also quoted President Hoover's statement in 1929 about the Supreme Court's decision in the *O'Fallon* case: "I am confident that there will be no increase in railway rates as a result of the *O'Fallon* case." But Cushman expressed no opinion as to whether the President should be able to control the ICC on a problem of rate levels. That question may be appropriate for a long and penetrating study by political scientists; it can hardly be disposed of satisfactorily in an offhand paragraph.

¹⁶ At p. 221 of the Cushman report appears a heading, "Interference with Presidential Management in the Field of Administration." But the ensuing discussion is mostly generalities. One of the most specific statements is: "Several agencies besides the Federal Trade Commission have authority over unfair trade practices, but there is no central authority that can whip conflicting policies into line." The statement is true. But the assumption that central management is necessarily indicated may be unsound. This is precisely the point at which a study of experience would be profitable. What have been

The Committee's major recommendation concerning the independent regulatory agencies rested upon a serious misunderstanding that would not have occurred if the Committee had patiently studied the detailed facts. The recommendation was to break down each commission into two sections, a Judicial Section that would remain independent, and an Administrative Section that would be fully responsible to the Cabinet Officer and the President. "The Administrative Section must not do judicial work . . . The Judicial Section must not do policy-determining work."¹⁷ The President's Committee asserted that "This proposed plan meets squarely the problems presented by the independent commissions."¹⁸

If instead of dealing only in perspectives the Committee had dug into a few specific cases of administrative adjudication it would quickly have seen the impossibility of its proposal. The essence of administrative adjudication is the formulation of policy through case-to-case development. What happens under the Committee's proposal when the adjudication of a particular case requires the determination of a question of policy? The answer is that either the Judicial Section must decide the question of policy, thereby defeating the plan's central objective of bringing all policy determination under the control of the President and the Secretary, or the Administrative Section must perform the judicial function of deciding the case, thereby defeating the plan's important objective of keeping judicial work free from executive control.¹⁹

The President's Committee misunderstood the most elementary facts about adjudication. The idea that the Judicial Section should decide cases but "must not do policy-determining work" misconceives the nature of the function of deciding cases. Judicial officers cannot decide cases without determining policy, for the issues in the cases to be decided are often policy issues.²⁰

the consequences of lack of central authority in this one field? When one agency has been lethargic, has another protected the public interest? What harm, if any, has resulted from conflicting policies? A theory about need for central management will hardly answer questions of this type.

¹⁷ Report, p. 230.

¹⁸ Report, p. 41.

¹⁹ If any reader doubts this, let him examine specific cases of administrative adjudication. An easy example is the problem that came to the Supreme Court in *FCC v. WOKO*, 329 U. S. 223 (1946). In a proceeding on an application for renewal of a broadcasting license, the evidence showed that the applicant in a former application misrepresented the identity of its shareholders. The only relevant statute required applicants to set forth facts "as to citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications." The Commission has to make its own policy when particular misrepresentations are brought to light, necessarily relying upon full development of all facts and circumstances. Because the facts were undisputed, the only question for the Commission was one of policy.

No set of rules could conceivably answer all the questions of policy that may arise in adjudications. And some important agencies, notably the FTC and NLRB, have no substantive rule-making power concerning their main functions. Whether or not the mind of man may some day invent a way to escape from the need for deciding policy issues in particular cases, we may be sure that no such invention has yet appeared.

²⁰ Escape from the dilemma cannot be effected by having the Judicial Section refer

The Committee's misconception resulted from the basic attitude that the Committee could deal with the large problems of organization and leave the details to others to be worked out later.²¹ Yet the large problems could be understood only by mastering the details. To me the most amazing feature of the Committee's performance was its specific assertion that it had no concern for detail. Its representative, Luther Gulick, a member of the Committee, said before the Senate Committee: "We do not specify, nor have we determined, nor have we made the kind of study which would make it possible to say exactly how the division of functions should be made, or could be made, in any given office."²²

The proposal to set up a system of adjudication from which policy determination would be excluded was so clearly impossible of attainment that it was sure to fail as soon as the rudimentary facts about adjudication were brought out. The plan in fact did crumble under the scrutiny of the congressional committees. Indeed, Dr. Gulick could not answer even the simplest questions about specific application of the broad proposal:

Senator Byrd: You understand what I am trying to arrive at. Just answer in your own way.

Mr. Gulick: Then, Senator, stating it in my own way, you want me to name the commissions which should be torn apart and where their parts should be put?

Senator Byrd: No; only in the broad scope of dividing the administrative functions from the judicial.

Mr. Gulick: The broad scope cannot be answered, except in terms of the specific organizations, because some commissions should be treated in one way and some in another.

Senator Byrd: What would you recommend that should be done with the Interstate Commerce Commission?

Mr. Gulick: I do not know.

Senator Byrd: I have nothing further.²³

Later Commissioner Eastman of the ICC gave the congressional committee an analysis of the proposed bill based upon the report of the President's

questions of policy to the Administrative Section, for then the decision will be made by the Administrative Section, which will then be doing the judicial work of deciding the particular case.

Even when the specific policy issues can be anticipated, some of them can be better handled through adjudication rather than through rule making. The choice between rule making and adjudication is often very difficult and cannot be resolved in wholesale fashion; particular solutions must depend upon circumstances. For a difficult problem concerning choice between policy making through rules or through adjudication, see the majority and dissenting opinions in *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

²¹ The staff of the President's Committee was seriously mistaken about elementary features of FTC procedure. Compare the discussion of the "eleven steps" at p. 231 of the Report with the FTC Monograph prepared for the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. The staff's worst error was the idea that the Commission holds hearings before issuing complaints. This error substantially affected the major recommendation.

²² *Hearings before the Select Committee on Government Organization, on S. 2700, 75th Cong., 1st sess., p. 99 (1937).*

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

Committee. He concluded with a statement that "those who advocate a change ought to present a specific statement of the ills which they want to cure and how they propose to cure them, after a careful analysis of the Commission's work, and in consultation with those directly concerned with it. Nothing of that kind has been done, to our knowledge. All that we have is the vaguest and most indefinite of generalities."²⁴

After that, the proposal to have one group determine policy and another group decide cases was not again given serious consideration. The proposal died because the vision behind it went only to the green patches on the hillside.

After Congress rejected the proposed plan, what was the impact of the report of the President's Committee on political scientists? Did they recognize the inadequacy of the factual inquiry and take steps to correct it? To an amazing extent, other political scientists have accepted the factual conclusions and the theories of the President's Committee without questioning them. Professor Lindsay Rogers wrote a warm endorsement of the Committee's analysis of the problem of the independent regulatory agencies.²⁵ The Brookings Institution criticized adversely the Committee's plan of separating administrative and judicial action, but it did not supply the needed factual investigation.²⁶ Some

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

²⁵ Lindsay Rogers, "The Independent Regulatory Commissions," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 52, pp. 1-17 (March, 1937).

²⁶ *Report to the Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government*, Sen. Committee Print No. 10, 75th Cong., 1st sess., p. 92 (1937): Regulatory cases involve "an inseparable mixture of policy-determination, fact-finding, and decision" and "often cannot be broken up into component elements of administration and adjudication." Schuyler Wallace, in *Federal Departmentalization* (New York, 1941), p. 167, rejected the recommendation of the President's Committee on the basis of an overstatement: "The truth of the matter is that a differentiation between the administrative, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial aspects of the work of these commissions is almost impossible except in the realm of theory." Although the differentiation is difficult or impossible near the borderlines, it is also often easy; for instance, all would agree that an unfair-practice case in the FTC or NLRB is judicial or quasi-judicial. A disagreement with the President's Committee on theoretical grounds also was presented by Blachly and Oatman, *Federal Regulatory Action and Control* (Washington, 1940).

Thirteen years after the report of the President's Committee, a political scientist at last analyzed the Committee's proposal in the light of the detailed facts of a regulatory commission. See Charles Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York, 1950), pp. 498-519. He says (p. 513): "The President's Committee stated that the division of work which it proposed between judicial and nonjudicial aspects 'would be relatively simple.' . . . I find it much easier to believe that the members of the Committee and the persons on whom they relied for advice did not know what the problems were." Hyneman's treatment has been called "as lethal a critique of the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management regarding regulatory commissions as has come to this reader's attention." Merle Fainsod, "The Presidency and Congress," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 11, pp. 119-24 (Spring, 1951). See also Emmette S. Redford, *Administration of National Economic Control* (New York, 1952), p. 315: "More significant than application of law to facts is expansion of policy through case-to-case administration. It is submitted that the argument for independent placement breaks down where policy cannot be made specific in advance of the exercise of the judicial function."

of the texts merely parroted the Committee report. Pfiffner, for instance, asserts dogmatically that "The tendency toward infinite expansion of administrative units, each separate and independent from the others, raised obstacles to the proper fulfillment of presidential responsibility."²⁷ But Pfiffner does not examine specific obstacles to see whether they are real or imaginary or whether they can be easily hurdled. Other texts boosted the unsupported theory further up into the sky. An example of a textwriter who begins with the Committee's factual assumptions and adds to them his own factual assumptions is Graves, who instructs the users of his text that "Each of these agencies proceeds in its own way without any effective supervision on the part of the chief executive or any attempt to coordinate the administrative aspects of its activities with the policies and procedures of the administration as a whole."²⁸ Surely the many officers of the government who have been dealing with problems of coordination would be startled to learn of the absence of "any attempt to coordinate."

Happily, a technique of factual inquiry was finally brought to bear upon the supposition of the President's Committee that the system of independent regulatory agencies is "inevitably . . . chaotic. . . ." This was done by a task force for the Hoover Commission.²⁹ The task force was not content with either theory or broad perspectives; members of its staff wrote detailed monographs about each of the independent regulatory agencies. For instance, the monograph on the Federal Trade Commission is about 150 pages of single-spaced mimeographing, concisely written. Full and perceptive treatment is given to relations of the Commission with the President, with Congress, with the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice, with the Food and Drug Administration, and with other agencies. An account is given of specific problems of coordination and of the methods of handling each one.

Having the various studies by the authors of the monographs, the task force was able to base its report upon the detailed facts. Referring to the idea that independence of regulatory agencies impairs coordination with the President's policies, the task force said: "Frequently, this criticism appears to be based mainly on theoretical or doctrinal grounds and not on actual failures of coordination among agencies."³⁰ The main conclusions of the task force are inconsistent with the theories that guided the President's Committee:

As would be expected, it was found that a large part of the work of most of the commissions is not closely related to that of the rest of the Government and requires no active coordination to avoid conflicts. . . .

The point to be emphasized here is that the study of the separate agencies forces the

²⁷ Pfiffner, *Public Administration*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1946), p. 463.

²⁸ Graves, *Public Administration in a Democratic Society* (Boston, 1950), p. 670. See also Leonard White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (cited in n. 4), p. 109.

²⁹ The task force was made up of a law professor and an industrialist. The Hoover Commission is said to have "largely passed over . . . university faculties of political science, and bureaus of public administration when it selected its staff." James C. Charlesworth, *Governmental Administration* (New York, 1951), p. 230.

³⁰ Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions, pp. 25-26 (1949).

conclusion that lack of coordination is not an insuperable obstacle with respect to the independent commissions. As has already been stated, some problems do exist and should be dealt with. But on the whole, coordination is needed in more limited areas than might be supposed a priori, and has been achieved in most of the major fields through inter-departmental committees or more informal techniques. . . .

On this question, the actual experience is far more convincing than theory.²¹

The last sentence is worth repeating, because it embodies a major point I am trying to make: "On this question, the actual experience is far more convincing than theory."

My thesis here is a constructive one. It is not that the President's Committee was wrong, but that the present generation of political scientists, with all too rare exceptions, seems content to accept conclusions founded upon theory even with respect to a subject that readily lends itself to rather easy factual investigation. I believe that the literature of public administration relies unduly upon abstraction and perspective, and not enough upon close investigation. Not only do the method of the Stein case studies²² and the method of the law school case book deserve greater emphasis in instruction, but research and the general literature need to deal more intensively and more concretely with particular and narrow problems. Professor Bailey's little book, *Congress Makes a Law*, is an example of a technique of writing and thinking that political scientists are too much neglecting.

The next hundred books on public administration will advance understanding only comparatively little if they begin and end with perspective, theory, and abstraction. But what tremendous progress a hundred books can make in the field of public administration if enough of them contribute to a solid foundation of detailed experience and if the super-structure of the literature rests firmly on that foundation!

IV. MISINFORMATION ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

To write a reliable summary of the major principles of a complex body of law is a task of considerable difficulty. Such a summary probably can be written only by one who has first developed his own basic understanding of the subject matter. The texts on public administration that include substantial discussions of administrative law show rather clearly that the textwriters have developed no such basic understanding. The resulting summaries are in a fundamental sense seriously misleading. The proportion of misinformation is exceedingly high. Even the most elementary ideas are often flagrantly in error.

Because these rather sweeping conclusions of mine should carry little weight without a supporting demonstration, I must set forth samples of misinformation. To minimize possible embarrassment I shall use numbers instead of names of authors and titles of books.

²¹ *Ibid.*, at pp. 26-28.

²² The case of "The Sale of the Tankers," at pp. 445-532 of the Stein collection, involves a problem of coordinating policy among the State Department, the Navy Department, and the Maritime Commission. The recalcitrant was not the independent agency but the Navy Department, which for a time resisted a decision by the President's Cabinet.

Book 1. The first edition of this book was published in 1935 and the revised edition in 1946. My comments are limited to pages 477-82 of the revised edition.³³ The first sentence on page 477 says: "In the United States there is no legal limit upon the right of courts to review the decisions of administrative tribunals." The law in fact imposes many limits. Statutes sometimes withdraw jurisdiction of courts to review.³⁴ Statutes often provide that administrative determinations shall be final.³⁵ Statutes usually forbid judicial substitution of judgment on questions of fact and on many questions of discretion.³⁶ Courts have placed many limitations upon their own power to review.³⁷ And the Constitution has been interpreted as forbidding so-called constitutional courts from providing a de novo review of administrative action that is deemed nonjudicial.³⁸

On the same page we are told: "Legislatures cannot insulate administration against judicial review by introducing into the statute clauses designed to thwart review." Not only can legislatures do this but they do it, and the courts usually give effect to what they do. The first few words in section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act are: "Except so far as statutes preclude review. . . ."³⁹

On the next page the author asserts: "As a general rule, courts attempt to distinguish between questions of law and fact by reviewing the former and not the latter." Under the dominant doctrine the courts review findings of fact to the extent of determining whether they are supported by substantial evidence, and this means that many orders are set aside that would stand if the courts did not review the facts.⁴⁰

³³ During the summer of 1953 a third edition of this book has been published. Some of the new errors in the new edition are even more astonishing than those in the second edition. For instance, page 487: "The present requirement is that 'substantial evidence' must be found throughout the entire record to support administrative action. . . . Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, the general practice of the courts had been to sustain agency findings if adequate evidence could be found *anywhere* in the record." The phrase "throughout the record" appears five times on this one page, and numerous times on other pages. Not only does the Act contain no such phrase, but the slightest reflection will show why a reviewing court could not require substantial evidence "throughout the record." If in a thousand-page record, 990 pages are devoted to unconvincing circumstantial evidence on one side, and ten pages to convincing direct evidence on the other side, should a reviewing court hold that the agency may not believe the direct evidence?

³⁴ E.g., 54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. §11a-2 (1946); 48 Stat. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. §705 (1946).

³⁵ In *First Moon v. White Tail*, 270 U.S. 243 (1926), the Court held that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review where the statute provided that the determination of the Secretary of the Interior should be "final and conclusive" of an Indian allotment. For other examples, see Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law*, §238 (St. Paul, 1951).

³⁶ An early such provision, copied in many later federal statutes, is in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1946).

³⁷ An outstanding early example is *ICC v. Union Pac. R. Co.*, 222 U.S. 541 (1912).

³⁸ E.g., *Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co.*, 281 U.S. 464 (1930).

³⁹ 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1011 (1946).

⁴⁰ E.g., *Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB*, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

At page 480 Book 1 says that "the courts normally will refuse to interfere with immigration orders for deportation." This is plainly false. In many hundreds of cases the courts have interfered; the review of deportation orders makes up a large portion of all review of federal administrative action.⁴¹

Book 1 asserts at page 481: "It is not easy to get the courts to reverse Post Office Department fraud orders, because the attitude is taken that the government is performing a business service to individuals on favorable terms." The courts have no such attitude. Fraud orders are as freely reviewed as any other orders, and the scope of review is the usual one. The decision establishing reviewability came in 1902.⁴²

Again: "The courts also find themselves averse to reviewing cases involving a necessary function of government, such as the collection of revenue." Tax cases in fact make up a large portion of all the business of federal courts; 485 cases came directly to courts of appeals from federal agencies during 1950, and of these cases 239 were tax cases.⁴³

Book 2. This text, published in 1951, contains ten statements on pages 136-46 that seem to me misleading or false.⁴⁴ For instance: "If a question has been considered and decided by a court, and a superior court declines to reopen it, the matter is called *res judicata*." Since the basic purpose of the principle of *res judicata* is to prevent the same parties from litigating the same claims or issues a second time, the law is that if a matter is *res judicata*, it cannot again be considered by the same court, by a court of equal rank, by an inferior court, or by a superior court. Book 2 goes on to say that "the generalization is that an administrative determination will stand, as *res judicata* unless . . . there has been honest error, or . . . additional material information has come to light." The author does not even understand that the primary purpose of the doctrine

⁴¹ In *Bridges v. Wixon*, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), the Court's review may even have gone beyond what is generally considered proper under the substantial-evidence rule.

⁴² *American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty*, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). For a recent review of a fraud order, see *Reilly v. Pinkus*, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).

⁴³ Annual Report, Director of Administrative Office of the United States Courts, p. 103 (1950).

⁴⁴ Other statements in addition to those discussed above also seem to me erroneous. Book 1 says at page 136 that when the elements of a decision can be separated so as to identify clear-cut law, "the court will rule on the law involved"; for one of the many cases of a court's refusal to rule on the law involved, see *Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board*, 320 U.S. 397 (1943). On page 138 the author relies on *Ohio V. W. Co. v. Ben Avon Borough*, 253 U.S. 387 (1920), with no indication that it may no longer be law, having been superseded by such cases as *FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), and *Railroad Comm. v. Rowan & Nichols Co.*, 310 U.S. 573 (1940). Page 142, statement that *res judicata* "operates against retroactive administrative action," whereas agencies often act retroactively; the Supreme Court ordered an agency to make law and apply it retroactively in *Addison v. Holly Hill*, 322 U.S. 607 (1944). Page 142, citing *Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.*, 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932) in support of *res judicata* when the court specifically said that the Commission was "not bound by the rule of *res judicata*." Page 142, statement that the Labor Board may not reopen a case; this statement is mostly false because *International Union v. Eagle-Picher Co.*, 325 U.S. 335 (1945) rests on a special statutory provision.

of res judicata is to prevent the correction of "honest error" and to prevent the reopening of cases when additional material information comes to light.⁴⁵

Book 2 says at page 144: "Utility rate proceedings are usually classed by courts as legislative but they are really judicial because confiscation of private property is the basic issue." The fact is that only a small minority of utility rate cases involve an issue of confiscation; perhaps confiscation is an issue in less than one per cent of ICC rate cases. I see no educational value—indeed, I see harm to educational objectives—in telling a student that what the courts call legislative is "really judicial," without stating the purposes and the effects of such labeling, and without stating reasons pro and con.

At page 146 Book 2 says without qualification: "The decision in quasi-judicial cases should be made by the same person or persons who have conducted the hearing." If this were true, the examiner system, the mainstay of administrative adjudication, would be destroyed. Even in the first *Morgan* case,⁴⁶ which Book 2 cites, the Court approved hearings before examiners and decisions by other officers.

Book 3. My comments on this text, published in 1950, are limited to Chapter 30.⁴⁷ Book 3 says at page 604: "The use of the rule-making authority may be authorized, unauthorized, or extraordinary or emergency. . . . Where not authorized, it is forbidden." The student may have difficulty with the idea that "The use of . . . authority . . . may be . . . unauthorized." Rule-making authority often exists when it is not explicitly granted. Lawyers and courts consider that power is either granted or withheld, that it may be granted either explicitly or implicitly, but that unless it is granted it is withheld and therefore forbidden.

Book 3 says at page 605: "It should not be necessary to wait until someone claims that his rights have been impaired before one can ascertain whether a rule is legal or what the rule means. As Professor (X) has said, 'It is the sheerest of nonsense that a regulation cannot be read or a statute understood without an official act of injury predicated upon them'." The fact is that the Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that is here branded as nonsense.⁴⁸ Of course I do not object to condemnation of Supreme Court decisions. But I think it egregiously unsound in a student text to take a vehement position that is opposed to established law, without stating what the law is, and without mention of reasons pro or con.

⁴⁵ For a full discussion of res judicata, see Davis, *Administrative Law*, pp. 563–613.

⁴⁶ *Morgan v. United States*, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).

⁴⁷ In addition to errors mentioned above, the following are especially important: the statement that rules are of "general application," ignoring section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act that rules may be "of particular applicability"; the statement making "rules" broader than "regulations," since regulations are only one of three classes under the rules heading, contradicting the statement made elsewhere that rules and regulations "are commonly used interchangeably"; the statement that laxity in publication of rules "no longer holds in most jurisdictions," contradicting other statements indicating that only nine states required publication of rules in 1948; as of 1953 it is not yet true that "most jurisdictions" publish rules.

⁴⁸ See the discussion of cases in Davis, *Administrative Law*, pp. 676–717.

At page 611 Book 3 sets forth what is labeled "Section 4 . . . as finally approved by the Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act." What is set forth is not Section 4 but an inaccurate paraphrase. Subsection (a) provides that the subsection "shall not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." For these words Book 3 substitutes: ". . . the subsection does not apply to rules other than those of substance." The whole category of interpretative rules, including for instance most Treasury regulations under the income tax law, is written out of the exception by the paraphrase.⁴⁹

At page 617 Book 3 says that "rules have the effect of law." The law is that interpretative rules often lack the force of law.⁵⁰

Book 4. This text has gone through three editions, the third published in 1948.⁵¹ At page 552 Book 4 classifies federal administrative tribunals into four categories, the first of which is "The independent administrative courts: the United States Customs Court, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Tax Court of the United States, and the Court of Claims. With some exceptions, the members of these bodies are called judges." All members of all four tribunals are called judges, with no exceptions.⁵² The Tax Court is probably an administrative tribunal, as the text says, but each of the other three is, as the Supreme Court has said of the Court of Claims, "a court, in fact as well as in name."⁵³

At page 557 Book 4 lists eleven provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, three of which seem to me unsupported by the Act: (1) "Hearing officers were required to make the initial decision." This ignores the Act's provision for recommended decisions, which are used in many cases governed by the Act. (2) "Hearing officers were forbidden to consult on any issue except upon notice and opportunity for the parties to participate." The Act does not forbid consultation "on any issue" but "on any fact in issue," and it is quite important

⁴⁹ Interpretative rules are explained, *ibid.*, pp. 194-226.

⁵⁰ E.g., *10 East Fortieth St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus*, 325 U.S. 578 (1945).

⁵¹ In addition to errors discussed above, the following seem especially important: differentiation of "rule" from "regulation" thereby departing from courts' usage, confusing students who may misunderstand the vocabulary of lawyers and courts, and departing from section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act; classification of agencies into four categories, the last three of which seriously overlap—the Packers and Stockyards Administration, for instance, falls into all of the last three categories; most regulatory agencies are licensing authorities and many are within government departments; statement that apart from constitutional bodies, agencies cannot punish for contempt, whereas statutes in eleven states confer such power, and have been upheld in at least five. (See Davis, *Administrative Law*, p. 123.)

⁵² A quick glance at the reports of decisions of these courts will show this.

⁵³ *Williams v. United States*, 289 U.S. 553, 565 (1933). The Court held in *Ex parte Bakelite Corp.*, 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929) that the Court of Customs Appeals is a court. The Judicial Code provides that the term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, district courts, the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court "and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior." 28 U.S.C. §451 (1949). The Tax Court judges hold office for twelve years. The statute provides that the Tax Court is "in the Executive Branch of the Government." 26 U.S.C. §1100 (1946).

that a hearing officer who is not a lawyer may get legal advice and that a hearing officer who is not an engineer may get engineering advice. (3) Book 4 says that one complaint against administrative practices that led to enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act was "that the decision was based in part on evidence secured subsequent to the hearing." On this point the author says of the Act: "The transcript of testimony and exhibits and all papers filed in the proceeding were made the exclusive record for decision." The author fails to note that because the Act expressly permits official notice—the use of extra-record information—the Act has probably brought about no substantial change concerning the complaint about use of evidence secured subsequent to the hearing.

On the subject of certiorari, Book 4 says: "The writ is not widely used in the Federal government as a means of direct review by the Supreme Court of decisions of administrative agencies, although it is available in a growing number of cases." The writ has never been used as a means of direct review by the Supreme Court of an agency decision; the case must first go to a lower court. Since 1913 the writ is not used to review administrative action in the federal courts; it is not used in a growing number of federal cases.⁵⁴

At page 582, in listing Administrative Procedure Act reasons for setting aside administrative action, Book 4 fails to note that the Act's important "except" clause qualifies every item on the list: "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. . . ." Because of omission of the "except" clause, the truth is quite different from what appears in the list.

General comments about misinformation. The conclusion seems abundantly supported that political science students have been learning a great deal that is not so about administrative law. How much does it matter?

In some respects, it matters very little. For even if all the misinformation were replaced by information, the students would still have something of only slight educational value. Memorizing and forgetting inaccurate summaries of legal complexities is as good mental exercise as memorizing and forgetting accurate summaries.

In other respects, the extent of the misinformation is important. If the text-writers cannot properly handle this material, what are the teachers likely to do? For instance, when a text says that a rate-fixing case is "really judicial," although the courts call it legislative, can a typical instructor be expected to deal adequately with a student's question about the conclusion stated in the text? Unless the instructor has greater understanding than that of the text-writer, either the educational process will be demoralized for the alert student or the instructor will be reduced to a monitor supervising memory work concerning words and ideas that are only partially understandable to those who are doing the memorizing.

⁵⁴ See Davis, *Administrative Law*, pp. 778-79.

My purpose is still constructive. The extent of the misinformation in the texts supports my belief that the texts should deal more intensively with smaller areas, that the central inquiry should be why and not what, and that the emphasis should be upon principles about governmental processes and not upon legal technicalities.

V. SUBJECT MATTER

Mr. Justice Jackson has recently declared in a formal opinion: "The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart."⁵⁵ Legal education has successfully kept pace with the revolutionary development of government intervention in economic life. Twenty years ago, the only instruction in administrative law was limited to a few seminars in a handful of leading law schools. Today not only do nearly all law schools provide instruction in administrative law but the course is required at most of the leading schools.

Political science instruction may be lagging to the extent that the regulatory process is a central feature of governmental activities but not of instruction. The texts on public administration are typically devoted four-fifths to such problems as agency organization, personnel management, fiscal planning, and other internal management, and one-fifth or less to the methods by which the agencies carry out the tasks for which they have been created. The focus of the texts on government and business is primarily upon substantive programs rather than upon the governmental processes of regulation. Such courses as are offered on administrative law are usually sparsely populated, mostly with graduate students. I think that much more attention should be given to the regulatory process.

Perhaps one of the reasons for inadequate recognition of the regulatory process in political science instruction is the lack of success of the efforts to provide such instruction. If so, perhaps a major reason for the lack of success is the tendency of political scientists to treat the wrong kind of administrative law for students of political science. In this general area, law and political science overlap, and the area of overlap is probably appropriate for instruction in both law and political science. But some subject matter may be the exclusive province of the political scientist and other subject matter the exclusive province of the lawyer. I think the texts have failed to discriminate adequately between the principles of government that should be the concern of the political scientist and the kind of legal technicalities that are unlikely to be understood by students who lack a substantial background of study of law. Even though I cannot draw a clear line between technical law and political science, and even though any attempt to locate such a line is likely to lead to substantial difference of opinion, I am still of the opinion that some problems should be con-

⁵⁵ *FTC v. Ruberoid Co.*, 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).

sidered beyond the proper scope of political science instruction: e.g., at what stage of administrative action judicial review should be sought,⁸⁶ whether the right remedy is certiorari or mandamus or injunction, and whether or not res judicata may prevent a second consideration of the same issues.

For an illustration in support of my view, let us turn to a textbook-casebook, second edition 1950, which I shall call Book 5. At the beginning of a new chapter, page 719, is a statement of "five principal propositions," the first two of which are: "1. The doctrine of 'prior resort,' 'primary jurisdiction,' or 'exclusive administrative jurisdiction': 'the necessity of resort to the administrative tribunal prior to going to the courts for relief in the event of controversies falling within the general area of the tribunal's statutory powers.' . . . 2. The 'exhaustion doctrine' proper: 'the necessity of exhausting all the available administrative remedies before turning to the courts for relief'." The student may well stop there and wonder what he has read. Are the various concepts listed in the first proposition different names for the same idea, or are the ideas different? Is the "exhaustion doctrine" something different from all the concepts listed in the first proposition? Instead of answering these questions, Book 5 confuses them further.

At page 724 Book 5 quotes a commentator with apparent approval: "The exclusive jurisdiction idea . . . has none of the flexibility of the primary jurisdiction . . . rule." If primary jurisdiction is more flexible than exclusive jurisdiction, then the two concepts must be different. But if they are different, why are they lumped together in the first proposition? If they are different, wherein do they differ except in flexibility? And if they are different, what is the meaning of the heading at page 721, "Exclusive Primary Administrative Jurisdiction"? And why does the author at page 729 use the term, "exclusive primary jurisdiction"? Nowhere in the volume can one find answers to these questions.

The student who is troubled by all this may console himself by reflecting that, anyhow, whether exclusive jurisdiction and primary jurisdiction are two concepts or one, exhaustion is a separate concept, since it is separately stated in the second proposition. But the author immediately obliterates this difference. The first judicial opinion set forth is one in which the Supreme Court explains its holding by saying that judicial review must be denied "until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted," but this opinion is set forth in the text under the heading "Exclusive Primary Administrative Jurisdiction," even though the next three cases are under the heading "The Exhaustion Doctrine Proper." Why the first case is an "exhaustion" case according to the Supreme Court but not according to the headings in Book 5 does not appear. Furthermore, at pages 728-29 Book 5 says that the Supreme

⁸⁶ Some political scientists evidently regard this subject as something that can be easily presented to students, but I think they are misguided. The subject is sufficiently difficult that the Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a consistent body of principles. For a discussion of various aspects of the subject, see Davis, *Administrative Law*, pp. 614-63 on exhaustion and ripeness, pp. 676-717 on standing, and pp. 812-67 on non-reviewable action.

Court "cited exhaustion cases to 'buttress' the validity of the exclusive primary jurisdiction statute, and this . . . 'underscores' the 'essential identity, for all practical purposes,' of the two principles." But if these two are identical for all practical purposes, why are the two original propositions two instead of one? Not only does this question remain unanswered, but by now Book 5 seems hopelessly confused.

What is a student expected to do about this kind of confusion? What should an instructor do?

To escape those questions, let us turn a few pages to page 726: "The cases on this subject [exhaustion] are said to fall primarily within the fields of taxation and public-utility regulation." Who says this is not revealed, but he is wrong, whoever he is, for the courts say and hold otherwise.⁵⁷

The technical opinion in *Levers v. Anderson*⁵⁸ is set forth in full. The case holds that in the special circumstances a motion for a rehearing before the Alcohol Unit of the Treasury Department is not a prerequisite to judicial review. The case was decided in 1945. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 takes care of the whole problem of administrative rehearings in a single sentence. Why study the 1945 case, then? The answer may be found in the quotation of a commentator that under the Act "a judicial review may be sought without applying to the agency for rehearing." This must mean that the law of the *Levers* case continues and that the lawyer need not apply for an administrative rehearing before going to court. But on this statement is hung a note which calls "inescapable" another commentator's conclusion that the Administrative Procedure Act "supersedes *Levers v. Anderson*." The author neither recognizes the inconsistency nor makes an effort toward reconciliation.⁵⁹

Where, then, does that leave us on the question whether the lawyer before applying for judicial review of the Alcohol Unit's order must first apply for an administrative rehearing? And why should a student of political science care?

I believe that political science instruction probably should either omit all instruction on technical legal problems of this kind or should supply the background necessary to an understanding of the problems. My reasons for objecting to the system of instruction now dominant are in part the same reasons

⁵⁷ The exhaustion requirement is one of general application, as even the six cases set forth in Book 5 clearly show. Those six cases involved labor relations, a building permit, immigration, an alcohol license, a tax, and a rate order.

The text presents *Myers v. Bethlehem S. Corp.*, 303 U.S. 41 (1938) as though its doctrine were unqualified. The Supreme Court in slightly different circumstances often holds the opposite, as in *Public Util. Comm. v. United Fuel Gas Co.*, 317 U.S. 456 (1943). No mention is made of such outstanding cases as *Aircraft & Diesel v. Hirsch*, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); *Lichter v. United States*, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).

⁵⁸ 326 U.S. 219 (1945).

⁵⁹ I am the commentator whose conclusion that the Administrative Procedure Act "supersedes *Levers v. Anderson*" is said to be "inescapable." But in the article cited for this, "Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction," *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 187-93 (1949), no such position is taken. The closest approach is a statement (p. 191) that "The Supreme Court's effort to distinguish between a meaningful rehearing and the mere formality of applying for a rehearing has been swept away by the APA."

that a political scientist will give for saying that some advanced courses in political science should not be studied until certain elementary courses have been taken. In addition, the students are unlikely to understand materials that the textwriters and the instructors have not first understood. Altogether too prevalent in the teaching materials are summaries of what appears on the surface—summaries that are prepared by textwriters who themselves do not go below the surface. The educational result of such teaching materials is likely to be positively harmful.

The choice should be, in my opinion, between omitting all instruction on technical legal doctrines and providing a rather intensive instruction on the particular doctrines that are covered. A full inquiry that reaches a deep enough level can of course be rewarding.

In making that choice, an independent reason in favor of omitting the most technical legal doctrines from political science instruction is the need for a more adequate treatment of the problems of government concerning the regulatory process. Some of the most vital political science aspects of the regulatory process are now neglected almost altogether.

For example, the problem of the combination of prosecuting and judging—of internal separation of functions versus the kind of complete separation that would create two agencies out of one agency—is essentially a problem of political science, because it is a problem of organization that governmental administrators have to deal with. Only obliquely is the problem one for lawyers; practitioners seldom deal with it in representing clients, because the courts have traditionally held that no relief is available on account of this combination of functions. The history of the National Labor Relations Board throws a good deal of light on the central problem, especially the experiment in complete separation under the Taft-Hartley Act. But I do not find either in the public administration texts or in other political science literature helpful studies of this problem. In a sixty-page chapter I have written on this problem, the principal reference to the literature of political science is to the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, whose views are dismissed as "naive" because the report failed to reach the central issue.⁶⁰

Why have not political scientists taken the leadership in trying to provide solutions to the problem of combination of functions? Anyone who studies the regulatory process imaginatively will find hosts of problems of this kind whose solution calls for the skills and the background of political scientists. Samples of additional such problems are suggested in the following section.

VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The area most in need of original research is the one that has been most neglected—the political science aspects of the regulatory process. The opportunities in this area are quite unusual, for continuing darkness covers some of the

⁶⁰ Davis, *Administrative Law*, p. 389. The central problem is whether or not an internal separation of functions can be satisfactory. The President's Committee did not discuss such internal separation.

most fundamental problems. Although the lawyers have been working in this area rather intensively, their emphasis is upon the safeguarding of private rights. The need is for studies designed to provide an empirical basis for increasing administrative effectiveness in accomplishing the objectives of regulatory legislation.

To what extent are legislative choices nullified by administrative failures? To what extent do the regulated groups control the regulators? To what extent, if at all, do regulatory agencies effectively represent an otherwise unprotected public interest? How can the regulatory process be made more successful—or less unsuccessful—in carrying out the will of the people's representatives?

Questions like these can be answered only by detailed investigation of experience. Instead of studying further such overworked subjects as judicial review of administrative action, we need to learn more about the regulatory process itself, its internal arrangements and methods, and its external relations—with Congress, with congressional committees, with individual congressmen, with the President, with executive departments, with independent agencies, with lobbyists, with regulated interests, with protected interests.

To show what I have in mind, I shall list some *samples* of specific questions about internal processes and about relations of agencies with regulated and protected groups:

What are the effects upon administrative policies of conducting general investigations of the broad problems that lie behind masses of small adjudications, as compared with the prevalent system of separately treating each problem in each adjudication? Are agencies often deficient in failing to make early use of formal rules to fill the gaps left in policies declared through adjudication? What are the potentialities of a greater interaction between rule making and adjudication, and of a broader and perhaps more democratic participation of affected parties by enlarging the role of policy making through rules and restricting the role of policy making through adjudication?

What are the effects upon administrative policies of granting to or withholding from private parties the right to compel prosecutions? Should private parties have the right to institute prosecutions for unfair trade practices and for unfair labor practices?

What are the effects upon administrative policies of greater autonomy in professional staffs, increased subdelegation, more decentralization, heavier reliance on methods of informal supervision as compared with methods of formal adjudication and formal rule making, comprehensive and periodic clarification of enforcement or prosecution policies as against ad hoc development of enforcement or prosecution policies from case to case, confidential settlement of cases as compared with public reporting of all consent orders and all agreements on which consent orders rest?

What are the unrealized potentialities of administrative advisory opinions? Could the Federal Trade Commission, for example, increase its effectiveness by imitating the Securities and Exchange Commission's method of using advisory opinions, at least for a considerable portion of the Trade Commission's work? What proportion of Trade Commission prosecutions results from lack of

prior clarification of law and policy, and what proportion could be obviated by formal rules or by advisory opinions? Should action be taken to induce the agencies to make more effective use of the declaratory-order power granted by the Administrative Procedure Act?

What in fact are the mechanics of lobbying before particular regulatory agencies, what are the successes and failures of the lobbying forces, what are the losses of the groups that are under-represented in these processes, and what institutional arrangements are indicated for more faithful reflection of legislative choices? In what circumstances are lobbying objectives lost before legislative bodies but won before administrative bodies, and with what consequences? What are the private organizations that engage in administrative lobbying in each field of regulation, what are the countervailing forces, what has been the experience with offsetting devices such as consumers' counsel and small-business representation, and what alternative devices might be more effective?

More specifically, what are the informal contacts between Civil Aeronautics Board members and the representatives of scheduled airlines? Wherein do the relations of nonscheduled airlines with Board members differ, why have the differences developed, and what is their significance? Apart from formal proceedings, what are the practices of airline executives and their counsel for gaining the favor of CAB members? What are the detailed relations between the Association of American Railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission? To what extent are the most significant policies made by the AAR, with ICC ratification? Is the influence of shippers' organizations and of motor carrier organizations less powerful than that of the AAR, and if so, why, and what governmental arrangements are needed to maintain a proper balance? Has the Securities and Exchange Commission lost some of its former aggressiveness, and what have been the specific influences of the regulated interests? Why has the Federal Communications Commission failed to enforce the policies announced in its "bluebook"? What are the methods used by major oil companies, notably the Phillips Petroleum Company, in controlling policies of the Federal Power Commission with respect to certain natural gas rates, how successful are those methods, what are the countervailing forces, and by what means can and should a proper balance be maintained? Can and should the groups whose interests the legislation is designed to protect somehow be made more influential in the pull and haul of policy formulation?

From the standpoint of effective accomplishment of legislative objectives, what does experience show concerning advantages and disadvantages of independence of agencies and of subordination of agencies to cabinet officers? What have been the specific effects of such independence or subordination upon administrative lobbying concerning particular issues? Is an independent agency more vulnerable or less vulnerable than an agency in an executive department to the pressures of the regulated groups? What are the effects of

independence of an agency upon pressures by the protected groups?⁶¹ What are the effects upon these questions of presidential support of, opposition to, or indifference to regulatory policies of the agency? What are the limits of regulatory policies which the regulated groups strongly oppose, when the regulatory policies have varying degrees of support by public opinion, by Congress, and by the President?

To what extent do policies of regulatory agencies reflect the relative political power of competing groups, and to what extent do independent professional

⁶¹ Many political scientists may regard David B. Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951) as an adequate answer to some of these questions. This book seems to me to be of outstanding excellence, but I do not see how important governmental planning could be based upon its conclusions concerning pressures on regulatory agencies. Vagueness and generality rob the basic observations of precision and reliability. Statements that are largely or mostly true are too often partly false. See for instance the following:

"Experience indicates . . . that the regulated groups will have more cohesion than those demanding regulation" (p. 418). The groups regulated by the NLRB from 1935 to 1947 were employers; did not those demanding regulation, the unions, have greater cohesion? Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, do not those demanding regulation, the railroads, have greater cohesion than the regulated? Do not scheduled airlines, which demand regulation of the non-scheduled lines, have greater cohesion?

"The significant difference between an 'independent' agency and one clearly part of the executive branch is that the latter may somewhat more readily reflect the relative standing of the organized and unorganized interests responsible for the passage of a statute" (p. 419). What does this mean? Does it mean that an agency in the executive branch more accurately reflects relative strength of competing groups than an independent agency? Does not a valid observation on this subject have to take into account the President's attitudes toward the regulatory program? What is the evidence, and what are the exceptions? Does the statement rest upon specific experience, or is it largely a guess?

"A commission formally independent of the chief executive and expected to assume the detachment of a judicial body is more likely to be primarily accessible to the organized elements among the regulated than is an agency in the executive branch" (p. 420). Does the statement mean that judicial detachment makes an agency more accessible to the organized elements among the regulated? Does not a court's judicial detachment make it less accessible? On the question whether an independent agency is more accessible to organized elements among the regulated than an agency in the executive branch, does not the answer depend upon agreement or disagreement between presidential policies and the positions of the organized elements among the regulated?

"A regulatory agency normally cannot operate a controversial statute effectively without the support of the chief executive" (p. 420). Is the Interstate Commerce Act a controversial statute? Did the ICC operate effectively without the support of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman? Is the Federal Trade Commission Act controversial; did the two Presidents support the Commission; and did the Commission operate effectively? Should the generalization command confidence in absence of more specific information?

"The political survival of an independent commission depends upon its reaching a modus vivendi with the regulated" (p. 420). Does this mean that the agency must satisfy the principal demands of the regulated? If so, what of the NLRB from 1935 until 1947? What of the SEC for perhaps a half dozen years after 1933?

"Because other interests may have a larger voice in the arrangements made by an executive agency, 'independence' for the regulators has a defensive advantage for the

judgments of administrators and administrative staffs counteract political pressures? To what extent do political influences override such professional judgments, and in what circumstances, if any, should the professional judgments be insulated against such overriding? To what extent do administrators develop excessive independence in resolving issues that ought to be resolved through compromise of political pressures, and what are the practical consequences?

What are the activities of individual congressmen, representing constituents or otherwise, in influencing administrative policies, what are the improprieties, what should be the limits, and what, if any, controls can be provided? What does experience show concerning use and misuse of the power of appropriation to control administrative policies? What are the processes by which regulatory policies are worked out through cooperative arrangements with congressional committees, with other parts of the executive branch, and with affected private interests, and what are the practical consequences?

Most of these questions, as well as other similar questions, are either unanswered in the existing literature of public administration or are answered only in vague or general terms. The pressing need is for extensive and intensive factual studies of administrative policy making—studies that will emphasize concrete, detailed, and practical facts and will postpone generalization, theory, and abstraction until adequate factual foundations have been laid.

regulated" (p. 420). Does this mean that interests other than the regulated interests may have a larger voice in the executive agency than in the independent agency? If so, are the President's views immaterial? What of the NLRB from 1935 to 1947 when the "other interests" were the unions? Do buyers of meat have a larger voice in the policies of the Packers and Stockyards Administration than buyers of natural gas have in the policies of the FPC? If so, is it because of FPC independence? What is the evidence?

"Once a set of relationships between regulated and regulators has been established, the resources of 'independence' will be fully employed to defend the existing regulatory pattern against disturbance or disruption" (p. 421). Was a set of relationships established between the NLRB and regulated employers between 1935 and 1947, and did the employers "defend the existing regulatory pattern"? Did the SEC in its first few years establish such a set of relationships, and did the regulated defend them?

COLLECTIVE SECURITY REEXAMINED

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

Northwestern University

(From one standpoint it is a truism to say that collective security is something new under the sun. In past eras and especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, war was conceived of as a duel in which contestants should be isolated and restrained by the rest of international society. When nations engaged in armed conflict their neighbors sought to localize the struggle and alleviate its poisonous effects. However short-sighted their actions in not meeting the conflict directly and turning back aggression at its source, the nations pursuing these policies were sometimes successful for varying periods of time in preserving islands of peace in a warring world.)

On August 8, 1932, however, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson proclaimed the revolutionary fact that the modern state system was entering a new era in which warring powers were no longer entitled to the same equally impartial and neutral treatment by the rest of society. He announced to the New York Council of Foreign Relations that in future conflicts one or more of the combatants must be designated as wrong-doer and added: "We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead we denounce them as lawbreakers."¹

(This is the cornerstone of the universally recognized theory of collective security to which most Western statesmen profess loyalty today.) It is said that Mr. Stimson's memoirs, *On Active Service*, have become the "bible" of the Department of State, and in Britain we have the word of *The Times* (London) in a recent editorial that collective security "... indeed, is the view to which this country, like most others, is committed by its membership in the United Nations. . . ."²

How are we to account for this new form of international relations? Perhaps there are three keys to the radical transformation of Western thought and the more modest shift in Western practice. Approached in imaginary and figurative terms, (collective security may be said to have found its soul in the revolution in beliefs, its body in the revolution in techniques, and its mind in the revolution in contemporary international institutions taking place in the last three-quarters of a century. The soul of collective security has been formed by the growth of practical morality.) The chief characteristic of social behavior in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has been the increasing attention paid to all forms of humanitarian projects. (In medieval society the thought of eliminating war or poverty was rarely given serious attention. War and poverty were conceived of as abiding moral problems and defects and flaws in a universal moral order.) So long as man continued in his present state and society

¹ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), p. 259.

² Editorial, "Cross Purposes," *The Times* (London), Feb. 5, 1952, p. 5.

could not be fundamentally transformed, war would never be eradicated. This philosophy, as well as the theological concepts undergirding it, was swept away by the Age of the Enlightenment. In its place the West seemed to accept the creed of democratic liberalism with its aim of abolishing all ills and diseases disturbing the body social. Voltaire in his pleadings for condemned men, Bentham in his views on prison reforms, and the various programs for the elimination or outlawry of war reflected the new spirit. (War became a practical problem in social engineering. The belief in one moral universe had been shattered; the belief in one world community demanding a multitude of social and institutional reforms took its place.)

(Another contemporary change of unparalleled importance has been the revolution in techniques and economics.) If one excludes the force of contemporary nationalism, the overwhelmingly most powerful force in producing revolutionary changes in both East and West has been industrialization. (The consequences which follow from the shrinking of a large-scale atlas into a small-scale globe can be attributed largely to industrialism.) Economically, it is obvious that the world is one world wherein ideally the activities and production of each part must be geared and meshed with the functions of all the others. Industrialism for historians like Arnold J. Toynbee displays the force of a massive oecumenical movement drawing the world together. Technological change, which progressed slowly enough for eighteen centuries, has suddenly exploded. Within our present century the change has been so staggering, the rate so accelerated that few fully comprehend and appreciate its scope. For eighteen centuries, ten miles an hour was the maximum speed of travel on sea and sometimes on land. In 1790 four days were required to travel the two hundred miles from Boston to New York. Today the same time permits travellers to circle the globe. The earth today is smaller and is more intricately and profoundly interdependent than the thirteen original states, and in consequence the technological basis for Wendell Willkie's one world is said to exist.

Since the technological basis of a single world is at hand, it is only logical that for many a single government should be indicated. The revolution in techniques and the transformation of beliefs have called for new institutions to enable the development of the mind of the West to keep pace with the growth of its body and soul. It was said that the interdependent and socially self-conscious international society lacked only rational controls and organization. It was shown that we suffer from a profound cultural lag. It was argued that for nations to act in concert solely when their immediate interests in survival are at stake is not enough. The mind, the body and the soul of modern society have called for a universal system of collective security heralded as the final essential step in repudiating great power conflicts and in guaranteeing perpetual peace.

THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

It is important that we ask at the outset, then: What is collective security in theory? What are its precepts and main tenets? What, in simplest terms, is

the philosophy of collective security? (The rock bottom principle upon which collective security is founded provides that an attack on any one state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the simple doctrine of one for all and all for one. War anywhere, in the context of Article 11 of the League of Nations, is the concern of every state.)

(Self-help and neutrality, it should be obvious, are the exact antithesis of such a theory.) States under an order of neutrality are impartial when conflict breaks out, give their blessings to combatants to fight it out, and defer judgment regarding the justice or injustice of the cause involved. Self-help in the past was often "help yourself" so far as the great powers were concerned; they enforced their own rights and more besides. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this system was fashionable and wars, although not eliminated, were localized whenever possible. In a more integrated world environment, a conflict anywhere has some effect on conditions of peace everywhere. A disturbance at one point upsets the equilibrium at all other points, and the adjustment of a single conflict restores the foundations of harmony at other points throughout the world.

(This idea of collective security is simple, challenging and novel.) It would do for the international society what police action does for the domestic community. If the individual is threatened or endangered in municipal society, he turns to the legitimate agents of law enforcement, the police. The comparatively successful operation of this system has meant relative peace and tolerable harmony for most local communities. Through the action of police or "fire brigades" on a world scale, collective security has as its goal two comparable objectives. (It would *prevent* war by providing a deterrent to aggression. It would *defend* the interests of peace-loving states in war if it came, by concentrating a preponderance of power against the aggressor. These two ends have been the goals of both the League and the United Nations.) Through power and persuasion, a collective system would seek to deter aggression, as in the case of the Soviet imperialist threat to Titoist Yugoslavia. A potential aggressor must know that Yugoslavia and other United Nations powers stand together under the same protective umbrella. (If war comes, the security system by pooling resources defends its interests against any nation which threatens to undermine it by swallowing up one of its members.) //

The ideal of collective security nowhere has been taken more seriously than among responsible leaders in the United States. More than the other political leaders accountable for the conduct of their nations' policies during and following World War I, Woodrow Wilson assumed that national interests were rapidly being supplanted by the common enlightened purposes of mankind everywhere and, particularly at the outset of the peace talks, sought to act upon his convictions. But the moral and political foundations required for collective action vanished with the cessation of hostilities and Wilson himself was forced to turn from his principles. He was driven to accept postwar territorial settlements in the Balkans that were at best half-hearted compromises with the crusade he had led. The tragic march of events of the "Twenty Years' Crisis" following 1919, however, revived the flame of belief in the hearts of other Ameri-

can political leaders that better forms for the conduct of international relations must be discovered and instituted. An uneasy conscience over America's departure from collective security after World War I—when the Senate defeated the Covenant of the League of Nations—coupled with a more skillful marshalling of opinion in support of the United Nations, inspired internationalist and isolationist senators to join hands in support of the same principle after World War II.

In his first speech to the Senate, Harry S. Truman of Missouri declared: "The breaking of the peace anywhere is the concern of peace-loving nations everywhere."³ Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg announced following the San Francisco Conference in a dramatic speech to the Senate that he would support the ratification of the Charter with all the resources at his command. For, he explained: "peace must not be cheated of its collective chance. . . . We must have collective security to stop the next war, if possible, before it starts; and we must have collective action to crush it swiftly if it starts in spite of our organized precautions."⁴ Thus, the American President whose course in foreign policy was to be charted boldly and unambiguously according to the abstract principles of collective security, and the reputed architect of the bipartisan foreign policy were from the beginning unequivocally committed by their words to support of the United Nations.⁵

Indeed, American support for the new method of preserving international peace and order has gone far beyond the ritualism of pious affirmation of an inspiring ideal. Approval for the principles of collective security at the time of World War II was asserted even more eloquently in the actions and policies of its leaders. As a young man Franklin D. Roosevelt had argued against the annexation of Hawaii. For, he maintained: "before we bother about foreign coaling-stations and fortifications we should look to the defense of our own coasts." New York, Boston, and San Francisco were still at the mercy of an enemy, and rather than prepare far-reaching security plans, the United States ought to concentrate on its own national defenses. In his concrete policies, however, President Roosevelt rejected this youthful counsel. In the late nineteen thirties, it became obvious that American interests could be protected only if other nations were secure, and the Roosevelt foreign policy became one of collective self-help. "Suppose my neighbor's home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose. . . .," he remarked, in justifying Lend-Lease to the Senate and the American people.⁶ This neighborly analogy was a practical way of convincing the people that their security was intimately bound up with Britain in its struggle for survival.

³ Cyril Clemens, *The Man from Missouri* (Webster Groves, Missouri: International Mark Twain Society, 1945), p. 150.

⁴ *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston, 1952), p. 217.

⁵ In his speech to the Senate asking ratification of the Charter, President Truman declared: "This Charter points down the only road to enduring peace. There is no other." Clemens, *The Man from Missouri*, p. 172.

⁶ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 2 vols. (New York, 1950), Vol. 1, p. 276.

To symbolize the collective effort involved in the conduct of World War II, the Grand Alliance was referred to as the Military United Nations, on which the Constitutional and Political United Nations was to be based. In June of 1950, President Truman enlisted American manpower and resources in a struggle which all responsible authorities agreed involved the survival of the United Nations and not the protection of American vital interests. Thus not only by words but more emphatically by policies and actions, recent American leaders have boldly approved and faithfully supported the ideal of collective security.

THE REAL ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

(This simple picture of the idea of collective security hardly furnishes a useful and realistic perspective on the way such a system operates in practice today.) Nor are we helped by comparing the structure of the two historic experiments in collective security. The formal agencies for collective security after World War I were in several important respects unimpressive. Article 16 of the Covenant provided that any member resorting to war contrary to the Covenant had committed *ipso facto* an act of aggression against all other members. It was intended that first economic measures and then overt force should be applied against any offender. But although the international obligations of members were less ambiguous than in the Charter, there was no clear provision for their implementation or organization by a central enforcement agency. Each nation had full freedom to provide what troops it saw fit. The Council could then advise on additional measures. In contrast, Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations commissions the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and Articles 43-47 obligate the members, upon the completion of agreements, to supply troops to the Military Staff Committee. The agencies for partial collective security, as found in the constitutional provisions of the North Atlantic Pact and the practical steps undertaken under NATO, are even more impressive and formidable today.

From the beginning, however, (the real issue concerning collective security has had little to do with charters or compacts. The real issue has been the question of why the implementation of a system logically so flawless, and enjoying such impressive official devotion and popular support, should have been accompanied by a period of virtually unprecedented collective insecurity.) It is a sobering fact that the nineteenth century was perhaps the most peaceful of modern centuries; the twentieth, by contrast, has been an epoch of unparalleled bloodshed. From 1815 to 1914 a system of old-fashioned balance of power contributed to the achievement of nearly a full century of uninterrupted peace.) The past forty years have witnessed in rapid succession two great wars which the historian Arnold J. Toynbee compares to the double wars of the Romans and the Carthaginians and the two struggles of the Peloponnesian War which wrecked Hellenic Civilization. He has observed that quite possibly we have dealt ourselves the same "knockout blows" that these wars represented for the older civilizations. There were only eighteen months in the nineteenth century

when France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, England and Spain found themselves at war with one another (excluding the Crimean War as a colonial struggle). By contrast, our experience thus far with the novel machinery of collective security has hardly warranted the unqualified postwar optimism of men like Mr. Hull that, with the new international organization, power politics and war were being left far behind in our progress toward utopia.

Instead the recent decades have been years of unceasing war or threats of war. What are the causes of this state of affairs? What are the reasons for the enormous gap between the theory and practice, the promise and performance of collective security? The most popular and reassuring answer has been that the radical doctrines of National Socialism and Communism have undermined the ideal system, and that modern technology has shattered the earlier limitations on conflict. Yet an equally dynamic creed challenged peace and order in the nineteenth century and provided a fighting faith for imperialist France.

The serious observer must look more deeply at the substance of political reality. In so doing he will find that collective security yesterday and today has been viewed unrealistically, and that its executors have been asked to perform tasks which could be performed with complete success only if certain objective conditions were realized. The most vital questions regarding collective security have seldom been asked; the real problems have often been evaded. The fundamental issues and problems which should have been boldly and realistically confronted have been concealed and obscured in constitutional verbiage and formal legalistic arguments. The four basic problems responsible for the tragic predicament of collective security include the problem of its basic preconditions, the political problem, the psychological problem and the problem of peaceful change. The first is from one standpoint most basic, for the preconditions of collective security, being frequently misunderstood, have presented the most stubborn obstacle to the maintenance of international peace.

Preconditions of Collective Security. Manifestly, collective enforcement is unattainable in the absence of appropriate international machinery and binding obligations clearly set forth in recognized legal instruments. Yet every informed citizen knows from experience that a legal arrangement imposed upon political and social conditions incompatible with its fulfillment makes successful political action difficult. Therefore it is essential in considering the reality of collective security that we understand fully its assumptions and requirements.

First, (collective enforcement assumes a status quo, or situation of peace, on which the nations with predominant strength agree. In practical terms, the peace which a collective system must defend is the territorial status quo existing at the time the system is brought into being.) There is nothing in past experience to indicate that all nations, or even a combination sufficiently powerful to defy the rest, will agree on the meaning of a particular status quo. Following every war, the defeated powers who feel they have suffered most by the terms of peace come to oppose the established status quo. In the aftermath of World War II, however, the question of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo has largely been superseded by an earlier and prior question,

Up to the present time, no practical arrangement has been worked out acceptable to the major powers, who in this case are primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, on which the postwar status quo could be founded. The unresolved conflict between East and West has prevented the establishment of peace. Consequently, the latest experiment in collective security presents us with the anomalous picture of a system created to defend a status quo which has not yet been brought into being.

Moreover, the absence of accepted conditions of peace has been interpreted by some as a positive virtue. The wartime Secretary of State Cordell Hull argued that the League had been destroyed on the floor of the American Senate because of its intimate relationship with the Peace Treaty of Versailles.⁷ Better to establish a general international organization, he urged, and then, with passions less inflamed, work out a just and reasonable peace. James F. Byrnes, one of Mr. Hull's successors as Secretary of State in the postwar period, said that he was convinced, based upon his studies as a congressman of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, that a "new approach" was essential. The negotiators at Paris had tried to settle too many difficult problems when the spirit of conflict and revenge still dominated their counsels. Mr. Byrnes prescribed a schedule of discussions in which the less controversial treaties, such as the Italian and Balkan settlements, would be negotiated first. Then the negotiators might turn from their initial successes to the more difficult questions of a German and a Japanese settlement. All agreements arrived at in this order would be introduced in the United Nations, where great and minor powers might participate in considering and amending them. In order to prevent the historic division of the nations into opponents and supporters of the postwar status quo, Mr. Byrnes reached the ingenious conclusion that: "We had to devise a system that would facilitate agreement among the major powers and at the same time provide the smaller states with ample opportunities to express their views."⁸ The newly created collective organization would intervene directly in the establishment of the postwar status quo.

In retrospect the problem inherent in the "new approach" has become plain for all to see. Its author, Mr. Byrnes, has observed: "It was a good theory. But it was faulty in one assumption."⁹ It assumed that the claims of the Soviet Union could be more readily accommodated to the vital interests of the West than has been the case. While this faulty assumption was shared by the majority of those responsible for the conduct of Soviet-American relations, there were at least three prominent leaders who at various times expressed misgivings about the priority accorded the founding of the United Nations. In 1941 President Roosevelt declared that he "would not be in favor of the creation of a

⁷ As early as May 11, 1944, a Special Committee on Postwar Plans, composed of Senators Connally, Barkley, George, Gillette (Democrats), La Follette (Progressive), Vandenberg, White and Austin (Republicans), had begun to explore this and other related questions.

⁸ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), p. 70.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had passed' . . . , " during which the major powers, and Britain and the United State in particular, had been successful in establishing and maintaining peace.¹⁰

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson maintained, in opposition to Mr. Byrnes, that the breakdown of peace after World War I was due primarily to the lack of political foundations from which the League of Nations had suffered. He held that " . . . the mistake was made of not securing that guarantee [of French security] before the second step of creating the League of Nations. . . . " was taken.¹¹ In the preparatory discussions on the United Nations Mr. Stimson accordingly warned: "we should not put the cart before the horse."¹² He urged that attention not be diverted from the paramount need for a settlement among the major powers by too much premature concern over blueprints for world organization. For the international organization would gain power and authority only if outstanding political problems had been adjusted. He advised: "We should by thorough discussion between the three or four great powers endeavor to settle . . . fundamental problems."¹³ If a general settlement based on mutual guarantees could be worked out, the new instruments of international organization would stand on more viable foundations.

A third distinguished American statesman supported the views of Secretary Stimson. In the Senate debate in 1944 on postwar plans, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg insisted that the United States must not subscribe to collective security " . . . until we know more about what the new status quo will be. It is my argument that we should go ahead and perfect a plan for collective security; but that we should make it wholly contingent . . . the new 'league' must be *contingent* upon the *character* of the *peace*."¹⁴

Second, (collective security demands that nations subscribing to the status quo be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defense at successive points of conflict. In theory, the supporters of the status quo might be capable in particular emergencies of mobilizing effective and decisive power against the single aggressor who sought to defy them. Or, by pooling the resources of all the nations in a permanently organized international force, collective enforcement could be made automatic, instantaneous, and preponderant.) The former condition, however, is practically impossible of fulfillment, inasmuch as the threat to the status quo comes historically from more than one dissatisfied power or aggressor. The second condition would call for the unprecedented practice of international contingents operating under an international agency empowered to decide conclusively when and how they should be used.

¹⁰ Quoted in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Vol. 1, p. 436. Mr. Churchill asked if this would not antagonize the extreme internationalists, but Mr. Roosevelt replied that the time had come to be realistic and that this group was almost entirely lacking in realism.

¹¹ Stimson, *On Active Service*, p. 603.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 604.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Vandenberg, *Private Papers*, p. 96.

The United Nations Charter seems to take a long step toward this objective by providing that all members are "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities. . . ." (Article 43, Paragraph 1.) Through this provision, the incurable weakness of decentralized enforcement by which past international systems have been rendered impotent is ostensibly rectified.) For the Achilles' heel of the earlier experiments was the decentralized character of the enforcement process; separate nations retained the right to determine whether or not military forces would be made available to meet particular crises. In 1942, Cordell Hull had urged that "some international agency must be created which can—by force, if necessary—keep the peace. . . ." ¹⁵ Yet Mr. Hull's proposition and Articles 43ff of the Charter, by which this historic difficulty apparently had been surmounted, in practice have remained a dead letter. No special agreements have been concluded by Members with the Security Council; talks in the Military Staff Committee soon reached an impasse. The Soviet Union has opposed proportionate contributions to an international air and naval force, which would leave it particularly vulnerable to forces overwhelmingly more powerful than its own. The United States has been concerned to make the United Nations Armed Force as strong as possible against the military preponderance of the Soviet Army in Europe and Asia, while the Russians have sought to keep it as weak as possible. ¹⁶ The stalemate in the Military Staff Committee is fundamentally a symptom of the struggle between the two great powers and between supporters and opponents of the undefined-status quo. In practice, the realization of the second condition of overwhelming strength for collective enforcement has constantly run afoul of special national demands for military security and supremacy.

There is a *third* and final prerequisite of collective security, however, to which we now turn, [that was widely assumed to be in existence at the time preparations for the United Nations were first being made. It is essential to collective security in a world of unequal powers that at least the major powers enjoy a minimum of political solidarity and moral community.] On October 13, 1944, Premier Stalin asked himself, in an article appearing in the *Soviet Information Bulletin*, if the world organization could be effective. He predicted that it would "be effective if the Great Powers, which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler-Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord." ¹⁷

¹⁵ 7 Department of State *Bulletin* (1942), p. 645.

¹⁶ It should be noted that the Russians have no monopoly on opposition to a powerful world police force. Senator Vandenberg declares in his *Memoirs*: "I am opposed to what is generally understood by the term 'international police force.' So, I believe, are the President, Secretary Hull and most realistic students of this problem. To be adequate, an international police force would have to be larger than the regular army and navy of any other power on earth. I think it is fantastic to believe that the people would long consent to the maintenance of any such enormous concentration of power in the postwar peace; and I also think that the temptation to reach for its ultimate control could become the greatest possible threat to peace in years to come." Vandenberg, *Private Papers*, pp. 120-21.

¹⁷ *USSR Information Bulletin*, Oct. 13, 1944.

The effectiveness of the United Nations and of the Security Council in particular was predicated upon the unanimity of the five great powers. It was an article of political faith in the Roosevelt Administration that trustworthiness and good will on the part of Americans would inspire the same qualities among the Russians. In a particularly revealing memorandum for President Harry S. Truman dated September 11, 1945, Mr. Stimson explained: "The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust."¹⁸ Unanimity among the great powers which alien ideologies and conflicting interests might otherwise undermine would be secured through the application of a code of social ethics that had in general been effective within the United States.¹⁹

By October of 1947, Mr. Stimson, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, had cause to reformulate his proposition and to say: "I have often said that the surest way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him. But I must add that this does not always apply to a man who is determined to make you his dupe. Before we can make friends with the Russians, their leaders will have to be convinced that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by acting on the assumption that our society is dying and that our principles are outworn."²⁰ Thus the preconditions of collective security under the United Nations have either been wanting from the beginning, or have been corroded and destroyed by the all-consuming forces of the "cold war."

The Political Problem The chief practical obstacle to collective security is the political problem deriving from the conflict of independent foreign policies. The loyalties and interests of nations participating in international organizations and collective security systems are of a different order from those of individuals taking part in the more intimate communities of the family and nation.²¹ Both individuals and nations pursue their own interests, but in some

¹⁸ Stimson, *On Active Service*, p. 644.

¹⁹ It remained, however, for Premier Stalin in conversation with Harry Hopkins to furnish unwittingly the key to the success or failure of this endeavor. He declared that trust and confidence in international as in national relations is dependent upon the existence of "... a minimum moral standard between all nations and without such a minimum moral standard nations could not exist." Premier Stalin continued that the leaders of Nazi Germany "knew no such minimum moral standard [but] ... without a second's thought would sign a treaty today, break it tomorrow and sign a second one the following day. Nations must fulfill their treaty obligations, he said, or international society could not exist." Nor, it might be added, could collective security survive. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Vol. 1, pp. 399-400.

²⁰ Stimson, *On Active Service*, pp. 649-50.

²¹ Some years ago Monsieur Paul Henri Spaak in an address before the Foreign Press Union declared: "There must be a hierarchy in international obligations. The nations of the continent cannot be asked to consider with the same realism and sincerity of judgment affairs which directly concern them and events which are taking place thousands of kilometres away in regions where they have neither interests nor influence. Indivisible peace, mutual assistance, and even collective security are general ideas whose practical effect must be clearly explained and clearly limited." Quoted in *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), pp. 354-55.

areas and on certain occasions the individual may forsake his egotistic motives for loyalty to some higher institution or nobler cause. There are institutions in integrated societies which provide common standards under which the individual can realize his aspirations. There need be no inherent conflict between an individual's private interests and his national loyalties, for the latter can often promote the realization of the former. On the other hand, conflicts are often inevitable between national and supranational loyalties, and when the projected policy of an international organization conflicts with that of a particular nation, at all times and in all places the national interest prevails.

In the debate between the so-called realists and idealists,²² the latter have often assumed that the conflict between national and supranational policies and purposes need not take the form the realists give it. Idealists have maintained that if two sets of objectives should be in conflict, the clash could always be resolved by taking "the long view." It should not be surprising that statesmen have been more disposed to approach the foreign policies of other nations with this as their "rule of thumb." For example, on January 10, 1945, in his momentous speech to the American Senate, Arthur H. Vandenberg assessed the objectives of the Soviet Union. He announced that the Soviet leaders appeared to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly, of a surrounding circle of states on the Russian borders. Their defense of this sphere of influence policy was on grounds of security against German aggression. While finding this a perfectly understandable claim, Senator Vandenberg observed: "The alternative is collective security. . . . Which is better in the long view, from a purely selfish Russian standpoint: To forcefully surround herself with a cordon of unwillingly controlled or partitioned states, thus affronting the opinion of mankind . . . or to win the priceless asset of world-confidence in her by embracing the alternative, namely, full and whole hearted cooperation with and reliance upon a vital international organization."²³

Yet Senator Vandenberg and other American statesmen, while raising this standard for others, have by their actions and not infrequently their words appealed to another less lofty if more attainable political goal. Not all of our leaders have been as transparently candid as Senator Vandenberg in expressing the hope "that American spokesmanship at the peace table is at least as loyal to America's own primary interests as Mr. Stalin is certain to be in respect to Russian and Mr. Churchill . . . to the British Empire."²⁴ Yet in his

²² Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," this *Review*, Vol. 46, pp. 961-88 (Dec., 1952); Herbert W. Briggs, "New Dimensions in International Law," this *Review*, Vol. 46, pp. 677-98 (Sept., 1952); and Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Study of International Politics," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 433-67 (Oct., 1952). The conflict between national and supranational objectives is illustrated in the present Korean dilemma. South Korea's interests since 1950 were identical with those of the United Nations, but with the approach of an armistice this identity of interests has disappeared.

²³ Vandenberg, *Private Papers*, p. 136. Five months later on June 14, 1945, the Michigan Senator conceded: "I agree that there must be this veto on the use of force" (p. 211).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

warning, the Senator appeared to employ a new "rule of thumb" based on the precept "that no one is going to look out for us . . . unless we look out for ourselves. . . ."²⁵

It is true that the ambivalence we have found in Senator Vandenberg's use of guides to action in foreign policy is sometimes accounted for by the role he played in American life. As a onetime arch-isolationist, he could be expected to cling to certain narrow standards and selfish nationalist principles. Yet Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who can hardly be placed under the same stricture, sensed instinctively the importance of American vital interests in the conduct of foreign policy. Theodore Roosevelt intervened to sustain a balance of power in Europe and Asia by offering American good offices at the Portsmouth Conference and by seeking to moderate the crisis over Morocco at the Conference of Algeciras in 1906. When asked at the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 why he opposed England, though admiring its democracy, and why he favored Russia, though despising its despotism and mendacity, he replied: "Do you not understand that I am looking after America's interest, that and nothing more. . . . If anyone else views action taken in American interest from the standpoint of a foreign power, I shall be sorry, but it certainly will not alter my own conduct."²⁶

The nature of the first Roosevelt's concept of foreign policy may be less surprising than the private admission by Franklin D. Roosevelt that he approached foreign policy on essentially the same basis. In early 1941, when seeking a formula by which aid to Britain could be extended, Franklin Roosevelt received a letter from a well-known advertising man reporting that charges being made by the Nyes and Lindberghs that we were acting in foreign policy to save the British and not ourselves were taking a serious toll. The business man urged Mr. Roosevelt to tell the truth, namely, that we were not concerned primarily with the British Empire as such but with our own safety, the security of our trade, the future of our crops, the integrity of our continent, and the lives of our children in the next generation. The President replied: "That I think, is a pretty good line to take because it happens to be true and it is on that line itself that we must, for all the above purely selfish reasons, prevent at almost any hazard the Axis domination of the world."²⁷ The American

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Letter to Holls, July 4, 1903, Theodore Roosevelt, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers*, 8 vols. (New York, 1910), Vol. 3, p. 509. For utopian critics who maintain that the national interest must be an empty concept without concrete meaning, the following attempt by Roosevelt to give it content may prove illuminating: "As long as England succeeds in keeping up the balance of power in Europe, not only on principle, but in reality, well and good; should she, however, for some reason or other fail in doing so, the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily in order to reestablish the balance of power in Europe, never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed." Quoted in Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, New York, 1925), p. 1.

²⁷ Letter to Senator Josiah W. Bailey, dated May 13, 1941, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, 4 vols. (New York, 1947-50), Vol. 2, pp. 1154-55.

strategy of fighting World War II first on the Atlantic sea lanes and in Europe reflected the priority Mr. Roosevelt gave to our interests in Europe.

In short, it is untrue to imply that American statesmen have been free from concern for immediate strategic interests and have consistently taken "the long view." There is almost no evidence that in pursuing our national destiny we have been immune from the same basic considerations by which other members of the society of nations have been guided.²⁸ When this principle has been disregarded, as in certain military decisions in 1945, American security has been gravely imperilled.

However, the pursuit of separate national interests by the various independent states presents the most troublesome issue we face in appraising collective security. The problem which impaired collective security under the League, and which was perhaps more decisive than the defection of the United States in causing its downfall, was the unresolved conflict in the foreign policies of the principal powers. The conceptions of the national interests of France and England clashed with one another and with the principles of the League.) France had one overarching objective: the absolute security of its territory. In French eyes, the one conspicuous threat it faced was Germany, which bordered France and perpetually endangered its northeastern frontier. In 1935-36, the second attack on the integrity of the League was launched with Mussolini's cruel "Rape of Ethiopia," which Il Duce preferred to describe euphemistically as a "civilizing mission." The dilemma with which France was confronted provides us with the classic instance of the political problem.

For France the sole threat against which sanctions had been prepared was Germany. Italy's aggressive action represented the wrong threat, at the wrong time, at the wrong border. Italy was the natural ally of France for, aligned with the much publicized Italian army, France hoped to balance the preponderance of the land forces of Germany, especially after Germany had moved into the Rhineland. The character of French foreign policy made it highly improbable that France could support sanctions up to the point where French loyalty to the Covenant would cost France its recent *entente* with Italy against Germany. British opinion appeared to accept this fact and Mr. Church-

²⁸ One of the most significant documents in the annals of recent American foreign policy was the blueprint of strategic interests in World War II called the "Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements." Dated September 11, 1941, it was signed by the Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. Paragraph 5 provided: "Those major national objectives of the United States which are related to military policy may broadly be stated as: preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty." This unequivocal statement of our basic objectives and interests puts to rest the illusion that World War II was conceived and conducted by American leaders who took no stock in the need for discriminating judgments respecting vital interests. Quoted in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Vol. 1, p. 496.

ill observed that "the Foreign Secretary [Mr. Eden] was *justified in going as far with the League of Nations against Italy as he could carry France*; but I added that he ought not to put any pressure upon France because of her military convention with Italy and her German preoccupations; and that in the circumstances I did not expect France would go very far."²⁰ In simplest terms, the choice for France was between the long range precedent which effective action might provide against the likelihood of German expansion and the immediately tangible results of not losing an ally against Germany. France compromised and sanctions were applied only half-heartedly.

The political problem also presents itself in regard to actual enforcement. Who is to apply sanctions? Who is to carry the burden of overt military action? In 1935-36, Britain alone was in a position to cut Mussolini's lines of communication and isolate his army. If genuine sanctions and force had been applied, the British navy would have shouldered the main burden. Yet there were murmurings by admirals and statesmen that the navy was ill-prepared, that there was ammunition for only about thirty minutes of fighting. British foreign policy, in contrast to that of France, directed that a stand should be taken. But the military component for action was lacking. In any enforcement action, since states are unequal, someone must bear more than his share. For this the British were unready in 1935-36.

The political problem has returned to plague Western society in the actions of the United Nations. The foreign policies of some nations have clashed periodically with the resolutions of that body. France and England are probably second and third-rate powers. England in particular has sensed this and has sought to husband her resources. Her first duty has been to her interests in Europe. She has maintained that a threat to her survival could come only from Europe. Any new action that would drain off a single drop of strength for efforts not in the national interest has been viewed with alarm. Moreover, England's policy has been one of watchful waiting in China. Under present conditions, the hope has been fostered that wise diplomacy could drive a wedge between the USSR and China, so that they would cease to march as members of a well-drilled team. The later phases of the UN's Korean policy have conflicted at every point with British Far Eastern policy. Is it surprising, therefore, that she has been a reluctant partner? The foreign policies of the member states, including those of the West, have diverged within the United Nations precisely as they did in 1935-36. Only the overwhelming power and material and political influence of the United States, made possible by the decline and exhaustion of postwar European and Asian powers, have prevented a repetition of the earlier experience. (Unless nations have a margin of power beyond that essential to their survival, they can hardly be expected to share in the defense of a principle.)

The Psychological Problem. (Collective security founders on other shoals. It sometimes breaks down because of collective resentments or hatreds and

²⁰ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), p. 169.

reactions which express certain features of a particular national character.) In 1931, the Japanese spilled over into Manchuria. Why was it that more positive action was not taken? To be sure there were legal, economic, and political obstacles existing. "War" in international relations is a weaselword, and debates which surround it easily become legal quagmires. Japan said it had not declared war, China had not done so, and therefore the bombs were a mere illusion. Behind this legal smokescreen the struggle went on and men were as dead as if they had fought in a legally more respectable war. Economically, the world was deep in a painful depression; politically, Manchuria seemed far away and of little immediate interest to Western nations. There was in addition, however, a psychological factor. Certain groups in the West harbored deep resentments against the victims of Japanese imperialism. In particular, certain elements within the British trading community remembered private scores that had not been settled and the recent ingratitude of the Chinese toward the West. This sector of Western public opinion took a kind of vicarious pleasure in the punishment the Japanese were inflicting upon China which, with India, became a symbol of the heavy toll being taken economically and psychologically in Europe by Asia's revolt. The Japanese action was unconsciously viewed as a retaliation against the whole anti-foreign movement that was sweeping Asia.

Another psychological factor was the attitude of responsible naval and military experts in Britain. One major result of the Washington Treaties of 1921-22 had been to leave Japan supreme on all fronts in the Far East. Its strategic position made it virtually immune from any serious attack. This confronted the newborn collective system with a military and naval problem which was made more acute by the prospects of joint operations by British and American naval forces. To British naval experts, American admirals and naval leaders were a boisterous and unproven lot. They had emerged overnight as the one irresistible threat to British naval supremacy. As youngsters in naval warfare, they would as likely as not prove erratic and unreliable under fire. Therefore, for Britain to commit herself unqualifiedly to a policy of military and naval intervention in an area where the newly acquired American naval supremacy would prevail would be risky and hazardous to British national interests. The disdain in which British naval leaders held their American opposite numbers was a psychological factor of great importance in 1931.³⁰

In 1950-51, a new psychological obstacle appeared to block effective universal collective security. The British have had a Far Eastern policy for nearly a century-and-a-half. To them the policy of the United Nations, as influenced by the United States and especially by its spectacular and outspoken general, was from the first based on false assumptions. When General MacArthur's

³⁰ The psychological turn of mind among certain professional Western soldiers before the Second World War offers a further illustration of this point. Admiration and respect for Germany's amazing rearmament program inspired the opinion that the conquest of England by Germany would prove the inevitable superiority of ground and air over sea power.

abortive thrust toward the Yalu River was turned back and the one action which all Western policy had sought to forestall—the intervention of the Chinese Communists—followed, the British reaction, however restrained, was clearly inevitable. Given the policy, the outcome was inescapable.

Peaceful Change. Collective security, as we have seen, depends upon agreed concepts of justice in international society shared by all or most of its members. In domestic societies this consensus is arrived at by public opinion's availing itself of the instruments of government in registering the majority will. If societies were characterized by ideal justice and perfect equilibrium among contending social groups, the problems of social change would perhaps disappear. Since the demands for social change are continuously asserted in the market place and resolved in legislative and electoral debates, the pursuit of abstract justice assumes less urgency than the claims for justice of particular social groups.

In every society two social forces inevitably exist in basic tension with one another. The one force comprises the groups supporting the status quo as stabilized and perpetuated in the political and legal order of the day. Another force made up of the groups sharing common opposition to the status quo seeks to change or overturn it. In the light of this conflict, the basic problem of government is to provide ways by which continuity is achieved and social change not prevented. Within organized and integrated societies, the courts historically have contributed continuity whereas legislatures have been the faithful agents of change. As Congress was the forum in which the claims and grievances of distressed groups were alleviated by New Deal laws and decrees in the 1930's, the British Parliament in the nineteenth century was the agency in which the middle-class revolt against feudalism was expressed and achieved.

It should be apparent, however, that the process of change in society is made possible by other agencies as well. The executive has provided an instrument through which opinion can be channeled and transformed into effective policy. Peaceful change thus involves the whole of society with its orderly machinery through which social groups seek support for their claims elevated into principles of justice that must be compatible with the society's fundamental values. It is the whole of domestic society, therefore, and not the legislature in isolation, that brings about social change. For while the making of new laws is the formal act of social change, the role of legislatures is essentially the ratification of the choices at which unorganized society has already arrived. This is made possible by the generally accepted framework of justice within which disputes can be settled.

It is obvious that the conditions and institutions which exist within domestic societies are absent or greatly weakened in international society. Legislative bodies with law-making powers capable of fulfilling the functions that Congress or any other legislature performs are conspicuously absent on the international scene. The General Assembly has the power to "make recommendations" on matters prescribed in the Charter; the Security Council may "decide" on measures to be taken and "call upon" members to act. While these powers appear to mark an advance, in practice they have hardly resulted in any espe-

cially decisive step toward international law-making.) The basic defects in the structure of international society are nowhere more apparent than in connection with peaceful change. Some observers maintain that the least satisfactory provisions of both the Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are those dealing with pacific settlement. At San Francisco, substantial criticism of these provisions was made. Chapter VIII, Section A of the Proposals dealing with peaceful settlement was subject to sufficient attack to require its revision by the Technical Committee and the Coordination Committee. If more time had been available, further changes no doubt would have been made. For example, it is unclear whether parties shall seek a solution only to those disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace" by the means specified in Article 33, and if so who shall decide if the dispute is likely to endanger the peace. A substitute phrase was offered toward the close of the conference which provided: "The parties to any international dispute shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, etc. . . . so that the maintenance of international peace and security will not be endangered." In the time remaining at San Francisco, this change could not be instituted; exaggerated concern with collective enforcement at the expense of accommodation and adjustment as instruments of peace appears to have been largely responsible for this shortcoming in most of the preliminary discussions.

(If the provisions contained in the Charter are not fully satisfactory, there is a more basic issue in connection with peaceful change. Collective security if pursued to its logical conclusion is probably incompatible with peaceful change.) In the 1930's, the Far Eastern situation deteriorated to a point where serious observers maintained that only military intervention could restore a stable balance of power. It was plain for all to see that Japan by its invasion of Manchuria was guilty of aggression. By its action, Japan had flouted its treaty obligations under international law. Yet the Japanese action in another respect was only an overt recognition that the treaties had become mere "scraps of paper" not based on political realities.

The staunchest advocate of firmness in Asia, Henry L. Stimson, conceded that the test for collective security had come in the worst part of the world. For the issue there was not what the law was but what it ought to be. He said at the time: "The peace treaties of modern Europe made out by the Western nations of the world no more fit the three great races of Russia, Japan, and China, who are meeting in Manchuria, than . . . a stovepipe hat would fit an African savage."²¹ Yet the claims of these nations for justice and the need for safeguarding the integrity of the collective system became mutually incompatible. (If collective security was to survive, every treaty would have to be defended or the structure's prestige would be undermined.) Therefore, Mr. Stimson was forced to conclude: "Nevertheless, they are parties to these treaties and the whole world looks on to see whether the treaties are good for anything or not, and if we lie down and treat them like scraps of paper nothing will

²¹ Stimson, *On Active Service*, p. 233.

happen, and in the future the peace movement will receive a blow that it will not recover from for a long time."²² The dilemma of collective security has been that its major proponents have been driven to oppose social change in the name of the sanctity of treaties. And since the agencies of social change which are available on the domestic scene are not present in international society, the military redress of claims or grievances has often appeared to be the sole rational alternative to the allegedly aggrieved parties.

To the extent that peaceful change is provided for in the Charter itself, Article 14 grants power to the General Assembly to recommend "measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin." Yet although this principle is less concrete and specific than what Senator Vandenberg proposed,²³ it has remained essentially a dead letter. For while it was invoked on the occasion of the Palestine dispute, it was subsequently abandoned and repudiated by the American delegation. Therefore the problem of peaceful change, which threatened and eventually destroyed the League and the Holy Alliance, has likewise imperilled and threatens to destroy the United Nations security system.)

THE UNREALITY OF TWO APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In the face of the problems we have outlined and discussed, (two approaches to the idea and the reality of collective security have vied with one another in recent years. The one demands in the name of a principle that all nations at all times resist aggression. Its adherents maintain that only in this way can the national interests of independent states be protected and served. This approach takes its stand on the abstract and uncorruptible ideal of collective security.

Another approach, based primarily on what we have denoted the reality of collective security, reaches other conclusions on the basis of opposing concepts and principles. In the present state of world affairs, we are told, a policy of collective security leads inevitably down the road of general war and universal catastrophe.) The Founding Fathers of this Republic knew more clearly than their present day heirs the futility of seeking to coerce sovereign states. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it was argued that unless states were united in one sovereign government (which both approaches agree is absent from the international scene today), they could be coerced only through civil war. Alexander Hamilton declared to the New York State Convention, met to ratify the new Constitution: "to coerce the states is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Senator Vandenberg urged that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals include: "If the Security Council finds that any situation which it shall investigate involves injustice to peoples concerned it shall recommend appropriate measures of adjustment which may include revision of treaties and of prior international decisions." Vandenberg, *Private Papers*, p. 163.

state. This being the case can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war."³⁴ Writing in the same tradition, Hans J. Morgenthau has maintained: "Under a system of collective security operating under less than ideal conditions, war between A and B or between any other two nations anywhere in the world is of necessity tantamount to war among all or at best most nations of the world."³⁵ Since ideal conditions are not presently in sight, collective security is tantamount to war.

Thus the West is presented, in theory at least, with a choice between almost equally hopeless and catastrophic alternatives. Through the fact of membership in the United Nations, Western nations are committed to a system of collective security embodied in the Charter. Confronted with reality, however, the staunchest champions of collective security are driven to invoke a dual standard as a guide for action. On the one hand, they must firmly resolve on principle to intervene to arrest aggression at its source. On the other hand, while unable to disavow the principle, in concrete actions they are required to apply it judiciously with immense self-restraint.)

The gulf between principles and actions in 1935-36 and again in 1950 illustrates the irony of collective security in the real world for, under its dispensation, Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia and the North Korean invasion of South Korea made intervention a foregone conclusion. Once aggression is identified, the duty of the nations espousing collective security is unequivocal. Yet since Britain and France were unprepared in 1935, it was doubtful that more could be accomplished than to drive Italy into the camp of Germany. (Notwithstanding, the viewpoint prevailed that if the champions of collective security did nothing, other more dangerous acts of aggression would follow.

The perils in pursuing the idea of collective security to its logical conclusion are matched only by the hazards involved in abandoning it. It is tempting to say that since collective security against a great power is unworkable, since psychological and political obstacles exist, and since the requirements for peaceful change are quite frequently at odds with enforcement, the system should be scrapped and replaced.) Yet the coalition of the Western nations has been aroused to the threat confronting it by the resolute stand that was taken in Korea, and the whole free world has been animated and inspired by our boldness, courage and, lately, our patience and restraint. In the struggle against Soviet imperialism, it is vital that we have firm friends and willing allies who recognize mutual interests. We can best assure their cooperation by preserving and strengthening the tenuous ties by which all are bound together within the United Nations.

Perhaps the supreme paradox of American foreign policy today is the neces-

³⁴ Quoted in Harrop Freeman and Theodore Paullin, *Coercion of States in Federal Unions* (Philadelphia, 1943), p. 14. The late Professor Edwin Borchard warned: "There is no element of the proposal of punishing aggressors which is not contested by history and disproved by experience." "The Impracticability of Enforcing Peace," *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 55, p. 988 (Aug., 1946).

³⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1948), p. 335.

sity placed upon us to seize and employ the essentially utopian instruments of collective security in a brutally realistic power struggle. Its agencies furnish a political framework through which the broad coalition of the free world can be strengthened and a more stable equilibrium of world power be restored. Britain and France and the free powers of Asia are more likely to play their part and contribute to the restoration of a balance of power in Europe and Asia if we assure them of support through mutual guarantees and create confidence by discussions in the halls and anterooms of the United Nations.

(Collective security, with its present foundations weakened and enfeebled, can contribute to peace and order if wisely and moderately employed. It has become clear in Korea that policies undertaken in the name of collective security are not necessarily tantamount to world war. Localized struggles are still possible if major powers are not confounded by the ideal or misled by a too absolute interpretation of the meaning of collective enforcement.) Moreover, the influence of other nations more skilled in historic diplomacy has served within the United Nations as a kind of built-in restraint on the impulses of American foreign policy. Our partners in utopia have nudged us in the direction of what would appear to be a more realistic foreign policy. Beyond this, (with the recent breakup of the simple bi-polar balance of power in the world, the practical uses for collective agencies may be multiplied indefinitely as the prospect of action by coalitions of members against independent if minor centers of power becomes a reality.

X The uses of collective security are more modest and limited than its more ardent advocates appreciate. Yet if participants base their policies on enduring political principles and judge and measure each action by the interests and power involved, it need not be an inevitable blind alley. Between the scylla of blind acceptance and the charybdis of logical rejection we must aim to establish the intellectual foundations required for an empirical and pragmatic approach to the modern concept of collective security.)

THE LAW OF OLIGARCHY

C. W. CASSINELLI

Whitman College

One of the most interesting generalizations in the field of social science is Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." The commentary on this hypothesis has usually been motivated by a desire to attack or to support it; seldom has anyone made a serious attempt to understand it before passing judgment. This situation is partially Michels' responsibility, since his statement of the law of oligarchy is badly confused and quite incomplete. Nevertheless, the notion that "oligarchies prevail" has a high degree of general credibility, and even the realization that Michels' statement of it is inadequate and his evidence for it inconclusive does not destroy its intellectual appeal.

In this paper I shall be concerned exclusively with an attempt to make the law of oligarchy understandable. This involves formulating the generalization as precisely as possible, defining its important terms, and stating its sources of evidence. This is not an investigation into what Michels "really meant," but an examination of what he said that is good political theory. I shall feel free to make any changes or additions which appear necessary to me. But such alterations will be primarily matters of definition and logical organization.

Since Michels never labels a particular sentence with the title "the law of oligarchy," we are obliged to construct the law on the basis of several of his general statements about a "ruling class in society."¹ Let us take the following as a preliminary statement of the law of oligarchy: *For any x, if x is an organization, then x is an oligarchy.* This does not convey much information, except that Michels utilizes the notion of organization, a decided advance beyond the vague notions about "class" or "stratum" or "group" expressed by other "elitists" like Mosca and Pareto. In order to put meaning into this preliminary statement, two concepts, that of organization and that of oligarchy, must be analyzed.

I

It is absolutely necessary to specify as precisely as possible what is meant by "organization" in our law; not only for considerations of accuracy and tidiness, but also in order to avoid the serious shortcoming of producing a law which is nothing more than a tautology. A common and understandable comment upon the law consists of asking if anything has been said other than that an organization is an organization, that in an organization some people give orders and others obey them, and that the latter usually outnumber the former. If the law of oligarchy is to be a significant generalization about political affairs, it must be shown how the concepts of organization and oligarchy differ from one another.

¹ Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, tr. by Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 377, 390, 401, 402.

Neither of these concepts is defined by Michels, so we must look elsewhere for suggestions in order to find meanings which will make our law significant, and also as accurate as possible. With respect to organization, the first suggestion comes from Chester I. Barnard. He points out that an organization must be defined as a *system of activities* (or forces or efforts) of two or more human beings, rather than as a body of persons united for a special purpose, for the following three reasons: first, we consider an organization to persist despite continual turnovers in the personnel "of the organization"; second, a single person during the same period of his life can "belong to" more than one organization; and, third, a single act of a person can be an "organization-act" of more than one organization.² If an organization is taken to consist of human activities, rather than of human beings, our definition can be made consistent with these three important considerations.

Let us take, then, as the raw material, so to speak, of an organization the activities of human beings. The problem now is to put these activities into some kind of relationship or order with one another. The usual way in which this is done is by saying that such activities are "united for a purpose." When we introduce the concept of purpose into a discussion of this nature, it must be made very clear that the ethical meaning of "purpose" has no place whatsoever in the attempt to arrive at workable definitions of political concepts. What we are looking for is a purpose exhibited by human beings, exhibited in some kind of behavior, which can be attributed to all those groups of activities ordinarily called "organizations."

When the idea of purpose is introduced as a distinguishing characteristic of a group of activities, two problems of identification immediately arise: if the attributing of purpose to an organization is to make sense, then we must be able to identify the people who have the purpose and we must also be able to identify the object (or end or goal) to which the purpose is directed. Regarding the identification of the possessors of the purpose, the question is whether all the people who perform the activities which constitute the organization are to have the single purpose by which the activities are ordered or whether only a certain sub-group has this purpose. If the latter alternative is adopted, the most likely possibility would be to select as the given sub-group the "leaders" of the organization. There are, however, several objections to this choice. First, the identification of the leaders presupposes a knowledge of the definition of an organization; that is, the principle which orders the activities must be understood before it can be determined which of the activities are "leading" in nature. Second, it may be very difficult to single out a specific purpose, or type of purpose, common to all leaders, from among the many and diverse purposes which they presumably have. And, third, it appears rather arbitrary to exclude the purposes of the "lesser" members of the organization from a definitive position. Except for the first, these objections are probably not insuperable; but, as will be seen, we can make them irrelevant.

² Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), Ch. VI. sec. I.

If we adopt the former alternative, that all the people who perform the activities which constitute an organization are to have the particular purpose by which the activities are ordered, then it can be seen that the probability that there will be a common purpose is rather low. Barnard tries to eliminate this difficulty by distinguishing between "subjective purpose" (personal motives) and "cooperative purpose." The latter is the consciousness on the part of the individual that his activity has a particular meaning in relation to the meanings which he imputes to all the other activities which "make up the organization."³ But this distinction does not provide us with a purpose as an ordering principle, since the definition of co-operative purposes presupposes the definition of an organization.

The second problem of identification that arises when purpose is taken as the ordering principle that makes activities into an organization is that of identifying the object (or end or goal) to which the purpose is directed. This problem becomes acute when an organization is defined in terms of purpose in general: for example, "an organization is a system of purposive activities," or "an organization is a group of activities united by a common purpose." Unless the particular goal of the purpose of every set of activities which is supposed to constitute an organization can be specified, it is impossible to distinguish a set of activities that makes up an organization from a set of activities that does not. Merely saying that the activities are purposive, without trying to identify the goals, is an empty statement. However, when we attempt to escape this unusable generality, it becomes very difficult to find a specific purpose, or even a specific kind of purpose, which motivates the activities which make up an organization. The concept of organization includes within its scope phenomena ranging from the local athletic club through large business firms to international groups dealing with economic or political affairs. It is unlikely that a purpose common to these diverse groups can be found.

Furthermore, even if a purpose ordering the activities into a system could be found in the case of each organization, this still would not serve to distinguish organizations from groups of activities which obviously are not organizations. Barnard is willing to absorb this fact into his definition, and includes such groups of activities as manifested by mobs, concert-audiences, and two people changing an automobile-tire within the scope of his definition of organization.⁴ This kind of definition not only is inconsistent with the customary usage of the word "organization," but also would not fit into any law of oligarchy, since it is rather ridiculous to say that a concert-audience is an oligarchy, no matter how the latter concept is defined.

With respect to this problem, we should consider another suggestion, made this time by Max Weber. He says that an organization is a system of *continuous* purposive activity.⁵ This is an interesting addition to our theory, but it fails

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴ Barnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 102, 104n.

⁵ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, tr. by Parsons and Henderson (New York, 1947), p. 151.

to account for two things: first, groups of activities like those exhibited by concert-audiences (or by any habitual mass-activities) are not eliminated, that is, these activities can be continuous, since the same people need not perform them; and, second, many organizations are short-lived, persisting hardly long enough to be called "continuous."

In view of all these various limitations to the defining of the concept of organization in terms of purpose in general or of a particular purpose, it would be wise to seek another type of approach. One characteristic which is exhibited by those groups of activities ordinarily considered to be organizations is the existence of a *specialization of function*, by which the many activities are ordered into a system. Specialization of function is an attribute which is fully objective, which is relatively simple to understand, which is usually considered as essential to an organization, and which can easily be identified in the course of empirical observation. Of course, there is purpose involved in specialization of function, but we can identify such an order without having to identify the purpose or purposes behind it.

The specialization of function among activities can, with profit, be taken as a necessary condition of an organization, but it is not sufficient. With only this characteristic as a differentia, groups of activities such as the two men changing the tire or as A's sweeping the streets and B's teaching school would constitute organizations. Another qualification is needed, and here Max Weber provides us with a second suggestion: in his definition of a "corporate organization" he says that the association of activities is characterized by an administrative staff "devoted to such continuous purposive activity."⁶ Let us simplify this and say that the additional defining characteristic of an organization is *the intent to maintain the existence of the specialized activities*. This intent is manifested in one or more of the given activities, that is, it is one of the specialized functions; and its goal is to maintain the other activities in their relationships to one another. The maintenance-activities may include within their scope the intent to maintain such maintenance-activities, but it is not necessary that they do so. (This avoids any fallacy of types, since one activity is directed to making future activities of the same kind possible.) There is never, of course, a completely rigid set of functional interrelations in an organization, and there is seldom the intent to maintain a completely rigid set. When there is a large enough change in these interrelations, we say that a "reorganization" has occurred.

The intent to maintain specialization is a notion which also obviously involves purpose. But the problem of discovering whether or not such a purpose exists is much more simple than the similar problem under the other definitions of organization discussed above. The maintenance-activities are performed, usually, by a small proportion of the people who contribute to the organization, and this makes it easy to locate them. There is much less difficulty in determining whether or not a given set of activities is of the maintenance-variety

⁶ Weber, *loc. cit.*

than there is in finding a purpose common to all or even to the majority of the members of the organization. The goal of the purpose is the same in every organization and it is specific and objective, and thus readily discoverable. Taking specialization of function and intent to maintain such specialization as the defining characteristics of an organization avoids the kind of circularity which definitions based upon the notions of "leaders" and "co-operative purposes" cannot avoid. It is not necessary to know what an organization is in order to identify the intent to maintain specialization of function and the people who carry out this intent; all that need be known is what such specialization is. This type of definition also includes our general feeling that persistence or continuity in time has an intimate connection with organization; and yet it allows for the fact that some organizations are short-lived.

The definition of the concept of organization is this: An organization is a group of human activities ordered by a system of specialization of function; a sub-group of these activities has as its goal the maintenance of this order or of an order very similar to it.

II

Having defined one of the concepts in the law of oligarchy, it remains to analyze the other, the concept of oligarchy. This, needless to say, is the crucial notion in the entire law, the notion which determines the meaning and hence the validity of the generalization. The term "oligarchy" is not especially fortunate, since its ordinary connotation is more narrow than the one that must be given it in the present discussion, and since it is ordinarily ambiguous, referring both to rule by the few and to rule by the wealthy.⁷ Furthermore, the idea of ruling associated with the notion of oligarchy is inconvenient since the law of oligarchy, as I shall formulate it, will not include any specific reference to the function of ruling. However, there is a tradition in political science regarding the notion of oligarchy which counteracts the associations of meaning described above. This is the tradition begun by Michels himself, and I am supposing it to be strong enough to prevent a violation of the common usage of the word "oligarchy" and to eliminate the task of inventing a new word by which to refer to the phenomenon being linked with organization by means of our law.⁸

The first thing that must be kept in mind is that the concept of organization implies that certain of the activities which make up the organization are "executive" or "leadership" activities—that is, activities involving authority—and that the people who perform these activities are much less numerous than those who perform the remaining activities. It is this group of leadership activities with which the law of oligarchy is obviously concerned.

⁷ See Carl J. Friedrich, "Oligarchy," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Science*, Vol. 11, pp. 462-65.

⁸ Michels never defines his concept of oligarchy. For his somewhat inconsistent suggestions regarding the nature of oligarchy, see *Political Parties*, pp. 136, 144, 145, 154, 389, 390.

Let us approach the problem of defining the concept of oligarchy by listing the possible meanings of "oligarchy" in our law, or rather by stating the possible relevant inferences that can be drawn from the statement that an organization exists. With this list in mind it will be easier to understand why a particular choice must be made. As I see it, there are five possibilities which the law could be stating; these are, in the order of increasing complexity:

(1) In political affairs some people, usually a minority, give orders and the rest of the people obey these orders. This possibility should be immediately rejected, because even if it does not say only that an organization is an organization it contributes practically nothing to our knowledge regarding politics.

(2) As a second possibility, the law might state that the leaders, who are a minority, are the sole source of any significant political action. This means that of the activities that make up an organization only those activities which are concerned with giving orders—that is, the "leadership" or "executive" functions—are relevant to the understanding of the political process.

(3) Another possibility is that the law says that only by means of such executive activities can significant political actions take place. This would make it a theory of the loci of political power.

Possibilities (2) and (3) suggest very important political hypotheses, which might be (inaccurately) summarized like this: specialization of function, with authority vested in a minority, is the best or perhaps the only way to get any important political results. But this amounts to saying that organization is needed for action, a statement that can hardly be put into the form of our law of oligarchy. In short, the law of oligarchy as I have adapted it from Michels concerns the results of organization, not the causes of it.

(4) The next possible meaning that can be given to the law of oligarchy, by means of a definition of the concept of oligarchy, is the following: the executive or leadership activities in an organization are free from control by the other activities; or, putting it another way, the people who hold positions of authority within an organization are not checked by those who hold subsidiary positions within the organization. (This is the meaning of the law which I propose to adopt, and hence the necessary qualifications can be introduced later.)

(5) The final possible formulation of the law of oligarchy is the most spectacular. It says that the people in positions of authority pursue their own interests, disregarding the interests of the mass of mankind, a procedure which leads to the exploitation of this mass. There are two objections to this theory. First, it is impossible to determine what constitutes the "interests" of the leaders and of the led, because an objective theory of interest requires that the people who are to be given the interests must themselves define them; and it is patently impossible to discover that all organizations are characterized by conflicts of interest and exploitation. But, in the second place, if we choose some objective standards, such as good food, comfortable homes, leisure, medical care, security, and deference, the statement that organization leads to exploitation is quite clearly false; and the statement that it leads to conflicts

of interest may be true regarding some of the standards, such as deference, but it is hardly a significant addition to our political knowledge.

These five formulations of the law of oligarchy are the ones which have been used by theorists of "the ruling class," and I believe that they exhaust the significant possibilities.⁹ As I said above, the fourth formulation involving lack of control is the one which I consider both valid and informative, and I shall now proceed to make this formulation as precise as possible.

There are, first of all, a matter of terminology and a matter of logical relationship which must be resolved. Michels uses the term "oligarchy" to refer to the "ruling minority," that is, to a group of human beings. It is more reasonable to use the word "oligarchs" in order to designate these people, and reserve "oligarchy" as the name of an organization which has such and such characteristics, that is, an organization which possesses oligarchs. Now it must be pointed out that taking this approach makes organization a (logical) necessary condition of oligarchy. This convention will lead to no difficulties since it conforms to ordinary usage¹⁰ and since the significance of our law of oligarchy lies in its stating that organization is a sufficient condition of oligarchy, a statement which is, as we shall see, an empirical generalization.

The definition of the concept of oligarchy to be adopted is the following: An oligarchy is an organization characterized by the fact that part of the activities of which it consists, viz., the activities having the highest degree of authority (which have been called "leadership" or "executive" activities); are free from control by any of the remainder of the organizational activities. This concept leads to a generalization which might be called "a theory of irresponsible leadership."

The key notion in this definition is that of freedom from control, a notion which must be specified in order for the definition to make sense. Freedom from control does not mean that the leaders can completely ignore the actions and desires of the lower ranks in the organization. Their activities are always guided, at least to some extent, by considerations regarding, metaphorically speaking, the material with which they must work.¹¹ As Machiavelli says, the Prince accommodates himself to the people and to the times. Or, as Professor Friedrich has stated it, the leaders anticipate the reactions of the led.¹² Freedom from control means that the executive activities are not restricted by the subordinate activities with regard to their positive content and direction. Since this is very difficult to express, let us consider an analogy. The sculptor is re-

⁹ Michels, as usual, is very imprecise: all five meanings can be found, undifferentiated, in his book; but his chief sin is his unannounced shift in emphasis from (4) lack of control (pp. 136, 144, 145, 154) to (5) exploitation (pp. 389, 390). Gaetano Mosca in *The Ruling Class*, tr. by Kahn (New York, 1939), pp. 50, 154, 329, also mixes meanings (4) and (5), and moreover stresses the obvious by emphasizing meaning (1), that political direction is the function of a minority.

¹⁰ See Friedrich, "Oligarchy," cited above, n. 7.

¹¹ Cf. Michels, *op. cit.*, p. 156, and Mosca, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹² Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1946), p. 589.

stricted in his action by the size, shape, pattern, hardness, brittleness, etc., of the particular piece of marble with which he is working. But the marble has no control over what the sculptor wishes to make out of it, given that his possible choices are restricted as described above. It is in this sense that executive activities are free from control in an oligarchy. The subordinate activities do not explicitly direct the form (or even the purpose) of the executive activities; they have only a "negative" or "restrictive" influence. To put it more bluntly, and somewhat less precisely, the executive can do what he wants to do, as long as he knows how to handle the human material with which he must work.

It can be seen that the implications of this definition of oligarchy are not as "elitist" as they might appear at first glance, by reflecting that our entire discussion is concerned only with the situation *within a single organization*. Nothing as yet has been said about the relation of any given organization to external groups, organized or unorganized.

By adopting a definition of oligarchy which is stated in terms of human activities and not of human beings, allowance is made for the fact that the same people are not always leaders or executives. This is tantamount to saying that our definition is consistent with the theory of "the circulation of elites."¹³ If the law of oligarchy is to attribute special power to a minority of people, it must be designed to account for the fact that this minority changes in personnel, usually gradually by absorption and assimilation of "new blood," but occasionally suddenly by a replacement of one group of people by another. Relative permanence in personnel "indirectly favors" oligarchy, according to Michels,¹⁴ but as will be seen this tendency is not directly connected with the phenomenon of organization; and thus our law need not take it into account.

The law of oligarchy, at this stage of its development, reads as follows: For any x , if x is a group of human activities ordered by a system of specialization of function, a sub-group of this group having as its goal the maintenance of this order or of an order very similar to it, then those activities of x which have the highest degree of authority are free from control by any of the remainder of the activities ordered by the system.

III

As stated, the law of oligarchy could be taken as an empirical generalization, arrived at by observing many organizations and noticing that they are all oligarchies. But our evidence is available in more specific categories, and we are able to answer the question: Why are organizations always oligarchies? In fact, Michels' book is primarily concerned with the several answers to this question, although he apparently did not think it important to tell us precisely what organizations and oligarchies happen to be. The answers are in the form of generalizations less broad in scope than the law of oligarchy, and we might

¹³ For Michels' statement of this theory see his *Political Parties*, p. 378.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

consider them to be stating the causes of oligarchy. When these subsidiary or supporting generalizations are stated, the law of oligarchy becomes a hyper-generalization which says that a certain proportion of the supporting generalizations are applicable to every instance of an organization.

Michels distinguishes between two general types of causes of oligarchy, which may be called "technical" and "psychological," respectively. I intend to state these in a very casual way, since putting them in good logical and causal order both internally and with respect to one another and to the law of oligarchy would bury our discussion in non-essential details. If it is remembered that these supporting generalizations are directed to the end of explaining why the leaders are free from control, then there should be no confusion.

The generalizations expressing the technical causes of oligarchy are the following: The large number of members of an organization prohibits any regular intercourse among them. The large number of issues that must be decided upon prevents the mass from participating in the making of most of these decisions. Organizational duties become so complex and complicated that only experts can handle them. Organizational duties become so numerous that they can be handled only by professionals, men who devote their time and energy exclusively to these duties.¹⁵

The generalizations expressing the psychological causes are as follows: Only a small number of people are interested in public affairs. The majority of people feel a need to be directed and guided. The majority of people have a sense of gratitude to the men who guide and direct them. The leader comes to be regarded as indispensable by the mass. The leader comes to consider himself as possessing a right to the office which he holds. Only a few people are capable of performing the functions of leadership. The exercise of power has a conservative effect, and the leader tends to use all his power to retain his position of power. The leader comes to regard the organization, and his own office, as more important than the professed goal of the organization.¹⁶

There is a rather important difference between technical and psychological causes. While the former are connected with the nature of organization and specialization of function, the latter have no special connection with the essence of organization. The phenomena of mass-apathy, consolidation of power, "hero-worship," etc., occur in any large group, whether or not it is an organization. By formulating the law of oligarchy in terms of organizations, we are able to take advantage of the existence of these psychological causes; while the technical causes, upon the existence of which our law depends for its validity, do not come within the scope of a law formulated in other terms, say "ruling class" or "organized minority." Furthermore, if we dispense with the concept of organization and talk, as Mosca does,¹⁷ about the domination of society by a minority, we have said nothing more than that in political affairs some people,

¹⁵ The respective sources for these generalizations are the following pages of *Political Parties*: 25, 27, 28, 36.

¹⁶ *Political Parties*, pp. 49, 53, 60, 86, 95, 206, 373.

¹⁷ *The Ruling Class*, p. 329.

who are usually in a minority, give orders and the rest of the people obey them. I have already commented on this statement, which is little more than a truism. The psychological causes alone are not enough to establish freedom from control on the part of the ruling minority, as modern representative governments have shown.

With the introduction of the supporting generalizations and of the distinction between technical and psychological causes, the law of oligarchy becomes a hyper-generalization, stating that the technical causes accompany every organization and also that some proportion of the psychological causes are also present, a proportion which differs from organization to organization, depending upon factors like the length of time the leaders have held their positions (see above).

The validity of the law of oligarchy depends, of course, upon the correctness of the generalizations stating the existence of the technical causes. I do not intend to argue in support of these generalizations, since such a task is beyond the scope of the present paper. It is obvious, however, that such an argument must rest upon an investigation into the nature of organizations. (Michels devotes not more than one-quarter of his book to this kind of investigation; the remainder is concerned with the less important and, I think, less interesting psychological causes; but he has stated these latter systematically and clearly).

IV

It has probably occurred to the reader that not all organizations exhibit the properties necessary for the existence of the technical causes. These properties were, it will be remembered, a large number of members, a large number of issues requiring action, and complicated and numerous organizational duties. The obvious inference is that the law of oligarchy applies only to large organizations. Moreover, we know that small organizations are usually not oligarchies. If a small organization does happen to be characterized by freedom from control regarding the executive activities, then the causes of this characteristic must be psychological in nature. Since our formulation of the law of oligarchy depends exclusively upon the concept of organization and since the properties necessary for the existence of the psychological causes do not follow from this concept, we must amend the law so that it refers only to large organizations. The problem is to determine what a large organization is.

This is clearly a very difficult problem, as are all such problems in political science involving the drawing of lower limits to a quantitative concept. Apparently Michels considers the crux of the issue to be the numerical limit to regular intercourse among the members of the organization, the condition required for our first technical cause. On the basis of this approach, he suggests a limit in the interval 1000-10,000.¹⁸ Organizations with memberships exceeding 1000-10,000 fall within the scope of our law and are thus oligarchies. However, the number and complexity of the issues to be decided and of the duties to be

¹⁸ *Political Parties*, p. 26; see also Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

performed are not always proportional to the number of members of the organization; or, if they are proportional, they do not appear to be related to the possibilities of regular intercourse among the members. Whatever the solution to this problem is, it naturally depends upon an analysis of the causes of oligarchy within an organization; and, as far as I know, such an analysis has not as yet been made. In any event, the necessary complexity and quantity of issues and duties can be said to be associated with organizations whose membership exceeds a limit in the interval 1000-10,000, and this statement is accurate enough for our present purposes.

Consequently, the law of oligarchy must be qualified as follows: For any x , if x is an organization *and* the number of people involved in x , i.e., those who perform the activities of which x consists, exceeds 1000-10,000, then x is an oligarchy. (If we knew more about the conditions under which issues and duties become numerous and complex, then the qualifying clause could be expanded to include the proper minimum limits to these conditions.)

V

It will be of advantage to summarize the present account of the logical structure of the law of oligarchy in ordinary language, without any pretense of precision. What I have tried to do is to set forth what the law of oligarchy states; I have not been concerned with evaluating the truth of this statement. Such an endeavor is justified, among other reasons, because neither Michels nor anyone else has made a sustained attempt to specify the meaning of the law, a shortcoming which has led to its being credited with all kinds of wild assertions. And, as a consequence, most of the criticism of Michels' work has been beside the point.

The law of oligarchy states that, when an organization reaches a certain size and attains a certain degree of complexity, the people who exercise authority by virtue of their positions in the organization are controlled by the people with less authority only in the "negative" way described above. It must be remembered that the law of oligarchy is a hyper-generalization, depending for its validity upon the factual accuracy of the generalizations stating the technical causes of oligarchy. Thus "irresponsibility" of leadership which results from a non-technical cause, such as the hierarchical structure of a business or a military organization, is not covered by the law. However, even in the case of "legitimate" hierarchies the technical causes may be operative in the sense that those formally in control of the organization are unable, for reasons of size and complexity, to hold their nominal subordinates responsible. (This possibility is the one central to the theory of the "managerial revolution.") The circumstances under which the technical causes thus become operative are again part of the theory of the "supporting generalizations."

It is very important to keep in mind that the law says nothing about the situation which results from the organization's relations with other groups of people. It is concerned only with the situation *within* any single organization. Thus nothing can be inferred about the "oligarchical" nature of society or of

the state, unless additional assumptions are introduced into the argument. But the law of oligarchy does tell us that wherever organizations occur in society, control of the organizational leadership must come from outside the organization. Michels¹⁹ thinks that such control comes from the leaders of other organizations, when there are other organizations strong enough to challenge, and others have agreed with him. Thus the law itself is not inconsistent with "democracy," nor does it mean that human volition has nothing to do with the development of the political process.²⁰ The law of oligarchy says only that the leaders are not controlled by the members of their own organizations; it says nothing whatsoever about the number and relative strength of the organizations which occur within any society or state or even government.

¹⁹ *Political Parties*, pp. 400-8.

²⁰ As David Spitz thinks; see his *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York, 1949), pp. 27-29.

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MOVEMENT, 1933-1953*

HAROLD W. DAVEY

Iowa State College

Informed policy-making is the primary responsibility of any legislative body in a democracy. The policy-making task at all levels of government has become increasingly complex, technical and burdensome. This has been particularly evident in the years since the Great Depression. The demand for an increasing quantum of governmental services and functions at all levels and the competition among governmental units for revenue sources to finance public services have been chiefly responsible for magnifying the legislative burden. Hence it is surprising and disturbing that the people's policy-makers at the state level have been somewhat loath to reorganize their legislative processes and procedures to meet contemporary needs. Many "little Hoover" commissions have been busily engaged in recent years in attempting to modernize state administrative organization.¹ No correspondingly vigorous effort has been made at legislative self-examination, although the need is at least equally pressing. Only ten states have annual legislative sessions, in spite of the fact that informed students of state government generally agree that the volume of legislative business in most states requires annual sessions.² Few states have made substantial progress in streamlining and revising their committee systems. Only a few have undertaken to remove unrealistic constitutional prohibitions limiting the length of legislative sessions.

Thorough-going consideration of legislative reorganization is beyond the scope of this discussion.³ We are concerned here solely with analyzing the legis-

* The views expressed herein are solely those of the writer. Conclusions are based mainly on first-hand research by correspondence and personal interview. In 1948-49, the writer engaged in correspondence with legislative council personnel in about 20 states, principally with directors of council research departments. Analysis of academic literature and correspondence was supplemented in the summer of 1949 by a field trip for personal interviews to three legislative council states, Kansas, Illinois and Missouri. The writer also has profited by use of the Council of State Governments' Joint Reference Library in Chicago and by personal interviews with CSG staff personnel. Research done in 1948 and 1949 was brought up to date in 1952 and 1953 by additional correspondence with legislative council research personnel, CSG officials, and state legislators.

The writer wishes to acknowledge, especially the help and encouragement of the following: Louis Dorweiler, Frederic Guild, Jack Isakoff, Arthur Y. Lloyd, Jack Rhodes and Herbert F. Wiltsee.

¹ Apparently, however, legislative translation of recommendations into action on the administrative re-organization front has not been particularly satisfactory. See Karl Bosworth, "The Politics of Management Improvement in the States," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 84-99 (March, 1953).

² The ten states with annual sessions are Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.

³ The Council of State Government's Committee on Legislative Processes and Procedures, in its excellent report, *Our State Legislatures* (Chicago, 1948), calls attention to the need for consideration of the following points:

lative council or legislative research committee as one device for improving the state legislature's ability to deal intelligently with serious issues of policy.⁴ The analysis deals with (1) the origins and purposes of legislative councils, (2) the organization and powers of legislative councils, (3) objections to the legislative council device, and (4) evaluation of the legislative council as a tool for improving the legislative product.

I. ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

At least 32 states now have legislative councils or council-type agencies.⁵ Kansas established the first council in 1933. Other states began to follow as their legislative burdens became so serious that they were forced to act. The

- (1) Length and frequency of legislative sessions.
- (2) Adequacy of compensation for legislators.
- (3) Staggering of legislators' terms to insure continuity in leadership and legislative responsibility.
- (4) Appointment of full-time legislative employees on the basis of merit and competence.
- (5) Reduction and reorganization of legislative committees.
- (6) Provision for public hearings on all major bills.
- (7) Adequacy of clerical and research facilities for legislators. Consideration of need for legislative council and/or legislative reference service.
- (8) Adequacy of the legislature's reference, research, bill-drafting, and statutory revision services.
- (9) Limiting by rule the period during a legislative session when new bills may be introduced. Provision for drafting, filing and printing of bills before the opening of a legislative session.
- (10) Need for a permanent joint committee on legislative organization, rules and procedure to expedite legislative procedure.
- (11) Adequate budget for the legislature.
- (12) Delegation of claims against the state to judicial or administrative agencies. Design of effective substitutes for special legislation on matters of purely local concern.

⁴ In view of the rapid growth of the legislative council movement in recent years, the academic literature on legislative councils is surprisingly sparse. One of the best recent articles is Frederic H. Guild, "Legislative Councils: Objectives and Accomplishments," *State Government*, Vol. 22, pp. 217-19, 226 (Sept., 1949). See also Lawrence W. O'Rourke, *Legislative Assistance*, (University of California at Los Angeles Bureau of Governmental Research, 1951) and Norman Meller, "The Policy Position of Legislative Service Agencies," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 109-23 (March, 1952). The University of Hawaii's Legislative Reference Bureau has released in mimeographed form an excellent research monograph on legislative councils and legislative reference services. Released in April, 1948 under the title *Legislative Aids*, this report may be obtained on a library loan basis from the Council of State Governments' Joint Reference Library, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois. For valuable recent data on organization, appropriations, functions and powers of legislative councils, see Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States 1952-53* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 114-24. For additional bibliography on the legislative council movement, consult two reports by Frederic H. Guild in the *Law Library Journal*, Vol. 36, pp. 169-90 (Nov., 1943), and Vol. 42, pp. 60-75 (May, 1949).

⁵ By April, 1953, Arizona, Colorado, and Montana had established legislative councils this year. Alaska also established a legislative council in 1953.

TABLE I. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STATES

State	Year of Adoption	Agency Name
Alabama	1945	Legislative Council
Arizona	1953	Legislative Council
Arkansas	1947	Legislative Council
Colorado	1953	Legislative Council
Connecticut	1937	Legislative Council
Florida	1949	Legislative Council
Illinois	1937	Legislative Council
Indiana	1945	Legislative Advisory Commission
Kansas	1933	Legislative Council
Kentucky	1948	Legislative Research Commission
Louisiana	1952	Legislative Council
Maine	1939	Legislative Research Committee
Maryland	1939	Legislative Council
Minnesota	1947	Legislative Research Committee
Missouri	1943	Committee on Legislative Research
Montana	1953	Legislative Council
Nebraska	1937	Legislative Council
Nevada	1945	Legislative Counsel Bureau
New Hampshire	1951	Legislative Council
New Mexico	1951	Legislative Council
North Dakota	1945	Legislative Research Committee
Ohio	1952*	Program Commission
Oklahoma	1939	Legislative Council
Pennsylvania	1937	Joint State Government Commission
South Carolina	1949	Legislative Council
South Dakota	1951	Legislative Research Council
Texas	1949	Legislative Council
Utah	1947	Legislative Council
Virginia	1936	Advisory Legislative Council
Washington	1947	Legislative Council
Wisconsin	1947	Joint Legislative Council
Wyoming	1951	Legislative Interim Committee

* Ohio is now counted by the Council of State Governments as a legislative council state.

council movement has accelerated considerably in the postwar period, as can be seen in Table I.

A legislative council may be defined as a permanent joint committee of the state legislature, assisted by a full-time professional research staff appointed by the council on the basis of merit. Most legislative councils are made up of an equal number of legislators from each house. The median size of legislative councils today is around 18 members. Councils ordinarily meet not less than four times a year, including years when the legislature is not in session. Thus one of the principal values of the legislative council device is to insure continuous attention to major areas of state policy between legislative sessions.

While legislative councils may perform a number of functions for the legis-

lature, the primary purpose of their creation in most states has been to provide competent assistance to the legislature on major problems of state policy requiring research for informed action by the legislature. For this reason, the integrity and effectiveness of the council's research arm is of vital importance to the success of the legislative council idea. Appointments to the research staff must be made on the basis of professional qualifications. If research personnel were to be chosen on a partisan basis, the fundamental purpose of the legislative council idea would be in serious jeopardy.⁶

Among the functions that a legislative council may perform for the legislature, the following⁷ may be listed:

1. Collect information on state government and on legislative proposals.
2. Prepare research reports on major issues of state policy.
3. Recommend legislation.
4. Draft bills embodying such recommendations.
5. Investigate administrative agencies to effect economies in state government.
6. Cooperate with administrative agencies or with special committees.
7. Study legislative procedures.
8. Study effect of statutory and constitutional provisions.
9. Study financial and personnel needs of state government.
10. Study revision of statutes.
11. Prepare legislative program.
12. Prepare public report on recommendations in advance of legislative sessions.

State laws differ materially in the functions assigned to their legislative councils. However, it can be stated with some confidence that *all* legislative councils or council-type agencies perform the following three major functions: (1) provide each legislator with his own source of factual information on state problems of current importance; (2) provide a mechanism that can insure coordinated and continuing study and consideration of major legislative problems between legislative sessions; (3) issue fact-finding reports, with or without specific policy recommendations, for the information of the legislators and citizens generally, usually in advance of the legislative session.

The first operative council was not the brain-child of some ivory tower political scientist dreaming of a legislative utopia. The inspiration for the Kansas legislative council plan came from Sam Wilson, manager of the Kansas Chamber of Commerce in the early 1930's.⁸ State Chambers of Commerce customarily have standing committees on various subjects. Wilson appreciated that the Chamber's standing committees spent a great deal of time and effort in

⁶ The research arm of the council need not be large. The *sine qua non* here is quality of personnel. In most states, the council's research unit consists of two to four professional research men, plus requisite clerical assistance. In states with a large volume of varied legislative business, the research unit may be considerably larger. The Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission research staff, for example, numbers 22, including economists, statisticians, accountants and other research personnel, according to Guy W. Davis, counsel and director, Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission.

⁷ This list of functions is adapted from Lawrence W. O'Rourke's study (cited in note 4).

⁸ It should be pointed out, however, that the National Municipal League as early as 1921 recommended a legislative council as part of its model state constitution.

digging up factual background for their proposals for the legislature's consideration. It was suddenly borne in upon Wilson that the legislature itself, in the press of a legislative session, had completely inadequate facilities for obtaining accurate and reliable information to enable it to deal intelligently with all the multifarious problems coming before it. The recognition of this need by a practical business man was the real genesis of the Kansas legislative council.⁹

In the 20 years since Kansas established the first such agency, the legislative council has come to be regarded by professional students of state government as a device well-calculated to insure an efficient and responsible job of policy-making by the state legislature. Of course, no procedural mechanism is a fool proof panacea. Nevertheless, particularly in the postwar years, the legislative council appears to have met a real need of state legislators. As the Advisory Council for Iowa Economic Studies points out in a recent report:

The legislators themselves are the main customers for the services of a legislative council. They have first claim on the time and abilities of the council staff. The legislative council operates as a service agency for the legislature as a whole. Its primary purpose is to help the members of the legislature to do a more effective job of policy-making, based on sound sources of unbiased information.

Thus, the chief values of a legislative council are *educational* and *informational*. A legislative council helps to make research findings immediately usable by the individual legislator. The close working relationship between legislators serving on the council and the council's professional research staff guarantees that the research will be geared to the specific and immediate needs of the legislature itself. The close relationship between legislator and expert assures that the results of independent fact-finding will be put to immediate practical use.¹⁰

The legislative council movement took root and has its principal strength in the Midwestern states. This is significant. The average legislator in most of these states is a "citizen-legislator."¹¹ He is not a full-time politician or professional legislator, as may frequently be the case in large industrial states whose legislatures meet annually. The "citizen-legislator" is generally a public-spirited citizen who leaves his farm or profession for several months every two years to devote his energies and abilities to serious issues of state policy. The "citizen-legislator" needs urgently a source of reliable information. Lacking

⁹ This account of the origins of the Kansas legislative council is based on personal interviews with Dr. Frederic H. Guild, director of research for the Kansas Legislative Council since its inception in 1933, and with Mr. Sam Wilson. Wilson reasoned that the legislature would produce an improved product if there were some agency to provide continuous deliberative action between legislative sessions and which could do some objective fact-finding on problems coming before the next legislature. Wilson stumped the state in favor of the council plan. Local Chambers supported it and considerable grass roots sentiment was built up before the bill was introduced.

¹⁰ Advisory Council for Iowa Economic Studies, *Helping Iowa's Legislature*, mimeographed (Ames, 1952). This report deals with the need for establishment of a legislative council in Iowa. It is a revision of an earlier report along similar lines by the Advisory Council, published in May, 1950. The writer of this article did the basic research on which both Advisory Council reports are based.

¹¹ This term should be credited to Mr. Herbert Wiltsee, Southern Representative for the Council of State Governments.

such a source, even the most conscientious legislator is forced to rely on the conflicting and often distorted reports of interested groups. No legislator has the time or resources to investigate personally the factual background on each of the issues he is asked to vote upon. He is entitled to the expert assistance that the research department of a legislative council can provide.

II. ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

The size and composition of a council will be determined in most cases by such factors as the total number of legislators, political representation, joint composition, and area representation. Both large and small councils have their respective merits. A council should be large enough to be reasonably representative of the legislature as a whole. However, it should not be so large as to militate against effective deliberative work. Approximately 15 to 20 members would appear to satisfy these considerations in most states.

The question of the size of the council requires attention to the most significant recent organizational development in this field. Three states now make every legislator a member of the legislative council.¹² In each case, the move appears to have been made by supporters of the council idea to mollify legislators who were resentful at not being named to the council. It is questionable whether such appeasement was either necessary or desirable.¹³ Perhaps, however, it is too early to pass judgment on the merits of this organizational innovation.

The arguments for and against the new system in Oklahoma have been set forth in temperate fashion by O'Rourke as follows:

Advantages of the new system are many. All legislators now participate in council work, thus dispelling any ill feeling which may have developed under the former plan. The "Super legislature" criticism can no longer be made. The new council offers an opportunity for all members of the legislature to participate in the study and investigation of legislative problems. This council activity will serve to educate and inform the legislator so that he may better perform his policy-making function when the legislature meets in full session.

Disadvantages are present under the new system. The larger council offers problems of coordination. Coordination of activities must be worked out between the chairman of the council, the director of the council's staff and the committee chairman. There is the additional problem of an increased budget. Under the Oklahoma plan, members of the council receive a mileage allowance as well as their regular pay as legislators. The large council also needs increased staff services to meet its activities. To date these problems have not proven serious and apparently the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.¹⁴

¹² Nebraska, with a unicameral legislature, changed to this practice in 1951. Oklahoma revised its law in 1949. South Dakota made all legislators members of the council when it first established a legislative research council in 1951.

¹³ Dr. Jack Rhodes, director of research for the Oklahoma Legislative Council, advised the writer that if the Oklahoma Council had not been expanded in 1949 to include all members of the legislature, the council law would probably have been repealed. However, Dr. Rhodes feels that the expanded membership has been "highly beneficial" as far as Oklahoma is concerned. Council appropriations have increased substantially in recent sessions as a direct result of increased legislative confidence in the council and gratifying interim participation by virtually every member of the legislature, according to Dr. Rhodes. (Letter to the writer, April 17, 1953.)

¹⁴ Lawrence O'Rourke, *Legislative Assistance* (cited in n. 4), pp. 13-14.

In considering the *powers* assigned by statute to legislative councils in the various states, it is desirable to review the controversy over "recommending" councils versus "fact-finding only" councils. Opinion on this question is still divided among professional students of the legislative council movement. However, most newly-created councils are of the "recommending" type.

An alternative type that merits serious consideration is one that leaves the submission of recommendations to the discretion of the council. A permissive statute gives the council enough flexibility to enable it to "feel" its way in response to the wishes of the legislators themselves. The council is not required to submit a legislative program nor to accompany all research reports with policy recommendations. On the other hand, the council is not prohibited from making recommendations when it feels they are appropriate.

A permissive statute appears to be a desirable compromise in any state where fears are expressed about the legislative council's becoming a "super-legislature." Also, it must be remembered that perhaps the chief values in the legislative council plan lie in the research assistance phase, whether or not recommendations accompany research findings. Nevertheless, the writer has concluded that the maximum potential of the legislative council mechanism is not achieved unless the council itself assumes the responsibility for formulating policy recommendations to the legislature.

Kansas and Pennsylvania may be cited as illustrative of the "recommending" type. Missouri and Illinois are representative of the "fact-finding only" type. Persuasive arguments may be advanced for each type. In favor of the "recommending" type are the following considerations:

1. Legislative council members take more direct and sustained interest in the work of the research staff if they must "take a stand" after research on a problem has been completed. Council members have a keener sense of participation and show more interest in sub-committee assignments.
2. Where research reports are submitted without any policy stand by the legislative council, meetings of the council may be routine and perfunctory. Less effective use of research will be made. Many excellent reports may go unnoticed because the council members do not have the interest to see that these reports are read and used by other legislators.
3. The real values in close collaboration between the "citizen-legislator" and the research staff are not maximized if the council member does not have to take a stand.
4. Experience has shown that the fears of giving the council the power to recommend are largely groundless. In no case where the council recommends legislation has the council become a super-legislature. The high percentage of acceptance of council bills is not attributable to undue influence from the council. Rather it is due to a recognition by the legislature as a whole that council bills are based on thorough research followed by thorough discussion.

In support of the "fact-finding only" type of council, the following considerations may be advanced:

1. The development of an efficient and unbiased research service for the legislature is the principal value inherent in the legislative council device. The advance planning and recommending functions of the legislative council have been overrated by their supporters.
2. A council that confines itself to the submission of research reports without recom-

mentations need have no fear of being charged with an interest in usurping legislative power.

3. When the power to recommend is exercised, there is a constant danger that undesirable political considerations will be introduced. This may raise doubts as to the integrity and accuracy of the council's factual reporting to the legislature.

4. In states with frequently shifting party majorities, council recommendations made in advance of the next legislative session might become those of the minority party after November elections. Such contingencies might ultimately discredit the legislative council device and serve to obscure the real values of the objective factual investigation preceding the formation of policy recommendations.

A growing feeling can be noted on the part of legislators generally, whether members of the council or not, that the council's research and study assignment is not completed until the council announces conclusions or at least sets forth alternative policy suggestions on the matters that the council has been studying.¹⁵ In practice, a substantial majority of legislative councils do submit legislative recommendations together with research reports.¹⁶ The percentage in favor of the "recommending" type appears likely to increase over the next few years.

To facilitate their research work, most councils are empowered to enlist cooperation and support from other state agencies. Many councils have the power to subpoena witnesses and to hold hearings.

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IDEA

In the history of the legislative council movement only one state, Michigan, has ever repealed its law establishing a legislative council.¹⁷ One other state, Rhode Island, never appropriated funds to activate its council. With these two exceptions, the council movement has had a steady and successful growth. Nevertheless, in states that have not yet adopted this device vigorous objections are still heard. Among the principal objections are these:

1. The legislative council would become a super-legislature. It would derogate from the proper authority of the legislature as a whole. The legislature would be run by a powerful small clique of council members.

2. A legislative council is an unnecessary and expensive luxury. It will cost more than it is worth.

3. Special interim committees can do a better job on problems requiring attention between legislative sessions than can a legislative council.

4. Only a favored few will benefit from the facilities of a legislative council's research staff. The needs of the individual legislator will be ignored. His requests for service may go unheeded or be screened out by the legislative council.

¹⁵ Authority for this observation is Mr. Herbert Wiltsee. Recent correspondence with legislative council personnel in a number of states that appear to be moving gradually toward the "recommending" type council confirms his observation.

¹⁶ According to the Council of State Governments, legislative councils in the following states submit policy recommendations to their legislatures: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

¹⁷ Kentucky repealed its original council law in 1948, but immediately enacted a new legislative council law at the same session.

5. Legislative council bills will get special attention by standing committees. They will monopolize the attention of the legislature. The individual legislator who has worked hard to prepare his own bills will find that they are ignored by the legislature in favor of council bills.

These objections are serious. If any one or combination of them is supported by experience, a state would be well-advised to think twice before adopting such a proposal. In appraising their validity, we can properly turn to the experience in legislative council states.

Will a legislative council become a super-legislature? The super-legislature charge against a legislative council has been raised initially in almost every state when the council proposal was first under consideration. Some councils have had considerable opposition on this score during their early years. Nevertheless, experience in council states rather conclusively refutes the validity of the charge.

No governmental body is more jealous of its rights and prerogatives than a legislative assembly. The fastest way for a newly-established legislative council to commit suicide would be to provide some substance to the fear that it might become a super-legislature. Extensive personal correspondence on this matter shows that in most cases the legislative council proceeds with great caution and circumspection in presenting its reports and recommendations to the legislature as a whole. Certainly, tact and diplomacy are called for at all times. Willingness to cooperate with legislative standing committees and with individual legislators must be clearly evidenced.

Above and beyond these common-sense considerations, it is also worth noting that there are many inherent safeguards in the legislative council device that preclude effectively the council's becoming a super-legislature even if it be hypothecated that the council should have such a desire. These safeguards include the following:

1. Most legislative councils are by nature "lame duck" committees, appointed out of an expiring legislature. It is difficult for "lame ducks" to behave tyrannically even if they were disposed to do so.

2. The bulk of the council's work is done *between* rather than during sessions of the legislature. The council's reports and recommendations are completed before the start of the legislative session. Many councils do not operate as councils during the actual legislative session.

3. Acceptance or rejection of the council's work depends on the quality and thoroughness of the research by the council's staff and the basic value of the council's recommendations. The only *procedural* advantage that council bills enjoy is their early submission. The only *substantive* advantage that council bills may have is a more solid evidential foundation based on the research preceding the formulation of council recommendations. The fact remains that once council bills are introduced, they are "on their own" in company with hundreds of individual legislator bills.

4. Council recommendations are accompanied in all cases by research findings stating the factual background. The council's report provides factual and analytical ammunition for *both* sides of whatever policy issue is under consideration. Thus, individual legislators who may be opposed for policy reasons to the council's recommendations can find reliable factual support for their own views in the council's research report. This is a far cry, in the writer's judgment, from a super-legislature ramming unwanted legislation down the

throats of helpless legislators. If council reports did not contain both sides of the picture on every subject considered, the justifiable outcry from the legislature would eliminate the council device in short order.

5. Finally, the normally heavy turnover rate among state legislators makes it extremely unlikely that any legislative council could become a small band of willful men obstinately set on running the legislature.

It cannot be denied that a legislative council, under some circumstances, *might* become a super-legislature. However, it is doubtful that the council movement would have made such rapid progress in recent years if there were any real evidential basis for these super-legislature fears. The writer has examined council research reports from some 20 states. These reports in general reflect thoroughness and fairness in research and analysis. In most of the reports examined by the writer there was ample "ammunition" for both sides of the policy question reported upon.

In the final analysis, experience does not appear to support the super-legislature charge. The "recommending" council, the only type against which the charge could possibly be made, is in the ascendancy within the council movement. Nearly all the newer councils are of the recommending type. There appears to be neither a logical nor an evidential basis to support the fears of those who feel that the council device constitutes a grab for undue power and influence.

Is a legislative council too costly? State legislatures currently appear to be economy-minded. There is strong objection to any measure involving new appropriations and a tendency to require proof that a new service will be in a sense self-liquidating. The history of the legislative council movement shows that most councils began with severely limited appropriations, demonstrated their worth, and have had their appropriations increased to correspond with increasing demands for their services. Table II shows appropriations for legislative councils for the 1951-53 biennium.

A legislative council is a device to improve the quality of the legislative product. It would therefore be incorrect to estimate the value of its service to the legislature and the state on a dollars and cents basis. Improved legislative understanding of key policy questions rather than cost savings should be the more important consideration. However, because of the virility of this cost argument, the writer has made inquiry among legislative councils as to specific savings effected as a direct consequence of council research reports. Among the examples of direct cost savings attributable to council research activity, the following may be cited:

1. In one midwestern state, a research study on travel and mileage expenses of public employees resulted in an annual saving of approximately \$100,000.
2. In the same state, a research study of highway department economies necessary to retain federal matching aid was directly responsible for avoiding the loss of that aid.
3. In another midwestern state, a council research study prevented a costly and unnecessary expenditure in connection with the state's mental health program.
4. In a western state, a council research study on plans for a new heating plant at the state university resulted in a different approach to the problem than that originally contemplated. The direct saving here was estimated at \$500,000.

TABLE II. LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS: 1951-1953 APPROPRIATIONS*

State	1951-53 Appropriations for Council and Research Service	State	1951-53 Appropriations for Council and Research Service
Alabama	\$ 86,500	New Hampshire	10,000
Arkansas	81,200 ^a	New Mexico	50,000
Connecticut	42,750	North Dakota	40,000 ^a
Florida	102,500	Ohio	100,000
Illinois	98,040 ^a	Oklahoma	100,000 ^a
Indiana	85,750	Pennsylvania	250,000 ^d
Kansas	145,000 ^a	South Carolina	100,875 ^b
Kentucky	150,000 ^{a,b}	South Dakota	25,000
Louisiana	†	Texas	104,000 ^a
Maine	88,748	Utah	40,000
Maryland	80,000 ^b	Virginia	35,760 ^{a,c}
Missouri	190,000 ^a	Washington	100,000 ^f
Minnesota	106,800	Wisconsin	66,000 ^a
Nebraska	75,885	Wyoming	25,000
Nevada	39,041		

* Table adapted from data supplied by the Council of State Governments.

† No information available.

^a Excludes earmarked appropriations for special studies or other specified purposes.

^b 1950-52 biennium.

^c Includes \$20,000 for Legislative Audit Committee.

^d 1949-51 biennium.

^e Plus \$63,990 for Division of Statutory Research and Drafting.

^f Council does not receive direct appropriation. This is amount budgeted out of total legislative expense appropriation item.

These cases illustrate the constant potential for more economical and efficient government inherent in legislation based on solid, factual investigation. At this point it may be advisable to suggest that many states have found the legislative council to be a viable and relatively inexpensive alternative to annual sessions.

Can interim committees do a better job than a legislative council? Some legislators oppose the legislative council as unnecessary. They contend that interim committees can do a more effective job. Here again experience appears to refute the charge. Existence of a council does not eliminate interim committees. However, a legislative council can reduce the need for interim research assignments to *ad hoc* committees. The legislative council's research arm can perform many assignments more efficiently and less expensively than can *ad hoc* interim committees. However, in any state the need for special interim committees on highly technical or complex questions will arise periodically.

Council reports are likely to be more understandable to the average legislator than the more technical reports of interim committees, usually prepared by outside specialists. Also, experience in council states indicates that legislators are likely to make greater and more immediate use of legislative council reports than of interim committee reports.

Dr. Guild offers an interesting analysis of the comparative cost of research studies by legislative councils and special interim committees. He writes:

We figured in Kansas that our interim committees, omitting one of the larger committees with a particularly high appropriation, had been costing the state \$15,000 per subject studied. In the first eight years' operation of the Kansas legislative council, the average cost per subject was \$1,500, and not only did no one feel that the subjects were less well covered, but in certain instances they thought the council gave better coverage.¹⁸

Some research jobs are too big or too specialized for a legislative council's small research unit to handle. In such cases, an *ad hoc* interim committee is necessary. For the greater number of interim research assignments, however, the legislative council and its research arm can do the job better, more quickly, and more economically than can interim committees with part-time research personnel.

Will the needs of individual legislators be ignored? Will legislative council bills get all the attention? Although the criticisms implied in these questions are rather commonly heard, little evidential support was found for them in the council states surveyed. Council bills *do* get attention. Such attention is usually favorable because of two rather obvious considerations: (1) council bills are based on independent research and are likely to be carefully thought out; and (2) council recommendations usually deal with major issues of policy requiring legislative action.

Council bills appear to enjoy a high rate of acceptance in most states. However, one should not conclude that bills by individual legislators are ignored. On the contrary, many legislators benefit from council research staff services in preparation of individual bills. Furthermore, if individual legislators wish to introduce legislation in opposition to a recommendation by the legislative council, they can frequently find factual support for their position in the research report accompanying the council's own bill.

In this writer's judgment, many legislators who raise either or both of these objections have an imperfect understanding of the manner in which a legislative council customarily operates. A council is designed to serve *all* members of the legislature, not council members alone. Council research reports (and recommendations where made) are circulated to all members of the legislature and, in many cases, to interested citizens outside the legislature. Legislative council activity is not confidential or secret. Furthermore, to the extent that manpower permits, the research needs of individual legislators are met. Admittedly, the legislative council functions as a screening committee on research requests and makes priorities in assignments to its research staff. Since the council's research arm is usually small, the need for screening and research priorities should be obvious.

More experienced members of state legislatures without legislative councils are occasionally prone to deprecate the council idea. They know the "ins and outs" of legislative procedure, and where to go for information they need.

¹⁸ Personal letter to writer, March 22, 1952.

Furthermore, they may regard the council and its reports as a threat to established power blocs in the legislature. Yet in states where legislative councils have been established, the experienced legislators are likely to be more appreciative of the agency's research facilities than are the newer members of the legislature.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

In summary evaluation of the objections to the legislative council device discussed in this report, it can fairly be said that in general they are not supported by experience in council states. It is highly significant that the legislative council has continued to gain favor as a mechanism for improving the legislative product, particularly in recent years.

On balance, the chief contributions of the legislative council device appear to have been these:

1. Council research reports have helped to raise the informational level in state legislative assemblies, thus contributing substantially to an improved legislative product.
2. By coordinated research activity between legislative sessions, councils have facilitated the prompt and thorough treatment of major issues of state policy.
3. The council, through its research activity and deliberative action, has contributed to muting the impact of undesirable pressure group activity on individual legislators. The "citizen-legislator" is no longer forced to make his own discounting of the competing claims of professional lobbyists. He has his own source of reliable, unbiased information.
4. In states where the council makes recommendations on major policy issues in advance of the legislative session, the early and thorough consideration by the legislature of such measures is facilitated. The labors of the council and its research arm *between* sessions help to alleviate the "log jam" conditions so common in states without annual sessions and without legislative councils.

The foregoing analysis of the legislative council movement supports the Council of State Governments' conclusion that the legislative council is properly regarded as the "most significant development in the legislative service agency field during the past twenty years."²⁰

¹⁹ This point is stressed by Arthur Y. Lloyd, Director of the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, in a letter to the writer, March 30, 1953.

²⁰ Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States, 1952-53* (Chicago, 1952), p. 115.

INCREASING THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE FOR FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS*

WALTER H. C. LAVES
Governmental Affairs Institute

The purpose of this paper is to inquire what contribution American political science can make to the easing of the shortage of competent manpower for assignments abroad.

The problem is, of course, not peculiar to the United States except in respect to its magnitude. Nearly every country with major responsibilities involving the assignment of personnel abroad is faced with it. On a world scale the United Nations, especially with respect to the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, is facing difficulties in searching out individuals who are competent, willing, and available. This was forcefully revealed by a study the author recently made for all the specialized agencies on behalf of the Technical Assistance Board. It appears to be a characteristic of our times that not enough men and women have been trained to deal competently with the kinds of problems with which we are faced in intensified intercultural relations. Thus, while this discussion will deal chiefly with the problem of increasing the American personnel potentially available for foreign assignments—something with which American political scientists need to be urgently concerned—we must avoid losing sight of the broader world setting of the problem. As the market of recruitment is world-wide for many areas of "foreign" and "international" work, so the means selected to increase the supply for the market should be as nearly world-wide as practicable.

Again, lest we fall into another kind of parochialism, it is essential to remember that political science is but one of the intellectual resources involved in helping to solve the problem. Whatever initiatives political scientists take must, of course, be related to, and coordinated with, the special initiatives of many other groups, including particularly our colleagues in other social sciences, history, education, linguistics and the humanities.

The solution of the problem under discussion, whether on a world basis or in the United States alone, will not come quickly, though a host of emergency efforts will be required and undertaken to meet immediate crises.

It is not intended to deal directly with the special problems of recruitment and training peculiar to the career Foreign Service. Rather, our special concern is with the more general needs for personnel in specialized mission assignments abroad. Any progress made in solving the more general problem will, of course,

* This paper was prepared as a basis for a panel discussion at the American Political Science Association's annual meeting held in Buffalo, New York, 1952. It is reproduced here, with a few minor changes, because it points to a major problem facing the United States government in which political scientists have a special concern and responsibility. Acknowledgment is gratefully made to John B. Robinson, Foreign Operations Administration, for assistance in preparing the paper.

also ease the Foreign Service problem. No pretense is made that all the issues have been raised, and obviously only some solutions have been suggested.

Nature of the Problem. The essence of the manpower shortage with which we are concerned here is not people but *competence* and *availability* of people. This shortage of competent and available people for work involving assignments abroad has been recognized from the earliest days when men were sent to represent their cities, states, countries, or commercial enterprises abroad. It has continued to be a problem of modern governments relating to both colonial and foreign relations. The United States has given concentrated attention to it only sporadically, and for the most part only when the development of the Foreign Service has been involved.

The shortage has become more noticeable and actually acute in the United States with the rapid expansion of American commitments abroad and the mounting direct participation of the United States in international relations. In this respect, the problem for the United States is a direct result of the combination of two factors: (1) a long period of isolation which has left its mark upon thinking about current issues of foreign policy and international relations, and upon our entire educational process, which still fails to provide adequate world orientation; and (2) the precipitate manner in which the United States has been placed in a central world position.

Today the need for more competently trained American personnel is found in the staffing of several kinds of activities:

1. The United Nations and specialized agency programs, and particularly in the Expanded Technical Assistance Program.
2. United States government missions, including:
 - a. The regular Foreign Service and Foreign Service Reserve assignments;
 - b. Point IV and similar technical assistance programs in economically underdeveloped countries requiring particularly functional specialists;
 - c. Special emergency and temporary programs such as the Mutual Security program, which again require principally functional specialists, but which relate to both economically underdeveloped countries and to many of the more industrialized countries.
 - d. Military agency programs involving large-scale installations abroad and requiring U. S. personnel of various ranks and services.
3. Non-governmental organization programs, both national and international, in the fields of education, religion, science, etc.
4. Commercial enterprises involving installations and operations in other countries.

The number of persons involved in these activities has increased tremendously, even leaving out of account figures for military personnel. It is estimated for the United States government that about 35,000 to 40,000 civilian Americans are now variously engaged abroad in foreign countries. The United Nations and the specialized agencies employ a regular secretariat staff of 8,600, 20% of whom are U. S. nationals. In addition to the experts which these organizations normally send on missions, the need for experts under the expanded Technical Assistance program of the United Nations in the year 1953 is expected to reach about 2,160, 25% of whom would be U. S. nationals.

Qualifications Lacking. Experience in recruiting Americans for assignments

abroad, whether for the United States government service, for private or for United Nations agencies, has revealed a lack of background and in the following principal respects: (1) knowledge of the country or potential assignment; (2) language of the country of potential assignment; (3) sensitivity to cultural differences and awareness of their importance; (4) psychological preparation for life working outside one's own country and culture; (5) technical competence applicable to the needs of other countries; and (6) recognition of the problems involved in working on assignments abroad.

How to increase the number of Americans with these necessary qualifications is a problem worthy of the attention of political scientists. The availability of competent personnel is a condition for the successful functioning of domestic and international programs and processes. The absence of competent personnel not only is a hazard to good administration, but is also a danger to the international relationships and position of the United States.

Looked at in its proper perspective, this problem derives from the orientation of our educational systems. These have not been able to keep abreast of the rapidly changing world conditions and have therefore failed to train and orient students adequately during their passage through college, or university. Today, with new and far-flung responsibilities of wide significance, the United States—though not the United States alone—therefore lacks personnel to carry out its tasks. The remedy must lie essentially in concentrated and long-range educational efforts.

Stop-gap Orientation Programs. A number of special efforts have been made by both international and United States agencies to fill the gap resulting from inadequacies in educational preparation. The record of these efforts, now for a number of years, and particularly to the beginning of the last decade, shows a variety of kinds of programs that have been developed in this country have been described in detail by Wallace Sayre and Clarence Thurber in a monograph entitled, "Training for Specialized Mission Personnel," prepared under the auspices of the Public Administration Clearing House. Here are described the kinds of special programs developed by UNRRA, military government, the United Nations, the U. S. Foreign Service Institute, and other agencies. Private business engaged in overseas operations has also developed educational programs, some of which are described in the Sayre monograph. For many years religious and other voluntary organizations have devoted great time and energy to briefing and orientation.

Briefing and orientation programs constitute today one of the major concerns of all governmental and United Nations agencies engaged in sending staff to other countries. While varying in quality and scope, these programs are designed to provide not only technical and administrative briefing but also a broad background and introduction to different cultures.¹ All of these

¹ Reference to these is made in the author's report to the chairman of the Assistance Board, referred to above, and in a forthcoming report, to be published by UNESCO (1954) on a UN-UNESCO Conference on Social Aspects of Technical Assistance, organized for the United Nations agencies by the author in March-April 1953.

tion efforts are attempts through intensive programs to provide what should, to a large extent, have been in the educational background of the persons recruited. At the very least, the educational programs should have provided a broader background against which briefing and orientation could more quickly take place.

One obvious weakness of stop-gap programs is the pressure under which they must be conducted. For individuals going out under technical assistance programs, for example, the time devoted today to briefing and orientation very rarely exceeds four weeks and is generally less. Last-minute preparations for departure further increase the pressure for those concerned.

More serious is the frequent non-receptivity of the mind to being briefed, and the lack of a basic quality of human sympathy and understanding. These are obstacles difficult to overcome in intensive programs, no matter how much time is allowed. They relate to the entire previous educational experience which it is hard to supplement adequately or change. Qualities that should be conditions for selection are not easily developed after selection has taken place. The fact that people with adequate educational backgrounds are hard to find, combined with the pressure upon agencies to get programs under way, usually leads to the sacrifice of other necessary qualities in favor of technical competence and availability.

At its very best, therefore, briefing and orientation is a stop-gap emergency action and cannot take the place of more basic orientation through longer range and more systematic educational processes.

Improved Selection Procedures Needed. For the sake of completeness it should be noted that a part of the problem of securing more satisfactory personnel is development of better recruitment and selection procedures. This goes beyond the scope of the current discussion; yet it is clear that progress in this respect would undoubtedly uncover new sources of suitable talent and would materially reduce the orientation task. The inquiry now going on under joint auspices of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, the Department of State, and the Foreign Operations Administration promises to provide new guides for selection procedures.

The Role of Educational Institutions. Intensive area study programs have received a great deal of attention; indeed, in terms of the problem of providing skilled persons for assignments abroad, this has been the field of greatest concentrated effort. These programs, under way at many leading educational institutions with generous assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, have produced many gratifying results. Some of the programs have been designed particularly to fill gaps in selected fields of study. Others have sought to fill particular administrative needs of the Foreign Service, the intelligence services, and the military services.

There appears to be need for much greater coordination of area programs, and we need to explore what can be done to fill gaps which still exist. Special attention to relating these area programs to other social science courses would greatly increase their usefulness and would help meet the problems outlined below. Certainly such programs are one answer to an immediate and pressing need. They also lay necessary foundations for future training of American per-

sonnel resources of a more general character. Important as these area programs and similar concentrated efforts to develop specialists are, however, they are directed at one segment only (albeit a very important one) of the greater problem we face today.

Another significant educational development in this connection is the attempt made during recent years to improve the teaching of international relations. One thinks immediately of the efforts under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment and the Brookings Institution. Efforts of this kind—and there are many underway in a wide variety of institutions—necessarily increase the number of better trained people who are potentially available for public and private service abroad. Again, some are designed to reach another kind of specialist, but one aim is to reach a large proportion of students in secondary schools and colleges.

Directly related to the problem of increasing the number of persons potentially available for service abroad, although frequently overlooked and generally not recognized as of crucial importance, are the attempts to increase world orientation through general education at the secondary school and college levels. The term "general education" is used to describe the content of educational programs provided at the secondary school and college levels, without direct intent to provide technical or professional specialists. Continuing and increasing efforts to include world orientation at this level of education is basic to achieving effective progress in solving the manpower shortage with which we are here concerned.

The world in which modern college and secondary-school graduates will live and function is obviously very different from that in which most of our basic educational requirements were developed. The requirements for general education must continually be adjusted to these changes. The curricula of most educational institutions, secondary and college, tend to lag far behind the times. Failure to provide adequate world orientation is doubly dangerous. It leads to a shortage of leadership and competent manpower when these are most needed. It also prevents, through want of public understanding, sufficiently quick adjustment in policy and action to new economic, political, and social world relationships. In short, it tends to prevent a clear view of the national interest and of the needs for promoting the general welfare.

The general educational process of secondary schools and colleges is an important element in providing citizens with their knowledge, attitudes, and motivations for work and participation in life. While other environmental factors also condition the citizen, the educational process is the chosen instrument of society for this purpose.

What is done by secondary and college programs to prepare the citizen for living and for working in the radically changing world community bears directly on the problem of availability of personnel for foreign assignments. We have been giving far too little attention to providing the student as a citizen with the knowledge, attitudes, and motivations that will permit him to func-

tion in the greater community within which his nation exists. This applies to both the professional specialist and the non-professional student.

The major problem is not to train students for overseas assignments alone. Indeed, this is an especially important fact to underline. The uncertainties of employment, especially in international programs, are so great and the magnitude of the need for personnel so generally undefined, that it would be a mistake to start training on a large scale a group of persons exclusively prepared for this kind of work. Moreover, it is likely to remain true that a professional person is not wanted for work abroad until he has been successful at home. The fortunes of individual careers, family responsibilities among other things, are so unpredictable that it is impossible to know whether a man will in fact be ready and able to go abroad. The demand for experts, today at least, is for people who have proven their professional competence, and not for those fresh out of professional schools.

At this level, therefore, the task of education is not one of training directly for foreign work so much as it is to provide a broader base for the general citizen and professional man so that he may be able to take on assignments elsewhere if these develop. Incidentally, in the case of the United States, it is very likely that we shall continue to rely heavily upon non-professional foreign service personnel to supplement a small corps of Foreign Service Officers.

In considering the importance of world orientation as a part of general education, it is worth recalling that one important phase in the administration of foreign affairs abroad—indeed, the phase that will involve sending the largest number of Americans abroad—is the deployment of American troops in foreign countries. This is no passing phenomenon, if one may be permitted a guess. For this purpose, Americans are not and will not be selected because of special qualifications for service abroad, and least of all for their knowledge, attitudes, and motivations on matters of international affairs. Briefing and orientation in the armed services is not likely to be much better than in the civilian services—although considerable improvements have been made in this respect, notably since the creation of NATO and SHAPE. But the impact of hundreds of thousands of American military personnel abroad is a major factor affecting the attainment of the entire range of United States foreign policy objectives. Practically all of this military personnel goes through some portion of the general educational process and should be provided with world orientation in the areas in which gaps have been noted to exist at present among specialists recruited for overseas service.

An equally important consideration in support of including basic world orientation within general programs of education is that it is the non-professional citizen with no probable foreign assignment who finally provides the conditions and authority for most such activities. He is the voter and the taxpayer, who must understand and approve the policy and administration of our foreign affairs. In the communities of the United States, he sets the tone and attitude of public opinion against the background of which government re-

cruits for service abroad. From his number come most of the legislators who must provide the approval for and the condition of employment in overseas work. In many respects, and at many times, the general citizen's knowledge, attitudes, and motivations are crucial to finding and maintaining competent people for foreign assignments.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to suggest the precise content of programs which would provide knowledge, attitudes, and motivations required for competent service of Americans abroad. Previously we have listed some of the main gaps revealed in the qualifications of persons selected by government. By different means, the approaches suggested for educational institutions should seek to fill these gaps. There are in addition some specific educational efforts which might usefully be made to assist in finding and in training adults interested in assignments abroad today.

One matter seems to merit special mention because of its basic importance to the future of American participation in world affairs. Far more attention needs to be given to the revision of present language training programs in order to develop language as a useful tool rather than a system of units of instruction to which the student is exposed. Great progress has been made in the improvement of language teaching during the last ten years, but we are still a long way from making these improvements available to the average secondary school, college and university student. As a consequence, we continue to be handicapped as a nation in conducting our relations with people of other countries.

Role of Political Scientists. Political scientists, by the scope and nature of their professional interest, seem to have a special responsibility to assist in increasing the number of competently prepared Americans available for service abroad. Their role in educational institutions naturally gives them special opportunities to encourage both area studies and more adequate programs in the field of international relations. But most significantly, their assistance is required in an intensive effort to raise the general level of public understanding concerning the implications for our welfare of the fundamental alterations in economic, political, and social relationships that have occurred in the modern world. The increased need for competent personnel to represent the United States abroad or to serve the United Nations, business organizations, and other private undertakings, are all consequences of these changes. The personnel needed for this purpose requires knowledge, attitudes and motivations consistent with these circumstances. Whether these qualifications are provided by our educational media will depend in no small measure upon the degree of initiative taken in this regard by political scientists.

THE INDEPENDENT VOTER IN 1952: A STUDY OF PITTSFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS*

PHILIP K. HASTINGS

Williams College

A challenging problem for both the student of political behavior and the practical politician is the self-labeled independent voter. Much of the research on what appears to be an increasingly larger segment of the American electorate has been either historically or sociologically oriented in the sense that it has focused on trend studies of the voting pattern of this group or has attempted to describe it in terms of its objective characteristics.¹ Frequently, by inference at least, we are led to believe that the future political behavior of the independent can be anticipated if we have information of the above nature. The central purpose of this article is to present evidence favoring the hypothesis that the political behavior of the independent is more closely related to relevant psychological variables, such as his political perceptions, than to his past voting habits or his objective attributes.

During the period from April through November of 1952, the author directed a detailed study of the political opinions and behavior of the residents of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, a city of approximately 53,000 people. The research methods employed in the project included a systematic historic analysis of the community, a series of four public opinion surveys,² content analysis of some of the mass media of communication, and a panel study. The first poll took place late in the spring of 1952, the second in August, and the third and fourth were carried out just prior to and immediately following the November elections. The panel members, coming from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, were interviewed periodically throughout the course of the project. The information accumulated during these interviews has been compiled in the form of case histories.

A somewhat unusual characteristic of Pittsfield is the relatively large percentage of its adult population (about 40%) claiming to be independent politically.³ As a result of our analysis of Pittsfield's self-identified independents, at least four conclusions were evident. First, in terms of objective or descriptive characteristics, they tended to be more like Democrats than Republicans. Second, as far as their pre-1952 voting behavior was concerned (specifically, in the 1948 and 1950 elections), the Pittsfield independents, by and large, voted with the Democrats. Third, during the 1952 campaign, the independents tended to agree

* This article presents the principal parts of a paper read by the author at the May, 1953 meetings of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, held in Pocono Manor, Pennsylvania.

¹ For an informative review of the history and present nature of research on the independent voter, the reader is referred to Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Independent Vote: Measurement, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 46, pp. 732-53 (Sept., 1952).

with the Republicans regarding which problems the two groups perceived as being the most crucial facing this country today. Fourth, a majority of independents voted for the Republican candidate for President in last fall's election.

In Table I, it will be noted that the Democrats and independents agree most closely on the dimensions of age and economic status. Regarding educational attainment, occupation, and religious affiliation, there is less agreement between the two groups, but even on these counts, the independents tend to be more like those individuals affiliated with the Democratic party. It is interesting to note the main exception to this trend. On the basis of thirteen factual questions dealing with current events and people on the political scene, the independents and Republicans scored significantly higher than the Democrats. For the Republican voters, this result might well be a reflection of their relatively higher educational level. In the case of the independents, their comparatively high information score is possibly an indication of their greater sensitivity to and interest in political matters.

The apparent similarity between the independents and the Democrats is evident not only from the factual characteristics which have been considered thus far, but is revealed again when one examines the voting records of the three political groups in the 1948 and the 1950 elections. It will be noted in Table II that in the presidential election of 1948, many more of Pittsfield's current independents voted for Truman than for Dewey. The same voting pattern is evident in the Massachusetts gubernatorial race of 1950. It should

* Sample sizes and confidence limits:

Survey	Sample size	Confidence limits	
		.95	.99
April	362	11%	14%
August	222	14	17
October	217	14	17
November	198	14	18

Survey estimate (October) of the vote compared with the actual vote:

	Estimated	Actual
President:		
Eisenhower	54%	53.4%
Stevenson	46	46.6
Senator:		
Lodge	55%	53.2%
Kennedy	45%	46.8
Governor:		
Herter	61%	57.7%
Dever	39	42.3

* The respondents in each survey were asked the question: "Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?"

TABLE I. FACE DATA CHARACTERISTICS: INDEPENDENTS, DEMOCRATS, AND REPUBLICANS*

Face Data Characteristics	Political Affiliation		
	Ind. N=162	Dem. N=109	Rep. N=91
Age:			
Under 40	38%	39%	28%
Over 40	62	61	72
Economic:			
Under \$4,000 a year	55	59	39
Over \$4,000 a year	45	41	61
Education:			
Grades 1-8	27	37	18
Grades 9-12	50	51	34
Part or all college	18	8	38
Other	5	4	10
Occupation:			
Labor	35	47	20
White collar	12	10	14
Management and professional	10	5	19
Housewife	32	33	42
Other	11	5	5
Religion:			
Protestant	37	14	82
Catholic	54	80	13
Jewish	6	4	1
Other	3	2	4
Sex:			
Male	58	48	44
Female	42	52	56
Level of Information:			
Low (0-6)	16	27	8
Medium (7-10)	44	54	52
High (11-13)	40	19	40

* These data were compiled from the results of Survey #1 (April, 1952). Essentially the same statistics resulted from the other three surveys conducted during the course of the study.

be clearly understood, of course, that these data result from the author's 1952 analysis of how those individuals who identified themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or independents claim to have voted in the two preceding elections. Since a similar study of Pittsfield was not undertaken in 1948 and 1950, and since the respondents were not asked if they had in the past considered themselves members of any other political group, it is not possible, for example, to say whether the particular members of our independent group in 1952 had shifted in their political allegiance from 1948 to the present. The Pittsfield data show only that a majority of the 1952 self-labeled independents said that they voted Democratic in 1948 and 1950.

In the 1952 elections, however, a majority of Pittsfield's independents voted

for the Republican presidential candidate. It is evident, then, that a significant shift in the voting behavior of this group took place between 1948-1950 and 1952. If we had been attempting to foresee the voting trend of the independents this past year, and had relied upon our knowledge of the factual characteristics which define the group or our information regarding their past voting record, we would have anticipated incorrectly their behavior at the polls last November 4.

TABLE II. 1948, 1950, AND 1952 VOTING RECORD:
INDEPENDENTS, DEMOCRATS, AND REPUBLICANS

	Political Affiliations		
	Ind. N=162	Dem. N=109	Rep. N=91
1948:			
Truman	67%	93%	10%
Dewey	31	7	87
Other	2	—	3
1950:			
Dever (D)	64	86	12
Coolidge (R)	30	7	84
Other	6	7	4
1952:*			
Stevenson	39	72	6
Eisenhower	57	28	92
Other	4	—	2

* The 1952 percentages are based upon the results of Survey #4, which was conducted during the third week of November. The number of cases in each breakdown was as follows: Independent 90, Democrat 53, and Republican 55.

It was our contention that the nature and extent of perceptual agreement characteristic of the three major political groups would constitute a sounder and more basic criterion against which to judge voting intention. Numerous questions, designed to specify the nature of the respondent's perception of political issues, were asked during the course of the study. Our hypothesis was that each of the three main political groups would be apt to stress differentially the various issues which were being raised and focused upon during the campaign. In other words, it was felt that there might be a characteristic pattern in what Democrats vs. Republicans vs. independents perceived as the most pressing concerns of this country today.

As might well have been predicted, the Republican voter cited internal problems of an economic and political nature considerably more often than did the Democratic voter. Our April results showed that within the Republican ranks, seven out of ten people pointed to economic problems as the most pressing difficulties facing the United States today, while but four out of ten Democrats did likewise. Among the independents, six out of ten individuals were con-

cerned most with economic problems. The three groups emphasized to about the same degree strictly political problems.

The frequency with which foreign affairs issues were mentioned by members of the three political groups in the April sample is indicated by the following percentages: independents 90%, Republicans 83%, and Democrats 79%. Although these differences are relatively small, it is pertinent to make two observations regarding them. First, the very large number of people in all three political groups who were thinking of this country's role in international affairs should be noted. Second, these percentages show that the independents as a group are perhaps more internationally oriented than either the Republicans or the Democrats. It would not seem unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that Pittsfield's independent voter in 1952 paid particular attention to the foreign policy planks in the platforms of both the Republican and the Democratic parties.

If our central hypothesis is valid, a relatively high percentage of those independents who agreed with the Republican respondents perceptually should have translated their predispositions into a Republican vote in November. One would not expect the remaining segment of the independent group to vote Republican to as great a degree. Taking the category of economic issues as an illustration, our April survey data indicated that in Pittsfield 65% of the Republicans, 56% of the independents, and 39% of the Democrats cited economic problems as among the most crucial facing the United States today. Although the gross percentages varied from survey to survey, the ratios indicated by these figures remained relatively constant throughout the study. In November, after the elections were over, the members of our fourth survey sample were asked to cite the reasons which they felt were most important in explaining the Republican victory. Economic problems were mentioned by 45% of the Republicans, 42% of the independents, and 23% of the Democrats.

TABLE III. 1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF REPUBLICANS, INDEPENDENTS, AND DEMOCRATS IN RELATION TO CONCERN WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

	Cited Economic Problems		Did Not Cite Economic Problems	
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Eisenhower	Stevenson
Republican	100 %	—	93 %	7 %
Independent	71	29 %	58	42
Democrat	—	100	30	70

Table III indicates how the people in each of these three groups and their counterparts (i.e., those individuals within each of the three political groups who did not cite economic problems) actually voted. To be noted particularly are the percentages indicating the degree to which those independents who cited economic problems (in comparison to those who did not) voted Republican.

Analysis of Pittsfield's self-identified independent voters has resulted in evidence supporting the following conclusions:

1. Although in 1952 the independents tended to resemble the Democrats in sociological make-up, and although a majority of them voted Democratic in the two elections preceding 1952, as a group they demonstrated a relatively high degree of perceptual agreement with the Republicans.
2. It would seem likely that the closeness of the independents to the Republicans perceptually accounts, to a large extent, for the independents' Republican vote in November.
3. Research designed to reveal and measure the psychological variables relevant to an individual's political behavior, rather than analysis of the pertinent sociological and historical facts, may well provide a sounder basis for understanding if not predicting said behavior.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES*

COMPILED BY FRANCIS E. ROURKE

Yale University

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Gilbert Abcarian, Political Implications of Art.
California (Berkeley).

Fred Ablin, George Plekhanov and the
"Iskra" Period. *Columbia*.

Harold W. Adams, Significance and Impact of
Heinrich Treitschke. *Clark*.

Justin Atkinson, The Political Thought of
L. T. Hobhouse. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert D. Barendsen, The Chinese Communist
Germ Warfare Propaganda, 1952-53. *Yale*.

Stanislaus Belch, Thomas Hobbes' Concept of
Religion and the State's Relation to It.
Notre Dame.

Samuel B. Bloom, Philosophic Foundations of
Representative Government. *California*
(Berkeley).

Robert Boynton, The Socio-Political Philosophy

Projects in Public Administration" (reported
to Public Administration Service), the most
recent edition of which appeared in 1951;
"Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy
in Progress in American Colleges and Uni-
versities," in the *American Economic Review*;
"List of Doctoral Dissertations in History
Now in Progress," published annually by the
Division of Historical Research of the Car-
negie Institution through 1938, and since then
by the American Historical Association, as
supplements to the *American Historical Review*
(1940 and 1941), as Vol. III of its *Annual
Report* (1941), and as separate publications
(1947 and 1949); and "Doctoral Dissertations
in Sociology," in the *American Journal of
Sociology*. Consult also the "External Research
List," published by the Office of Intelligence
Research, Department of State. These are in
addition to the "List of American Doctoral
Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most re-
cent of an annual series published by the
Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotter
and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations
Accepted by American Universities, 1951-52,"
the nineteenth of a series beginning in 1933-34,
compiled for the Association of Research
Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Pal-
frey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to
Bibliographies of Theses, United States and
Canada" (Chicago, American Library Associa-
tion, 2nd ed., 1940).

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as com-
pleted may be found in "Dissertation Ab-
stracts," published bi-monthly by University
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

* Similar lists have been printed in the RE-
VIEW as follows: V, 456 (1911); VI, 464
(1912); VII, 689 (1913); VIII, 488 (1914);
XIV, 155 (1920); XVI, 497 (1922); XIX, 171
(1925); XX, 660 (1926); XXI, 645 (1927);
XXII, 736 (1928); XXIII, 795 (1929); XXIV,
799 (1930); XXV, 798 (1931); XXVI, 769
(1932); XXVII, 680 (1933); XXVIII, 766
(1934); XXIX, 713 (1935); XXX, 811 (1936);
XXXI, 772 (1937); XXXII, 796 (1938);
XXXIII, 732 (1939); XXXIV, 767 (1940);
XXXV, 752 (1941); XXXVI, 734 (1942);
XXXVII, 706 (1943); XXXVIII, 766 (1944);
XXXIX, 779 (1945); XL, 775 (1946); XLI,
754 (1947); XLII, 759 (1948); XLIII, 787
(1949); XLIV, 689 (1950); XLV, 779 (1951);
XLVI, 819 (1952).

Items which appeared in the September,
1952, list are in general classified under the
same headings in the present list, and new
items have been assimilated to the 1952 clas-
sification as far as possible. In cases where
classification of an item has been suggested by
the institution concerned, the suggestion has
been followed. Each item is listed under one
classification only.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on
information from departments giving graduate
instruction in political science. Often disserta-
tions are in progress in departments of eco-
nomics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap
or supplement dissertations in preparation in
political science. Attention is called especially
to the following lists: "Current Research

- of George Santayana with Special Reference to His Recent Thought. *Michigan*.
- Donald W. Brandon, Liberty and the Public Interest: A Critical Analysis of the Relation between Individual Rights, Group Interests, and the General Welfare in Recent Democratic Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).
- George Brasington, Jr., Representative Government in Jacksonian Political Philosophy. *Illinois*.
- Burton Brazil, Loyalty Oaths in California: Theoretical Background and Implications. *Stanford*.
- William R. Brown, Deviations in American Communism: The Influence of American Politics and Economics on Communist Theory. *Washington* (St. Louis).
- Francis M. Carney, Recent Development of the Concept of Representation. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Karl H. Cerny, Catholic Social Thought in the United States. *Yale*.
- Ross Clinchy, The State and Minority Rights. *Columbia*.
- Samuel Cook, A Critique of Ethical Theories of Democracy: An Inquiry into the Logic and Value of Democracy. *Ohio State*.
- David Cooperman, The Psychology and Ethics of Violence: A Study in Political Theory. *Minnesota*.
- Bernard R. Crick, The Origins and Conditions of the American Science of Politics. *Harvard*.
- George Demetriou, The Relationship of Political and Ethical Thought in Current American Theory. *Minnesota*.
- J. Raymond Derrig, S.J., Political Thought in American Catholic Newspapers. *St. Louis*.
- Susan H. Devine, The Political and Social Philosophy of Herbert Hoover. *Pennsylvania*.
- Laird J. Dunbar, The Emergence and Growth of the Idea of the Compatibility of Administration and Politics in Recent American Theory and Practice. *New York University*.
- David M. Earl, Political Thinking in Maiji Japan. *Columbia*.
- James Eayrs, The English Agrarians: A Study of the Political and Social Thought of Spence, Ogilvie and Paine. *Columbia*.
- Harry H. Eckstein, The Role of Values in Political Inquiry: A Methodological Analysis. *Harvard*.
- Esther Edelman, Political Theory of Ernest Jones. *Columbia*.
- Emily H. Ehle, The Identification of Local Leadership within an American City (Philadelphia). *Pennsylvania*.
- James V. Elliott, The Social and Political Thought of Daniel Defoe. *Harvard*.
- Frank Evans, Jr., The Political Theory of Richelieu. *Georgetown*.
- Victor C. Ferkiss, The Political and Economic Philosophy of American Fascism from the Great Depression to Pearl Harbor. *Chicago*.
- Edward Fishman, The Political and Social Philosophy of Owen J. Roberts. *Pennsylvania*.
- Martin Fleisher, Political Theory of James Harrington. *Columbia*.
- Theodore B. Fleming, Jr., John Stuart Mill's Essay *On Liberty* and Its Critics. *Yale*.
- Richard D. Forster, The British Political Image of the United States. *Yale*.
- Garland Fothergill, Some Elements in the Political Thought of John Dewey. *Minnesota*.
- Julian Franklin, The Theory of Caesarism. *Columbia*.
- Leonard Freedman, Group Opposition to Governmental Welfare Activities in the United States. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Stanley T. Gabis, Secrecy in Politics: A Study in Attitudes. *Chicago*.
- Alexander L. George, The Intelligence Value of Content Analysis. *Chicago*.
- Robert O. Gibbon, The Relation of the State to the Economic Order in Greek and Roman Political Thought: A Study of Greek and Roman Political Thinkers. *Minnesota*.
- R. Gordon Gilbert, Description and Prescription in Seventeenth Century Science. *California* (Berkeley).
- Gilbert F. Gilchrist, Of Laws and Men; Political and Social Thought of James Harrington. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Robert C. Good, The Contribution of Reinhold Niebuhr to International Relations. *Yale*.
- Gordon B. Greb, The Political Philosophy of the American Press. *Stanford*.
- John P. Green, The Philosophic Premises of Locke's Politics: The Concept of the Law of Nature. *Chicago*.
- Adele Haddad, The Concept of the State in Islamic Thought. *Michigan*.
- Edward Handler, The Political Theory of John Adams: A Study of the Emergence of a Conservative Tradition in American Political Thought. *Harvard*.
- Norman B. Hannah, The Purpose of the State in Greek Political Theory. *Minnesota*.

- Philip Haring*, *Lasswell's Conception of Political Science: A Critical Analysis*. *Chicago*.
- Heber R. Harper II*, *The Political Views of Certain Contemporary Religious Fundamentalists*. *Michigan*.
- Beresford Hayward*, *An Evaluation of the Program of American Labor for a Full Employment Economy as an Efficient Expression of Its Contemporary Political Philosophy*. *Chicago*.
- Henry J. Hodder*, *The Political and Social Thought of Thorstein Veblen*. *Harvard*.
- David Holland*, *The Problematic Situation as a Context for Valuation in the Writings of John Dewey*. *Harvard*.
- Richard L. Hough*, *Base Theorists of Elitist Doctrine: Their Impact on Democratic Theory*. *California* (Los Angeles).
- James K. Hunter, Jr.*, *The Influence of George Bernard Shaw on Political Theory*. *Ohio State*.
- John K. Knaus*, *The Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*. *Stanford*.
- Bernard Kronick*, *Political Ideas of Winston Churchill*. *California* (Berkeley).
- Irma Lang*, *Swiss Federalism: Theory and Structure*. *Harvard*.
- Murray B. Levin*, *Political Theory of Thomas Hodgskin*. *Columbia*.
- Guenther Lewy*, *The Political Philosophy of Mariana*. *Columbia*.
- Allen McConnell*, *Alexander Herzen and the Revolutions of 1848*. *Brown*.
- Brian A. McGrath, S.J.*, *The Basic Political Philosophy of Woodrow Wilson*. *Harvard*.
- Donald K. McKee*, *The Intellectual and Historical Influences Shaping the Political Theory of Daniel de Leon*. *Columbia*.
- Thomas F. Maher*, *Population and Politics: The Political Aspects of Birth Control*. *Notre Dame*.
- Serif A. Mardin*, *The Influence of Positivism on the Development of Turkish Political Thought in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. *Stanford*.
- Lucian C. Marquis*, *Religious Factors in the Development of Minor Parties in the United States*. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Joseph O. Matthews*, *Benjamin Disraeli, Theorist of Toryism*. *Yale*.
- Edward N. Megay*, *Treitschke as a Political Philosopher*. *Georgetown*.
- James K. Melville*, *Brigham Young and American Political Ideas*. *Utah*.
- Fauzi M. Najjar*, *The Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi: As a Rationalistic Interpretation of Islam*. *Chicago*.
- Dorothy L. Noble*, *Francis Nicholson*. *Columbia*.
- Erma H. Olson*, *Democratic Theory and the Idea of the Managerial Revolution*. *Minnesota*.
- Ivan W. Parkins*, *John Dewey on Liberty*. *Chicago*.
- Stanley J. Parry*, *A Study of the Political Thought of Johannes Althusius as Expressed in His Politica Methodice Digesta*. *Yale*.
- Abelardo Patino*, *The Political Ideas of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia during the 1946-52 Crisis*. *American*.
- Frank A. Pinner*, *Political Values: An Empirical Approach*. *California* (Berkeley).
- Truman A. Potter*, *Some Contributions of Interest-Group Analysis to Political Theory in America, 1900-1950*. *Minnesota*.
- Fred Raniele*, *Theories of Conscientious Objectors toward War in the 16th and 17th Centuries*. *Minnesota*.
- William O. Reichert*, *Recent American Conservatism*. *Minnesota*.
- Philip Rieff*, *Freud's Contribution to Political Philosophy*. *Chicago*.
- Norman M. Rosenberg*, *The Grande Chartreuse: Studies in the Literature of Marxist Disenchantment*. *Columbia*.
- Gens W. Selzer*, *Contemporary American Ideas of Human Equality*. *Columbia*.
- Theodore L. Shay*, *The Myth of Progress with Special Reference to Its Political Implications*. *Northwestern*.
- Judith N. Shklar*, *Political Fatalism: A Study in Contemporary Political Theory*. *Harvard*.
- Herbert P. Shyer*, *The Political Philosophy of David Hume*. *Harvard*.
- David G. Smith*, *The Political Theory of V. I. Lenin: Some Fundamental Concepts as the Basis for a Systematic Critique*. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Robert F. Stephens*, *Political Theories Inherent in Selected Psychological Theories*. *Michigan*.
- Richard W. Sterling*, *Ego and Ethic in International Politics: Friedrich Meinecke and the Idea of Raison d'Etat*. *Yale*.
- William A. Stewart*, *The Political Ideas of L. T. Hobhouse*. *Minnesota*.
- Nathan M. Talbot*, *The Political Thought of T'an Ssu-T'ung*. *Washington* (Seattle).
- James Tierney*, *Laski and Bryce: A Comparative Study of Their Thoughts on American Democracy*. *Brown*.

James E. Titus, Left of Center: A Study of American Liberalism in the 1930's. *Wisconsin*.

William F. Troutman, Theories of the Relationship between Church and State in America in the Period 1786-1791. *Duke*.

Charles W. Van Cleave, The Doctrine of State and Church in Roman Catholic Thought in the Twentieth Century. *Texas*.

David B. Walker, The Political Ideas of Rufus Choate. *Brown*.

John Wallerstedt, The Political Thought of Henry Jones Ford. *Georgetown*.

Victor E. Walter, The Idea of Justice in Sociological Jurisprudence. *Minnesota*.

Kenneth Walls, The Problem of War in Western Political Thought. *Columbia*.

George Weber, Church and State in France: A Study in the Manipulation of Liens upon Political Obedience. *Virginia*.

Lloyd M. Wells, The Theoretical Defense of Big Business 1933-1953: A Study in Contemporary American Political Thought. *Princeton*.

Ruth L. Wishneff, Charles Péguy and the Crisis of the Third Republic. *Cornell*.

Robert Yee, American Liberalism, 1919-1929. *Washington* (Seattle).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Myer Alpert, Public Policy and the Pulp and Paper Industry. *Harvard*.

Cleveland Anschell, Federal Aid for Highways. *Harvard*.

Jack E. Babcock, Political Aspects of Economic Mobilization. *Georgetown*.

John W. Baker, The Theory and Practice of the Public Representative on Governmental Agencies Dealing with Conflicting Economic Interests. *California* (Berkeley).

Lucius Jefferson Barker, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Study in Public Policy Making. *Illinois*.

David W. Barkley, Problems of the Aging Population and the Role of Government. *Harvard*.

Robert L. Berg, Presidential Power and the Royal Prerogative. *Minnesota*.

Ray William Bronez, Interest Groups and Public Housing. *Chicago*.

Edmund Begole Brownell, A Study of the Interaction between the Department of the Treasury and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. *Michigan*.

William Buchanan, Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States: A Statistical Analysis. *Princeton*.

Edward M. Caine, The Regulation of Commercial Aviation under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. *New York University*.

King Carr, Collective Bargaining as a Public Campaign: Steel Industry, 1945-1949. *Chicago*.

Harold W. Chase, Controlling Subversive Activities: A Case Study of the Efforts of the National Government to Control Indigenous Communists, 1932-52. *Princeton*.

Hyo Won Cho, The Evolution of RFC Functions: A Study in the Rise and Decline of an Agency. *Ohio State*.

Charles L. Clapp, The Presidential Primary in 1952. *California* (Berkeley).

Omar A. Coleman, Inter-State Trade Barriers. *Washington* (Seattle).

Paul B. Crooks, Farm Planning in Indiana. *Harvard*.

Allen Davis, Conflicts in Land Policy Between Federal and State Government. *California* (Berkeley).

James W. Davis, The Use and Effect of the Presidential Primary System. *Minnesota*.

John Thomas Dempsey, Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of Its Members. *Michigan*.

Jean M. Driscoll, Candidates and Constituency: A Study of Nominations and Elections in a State Senatorial District. *Northwestern*.

Aurie N. Dunlap, The Political Career of Arthur H. Vandenberg. *Columbia*.

Nancy Ann Edwards, Congress and Administrative Reorganization. *Columbia*.

William Clinton Ellet, Jr., Federal and State Control of Atomic Cities. *Michigan*.

Thomas P. Emerich, The United States' Shipbuilding Industry and National Policy. *Georgetown*.

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The American Cabinet: An Analysis from Wilson to Truman. *Harvard*.

Jenniellen Ferguson, Voting Behavior for President in 600+ Counties in the United States, 1900-1950: A Statistical Study. *California* (Los Angeles).

Jason L. Finkle, Congress and the Atomic Energy Program: A Study in Congressional Direction and Control. *Michigan*.

James Joseph Flannery, Water Pollution Control; Development of Public Policy and Federal-State Relations. *Wisconsin*.

- George Foufas*, American Party Platforms—1940, 1944, 1948. *Harvard*.
- Robert S. Friedman*, The Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives: A Study of its Functions and Procedures. *Illinois*.
- Lawrence H. Fuchs*, Ethnic Voting Behavior in Boston. *Harvard*.
- Gabriel Gabrelian*, Voting Behavior in the United States. *Princeton*.
- William C. Gibbons*, Congress and the International Information Program Since the End of World War II: A Case Study in the Intellectual Role of Congress in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. *Princeton*.
- Charles E. Gilbert*, Representation in Congress: A Case Study. *Northwestern*.
- Betty Goetz*, The Foreign Affairs Program of the League of Women Voters: Formulation, Mobilization of Public Opinion, Methods of Influencing Government Action, Evaluation of Results. *Minnesota*.
- Delphis C. Goldberg*, Public Assistance Grants. *Harvard*.
- Lyman J. Gould*, The Government of Puerto Rico: From Territory to Commonwealth. *Michigan*.
- Gerald John Grady*, The St. Lawrence Waterway Controversies: A Study in Policy Formation. *Chicago*.
- Charles J. Graham*, Recent Republican Foreign Policy. *Illinois*.
- Alice Greene*, The Not So Supreme Court (The Supreme Court Fight of 1937). *Harvard*.
- Richard C. Gripp*, The Theory of Recent American Federalism. *Southern California*.
- Nathan Hakman*, The I.W.W.: A Study of Group Pressures in the Political Process. *Illinois*.
- Bartlett E. Harvey*, Public Opinion and the Formation of Foreign Policy—Three Studies. *Harvard*.
- William D. Hatley*, The Dixiecrat Movement. *Missouri*.
- David William Hazel*, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: A Study in the Congressional Legislative Process. *Michigan*.
- Marston Headley*, The Role of the States in the Administration of a National System of Public Employment Offices. *Harvard*.
- Jack M. Hertzog*, The Administration of Soldier Voting in the United States Army. *American*.
- Edward Heubel*, The Organization and Conduct of Congressional Investigations since 1946. *Minnesota*.
- Wilbur W. Hitchcock*, Defense of National Honor as Justification for Military Measures. *Pennsylvania*.
- Renze L. Hoeksema*, United States Postwar Aid to the Philippines. *Harvard*.
- Walter Hohenstein*, Federal Control over Local and State Officers. *Minnesota*.
- A. Freeman Holmer*, An American Labor Party? An Analysis of the Causes of Labor's Political Failures, with Emphasis on the Period 1920–1948. *Columbia*.
- Jack E. Holmes*, Politics of National Farmers Union. *Chicago*.
- Irving Howards*, The Influence of Southern Senators on American Foreign Policy from 1940 to 1950. *Wisconsin*.
- James Howe*, The Budget and Foreign Affairs. *Harvard*.
- Robert M. Hunsaker*, The Politics of Public Utilities. *Minnesota*.
- John E. Hutchinson*, American and British Labor in Politics. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Slater K. Isenberg*, The Social Characteristics of Selected Areas of Non-Voting Concentration. *American*.
- Fridolph Johnson*, Limitations on the Scope of Presidential Power to Conclude International Agreements. *Michigan*.
- Stanley Kelley*, The Public Relations Counsel as Campaign Manager. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Robert C. Kennedy*, The Development of Labor Legislation in the Eightieth Congress (First Session). *American*.
- Alan Edmond Kent*, Wisconsin and Foreign Policy; Wisconsin's Senators and Representatives since World War I. *Wisconsin*.
- Clifford Ketzel*, Exchange of Persons and Foreign Policy. *California* (Berkeley).
- Charles F. Kiefer*, The Secretary of Agriculture. *Harvard*.
- James A. Killough*, Federal Regulation of Radio and Television Broadcasting. *Pennsylvania*.
- Kenneth Kofmehl*, Congressional Staffing, with Emphasis on the Professional Staff. *Columbia*.
- Richard P. Kosaki*, Political Beliefs in the Territory of Hawaii as Reflected in Legislative Sessions, with Special Reference to Racial and Cultural Influences. *Minnesota*.
- Richard B. Lambert*, INCODEL, an Instrument of Interstate Governmental Cooperation. *Rutgers*.

- Lewis J. Lapham*, Congressional Organization and Policy Formulation, with Special Reference to the House Committee on Rules. *Harvard*.
- David D. Levine*, Legislation by Executive Order in the Federal Government. *American*.
- James R. Lewis*, The Impact of Television on Political Conventions and Campaigns. *American*.
- Richard P. Longaker*, Andrew Jackson and the Presidency. *Cornell*.
- John C. Lowe*, New Deal Democracy: Its Impact on American Democratic Processes. *Iowa*.
- Joseph D. Lubin*, The Item Veto and the Presidency. *California* (Berkeley).
- Thornton McClanahan*, Organization of the Presidency for Fiscal Policy. *Harvard*.
- Charles B. Macklin*, Land Grant Colleges and Public Policy. *Chicago*.
- William B. Macomber, Jr.*, The Congressional Republicans and Organized Labor; 1926-1948. *Chicago*.
- Lewis Mainzer*, Research Policy Formation under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. *Chicago*.
- Elizabeth Marvick*, The Study of Voting Behavior in Its Relation to the Theory of Political Democracy. *Columbia*.
- Norman Meller*, Centralization and Integration in Hawaii. *Chicago*.
- Frank S. Mellor*, Employment of Civilians by the Department of the Army: Factors in Determining Whether Military or Civilian Personnel Should Be Assigned to Particular Activities or Jobs. *Harvard*.
- Leno C. Michelin*, Post-War Conceptions of Managerial Responsibility in Labor Relations. *Chicago*.
- John H. Michener*, The United States Cabinet: A Study of Proposed Modifications, with Special Reference to Cabinet-Congressional Relations. *California* (Berkeley).
- Don Muchmore*, Political Use of the Presidential Appointive Power, 1900-1950. *California* (Los Angeles).
- A. Edward Palmos*, Some Recent Attempts of Non-Political Organizations to Influence Federal Legislation. *New York University*.
- Winfield Payne*, Public Policy and Government Regulation of Transportation. *Harvard*.
- Denis Philipps*, Americans and Compulsory Military Service: A Study of Changing Public Policy with Particular Reference to the Period 1940-1951. *New York University*.
- Ira Polley*, Wage Stabilization in Region 8: A Case Study. *Minnesota*.
- John R. Probert*, The National Security Act of 1947. *Pennsylvania*.
- Edward William Proxmire*, The Limitations and Possibilities of Increasing Public Understanding of National Politics through the Daily Newspaper. *Harvard*.
- Louis A. Radelet*, The Presidency and the Crisis; Powers of the Office from Pearl Harbor to V-J Day. *Notre Dame*.
- Harry H. Ransom*, United States Congress and Air Power, 1919-1926. *Princeton*.
- Norman F. Reber*, Main Factors That Determine the Editorial Content of Farm Magazines as It Relates to Influence on Public Opinion. *Pennsylvania*.
- Merton L. Reichler*, Disintegration and Insurgency in the Democratic Party in New York County. *Columbia*.
- Ross Richard Rice*, The Politics of Missouri Valley Development. *Chicago*.
- Donald H. Riddle*, The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Control of the Military. *Princeton*.
- James W. Riddlesperger*, Alexander Hamilton and the Modern American Constitution. *Texas*.
- Charles L. Robertson*, The Role of the Secretary of State in Foreign Policy Making. *Princeton*.
- George Robinson*, The Development of the Senate Committee System. *New York University*.
- John Henry Romani*, The Philippine Presidency: An Evaluation in Terms of American Practice and Procedure. *Michigan*.
- James N. Rosenau*, The Senate and Dean Acheson, 1949-52. *Princeton*.
- Harold I. Roth*, Collective Bargaining Patterns in the Motion Picture Industry. *Chicago*.
- Lloyd I. Rudolph*, American Politics 1787-1800: A Study in the Origin of Party. *Harvard*.
- Martha Lee Saenger*, The 1944 Presidential Campaign: An Analysis of the Forces behind the Pro-Roosevelt CIO Political Action Committee. *Ohio State*.
- Warren D. St. James*, The NAACP: Its Organization and Methods. *St. Louis University*.
- Carl Santoro*, A New Approach to the Problem of Non-Voting. *Pennsylvania*.
- O. Glenn Saxon, Jr.*, The Policies and Attitudes of the American Federation of Musicians

- on Technological Advance. *Columbia*.
- Peter P. Schauflyer, The History and Potentialities of the Legislative Veto Device in the Federal Government. *Harvard*.
- Kenneth E. Scott, Marshall Plan and Executive Decision Making. *Princeton*.
- Edgar L. Shor, The Political Role of the Secretary of Labor: The Secretary and Labor Policy Since 1933. *Chicago*.
- Morris L. Simon, The 1948 Election: An Interpretive Study. *Cornell*.
- Robert C. Spencer, The Steel Dispute of 1952: A Case Study in the Politics of Collective Bargaining. *Chicago*.
- Robert C. Stender, The Defense Budgetary Process. *Harvard*.
- Oscar Stradinger, The Bureau of Reclamation: A Study in Administrative Organization and Techniques as These Influence and Are Influenced by Policy Positions. *Chicago*.
- Ross B. Talbot, The Politics of Agricultural Organization: 1925-1948. *Chicago*.
- Harris E. Thurber, The Vermont Judiciary: A Study in Cultural Adaptation. *Princeton*.
- Edwin Timbers, Labor Unions and Fair Employment Practices Legislation. *Michigan*.
- Henry Tomasek, The Great Plains Agricultural Council. *Chicago*.
- Daniel Webster Tuttle, Intergovernmental Relations in Wyoming Land Policy and Administration. *Minnesota*.
- Robert W. Van de Velde, The Role of U.S. Propaganda in Italy's Return to Political Democracy. *Princeton*.
- Edwin R. Walker, Changing Tools and Techniques of American Statecraft. *Princeton*.
- Andrew J. Wann, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Study of Leadership. *Missouri*.
- Leo Weinstein, The Place of Lobbying in the Legislative Process. *Chicago*.
- CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
- Roscoe C. Adkins, Justice Brandeis and Administrative Law. *Texas*.
- Redmond J. Allman, Variation in the Number of Associate Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1801 to 1869. *Notre Dame*.
- Barton Bean, The American Civil Liberties Union; History and Analysis. *Cornell*.
- Alfons J. Beitzinger, Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. *Wisconsin*.
- Walter F. Berns, Judicial Interpretations of Freedom and the Problem of Virtue. *Chicago*.
- William E. Biggs, The Defense Production Act: A Study in Administrative Law. *Ohio State*.
- George R. Blackburn, Freedom of Association: The Group versus the Individual before the Courts. *Harvard*.
- Virgil C. Blum, Legal Aspects of Equality and Religious Liberty in the United States since 1900. *St. Louis*.
- Gordon B. Cleveland, The Role of the Rule of Law in the Administrative State, with Special Emphasis on Civil Liberties. *North Carolina*.
- Fredryc R. Darby, The Constitutionality of Anti-Miscegenation Laws under the 14th Amendment. *California* (Berkeley).
- Emily Dawson, The Supreme Court's Conception of Religious Liberty in the Jehovah's Witnesses' Cases. *Minnesota*.
- Christopher Dyer-Bennet, The Vitality of the Judicial Opinions of Justice John Marshall Harlan. *California*. (Berkeley).
- Stephen T. Early, Jr., Mr. Justice McReynolds and the Judicial Process. *Virginia*.
- William P. Ehling, Contempt by Publication: Historical Development in Theory and Practice. *Syracuse*.
- Charles W. Engelland, William O. Douglas, Dissenting Justice. *Iowa*.
- Dorothy Fields, Mr. Justice Murphy. *Columbia*.
- William F. Fitzgerald, A Study of the Effects of the *Shelley v. Kraemer* Decision with Respect to Restrictive Covenants. *Georgetown*.
- Howard I. Forman, Government Ownership of Patents and Patent Rights. *Pennsylvania*.
- Royal C. Gilkey, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties. *Minnesota*.
- Walter Gouch, Judicial Philosophy and Opinions of Justice Cardozo. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Milton Greenberg, The Loyalty Oath in the American Experience. *Wisconsin*.
- Luther Hagard, The Equality of the States in the United States: Theory, Constitutional Law and Practice. *Minnesota*.
- Timothy G. Higgins, The Politics of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the Progressive Era, 1900-1917. *Wisconsin*.
- Charles A. Hollister, Judicial Interpretation of the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution. *Pennsylvania*.
- John W. Hopkirk, William O. Douglas, Individualist. *Princeton*.
- John T. Kitos, Coordination of Public Health and Hospital Administration in New York State. *Syracuse*.
- Jacob Kossman, Constitutional Rights of a

- Defendant in Federal Criminal Proceedings. *Pennsylvania*.
- Oscar Kraines, Ernst Freund's Contribution to American Legal Thought. *New York University*.
- Roseana Kronick, The Power of the President to Remove Officials, with Emphasis upon Officials Exercising Quasi-Judicial and Quasi-Legislative Functions. *California* (Berkeley).
- Robert S. Lancaster, The Political Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Judge Learned Hand. *Michigan*.
- J. T. Law, The Constitutional Ideas of Mr. Justice Horace Gray. *Wisconsin*.
- Ruth Leffler, The Concept of Governmental Tort Liability Culminating in the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Political and Legal Analysis. *Chicago*.
- Harold J. Leu, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Extra-Continental Jurisdiction of the United States. *Michigan*.
- Eleanor Tabor Linenthal, Free Speech and the Power of the Courts and Congress to Punish for Contempt. *Cornell*.
- Theodore V. Liss, The Genesis and Development of the Concept of the Free Flow of Commerce. *Michigan*.
- Lewis I. Maddocks, The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan. *Ohio State*.
- John M. Martin, Jr., Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the United States. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Eugene A. Mawhinney, The Development of the Concept of Liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment. *Illinois*.
- Ernest B. Means, Free Speech v. Fair Trial. *Wisconsin*.
- Robert T. Miller, Judicial Interpretation of Religious Freedom in the U.S. *Texas*.
- Lyndon R. Musolf, Some Aspects of Federal-State Water Problems and the Courts. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Harding C. Noblitt, The Supreme Court and the Progressive Era, 1902-1921. *Chicago*.
- Gilbert L. Oddo, Mr. Justice Douglas and the Supreme Court. *Georgetown*.
- Julius Paul, The Legal Philosophy of Jerome Frank: A Study of the Law in Action. *Ohio State*.
- Palmer C. Pilcher, Liability of Hospitals and Hospital Administrators. *Syracuse*.
- Earl Adrian Radley, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Conception of the Role of the Supreme Court in the American Federal System. *Harvard*.
- Charles M. Rehmus, Executive Powers in National Emergency Labor Disputes. *Stanford*.
- Nelson M. Robinson, Regulatory Systems and Hospital Standards. *Syracuse*.
- Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Doctrine of Judicial Restraint. *California* (Berkeley).
- Eva R. Rubin, The Supreme Court at Mid-Century: A Study of Judicial Self-Limitation. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Robert Runo, Law Making by the Roosevelt Court: A Study in Methods of Statutory Interpretation. *Chicago*.
- Robert H. Salisbury, Jr., The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: A Study in Policy Formation. *Illinois*.
- John R. Schmidhauser, The Role of the Supreme Court as Arbiter in Federal-State Relations. *Virginia*.
- Alan Silverman, Mr. Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties. *Columbia*.
- L. Dean Sprague, Civil Rights during War. *Syracuse*.
- Robert J. Steamer, The Constitutional Doctrines of Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson. *Cornell*.
- K. T. W. Swanson, The Rise of Public Prosecution in the American System. *Syracuse*.
- John H. Vanderzell, Administrative Patterns Established by State Legislation to Regulate Residential Building and Housing. *Syracuse*.
- William Welsh, The Local Regulation of Minimum Housing Standards in Selected Cities throughout the United States. *Syracuse*.
- Warren C. White, The Constitutional Privilege against Self-Incrimination. *Maryland*.

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Frank C. Abbott, State Organization and Administration of Tax-Supported Higher Education. *Harvard*.
- Sylvester S. Aichels, Pressure Groups and the Legislative Process in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Dec Akers, Procedures of Regulatory Administration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. *Kentucky*.
- Eva Aronfreed, City of Philadelphia Public Relations Department. *Pennsylvania*.
- Chester W. Bain, The Readjustment of City and County Boundaries in Virginia. *Virginia*.
- Richard N. Baisden, Los Angeles Labor and the Los Angeles City Government. *Chicago*.

- Sidney Belanoff*, Geographical Variations in Political Participation in the Detroit Area. *Michigan*.
- Jewel Bellush*, Herbert H. Lehman, Lt. Governor and Governor: A Study in State Leadership, 1928-1942. *Columbia*.
- Wallace H. Best*, Referendum Politics in California. *Southern California*.
- Jos H. Bindley*, Voting Behavior in Ohio, 1924-1950, An Analytical Study. *California* (Los Angeles)
- Lemuel F. Blitz*, The Involvement of Local Governments in Metropolitan Problems in the Norfolk, Virginia, Area. *North Carolina*.
- William J. Block*, The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service: A Study of Group Activities. *Illinois*.
- John A. Bond*, Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota. *Minnesota*.
- Gary P. Brasier*, Intergovernmental Relations in the Field of Public Airports, with Special Reference to Minnesota. *Minnesota*.
- Morton Broffman*, Executive Office of the Mayor of New York City. *Harvard*.
- Oliver C. Carmichael, Jr.*, New York Establishes a State University. *Columbia*.
- Wen-Pin Chen*, State Supervision and Control over Local Law Enforcement in the United States. *Illinois*.
- Robert L. Clark*, State Administrative Supervision over Local Government, West Virginia. *Illinois*.
- Charles C. Curran*, The Health Function on the Local Level: Kansas City, Missouri—An Administrative Case Study. *Harvard*.
- Thomas J. Davy*, State Administered In-Service Training Programs for Municipal Officials under the George-Deen Act, with Special Reference to Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Carl E. DeVane*, Problems Allocating the Principles of Administration in the Process of Public Budgeting, with Special Reference to the City of Philadelphia. *Pennsylvania*.
- Stanley E. Dewey*, Impact of a Federal Project (Pike County Atomic Energy Plant) on Local Government in Rural Ohio, with Special Reference to Intergovernmental Relations. *Ohio State*.
- Gerald E. Dunn*, State Courts and the Administration of Federal Law. *Johns Hopkins*.
- George Elcáness*, A History of the Consolidation of the City of New York. *New York University*.
- Floyd O. Flom*, The Legislative Process in Minnesota, with Emphasis on the Role of the Individual Legislator. *Minnesota*.
- William R. Gable*, Politics and Personalities on the Chicago City Council. *Chicago*.
- Fenton Gage*, Local Housing Authorities of Upstate New York. *Harvard*.
- Herbert Garfinkel*, F. E. P. C. Legislation in Illinois. *Chicago*.
- Louise B. Gerrard*, Newspapers and Politics: Proportional Representation in New York City. *Columbia*.
- Frank K. Gibson*, The Control of Stream Pollution in West Virginia. *North Carolina*.
- John Gillespie*, Governments in Travis County, Texas. *Texas*.
- Gibson Gray*, A Political Education for the New Reformers: A Study of the Evolution of the Movement for Fair Employment Legislation in Pennsylvania from 1945 to 1951. *Columbia*.
- Stewart L. Grow*, The Development of National Parties in Utah. *Utah*.
- G. Phillips Hanna*, New Hampshire Politics: A Case Study of the Recruitment of Political Leaders. *Princeton*.
- Leroy C. Hardy*, Reapportionment in California, 1951: A Political Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Louise Harned*, Participation in Political Parties: A Study of Party Committeemen. *Yale*.
- Frederick H. Harris, Jr.*, A Study of Political Activity in Two North Carolina Counties. *North Carolina*.
- Donald B. Hayman*, Social Security and State and Local Retirement in North Carolina. *North Carolina*.
- Allan Healey*, An Analytical History of the Power of Political Parties in Illinois, 1928-1948. *Chicago*.
- Clarence J. Hein*, The Operation of the Direct Primary in Minnesota. *Minnesota*.
- Page L. Ingraham*, Politics of Agriculture in Minnesota, 1930-1950. *Chicago*.
- Evan A. Iverson*, The Two Party System in Utah. *Utah*.
- James A. Jarvis*, Intergovernmental Relationships of Louisville, Kentucky, with Special Reference to Public Housing. *Illinois*.
- Eugene W. Jones*, The Employment Security Commission in North Carolina. *North Carolina*.
- David Lazar*, The Suffrage in New York State. *New York University*.
- Charles F. LeeDecker*, State Grants-in-Aid to Local Governments in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania State*.

- Virginia E. Lewis*, Fifty Years of Politics in Memphis. *New York University*.
- Ellis E. McCune*, Jury Selection in California: A Study in Judicial Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Russell W. Maddox, Jr.*, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the United States. *Illinois*.
- Seymour Mendelsohn*, The Administrative Organization of Field Services in New York. *New York University*.
- Lois B. Merk*, Massachusetts in the Woman Suffrage Movement. *Harvard*.
- Warner Mills, Jr.*, Ross Sterling, Governor of Texas. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Lee Moore*, Annexation and the Administration of Metropolitan Areas in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania State*.
- John C. Murray*, The Development of the Executive Branch of Government in Rhode Island. *Brown*.
- Isham G. Newton*, A Survey of the Minor Judiciary of North Carolina, with Special Emphasis on the Justice of the Peace. *Pennsylvania*.
- Walter H. Niehoff*, Democratic Trends in the Constitutions of Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania State*.
- James Nietmann*, The Administration of Government in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, 1875-1950. *Harvard*.
- Garfield S. Pancoast*, The Second Class Township in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Daisy Parker*, The Executive Department of the State of Florida. *Virginia*.
- Philip C. Pendleton*, A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Municipal Leagues of Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Clara Penniman*, Recent Developments in the Administration of the State Income Tax. *Minnesota*.
- Frank Peters*, The Colonial Governor of Delaware. *Duke*.
- Theodore P. Pidus*, The Council Manager Plan in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Nathaniel S. Preston*, Scope and Control in the Use of the Public Corporation by American State and Local Government. *Princeton*.
- Harold L. Rakov*, The Changing Focus of Administration and Control of Public and Private Education in New York State. *Syracuse*.
- Martin R. Ream*, Alcohol Beverage Revenues and Control: A Comparative Study of the Financial and Social Aspects of the State Monopoly and the State Liquor Licensing System, with Special Emphasis on their Application to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New York. *Pennsylvania*.
- Joseph W. Reid, Jr.*, Intergovernmental Relations in Alabama. *North Carolina*.
- Samuel J. Resnick*, The City Planning Commission and the Department of City Planning of the City of New York. *New York University*.
- Robert B. Richert*, Participation of Citizens in Advisory Committees and Administrative Boards: Selected Michigan Cities, 1945-1952. *Michigan*.
- Joseph Robertson*, The Regulation of Public Utilities in Alabama. *Minnesota*.
- Laurence W. Robertson*, The Power Structure of UAW-CIO and Its Impact on Public Policy in Michigan. *Northwestern*.
- Bernard Rubin*, Public Relations as a Function of Modern Government: A Study of Its Development in the Executive Department of New York State. *New York University*.
- Robert L. Sawyer, Jr.*, The Regulation and Control of Subversive Activities in Michigan. *Michigan*.
- Walter F. Scheffer*, Truck Transportation, A Major Factor in the Highway Problem of Wisconsin. *Wisconsin*.
- Joseph A. Schlesinger*, Methods of Ascendancy to the Office of Governor in the United States. *Yale*.
- Gerard H. Silverburgh*, Fusion Reform in New York City, 1933-1934. *Columbia*.
- Francis J. Sorauf, Jr.*, The Growth of Voluntary Committees in Wisconsin Political Parties. *Wisconsin*.
- James K. Sours*, Local Rent Control in Wichita (Intergovernmental Relations). *Harvard*.
- Israel Stiefel*, Reorganization of the Pennsylvania State Administrative Structure. *Pennsylvania*.
- John O. Stiebel*, The Rhode Island General Assembly. *Harvard*.
- John E. Swanson*, The Use of the Licensing Power by the City of St. Louis. *Illinois*.
- Marvin Tableman*, City-State Fiscal Relations in Michigan, 1937-1947. *Michigan*.
- James D. Thomas, Jr.*, County Government and Administration in Alabama. *Ohio State*.
- A. E. Van Eaton*, The Initiative and Referendum in Missouri. *Missouri*.
- J. Roffe Wike, II*, The Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association: A Study of a Political Interest Group. *Pennsylvania*.
- William C. Wimberly*, The Illinois Primary. *Illinois*.

Arthur B. Winter, Special Governmental Districts in Tennessee. *Duke.*

Frederick M. Wirt, State Motion Picture Censorship: A Study in Freedom and Power. *Ohio State.*

Lloyd Woodruff, County Boards in Wisconsin. *Minnesota.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Sidney Baldwin, The Farm Security Administration: A Study in Politics and Administration. *Syracuse.*

William J. Bell, A Reexamination of Bureaucracy. *Indiana.*

Eugenie K. Bigelow, Role of Advisory Bodies in the Foreign Service. *Pennsylvania.*

William R. Bigger, Flood Control in Los Angeles County: A Study in Inter-Government Relations. *California* (Los Angeles).

Calvin G. Brooks, Administration of an Extended Social Security System in the United States. *American.*

Milon L. Brown, Personnel Policies and Practices in Federal Administration: A Critique of Personnel Management in Selected Federal Agencies. *Pennsylvania.*

Andrew S. Bullis, Jr., Fiscal Administration in Selected Pennsylvania Cities. *Syracuse.*

Frederick O. Bundy, The Administration of Rule Making and Licensing Processes under Selected Statutes of the Department of Agriculture. *Syracuse.*

Charles E. Campbell, Current Executive Development Programs in the United States Army and Air Force with an Appraisal of Selected American Industrial Training Procedures. *American.*

John M. Capozzola, The New York Regional Office of the N.L.R.B.; Organization, Policies and Procedures. *Pennsylvania State.*

Daniel T. Carroll, The Development of the Appeals System in the Federal Civil Service. *Chicago.*

Vernon W. Darier, Two Different Approaches to Extension Program Development and their Influence on Program Content. *Harvard.*

Laurel A. Engberg, The Administration of Non-Tax-Supported Liberal Arts Colleges in the Middle West. *Wisconsin.*

Harold E. Finnegan, Quantitative Measures of Manpower Management and an Interpretation of Their Application in a Large Federal Mental Hospital. *American.*

Emanuel Fuchs, Federal-State Relations in

River Basin Development: A Case Study of the Missouri Valley. *Harvard.*

David R. Gardner, The Coordination of Federal, Regional, State, and Local Agencies in the Preparation of Detailed Soil Survey Reports. *Harvard.*

George Goodwin, Group Formulation of Railroad Policy. *Harvard.*

Clifford R. Gross, The Budgetary Administration of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance. *Syracuse.*

John F. Hallom, National Security and Individual Liberty, 1939-1953. *Texas.*

Marvin Harder, A Study of the Administration of Federal Grants-in-Aid in the State of Kansas. *Columbia.*

Edward L. Henry, A Politico-Administrative Appraisal of Government Organization for Monetary Policy. *Chicago.*

Robert S. Herman, Revenue Estimating in New York State Government. *New York University.*

Lawrence J. Herson, State Administrative Reorganization: The Precedent of Illinois. *Yale.*

Duane W. Hill, State-Municipal Relations in Iowa. *Iowa.*

Victor C. Hobday, Tennessee Municipalities and TVA Electric Power. *Syracuse.*

Barrett Hollister, Natural Resources Administration in Ohio. *Syracuse.*

Erin Hubbert, William Ashby Jump, Public Administrator. *Syracuse.*

Clyde W. Humphrey, Organizing and Administering Vocational Business Training in Public Educational Agencies. *American.*

Benjamin L. Hunton, The Budget of the Department of War, 1922-1932. *American.*

Albert P. Ingraham, Situational Factors in Federal Government Executive Positions and Their Relation to Executive Selection and Development. *American.*

Penrose Jackson, Personnel of Selected Federal Regulatory Commissions. *Texas.*

Judith N. Jamison, Administrative Reforms of the Hiram Johnson Era in California. *California* (Los Angeles).

David L. Jickling, The Personnel System of the U. S. Post Office. *Chicago.*

Millon G. Johnson, The Development of Public Medical Care for Children in Oklahoma through Services to the Crippled: A Case Study of Administrative Federalism. *Harvard.*

Garth N. Jones, Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. *Utah.*

Francis X. Kane, Empirical Method of Deter-

- mining Material Shortages in the Event of Total Mobilization. *Georgetown*.
- Leon J. Katz, The Public Relations Concept in Public Administration; the Theory and Practice of Public Relations in Democratic Public Administration, with Special Reference to the Federal Security Agency. *Columbia*.
- Robert V. Kirch, Regulatory Administration in a Public Utility: A Case Study. *Indiana*.
- Robert L. Kline, The Administration of Federal Migratory Waterfowl Legislation. *Iowa*.
- David C. Knapp, The Appropriations Committees and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (1940-1950): A Study in Legislative-Administrative Relations. *Chicago*.
- Anna Knoll, The Problem of Training Career Administrators. *American*.
- Donald W. Krimel, Government Public Relations as an Administrative Tool. *Wisconsin*.
- Gerhard J. Kruger, Position Classification and Employment Politics in the Department of Agriculture from 1914 to the Present Time. *American*.
- Ezra Lander, Performance Budgeting and Accounting Policy in the Department of the Army. *American*.
- William Larsen, The Field Service of the United States Bureau of the Budget. *California* (Berkeley).
- John A. Larson, Jr., State-Local Fiscal Relationships in Arkansas. *Northwestern*.
- George R. Long, The Administration of Virginia State Highways. *Virginia*.
- William H. Ludlow, Government Control of Urban Population Densities. *Chicago*.
- Conrad L. McBride, Role of the States in Conservation and Development of Natural Resources. *California* (Los Angeles).
- John P. McCarthy, Legislative-Executive Relations: Federal Organization. *Chicago*.
- Donal E. J. MacNamara, The Administrative Organization and Operation of Provost Marshal General Activities in World War II. *Columbia*.
- Byron S. Martin, Planning for Total Mobilization for War in the United States: 1920-1940. *Chicago*.
- Charles Miller, II, The Administrative Feasibility of Including Domestic Servants under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Program. *Pennsylvania*.
- Winfred P. Minter, Military Purchasing and Procurement by the Confederate War Department, 1861-65. *Chicago*.
- Arthur J. Misner, Faculty Participation in University Administration. *California* (Berkeley).
- William B. Monat, A Critical and Evaluative Study of the Minnesota State Merit System. *Minnesota*.
- Martin W. Moser, The Personnel System in the Department of State. *Maryland*.
- Maurice J. Mountain, Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information. *Harvard*.
- Mildred E. Negus, A Study of the Unit Cost of a Tax-Supported Public Health Nursing Service, with Special Reference to the District of Columbia. *American*.
- James E. Nix, The Admission of Negroes to State Universities in the South. *Syracuse*.
- William C. Nolan, Organization for the Regulation of Trade—The Federal Trade Commission from Humphrey to the Basing Point Decisions. *New York University*.
- Benjamin L. Olsen, Administrative Aspects of Water Resource Development in California. *Stanford*.
- W. Scott Payne, Public Policy in the Field of Air Transportation. *Harvard*.
- Robert H. Pealy, State Administration of the Property Tax: A Comparative Study of Five States. *Michigan*.
- Ben Posner, Accounting Data as Related to Performance Budgeting in the Federal Government. *American*.
- Robert W. Powers, Interagency Cooperation in Foreign Technical Assistance Programs. *Minnesota*.
- Les B. Reifel, Limitations and Potentialities of Democratic Administration in Colleges and Universities in the United States. *American*.
- Vorley Rexroad, The Administration of the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Project. *New York University*.
- Harry W. Reynolds, Jr., Executive Coordination of Administrative Boards and Commissions in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania*.
- Leo Richards, Budgeting in the National Housing Agency. *American*.
- Herbert Rosenberg, Program Planning of Scientific Research and Development in the Navy Department. *Chicago*.
- Arthur H. Rosien, The Administrative Relationship between the Army and the Territory of Alaska. *Syracuse*.
- Harold H. Roth, The Executive Office of the President: Its Development as an Administrative Instrument. *American*.
- Lloyd W. Schram, The Columbia River Basin and the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations

- with Special Reference to Problem 12. *Washington* (Seattle).
- Bernard E. Schultz, The Federal Occupational Classification Structure under the Classification Act of 1949. *American*.
- William J. Siffin, Government and the Cotton Problem. *Harvard*.
- James E. Skillington, Jr., Proposed Modifications of Congressional Participation in the Budgetary Process. *American*.
- David W. Smith, The Board of Examiners in Montana State Administration. *Utah*.
- Elizabeth B. Smith, Intergovernmental Relations in Public Health Administration: A Study of the Adaptation and Execution of Public Policy. *Virginia*.
- Sidney Spector, Public Administration among Primitive Societies. *Chicago*.
- Richard Stuart, Financing Capital Improvements in Maine. *Pennsylvania*.
- Nelson E. Taylor, Jr., The Association of American Railroads—Its Role as a Pressure Group. *Harvard*.
- David M. Thorpe, Program Development and Coordination of Agricultural Agencies. *Harvard*.
- Maurice K. Townsend, The Personnel Function: A Study in Staff-Line Relations. *Chicago*.
- Simon Tucker, The Development of the Employment Activities of the United States Civil Service Commission. *American*.
- A. Donald Urquhart, The Conduct of Administrative Hearings in Metropolitan Los Angeles. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Alice W. Wallace, Public Welfare Administration at the City-County Level in Michigan. *Michigan*.
- Marshall O. Watkins, The Role of the Extension Specialist and his Relation to the Extension Program. *Harvard*.
- Troy Westmeyer, Administration of Municipal Income and Payroll Taxes. *New York University*.
- J. Lee Westrate, The Administrative Theories and Practices of Herbert Hoover. *Chicago*.
- William L. C. Wheaton, The Administration of the Federal Housing Program. *Chicago*.
- Donald Wilhelm, Jr., Some Aspects of the Public Administration of Natural Science Research. *Harvard*.
- George L. Willis, Administrative Development of Alcoholic Beverage Control in Indiana. *Indiana*.
- Walter Wilmot, Administration of Air Pollution Control. *Harvard*.
- Jesse D. Winzenreid, The State of Wyoming: A History and Evaluation of Financial Administration. *New York University*.
- John L. Withers, The Administrative Theory and Practice of William Howard Taft. *Chicago*.
- Arthur Wolfe, American Civil Service Examinations. *Chicago*.
- James R. Woodworth, Administration of the Pure Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act since 1938. *Harvard*.
- Laurence N. Woodworth, United States Taxation of Income Earned Abroad. *New York University*.
- John D. Young, Regional Administration in the Federal Security Agency. *American*.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Mohammed Adham, Special Problems of Government in the Arab States of the Middle East. *American*.
- Bruce Adkinson, British Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. *Princeton*.
- Berndt G. Angman, The Ideological Development of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden in Regard to the Question of Socialization, 1932-1952. *Texas*.
- David E. Apter, Political Democracy in Africa: A Study of Institutional Transfer in the Gold Coast. *Princeton*.
- Robert W. Barrie, The Council of Europe. *Minnesota*.
- Paul Barringer, Soviet Policy toward Scientific Research: A Case Study. *Harvard*.
- Richard Barron, The Political Parties and the Fourth French Republic. *Virginia*.
- Harry J. Benda, Some Political Aspects of the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia. *Cornell*.
- Richard Bender, Structure and Organization of the Associated States of Vietnam. *Cornell*.
- Fredrick T. Bent, The Policies and Practices of British Municipal Labor Unions. *Chicago*.
- William Berry, Problems in the Economic Development of British African Territories. *Harvard*.
- John A. Billings, The British Administration of the Mandate of Transjordan, 1923-1939. *Princeton*.
- Byron E. Blankinship, Spain and World War I: A Study of Foreign Policy, 1910-1920. *Columbia*.
- Louis C. Boochever, Jr., The Development of the Soviet Coal Industry. *Harvard*.
- Frank R. Brandenburg, The Philosophy of the

- Mexican Revolutionary Party. *Pennsylvania*.
- Conrad Brant, The Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern, 1924-1930. *Harvard*.
- Cecil C. Brett, Local Autonomy in Okayama Prefecture, Japan: A Study of National-Local Relations. *Michigan*.
- Lyle C. Brown, The Cardinas Administration in Mexico, 1934-40. *Texas*.
- Leslie Bundgaard, Local Government in the Philippines. *Georgetown*.
- Ben G. Burnett, The Colombian Party System: A Contemporary Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Leo D. Cagan, Civil Service Unions: A Comparative Study of American and British Commonwealth Experience. *Chicago*.
- Charles Carroll, Australia and Argentina—A Study of the Bases of Federal Government. *Harvard*.
- Tse-Tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement and Its Influence upon China's Political and Social Development. *Michigan*.
- James B. Christoph, Theories, Laws and Practices Concerning the Political and Civil Rights of State Workers in Great Britain. *Minnesota*.
- Cathie L. Clark, The Development of Government and Administration in Brazil since 1889. *American*.
- Alessandro L. Corradini, The Conduct of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain. *Wisconsin*.
- Robert Curtis, Origins and Development of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire. *Georgetown*.
- Jose M. de Gamboa, Philippine Political Parties as Instruments of Reform. *Cornell*.
- William F. DeMyer, The Political Career of Leon Blum. *Georgetown*.
- Kurt DeWitt, The Relation between Civil and Military Power in a Totalitarian Dictatorship: The Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party 1933-1945. *George Washington*.
- Alfred Diamant, The Course of Political Catholicism in Austria. *Yale*.
- Roger Di-Gioja, The Problem of the Executive in France, and the Fear of Bonapartism. *Notre Dame*.
- Jack D. Dowell, German Rearmament. *Stanford*.
- Eugene Dvorin, The New Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. *California* (Los Angeles).
- John Eaves, Jr., Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog. *Columbia*.
- J. Dixon Edwards, Japan's Relations with the Prewar Puppet Governments of China: A Study in Nationalist Foreign Operations. *Columbia*.
- Marie A. Edwards, Labor Legislation in Occupied Japan, 1945-1950. *Northwestern*.
- Irma E. Eichhorn, German Foreign Policy after Munich. *Michigan*.
- Harold T. Ellis, The Political and Economic Effects of Partition in Ireland, 1920-1950. *Stanford*.
- Frederick C. Engelmann, The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada. *Yale*.
- John G. Eriksen, Church and State Relations in Germany, 1930-1945. *Minnesota*.
- Donald R. Farmer, Federalism and Multinationalism in the Soviet Union. *Minnesota*.
- Josephine Fishel, The Fabian Society and the British Labour Party. *Duke*.
- Cary O. Fisher, Revolution by Coup d'Etat: A Study of Modern Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics. *Stanford*.
- William S. Flash, Democratic Aspects of the British National Health Service: Local Government and Regionalized Health. *Harvard*.
- William Fleming, The Jurisdiction of German Courts to Decide Controversies Arising under the Weimar Constitution. *Columbia*.
- Harold A. Fletcher, Jr., The Nationalization of Industry in France: A Study of the Political and Administrative Aspects of the Problem. *Harvard*.
- Charles R. Foster, A Study of the German Social Democratic Party. *Ohio State*.
- I. Paul Giardina, The Economic Effects of the Disposition of the Italian Colonies upon the Economy of Italy. *New York University*.
- George Garofalides, The Greek Enigma. *New York University*.
- John L. Groom, The Function of Soviet Law. *Southern California*.
- William B. Gwyn, Democracy and Political Expenses in Nineteenth Century England. *Virginia*.
- Susan Han, The Chinese Elite. *Chicago*.
- William S. Hardenbergh, The Legislative Assembly of British Columbia. *Illinois*.
- Louis K. Harris, Democracy in Latin America. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Dan F. Henderson, The Pattern and Persistence of Traditional Procedures in Japanese Law. *California* (Berkeley).
- Laurin L. Henry, International Technical Assistance in Public Administration. *Chicago*.
- Paul H. Heppie, The Ideology of the Canadian Liberal Party 1921-1951. *Wisconsin*.

- James K. Herold*, The Role of the Trade Unions in Nationalized Industries—A Case Study: The National Union of Mineworkers. *Harvard*.
- H. Grant Hicks*, Chinese Nationalist Administration and Reform in Formosa. *Columbia*.
- Karl A. Hochschwender*, The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Western Germany. *Yale*.
- Ernest V. Hollis, Jr.*, The Soviet Police System, 1917–1946. *Columbia*.
- Ursula Holtermann*, Democracy Resurrected: A Study of German Political Parties, 1945–1950. *Chicago*.
- Leonard J. Horwitz*, United States-Argentine Relations 1943–1947, with Special Reference to the Braden-Peron Affair. *Pennsylvania*.
- George M. Hougham*, Minor Parties in Canadian National Politics. *Pennsylvania*.
- W. Carter Ide*, The Politics of French Labor. *Harvard*.
- Eric G. James*, Administrative Planning in the British Caribbean, with Special Reference to Jamaica. *New York University*.
- T. M. Joshi*, Economics of Public Finance in Bombay. *Pennsylvania*.
- Misha N. Kadick*, Soviet Use of Manpower. *Princeton*.
- Eli Kaminsky*, The French Government and the Communists since 1947. *Harvard*.
- Hossein Kazemzadeh*, The Impact of the United Nations Membership upon Iran's Power Position: A Study in Iran's Security Problems and the Impact of the U.N. *Princeton*.
- James Kitchen*, Local Government in Guatemala. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Edward B. Kovar*, France above the Parties: Gaullism and the Movement for Constitutional Revision in the Fourth Republic. *Columbia*.
- Richard Kramer*, Communist Moral Education of Children as Illustrated in Three Official Soviet Periodicals. *Columbia*.
- William B. Kyes*, A Comparison of the Air Defense Systems of Germany and the United Kingdom during World War II. *Georgetown*.
- Frank C. Langdon*, The Japanese Policy of Expansion in China, 1917–1928. *California* (Berkeley).
- Joseph G. LaPalombara*, The Postwar Democratic Labor Movement in Italy. *Princeton*.
- Harry Lazer*, Balfourian Conservatism: A Study in Political Ideas and Political Leadership. *Columbia*.
- Jerzy Lerski*, Polish Exiles in the United States, 1834–1865. *Georgetown*.
- Frank M. Lewis*, The Multi-Party System in the Presidential Form of Government in Chile. *Texas*.
- J. Gus Liebenow, Jr.*, Comparative Studies of Indirect Rule in British East Africa. *Northwestern*.
- Gerhard Loewenberg*, Effects of Governing upon the British Labour Party, 1945–1951. *Cornell*.
- Leo B. Lott*, The Theory and Practice of Federalism in Venezuela. *Wisconsin*.
- Ruth H. Lutz*, The Political Parties of Mexico. *Pittsburgh*.
- James H. McCrocklin*, A Study of the Garde d'Haiti. *Texas*.
- Thomas H. McLeod*, Dominion-Provincial Conferences as a Technique in Intergovernmental Coordination. *Harvard*.
- Sidney Mailick*, The Emergence of a System of Administration in Israel. *Chicago*.
- Joseph F. Marsh*, British Departmental Decentralization: A Study of National Departmental Organization in the Southern (#6) Standard Region for the Administration of Public Health and Welfare Services. *Harvard*.
- Albert A. Mavrinac*, The Antecedents of the M.R.P. *Harvard*.
- Douglas H. Mendel, Jr.*, A Study of Political Participation in Rural Japan. *Michigan*.
- Frank A. Mesplé*, The Native Political Parties of French North Africa. *Stanford*.
- Frank O. Miller*, Minobe Tatsukichi—Exponent of Liberal Constitutionalism under the Meiji Constitution. *California* (Berkeley).
- Kenneth Miller*, British Socialism and the Continuity of Foreign Policy, 1931–1950. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Ante Mlikotin*, The Structure of Contemporary Yugoslav Government. *Indiana*.
- George R. Monsen*, De Gaulle and the R.P.F.: Man, Movement and Mystique. *Stanford*.
- Steven Muller*, The Prime Ministership in Canada. *Cornell*.
- Joe W. Neal*, The State Governments of Northeastern Mexico: Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. *Texas*.
- Mark Neuweld*, The Central Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the Structure, Leadership and Dynamics of Development. *Harvard*.
- Edward J. O'Connor*, India and Democracy: An Analysis of the 1951–1952 Elections and Their Political Impact. *Notre Dame*.
- Eze A. Ogueri*, The Indirect Rule System; Its Theory and Practice, and the Idea of Self-

- Government (Independence) in the British Colonial and Protectorate Policy in Nigeria, 1890-1950. *Harvard*.
- Leon V. Padgett, Popular Participation in the Mexican One-Party System. *Northwestern*.
- Stelios Papadakis, An Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece. *Pennsylvania*.
- H. Carroll Parish, Development of Democratic Institutions in Southeast Asia. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Don Peretz, Israel and the Arab Refugees. *Columbia*.
- Lawrence L. Petersen, The Swedish Cooperatives and Politics. *Notre Dame*.
- Ivan M. Ponedel, The Development of English Labor Law: The Legal Position of the Laborer from 1349 to the Present. *California* (Berkeley).
- Jesse Proctor, Federation of the British West Indies. *Harvard*.
- Robert Quick, Partisan Politics and Foreign Policy in Postwar France. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Emanuel Rackman, Making of the Israeli Constitution. *Columbia*.
- Russell F. Rhyne, The Political Impact of Economic Planning in Indonesia. *California* (Berkeley).
- James Riedel, The British Debate on Foreign Policy: 1945-1950. *Chicago*.
- Linford Dale Riley, Jr., The Associated States System in Indo-China. *California* (Los Angeles).
- James S. Roberts, The Participation of Civil Servants in Partisan Political Activities in Sweden. *North Carolina*.
- Owen W. Roberts, The Colonial Policy of the French Socialist Party, 1946-1951. *Columbia*.
- Leslie G. Rose, The French Economic Council. *Columbia*.
- William L. Rofes, A Study of the Prime Minister in Great Britain. *Columbia*.
- Leo E. Rose, The Effect of Occupation Policy upon the Labor Movement in Japan. *California* (Berkeley).
- Alvin Z. Rubinstein, An Analysis of Soviet Economic Policy in the Economic and Social Council and the Economic Commission for Europe, 1946-1951. *Pennsylvania*.
- Robert Rupen, The Course of Nationalism in Outer Mongolia, 1900-1925. *Washington* (Seattle).
- Thomas A. Rusch, The Role of Socialist Ideology in the Congress Party of India, 1931-1951. *Chicago*.
- Hassan H. Saab, The Impact of Communism on Islamic Society. *Georgetown*.
- I. Milton Sacks, Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam. *Yale*.
- Herbert Pierre Secher, Political Parties in Post-war Austria since 1945. *Wisconsin*.
- Will J. Selzer, The Trusteeship Council and Self-Government with Particular Reference to British Administration in Africa. *Pennsylvania*.
- F. Burke Sheeran, Intergovernmental Relations in Canada, Australia, and the United States: A Comparative Study of Federal Government. *Southern California*.
- Kurt L. Shell, Austrian Socialist Party, 1945-1952. *Columbia*.
- Olga C. Sonder, Political Processes and Electoral Procedures under the Indian Republican Constitution Put into Effect on January 26, 1950. *Stanford*.
- Herbert G. Sonthoff, Robert von Mohl and the Problem of German Federalism. *Harvard*.
- Richard Felix Staar, Political Dynamics in Poland, 1948-1953. *Michigan*.
- Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan. *Stanford*.
- Claude B. Stephenson, Jr., The Use of Technically Competent Committees in Swedish Local Government. *North Carolina*.
- Robert Scott Sullivan, The Ukraine and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—A Study in Soviet Policy and Ukrainian Nationalism. *Chicago*.
- Joseph Lee Sutton, A Political Biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi. *Michigan*.
- Harold M. Thewlis, Authoritarian Tendencies in the French Right, 1924-1940. *Columbia*.
- Jack E. Thomas, Evaluation of Soviet Air Power. *California* (Berkeley).
- Robert F. Thompson, The Retention and Rejection of Occupation Reforms in Japan after the Signing of the Peace Treaty. *Minnesota*.
- Thomas Waller Thorsen, The Administration of Medical and Public Health Services in Scandinavia. *Utah*.
- Roy Tollefson, Political Thought in the Norwegian Labor Party (1917-1928). *Chicago*.
- George O. Totten, III, The Social Democratic Movement in Pre-War Japan. *Yale*.
- Frank Untermeyer, The Problem of Federation in the British Central African Colonies. *Chicago*.

Margaret D. Urist, Nationalism in Guatemala. *Southern California*.

Paul W. J. Van der Veur, Minority Groups in the United States of Indonesia. *Minnesota*.

Eric Waldman, The Spartacus Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation between Political Theory and Party Practice. *George Washington*.

Carlo F. Weiss, Catholic Corporatism in Italy. *Yale*.

Ernst F. Winter, Austrian Agrarian Policy: 1945-1953. *Columbia*.

Ernest Wohlgenuth, The Politics of Labor in West Germany. *Chicago*.

George Elliott Wolff, Executive-Legislative Relations in the Third French Republic, 1920-1940. *North Carolina*.

Laurence Wyatt, Some Freedoms in England Today. *Minnesota*.

Willard Ross Yates, An Examination of the Leading Constitutional and Social Ideas of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire, 1945-1947. *Yale*.

Phoebe Yu, A Comparison of the British and American Personnel Systems. *Chicago*.

Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Self-Assertion in the Soviet Factory: Study of Worker Grievances and Their Adjustment. *Stanford*.

Paul Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-50. *Harvard*.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Robert L. Abbey, The World Health Organization: A Case Study in the Functional Approach toward International Organization. *Harvard*.

Nasser Ahmed, Development of Administrative Practices in the United Nations Secretariate. *Kansas*.

Charles E. Allen, The Development and Significance of International Health Collaboration, 1792-1950. *Stanford*.

Luther A. Allen, The French Left and Soviet Russia, 1933-1940. *Chicago*.

Eliecs A. Altroggen, Power Politics Concerning Sinkiang, 1860-1946. *Chicago*.

Yilmaz Altug, Turkey and the Development of International Law. *Kentucky*.

Abdul-Malik S. Al-Zaibag, Iraq Oil Politics in the Inter-War Period. *Columbia*.

Charles D. Ameringer, Never Abandon Panama! The Story of Philippe Bunau-Varilla and the Panama Canal. *Fletcher School*.

Nan Louise Grindle Amstutz, The Economics of Socialism. *Fletcher School*.

John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism and Disaffection in the Ukraine. *Columbia*.

John P. Armstrong, A Study of Senator Taft's Foreign Policy. *Chicago*.

Clarence W. Baier, Jonathan Russell and the Development of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1810-1920. *Brown*.

Bettie J. Baker, Toward an Understanding of International Regionalism. *Michigan*.

Arthur C. Banks, Jr., International Law and the Second World War. *Johns Hopkins*.

Irving Barnett, UNRRA's Experience in China. *Columbia*.

Sidney N. Barnett, Judicial Interpretations of the United Nations Charter in International and National Courts. *Columbia*.

George Basich, The Effect of Russian Expansion on British Political Opinion, 1763-1856. *Chicago*.

Frederick O. Beattie, III, The Utility of Theories of Aggression to the Understanding of International Relations. *Chicago*.

Anne B. Beeler, The International Labour Organization; Important Developments in Its Structure, Function and Constitution since 1935. *Cornell*.

John A. Bekker, The Soviet Union and World Organization. *Chicago*.

Aaron Bell, The United States' Doctrine of the Just War. *Chicago*.

George C. Betts, The International Criminal Court. *Syracuse*.

Thompson Black, Prize Law in World War II. *California* (Los Angeles).

Helen A. Blackway, Ideas and Opinion Determinants in Foreign Policy Issues. *Pennsylvania*.

S. Cole Blasier, Soviet Policy toward Cuba and Chile, 1945-1948. *Columbia*.

John D. Blumgart, The Political Consequences of the American Aid in Greece. *Columbia*.

William G. Bowdler, The Quest for Collective Security in the Americas. *Fletcher School*.

James E. Boyce, The United States and the Integrity of China (1898-1908). *Fletcher School*.

Chester P. Bradley, New Trends in British Colonial Policy. *Columbia*.

Ralph Brown, Concepts of Air Superiority. *Georgetown*.

Weldon J. Brown, The Political Aspects of Commercial Trade Controls in Central and South America. *American*.

Bue Brun, International Maritime Policy. *Fletcher School*.

- Jean Emile Buckens*, The Right of Petition in the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. *Fletcher School*.
- Barbara B. Burn*, International Law and the Administration of Colonies. *Fletcher School*.
- Henry C. Bush*, British Opinion Concerning the United States Foreign Policy since 1945. *Chicago*.
- Robert O. Byrd*, Quaker Alternatives to Official Policy in the Field of International Relations. *Chicago*.
- Florencio Campomanes*, The Problem of Integration of the Organization of American States into the United Nations. *Georgetown*.
- Russell B. Capelle*, Formulation of French Foreign Policy under the Fourth Republic. *Boston University*.
- George A. Carroll*, American Policy Concerning Control of Atomic Energy. *Fletcher School*.
- Webster C. Cash*, A Comparative Study of the Specialized Agencies in the United Nations: The Relation of Their Functions to Their Organizational Forms. *Chicago*.
- Alphonso Castagno*, Regional Influences in Italian Foreign Policy. *Columbia*.
- Nancy G. Cattell*, Soviet Policy and the German Revolution of 1918-19. *Columbia*.
- Matthew Casan*, Diplomatic Relations; Roumania-United States, 1940-1950. *Georgetown*.
- J. Leo Cefkin*, The National Commission of Unesco with Special Emphasis on the United States. National Commission for Unesco. *Columbia*.
- Yu Nan Chang*, A Study of U. S. Security Arrangements in the Far East, 1950-52. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Ping-Lang Chao*, Finality of International Arbitral Awards. *New York University*.
- Chu Pei Chen*, The Diplomatic Services of Major Powers. *New York University*.
- Kwen Chen*, Legal Status, Privileges, and Immunities of the United Nations, Its Related Organizations and Their Personnel. *Michigan*.
- Yu-Ching Chen*, American Policy and the Collapse of the Nationalist China. *New York University*.
- Chieh Yue Chiang*, The Concept and Development of International Responsibility for Colonial Administration. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Charles K. Chu*, Philander Knox's Far Eastern Policy, 1909-1913. *Chicago*.
- Martin Clancy*, Rules of Warfare Observed by American Military Forces in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. *Georgetown*.
- Joseph I. Coffee*, A Case History of Techniques of Soviet Aggression (Poland, 1919-1920). *Georgetown*.
- Sidney Coleman*, A Study of the Administration of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- George C. Constantinides*, The United States and Greece, 1940-47: A Study in Foreign Policy. *Harvard*.
- Ralph E. Cook*, American Participation in the Lausanne Conference, 1922-23. *Fletcher School*.
- Brownlee S. Corrin*, The United Nations, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. from Dumbarton Oaks to Korea: A Study in Controversy and Cooperation. *Stanford*.
- Morton H. Cowden*, Soviet and Comintern Policy toward the British Labor Movement, 1917-26. *Columbia*.
- Richard F. Crabbs*, Administrative Aspects of Technical Assistance. *Stanford*.
- Martin G. Cramer*, TCA Program in India. *Fletcher School*.
- Claude B. Cross*, The United States and the North Atlantic Pact. *Iowa*.
- Frank J. Curtis, Jr.*, The Role of Argentina in the United Nations. *Pennsylvania*.
- William B. Dale*, Full Employment and American Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School*.
- William M. David, Jr.*, U. S. Policy toward the Baltic States, 1917-1922. *Columbia*.
- James F. Davidson*, Edmund Burke's Theory of International Relations. *Chicago*.
- Margaret M. Davies*, The Role of the American Trade Union Representatives in the Aid-to-Greece Program. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Grant R. Davy*, Canadian Policies in the United Nations. *Fletcher School*.
- Francois M. Dickman*, The Economic Foreign Policy of the United States in Western Europe from 1945 to 1948. *Fletcher School*.
- Anatole Dinbergs*, The Pattern of Annexation by the Soviet Union. *Georgetown*.
- Dorothy Dodge*, The Recognition of the "People's Government" in China: A Problem of International Law and Politics. *Minnesota*.
- Joseph F. Dolecki*, Polish Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. *New York University*.
- Herbert W. Dowd*, The Native Land and Labor Policies of the South African Administration of South West Africa. *Fletcher School*.
- Arthur E. Dowell*, Appeasement and Conciliation in Global Crises, 1938-1948. *Chicago*.

- Margaret W. Dower*, Neutrality in Small European Nations. *Boston University*.
- Edward Drake*, The Soviet Alliance System. *New York University*.
- Wilbert B. Dubin*, The Rise of Post-War Political Stratifications in Southeast Asia. *Georgetown*.
- Frederick B. Dunn*, Franco-British Relations in Southeast Asia, 1863-1904. *Chicago*.
- John Edmund Dwan*, Military Planning and Foreign Policy: The Search for Rationality in Strategic Judgments. *Yale*.
- Stanley W. Dziuban*, United States-Canadian Military Cooperation. *Columbia*.
- Charles P. Edwards*, The Western Powers and the Italo-Abyssinian Affair. *Fletcher School*.
- Harold E. Engle*, The Place of International Administration in the Structure of International Politics: A Critical Study of "Functionalism." *Columbia*.
- Phoebe Everett*, International Administration: A Comparative Study of the Caribbean and South Pacific Commissions. *Syracuse*.
- Bernard Fall*, The Post-War Problem of Indo-China. *Syracuse*.
- Thomas S. Farr*, European Federation: Proposals and Prospects. *Chicago*.
- Millon Feder*, Great Power Relations in the Origin and Development of the Kingdom of Lybia. *Michigan*.
- Mark Cecil Iselin Feer*, India's Policy toward China since 1949. *Fletcher School*.
- Vernon L. Ferwerda*, United Nations Settlement of Armed Conflict: Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir. *Harvard*.
- Edmund S. Finegold*, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *Harvard*.
- Lawrence S. Finkelstein*, Indonesia and the United States. *Columbia*.
- Michael J. Flach*, The Slav Congresses and Pan-Slavism, 1848-1914. *Fletcher School*.
- Arthur Frank*, United States and Czechoslovak Foreign Relations. *Utah*.
- Robert W. Frase*, Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy. *Harvard*.
- C. Dale Fuller*, The Soviet Union's Concept of the League of Nations as an Instrumentality for the Maintenance of Peace, 1934-1939. *Columbia*.
- Arthur Funston*, The United Nations and Human Rights. *Indiana*.
- John O. Gallagher*, United States Monetary and Financial Diplomacy and the Failure of the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933. *Fletcher School*.
- Richard F. Gardner*, The Relations of the United States and Spain from 1898 to 1948. *Fletcher School*.
- Tesfay Gebre-egziabhier*, Constitutional Developments in Relation to Treaties after 1945. *Fletcher School*.
- Charles Gendreau*, Agricultural Settlement and Colonization in Latin American National Development Programs. *Minnesota*.
- Victor H. Gibean*, Cuban-American Relations during the First World War. *North Carolina*.
- John S. Gibson*, The Impact of Regional and Limited Security Arrangements upon the United Nations as an International Peace and Security Organization. *Columbia*.
- Eggert W. Giers*, The American Policy toward the Negotiation and Conclusion of a Peace Contract with Germany following World War II. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- John S. Gillespie*, The Role of the Director-General in the Development of the International Labor Office. *Columbia*.
- Meredith Gilpatrick*, Military Strategy on the Western Front, 1871-1914. *Chicago*.
- Edward Glick*, The Policy of the Latin American Governments toward Israel in the United Nations. *Florida*.
- Robert Goerder*, Impact of Air Power in Korea on Chinese and Korean Troops as Evident in Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports. *Georgetown*.
- Elliott R. Goodman*, The Bolshevik Concept of a World State. *Columbia*.
- Marjorie H. Gordon*, The New Japanese Constitution. *Indiana*.
- Robert C. Gordon*, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: A Study in Comparative International Organization. *California (Berkeley)*.
- Budda V. Govindaraj*, The Role of India in the Settlement of Disputes within the United Nations. *Michigan*.
- Angelina Grammatico*, The United Nations and the Development of Human Rights. *New York University*.
- Morris A. Greene*, The Transfer of a Functioning International Organization from One Site to Another. *American*.
- Frances A. Gulick*, Agrarian Problems in Indonesia. *Fletcher School*.
- Merle Gulick*, The Foreign Policy of Senator Connally. *Georgetown*.
- Eric J. Haas*, The Modern Problem of Intervention. *New York University*.
- William C. Hamilton*, Making Foreign Policy in Pressure Groups. *Yale*.

- Pyo-Wook Han*, Post-War Developments in Korean Government. *Michigan*.
- Thomas H. Handy*, Russia and Postwar Anglo-American Relations. *Texas*.
- John Hanessian, Jr.*, The Question of Western European Integration. *Syracuse*.
- Milan E. Hapala*, The Russian Question and the Evolution of Czechoslovak Political Parties. *Duke*.
- Maurice Harari*, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1936-1951. *Columbia*.
- Clifford Harding*, The World Position of Iran as Effected by the Work of Reza Shah. *New York University*.
- Bruce B. Harlow*, Determinants in International Relations: An Inquiry into Fundamentals. *Columbia*.
- Don Harris*, International Economic Cooperation in Europe, 1814-1950. *California* (Berkeley).
- Bartlett Harvey*, Foreign Policy and Public Opinion; The Shift in Policy toward the German Economy, 1945-1948. *Harvard*.
- Gene S. Haugse*, Treaties of Alliance. *Nebraska*.
- Robert D. Hayton*, Relations between Argentina and Chile. *California* (Berkeley).
- Joseph A. Hearst*, American Policy in Occupied Italy. *Columbia*.
- William A. Helsel*, United States Embassy in Berlin, 1921-1933. *Fletcher School*.
- William Henderson*, Eleven Days to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Crisis Government in America. *Columbia*.
- Frederick Herman*, The Victors and the Vanquished: The Quest for Security as Illustrated by Three Allied Occupations of Territory of Defeated Powers: France, 1815-1818; Germany, 1918-1929 and Germany, 1945-. *Fletcher School*.
- Edward Hermberg*, Hans Kelsen's Theory of the Development of International Law and Organization: An Analysis of Its Position within His General Theory of Law and the State. *Yale*.
- Robert Herrera*, Latin American Territorial Disputes in International Law. *Columbia*.
- Wilhelm G. Herta*, The Swiss Conception of International Law. *Columbia*.
- Raul Hilberg*, The Destruction of the European Jews. *Columbia*.
- Conrad P. Homberger*, A Theory of International Relations. *Columbia*.
- Robert Hopkirk*, Functional Regionalism: A Pattern of International Organization in the Economic and Social Fields of the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Robert J. Horgan*, American Thought on the Soviet Union, 1933-1939. *Notre Dame*.
- Thomas Hovel, Jr.*, The Development of International Organization in the Field of Inter-governmental Commodity (Food) Arrangements. *New York University*.
- Allen Hovey, Jr.*, Politics of Unity: The European Movement and the Council of Europe. *Columbia*.
- John M. Howell*, The Development of the Concept of Domestic Jurisdiction. *Duke*.
- Albert J. Hoyt*, The Role of Regionalism in Contemporary World Politics. *Southern California*.
- William Y. Huang*, The Role of China in the Origin and Development of the U.N. *Michigan*.
- Robert P. Huff*, Diplomatic Relations between Spain and the United States, 1945-1953. *Stanford*.
- Otis Hung-i-Shao*, Henry L. Stimson's Far Eastern Policy, 1929-1933. *Brown*.
- Dunning Idle, IV*, Indonesian Neutralism and the Cold War. *Yale*.
- Thomas A. Israel*, The Implications of the Social Contract Theory for International Organization. *Illinois*.
- Harold K. Jacobson*, The Impact of the Soviet Union on the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations. *Yale*.
- Louis C. James*, Relations of the North American Railroads: A Study in International Cooperation of the Railroads of Canada, Mexico and the United States. *Columbia*.
- Ernest John*, Some Aspects of General Staff Liaison in Coalition Warfare. *Georgetown*.
- Raymond V. Johnson*, Development and Administration of the International Broadcasting Program of the United States. *Stanford*.
- Doris W. Jones*, The First Moroccan Crisis and the Foreign Policy of Theodore Roosevelt. *Fletcher School*.
- Charles Katsanos*, Russia's Pan-Slavism: Theory and Practice in the Light of Russia's Balkan Expansionism up to 1912. *Georgetown*.
- Pierre Keller*, National Attitudes toward Western European Integration. *Yale*.
- George H. Kelly*, The Union Française and French Colonial Policy. *Stanford*.
- Jesse C. Kennedy*, American Foreign Policy in China, 1937-1950: An Analysis of Why It Failed. *Chicago*.
- Lu Yu Kiang*, A Critical Study of the Operation of the United Nations Trusteeship Sys-

- tem, with Special Reference to the Methods of Supervision over the Administering Authorities. *New York University*.
- E. Darrell Killen, Pacific Security Alternatives as Seen through Australian Eyes. *Chicago*.
- Chonghan Kim, Prince Konoye and Japanese Foreign Policy, with Special Reference to the Period 1937-1941. *Indiana*.
- Chase Kimball, A Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. *Fletcher School*.
- Alvin Knepper, John Gilbert Winant and International Social Justice. *New York University*.
- Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1951. *Florida*.
- Maximilian Koessler, The Dachau Trials: A Study of the War Crime Trials. *Columbia*.
- Kwang Lim Koh, International Regulation of Fisheries, with Special Reference to Those in the North Pacific Ocean. *Rutgers*.
- Leon Koruciewicz, Polish-German Diplomatic Relations, 1934-1939. *California* (Berkeley).
- Irving Kramer, Problems of the Japanese Peace Treaty. *Columbia*.
- Lawrence Lazar, International Law and Diplomatic Asylum. *Fletcher School*.
- Luke Tsung-Chou Lee, The Development of the Consular Institution, 1931-1951. *Fletcher School*.
- Pichon Pei-Yung Leh, China: Its Westernization and Nationalism, 1919-1926. *Chicago*.
- Bruce LeMessurier, The United States Senate and America's Latin American Policy, 1938-1950. *Chicago*.
- Sigrid Leube, The Position of Non-Member States with Regard to International Organizations: The League of Nations and the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Hua-Wei Li, The Development of Economic and Social Rights by the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Paul Ta-Kuang Lin, Problems in the Policy of the British Commonwealth toward the Japanese Empire, 1921-1941. *Harvard*.
- Arthur W. Lindsley, The Problem of Control over Current Methods at Conflict between Nations. *New York University*.
- Seward Ling, The Administrative Tribunal at the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Raymond McDuffee, The Department of State and the Russian Revolution (March-November, 1917), *Georgetown*.
- Stuart H. McIntyre, Legal Effect of War on Treaties. *Columbia*.
- Raymond D. Mack, The Development of the Inter-American Regional System: The Contribution of the Jurists. *Indiana*.
- Joseph C. McKenna, S. J., Diplomatic Protest as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy. *Yale*.
- Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy towards the Chinese Communists, 1935-1949. *Columbia*.
- Charles H. McLaughlin, Principles of Treaty Interpretation. *Columbia*.
- David S. McLellan, The French (Non-Communist) Image of American Foreign Policy. *Yale*.
- Dagmar McNow, The Military and Diplomatic Struggle for the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia. *California* (Los Angeles).
- P. D. Madhani, Expropriation of Property under International Law. *Columbia*.
- Alfredo Manat, The Relations of the United States and the Philippines since the Coming into Effect of the Commonwealth Act, 1935-1950. *Chicago*.
- Yunan Mao, The Principle of Sovereign Equality in the United Nations. *Chicago*.
- Melvin M. Marcus, Voting Procedure in the Practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. *Michigan*.
- John L. Martin, Legal and Diplomatic Control of International Propaganda. *Minnesota*.
- Laurence Martin, Anglo-American Liberalism and the Allied Peace Program of 1918. *Yale*.
- Gerald Maryanov, Domestic Jurisdiction in the United Nations. *Indiana*.
- Arno Mayer, The Spectre of Communism at Versailles. *Yale*.
- William S. McCrea, A Comparative Study of the Mexican Oil Expropriation of 1938 and the Iranian Oil Nationalization of 1951. *Georgetown*.
- Irene W. Meister, Soviet Union's Policy in the Near East since the End of World War II. *Fletcher School*.
- Thomas P. Melady, Role of Taxation in the Development of Underdeveloped Countries. *Catholic University*.
- Everett K. Melby, The Refugees in Western Germany. *Chicago*.
- Earl Thomas Millen, The Impact of Tensions upon International Relations and Organization. *Washington* (Seattle).
- Frances Mond, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights. *Columbia*.
- Glenn Guy Morgan, An Evaluation of the Role of the Specialized Organizations of the Organization of American States. *Virginia*.

- Andrew J. Morse*, An Analysis of British Opinion in Reaction to the American Initiative during the Postwar Years. *Chicago*.
- Norman W. Mosher*, State Trading and Great Britain: A Case Study of State Trading, Methods of its Implementation, the Effects on the National Economy, and its Relation to Multilateral Trade. *Fletcher School*.
- Daniel P. Moynihan*, United States and the International Labor Organization. *Fletcher School*.
- Robert J. Myers*, The Political Philosophy of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. *Chicago*.
- Hossein Nazem*, Neutrality of Iran. *Columbia*.
- Inez Nelson*, The Security of Small States. *Chicago*.
- Norman W. Nelson*, Subsidies to Producers as a Substitute for Tariffs. *Fletcher School*.
- Randall H. Nelson*, United States Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Agreements since 1940. *Michigan*.
- Benjamin Nimer*, Walter Lippmann: International Relations in Theory and Practice. *Chicago*.
- Leon Novar*, Great Power Conflicts in Iran, 1920-1921 and 1943-1947: A Comparison. *Chicago*.
- Grady H. Nunn*, International Administration in the Western Hemisphere. *New York University*.
- Alfred G. Obern*, International Regional Organizations: A Study in International Administration. *American*.
- James F. O'Brien*, The London Economic Conference of 1933. *Georgetown*.
- William O'Brien*, Some Contemporary Aspects of the Principle of Military Necessity. *Georgetown*.
- Irvin Oder*, The United States and the Palestine Mandate, 1920-1948. *Columbia*.
- Eric H. Olson*, The New Colonial Administration of West Africa. *Syracuse*.
- Roy Olton*, Africa in American Foreign Relations during the Nineteenth Century. *Fletcher School*.
- Wladimir Oneczewicz*, The Diplomatic and Military Preparation of the Attack on Poland by Germany and Russia in 1939. *Georgetown*.
- Mark T. Orr*, The Administration of Japanese Education under the Occupation. *North Carolina*.
- Gene D. Overstreet*, The Soviet View of India and Communist Policy in India: A Study of Strategy and Tactics. *Columbia*.
- Robert von Pagenhardt*, The Executive Office and Powers of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. *Stanford*.
- Alex A. Palamiotis*, Recent Developments in the Law of Territorial Waters. *Utah*.
- R. V. Patwardhan*, Possible Development of a Regional System in South East Asia. *New York University*.
- Oscar Perlmutter*, The Foreign Policy of Dean Acheson: A Case Study in the Conduct of Foreign Relations in a Democracy. *Chicago*.
- Maria Perry*, Prelude to War in Eastern Europe: Romania and the Powers, 1931-1941. *Columbia*.
- Robert J. Peterson*, The Status of Manchuria since 1931. *Chicago*.
- Jack C. Plano*, The United Nations and the India-Pakistan Dispute. *Wisconsin*.
- Emil R. Platig*, The Philosophy of International Relations of John Foster Dulles. *Chicago*.
- Adamantia Pollis*, The Effects of Great Power Policy on Greek Nationalism. *Johns Hopkins*.
- John A. Power*, Financing of the United Nations and Its Specialized Agencies. *Catholic University*.
- G. S. Rao*, The Coordination of Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: A Case Study in Technical Assistance Programme. *Columbia*.
- E. Haynes Reynolds*, The Impact of the East-West Conflict in the Middle East. *Southern California*.
- George H. Ried*, Administration of an International Police Force. *Syracuse*.
- Najmuddin Rifai*, Lybia—Road to Independence. *Columbia*.
- Walter L. Riley*, An Analysis of the Law of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. *Washington* (Seattle).
- Dorothy Roberts*, An Analysis of the Bi-Partisan Foreign Policy as a Method of Conduct of the Foreign Relations of the United States. *Chicago*.
- Seymour Rotter*, Soviet and Comintern Policy toward Germany, 1919-1923: A Case Study of Strategy and Tactics. *Columbia*.
- Paul Rupprecht*, The International Position of Hungary in the U. S. Foreign Policy, 1933-1947. *Minnesota*.
- Donald E. Russell*, Revolution in China: A Study in American Reactions. *Chicago*.
- Marina Salvin*, The Soviet Challenge in the Balkans. *Columbia*.
- Isamu Sato*, The Impact of International Rela-

- tions upon the Government and Politics of Japan. *Chicago*.
- Charles E. Savige, A Study into the Obligatory Character of Resolutions Passed by the Principal Organs of the League of Nations and the United Nations. *Florida*.
- Warner R. Schilling, Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1914-1919. *Yale*.
- Donald H. Scott, The Cultural Relations Program of the United States in Mexico. *Southern California*.
- William E. Scott, French Policy and the Soviet Pact, 1931-1935. *Yale*.
- Esther Seeman, The Administration of the Minorities Treaties by the League of Nations and Its Implications for the United Nations. *Minnesota*.
- Charles B. Selak, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties. *Columbia*.
- Hari P. Sharma, India's Quest for Security and Peace. *Fletcher School*.
- Donald Shea, The Calvo Clause. *Minnesota*.
- Barbara J. Shockley, The Creation of a European Nationality. *Pennsylvania*.
- Joginder Singh, Domestic Jurisdiction and the Law of the United Nations. *Michigan*.
- Herman T. Skofield, Private Foreign Investment. *Fletcher School*.
- Donald G. Smith, The Status of the Inhabitants of the Trust Areas: A Legal, Social, Economic and Political Study. *Minnesota*.
- Gordon L. Spangler, The Washington Conference: A Case Study of Anglo-American Relations. *Fletcher School*.
- Donald T. Sparks, The Protestants as an Active Factor in International Relations and in American Foreign Policy Formulation. *Chicago*.
- Cummins Speakman, An Investigation of American Official Information on Political Extremism in Germany during the Weimar Period, with Special Emphasis on the First Six Years (1918-1924) and the Final Phase (1930-1933). *Yale*.
- George Stoney Springsteen, Jr., The British Navigation Laws: The Influence of Foreign Nations upon Their Modification and Repeal, 1783-1849: A Study in Commercial Policy. *Fletcher School*.
- Emil Starr, The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union, 1939-1949. *Chicago*.
- Robert B. Stauffer, Manchuria as a Political Entity. *Minnesota*.
- George W. Steckel, The U. N. General Assembly: Its Powers and Functions. *Johns Hopkins*.
- David J. Steinberg, Foreign Procurement and the Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. *Harvard*.
- Elizabeth I. Sterenberg, The Role of Forced Labor in Economic Development. *Chicago*.
- Virgil H. Stevens, Personnel Problems Peculiar to International Agencies: A Study in International Administration. *Southern California*.
- Jonathan D. Stoddart, The Influence of Immigrant Groups on United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School*.
- John G. Stoessinger, Post World War II Refugee Problem. *Harvard*.
- Lois J. Stone, The Development of Limitations on the Right to Resort to the Use of Armed Force in International Law. *Columbia*.
- Marvin R. Summers, United States Policy toward Communism in China. *Iowa*.
- Phillips Talbot, The Foreign Policy of India since Independence. *Chicago*.
- Howard J. Taubensfeld, International Legal Problems of Collective Action by International Organizations. *Columbia*.
- Loren E. Tesdell, The Middle East and Technical Cooperation. *Stanford*.
- Barbara J. Teters, Japanese Politics and Treaty Revision, 1870-1895. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Joseph M. Thom, The International Legal Status of the Refugee. *Washington (St. Louis)*.
- William W. Thomas, Francis Lieber and the International Law of Land Warfare. *North Carolina*.
- Joseph M. Thomashefsky, The International Legal Protection of Refugees. *New York University*.
- K. B. Y. Thotappa, Policy and Programme Coordination of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, with a Special Focus on the Role of the Economic and Social Council. *Chicago*.
- Clarence E. Thurber, Contributions of the State of California to the Point Four Program. *Stanford*.
- Donald R. Toussaint, The French Contribution to the Political Unification of Europe, 1944-1953. *Stanford*.
- Erwin W. Umbach, A Study of the Foreign Relations of the United States with Austria. *Fletcher School*.
- Juliane von K. Valentin, German-Japanese Relations in the Period between the Two World Wars. *Pennsylvania*.
- John P. Vloyantes, The Security-Power Di-

- lemma in International Organization, with Special Reference to Article XI of the Charter of the United Nations. *Utah*.
- G. Hans Voelkel, Discrimination against Aliens in International Law. *Columbia*.
- Kalman Von Voros, The Origins of the Munich Pact of 1938. *Georgetown*.
- Austin F. Walter, Australia's Relations with the United States, 1941-1949. *Michigan*.
- James L. Weber, The Development of the Foreign Policy Objectives of the British Labor Party, 1919-1939. *Fletcher School*.
- Clarence N. Weems, Jr., The Korean Revolution. *Columbia*.
- Melvin A. Weightman, The Present Status of the Concept of Self-Defense in International Law. *Pennsylvania*.
- Paul Welty, Theodore Roosevelt's Concepts of the National Interests of the United States. *Chicago*.
- John E. Westburg, General Theory and Practice of Modern Federalism. *Southern California*.
- Ponnambalam Wignaraja, The Conflict between Economic Rationality and Cultural Values: An Analysis of Four Policies for Increasing the Availability of Domestic Savings for Developmental Needs. *Yale*.
- Robert Wilfong, UNRRA and Displaced Persons. *Harvard*.
- F. Haydn Williams, Air Power and American Foreign Policy: The Berlin Air Lift. *Fletcher School*.
- Maurice J. Williams, The Problem of Economic Integration in Western Europe. *Chicago*.
- Ann R. Willner, Problems in Agricultural Production for the Domestic Market in Venezuela. *Chicago*.
- Martin W. Wilmington, Regional Cooperation for Supply and Development in the Middle East During World War II (The Middle East Supply Center). *New York University*.
- Harry Winkler, The Political Orientation of Israel in the Struggle between East and West. *Chicago*.
- William D. S. Witte, Quaker Pacifism in the United States, 1914-1941, with Special Reference to its Relation to Isolationism and Internationalism. *Columbia*.
- Klaus Wolf, Pioneer Entrepreneurs in Industry: A Study in the Sociology of Industrialization. *Chicago*.
- Gregory B. Wolfe, The Montevideo Conference, 1933: Reactions of the North and South American Press to Foreign Policy of the United States. *Fletcher School*.
- Claude Woltz, Bloc Action in the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Wah Wong, The Problem of "Self-Determination" in the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Helen L. Wood, British Concepts of Internationalism in the Nineteenth Century. *Northwestern*.
- Herbert H. Wood, Jr., International Supervision of Colonial Administrative Unions. *Columbia*.
- Theodore P. Wright, Franklin Roosevelt and the Ideal of Collective Security. *Yale*.
- Pamela N. Wrinch, Winston (Leonard) Spencer Churchill as a Theoretician in the Field of International Relations. *Yale*.
- David Wurfel, The Bell Report and After: A Study in the Political Problems of Social Reform through Foreign Aid. *Cornell*.
- Agnes Hwun-giat Yao, Comparison of Mandates and Trusteeship. *Chicago*.
- Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921. *Brown*.
- Tien-Cheng Young, The Use of Scientific Management Concepts in International Administration. *New York University*.

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

- Charles Blitzer; A.B., Williams, 1946; A.M., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Political Thought of James Harrington. *Harvard*.
- Joan V. Bondurant; A.B., B.Mus., Michigan, 1942; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. Gandhian Satyagraha and Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).
- Frederic S. Burin, II; B.S.S., C.C.N.Y., 1942; A.M., Syracuse, 1946; Ph.D., Columbia, 1952. The Rule of Law in German Constitutional Thought: A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence. *Columbia*.
- Edward R. Cain; A.B., Boston U., 1948; A.M., Columbia, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Rationalist Conception of Freedom in the

- Political Theory of Bernard Bosanquet. *Columbia*.
- Charles W. Cassinelli, Jr.; A.B., University of California, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. Representative Government: The Concept and Its Implications. *Harvard*.
- Raymond Francis Cour, C.S.C.; A.B., Notre Dame, 1937; A.M., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Catholic Action and Politics in the Writings of Pope Pius XI. *Notre Dame*.
- Herbert A. Deane; A.B., Columbia, 1942; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. *Columbia*.
- Emmett E. Dorsey; A.B., Oberlin, 1927; A.M., Columbia, 1934; Ph.D., American, 1953. The Evolution of the Concept of the Welfare State in the United States since 1890. *American*.
- Ursula von Eckardt; B.A., Hunter College, 1946; M.A., The New School, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Inalienable Right to the Pursuit of Happiness: The Meaning of the Concept Examined in the Declaration of Independence and in Related Texts. *The New School*.
- Morton J. Frisch; B. A. Roosevelt College, 1949; M.A., University of Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., Pennsylvania State, 1953. Lincoln's Principles of Statecraft. *Pennsylvania State*.
- Margaret Guilon; B.A., Bryn Mawr, 1939; M.A., Chicago, 1940; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. Alain: A Theory of the Radical Republic. *Harvard*.
- Mont Judd Harmon; A.B., Utah State Agricultural College, 1948; M.S., Wisconsin, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Harold L. Ickes: A Case Study in New Deal Thought. *Wisconsin*.
- Harry V. Jaffa; B.A., Yale, 1939; Ph.D., The New School, 1951. Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. *The New School*.
- Henry L. Janssen; A. B., Oklahoma, 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1953. Political Parties and the Public Interest. *California* (Berkeley).
- Duncan M. Kennedy; B.A., Bloomfield College, 1937; M.S.Sc., The New School, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1949. Principles of Burke's Political Philosophy, with Special Reference to Natural Law. *The New School*.
- Ralph Lerner; A.B., Chicago, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Political Zionism: The Thought of Pinsker and Herzl. *Chicago*.
- Jay Benjamin Lieberman; A.B., Illinois, 1935; Ph.D., Stanford, 1952. Changing Conceptions of Freedom of the Press. *Stanford*.
- Paul Mandelstam; A.B., Harvard, 1944; M.D., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Freudian Impact upon Contemporary Political Ideas. *Harvard*.
- James G. March; A.B., Wisconsin, 1949; M.A., Yale, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Autonomy as a Factor in Group Organization: A Study in Politics. *Yale*.
- David Mars; A.B., Rutgers, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Political Philosophy of Benjamin N. Cardozo. *Rutgers*.
- Ralph M. Miwa; A.B., Hawaii, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1953. The Ideology of Imperialism and Its Significance for Constitutionalism in Japan. *Johns Hopkins*.
- George S. Parthemos; A.B., Erskine, 1946; A.M., South Carolina, 1950; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1953. Greek Theories of Property and Some of Their Repercussions. *North Carolina*.
- Orville F. Poland; A.B., Harvard, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1953. The Public Interest and Recent United States Agricultural Policy: A Study in Pluralism. *California* (Berkeley).
- Robert L. Politzer; A.B., Washington, 1941; M.A., *ibid.*, 1942; Ph.D., Columbia, 1947; D.S.Sc., The New School, 1950. Rousseau's *Lettre à D'Alembert sur les Spectacles*: A Discussion and Interpretation. *The New School*.
- Roger P. Quilty, C.S.C.; A.B., Notre Dame, 1944; M.A., Catholic, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Influence of Hugues Felicite de Lamennais' Epistemology on his Theory of Democracy. *Catholic*.
- Melvin Richter; B.A., Harvard, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Political Philosophy of T. H. Green. *Harvard*.
- Edgar Robinson; A.B., Amherst, 1941; A.M., Columbia, 1942; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. John Dewey's Political Thought. *Columbia*.
- Herbert J. Spiro; A.B., Harvard, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. A Theory of Responsibility in Government. *Harvard*.
- Jay W. Stein; A.B., Minnesota, 1942; A.M., Stanford, 1949; Ph.D., Columbia, 1952. The Ideologues, Their Theories and Politics. *Columbia*.

Howard B. White; A.B., Hamilton College, 1934; M.S.Sc., The New School, 1938; D.S.Sc., *ibid.*, 1943. Prediction and Political Power. *The New School*.

W. Howard Wriggins; A.B., Dartmouth, 1940; A.M., Yale, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Image of the Ideal Communist Militant as Depicted in Communist Party Publications. *Yale*.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Charles P. Blackmore; A.B., Columbia, 1938; A.M., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Joseph B. Shannon, Political Boss and Twentieth Century "Jeffersonian." *Columbia*.

Loïc Bouvard; Bachelier en Droit, Université de Paris, 1950; Diplômé l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Princeton, 1953. Regionalism in Theory and Practice. *Princeton*.

Marion Ashby Buck; A.B., Radcliffe, 1930; A.M., Syracuse, 1931; Ph.D., Radcliffe, 1953. An American Experiment—Cooperation for Health. *Radcliffe*.

Marie B. Chatham; A.B., George Washington, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Maryland, 1953. The National Party Chairman. *Maryland*.

Reo M. Christenson; A.B., Redlands, 1948; A.M., Michigan, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Brannan Plan: A Study in Program-Formulating and Opinion-Influencing Activities of the Department of Agriculture. *Michigan*.

Edward F. Cooke; A.B., Middlebury College, 1947; A.M., Brown, 1949; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1953. The Platform and Resolutions Committees of the 1952 National Political Conventions. *Northwestern*.

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.; A.B., Centre College; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1950; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1952. Bi-Partisan Foreign Policy and the Two Party System. *Johns Hopkins*.

Dale G. Fallon; A.B., Michigan State, 1942; A.M., Buffalo University, 1946; Ph.D., Notre Dame, 1952. The Atomic Energy Act of 1945: A Study of Public Policy in the Field of Labor-Management Relations. *Notre Dame*.

Morris D. Forkosch; B.A., New York University, 1936; M.A., *ibid.*, 1938; J.S.D., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., The New School, 1952. The Consumer's Interest in the Sherman Antitrust Act. *The New School*.

Hubert S. Gibbs; B.A., Iowa; M.A., Minnesota; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1952. Advice and Consent: A Study of Congressional-Executive Liaison in Foreign Policy. *Johns Hopkins*.

James H. Grisham; B.A., Texas, 1936; M.A., Texas Christian, 1941; Ph.D., Texas, 1953. Crime Control: A Study in American Federalism. *Texas*.

Paul Y. Hammond; B.A., Utah, 1949; A.M., Harvard, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Secretaryships of War and the Navy: Civilian Control of the Military. *Harvard*.

John P. Hendrickson; B.A., Iowa, 1947; M.A., Minnesota, 1949; Ph.D., Iowa, 1952. Legislative Record of Republicans in the 73rd Congress in Relation to the Republican Platform of 1932 and the Campaign Speeches of Mr. Hoover. *Iowa*.

Morton H. Leeds; B.S.S., C.C.N.Y., 1944; M.A., The New School, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1950. The American Federation of Labor in National Politics. *The New School*.

Genevieve C. Linebarger; A.B., Duke, 1945; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1949; Ph.D., Maryland, 1953. The Federal Government in American Fiction, 1900-1950. *Maryland*.

J. John McDermott; LL.B., Fordham, 1927; B.S., New York University, 1934; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Treaty Power in Relation to Revenue and Appropriation Laws. *New York University*.

Timothy L. McDonnell; A.B., Gonzaga University, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., St. Louis University, 1953. A Case History of the Legislative Process: The Wagner Housing Act of 1937. *St. Louis University*.

William McIntosh; B.A., Rust College, 1942; M.A., Minnesota, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Development of Political Democracy in Puerto Rico. *Minnesota*.

Bruce B. Mason; B.S., North Texas State College, 1947; M.A., Texas Christian, 1949; Ph.D., Texas, 1953. American Political Protest, 1932-1936. *Texas*.

Donald R. Matthews; A.B., Princeton, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. United States Senators: A Study of the Recruitment of Political Leaders. *Princeton*.

Richard Neustadt; A.B., California, 1939; A.M., Harvard, 1942; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Presidential Clearance of Legislation. *Harvard*.

Harold L. Olson; B.S., Duluth State Teachers College, 1942; M.A., Colorado, 1948; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1953. Federal-State Cooperative

- Finance for Public Programs in Nebraska. *Nebraska*.
- Paul J. Piccard; B.A., Minnesota, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Texas, 1953. The Constitutional and Political Status of the Electoral College. *Texas*.
- Albert G. Pickerell; B.S., Kansas State Teachers College, 1934; M.S., *ibid.*, 1935; Ph.D., Stanford, 1952. The Battle for Men's Minds: America's "Psychological Offensive" in the "Cold War." *Stanford*.
- Rob R. Ratliff; A.B., American, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Defense Production Act of 1950: An Administrative Study. *American*.
- William P. Robinson; A.B., Howard, 1932; A.M., *ibid.*, 1935; Ph.D., New York University, 1953. Limitations on Judicial Review. *New York University*.
- Burton M. Sapin; A.B., Columbia, 1945; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; M.A., Princeton, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Role of the Military Establishment in the Japanese Peace Treaty: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy Decision-Making. *Princeton*.
- Frank P. Sherwood; A.B., Dartmouth, 1943; M.S., Southern California, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Public Relations of the Office of Price Stabilization—A Study of the Support-Building Process. *Southern California*.
- Allan P. Sindler; A.B., Harvard, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Politics of Louisiana, 1920-1952. *Harvard*.
- Maynard O. Smith; Ph.B., Wisconsin, 1940; Ph.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., The New School, 1953. Principles of Republican Government in the Federalist. *The New School*.
- C. Kenneth Snyder; A.B., Ursinus, 1940; Ph.D., Cornell, 1952. The Department of State and the Congress. *Cornell*.
- Edwin Stillings; A.B., Hiram College (Ohio), 1942; A.M., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Electoral Tides and Turnout. *Chicago*.
- Kenneth N. Vines; B.A., Birmingham-Southern College, 1946; M.A., Kentucky, 1947; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1953. The Role of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America in the Formation of American National Policy. *Minnesota*.
- John D. Williams; A.B., Stanford, 1946; M.P.A., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Politics of Economic Stabilization in the United States: A Study of Fiscal Policy. *Harvard*.
- CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
- Mabra G. Abernathy; B.S., Birmingham-Southern College, 1942; A.M., Alabama, 1947; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1953. Freedom of Assembly. *Wisconsin*.
- Doris S. Blaisdell; A.B., American, 1944; A.M., Wisconsin, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Constitutional Law of Mr. Justice McReynolds. *Wisconsin*.
- William W. Boyer, Jr.; A.B., College of Wooster, 1947; A.M., Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Church-State Relations in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin*.
- Alfred O. Canon; A.B., Southwestern at Memphis, 1944; A.M., Duke, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Constitutional Thought of Wiley Rutledge. *Duke*.
- Janice E. Christensen; B.A., Minnesota, 1944; M.A., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Constitutional Problems of National Control of the Suffrage in the United States. *Minnesota*.
- Richard A. Edwards; A.B., Indiana, 1947; LL.B., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., Columbia, 1952. The Effect of an Unreasonable Search and Seizure. *Columbia*.
- Robert Fuquay; B.A., Florida, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. An Analysis of Florida Administrative Law and Procedure. *Florida*.
- Ronald F. Howell; A.B., University of the South, 1948; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Conservative Influence on Constitutional Development, 1922-1937; Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler. *Johns Hopkins*.
- George F. Moore; B.A., Southwest Missouri State, 1949; M.A., Iowa, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Governmental Reorganization in Iowa. *Iowa*.
- Paul R. Murray; A.B., Idaho, 1941; A.M., Stanford, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Justice of the Peace in California. *Stanford*.
- Pamela H. Rice; A.B., Antioch College, 1945; A.M., Chicago, 1947; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1952. Racial Discrimination in Education under the United States Constitution. *Wisconsin*.
- Jack W. Rodgers; A.B., Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1947; M.S., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1953. The United States Constitution and Religious Liberty. *Nebraska*.

Joseph Tanenhaus; A.B., Cornell, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Organized Labor and Freedom of Speech: A Study of the Law Governing Picketing and Labor's Political Spending. *Cornell*.

Clement E. Vose; A.B., Maine, 1947; A.M., Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Interest Groups before the Supreme Court: The Restrictive Covenant Cases of 1948. *Wisconsin*.

Ellis L. Waldron; A.B., Ohio State, 1936; A.M., Wisconsin, 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation. *Wisconsin*.

Sidney Wise; A.B., Harvard, 1946; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1952. The Judicial Impact on Minimum-Wage Legislation. *California* (Los Angeles).

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Albert L. Alford; B.A., Akron, 1948; M.A., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. FEPC: An Administrative Study of Selected State and Local Programs. *Princeton*.

Gordon E. Baker; B.A., Reed, 1948; M.A., Washington, 1949; M.A., Princeton, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. America's Rotten Boroughs: Urban Under-Representation in State Legislatures. *Princeton*.

Palayam M. C. Balasundaram; B.A., Allegheny, 1947; M.A., Boston University, 1948; Ph.D., The New School, 1952. The New York State Insurance Fund: A Case Study of Government in Business. *The New School*.

William H. Cape; A.B., Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1947; M.S., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Kansas, 1952. The Kansas Department of Civil Service. *Kansas*.

Jephtha Carrell; A.B., Franklin and Marshall, 1944; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Inter-Jurisdictional Agreements in the Philadelphia Area. *Pennsylvania*.

J. M. Claunch; B.A., Stephen F. Austin College, 1928; M.Ed., Texas, 1937; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Government of Dallas County, Texas. *Texas*.

Morris W. H. Collins, Jr.; B.A., Georgia, 1939; M.A., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. State Regulation of Discrimination in Employment. *Harvard*.

Richard W. Dodge; B.S., Yale, 1944; A.M., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., Michigan, 1953. Some Aspects of the Political Behavior of Labor Union Members in the Detroit

Metropolitan Area. *Michigan*.

Charles D. Farris; B.S., University of Florida, 1936; A.M., *ibid.*, 1941; Ph.D., Chicago, 1953. Politics in a Southern Urban Community. *Chicago*.

Charles D. Goff; A.B., Wisconsin, 1938; A.M., Northwestern, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Politics of Governmental Integration in Metropolitan Milwaukee. *Northwestern*.

Alex Gottfried; B.E., Chicago Teacher's College, 1941; A.M., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. A. J. Cermak, Chicago Politician: A Study in Political Leadership. *Chicago*.

Robert O. McWilliams; A.B., Michigan, 1945; M.P.A., Wayne, 1947; Ph.D., Michigan, 1953. A Study of the Relationship of Political Behavior to Social Group Membership. *Michigan*.

Paul A. Pfretzschner; B.A., Buffalo, 1947; M.A., Yale, 1948; Ph.D., Iowa, 1953. City Planning and Reconstruction with Special Reference to the City of Easton, Pennsylvania. *Iowa*.

Victor G. Rosenblum; A.B., Columbia, 1945; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1953. Milk Control in California: A Study in Constitutional Power. *California* (Berkeley).

Stephen B. Sarasohn; A.B., Wayne, 1945; A.M., Columbia, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Regulation of Parties and Nominations in Michigan: The Politics of Election Reform. *Columbia*.

John M. Selig; A.B., San Francisco, 1935; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Centralized State Tax Administration in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert G. Thompson; B.A., Highlands, 1948; M.A., New Mexico, 1949; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1953. Administrative Enforcement of Building Codes in Selected Cities and Counties. *Syracuse*.

Ellsworth E. Weaver; B.S., Utah, 1937; Sc.M., *ibid.*, 1938; Ph.D., New York University, 1953. The Evolution of Political Institutions in Utah. *New York University*.

John P. White; B.A., University of Cincinnati, 1949; A.M., Chicago, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Lithuanians and the Democratic Party: A Case Study of Nationality Politics in Cook County. *Chicago*.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Charles P. Beall; A.B., DePauw, 1948; A.M.,

- Indiana, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Pluralism in Administration: A Study of the Social Group in the Administrative Process. *Indiana*.
- Ernest R. Bryan*; A.B., Syracuse, 1929; A.M., George Washington, 1933; Ph.D., American, 1953. An Administrative History of the United States Naval Photographic Center, 1941-1951, with Recommendations for Reorganization. *American*.
- Alan Campbell*; A.B., Whitman, 1947; M.P.A., Wayne, 1949; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The National Coal Board: The Relation of the Administrative Structure to the Problems Needing Solution. *Harvard*.
- William N. Cassella, Jr.*; A.B., Illinois, 1942; M.S., Syracuse, 1943; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. Governing the St. Louis Metropolitan Area: A Study in Public Administration. *Harvard*.
- Joseph G. Colmen*; B.S., City College, New York, 1939; M.A., Columbia, 1940; Ph.D., American, 1953. Objective Selection of Supervisory Personnel in Public Management. *American*.
- Virginia Cook*; A.B., Iowa, 1936; A.M., Illinois, 1941; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. Administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act: An Experiment in Federal-State Cooperation. *Columbia*.
- Robert T. Daland*; A.B., Milton College, 1942; A.M., Wisconsin, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Public Health Administration in Alabama. *Wisconsin*.
- Chester B. Earle*; B.A., Texas, 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Some Policy and Administrative Aspects of a National Health Program. *Texas*.
- Roy B. Eastin, Jr.*; A.B., George Washington, 1945; M.A., *ibid.*, 1945; Ph.D., American, 1953. The Supervision Improvement Program of the Government Printing Office. *American*.
- John Fletcher*; A.B., Amherst, 1939; A.M., Chicago, 1940; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The Federal Low-Rent Housing Program: A Study in Intergovernmental Relations. *Harvard*.
- Reed L. Frischknecht*; B.S., Utah State, 1947; M.S., Utah, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Administration of Agricultural Price Supports since World War II. *Utah*.
- Hugh M. Hall, Jr.*; B.A., Southern Methodist, 1943; Ph.D., Texas, 1953. The Investigatory Function of the Federal Trade Commission, 1933-1952. *Texas*.
- Rolf N. B. Haugen*; B.A., Minnesota, 1937; A.M., Harvard, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments, 1775-1920. *Harvard*.
- John H. Kaufmann*; A.B., Swarthmore, 1940; M.P.A., Harvard, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Estimation of Requirements for War: A Case Study in Steel. *Harvard*.
- David MacEachron*; A.B., Yale, 1944; M.P.A., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Role of the United States Department of Labor. *Harvard*.
- Robert J. M. Matteson*; A.B., Middlebury College, 1938; M.P.A., Harvard, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Federal Forestry Administration. *Harvard*.
- Charles A. Riegle*; B.S., Ohio State, 1941; M.S., Syracuse, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Program Management in the Department of the Army. *Syracuse*.
- Elliott P. Roberts*; A.B., Reed College, 1939; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1953. Relations between the Tennessee Valley Authority and State Governments in Control of the Tennessee River. *Wisconsin*.
- Judson G. Rosebush*; A.B., Lawrence, 1939; M.A., Fletcher School, 1940; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1953. A Scoring Schedule for the Measurement, Description and Analysis of Practices of Governmental Purchasing Agencies. *Syracuse*.
- Yang-Ch'eng Shih*; LL.B., National Tsing Hua University (China), 1939; M.A., Washington (Seattle), 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Theory and Practice of the Conservation of Water Resources in the United States, with Special Reference to Federal Administration. *Washington* (Seattle).

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Charles T. Barock*; Dr. Juris, Charles University Law School (Prague), 1945; M.A., Harvard, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Political and Social Institutions of the Russian Peasant, 1861-1905. *Harvard*.
- Randolph Braham*; M.S., C.C.N.Y., 1949; Ph.D., The New School, 1952. The People's Republic of Rumania: A Study of Its Genesis, Politics and Government. *The New School*.
- Gerard Braunthal*; A.B., Queens College, 1947; A.M., Michigan, 1948; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. The Politics of the German Free

- Trade Unions during the Weimar Period. *Columbia*.
- MacAlister Brown; B.A., Wesleyan, 1947; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Expulsion of German Minorities from Eastern Europe: The Decision at Potsdam and Its Background. *Harvard*.
- Zbigniew K. Brzezinski; B.A., McGill, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The Permanent Purge and Soviet Totalitarianism. *Harvard*.
- Otto W. Butz; B.A., Toronto, 1947; M.A., Princeton, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Political Science and Society in Germany 1870-1933: An Introductory Survey. *Princeton*.
- Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr.; B.A., Williams, 1948; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. Lloyd George: A Study in Political Leadership. *Harvard*.
- Cornelius P. Cotter; B.A., Stanford, 1949; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. Constitutional Democracy and Emergency: Emergency Powers Legislation in Great Britain since 1914. *Harvard*.
- Suna Kili Derya; A.B., Bryn Mawr, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Party Developments in Turkey: 1949-50. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Donald B. Easum; A.B., Wisconsin, 1947; M.P.A., Princeton, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The British-Argentine-United States Triangle: A Case Study in International Relations. *Princeton*.
- Frank A. Ecker; A.B., Wisconsin, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Michigan, 1953. The Politics and Administration of Soviet Central Asia. *Michigan*.
- Alexander Erlich; Ph.D., The New School, 1953. The Soviet Industrialization Controversy. *The New School*.
- Henry C. Galant; B.A., Illinois, 1940; M.A., Harvard, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The French Social Security System: The Politics of Administration. *Harvard*.
- E. Drexel Godfrey; A.B., Williams, 1946; M.A., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Non-Communist Left in Post-War France. *Princeton*.
- Umberto Gualtieri; B.B.A., Washington and Lee, 1929; D.S.Sc., The New School, 1943. Origin and Growth of the Italian Labor Movement (1860-1904). *The New School*.
- William H. Harbold; A.B., Pennsylvania State, 1947; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Monnet Plan: The French Experiment in National Economic Planning. *Harvard*.
- Franklin W. Houn; A.B., National Chen-Chi University, 1946; A.M., Denver, 1950; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1953. Central Government of China, 1911-1928: An Institutional Study. *Wisconsin*.
- Walter H. Kaufmann; A.B., The New School, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1950. Monarchism in the Weimar Republic. *The New School*.
- Francis P. King; B.S., Oregon, 1943; A.M., Stanford, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Third Force in French Politics. *Stanford*.
- Tieh Tseng Li; LL.B., National Central University, Nanking, 1928; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. Historical Study of the Statutes of Tibet. *Columbia*.
- Bernard Lieb; A.B., Upsala, 1936; M.A., New York University, 1938; Ph.D., American, 1953. Government and Administration in the New India. *American*.
- Yale C. Mazon; A.B., Stanford, 1928; M.A., Hawaii, 1933; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1953. Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1930-1945. *California* (Berkeley).
- Joseph F. Menzies; A.B., Notre Dame, 1945; A.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. A Constitutional and Political Comparison of the Executive Office in Latin America and in the United States. *Notre Dame*.
- Samuel M. Osgood; A.B., Nevada, 1949; A.M., Clark, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Life and Politics of Henri, Comte de Paris. *Clark*.
- Jaan Pennar; A.B., Bates, 1947; M.A., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Richard Coblen and Cordell Hull: A Contemporary Study of the Commercial Policies of 19th Century England and Contemporary United States. *Princeton*.
- Louise N. Powelson; A.B., Wellesley, 1944; A.M., Yale, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Political Parties of Austria, 1945-1951. *Yale*.
- Izzideen Rawi; Licencié, Teachers College, Bagdad, 1939; M.A., Indiana, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Policy of the Arab States towards Palestine. *Indiana*.
- Arnold A. Rogow; A.B., Wisconsin, 1947; M.A., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Labor Government and British Industry, 1945-1951. *Princeton*.
- Mario Rossi; Ph.D., The New School, 1952. The Jews in Modern Italy (1795-1945). *The New School*.
- Janet S. Seigel; A.B., New York University, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., The New School, 1948. An Introduction to the Study

- of the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic. *The New School*.
- John B. Stewart*; A.B., Wolfville (N.S.), 1945; A.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. Parliament and Executive in War-time Canada, 1939-1945. *Columbia*.
- Arthur R. Swearingen*; A.B., Southern California, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The Japanese Communist Party and the Comintern, 1919-1943. *Harvard*.
- Max B. Thatcher*; B.S., California (Los Angeles), 1935; A.M., *ibid.*, 1936; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1953. The Political Island of Quebec: A Study in Federalism. *Northwestern*.
- Te Hua Wang*; B.A., Catholic University, Peiping, 1945; M.A., Denver, 1949; Ph.D., Iowa, 1952. Land Reform in the People's Republic of China. *Iowa*.
- Ruth C. Widmayer*; B.A., Washington (Seattle), 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The Communist Party and the Soviet Schools, 1917-1937. *Harvard*.
- Paul E. Zinner*; B.S., Tufts, 1943; A.M., Harvard, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Strategy and Tactics of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1945-1952. *Harvard*.
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
POLITICS AND LAW
- Dion J. J. Archon*; A.B., Harvard, 1940; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The United States and the Eastern Mediterranean. *Harvard*.
- Mohsen D. Beheshti*; A.B., University of Teheran, 1944; M.A., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., The New School, 1951. Iran's Foreign Policy and Relations since 1940: A Study of the Forces that Affected Iran's Modern History. *The New School*.
- Michael Brecher*; A.B., McGill, 1946; A.M., Yale, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Kashmir Impasse. *Yale*.
- Holbert N. Carroll*; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Harvard, 1953. The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs. *Harvard*.
- David T. Catell*; A.B., Amherst, 1947; A.M., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Soviet Policy and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. *Columbia*.
- Paul T. Chang*; A.B., St. John's University, Shanghai, 1946; Ph.D., Notre Dame, 1953. Political Effects of World War II on Korea, with Special Reference to the Policies of the United States. *Notre Dame*.
- James S. Coleman*; A.B., Brigham Young, 1947; M.A., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Nationalism in Nigeria. *Harvard*.
- Arthur C. Cressy, Jr.*; A.B., Tufts, 1944; A.M., Fletcher School, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Canadian-American Co-operation in World War II. *Fletcher School*.
- Robert B. Farrell*; B.A., Queen's University, 1947; A.M., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Planning and Control of Canadian Foreign Policy. *Harvard*.
- Richard A. Fuller*; A.B., Coe College, 1944; M.S., Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Case Studies in Bipartisanship in United States Postwar Foreign Policy. *Wisconsin*.
- John B. Furey*; A.B., Southern California, 1947; A.M., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Voting Alignment in the General Assembly. *Columbia*.
- Franklin S. Gonzalez*; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Mexico and the United Nations. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Morton Gordon*; B.A., St. John's University, 1948; A.M., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. American Opposition to the E.R.P. and the North Atlantic Treaty—A Study of Anti-Administration Opinion. *Chicago*.
- Anni A. Gottschalk*; M.S.Sc., The New School, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Legal Studies on Collective Security under the League of Nations Covenant and United Nations Charter. *The New School*.
- Wallace B. Graves*; B.A., Oklahoma, 1943; M.A., Texas Christian, 1947; Ph.D., Texas, 1953. The United Nations, Great Britain and the British Non-Self Governing Territories. *Texas*.
- Frank J. Heintz, Jr.*; A.B., Catholic, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Regionalism in Political International Organization. *Catholic*.
- Gilbert O. Hourtoulle, Jr.*; B.A., New Jersey State Teachers College, 1947; M.A., Stanford, 1948; Ph.D., Pennsylvania State, 1953. The Case of Franco Spain before the United Nations, 1946-50. *Pennsylvania State*.
- R. Chu-Kua Huang*; A.B., National Central University, Nanking, 1941; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1953. Toward European Union. *Kentucky*.
- Fred. J. Khouri*; B.S., Columbia, 1938; A.M., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Arab States and the United Nations. *Columbia*.

- S. P. Kuo*; A.B., National Tsing Hua University, 1933; A.M., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Chinese Reaction to Foreign Encroachment, with Special Reference to the First Sino-Japanese War and Its Immediate Aftermath. *Columbia*.
- Augusta E. Lansing*; A.M., Fordham, 1941; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. Czechoslovakia's Foreign Policy, 1939-45: A Study in Futility. *Chicago*.
- James N. Murray, Jr.*; A.B., Illinois, 1947; A.M., Fletcher School, 1948; Ph.D., Illinois, 1953. The Formation and Functioning of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. *Illinois*.
- William C. Olson*; A.B., Denver, 1942; A.M., Yale, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Theodore Roosevelt and American Participation in a League of Nations. *Yale*.
- Alexander G. Park*; A.B., Iowa, 1946; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. Soviet Nationality Policy, 1917-1927: A Study of Bolshevik Doctrine and Practice, with Special Reference to Central Asia. *Columbia*.
- Henry A. Peck*; A.B., Tufts, 1942; A.M., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Freedom, Planning and International Trade. *Fletcher School*.
- Paul Seabury*; A.B., Swarthmore, 1946; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime. *Columbia*.
- John R. Skretting*; B.A., Beloit, 1947; M.A., Iowa, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Republican Attitudes toward the Administration's China Policy, 1945-1949. *Iowa*.
- Fred A. Sondermann*; A.B., Butler, 1949; A.M., Indiana, 1950; Ph.D., Yale, 1953. The Wilson Administration's Image of Germany. *Yale*.
- Suk-Soon Suh*; A.B., Seoul National University, 1947; M.A., Nebraska, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Recent Constitutions in Relation to International Law. *Nebraska*.
- Peter S. H. Tang*; A.M., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931. *Columbia*.
- John S. Thomson*; A.B., Swarthmore, 1943; A.M., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. The Government of the Shanghai International Settlement. *Columbia*.
- Lenoir C. Wright*; A.B., North Carolina, 1933; A.B., Oxford, 1935; A.M., *ibid.*, 1942; LL.B., Harvard, 1938; Ph.D., Columbia, 1953. United States Policy toward Egypt, 1830-1914. *Columbia*.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLES.....	844
Publications on Australia Useful to a Political Scientist: A Selective Survey. LOUISE OVERACKER.....	844
REVIEWS OF BOOKS.....	858
<i>Howe</i> , Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935. GEORGE CATLIN.....	858
<i>Easton</i> , The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. WILLIAM ANDERSON.....	862
<i>Himmelfarb</i> , Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics; <i>Fasnacht</i> , Acton's Political Philosophy: An Analysis; <i>Acton</i> , Essays on Church and State. C. H. DRIVER.....	865
<i>Kirk</i> , The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. CLINTON ROSSITER.....	868
<i>Elliott</i> , United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control. JAMES L. McCAMY.....	870
<i>Webb</i> , The Great Frontier. DAVID M. POTTER.....	871
<i>Strausz-Hupé</i> , The Zone of Indifference. FREDERICK M. WATKINS....	874
<i>Kahin</i> , Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. AMRY VANDENBOSCH	877
<i>Kruse</i> , The Community of the Future. EDGAR BODENHEIMER.....	879
<i>Swenson</i> , Federal Administrative Law. K. C. COLE.....	880
<i>Carr</i> , The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950. ROBERT A. HORN.....	882
Nature and Needs of Higher Education: The Report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education [together with staff studies]. GEORGE C. S. BENSON.....	883
BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	891
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.....	891
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT.....	900
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS.....	909
POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY.....	920

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLES

PUBLICATIONS ON AUSTRALIA USEFUL TO THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST: A SELECTIVE SURVEY*

As a relatively young democracy in which parliamentary government is combined with federalism and judicial review, Australia offers a particularly rich and challenging field of study to political scientists. Yet only recently have scholars at home or abroad shown much interest in its political institutions, and political science in a formal disciplinary sense is just beginning to be recognized by Australian universities.

The establishment of departments or chairs of political science at several of the state universities, and the recognition of the field in the Social Science Division of the Australian National University at Canberra, are encouraging signs of an awareness of the importance of political science as an academic discipline. At the same time an increasing number of scholars are turning their attention to problems of Australian politics and government, and an invaluable collection of basic materials is being assembled by the Commonwealth National Library. For many periods there continues to be a lack of the basic historical studies necessary for a definitive interpretation of men and events, and until more of these gaps are filled in it is unlikely that Australia will find "its Dicey, its Bagehot, its Jennings, its Bryce, and even its Brogan." In the meantime significant studies more limited in scope can be, and are being, made.

A sign of maturity is the movement currently under way to form a professional organization of political scientists. Already in existence is the Australian Institute of Political Science, which since 1932 has encouraged an interest in political, economic, and social problems among laymen and academicians. Its "summer schools" and "winter forums" generate many lively discussions and some of the papers read at the sessions (published by the Institute) are a valuable addition to the literature of the field.

The purpose of this article is to stimulate an interest in Australia among political scientists by pointing out the wealth of raw data waiting to be explored, as well as to guide readers to the more significant studies already published. The works listed fall into four groups: first, basic materials and "tools" such as handbooks, government documents, bibliographies, journals, newspapers, manuscript collections, and party publications; second, books contributing to an understanding of Australia and Australians; third, histories and biographies; and, finally, studies falling directly within the fields of political science and public law.

* Much of the material for this article was collected in Australia in 1946-1947 and 1951. The writer is indebted to the Social Science Research Council, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, and Wellesley College for the assistance which made these visits possible. In checking recent publications she had many helpful suggestions from C. Hartley Grattan, which are gratefully acknowledged.

I .

Commonwealth of Australia, Bureau of the Census, *Official Year Book* (Government Printer, Canberra), published by the Commonwealth in 1908 and biennially thereafter, includes valuable data. The electoral data included are very limited, however. Yearbooks or handbooks are also available for each of the states. Indispensable to the student of parties and politics is W. F. Whyte, *The Australian Parliamentary Handbook* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1952), inaugurating a new series. Included are the names of the officers of the Commonwealth and the respective states, 1951 election figures, and information about party organizations and leaders. Percival Serle, *Dictionary of Australian Biography* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1949, 2 vols.), includes short biographies of more than 1,000 Australians and others closely connected with Australia, who died before 1942. Designed primarily for settlers and tourists, but including information useful to the scholar, is the Australian National Publicity Association's *Australia: Official Handbook* (Melbourne), published by the Association in 1941, and periodically thereafter. A handsomely bound and illustrated volume containing up-to-date information about present-day institutions is Oswald L. Ziegler (ed.), *Official Commemorative Book, Jubilee of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1950), which was prepared by authority of the Commonwealth government and in collaboration with the Australian News and Information Bureau, Department of Interior. Indispensable to those in the United States who wish to keep abreast of current developments in Australia are daily mimeographed digests of news compiled from short-wave radio dispatches and other sources by the Commonwealth News and Information Bureau, New York. By paying mailing costs, these may be obtained from the Bureau, 636 Fifth Avenue, New York 20.

The research scholar will find rich primary source material in the documents of the Commonwealth and state governments. *Historical Records of Australia* (Government Printer, 1914 to date) are still being published.

The movement culminating in the drafting of the Commonwealth Constitution is covered in Australasian Federation Conference, 1890, *Proceedings and Debates* (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1890), and National Australasian Convention, 1891, *Official Report of the Convention Debates, 1897-1898* (Adelaide, 1897; Sydney, 1897; Melbourne, 1898).

Available in convenient pamphlet form, splendidly annotated and indexed, and revised periodically, is the Commonwealth of Australia, *Constitution* (Government Printer, Canberra). Commonwealth statutes are compiled in *Acts of the Commonwealth of Australia*, in force on January 1, 1936 (Government Printer, Canberra 4 vols.), and *Consolidation of Commonwealth Acts, 1901-1935* (Government Printer, Canberra). Supplements to these documents are published from time to time. Complete statutory consolidations are also available for all states except Western Australia. Equally important are the Commonwealth of Australia *Parliamentary Debates*, Senate and House, 1901 to present. Colonial and state parliamentary debates are published by all states except Tasmania.

Valuable material on the functioning of the federal system is included in Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on the Constitution, *Report together with Appendices and Index* (Government Printer, Canberra, 1929), and Convention of Representatives of the Commonwealth and State Parliaments on Proposed Alteration of the Commonwealth Constitution, November 24-December 2, 1942, *Record of Proceedings* (Canberra, 1942).

Commonwealth of Australia, Chief Electoral Officer, *Statistical Returns* (Government Printer, Canberra), published after each Commonwealth election, contain the raw data for significant studies of voting behavior.

The decisions of the High Court of Justice have been published in the *Commonwealth Law Reports* since 1903. The *Australian Digest, 1825-1933* (1940, 24 vols.), plus supplements, includes decisions of state and Commonwealth courts. Also available is a *Legal Monthly Digest*.

Select Documents in Australian History, 1788-1850 (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1950) is the first of a two-volume set by Charles M. H. Clark, Professor of History at Canberra University College. Arranged topically, and designed primarily for use in schools and universities, it includes many documents, but the extracts are often extremely short.

Comprehensive bibliographical guides are available only for the earlier period. *Bibliography of Captain Cook, R.N.* (Sydney, 1928) covers the collections in the Mitchell Library of New South Wales and in the Commonwealth National Library. John A. Ferguson's monumental *Bibliography of Australia* has been carried down to 1845 in the following volumes: Vol. I, 1787-1830; Vol. II, 1831-1838; Vol. III, 1839-1845 (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, 1945, and 1951). Only highly selective lists are available to students working in later periods. Among these the following may be mentioned: Commonwealth of Australia, *Official Year Book*; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VII, Part I (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1933); R. M. Crawford, *Australia* (Hutchinson's University Library: British Empire History, 1952); L. F. Crisp, *The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Longman's in association with the Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1949; Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949); C. Hartley Grattan (ed.), *Australia* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1947); U. S. Library of Congress, Division of Bibliography, *A Selected List of References on Australia* (Washington, 1942). Students visiting Australia are advised to avail themselves of the resources of the Mitchell wing of the New South Wales Library, Sydney, and the Commonwealth National Library, Canberra, where intelligent, cooperative staffs and rich resources are available. The Commonwealth National Library began its *Annual Catalogue of Australian Publications* with the year 1936 (Canberra, 1937) and its Public Affairs Information Service launched a monthly *Subject List to Current Literature* in July, 1945.

Invaluable for an understanding of the manners, morals, and politics of Australia in the 1880's and '90's is the *Bulletin*, published weekly in Sydney from 1880 on. This great independent journal of opinion crusaded for republicanism, a democratic franchise, and a united Australia. It was bitterly opposed

to sectarianism in politics, hypocrisy in social life, and Chinese immigration. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, published for over a hundred years and popularly known as "Old Granny Herald," is still the leading newspaper of Australia's largest city. It is strongly antilabor in slant, but its news coverage is good and it carries excellent special articles.

Rich material on both the early trade union movement and the organization of the Labor party is to be found in labor journals. The *Worker* (Queensland) was launched in Brisbane in 1890 and until 1892 was edited by the brilliant William Lane, who crusaded for socialism and the "new unionism." Started independently somewhat later was the *Worker* (Sydney), later rechristened the *Australian Worker*, which became the official organ of the powerful Australian Workers' Union. Among the more interesting present-day journals are *Common Cause*, official mouthpiece of the militant Miners' Federation of Australia; *Railroad*, the organ of the Australian Railway's Union; and the *Westralian Worker*, official newspaper of the Australian Workers' Union in Western Australia. Party organs include the weekly *Standard*, published by the New South Wales Labor party from 1943 to 1951, and the *Tribune* (Sydney), the official newspaper of the Australian Communist party. Unlike Britain, Australia has no Labor daily.

The scholarly and professional journals published in Australia are limited in number but include material of great value. The *Australian Law Journal*, published monthly since 1927 (Law Book Co., Sydney), is the organ of the legal profession. The *Australian Outlook*, launched in 1947 by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, includes excellent articles on a wide variety of topics. The most valuable periodical of general circulation is the *Australian Quarterly*, published by the Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, since 1929. It has recently added a department entitled "Political Review," by Geoffrey Sawyer, Professor of Law at the National University, which is of special value to Americans endeavoring to keep abreast of developments in Australia. *Economic Record*, published since 1925 as the journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand, includes studies on a wide range of topics. Articles of high quality appear in *Historical Studies; Australia and New Zealand*, published twice yearly since 1941 under the auspices of the University of Melbourne. Among its regular features are lists of theses under way in Australasian universities, and accessions of manuscripts. *Public Administration*, published since 1937 as the journal of the Australian regional groups of the Institute of Public Administration, includes excellent articles and book reviews. One of the more recent additions to the professional journals is *Social Horizons*, launched in 1945 by the Australian Institute of Sociology. The *Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, now in its thirty-ninth year, includes many excellent papers. Articles on Australia in *Round Table* (London) are less good than those for some other areas but, nevertheless, are a useful guide to current developments.

The student of politics will find rich material in the publications of the various political parties. For the Australian Labor party, complete records are

available of the proceedings of interstate conferences and of the annual meetings of the New South Wales party. Handbooks, including the constitution and rules of the party, are published for all states. *Forming the Liberal Party of Australia* is a useful record of the conferences leading to the organization of the present-day Liberal party. Current basic documents are published periodically by the federal secretariat of the party in a pamphlet entitled *Liberal Platform and Federal Constitution*. Also available are the constitutions and platforms of the state divisions of the Liberal party. Publications of the Country party include the platforms and policy statements of the federal party, and constitutions and rules of state organizations in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia. In South Australia, the Country party is served by the Liberal and Country League. The New South Wales party publishes the *Countryman*, a journal which has a wide circulation in rural areas. The Communist party publishes its constitution, its conference proceedings, and a wide variety of campaign literature. The *Communist Review*, a monthly organ of "theory and practice of the Australian Communist Party," began publication in 1941.

II

For those unfamiliar with Australia's heritage, environment, and character probably the best introduction is C. Hartley Grattan, *Introducing Australia* (first published 1942; rev. ed., John Day, N. Y., 1947). A useful symposium is the volume on *Australia* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1947), edited by Grattan, which appeared in the United Nations Series. Two brief but excellent interpretive studies by distinguished historians are: W. K. Hancock, *Australia* (Ernest Benn, London, 1930; Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1931), and R. M. Crawford, *Australia* (Hutchinson's University Library: British Empire History, 1952). A study somewhat confusingly organized but including valuable material is Brian C. Fitzpatrick, *The Australian People, 1788-1945* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2nd ed., 1951).

A book which will make the reader feel the sand and heat of the "outback" and appreciate the fortitude and integrity of those who live there, is Francis Ratcliffe, *Flying Fox and Drifting Sands* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1947). The author is an English scientist now permanently attached to the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research at Canberra.

G. V. Portus, *Free, Compulsory and Secular; A Critical Estimate of Australian Education* (Oxford University Press, London, 1937), is an excellent introduction to some of the geographical and historical factors which help to explain Australia's centralized system of education. The volume brings together three Joseph Payne lectures which this distinguished Australian historian gave under the auspices of the British Institute of Education.

Although Mollie Bayne, *The Australian Community* (Longman's, London, rev. ed., 1951), was written for school children, adults will find it a good introduction to the economy and government of Australia. *Freedom and Planning in Australia* (Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1949), by A. Campbell

Garnett, an Australian now teaching philosophy in an American university, is a useful elementary study of the social and economic system. In the concluding chapters the objectives of each political party are summarized by a representative of the group.

Those in search of solid fare will find several excellent studies of Australia's physiography and resources. Griffith Taylor, *Australia: A Study of Warm Environments and Their Effect on British Settlement* (Dutton, New York, 1940), and S. M. Wadham and G. L. Wood, *Land Utilization in Australia* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1950), are among the best. A useful symposium is G. L. Wood (ed.), *Australia: Its Resources and Development* (Macmillan, New York, 1947). An excellent short introduction is *The Australian Environment* (Melbourne, 1949), prepared for the British Commonwealth Agricultural Conference held in Australia in August, 1949, by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization.

Some of Australia's ablest scholars have directed their attention to the development and functioning of the economy, and some notable studies are available in this field. Edward O. G. Shann, *An Economic History of Australia* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1930), is slanted in defense of private enterprise. Two standard volumes which will serve as an effective antidote are Brian Fitzpatrick, *British Imperialism and Australia, 1788-1888: An Economic History of Australia* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1939), and *The British Empire in Australia: An Economic History, 1884-1931* (Melbourne University Press, 1937). J. A. Nauze, *Political Economy in Australia; Historical Studies* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1949), is another useful work. A brief treatment designed primarily for use in schools is A. G. L. Shaw, *The Economic Development of Australia* (Longman's, London, rev. ed., 1946).

Among recent studies of special phases of the economy, political scientists will find the following particularly useful: Colin Clark, *The National Income of Australia* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1938); Sir Douglas B. Copland, *The Australian Economy* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 4th ed., 1941), and *Australia in the World Crisis, 1929-1943* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1934); Orwell de R. Foenander, *Industrial Regulations in Australia* (Melbourne University, Melbourne, 1947), and *Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations* (Melbourne University, Melbourne, 1952); L. F. Giblin, *The Growth of a Central Bank* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1951); Lloyd Ross, *Labor in Australia* (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943); E. Ronald Walker, *The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Oxford University Press, London, 1947).

Two works which might be termed "classics" are Albert Métin, *Le Socialisme, sans doctrines* (Félix Alcan, Paris, 1901; 2nd ed., 1910), a widely quoted study of the early socialist movements in Australia and New Zealand; and William Pember Reeves, *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand* (G. Richards, London, 1902; Dutton, N. Y., 1925), by a statesman who played an important role in New Zealand politics.

Henry Bourne Higgins, *A New Province for Law and Order* (Workers' Educa-

tion Association, Sydney, 1922), is a notable essay on compulsory arbitration by a distinguished president of the arbitration court who helped shape the policies of that body.

III

In the field of history and biography, important gaps remain to be filled in, but the excellence of much of the work already done encourages one to look optimistically to the future.

Although now out-of-date, the *Cambridge History of the British Empire: Australia* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1933, Vol. VII, Part I), includes indispensable material. Among the articles particularly useful for an understanding of present-day issues are the following: F. Alexander, "Australia Since the War"; K. H. Bailey, "Self-Government in Australia, 1860-1900"; Sir Robert Garran, "The Federation Movement and the Founding of the Commonwealth"; W. K. Hancock, "The Commonwealth, 1900-1914"; A. C. V. Melbourne, "The Establishment of Responsible Government"; Sir W. Harrison Moore, "The Constitution and Its Working"; Sir Ernest Scott, "Australia in the World War: Political"; E. O. G. Shann, "Economic and Political Development." *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918*, edited by C. E. W. Bean, is available in twelve volumes (Sydney, 1921-1942).

For excellent brief, readable treatments of essentials by distinguished historians the beginner is referred to Sir Ernest Scott, *A Short History of Australia* (Oxford University Press, 7th ed., rev. by Herbert Burton, 1947), and F. L. W. Wood, *A Concise History of Australia* (Dymock Book Arcade, Sydney, 1935). Arthur N. Smith, *Thirty Years: The Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-1931* (Brown Prior & Co., Melbourne, 1933), is a useful political history written by a journalist.

For many periods and aspects of Australian history definitive studies from primary sources are still lacking, but examples of meticulous scholarship may be cited. Eris M. O'Brien, *The Foundation of Australia, 1786-1800* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1937; Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 2nd ed., 1950), on the period of penal colonization, ranks high on the list. Other excellent studies of colonization are R. B. Madgwick, *Immigration into Eastern Australia, 1788-1851* (Longman's, London, 1937), and R. C. Mills, *The Colonization of Australia, 1829-42* (Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1915). H. V. Evatt, *Rum Rebellion: A Study of the Overthrow of General Bligh* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1938), is a study of a crisis in early New South Wales history which is of special interest to students of politics. The author, who in the course of his distinguished career has been a member of the High Court of Justice and played a prominent part in United Nations proceedings, is now leader of the Australian Labor party.

The standard works on the pastoral period are two volumes by Stephen H. Roberts, *History of Australian Land Settlement* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1924), and *The Squatting Age in Australia, 1835-1847* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1935).

Relatively little work has been done on the history of the respective states.

A. C. V. Melbourne, *Early Constitutional Development in Australia: New South Wales, 1788-1856* (Oxford University Press, London, 1934), is among the notable exceptions. Two other studies which merit mention are J. S. Battye, *History of Western Australia* (Oxford University Press, London, 1924), and A. Grenville Price, *The Foundation and Settlement of South Australia, 1835-47* (Melbourne University, Melbourne, 1935). W. A. Townsley, *The Struggle for Self-Government in Tasmania, 1842-1856* (Government Printer, Hobart, 1951), is a recent pioneering study of a colony in which resistance to the transportation of convicts was involved in the struggle for self-government.

F. Alexander, *Moving Frontiers, an American Theme and its Application to Australian History* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1947), is an interesting plea for a reexamination of Australian history in the light of the Turner thesis.

Although several short histories of the labor movement have been written, no definitive work is yet available on this controversial and important topic. A useful work on the early period is James T. Sutcliffe, *A History of Trade Unionism in Australia* (Macmillan, Melbourne and London, 1921). This appeared originally in the Workers' Education Series. Probably the best brief survey is Brian C. Fitzpatrick, *A Short History of the Australian Labor Movement* (Rawson's Bookshop, Melbourne, new enlarged ed., 1944), by a distinguished economic historian at one time identified with the militant wing of the Australian Labor party. Frankly Communist in its slant is E. W. Campbell, *History of the Australian Labor Movement: A Marxist Interpretation* (Current Book Distributors, Sydney, 1945).

When one turns to biography one finds a few notable works, some superficial studies, and many gaps. Biographies which shed much light upon the early history and politics of two colonies are M. H. Ellis, *Lachlan Macquarie: His Life, Adventures and Times* (Dymock Book Arcade, Sydney, 1947), and Kathleen Fitzpatrick, *Sir John Franklin in Tasmania, 1837-1843* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1949).

Men prominent in the federation movement are the focus of two good biographies: Walter L. F. Murdoch, *Alfred Deakin: A Sketch* (Constable, London and Sydney, 1923); and John Reynolds, *Edmund Barton* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1948). Deakin's own disappointing account of this important period will be found in Alfred Deakin, *The Federal Story; The Inner History of the Federal Cause* (Robertson & Mullens, Melbourne, 1944).

Indispensable to students interested in the Labor party are H. V. Evatt, *Australian Labour Leader: The Story of W. A. Holman and the Labour Movement* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 3d ed., 1945), and Lloyd Ross, *William Lane and the Australian Labor Movement* (Forward Press, Sydney, 1938). The former is a history and an interpretation of the politics of New South Wales and the Commonwealth, as well as a biography of one of Australia's great political leaders; the latter is the story of a brilliant journalist who was identified with the socialist wing of the Queensland labor movement and who organized the ill-fated "New Australia" expedition to South America. An ex-

cellent brief sketch of an early labor leader is Clive Turnbull, *Bluestone: The Story of James Stephens, Leader of the Early Eight Hours Movement* (Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1945).

William G. Spence, one of the founders of the Australian Workers' Union and the Labor party, has written his account of these early struggles in *Australia's Awakening: Thirty Years in the Life of an Australian Agitator* (The Worker, Brisbane, 1942). First published in 1909, it includes material not readily available elsewhere.

Nettie Palmer, *Henry Bourne Higgins* (G. G. Harrup, 1931), is a notable biography of a distinguished "charter" member of the Commonwealth Court of Arbitration and Conciliation.

An excellent analysis of federal politics, as well as a keen interpretation of the career of a Liberal statesman who was active during the first thirty years of the Commonwealth, is L. F. Fitzhardinge, "Political and Public Life of Sir Littleton Ernest Groom," in *Nation Building in Australia; The Life and Work of Sir Littleton Ernest Groom* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941).

In the absence of full-length studies, mention should be made of the excellent short sketches in Vance Palmer, *National Portraits* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1940).

William Morris Hughes, the statesman whose public activity spanned sixty years and two world wars, and who at different times led both the Labor and Nationalist parties, wrote two volumes of memoirs: *Crusts and Crusades: Tales of Bygone Days* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1947); and *Policies and Potentates* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1950). Although something of the flavor of the man may be gained from these reminiscences, neither they nor a popular biography, Frank C. Browne, *They Called Him Billy: A Biography of the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes* (Peter Huston, Sydney, 1946), are safe guides to his place in history. Fortunately, the task of writing a full-scale biography of Hughes has been undertaken by L. F. Fitzhardinge, Reader in Sources of Australian History at the National University, who is admirably equipped for the task.¹ One may safely anticipate that the completed work will be a major contribution to the literature of the field.

Another important work which will be awaited eagerly is a biography of J. B. Chifley, the late leader of the Labor party, by L. F. Crisp, Professor of Political Science, Canberra University College.

IV

Turning to those studies falling directly in the fields of political science and public law, one may begin with works on the Commonwealth Constitution. Two which were for years the standard books on the making and early development of the Constitution are John Quick and Robert R. Garran, *The Annotated*

¹ Mr. Fitzhardinge is the author of "W. M. Hughes in New South Wales Politics, 1890-1900," *Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, Vol. 37, Part III (December, 1951), as well as of the Groom biography cited above.

Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1901), and W. Harrison Moore, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Sweet and Maxwell, Melbourne and London, 2nd ed., 1910). A useful and important recent addition in the field by a distinguished jurist is H. S. Nicholas, *The Australian Constitution* (Law Book Co., of Australia, Sydney, 1948). The volume includes helpful analytical notes, the texts of many important acts and agreements, and the text of the Constitution. A pioneer volume in a field hitherto largely neglected is George W. Paton (ed.), *The Commonwealth of Australia: the Development of Its Laws and Constitution* (Stevens, London, 1952), which is the second volume in a series on the development of the laws and constitutions of the British Commonwealth. The following chapters are especially usefully to the political scientist: "Constitutional Law," by Geoffrey Sawyer; "Law and Legal Institutions Affecting the Rural Economy," by S. M. Wadham; and "Social Services," by T. Kewley. A useful collection of leading cases with helpful explanatory and critical notes will be found in Geoffrey Sawyer, *Cases on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Law Book Co. of Australia, Sydney, 1948).

A standard work on an interesting constitutional problem is H. V. Evatt, *The King and His Dominion Governors: A Study of the Reserve Powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions* (Oxford University Press, London, 1936). W. A. Holman, *The Australian Constitution: Its Interpretation and Amendment* (Law Book Co. of Australia, Sydney, 1928), reflects the ideas of one of labor's early leaders.

The problem of striking a satisfactory balance between federal and state powers, which has never been happily solved in Australia, has claimed the attention of British and American, as well as of Australian, scholars. Australia is included in the general study by K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (Oxford University Press, London, 1947). The views of a distinguished group of scholars who participated in two seminars arranged as part of Australia's Jubilee celebration are brought together in Geoffrey Sawyer (ed.), *Federalism: An Australian Jubilee Study* (published for the Australian National University by F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1952).

Federalism was the earliest Australian problem to elicit the interest of American political scientists and two useful studies have resulted: E. M. Hunt, *American Precedents in Australian Federation* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1930); and K. O. Warner, *An Introduction to Some Problems of Australian Federation* (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1933). A more recent study by an Australian scholar who is skeptical of the value of federalism is Gordon Greenwood, *The Future of Australian Federalism: A Commentary on the Working of the Constitution* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1946). D. H. Drummond, *Australia's Changing Constitution; No States or New States* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 2nd ed., 1946), is a defense of federalism and an appeal for new states by one of the leaders of the Country party. Many of the forums of the Australian Institute of Political Science have been concerned with problems of federalism and papers delivered at these sessions, most of

which are available in published form, are valuable contributions to the literature of the field.

Until recently no comprehensive study of Australian government, Commonwealth or state, was available, and the subject was not recognized in university programs. About a hundred pages were devoted to Australia in Viscount Bryce's *Modern Democracies* (Macmillan, New York, 1921), and certain aspects of its government were covered in A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1928). More recently Australia was included in *Democracy in the Dominions* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2nd ed., 1952), a first-rate comparative study by the Canadian scholar, Alexander Brady. A reassuring sign of interest in this neglected field is the appearance of two recent general studies by Australians. The first full-length study of the democratic parliamentary institutions of the Commonwealth appeared on the eve of its fiftieth anniversary: L. F. Crisp, *The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Longman's Green, Melbourne and London, in association with the Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1949; Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949), is a work of permanent value by the Professor of Political Science at Canberra University College. An indispensable supplement to Crisp's book is Geoffrey Sawer, *Australian Government Today* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1948; 2nd ed., 1952), which gives an admirable, brief, and lucid description of the salient features of the governments of the states as well as of the Commonwealth. An introductory treatment more limited in scope is Thomas P. Fry, *Australian Contributions to the Evolution of Parliamentary Government* (University of Queensland Papers, Faculty of Law; Vol. I, No. 1, 1947).

Two books designed primarily for the layman will be useful to the specialist. John E. Edwards, *Parliament and How It Works* (Canberra, 1945), is a description of the organization and procedure of the Commonwealth Parliament by the Clerk of the Senate. The second is a sympathetic treatment by a journalist with long experience at Canberra: Warren Denning, *Inside Parliament* (Australasian Publishing Co., Sydney, 1946). A useful pamphlet, written by a divisional returning officer for Commonwealth elections, is E. P. Senior, *Australian Systems of Voting* (Current Book Distributors, Sydney, 1946).

To F. A. Bland, the first professor of public administration in Australia, scholars are indebted for several studies in this field. *Shadows and Realities of Government; an Introduction to the Study of Organization of the Administrative Agencies of Government with Special Reference to New South Wales* (Workers' Educational Association of N.S.W., Sydney, 1923) stresses the difficulty of drawing a line between politics and administration. *Government in Australia: Selected Readings* (Government Printer, Sydney, 2nd ed., 1944) deals mainly with administrative problems. *Planning in the Modern State* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 2nd ed., 1945) is a reappraisal of Australian government in the light of the emergence of the "social service" state. An excellent analysis of recruitment policies and methods is Robert S. Parker, *Public Service Recruitment in Australia* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1942). The writer, who

served in the public service of New South Wales before writing the book and who was at one time on the staff of Canberra University College, is now Professor of Political Science at Victoria University College, Wellington. F. W. Eggleston, *State Socialism in Victoria* (P. S. King & Son, London, 1932), is a study of administrative problems created by the growth of government corporations in Victoria, by a distinguished statesman who was active in the public life of Victoria and the Commonwealth.

Local government is a field largely unexplored, but two recent studies are valuable additions to the scanty material available: Alan Davies, *Local Government in Victoria* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1951); and J. R. H. Johns, *Metropolitan Government in Western Australia* (University of Western Australia Text Books Board, Perth, 1950).

Until recently the interpretation of parties and politics has been left largely to journalists and participants in the struggle. Useful material on the origin of the Labor party and the solidarity controversy is included in George Black, *History of the New South Wales Political Labour Party* (Sydney, 1910). The judgments are those of a participant in the struggle and should be read with that in mind. Charles A. Bernays, *Queensland Politics During Sixty Years, 1859-1919* (Government Printer, Brisbane), is written by a civil servant and the emphasis is personal and anecdotal.

An illuminating account of the tangled series of events leading to the split in the Labor party during the depression of the 1930's, written by a journalist who was at Canberra during the events, is Warren Denning, *Caucus Crisis: The Rise and Fall of the Scullin Government* (Cumberland Argus, Parramatta, N.S.W., 1937). V. G. Childe, *How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers' Representation in Australia* (Labour Publishing Co., London, 1923), is an informative and provocative but tantalizing study of the internal politics of the N.S.W. Labour party from its organization to the early 1920's. From 1919 to 1921 the writer was private secretary to the Premier of New South Wales, but he is now a university professor of prehistoric European archaeology and Director of the Institute of Archaeology in England. A very different interpretation of New South Wales politics in a later period is given in J. T. Lang, *Communism in Australia* (Century Publication, Sydney, 1945). The author, who was the storm center of labor politics for a generation, tends to associate all left-wing groups with Communism. M. H. Ellis, *The Garden Path* (Land Newspapers Ltd., Sydney, 1949), although more objective, is slanted in the same direction.

Although Australia abounds in political gossip, "muckraking" studies have seldom appeared in book form. An exception is Frank J. Hardy, *Power Without Glory* (Realist Printing and Publishing Co., Melbourne, 1950). The publication of this fictionalized but thinly disguised tale of "machine politics" in Victoria was followed by a sensational (but unsuccessful) suit for libel.

Comprehensive, objective analyses of the structure and functioning of parties are few. Hancock's interpretive work, *Australia*, cited above, includes material on parties. Another brief, provocative sketch is G. V. Portus, "Political Parties," Australian Institute of International Affairs, *Australian Policies*,

Political and Strategic (Supplementary Papers, Series D, No. 1, 1938). To these vignettes, two longer studies have recently been added. F. W. (Sir Frederic) Eggleston is a distinguished elder statesman who has played a prominent part in Australian public life for many years and his book, *Reflections of an Australian Liberal* (F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, published for the Australian National University, 1953), is partly an analysis of the structure and policies of present-day parties and partly an appeal for a revival of liberalism. The book includes a series of tables showing the vote for members of the Commonwealth House and Senate, 1901-1951, and the composition of federal and state governments for each year since federation, which scholars will find invaluable. A second recent, comprehensive study is Louise Overacker, *The Australian Party System* (Yale University Press, New Haven, and Oxford University Press, London, 1952).

Among the discussions of political issues by political leaders, several are worth citing. W. M. Hughes, *The Case for Labour* (Workers Trustees, Sydney, 1910), is a defense by an early leader of Labor, identified above. The emphasis of H. V. Evatt, *Liberalism in Australia* (Sweet and Maxwell, London, and Law Book Co., Sydney, 1918), is largely historical. Robert G. Menzies, *The Forgotten People* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1943), which brings together a series of radio addresses, is a useful guide to the ideas of the present leader of the Liberal party. The aims and policies of the Labor party in the postwar period, 1945-1951, as well as of its late leader, are reflected in J. B. Chifley, *Things Worth Fighting For*, a volume of speeches selected and arranged by A. W. Stargardt (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1952).

Problems of foreign policy are only beginning to claim the attention of scholars. Between the world wars, the Australian Institute of International Affairs published several useful studies, among them *Australian Foreign Policy, 1935-1936* (published for use at the sixth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936); *Australia in the Commonwealth* (Australian Economic Policies, Series B); *Australia and the Pacific* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944).

F. W. Eggleston, *Australia in World Affairs* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1946), is a collection of speeches and articles of the statesman identified above, whose career included diplomatic service. Sir John Latham, later Chief Justice of the High Court, is the author of *Australia and the British Commonwealth* (Macmillan, London, 1929). *Foreign Policy of Australia* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1945) and *Australia in World Affairs* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1946) are valuable collections of speeches and articles by H. V. Evatt, who served as Minister for External Affairs.

A recent book by an American, written largely from official sources, is Werner Levi, *American-Australian Relations* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1947). Nicholas Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-1939* (Oxford University Press, London, 1952), prepared under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a valuable study covering a wide scope.

W. Macmahon Ball, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mel-

bourne, who served as a member of the Allied Council for Japan, has written two critical analyses of Far Eastern problems and policies: *Japan, Enemy or Ally?* (Cassell, London; rev. and enlarged ed., John Day Co., New York, 1949); and *Notes on Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1952). Although written for school children, R. M. Crawford, *Ourselves and the Pacific* (Melbourne University Press, 3rd ed. rev., 1952), is of value to adults as well.

More specialized in emphasis are Myra Willard, *The History of the White Australian Policy* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1923); and W. D. Borrie, *Population Trends and Policies; A Study in Australian and World Demography* (Australasian Publishing Co., Sydney, 1948).

In concluding this section, it may be well to emphasize that although articles in journals, and papers published by the Australian Institute of Political Science, are not listed above, material of great importance will be found there. Also, scholars visiting Australian universities and libraries will do well to seek out theses and manuscripts as yet unpublished, for as has been pointed out recently by an Australian, "too much original research, especially in the social sciences, at present never gets beyond the walls of the classroom; some other countries suffer from an endless outpouring of academic pamphlets but we are far from that position in Australia."²

LOUISE OVERACKER.

Wellesley College.

² Geoffrey Sawer, in a review of T. P. Fry's *Australian Contributions to the Evolution of Parliamentary Government*, in *Historical Studies—Australia and New Zealand*, Vol. 3, pp. 349-50 (Feb., 1949).

BOOK REVIEWS

Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935. Vols. I and II. EDITED BY MARK DEWOLFE HOWE. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 1650. \$12.50.)

In *Causeries de Lundi* Sainte-Beuve remarks, about Chateaubriand: "As all who have known M. de Chateaubriand know that those things occupied a great place in his life, it follows that these Memoirs, which tell so many truths to all the world and about himself, do not, however, contain everything about him, unless they are supplemented by a commentary." This vast *Holmes-Laski Correspondence*, somewhat esoteric in bibliophil reference and pepperings in Greek and Latin but of undoubted future interest, properly enough carries no such additional commentary—although we are told that omissions have been made, dictated by "the limits set by the caution of British publishers," presumably about libel. (The comments of Sir Ernest Barker, Harold Laski's Oxford tutor, about the earlier years would be peculiarly illuminating.) Nevertheless, a large number of conversations between public figures are here recorded. In some cases all present are now dead. The professional concern of the future historian and student of politics will be how far the records are in good faith and reliable. The commentary, therefore, here even more than with Chateaubriand, is strictly necessary.

In these letters we see an almost grandpaternal relation of the correspondents. Indeed in corresponding with Laski, who had what Holmes calls his capacity "to wiggle himself in," Holmes declares he feels "like the Vicar of Wakefield corresponding with the Prime Minister." On the one side is the debonaire Associate Justice, the friends of his youth mostly dead, himself part Nestor, part Voltairean *philosophe*; tough-minded (an "adult male" is the favored term); sceptical of all nonsense about natural rights when the ultimate issue is who can kill whom; in revolt against his Boston upbringings and relishing a bit of neat blasphemy; a rationalist foe of all clergy, but cloaked by a venerable age and an immense respectability. On the other side, we have the precocious youth, twenty-three when the story begins; ready with slashing literary judgements; admiring Lytton Strachey but summing up Marx as "somewhat scatter-brained" who "can't think organically"; much more than, in Judge Learned Hand's phrase "a smart chap," full of what has been called "intellectual fizz." He is immensely flattered by the correspondence, but has a more than feminine gift for saying, when he chooses, what others will wish to hear; a fastidious aspirant dedicated to "fine thought" and the exhilarating adventure of ideas—"that fellow just breathed mind of the highest quality," he says of Leslie Stephen; himself in such pell-mell reaction against the orthodox Judaism of his father as almost thereby to explain his theory of authority in the state; with an almost religious enthusiasm for atheism; thinking that "sometimes a bathe in blood can change the world." "What swoops down on me is the bar-

riers between things, not their unity." This comment in the earliest letters may provide the key to the whole position, may indicate something more fundamental than any liberalism of his first phases, and may explain his conviction that all pursuit of social harmony is bogus and cowardly evasion of "facts." "I take it that the interests of capital and labour are irreconcilable in fundamentals." It is extremely important to note that Laski began as a biology student, an admirer of Galton, until warned by his tutor, Julian Huxley's colleague, that he had not the appropriate mind. In the earlier letters those who know only the later career will be surprised to read the creed: "I am a Darwinian . . . merely by education John Smith won't become Adam Smith." As for Marx, so with him, the struggle for survival, unredeemed by the religious bond of fraternity, ended by becoming the social war *à l'outrance* of classes, where the weak voice of reason was merely an echo from private worlds of experience determined by chances of birth.

The position of Mr. Justice Holmes in legal history is assured and not much affected by these letters of a veteran, a fine old heathen if ever there was one. He expresses a very (modern) American, approximately pragmatic but in the last analysis Hobbesian and (in this reviewer's opinion) quite deplorable view of the bases of law. If there is, as President Eisenhower's Inaugural Address suggests, a revival of Stoic-Christian natural law doctrine, the trend will be away from him. Of socialists he declared, without demur from his young friend, that he had never read one "that I didn't think talked drool . . . some essays by the great Webb . . . I thought were slobber." However, of a particular viewpoint, shaped in the mood of aggressive competition of the last century, he is a most distinguished expositor.

The case of Laski, here illuminated, is more complex. This reviewer recalls being bitterly castigated by a distinguished professor of the London School of Economics for describing Laski as a genius, even if on a small scale. It is indeed amazing that neither Harvard nor Yale chose to give him even an assistant professorship. Maybe Mr. Holmes made him and spoiled him. He had his own notions of a good time: "we destroyed a goodly number of existing reputations, that always seems to me quite the most pleasing way of being malicious"; there is "that place between malice and wit where wisdom dwells." He was a brilliant anecdotalist, a most learned man; his earlier liberal work, before he aspired to write corrective footnotes to Marx, will remain against criticism; in his later years political colleagues found him pompous to the point of boredom. He was never as influential on either side of the Atlantic as the other side supposed. Generous to a fault towards his *protégés* and those who accepted his patronage, he was not only arrogant but waspishly vindictive to those who opposed his purposes. His political judgement—in 1920 when he expected civil war in Britain; in 1921, when he allowed Lloyd George ten years more power; in 1931, when he spoke of a Labour victory; and onwards—was quite singularly poor. In this *Correspondence* neither Mr. Attlee, Mr. Morrison, nor (by name) Mr. Bevin earns mention, although one gathers that, in 1924, the dockers turned to Laski to win their case. In public a partisan to the finger tips, this did not pre-

vent for Laski attempts at a correspondence with Premier Baldwin, which maybe earned the encomium that Laski was dictator of Labour party theory. That he was able, as he stated, to regard the English "with the attachment of an outsider" perhaps explains why, later, for long Ernest Bevin declined to reply to his letters and Attlee advised him that his best service to the party would be to keep quiet.

Truth to tell, Laski was a species of academic Baron Munchausen—a matter which gravely concerns the future historian and makes "commentaries" imperative. From the days of C. M. Lloyd, of the London School and the *New Statesman*, to the present, the stories come back. This reviewer, in some cases from direct knowledge and elsewhere by written inquiry, is aware of inaccuracies of statement, feeding to a soaring vanity, which, even when small, like Ouida's famous statement "none rowed as fast as stroke," give the case away. The unkind would have a brutal name for this corruption of the currency, that circulates among men of integrity, such as has long ceased to be amusing. With our own ears we have heard Laski describing apocryphal conversations with the King (whose constitutional position he endeavoured—without having "a drop of English blood in his veins," as he says—to redefine). His claim has been heard of that he was due to go to the House of Lords, there to lead his party—an allegation which, on the highest authority, can be stated to have been manufactured out of whole cloth, unsupported by a tittle of truth. The historian of the future will be wise to accept no statement from this source without independent confirmation.¹ The judgement of a kinsman that "I don't think I have known anyone in the world so conceited," is condoned when one finds him dismissing Gandhi as, if the salt of the earth, yet an "intolerable bore," and as having "no political sense whatever," or when, at the time of the 1931 Conference, we were coolly told: "Sankey made me try to bring the Mohammedans to reason and I had their leader" (who does not impinge enough on Laski's consciousness to rise beyond anonymity) "here for hours trying to find a basis for discussion." One recalls the apocryphal remark of Poincaré: "Laski, we have gone into the Ruhr. Now what shall we do with it?" It is pitiful.

Let us ascend from this mire of human frailty. Laski had a most brilliant intellect, spoiled by defects of character. It is yet by his work in theory that he will be judged. Indeed he sought to summon his contemporaries to that bar. M. Julien Benda speaks of a treason of the clerks because of a bitter partisanship. Perhaps Benda is wrong. There is yet a graver charge. Laski alleged, in the libel case which he lost with costs, that he did not declare that the forcible overthrow of present government lay in history's near-inevitabilities. His social

¹ In December, 1921 Laski claimed, in a letter to Holmes (Vol. 1, p. 386) that he had been seeing Winston Churchill once a week for a month for as long as one and a half hours, in personal argument, and that he had submitted a formula for settlement of the Irish question, which was in the end almost verbally accepted. On May 13, 1953, this reviewer received a written message from Sir Winston Churchill that he "does not remember ever having heard of him [Laski] in connection with the Irish settlement of 1921." A check of certain academic references produces not dissimilar results.

philosophy was yet, as touching current events, deeply pessimistic, even more Darwinian than Marxist, and explained his statement that, if Britain had to choose between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., she would, he knew, choose the U.S.S.R. In his posthumous *Dilemma of Our Times*, he not only sees in Mr. Churchill the organizer "of the counter-revolution," but says: "The Truman doctrine, as soon as it is seriously applied, means the endowment with American strength of all the interests which seek to prevent the working class from winning its place in the sun." It was rather of this view that he was proud as Lucifer, and this which was distinctive, than that detestation of those who "impose a yoke worse than slavery" on humble folk from vulgar lust for profit, which distinction was characteristic of many good men whom he frankly despised. Whatever his early doubts, the pessimist in him had overwhelmed, in the noise of arms of the social war, the apologist, with Russell, of scientific rationalism. The "red-blooded" or "masculine" approach seemed to be that of condoning massacre on a scale that made the French Revolution pale, since it was necessary in the ungodly Darwinian struggle. One must not (who knows why?) cause pain, it seems, except when having malicious fun or "when necessary." When is "necessary"? The answer must depend upon our judgement of the human capacity for peaceful change, the old order yielding to the new. "Thus far," says Laski, "in history all the evidence is against this assumption."

Christian civilization rests on certain fundamental affirmations, however imperfectly implemented. Whether these affirmations can be made is today of critical importance for civilization and survival. Marxo-Darwinism (and neo-Darwinism is the more dangerous part of the compound) is, to put the matter mildly, not one of the affirmations. The comment about Christian affirmations holds true of the civilization of Islam and of the orthodox Judaism of Nathan Laski, Harold's father. The affirmations of the three have much in common. A civilization fails when, in Malraux's words, "it doubts its own credentials." With a brilliant pen and clever mind, deeply believing a Napoleon to be less influential than those who hold the pen, and spurred on by a vast ambition, Laski encouraged pessimistic doubt and, culturally, as much as any single man of our age, sold the pass of the West, substituting the mood of defeatism for that of reform. The particular good he did (for example as a busy arbitrator who did not in principle approve of arbitration) must not be overlooked, nor yet his early adversities which brewed the poison of resentments. But to know much of talent is not to forgive all but to demand much. It would be more a hypocrisy than a deliberate act of charity not to make on him the same comment that he made on Lord Keynes: "Keynes' personality seems to me not a national asset." Had he lived and his influence been greater than in fact it was, he might have made inevitable a schism in the Labour party of Britain, by causing the revolt of those unable to share his views, and maybe even the establishment there, as elsewhere exists in Europe, of a Christian Social party. His high water mark in this connection was perhaps his preface of praise in 1948 to the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx, of whom he nevertheless declared, "really I loathe the fellow." The bulk of his compatriots, if such he regarded them (Vol. I, pp. 113,

303), he seems to dismiss as "servile." He provides, I will therefore say, to his contemporaries, not a lighthouse signal but a wrecker's lamp. The skilful mariner will note and avoid it. In the relevant words of M. Sainte-Beuve: "And why should I not speak of him? . . . the time of illusions and indulgence is past; it is absolutely necessary to speak truths."

GEORGE CATLIN.

University of California, Berkeley.

The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. By DAVID EASTON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1953. Pp. xxiii, 320. \$5.00.)

In this important book an able young political theorist endeavors with considerable success to show that American political theorists generally are today making very little contribution to political science, to indicate the reasons for their failure, and to suggest what he thinks they need to do. Many of his specific analyses and arguments meet with this reviewer's approval. For example, his statement of the scope of politics, and his arguments that neither "power" nor "the state" is coextensive with the human activities called politics, are to me very acceptable. Other examples of what I consider to be good judgment and cogent argument could easily be given. My adverse criticisms of the work go to the central conceptions and to the argument of the book as a whole.

1. The title and the subtitle are both open to objections but for different reasons. By his title, "The Political System," the author means the aggregate of interrelated human activities having to do with the formation and effectuation of community policies for "the authoritative allocation of values for a society." This defines the scope of political studies, as distinguished from economic, anthropological and sociological studies, for example, but the book is not primarily about political activities or "The Political System." Instead it is mainly about the work of a small number of scholars called political theorists.

The subtitle, "An Inquiry into the State of Political Science," is also somewhat misleading. The author pays some attention to studies in the field of political behavior, but mainly he deals with political theory, political theorists, and the historians of political thought. Political science in the United States embraces other large fields of scholarship—public law, public administration, political parties, and international relations, for example—none of which receive any substantial consideration in this book. In short, the book is mainly about political theorists and what they need to do to begin to earn their salt.

2. The failure of political theorists in the United States to provide political scientists with any significant theoretical framework for their studies in either the moral or the "causal" branches thereof, is the main theme of the argument throughout the book. "Theory has become increasingly remote from the mainstream of political research" (Preface, p. ix). Despite this asserted failure of political theorists, the author argues insistently for the importance of the theorist in bringing order out of the vast but chaotic and disconnected accumulations of facts that other students of politics have provided. Indeed he seems to

argue for the continuing need to have an autonomous group of theorists, separate or at least clearly distinguishable from other political scientists.

How did it come about that political theory has failed so completely and has become so irrelevant to the other studies in politics? From a number of scattered passages in the book (pp. 9, 43, 101, 231, 234-35, 313, 314), I get the impression that the author believes that once upon a time political theorists and political theory were far better than they are today. In that golden age, whenever it was, there were political theorists or social philosophers who grasped and combined into vital philosophies both the moral side and the causal or empirical side of the study of politics. From those greater days of political theory there has been a "decline," a fall from grace. The assumption seems to be that once the original sin or sins have been brought to their attention, present-day political theorists may see the evil of their ways and reform themselves. With more modesty than others who have made similar "discoveries," the author of the work before me does not hold himself out as the Messiah who has found the way to salvation.

3. I have grave doubts about this entire interpretation of what has happened, and I also doubt that the hoped-for outcome of this appeal to political theorists to reform themselves will come to pass. What interests me even more, however, is the phraseology in which much of the argument is stated. The pages are heavy with "the mood of our age," "the pessimism of our times," and similar gloomy phrases. The author stands at least part of the time with certain other theorists who carry the weight of the world upon their minds (I do not say upon their shoulders). They do not seem to be able to recognize change simply as change, or to accept the universe as it is or the human race as it has revealed itself through the centuries. From their viewpoint almost everything is in decline. To dare to speak in their presence of such a thing as progress is to brand oneself as an abysmally ignorant person. But having read a great deal of history, and having lived through Spengler, Pareto, Toynbee, and other heavy thinkers of recent decades without having been infected with their gloom, I simply cannot take seriously much of the vague pessimism that I find in some parts of this book. This sort of world-pessimism seems to me to be a disease that is limited in its incidence to a small class of intellectuals who take themselves too seriously. The rest of the human race is hardly aware of their mental sickness. Fortunately I find evidences that the author of this book does not have a serious case.

4. Also characteristic of large sections of the book is a vague, theoretical, and sometimes metaphorical language that is rather far removed from politics as observable human activity. The vocabulary includes numerous "isms," from behaviorism through communism, empiricism, historicism, historism, optimism, pessimism, positivism, relationism, relativism, scholasticism, scientism, socialism, sociologism, traditionalism, and so on to utilitarianism. At least some of these terms are of such doubtful meaning as to have little value in a scientific discussion. Also noticeable is the author's tendency to use abstract collective nouns as if they represented real self-operating entities. Thus, "There are few social theories that do not show some *insight* into the problems *they* seek to

solve, . . . " (p. 21) and "Although *it* had discovered the natural tendency towards progress, social science did not deny *itself* a further useful role" (p. 15; italics mine). It is *men* who try to solve problems and who may possibly have insights. Social theories and social science are merely collective names for the varied results that certain students and writers have produced. They are not living entities that have insight or that "seek to solve" problems.

5. The author's argument in general is based upon a sort of dichotomy. The study of politics is one, but it has two sides—the moral, or what men would do if they were to do right—and the "causal," or what men do in fact and more or less under necessity. For the moral side, the author says there is value theory but he does not insist upon any empirical study. To accept empirical study for the moral side would be to embrace relativism and that is one of the great sins. In this realm, therefore, it is the role of the political theorist to seek to clarify his own moral principles to himself, but how this is to be done does not appear.

For help in the study of the causal side of politics, there is causal theory and there are empirical methods of testing theories. The author clearly believes that much more can be done by political theorists in the direction of developing causal theories of politics. He apparently expects these theories to be broad and general, but of such nature that *in principle* they might be tested by empirical data. Other workers in the study of politics will presumably have to analyze these theories and separate them into parts that can be tested empirically and then find the ways of so testing them (pp. 315–16). Arguing for "the autonomy of theoretical research," the author does not sufficiently consider the alternative of giving the empirical workers better training in theory and in research methods so that they can develop their own hypotheses and theories more successfully in connection with their specific research projects.

I have a feeling that the time has not yet arrived when all-comprehensive theories of politics, such as the author seems to think the theorists should produce, can be of much assistance to those workers who are studying men in politics at first hand. The general equilibrium theories discussed in Chapter 11 illustrate what I have in mind. Many tools of research will have to be developed and many limited theories will need to be worked out by well-trained students of actual politics before the conditions will be ripe for the Einstein of politics to concoct a general field or equilibrium theory. And to ask political theorists to assume responsibility for two great areas, that is, for moral theory and for political theory in the causal sense, is asking far too much of them.

6. There are many other things in this book that call for analysis and comment. Thus while the distinctions made in Chapter 10 between the writings of Dunning, McIlwain, and Sabine are of considerable interest and acuteness, the adverse criticism of these men as if they were "American political theorists" is, I think, unjustified. Two of these men were trained as historians, and all three in their principal works were writing histories of political thought and not pretending to put forth their own political theories. If their "historical approach has managed to crush the life out of value theory" (p. 235), if, in short,

the value theories in politics discussed by these men were such frail blossoms that they could not stand up against the winds of historical analysis, their chances of survival must in any case have been very small.

But enough of these comments and criticisms. This book still has great merits. The author is both modest and optimistic, despite certain overtones of pessimism. He searches courageously and intelligently for ways in which political theorists might contribute more significantly to political science. He is open-minded and even friendly toward empirical methods of study. He is moving, I believe, in a direction in which there is hope of finding increasing light.

WILLIAM ANDERSON.

University of Minnesota.

Essays on Church and State. BY LORD ACTON. EDITED BY DOUGLAS WOODRUFF. (New York: Viking Press. Pp. vi, 518. \$6.00.)

Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics. BY GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. x, 260. \$3.75.)

Acton's Political Philosophy: An Analysis. BY G. E. FASNACHT. (New York: Viking Press. Pp. xiv, 265. \$4.00.)

For the past two decades the reassessment of the Victorians has been proceeding apace, and since the war it has conspicuously accelerated—a fact not without significance for the student of opinion. The simultaneous appearance of these three books relating to Acton (who has not figured prominently in the more popular studies) is further evidence of an obvious trend. It could even mark the beginning of a cult.

Acton is a fascinating figure however you look at him, and in some respects a tragic one too. He was not only one of the most encyclopedic scholars since Comenius, but also a considerable social prophet. And as a public "character" affiliated with the aristocracy (both lay and ecclesiastical) of four countries, he was a man around whom legends grew even in his own lifetime. Testimony to his prodigious learning is incontrovertible. Gladstone, Bryce, Creighton and scores of others in the worlds of scholarship and politics bear witness to its astonishing range and depth. Andrew White called him "the nearest approach to omniscience" he had known, and Arnold Toynbee regards him as "one of the greatest minds among Western historians." It was commonly said of him that he knew everyone in Europe worth knowing and had read every book in Europe worth reading (for he was quadrilingual from childhood). Yet despite this fabulous erudition, and despite the elaborate preparation he made for a wide variety of studies ranging from pagan religions to the French Revolution, he did not write a single book. To this day the paralyzing effect of his perfectionist standards of scholarship is referred to in British university common rooms as "Acton's disease." His influence (and considerable it was) was exerted through journalism, book reviews, personal contacts with statesmen and scholars, and finally after 1895 as Regius Professor at Cambridge University. Since his death fifty-one years ago, five volumes of his lectures and essays have been brought out by

friends and disciples. Now Mr. Woodruff brings us a sixth consisting of essays and book reviews which Acton contributed in his twenties and thirties to the Liberal Catholic journals he edited. Of one of those journals Matthew Arnold said: "perhaps in no organ of criticism in this country was there so much knowledge, so much play of mind." The contributions here reprinted still remain both a delight and a provocation. But when one has finished these 450 pages, one is left marvelling at Acton's conception of the general reader, for few but specialists are likely to get much out of them today. The editor provides no explanatory notes; on the other hand, he introduces the volume with a gracious and scholarly essay giving us the immediate background against which the essays were written.

Acton merits the critical consideration of social scientists today, however, for reasons other than the profundity of his learning and the contributions he made to historiography. For him history was more than a tale that is told: it was the raw material for a philosophy of social life, and immanent within its data were enduring issues to be disentangled and analyzed to the betterment of living. Those fundamental issues that troubled him unceasingly for most of half a century are the same that beset the world today, so that there is literal truth in Miss Himmelfarb's contention that "he is, indeed, one of our great contemporaries." Acton's teaching may thus be likened to a rich fugue in which he interweaves the variations on several recurrent themes: in particular, the nature of freedom, the relation of values to property and power, the problem of Church and state, and the implications of ideology for the political process. And as counterpoint to those themes run his four emphatic repudiations: namely, of racialism, of autocracy, of majoritarianism, and of nationalism.

Acton's appeal is especially cogent for our generation because of the distinctive quality of his politics. This Anglo-Bavarian aristocrat grew into an uncompromising liberal, defiant of autocracy in the Church as well as in the state, believing passionately in both the sovereignty of the individual conscience and the corporative organization of society. But his was essentially a Christian liberalism in striking contrast to the classic liberalism that derived from French rationalism and Benthamite utilitarianism. For whereas the latter rested essentially on an optimistic view of the malleability of human nature, Acton's liberalism was firmly grounded on the pessimistic conception of original sin—a postulate he immortalized in his best-known epigram about the corrupting consequences of power. It is this fact that makes him the fellow of Maritain and the French MRP thinkers today.

All these matters are effectively set forth by Miss Himmelfarb in her able monograph. It is, she says, "not so much the biography of a life as the biography of a mind." This is not an easy distinction to sustain, though on the whole she sustains it successfully. Her purpose is to present Acton's thought as developing in response to the personal and public issues that confronted him. She makes us appreciate the astonishing precocity of the young Munich-trained scholar who began to be a public influence at the age of 24. She communicates to us the zeal with which he returned to England to establish a sort of lay apostolate of

his own to proclaim Liberal Catholicism and convince the obscurantists (especially in the hierarchy) that Catholic Christianity had nothing to fear from the new learning, either historical or scientific. She makes us feel the anguish of his failure, both in that and in his momentous struggle to prevent Pius IX from proclaiming the dogma of papal infallibility. And with remarkable sympathy she enables us to see how, in the course of this unfolding, his politics changed from a Burkean Toryism that accepted the deliverance of history to a Gladstonian Liberalism that virtually repudiated it. Yet from beginning to end he never lost his profound Catholic piety. The man who called the papacy the "fiend skulking behind the Crucifix" could also say "I am not conscious that I ever in my life held the slightest shadow of a doubt about any dogma of the Catholic Church."

Of biographical narrative Miss Himmelfarb gives us only the necessary minimum: so much so, in fact, that at times she becomes almost laconic. Yet her sharply-drawn purpose, so consistently maintained, gives an austere precision to the entire work. Within the limits of that purpose, this is an immensely satisfying study which does what has not been done before, and in the process makes an important contribution to the history of Victorian culture. Miss Himmelfarb is not merely master of her materials; she uses them with the unobtrusiveness of mature discrimination. The cool clarity of her style is admirably suited to her theme; she speaks throughout with the quiet voice of sensitivity; and when she comes to deal with the more tense situations, she handles them with a terseness that catches some of Acton's own epigrammatic quality.

There are a few things that even the most grateful reader may think are not dealt with as adequately as they might be. For example, Miss Himmelfarb fails to make us understand just how and why the young Acton lost his early enthusiasm for Macaulay. And she does not make us feel the true inwardness of Acton's antipathy towards Cardinal Newman; we merely learn that at some unspecified point, an intellectual incompatibility had grown into a personal animosity. Perhaps, too, she underemphasizes Acton's stress upon economic motivation and his high regard for Harrington; certainly she does not indicate the fissure this produced in his thinking. But these are relatively minor complaints. The great thing about this book is that it evokes anew enthusiasm for a majestic figure, and that it sends one back to Acton's own essays with deeper understanding. It even impels one to go beyond the monograph itself and to venture into the territory which Miss Himmelfarb purposely avoids—that is to say, the intriguing field of Acton's complex psychology and the turbulent intricacies of his personal relationships.

When we turn to Mr. Fasnacht's book we experience an acute disappointment, alike for the great opportunity the author has missed and for the banality with which he executes the limited design he has undertaken. The book purports to be an exposition of the salient features of Acton's thinking, but it turns out to be mainly a concatenation of quotations and paraphrases grouped under such obvious chapter headings as "The Idea of Development," "The History of Freedom," and so forth. Even at that there is little skill in presentation;

frequently one cannot tell whether the author is giving his own opinion or paraphrasing Acton; and the deadly monotony of the author's simple declaratory sentences militates against sustained interest. At times the comments reach a remarkable depth of banality. ("Acton's ultimate thought is that it is the truth that makes us free. And the ultimate truth is that Caesar and God are different.")

The book has a measure of usefulness, however, either as an anthology or as a first-level exposition of Acton's teaching, the more so as Mr. Fasnacht has conscientiously incorporated much material from Acton's unpublished manuscripts in the University Library at Cambridge. But despite its title, there is far more history than analysis in it. In fact, the fundamental philosophic issues raised by Acton's political ideas are not considered at all. His concepts are not critically examined; the presuppositions of his thinking are not laid bare; the shifts and contradictions within his system are not explained or discussed. Even some of Acton's central ideas are cavalierly handled: thus, the implications of his pluralism are not pressed; his theory of "revolution in permanence" is not critically considered; and ultramontaniam gets only two references in the index, though no Catholic writer of modern times carried further than Acton did the distinction between the Divine Church and the human ecclesiastical institution. Most astonishing of all in a book bearing this title, there is no attempt to discuss Acton's conception of political science (a term he frequently used) even though that is central to the whole issue. But it is not merely the absence of these things that is the most regrettable feature of the book; rather is it the fact that the author seems so oblivious of their relevance to the material he is handling and the topic he professes to be discussing. Yet the consideration of Acton's philosophy of politics and history is singularly timely: as timely, indeed, as the current discussions of David Easton's inquiry into our discipline.

C. H. DRIVER.

Yale University.

The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. By RUSSELL KIRK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1953. Pp. 458. \$6.50.)

The Conservative Mind is a study of political and social conservatism written, be it noted, by an unabashed conservative. Professor Russell Kirk of Michigan State, who already enjoys a solid reputation as historian of ideas thanks to his incisive *Randolph of Roanoke*, has brought together a series of essays about British and American conservative thinkers in a book marked by candor, discipline, erudition, and grace. Burke and John Adams are his two favorite political thinkers, but respectful, often loving treatment is also bestowed on such diverse figures as Scott, Canning, Coleridge, Randolph, Calhoun, Macaulay, Fenimore Cooper, de Tocqueville, John Quincy Adams, Brownson, Hawthorne, Disraeli, Newman, Maine, Godkin, Henry and Brooks Adams, Mallock, Babbitt, More, and Santayana. The sum of these essays is a study that must certainly be acknowledged one of the most valuable contributions to intellectual history of the past decade.

Professor Kirk's philosophy of conservatism is in the great tradition. At the outset, he establishes his "canons of conservative thought": (1) belief in a universal moral order supported and sanctioned by religion; (2) affection for the variety and mystery of traditional life; (3) conviction that civilization is grounded upon orders and classes, the only true equality being moral equality; (4) belief in the inseparability of property and freedom; (5) faith in Burkean prescription; and (6) recognition that change and reform are not necessarily the same thing. And at the conclusion he restates these canons in terms of modern issues. The new conservatism, he believes strongly, must be grounded in an affirmation of the moral nature of society, must defend property ("property diffused and defined, property in the form of homes and pensions and corporate rights and private enterprises"), must preserve local liberties and divided political power, and above all must approach the complexities of modern society in a spirit of true "national humility."

The canons of conservatism, writes Professor Kirk, have been menaced by at least five major schools of radical thought: Rationalism, Romanticism, Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Collectivistic Materialism. The common ground from which these schools have proceeded to the attack on the prescriptive arrangement of society are: (1) belief in the perfectibility of man and unlimited social progress, (2) contempt for tradition, (3) political leveling, and (4) economic leveling. The author reserves his particular scorn for Rousseau, Bentham, Marx, and John Dewey, the chief purveyors of these utopian ideas.

Professor Kirk's stand for conservatism is staunch and uncompromising. It is refreshing to meet an historian of political and social ideas willing to go on record with statements like these: of Emerson—"His specific political notions are almost shocking—frightening in the first instance for their perilous naïveté, in the second instance for their easy indifference to uncomfortable facts"; of Babbitt's *Democracy and Leadership*—"perhaps the most penetrating work on politics ever written by an American"; of the Civil War and Reconstruction—"that hurricane-fanned conflagration of reforming enthusiasm and sinful appetite"; of Paul Elmer More—"possibly the most redoubtable American theologian of any communion." It should be said in the author's behalf that he never fires one of these broadsides without carefully training his guns. His scholarship is manifestly of the highest order.

In dealing with this subject, especially in dealing with it in so clear and committed a spirit, Professor Kirk has laid himself open to serious attack. Limitations of space do not permit a full catalogue of possible chinks in his armor, but certainly it would seem proper to point out what may well be the most serious defect of the book: the implicit assumption, occasionally made explicit but never really supported by conclusive evidence, that all our present discontents may be traced back to the forces of lustful, shallow, irreligious liberalism loosed upon the West by the French Revolution. The historian of ideas has a deep obligation not to put too much faith in the power of ideas.

In his presidential address to the American Historical Association several years ago, Samuel Eliot Morison called for a history of the United States from

the conservative point of view, a study that would parallel Keith Feiling's *History of England*. Professor Kirk's performance in *The Conservative Mind* leads this reviewer to believe that he might very well be the person for whom Professor Morison is looking. Certainly the so-called "new conservatism" of the postwar period takes on new substance and meaning with the publication of this splendid book.

CLINTON ROSSITER.

Cornell University.

United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control. BY WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, CHAIRMAN OF STUDY GROUP. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 288. \$3.75.)

During 1950-51 six men held systematic discussion of the conduct of American foreign affairs, under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. All of them—William Yandell Elliott, McGeorge Bundy, Harry D. Gideonse, George F. Kennan, Don K. Price, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.—were experienced in some aspect of administration in addition to being students of government. Professor Elliott, their chairman, drafted this report to present the consensus of the group. It makes good reading for professionals, but it also shows again the disturbing fact that professional students, while still not sure of many answers, are far ahead of the officials of government who flounder helplessly in the mounting questions of this area.

The possibility of major constitutional changes to set up integrated government is, inevitably, discussed inconclusively. Aside from this possibility, the group held two other views, one that smaller constitutional changes should serve the desperate need for reform, the other that leadership and education can bring sufficient change. They agreed that constitutional amendments are desirable to set up approval of treaties by an absolute majority in both houses of Congress, to provide a four-year term for members of the House, to give the President an item veto for appropriation acts, and to make the electoral vote more representative of the popular vote. Within the present Constitution they think the President and Congress must get along together in more understanding if the contemporary difficulties are to be solved in any degree.

Some general points keep returning. One is the fact that no organization, no procedure can be a substitute for the personal leadership of the President and key members of Congress. Another is the fact that military policy is an integral part of foreign policy and should be recognized as such. By inference the group extends the principle that war is much too important to be left in the hands of generals to a principle that all military policy matters are too important to be left in the hands of generals. The military posture of the United States is basic in foreign relations and its definition is basic foreign policy.

The group accepted the need for a strong congressional role in foreign relations and rejected the elite theories of public opinion but agreed that the electorate could give only "programmatic" direction to government, that parties should have more discipline and show more responsibility, and that professional

services should be extended in diplomacy by raising the whole civil service in this field to the professional level of the career foreign service. "Regardless of what specific methods of reform seemed most persuasive to us individually, as a Group we agreed without question on (a) the new importance of associating congressional leadership with the Executive Branch in the formulation of policy; (b) the importance of giving the President enough leverage to overcome the particularist tendencies of executive departments; (c) the importance of associating department heads, and departments generally, with the President and his office in the formulation of policy; and (d) the importance of giving the President adequate authority and staff for this purpose."

As we might expect, the theme is sombre for coherence and continuity of foreign policy within our present organization and practice of government. This group of scholars, observant and thoughtful men, have combined an approach to the ideal condition with a sense of politics and what can be accomplished. It is no discredit to them to say that they have not proposed the final remedies. Only the naive can be positive about remedies in this aspect of government since the nation entered a new condition in World War II. Trial and error will almost surely test all proposed solutions. Meanwhile the scholars, as represented by this group in 1950-51, are far beyond public officials in their recognition of the great danger in our institutional incompetence. They may not have the final answers, but they are proposing the changes that can be tried and tested for further change. Unless public officials make the changes, the problems become more difficult by the day and the danger of national disaster becomes a greater threat.

It will be ironic indeed if history records the United States as the nation that studied government organization the most but fell because it refused to change its organization, or the nation that had the greatest power of this era but failed because it could not work out organization and coordination in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the Study Group are to be thanked for this serious, advanced, and sensible discussion of matters that may mean the life or death of this strong nation.

JAMES L. McCAMY.

University of Wisconsin.

The Great Frontier. BY WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1953. Pp. xiii, 434. \$5.00.)

Sixty years ago this December, Frederick Jackson Turner delivered at Chicago his famous paper on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." By this one short essay, with its revolutionary impact, Turner won general acceptance for his thesis that the key to American development and to the American character lay in the presence, for three hundred years, of a copious supply of free land at the edge of settlement.

For a generation, no one challenged Turner's *dicta*, and then, in the twenties, an increasing body of criticism began to develop. This criticism centered upon two features: the agrarian limitations and the nationalistic limitations of

Turner's theories. Instead of recognizing the influence of varied resources such as copper, coal, timber, iron, and petroleum, Turner concerned himself almost solely with the abundance of cultivable soil, and thus his thesis was restricted in its application to our agrarian age, when it might have served as a key to our industrial age as well. Further, preoccupation with the thesis led to a kind of historiographic isolationism, for historians continued to dwell upon this continental theme at a time when it became increasingly clear that we must understand our past as a part of the history of Western civilization at large. The critics who voiced these objections tended to reject the frontier thesis altogether.

In a book which is probably the most striking and effective reaffirmation of the frontier doctrine since Turner, Walter P. Webb has cut free from both the restrictive Americanism and the restrictive agrarianism of Turner, and has proposed a bold and sweeping theory of modern history. *The Great Frontier* advances the thesis that we are now ending a single historical phase that began with the Age of Discovery. This Age opened up a world frontier which was "inherently a vast body of wealth without proprietors." By doing so, it precipitated a "sudden, continuing, and ever-increasing flood of wealth" upon the centers of Western civilization, thus inaugurating a period of boom which lasted about four hundred years and during which all of the institutions of Western man—economic, political, and social—were transformed in adjustment to the needs of a world in boom. With the end of this supply of undeveloped resources, modern man now faces frightful difficulties of adjustment.

In his recognition of the extremely varied forms of wealth which the natural resources of the new continents presented to mankind, Webb everlastingly breaks the false link between agrarian thought and frontier doctrine. In his emphasis upon the global character of the Great Frontier, he forever divorces the frontier thesis from narrow nationalism. By the originality and freshness of his approach, and by his talent for viewing developments in the large, he gives historians everywhere something worth chewing upon.

But, in my opinion, Professor Webb has greatly weakened the validity of his thesis by his disregard of technology as a factor and his acceptance of geographical determinism as the sole key to modern history. Granted the great importance of the frontier as a locus of wealth, it does not necessarily follow that the frontier is the *only* significant source of modern wealth. Webb asserts that "it was the constant distribution on a nominal or free basis of the royal or public domain that kept the boom going and that gave a peculiar dynamic quality to Western Civilization for four centuries," and his discussion is pervaded with dark forebodings for the future of a world which no longer commands such a stock of untapped resources. In short, he commits himself to an unsophisticated form of geographical determinism, and he apparently does this somewhat innocently, without having taken into consideration the writings of James C. Malin, Isaiah Bowman, and others who have analyzed the pitfalls of this concept.

It would, of course, be absurd to deny the vital role of natural resources as a

basis for our present supply of goods of all kinds. But resources alone do not bring about the supply of goods, for primitive peoples with bare subsistence standards have possessed the same resources for as much as fifty thousand years. Wealth depends also upon our ability to convert resources into a socially useful form—that is upon productive capacity. Our productive capacity, in turn, depends not only on the raw materials which are ready to hand, but even more upon our ability to increase, through technology, the volume of goods which can be turned out by each worker. For instance, free land was wonderful, but it could never, by itself, have freed us from the condition in which more than 70% of our labor force was required to produce the food needed by our people. But when technology enabled 11% of our labor force to produce food for all, it freed nearly 60% for other productive activities.

In practice, of course, the forces of technology and environment constantly interplay, and cannot be isolated. Because they do interplay, it might be argued that the abundance of resources on the Great Frontier has stimulated the technology—that the spectacle of vast riches waiting to be grasped has inspired men to devise new means for grasping them—and that in this sense, the Great Frontier brought into being the new technology. But it is a stubborn fact that the technological revolution seemed to precede the Age of Discovery. From the time of the Crusades, four centuries before Columbus and da Gama, Western Europe was in transition. The use of gunpowder, the art of printing, improvements in navigation, the revival of commerce, the whole pervasive change known as the Renaissance—all these had paved the way not only for the great geographical discoveries but also for the industrial transformation of Europe. Viewing the matter in this way, it might be argued that what really happened was that an advancing technology opened up a whole new range of potentialities, including the physical resources of the New World—rather than that the epic geographical discoveries precipitated a technological revolution.

This is not meant to imply that the environmental factor should be relegated to a secondary position. It is not my purpose to assert either that technology can operate without materials, or that Webb's Malthusian misgivings for the future are unjustified. But precisely because the factors which he deals with are of capital significance, it is important that they should not become identified with doctrines of geographical determinism. When he attacks, to such good effect, the glib and over-worked "Fallacy of New Frontiers," it is unfortunate that he goes on to claim that "Science . . . is not likely . . . to make the [world] we have much better than it is"—something which science has done repeatedly in the past and which, if not perverted to the uses of war, it is eminently likely to do in the future. In short, it is unfortunate that the time-worn fallacies of geographical determinism should have crept into a work with so many original and striking insights. For Professor Webb's formulation is one of the first fully-developed treatments of a major aspect of modern world history, and even those who may criticize his theory will find that his book is one of the rare volumes which force the reader to re-examine his historical assumptions, to re-cast his historical thought, and to recognize clearly great

historical patterns which, because of their very magnitude, he had never previously perceived as a whole.

DAVID M. POTTER.

Yale University.

The Zone of Indifference. BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1952. Pp. 312. \$3.75.)

The prevailing sense of political crisis has led many recent writers to consult the history of past civilizations for guidance in the present. To some extent the present work falls within this familiar category. Believing that the crucial issue of contemporary policy is the problem of maintaining effective cooperation between the United States and Western Europe, and that the principal threat to Western culture is the impending breakdown of communication between these two vital areas, the author has tried to throw light on these matters by examining the ways whereby the integrity of cultures has been maintained in the past, and the circumstances attending their disintegration. The alienation of Byzantium from Rome, which destroyed the cultural unity of the Roman Empire and crippled its capacity for self-defense, is repeatedly mentioned as the classic parallel to the contemporary situation. Wisely recognizing, however, that "history repeats a timeless score, but not itself" (p. 27), the author refrains from spelling out this analogy in any detail, but turns rather to an analysis of the meaning of culture in general, and of the sociological and psychological processes which maintain cultures both in sickness and in health. His purpose in so doing is to establish criteria of cultural health against which to measure the forces of disintegration in our own particular culture.

This preliminary part of the work is not especially novel. Although the author reserves his warmest praise for Spengler, his own position is rather closer to that of Toynbee. Rejecting any sort of pseudo-biological determinism, he also adopts an essentially psychological and moralistic interpretation of history. "Men are linked to each other through meaning and purpose" (p. 15). "Culture is vital belief" (p. 60). As long as men share in a single "Social Mind," they are members of a common culture, and will devote themselves to its defense. But there is always a possibility that they will lose confidence in the vital beliefs of the culture in which they have been bred. This "alienation of the Social Mind," when carried beyond a certain point, leads to disintegration and death. The problem of alienation is, therefore, the crucial element in the history of all human cultures. To anyone familiar with the general position of Toynbee, all this will be fairly familiar.

The real meat of the book consists, however, not in the elaboration of these general concepts, but in their application to the specific problems of contemporary foreign policy. This the author proceeds to do with a good deal of originality and insight.

According to Strauss-Hupé, the origins of Western culture are to be located in the 15th century, when the fall of Constantinople finally severed the ties

between Eastern and Western Europe, and forced the West into that sudden career of overseas expansion which was to delimit its future field of action. This coincided with the intellectual movements of the Renaissance and Reformation, which broke the crust of traditional society, and established the typical vital belief of Western man. The core of this belief, nourished by the converging influences of Greek intellectualism, Roman legalism, and Christian conscience, was individualism. In social life this found expression in the concept of the self-directed man, a person whose life-course was governed not by the inherited status of traditional society or by the external fiat of tyranny, but by self-imposed criteria of action. In politics it led to the concept of the sovereign state as the indispensable defender of cultural values, and to the ideal of an international order based on balance of powers and contractual freedom rather than on organized authority. Such were the vital beliefs which gave Western culture its unique expansive power, and enabled the Western world for centuries to dominate the alien and perennially hostile forces of the East.

How then did the present crisis arise? The Western empires in Asia are in full retreat, and a hostile Russia, heir to the estrangement of Byzantium, threatens momentarily to overwhelm a divided and apathetic Europe. Is this shift in the balance of world power a result of purely external forces? Or is the weakness of the Western world internal and self-imposed?

The latter is the proposition defended in the present book. While admitting that the external position has in fact deteriorated, the author believes that the preponderance of material strength is still overwhelmingly favorable to the West. The difficulty arises from an alienation of the Social Mind which is making it increasingly difficult for America and Europe to pool their efforts in any joint endeavor.

Strausz-Hupé's thesis, and this is the most interesting and controversial feature of his work, is that the current obstacles to communication arise from the fact that America is now the true bearer of Western culture, while Europe has become largely alienated from it. The United States was founded in the 18th century, at a time when post-Renaissance optimism was at its height, and in a country where there were few vestiges of traditional society to impede the realization of Western ideals. This enabled the United States to pass through the changing conditions of 19th-century life with unimpaired faith in individualism. America "supplied the one positive answer given in the nineteenth century" to the problem of modern industrialism, by creating "an industrial society that was free and classless" (p. 163). In Europe, on the contrary, the forces of liberalism were never strong enough to gain the total allegiance of society. The remnants of traditional society, retreating for protection into the arms of an ever more powerful state bureaucracy, were able to prevent any comparable development in that part of the world. The turning point came in 1848, when the last great attempt to rally the European masses behind the ideal of liberal nationalism went down to defeat. The result was a profound and lasting alienation of the European proletariat. The vital belief of Western culture, which still unites America, has been increasingly unable to arouse the energies of a united

Europe. The spectre of total alienation, and of the final severing of Western culture, is at hand.

Under these circumstances, the primary duty of the United States is clear: it is to lend the weight of its moral leadership to the reestablishment of the unity of Western culture. American military and economic power is, at the present time, the only force capable of defending this culture against the dangers of Eastern encroachment. But this power is culturally significant only insofar as it may provide a last opportunity for restoration of the Western consensus. From as far back as the time of Tocqueville, the American political and social experiment, with its unique combination of democratic freedom and national unity, has exerted a powerful influence on the liberal thought of Europe. Although recent developments in the United States as elsewhere have tended to diminish the individual's capacity for self-determination, especially in economic affairs, the Western ideal of individualism is by no means spent. If the liberal forces of Europe and America continue to share and to work toward the realization of this ideal, Western culture may still be saved from disintegration. But if the "Western dialogue" ends, and the two halves of the Western world no longer continue, as in the past, to fortify one another by the exchange of vital ideas and experiments, all will be over. Although American military power may well prevent Western Europe in any case from being overrun by the East, this can, in the absence of a true consensus, be achieved only through the establishment of an American Empire which, no matter how benevolent, will spell the death of Western culture. Since this is the last thing America wants, it follows that American policy should be directed toward the encouragement of democratic leadership in Western Europe, and that the build-up of purely military power should be subordinated to this objective. This is the essential message of the book.

Altogether this should be reckoned as one of the more useful and stimulating of the recent contributions to the literature of international politics. Its prime virtue is to emphasize, as against the isolationist tendencies operating on both sides of the Atlantic, the fact that close relations between America and Europe are not merely a question of temporary military convenience, but of long-range cultural needs. Like all books which cover an enormous territory in a few pages, it abounds in generalizations which, as the author himself points out, are far too sweeping, particularly in such ticklish matters as the identification of "national character." Despite the evidence of Tocqueville and others, moreover, the reviewer is by no means convinced that the American experiment has ever had so great a power of attraction as the author thinks. The reviewer also believes that the book tends, in its emphasis on the role of ideas in history, to underestimate the power of other factors. In view of the demonstrated destructive and coercive powers of the modern police state, which Strausz-Hupé himself recognizes as a powerful agency of moral disintegration, is it really possible to be sure, for example, that the establishment of a free and productive society in Western Europe would "exert an irresistible pull upon the peoples of Eastern

Europe" (p. 298), and thus threaten the hold of Russia on that region? But these are matters of opinion, and the opinions set forth in the present work are clearly worth considering.

FREDERICK M. WATKINS.

Yale University.

Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. BY GEORGE McTURNAN KAHIN.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 490. \$6.00.)

Indonesia's road to independence was not an easy one. It came as the result of a world war, long hostile occupation, and finally revolution, with United Nations intervention. The Indonesian, like the revolutions in other Asian countries, was not simply a struggle for national political independence. It contained other elements, such as revolt against poverty and misery, and against domination of the West, whether politically, economically or culturally. In many respects it is a continuing revolution. To attempt an analysis of one of the contemporary Asian revolutions, especially when the setting is as complicated as was that of Indonesia, is no simple task.

Dr. Kahin has given us a detailed story of Indonesia's road to independence. He brought to his task unusual qualifications. He spent several years in intensive study and research in Indonesian history and politics. He acquired a mastery of Dutch and Indonesian languages and read widely in the rich Dutch literature on Indonesia. After several years of preparation he had the good fortune to be in Indonesia during the last year of the revolution. He made the acquaintance of a large number of the Indonesian leaders. Kahin saw an important phase of the revolution at first hand, and to a remarkable degree from the inside. His account of the revolution will long remain a unique and important source of information about its leaders, the course of events and their relationship to one another.

In his discussion of the social environment of Indonesian nationalism, Kahin challenges what he calls the frequently made observation that during their long rule in the Indies the Dutch followed a policy of maintaining the existing structure of native society and that the basic characteristics of that society remained virtually unchanged. He, on the contrary, holds that during the three centuries of Dutch rule the moderately authoritarian Javanese society became "generally strongly authoritarian in character." This is in part setting up a straw man and then knocking it down. Those who have made the observation which he attacks certainly never meant to convey the idea that no changes took place in Indonesian society under Dutch rule. No society in modern times has been hermetically sealed or placed in refrigeration, or can be. It was Dutch policy to protect and preserve native culture and institutions as much as possible, or as J. S. Furnivall put it, to conserve "the influence of custom." This has nothing to do with the question of whether the policy was good or bad. The present reviewer is inclined to conclude that the policy was unwise and in the end productive of more evil than good; but Furnivall, in his *Colonial*

Policy and Practice, which is a comparative study of British and Dutch policy in Burma and the East Indies respectively, has many good things to say about the Dutch policy, and he certainly is no apologist for colonialism. Since Java, to say nothing of the East Indies as a whole, was politically unintegrated when the Dutch began to impose their rule, central authority had to be created and strengthened. If that had not been done there would not be an Indonesian nation today. Would the government have been any less "authoritarian" if the Dutch had not strengthened the personal authority of the native elite, but had imposed direct rule upon the whole area? It is difficult to conceive of a colonial regime which is not authoritarian.

It cannot be said that Dr. Kahin has given a consistent and valid picture of the forces which produced the revolution. For example, at one point one gets the impression that a strong factor was the deliberate policy of the Dutch in withholding education from Indonesians, but later it appears that Western education, by creating a new elite, had provided the movement with impetus and leadership. Mr. Kahin seems to feel that he must find a justification for, or at least an explanation of, the revolution in the evils of Dutch rule. The nationalist movement developed not because of the defects or even vices of the Dutch administration, of which there were many, but because on the whole it promoted conditions which made possible the development of Indonesian leaders. The desire for national independence is so natural that it does not have to be accounted for or justified by marshalling a series of injustices. Grievances against foreign rulers are quite naturally exaggerated and are felt more keenly than worse evils imposed by a national government. This is very understandable, but the detached student should be able to see all this in its proper perspective.

This is not the most objective book ever written. Mr. Kahin's very natural sympathy with the Indonesian cause is obvious in many pages of his book. Unfortunately, this sympathy frequently leads him to make superficial statements and unsound judgments. In his discussion of Darul Islam he states (p. 331) that "the Dutch were unable to suppress or even contain the growth of Darul Islam," which is undoubtedly true; but he was much impressed with the view of numerous Pasundan officials that only "Republican troops would be able to suppress the Darul Islam." The situation was not as simple as that. The Indonesian troops after three years of effort have not yet succeeded in doing it. The abolition of the federal system only six months after the transfer of sovereignty and the institution of a unitary system before the adoption of a permanent constitution was not a statesmanlike performance. Precious time was lost in making the transition. For months, and that at a critical time, the government was practically at a standstill. Kahin, however, gives it complete justification. The last chapter, on achievements and prospects, contains much excellent analysis but suffers from being somewhat uncritical.

AMRY VANDENBOSCH,

University of Kentucky.

The Community of the Future. BY FR. VINDING KRUSE. (New York: The Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. vii, 828. \$12.00.)

The intellectual world owes a debt of gratitude to the translators of this huge volume for having made the rich harvest of thought of a prominent Danish professor of jurisprudence accessible to English-speaking readers. The theses propounded in the book are provocative and often unorthodox; but even readers who reject Dr. Kruse's social philosophy will find it worth their time to study his penetrating analysis of the entire realm of political, economic, and legal relations and his detailed proposals for improving the social order.

The main theme is that man, in order to survive under the threat of ruthless wars and barbarism from without and moral decay from within, must rise above the quest for material values, in personal life as well as in the life of nations, must strive to overcome his predatory propensities, and must develop a new, unselfish type whose deepest satisfaction is derived from spiritual, moral, and esthetic values. Dr. Kruse believes that the choices implicit in this definition of the ultimate goal do not necessarily depend upon the acceptance of some religious belief, but may be based upon premises and axioms which are scientifically provable. In his opinion, the experiences of thousands of years have shown that no solid and lasting foundations for a social order can be built without moral self-control, consideration for others, justice, and productive cooperation in realizing the great aims of civilization. He foresees an eventual renaissance of those ethical ideals which are common to all influential world religions and which social science can demonstrate to be the most *practical* principles for administering human affairs.

Dr. Kruse's approach to the problem of social control prescribes tasks for social science which are commonly believed to be outside of its proper province. In his view, science need not limit itself to a descriptive analysis of observable facts, but may legitimately extend the scope of its inquiry into the realm of the "ought." He is convinced that the truth or untruth of ethical axioms can be verified by objective historical research and scientific proof. He develops a rather strong case for the proposition that the social experiences of centuries of human effort can furnish us with many insights that are of lasting value in our attempt to find the guiding principles of social regulation. Just as the applied natural sciences teach us that we *must* close a circuit if we want the benefit of light, that we *must* use a certain type of construction to produce a certain bridge, that we *must* use insulin to combat certain diseases, so social experience teaches that men *must*, for example, show industry and self-control to earn a living and to obtain technical progress. Dr. Kruse maintains that, by using scientific methods, ethics can be developed into a spiritual medical science which complements the treatment of the body by physical medical science by an experimental treatment of the human soul. He also believes that jurisprudence is capable of becoming a science of proper lawmaking once the indispensable goals of the legal order have been ascertained by the social scientists.

With these methodological premises, Dr. Kruse undertakes to outline a comprehensive system of man's rights, duties, and responsibilities in a new community. Practically no field of life is neglected by the author in his ambitious endeavor to ascertain the principles most conducive to the promotion of justice and the general welfare in a modern commonwealth. He discusses the personal rights of man, the law of the family and of inheritance, the right of physical and intellectual property, the right to earn, the organization of labor and capital, agriculture, architecture, town planning, and the preservation of the beauty of nature. In each of these fields he presents us with concrete proposals for the improvement of the law.

In the final chapter the author discusses the political constitution for a new community. Pointing out the shortcomings of traditional democracy as well as the dangers and pitfalls of autocratic rule, the author advocates a third solution which would introduce into political life an element of "expert rule" and guidance by an intellectual elite, but which would at the same time preserve the freedom of the spirit, the fundamental rights of men, and the supremacy of the law. The inherent faults of democracy, he points out, have since the time of the Greek republics led to endless alternations between democratic rule and dictatorship. Dictatorship provides no cure, since it stifles the energies of free people and by abuse of concentrated power is likely to reduce the masses of the people to a condition akin to slavery. Dr. Kruse's plan for solving this political dilemma of our epoch is a revision of the electoral system under which the political representatives of the nation would be chosen by professional associations, industrial and trade organizations, and institutions of research and learning, rather than by the populace as a whole. He believes that this system will bring about an "enlightened democracy" in which vocational groups will elect to political office those whom they know to be qualified and experienced.

It is not possible, within the scope of this review, to mention more than a small fraction of the political, economic, and legal problems for which Dr. Kruse proposes definite and often bold solutions. Some of his recommendations may be very difficult of realization; others would require thorough study in the light of the experiences of various nations. But whatever one may think of the merit of individual proposals of the author, all of his ideas are the product of thorough analysis and high-minded, earnest purpose, and they should be neither ignored nor lightly treated by those who, in theory or in practice, are concerned with the advancement of human welfare.

EDGAR BODENHEIMER.

University of Utah.

Federal Administrative Law. BY RINEHART JOHN SWENSON. (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1952. Pp. v, 376. \$6.00.)

The ten subtitles of this book will themselves suggest to the reader that the author's "administrative law" is a subdivision of constitutional law rather than an aspect of administration. Thus, after a brief introductory chapter entitled

"From Laissez Faire to Bureaucracy" and a second chapter discussing "The Place of Administration in the Constitutional Trichotomy," the headings are as follows: "The Administrative Process," "Enforcement of Administrative Action," "The Rule of Law: The Doctrine of State Immunity," "The Rule of Law: The Liability of Public Officers," "Judicial Processing of Administrative Action," "Limitations of Judicial Control of the Administrative Process," "Government by Agency or Government by Lawsuit," "Congressional Supervision of the Federal Administrative Process."

This emphasis upon what the courts have said about the scope of permissible administrative discretion (to the exclusion of the rules made in the exercise of that discretion) is certainly unexceptionable—provided it is the result of a deliberate choice of perspective the significance of which is duly appreciated. It is Professor Swenson's failure to mention the alternative approach—indeed, his failure to come to grips with the problem of basic definition at all, which sets the distinctly non-philosophic tone of the work.

No doubt this may have been intentional. The author has done such an admirable job of documenting judicial commentary on all the subjects mentioned above that he is entitled to classify himself as a member of the "law and no nonsense" school of writers who consciously sacrifice imagination to industry in their pursuit of the legal muse. Nor is this simply to "praise with faint damns" since Professor Swenson's appraisal of judicial exegesis frequently betrays a lively sense of humor. For example, along with a nice appreciation of the ambiguities of separation of powers dialectic, he expresses a commendable impatience with the solemn nonsense of certain notable attempts to reconcile the inconsistencies of the doctrine. One might wish even here, however, for a little more historical perspective, for this might have suggested an explanation for the bankruptcy of doctrinaire separation of powers theory without smothering sympathy for the practical end the theory still serves. As a matter of fact, it is this sturdy unwillingness to probe below the level of what may be called the "administrative logic" of such formulations that is calculated to make a student of theory continually uneasy throughout the book.

To be sure, this does not purport to be a book on theory. Yet, in the case of one who has adopted the external, constitutional law approach to administration, it is not unreasonable to look for evidence of awareness of institutional patterns transcending the process of policy making and execution. But Professor Swenson is sometimes incorrigibly dogmatic. On page 234 he devotes a short paragraph to the underlying significance of judicial review, the burden of which is that "Judicial review of administrative action should not be regarded as a form of 'control' but rather as a step in an integrated process of common achievement, the administration of justice."

No one would, I think, begrudge Professor Swenson this comfortably monistic conclusion if he had come to it after assessing some of the traditional dichotomies of our constitutionalism and found them wanting; or, perhaps, if he had made it clear that he was discussing only *one* of the functions expected of courts under our system. As it is, however, one is left with the suspicion that the

author does not appreciate that some of the old dualism is still very much alive despite the formal coordination supplied by the modern legislative function.

And if this is the case it does much to explain the summary fashion in which he disposes of judicial remarks which do not fit into a monistic pattern. For example, Chief Justice Hughes is taken rather sharply to task for his disposition of *Norman v. Baltimore* and *Perry v. U. S.* Professor Swenson observes (p. 158) that Hughes' conception of a right without a remedy is "strange doctrine," and he reminds the Chief Justice that the immunity of the United States from suit is a "basic attribute of sovereignty" and not a matter of procedure as the latter described it.

Most students of constitutional law will, of course, agree that Hughes is somewhat less than convincing in the *Gold Clause* cases. But very few will find the notion of a right without a remedy by action utterly strange—even on purely analytical grounds. Moreover, a characterization of the immunity doctrine as a matter of procedure is at least as palatable as its attribution to the logic of sovereignty when we consider (a) that the former proposition is historically quite accurate, and (b) that it is the manipulation of sovereignty by the judges rather than the logic of sovereignty which helps to explain the contemporary posture of suits against the state. Thus, the logic of sovereignty can hardly explain why Congress is the sovereign for purposes of consenting to suit, but definitely *not* the sovereign for most other purposes. Professor Swenson might reflect that the availability of injunction to prevent the collection of federal taxes does not depend on the acquiescence of Congress—from which it may be inferred that the logic of sovereignty is not inexorable.

K. C. COLE.

University of Washington.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950. BY ROBERT K. CARR. (New York: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 489. \$6.50.)

Professor Carr's premise is that "a small, highly disciplined group of American Communists, cooperating closely with the international Communist conspiracy, can do grave damage to this country. But the damage they can do is not the subversion of the American people; it is the damage that criminals can do . . . espionage and sabotage." His conclusions are that: "On balance the good things that the Un-American Activities Committee has done are outweighed by the bad . . . the wisest policy to follow would be the complete abolition of the committee."

Even if he does not agree fully with either premises or conclusions or what lies between them, anyone who reads the book objectively will agree that the author has written it objectively. That alone is no easy task and no small accomplishment for any writer on this subject. After a brief chapter on the origins of the Committee, four long chapters evaluate its work in the 79th, 80th and 81st Congresses. Each major hearing and some reports are described. It is an excellent condensation, for it does not lose the flavor.

Two chapters on personnel and staff give thumbnail sketches of prominent

members of the Committee. The Congressmen are graded on both ability and deportment. In general they are rated a low C on ability (Mr. Nixon gets an A-). In deportment the failures are obvious. Most valuable in these chapters and in the one on investigations is a detailed account of the files, the organization, and the undramatic daily activities in the backroom that support the brief, frenetic, and sensational hearing days. In a chapter on the Committee's publications Professor Carr finds them gravely below acceptable standards.

The precise summary of the courts' treatment of cases arising out of the Committee's activities and of the constitutional issues involved is excellent. The author concludes that the courts have shown wisdom in leaving the Committee unfettered so far. Judicial restraint is in this matter considered sounder than judicial restraints.

A chapter on press coverage of the Committee, though not exhaustive, is thought-provoking. Even good newspapers with thoughtful editorials about the Committee, the author finds, tended to present confused, sensational, and superficial accounts of the Committee's doings in their news columns.

In all, this study of a highly important and highly controversial subject is, in its thorough exposition of the facts and in the calm and care which pervade its judgments, an example of scholarship at its best. Yet when this is said—and it should be said emphatically—something remains, if it can be said without seeming to tax the author with not writing a book he did not set out to write. There is, to this reviewer (who probably voices a minority opinion), a certain air of unreality about much of the scholarly discussion of the broader problem of loyalty and subversion with which this book is concerned.

Professor Carr's words all too probably will reach the ears of only a rather small group of people who will find in them confirmation of their own more casual conclusions. For them the book's very excellence may be its vice. For there are many others, apparently millions, who would not be convinced by his words even if they heard them. And why would they not? Because they feel, unlike the author, that there is a danger of "the subversion of the American people." Those who see no such danger face a great temptation: that is to regard the belief that such a danger exists as a great aberration, and to conclude that they can only denounce it or deplore it.

Instead, is it not the responsibility of social scientists, whatever the causes of these widespread fears of subversion may be, to explore them? Without adequate diagnosis, prescription is uncertain and prognosis unencouraging. But are we giving enough attention to the diagnosis? Perhaps Professor Cushman, the general editor of this series, will do so in his promised summary volume. Perhaps the recipients of the large grant from the Ford Foundation recently announced will do so. Someone should.

ROBERT A. HORN.

Stanford University.

Nature and Needs of Higher Education: The Report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 191. \$2.50.)

Who Should Go to College. BY BYRON S. HOLLINSHEAD WITH A CHAPTER BY ROBERT HAVIGHURST AND ROBERT R. RODGERS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 190. \$3.00.)

The Federal Government and Financing Higher Education. BY RICHARD G. AXT. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xiv; 295. \$4.00.)

Government Assistance to Universities in Great Britain: Memoranda Submitted to the Commission on Financing Higher Education. BY HAROLD W. DODDS, LOUIS M. HACKER AND LINDSAY ROGERS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 133. \$2.50.)

State Public Finance and State Institutions of Higher Education in the United States. BY H. K. ALLEN IN COLLABORATION WITH RICHARD G. AXT. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 196. \$3.00.)

Student Charges and Financing of Higher Education. BY RICHARD H. OSTHEIMER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1953.)

The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States. BY RICHARD HOFSTADTER AND D. DEWITT HARDY. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 254. \$3.00.)

A Statistical Analysis of the Organization of Higher Education in the United States, 1948-1949. BY RICHARD H. OSTHEIMER. (New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. xviii, 233.)

Financing Higher Education in the United States: The Staff Report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education. BY JOHN D. MILLETT. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xix, 503. \$5.00.)

All of us in the academic world are, of course, vitally aware of the problem of financing higher education. The problem of keeping afloat in the contemporary inflationary economy is equally difficult for the administrator who has to meet an academic payroll and for the professor who has to meet a family payroll. Accordingly the thoughts on this problem of a study commission sponsored by the Association of American Universities and including some leading industrialists and educators are very welcome. The report is doubly welcome because the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundation grants made it possible to produce a number of interesting supporting monographs. We political scientists can be pleased that one of our number, John D. Millett, served as executive director of the Commission and has himself written the most substantial volume.

In some ways the report of the Commission is less fruitful than the supporting monographs. This is probably because of the difficulty of dealing with the problems of American higher education in a 200 page report. As the Commission itself remarks, our higher education is easily the most diverse in the world. Fruitful generalizations about it thus become very difficult to make. Nevertheless, the report of the Commission contains some food for thought. It begins with an excellent review of higher education in the United States which is, of

course, familiar material to most of us academic folk but may be very valuable to persons outside the higher educational system. It may be news even to professors that "one-fifth of all American youth goes to college." This is proportionately five times as many as in England, six or seven times as many as in Germany, and ten times as many as in France.

The Commission also illustrates the diversity of American education with some statistics which may be new to some professors. Slightly over half of our 2,250,000 students in 1948-1949 were enrolled in universities. Slightly less than one-quarter were in liberal arts colleges. The balance was split between professional schools and junior colleges. The report also indicates that these 2,250,000 are not enough. It takes the figures of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training which indicate that only about one-half of the young persons who rank high in terms of intellectual promise (as measured by intelligence tests) actually go to college. In fact one-fifth of the top 500,000 young people in these terms never finish high school.

The reviewer has some doubts as to the validity of this analysis. It has been his observation, both in the competition of college and subsequent careers, that intelligence as measured by standardized tests is far from being the major criterion of an individual's worth. He wonders if the addition to our colleges of 200,000 or 300,000 bright young people who do not really want to go to college would improve our academic standards or the leadership of the nation. Clearly, the point is disputable. It seems unfortunate, however, that the Commission did not, in its report, refer to the qualification introduced by Mr. Hollinshead in his book published for the Commission that an inquiry made by Mr. Roper for the American Council on Education shows that one-third of the high school graduates of top intelligence who did not go to college would not wish to go even if they were given generous scholarships. The reviewer's argument is not with the assumption of the Commission that more people should go to college. Certainly, American industry is able to absorb even more college graduates than we are now producing. The reviewer's only question is whether brightness as measured by intelligence tests is the real criterion for selecting college-worthy students.

The Commission next addresses itself to the economic problems of higher education. The major difficulties which higher education has encountered are, of course, familiar to most of us. They include: (1) inflation, which has reduced the purchasing power of the educational dollar; (2) expansion of educational services demanded by the increased complexity of our knowledge; (3) fluctuation of student enrollments caused by changes in military demands; (4) needs for enlarged and modernized capital plant; and (5) uncertain sources of income.

The first point is illustrated by a problem which is all too familiar to most of us. Faculty salaries rose from 40% to 60% in a period when the consumers price index went up over 80%. Private colleges have been especially unable to meet this rise in living costs. In its discussion of the expanded services rendered by colleges and universities, the Commission pays particular attention to expanded research, especially governmental research. It concludes that uni-

versities should be careful about taking on such projects and that sponsoring agencies should pay the full costs of the projects and be more flexible in their policies. In its discussion of the problem of fluctuating enrollment, the major conclusion of the Commission is the need for a national manpower policy so that the waves of students going through colleges and universities can be evened out.

In discussing the need for enlarged plant, the Commission pays especial attention to medical education and to the general problem of handling medical schools. The major conclusion is, of course, the necessity of increased income. The same conclusion is also reached in the discussion of the plight of the liberal arts colleges. The latter are criticized on the score of the extravagance of their curriculum. The comment of the reviewer as administrator of a liberal arts college is that these criticisms are not sufficiently far-reaching. Our liberal arts colleges have not only made the mistake of trying to imitate universities in the extension of their program, but they have also tried to take on more students than their endowment would justify.

The Commission then turns its attention to the sources of support of higher education. It notes the greatly increased importance of tuition, which in 1950 represented 47% of private university income, 72% of liberal arts college income, and 46% of separate professional school income. The proportion of income of public institutions from tuition has also risen substantially—from 22% in 1930 to 31% in 1950. The Commission notes that large private universities in urban centers frequently compete successfully with state universities because their high tuition charge is balanced by the cost of room and board in state universities, which are usually located in towns more remote from centers of population. It does not go on to indicate the danger facing such large private universities as more and more state institutions are established in large urban areas. By and large the Commission does not seem to feel that tuition has risen more than the ability of families to pay. It does note, however, that high tuition fees are damaging to families like those of clergymen and teachers.

The Commission places well-merited stress on endowment. This is a desirable point which many colleges have been somewhat overlooking in the rush for annual giving and concern about lower rates of endowment income. The Commission quite properly notes that the record of security and of return on endowment funds held by colleges and universities, both private and state supported, has been so excellent over the past century that the faith of earlier donors on endowment has been justified. This reviewer would like to add to the Commission's encomiums on endowment the additional point that private colleges and universities would, in most cases, be much better off if they had not let the size of their student body run ahead of their endowment. Colleges can no more afford to run ahead of their endowments than generals can afford to run ahead of their troops.

In its discussion of state governmental support, the Commission notes that heavy demands for welfare services are now assailing the states. This conclusion

could have been supported by an interesting point to be found in one of its own subsidiary reports: that the percentage of state income going to higher education is much less now than it was two decades ago. The Commission considers the possibility of state aid to students in either public or private institutions but waters down its recommendation by saying: "obviously no such program should be set up in competition with the direct operating needs of state institutions of higher education." It was somewhat disappointing to the reviewer to note that the Commission failed to recognize at this crucial point in its report the desirability of maintaining at least some strong private institutions in most of the states.

The Commission discusses federal aid to education carefully and states its belief that present federally supported research programs have been very useful. It concludes, however, that it would be unwise to have the federal government moving further into the support of our higher education, justifying its position on the danger of the location of too much power in the federal government and the uniformity and mediocrity which would result from direct federal control. This conclusion is partially supported by indirect evidence from a study on higher education from Great Britain. Political scientists can applaud the Commission's careful consideration of this important problem.

The Commission also recommends the strengthening and continuation of giving by alumni and of corporate support, which it illustrates with several examples. It also speaks of church support and labor union support. Perhaps the strongest comment it makes is with regard to American foundations which now may run as high as three thousand in number with total assets of several billion dollars. The Commission quite properly notes with regret that foundations have practically eliminated liberal arts colleges from their support and tend to make their grants to universities only for temporary projects. If foundations would give some of their support on a matching basis to colleges for endowment, they would perform a much more useful function for the preservation of the essentials of liberal education in America than they are now performing with their miscellaneous research grants.

One of the more interesting of the several supporting volumes discusses potential college student bodies. *Who Should Go To College* documents with figures the fact that colleges attract only two-fifths of the top 25% of young people, measured in terms of intelligence tests. Mr. Hollinshead notes the irrational factors on which students go to college. He cites a rough estimate that "half of the present student body of the average college is in that particular college because of influence of relatives or friends of its constituency." He casts some doubt on the financial difficulties of going to college, noting not only the Roper inquiry referred to above, but also the fact that student enrollment increased steadily during depression years. He concludes that perhaps half of those in the top quarter in intelligence who do not go to college would go if they were financed. He guesses an average need of \$500 per student for financing and thus estimates that a sum of around \$226,000,000 would enable those of the able group who might be persuaded to go to college to do so. He comments that

this cost would be equal to that of only one and a half days of the cold war. However, he has nothing to say on the all-important problem of whether all of these young folks who could be induced to go to college would study after they got there.

In discussing the implications of the suggestion of student subsidy, Hollinshead notes quite reasonably that college policy in scholarships is frequently one of competing for "the glamorous youngsters" and not looking beneath the surface for unnoticed talents. He advocates a national scholarship program administered through the U. S. Office of Education and committees established by regional associations. This thought is based on the, to the reviewer, naive assumption that the government could make such grants without maintaining control.

An interesting chapter by Havighurst and Rodgers of the University of Chicago discusses motivations for "superior" youth who do not go to college. The conclusion is that improved guidance procedures, community scholarship associations, and better motivating procedures on college campuses would be helpful.

Richard G. Axt's careful study of the role of the federal government in financing higher education begins by commenting that federal aid is like higher education in America: i.e., large and diverse. It is noted that federal activities in higher education are all peripheral to higher education itself. The federal government uses higher educational institutions for its own purposes. The writer generalizes, probably correctly, that if and when government control of higher education comes in the United States, it is more likely to come from state governments than the federal government. A review of the Morrill Act notes that it, along with the Dartmouth College case, gave great impetus to state educational institutions. The results of the Morrill Act are fully and thoughtfully outlined. It is interesting to learn that the Second Morrill Bill was for a time combined with thoughts of federal aid to public school systems. Of course, the Second Morrill Act of 1890 as finally passed had great influence on the subjects taught in land grant institutions.

In discussing federal research, Axt points out that almost all of it has been concentrated in a few large universities. The Atomic Energy Commission's research has been more or less in pure science. The Army and Air Force research seems, by general agreement of university administrators, to be most closely supervised and hence the most difficult to handle. An interesting point is made that there is far more federal research outside of universities than in universities. It is hoped that the National Science Foundation can develop better procedures for research control.

Axt also has a lengthy and careful study of the G. I. Bill of Rights, including the double payment made to land grant institutions in some cases. In discussing grants made for medical research by the Public Health Service, he notes a few cases in which private foundation grants have ceased because of the federal program. Medical schools have favored a bill for direct federal aid, but Axt does not think this is likely to be enacted. He makes a careful review of the

Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education. In discussing the federal scholarship program proposed by the Truman Administration, he favors the double stipend for tuition and for room and board in an effort to help support private education. He comes to a general conclusion that the federal government could aid private education by modifying its existing programs with the needs of educational institutions in mind. By and large, Axt's volume is most thoughtful and informed.

The brief study entitled *Government Assistance to Universities in Great Britain* gives much interesting data on British higher education. The conclusion is that the British have tried very hard in administering their grants to keep from controlling universities unduly. Nevertheless there are still some apprehensions in Great Britain, and American students of the British system are careful to point out that the degree of independence in England might not be duplicated in the United States since conditions here are very different. Thus, in a way, the conclusions of both the Axt volume and the Dodds-Hacker-Rogers volume point against reliance on federal aid for pulling higher education out of its difficulties.

State Public Finance and State Institutions of Higher Education in the United States is good reading for professors in state universities. It gives the interesting information that the percentage of state budgets going to higher education shrank from 10% in 1915 to 4% in 1949. This is, of course, a natural result of the greatly increased state expenditure for social welfare and other purposes. The study brings up to date a great deal of information on state expenditures and income. It arrives at the conclusion that state financial problems are likely to remain pressing for some time to come but that "if the public institutions demonstrate with skill and energy their real service to the people of the states, the states will respond to their needs."

Richard H. Ostheimer's *Student Charges and Financing of Higher Education* is written on a statistical basis which makes heavy reading, but the subject is thoughtfully handled. One interesting estimate is that four-fifths of the G. I.'s would have gone to college without the G. I. Bill of Rights. The author, at times, slips into the fallacy that increasing student enrollment improves services to students, forgetting the effect of endowment subsidy. He concludes that enrollment does drop slightly with fee increases but that, by and large, enrollment is also proportioned to income and to the education of the population surrounding the institution. There is some association of enrollment and fee increases by the types of institutions. This volume, when published, will deserve very careful analysis by the institutions which are contemplating fee increases.

The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States is an interesting historical and philosophical review which merits careful reading by all of us. The reviewer found the historical section most interesting. It deals more largely with universities than colleges but does pay some attention to the whole of higher education. It does not bear any particular relationship to the financial problems which are the major study by the Commission except

•

as it assesses the value of the product of higher education. One can be certain that the material in it will be cited and quoted in many articles in the bulletins of the American Association of University Professors and the American Association of Colleges.

A Statistical Analysis of the Organization of Higher Education in the United States, 1948-1949 contains much information of value to those studying educational finance.

The most elaborate supporting volume is John D. Millett's *Financing Higher Education in the United States: The Staff Report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education*. It includes re-studies of most of the problems reviewed in the other specific studies, much material which is not covered in the other studies, and Millett's point of view on both groups of problems. In some ways, it is the most valuable volume of the series. Millett likes to speak *ex-cathedra* and while he makes some mistakes, he makes many more penetrating and thoughtful comments. One proposal with which liberal arts college administrations will almost universally disagree is that of increasing the student-faculty ratio to 18-1. This might work in the eastern states which do not have strong public institutions, but in the west and mid-west, a lower student-faculty ratio is essential to survival of liberal arts colleges. Millett throws out some interesting comments on the need for academic responsibility as a correlation to academic freedom. He recognizes that faculty salaries need to rise at least 30% to catch up with inflation. At another point he notes that athletics is not a revenue yielder except for three or four private universities. He notes that endowment income is really important for only a few educational institutions but that income from endowment has not fallen as much as is generally thought. He notes that gifts are increasing but not as fast as inflation. In general, he thinks that increases in tuition will not decrease enrollment but that colleges should learn more of the sociology of their student bodies before making increases.

GEORGE C. S. BENSON.

Claremont Men's College.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G. A. R.
 BY MARY R. DEARING. (Baton Rouge:
 Louisiana State University Press. 1952. Pp.
 x, 523. \$8.00.)

"OPA has a deep sense of responsibility toward returned servicemen." These words of Administrator Chester Bowles, as he inaugurated a broad program to assist World War II veterans wishing to enter business, characterized the solicitous attitude of federal agencies months before the war's end. This and the elaborate benefits provided by Congress to aid the ex-GI, under the ever watchful lobbies of the Legion, AMVETS, and other veterans' organizations, contrast markedly with federal policy toward Union soldiers immediately after the Civil War. The Congress did appropriate money to pension war widows, orphans, and the wounded. But neither the federal government nor states made provision even for hospitals for the disabled veteran.

When the economy failed to absorb ex-Union soldiers, veterans' societies sprouted up to seek political remedies. Meanwhile Republicans and Democrats did not overlook the veterans' vote. A Republican party split between conservatives and Radicals in Illinois in 1866 was responsible for producing the G. A. R. The Radical founders needed the soldier vote to cement their control of the Republican party. As the G. A. R. became nationwide, the open alliance with Radical Republicans brought loud Democratic press attacks. To avert possible public ill will, the G. A. R. donned a mask of nonpartisanship. Behind this mask, the organization remained a Republican ally until sectionalism was valueless as political capital. Membership and fortunes fluctuated, but at the height of its power it boasted over 425,000 veterans, and it jammed what amounted to a service pension bill through the Congress. The G. A. R.'s self-defined nonpartisanship policy, women's auxiliaries, and patriotic programs became the pattern for twentieth-century veterans' groups.

Mrs. Dearing's monograph narrates chronologically the leadership, activities, and political incidents involving the G. A. R.: the metamorphosis from party adjunct to powerful pressure group; its machinations in presiden-

tial nominations, election campaigns, and before Congress. The book is a meticulous study based upon exhaustive investigation into manuscript collections, newspapers, and G. A. R. records. It affords much information about the anatomy of this nineteenth-century interest group. But one can only regret that the author rather breathlessly heaps fact upon fact with almost no perspective or interpretation.—VICTORIA SCHUCK, *Mount Holyoke College*.

Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 BY HAROLD F. GOSNELL. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. viii, 235. \$3.50.)

It is entirely plausible that no American political leader will ever receive so much notice as Franklin D. Roosevelt. The volume of comment on his life and works is already beginning to rival that on Lincoln and Jefferson and has probably surpassed that on Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. This book by Professor Gosnell deserves a high place in Roosevelt literature. Persons familiar with Gosnell's previous work may be surprised at the sober academician's frank admiration for the jovial practitioner of politics. The book reflects Gosnell's scholarly objectivity, as well as his earnest desire to acclaim that which he considers true and noble and of good report.

Though fully aware of the attempts made during the past quarter-century to subject leaders to psychoanalytical scrutiny, Gosnell chooses to strive for an understanding of his subject by appraising his early environment, his associations, his traits, and his techniques in chronological order and in a moderate, commonsense manner. There is in this book none of the incisive, iconoclastic and inspired criticism which Edmund Wilson has recently accorded Lincoln and Laski. This is an orthodox book, sympathetic toward its subject and permeated by a spirit of love of democracy, love of country, and respect for the simple truth.

When Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, at the age of sixty-three, he was mourned by millions the world over. What manner of man was this whose passing evoked such strong

emotion? And who, also, during his life, was so cordially detested and reviled by his enemies (a fact Gosnell overlooks or dismisses as of little importance)?

Born into a family of moderate wealth, a family which mingled on easy terms with the aristocracy of the Hudson Valley, the titled nobility of Europe, and the leading figures of the professional, financial and official worlds of New York, Boston and Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt never stood in awe of any one. Only vaguely aware of his own financial and social advantages as obligations of superior force requiring him to devote himself to the interests of "his people," Roosevelt brought to public life a dauntless spirit, a proud devotion to America and its democratic institutions, a sublime self-confidence and poise.

Well-known is the love lavished upon him by his mother. It was a relationship which in other circumstances might have had untoward effects. The young boy might have developed a feeling of hostility toward his father. But, as Gosnell observes, James Roosevelt was fifty-three years old at the time of Franklin's birth, twenty-five years his wife's senior. In his harmonious, serene and secure household, James' position was like that of a benevolent grandfather, a model of rectitude, a wise patriarch and friend.

In this patrician yet deeply religious home, young Roosevelt grew to manhood. He went to the right schools, Groton and Harvard and Columbia. He entered the practice of law. He married, at twenty, a distant cousin, the magnificent Eleanor Roosevelt, who after a rather sad childhood, gradually acquired those qualities which were to make her an ideal wife and companion, later a prudent and indefatigable political helpmate to her husband, and finally, one of the great ladies of the world.

Gosnell gives due credit to each of these women, mother and wife, as forces in the shaping of his subject's character, as preceptors, protectors and confidantes. He gives proper credit also to Louis Howe, the wizened little journalist, who was Roosevelt's chief tactical advisor until his death. Proper and moderate credit is also given Wilson, Daniels, Smith, Farley, Flynn, the "Brains Trust," Hopkins, Sherwood and Rosenman. Omitted from the record are some persons whose influence or help must have been great; unduly emphasized is the role of others. There is always a tendency to assign to those who reminisce most volubly or extensively a disproportionately large sig-

nificance. Nevertheless, the author makes it clear that Roosevelt never subordinated his judgment to that of others. Even as Daniels' assistant, he made most of the decisions. As President, he surrounded himself with new men. "No person who had exercised authority higher than Roosevelt's in 1913-1920 got a cabinet post. The new cabinet was composed of Roosevelt men who had their reputations to establish." Although Gosnell is aware of this problem of interpersonal relationships, he is content to give it only passing reference. It is worthy of special study, how Roosevelt held the affection and support of the many able men he used and discarded or thrust into some far corner of his domain.

The reasons for Roosevelt's successes are said to be: Roosevelt's character and traits, on which there is quite general agreement; not "easy money," since he was frequently an advocate of economy; not the support of the urban machines, although he was a "realist" in his treatment of them; the fact that he was patient, and usually could afford to be patient; the fact that he regarded public office as an opportunity for public service; the fact that he included in his experience intense interest in the business of politics and voluminous correspondence and contact with men in all walks of life; great adroitness and skill in handling journalists and critics; wide knowledge and skill in manipulating the language symbols of America, drawn from the Bible and from the words and deeds of great political leaders of the past.

Although there were external factors which made possible victories in 1940 and 1944, the most significant of Roosevelt's accomplishments are that he won every New York campaign in which he entered wholeheartedly, and that after he and Howe had worked and planned to that end for twenty years, he won the presidency in 1932. Naturally, since this is a report on Roosevelt as a campaigner, this book casts no light on the problem of a declining Democratic presidential vote from 1936 to 1952, during a period when there was no corresponding deterioration in the popular vote for Democratic candidates for Congress. Students of history, politics and of the phenomenon of leadership will find this volume very useful. This is especially true of Gosnell's statements on controversial issues, which he has adequately documented.—ROR V. PEEL, *University of Utah*.

The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II. BY ELIOT JANESWAY. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 382. Chronicles of America, Vol. 53, \$2.50; trade ed. \$5.00.)

This is an exasperating book addressed to an important topic, the ability of our people to discipline themselves in unity of purpose and to marshal their strength to mount and sustain the home front effort required for the successful prosecution of war, if not for national survival. This account does not stress statistics of achievement, nor systematic exposition of the governmental machinery evolved, nor the industrial or governmental techniques devised. Instead the author concentrates on the political story, largely in terms of the personalities involved. His opening theme (marred by an obvious strain for the literary effects of chiasmus) is that Roosevelt put his faith of ultimate success more in the developing momentum of production than in expert management. Time, and the involvement of all the people, were the basic needs, rather than skilled administration; and Roosevelt spent his attention accordingly. Nevertheless, much of the story consists in lamenting that the suppressed report of the War Resources Board in 1939, credited to Baruch, was not put into effect, and in criticizing officials for administrative bungling. The author has his pets, e.g., Baruch, Forrestal, Eberstadt, Clay; and his pet hates, e.g., Nelson, Stettinius, Hopkins.

The author is a journalist who purports to give us the lowdown on maneuvers and feuds within the wartime administration, even to the point of interpreting the inner thoughts of his characters. In doing so he loses sight of his main theme and violates a first canon of scholarship, that the reader be given enough of the evidence to judge the reliability of the conclusions. It may be that a good deal of what he says is so; this is not the place for reappraisal of the events. But so many of his statements and characterizations are so positive and tendentious that I am strongly reminded of the judge who said he might be in error but he was never in doubt.—HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Ohio State University*.

TVA: Democracy on the March; Twentieth Anniversary Edition. BY DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 294. \$3.50.)

After revisiting and re-examining TVA, Lilienthal has revised his 1943 story and has

written a prefatory note summarizing his conclusions of 1953. He concludes that the principles described in the 1943 edition are "as sturdy and workable as ever," that standards of competence and integrity have been preserved in the agency, and that the TVA offers a pattern of decentralized, unified management which is applicable to other river basins in this and other countries.

Valley of Tomorrow: The TVA and Agriculture. BY NORMAN I. WENGERT. (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee. 1952. Pp. xv, 151. \$1.50.)

An analysis of TVA's agricultural program and of the varied administrative relationships involved in its development, with a critical evaluation of the agency's performance against the standard of regional resource development of which TVA is symbolic.

Political and Civil Rights in the United States. BY THOMAS I. EMERSON AND DAVID HABER. (Buffalo, New York: Dennis & Co. 1952. Pp. xx, 1209.)

Introduced in a foreword by Robert M. Hutchins as "the only comprehensive collection of cases and materials on the most important subject in the world today," this "casebook" includes the following topics: security of the person, fairness in governmental procedures, right of franchise, freedom of speech (3 chapters, 447 pages), academic freedom, freedom of religion, discrimination. It includes elaborate notes collecting the major legal and related materials. Designed primarily for law students and lawyers, it will be useful also to political scientists for reference and class use.

Basic American Documents. EDITED BY GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR, HENRY W. LITTLEFIELD, AND ARTHUR W. LITTLEFIELD. (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co. 1953. Pp. x, 365. \$1.50.)

American historical documents rated most significant by 277 teachers of American government and history are presented chronologically with brief introductory notes. The 53 documents with the highest ratings are in substantially complete form, and 57 others are summarized.

The Faith of Our Fathers: An Anthology of Americana, 1790-1860. EDITED BY IRVING

MARK AND EUGENE L. SCHWAAB. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xviii, 396. \$4.75.)

124 selections from writings, speeches, resolutions, and petitions of ordinary people and less renowned leaders to illustrate their aspirations for political, economic, and social betterment.

The New Dictionary of American History. BY MICHAEL MARTIN AND LEONARD GELBER. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. v, 695. \$10.00.)

Projected as a ready reference source of the subject matter of American history, this volume contains over 4,000 biographical and descriptive sketches, alphabetically arranged.

The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings. EDITED BY SAUL K. PADOVER. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. ix, 361. \$4.00.)

A well-selected and logically arranged collection of the principal writings of James Madison, including his contributions to *The Federalist Papers* and to the debates in the constitutional conventions, together with excerpts from other essays and speeches and from his correspondence, with an introduction by the editor.

The American Electoral College. BY ROGER LEA MACBRIDE. (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1953. Pp. 89. \$0.75.)

A very brief and rather superficial review of the history and operation of the electoral college and the problem of its reform.

William L. Wilson and Tariff Reform. BY FESTUS P. SUMMERS. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 288. \$5.00.)

A scholarly presentation of the political career and tariff-reform activities of a well-known politician of the Cleveland era.

His Lordship's Patronage: Offices of Profit in Colonial Maryland. BY DONNELL MACCLURE OWINGS. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society. 1953. Pp. xii, 214.)

A study of the "origins, growth, and final pattern" of the numerous offices of profit in colonial Maryland with an appended chronology and civil list.

•
Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West: 1865-

1896. BY HORACE SAMUEL MERRILL. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 300. \$4.50.)

A review of the close cooperation of big business and politics in the Middle West during the last third of the 19th century. The study is well-documented and interestingly written.

The Great American Parade. BY H. J. DUTELL. TRANSLATED BY FLETCHER PRATT. (New York: Twayne Publishers. 1953. Pp. 321. \$3.75.)

A foreigner's view of the social institutions, ideas, foibles and way of life of the American people, which purports to represent what all Europeans think of America.

Ideas and Issues in Public Administration: A Book of Readings. EDITED BY DWIGHT WALDO. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1953. Pp. x, 462. \$5.50.)

A well-selected group of thought-provoking readings with pungent, lively introductory notes by the editor.

Reader in Public Opinion and Communication: Enlarged Edition. EDITED BY BERNARD BERELSON AND MORRIS JANOWITZ. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 611. \$5.50.)

This compilation of readings in public opinion, originally published in 1950, has been enlarged by the addition of a section on "Methods in Public Opinion Research."

Business and Government. BY MARSHALL EDWARD DIMOCK. (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1953. Pp. xvi, 799. \$6.50.)

This revision of a college text first published in 1949 includes a new chapter on "The Cold War Economy" and makes some rearrangement of chapters and materials to provide "better integration throughout."

Government and the American Economy, 1870—Present: Select Problems in Historical Interpretation. BY THOMAS G. MANNING AND DAVID M. POTTER WITH THE COLLABORATION OF WALLACE E. DAVIES. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1950. Pp. xvi, 464.)

Documentary materials grouped around selected topics, and accompanied by editorial explanation. In some cases, such as OPA and

agriculture under the New Deal, the topics are recent, while in others, such as railroads and antitrust, the analysis is not brought up to date. The purpose is, however, to illustrate the historical process. Paper bound, small print.

Free Enterprise and Economic Organization: Legal and Related Materials. By LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ. (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press. 1952. Pp. xx, 1215.)

A casebook, designed primarily for law students, which includes materials on antitrust and on controls over price by government or under its sanction.

Government's Role in Economic Life. By GEORGE A. STEINER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1953. Pp. xi, 440. \$6.00.)

A college text written by an economist but dealing as much with political, legal, and administrative aspects of government's role as with economic aspects. It provides an overall analysis of forces, goals, and means, and an extended analysis of public policy in the depression of the 1930's and the national-security crisis of the 1940's, but does not summarize, as do most texts, particular lines of government policy relating to agriculture, labor, and business.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Gordon, Emanuel L. Loss of Citizenship by Continuous Residence Abroad. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1953.

Hambro, Lois H. Denaturalization under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. *Michigan Law Review*. April, 1953.

Hansen, Orval. The Federal Lobbying Act: A Reconsideration. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1953.

Hobbs, Edward H. Executive Reorganization in the National Government. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Mississippi. 1953.

Jackson, Robert H. A Presidential Legal Opinion. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1953.

Nelson, Delmas H. The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr. The Vice Presidency. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1953.

State Government

Annual Legislative Sessions. Kansas Legislative Council. 1953.

Kammerer, Gladys M. Advisory Committees in the Legislative Process. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Lee Eugene C. State Equalization of Local Assessments. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Rothenberg, Leon. State Budgets—1953. *State Government*. May, 1953.

Stanford, Edward F. Coordination of State Safety Programs. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Toll Roads and Toll Authorities. *State Government*. June, 1953.

Local Government

Haar, Charles M. Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case. *Harvard Law Review*. April, 1953.

Isakoff, Jack F., and Gilbert Y. Steiner. Illinois Municipal Revenue. Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois. 1953.

Kennedy, Harold W., and Arvo Van Alstyne. Convention Expenses of Local Government Officials. *Western City*. April, 1953.

Modern Management for the City of New York, Vol. I. Report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey. 1953.

Scott, Stanley, Joseph D. Lubin, and Robert J. McNeill. Public Services in Unincorporated Communities. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Vogel, Joshua H., and Ernest H. Campbell. Municipal Regulation of Traffic View Obstructions. Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington. 1953.

Willmott, John F. How To Install a Budget System. *Public Management*. April, 1953.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Allen, Francis A. Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March-April, 1953.

Bilger, Donald E. Contumacy before the Legislature. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1953.

Bischoff, Ralph F. Minority Rights and Majority Rule. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1953.

Blumrosen, Alfred W. Equal Protection—Validity of State Restraints on Alien Ownership of Land. *Michigan Law Review*. May, 1953.

Civil Rights in the United States, 1952: A Balance Sheet of Group Relations. American Jewish Congress and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 1953.

Clark, Homer. The Supreme Court and the Amending Process. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1953.

Constitutional Restraints on the Expulsion and Exclusion of Aliens. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1953.

The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1953.

Ernst, Morris L., and Arthur Joel Katz. Speech: Public and Private. *Columbia Law Review*. May, 1953.

Gardner, George K. Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States. *Boston University Law Review*. April, 1953.

Hart, Henry M., Jr. The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1953.

Hough, Richard Lee. The Jehovah's Witnesses Cases in Retrospect. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.

Indritz, Phineas. Racial Ramparts in the Nation's Capital. *Georgetown Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Morley, Felix. Treaty Law and the Constitution: A Study of the Bricker Amendment. American Enterprise Association. 1953.

Murray, John M. The Privilege against Self-Incrimination versus Immunity: Proposed Statutes. *Georgetown Law Journal*. May, 1953.

The Privilege against Self Incrimination: Does It Exist in the Police Station? *Stanford Law Review*. April, 1953.

The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts. *Harvard Law Review*. May, 1953.

Schubert, Glendon A., Jr. The Steel Case: Presidential Responsibility and Judicial Irresponsibility. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.

Smith, James Barclay. The Privilege of Silence and the Legislative Process. *Georgetown Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Smith, James Morton. The Aurora and the Alien and Sedition Laws. Part II. *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*. April, 1953.

State Views on Economic Due Process: 1937-1953. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1953.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Kaplan, Benjamin, and Livingston Hall, eds. Judicial Administration and the Common Man. [Symposium.] *The Annals*. May, 1953.

King, Rufus G. The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick. *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1953.

Lyon, Charles S. The Crime of Income Tax Fraud: Its Present Status and Function. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1953.

Narcotics Regulation. *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1953.

Rice, Ralph S. Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance. *Michigan Law Review*. May, 1953.

Schaeffer, Wendell G. Management in the Judiciary. *Public Administration Review*. Spring, 1953.

Vanderbilt, Arthur T. The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March-April, 1953.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Cozad, Lyman H. Research in Smaller Personnel Agencies. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1953.

Etheridge, Fletcher H. Appeals from Administrative Decisions in Government Contract Disputes. *Texas Law Review*. May, 1953.

Flemming, Arthur S. The Civil Servant in a Period of Transition. *Public Administration Review*. Spring, 1953.

Fuchs, Ralph F. Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana: II. *Indiana Law Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Gange, John. The Secretariat Function: A Staff Aid for Executive Management. Public Administration Clearing House. 1953.

Heckman, Jerome H. Our Immigration Laws, A Continuing Affront to the Administra-

tive Procedure Act. *Georgetown Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Pffinner, John M. Research in Organization Effectiveness. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1953.

Schwartz, Bernard. A Decade of Administrative Law: 1942-1951. *Michigan Law Review*. April, 1953.

———. Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants. *Georgetown Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Bone, Hugh A., ed. The 1952 Elections in the Eleven Western States. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.

DeSantis, Vincent P. The Presidential Election of 1952. *Review of Politics*. April, 1953.

Gable, Richard W. NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death? *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Hayes, Isabella Mallory. Financing Presidential Campaigns: A Selected Bibliography of 1952 Literature. Library, University of Maryland. 1953.

Kobre, Sidney. How Florida Dailies Handled the 1952 Presidential Campaign. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Lieberman, J. Ben. Restating the Concept of Freedom of the Press. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Prosser, William L. Interstate Publication. *Michigan Law Review*. May, 1953.

Snyder, Earl A. Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates. *Virginia Law Review*. April, 1953.

Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds. *Harvard Law Review*. May, 1953.

Turner, Julius. Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Union Political Expenditures under Taft-Hartley Section 304. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March-April, 1953.

Waterbury, Lester E. Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Our Water Resources. Tax Foundation. 1953.

Business and Labor

Bernstein, Irving, and Hugh G. Lovell. Are

Coal Strikes National Emergencies? *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. April, 1953.

Billyou, De Forest. Railroad Reorganization under Section 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act. *Virginia Law Review*. May, 1953.

Cary, William L. Government Financing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of the Glenn L. Martin Company. *Harvard Law Review*. March, 1953.

Faragher, Robert V., and Fritz F. Heimann. Price Stabilization during a Period of Cold War. *California Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

The Federal Employers' Liability Act, Part 1. [Symposium.] *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Spring, 1953.

Federal Jurisdiction over Unfair Competition. *Minnesota Law Review*. March, 1953.

Financing Unemployment Compensation. Tax Foundation. 1953.

Gregory, Charles O. Unprotected Activity and the NLRA. *Virginia Law Review*. May, 1953.

Hamann, H. F. The New Patent Act and the Presumption of Validity. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1953.

Hays, Robert C. The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn—Against the Employer. *California Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

Kahn, Mark L. Wage Determination for Airline Pilots. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. April, 1953.

Kleiler, Frank M. Presidential Seizures in Labor Disputes. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1953.

———. White House Intervention in Labor Disputes. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Lakusta, Boris H. Regulation of Truckers for Hire in California. *California Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

Leland, Wilfred C., Jr. "We Believe in Employment on Merit, But . . ." *Minnesota Law Review*. March, 1953.

Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to Discharge Suspected Subversives. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Morton, Davis W., Jr., and Albert H. Cotton. Robinson-Patman Act—Anti-Trust or Anti-Consumer? *Minnesota Law Review*. March, 1953.

Netterville, Victor S. Local Service Airlines: Trunkline Suspensions in Aid of the Local

Service Experiment. *Southern California Law Review*. April, 1953.

Price Control: Prospect and Retrospect. [Symposium.] *Iowa Law Review*. Winter, 1953.

Priest, A. J. G. What Should Commissions Regulating Public Utilities Do About Accelerated Tax Amortization? *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1953.

The Requirement of "Concerted" Action under NLRA. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1953.

Rich, Giles S. Infringement under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1953.

Shay, Robert Paul. Regulation W: Experiment in Credit Control. University of Maine Studies. 1953.

Slichter, Sumner H. Revision of the Taft-Hartley Act. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May, 1953.

Somers, Herman M. and Anne R. Industrial Safety and Health in the United States. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1953.

Tower, Charles H. Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Act: Some Suggestions for Amendment. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1953.

Trade Rules and Trade Conferences: The FTC and Business Attack Deceptive Practices, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust Violations. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Williams, C. Dickerman. Transportation Regulation and the Department of Commerce. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Hayman, Donald B. Social Security and State and Local Retirement in North Carolina. Institute of Government, University of North Carolina. 1953.

Military Affairs and National Security

Cuneo, Gilbert A. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal? *American Bar Association Journal*. May, 1953.

Feld, Benjamin. The Court-Martial Sentence: Fair or Foul? *Virginia Law Review*. April, 1953.

Lawrence, James F. Trial of Civilians by Military Tribunals under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. *George Washington Law Review*. June, 1953.

Perkins, James A. Administration of the Na-

tional Security Program. *Public Administration Review*. Spring, 1953.

Reddick, L. D. The Negro Policy of the American Army since World War II. *Journal of Negro History*. April, 1953.

The Reserves of the Armed Forces: A Historical Symposium. *Military Affairs*. Spring, 1953.

Tomkins, Dorothy C. Civil Defense in the States; a Bibliography. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. Agricultural Credit. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Conservation and Watershed Programs. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Dairy Industry. Hearings before Special Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Farm Credit Act of 1953. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Housing Amendments of 1953. Hearings. Also House Report No. 653. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Rent Control, 1953. Hearings. Also Housing and Rent Act of 1953. House Report No. 275. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Limitation of Federal Expenditures. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953 (Department of Agriculture). Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (Department of Defense). Hearings. Also, Disapproving Reorganization Plan No.

6. House Report No. 652. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Statehood for Alaska. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 675. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Flammable Fabrics Act. Hearings. Also House Report No. 425. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles Area. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Investigation of Communist Activities in the New York City Area. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Customs Simplification. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Unemployment Insurance. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Message from the President. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953. House Doc. No. 102. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953. House Doc. No. 111. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953. House Doc. No. 120. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, Providing for Reorganizations in the Department of Justice. House Doc. No. 130. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1953, Relating to the Export-Import Bank of Washington. House Doc. No. 135. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, Relating to the Department of Defense. House Doc. No. 136. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

House and Senate. Committees on the Judiciary. Federal Construction Contract Act. Joint Hearing before Subcommittees. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committees on Public Works. Niagara Power Development. Joint Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Farm Credit Act of 1953. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services.

Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Differential Pays for the Armed Services of the United States. Report of the Strauss Commission on Incentive-Hazardous Duty and Special Pays. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Government Lending Agencies. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Housing Act Amendments of 1953. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 455. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Finance. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953. Statements submitted to Committee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Adequacy of United States Laws with Respect to Offenses against National Security. Legal Analysis by Library of Congress. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Amending the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to Provide for More Effective Evaluation of the Fiscal Requirements of the Executive Agencies. Senate Report No. 295. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Creation of Commissions to Study Federal Reorganizations, and Federal-State Relations. Hearing. Also Senate Reports Nos. 215 and 216. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953. Hearings before Subcommittee on Reorganization. Also Senate Report No. 297. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Outer Continental Shelf. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 411. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Submerged Lands. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Broadcasting and Televising Baseball Games. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Survey of Organization and Operations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Report by Wolf Management Engineering Co. Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Additional Circuit and District Judges. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 224. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Amending the Constitution Relative to the Taking of Private Property. Hearing before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Court of Claims as a Constitutional Court. Hearing before a Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Immunity of Witnesses Appearing before Congressional Committees. Senate Report No. 153. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Rules of Practice and Procedure before Federal Agencies. Hearing before a Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Salaries of Members of Congress, Federal Judges, and United States Attorneys. Hearing before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 262. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Subversive Influence in the Educational Process. Hearings before Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Taft-Hartley Act Revisions. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Administration of the Classification Act of 1949 and the Compensation Process Established by the Act. Senate Doc. No. 34. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Analysis of the Whitten Amendment. Senate Doc. No. 35. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Appeals and Grievance Pro-

cedures in the Federal Government. Senate Doc. No. 33. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Effect of Personnel Office Staffing Ratios on Manpower Utilization. Senate Doc. No. 23. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Improving the Federal Administrative Management Program. Senate Doc. No. 36. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Manpower Utilization by the Federal Government through the Use of Private Contract Labor. Senate Doc. No. 32. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Military Personnel in Civilian Occupations. Senate Doc. No. 30. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Personnel Investigations of Employees and Applicants for Employment in the Executive Branch of the Government for Loyalty, Suitability, and Security. Senate Doc. No. 29. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.

———. Personnel Recruitment and Employment Practices in the Federal Government. Senate Doc. No. 37. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Training and Education in the Federal Government. Senate Doc. No. 31. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business and Defense Subcontracts. Senate Report No. 206. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Subversive Activities Control Board. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, vs. Communist Party of the United States of America. Senate Doc. No. 41. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Other Federal

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Governments Division. Governments in the United States in 1952. 1953.

Judicial Conference of the United States. Reports of Proceedings of Special Sessions, March 26-27 and May 8, 1953. 1953.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Nationalization in Practice: The British Coal Industry. BY WILLIAM WARREN HAYNES. (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. 1953. Pp. xviii, 413. \$4.00.)

In a complete analysis of nationalization in the British coal industry, the author treats two aspects that are of special interest to the politi-

cal scientist. The first is what happens when a major industry is taken over for government operation. The author finds the answer to be neither the Utopia the socialists have been seeking, nor the release of a destructive revolutionary force that the conservatives feared. In fact what happens is what one might expect to happen when a new organization sets about

to deal with an old and difficult problem: disappointment and apathy at the bottom, frustration at intermediate levels, turmoil and indecision at the top. There is no magic in nationalization. The old problems of wages, output, managerial competence, accountability, pricing and new investment remain. The magic, if any, is in rationalization: large-scale management not unfamiliar in most large U. S. corporations. However, in the particular context of the British coal industry, it is hard to see how rationalization could have been obtained except by nationalization.

The second aspect of interest is the struggle with administrative measures (Chs. XII-XV). First, one notes a movement away from autonomy in the legislative provisions fixing the relations between the National Coal Board and the Parliament. Second, it is interesting that while the Coal Board was strongly functional in its original organization with each member except the Chairman and Deputy Chairman in charge of a department, changes arising out of experience have made the Board preponderantly nonfunctional. Third, since coal mining is an activity in which field operations are especially significant, it was inevitable that the problem of decentralization should demand early attention. With a functionally organized Board, it was natural that the "parallel vertical pipes of communication" with their centralizing effect should tend to dominate, causing confusion and undermining the colliery manager. Changes in organization made to remedy this situation have emphasized the command channel, thus adding evidence to support administrative theory that decentralization necessitates an integral responsibility at each area level.—ERWIN W. BARD, *Brooklyn College*.

Türkiyede Siyasî Partiler, 1859-1952 [Political Parties in Turkey, 1859-1952]. By Dr. TARIK Z. TUNAYA. (Istanbul: Dogan Kardeş Yayınları A. Ş. Basmevi. 1952. Pp. viii, 799.)

Dr. Tunaya, of Istanbul University Law School, has produced a closely printed volume of 758 pages listing formally 133 parties founded in Turkey since 1814, including thirty-five that have been established since 1923 and treating twelve as currently active. The body of the text contains a considerable volume of party constitutions and platforms.

Professor Tunaya concludes that the two parliamentary periods ending in 1918 and 1945

were characterized by such bitter interparty rivalry as to preclude a functional multiparty parliamentary system. In spite of the fact that most of the 133 parties catalogued were mere incipient gestures, he believes that the only satisfactory guarantee of personal liberty and political stability in Turkey is such a system of group formation—which he implies became viable in Turkey in 1945 with the end of ruthless Republican suppression of rival groups.

One might note that political party platforms exhibit a common thread of emphasis on the necessity for raising levels of living and production in Turkey.—EASTIN NELSON, *University of Texas*.

Comparative Political Institutions: A Study of Modern Democratic and Dictatorial Systems.

By DANIEL WIT. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1953. Pp. ix, 534. \$4.75.)

A broad-based effort to make the study of comparative government comparative by use of a "functional" approach. The author focuses on a given function or institutional process, adducing detail from a number of governmental systems. Ample, though necessarily inadequate, materials on particular governments, mainly those of the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and Western European countries, are interspersed. The emphasis is on cultural and ideological factors.

Documents on Fundamental Human Rights.

Pamphlets I, II, and III. COMPILED AND EDITED BY ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951, 1951, 1952. Pp. 277, 278-633 (with unpagged appendix), 634-998.)

Pamphlet I includes primarily American documents (charters, state constitutions, etc.) before 1791 but also six British documents and the French declaration of 1789; Pamphlet II includes cases and other documents on "Habeas Corpus and Freedom from Unlawful Detention" and suggestions for student papers on human rights; Pamphlet III deals with bills of attainder, *ex post facto* laws, freedom of debate in Congress, and human rights in recent foreign constitutions and United Nations documents.

Monarchism in the Weimar Republic. By

WALTER H. KAUFMANN. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 305. \$4.00.)

This is a careful study of the rise and fall of the monarchic movement in Weimar Germany from 1918 to 1933. After having set the stage

in a brief introductory chapter describing the political scene in Germany on the eve of World War I, the author breaks the period under review into two phases, using the abortive Kapp putsch of 1923 as the dividing line. He finds that during the first phase the monarchists were the core of a violent rightist opposition to the republican form of government while from 1923 to 1933 they became more moderate, accepted the Republic, but gradually became outflanked by the more radical National Socialists. The book is well-documented and is a valuable contribution to the vast and still growing literature on the life and death of the Weimar Republic.

Systematisches und alphabetisches Verzeichnis der Gemeinden der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Stand Januar 1953. BY STAATLICHE ZENTRALVERWALTUNG FÜR STATISTIK OF THE REGIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Zentralverlag. 1953. Pp. 91.)

The law of July 23, 1952, "über die weitere Demokratisierung des Aufbaus und der Arbeitsweise der staatlichen Organe in den Ländern" of the German Democratic Republic abolished the Länder and replaced them by 14 Bezirke. The "Verzeichnis" arranges the cities and towns by Bezirk and under each by Kreis. At the end is a map showing the Kreise.—J.B.C.

Landtags Handbuch. (2. Wahlperiode.) (Saarbrücken: Landtagsverwaltung. 1953. Loose-leaf, 20 sections, mainly mimeographed in foolscap folio format.)

The manual of the Saar parliament for the second electoral period, intended mainly for the use of the fifty members, includes not only the rules as drafted in 1951, the Constitution of December 15, 1947 as printed in the *Amtsblatt*, but also various basic laws such as those on the general administration of the Saar, the budget, control of accounts, the flag, the coat of arms, and the official seal. Ballots from the three election districts for the election of November 30, 1952, are included as well as the law and the regulations governing the election. The list of the Landtag members gives occupations and addresses. There is a grouping by parties, 29 representing the Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes, 17 the Sozial Demokratische Partei des Saarlandes, and 4 the Communist Party. There are three women members. The first session of the second elec-

toral period was held on December 15, 1952.—J.B.C.

Handbuch des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin. 1. Wahlperiode (ab. 11. Januar 1951). (Berlin: Hrsg. vom Büro des Abgeordnetenhauses. 1952. Pp. 219.)

Under the Constitution of September 1, 1950, drawn up by the Stadtverordnetenversammlung, the city of Berlin (western sector) became a "Land" of the Bundesrepublik. The handbook of the first Berlin Parliament includes not only the 1950 Berlin Constitution but also the Federal Constitution, the rules of the parliament, the electoral law, the results of the election of December 3, 1950, brief biographies of the two hundred members, and various other pertinent information. The debates of the parliament beginning with the first meeting on January 11, 1951, are published from day to day under the title *Stenographischer Bericht*.—J.B.C.

Das amtliche Schrifttum der Bundesrepublik, unter Mitwirkung des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung und der Bundesministerien. (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, G. m. b. H. 1952. Pp. 47.)

This much needed brief guide to the official publications of the federal republic of Germany is limited to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Bundeskanzleramt, and the ministries, and gives with most items some characterization as well as information relative to procurement.—J.B.C.

Les journaux officiels de la République française: étude historique et analytique. BY DIRECTION DE LA DOCUMENTATION. (Paris: La Documentation française. 1953. Pp. 22. Notes et études documentaires, no. 1,738. Série française, cccxxi.)

The official gazettes of France from 1789 to date form a maze of increasing complexity sufficient to daunt the most hardy searcher for laws, decrees, regulations, parliamentary debates, documents, administrative reports, etc. More than 40,000 pages annually now of the *Journal officiel de la République française* are divided among some ten different editions plus three other publications. From 1869 to 1950, the complete collection of the *Journal officiel* amounts to 1500 volumes. Without the help of the present brief guide, "le lecteur profane

risque de s'y perdre avant d'avoir atteint son but."—J.B.C.

Les élections législatives du 17 juin 1951. BY MINISTÈRE DE L'INTÉRIEUR. (Paris: La Documentation française. 1953. Pp. 452. Collection "Recueils et monographies," 20.)

The detailed report on the elections of June 17, 1951, to the French National Assembly includes the text of the electoral laws, general statistics along with six maps of France showing the principal tendencies of opinion, and the returns from each "département," from the four overseas départements, from Algeria, and from the overseas territories, and a final set of tables showing the returns from special elections of June 17, 1951 and December 31, 1952, to fill seats of deputies deceased, resigned, and incapacitated.—J.B.C.

Commission mixte d'enquête sur le fonctionnement des services de l'Etat et des institutions parétatiques. *Premier rapport aux Chambres législatives.* (Brussels: Moniteur belge. March 12, 1952. 122^e année, n. 72, pp. 1714-1792.)

The Belgian Commission on the Organization of the Government was authorized (by a law of June 1, 1949 although it did not begin work until October 1950) to find ways and means of increasing the efficiency of the government services as well as of making budgetary economies. The first report, dated December 22, 1951, and presented by H. Matton, the chairman, recommended among other things that two "parétatique" bodies be abolished.—J.B.C.

State of Travancore-Cochin. *The Travancore-Cochin Legislative Assembly Manual.* (Ernakulam: Government Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 132.)

The manual includes the rules and standing orders, the articles of the Constitution of India as they apply to the legislatures of Part B states, the Payment of Salaries and Allowances Act, the Legislative Assembly (removal of disqualifications) Act, legislative library rules, procedure in respect of questions and answers, and prohibition of simultaneous membership rules. English, Malayalam and Tamil are used for the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. The states of Travancore and of Cochin were united as Travancore-Cochin in July, 1949.—J.B.C.

Travancore-Cochin Legislative Assembly. *A Selection from the Decisions from the Chair, 1922-1951.* With index. COMPILED BY K. MAHADEVA AIYAR, EDITOR OF DEBATES OF THE TRAVANCORE-COCHIN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY. (Ernakulam: Government Press. 1952. Pp. vi, 52.)

Compiled from the reports of the proceedings of the legislative bodies of Travancore, 1922-1949, of Cochin, 1925-1948, and of Travancore-Cochin, 1949-1951, in response to a request from the Secretary of the Parliament of India. A Conference of Indian Presiding Officers of legislative bodies in Sept., 1949 had requested states already having legislatures to compile and publish selections of decisions by the chair. The integrated legislative body of the integrated state which first met on July 11, 1949 was called "The Legislative Assembly of the United State of Travancore and Cochin," and after the Constitution of India came into force on Jan. 26th, 1950, the "Travancore-Cochin Legislative Assembly."—J.B.C.

The Official Gazette of the United Kingdom of Libya. (Tripoli, Libya: The Government Printer. 1951-. No. Extraordinary, 7th Oct., 1951, Vol. 1. No. 1, Oct. 24, 1951 to date.)

The Constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya as adopted at Benghazi on Oct. 7, 1951, is published in English as an extraordinary number of the *Official Gazette*. Libya, composed of the provinces of Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania, and having the two capitals of Benghazi and Tripoli, has Arabic as the official language.—J.B.C.

Nigeria. House of Representatives. *Debates. First Session. 29th, 30th and 31st January, 11th to 31st March and 1st to 9th April 1952.* (Lagos: Government Printer. 1952. 3 vols.)

Under the new Constitution of Nigeria, the first meeting of the Legislature was held on January 29-31, 1952, for organization, and the stenographic report of debates extends only to 18 pages. The last meeting of the Legislative Council, the former legislature, was held in August, 1951, when there was a debate on the holding of elections under the new constitution. The debates of the budget meeting in March and April extended to nearly twelve hundred pages in two volumes. In addition, there are regional legislatures in the Eastern, Northern, and Western regions, the debates of

which are also available in printed form.—J.B.C.

Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly of the Gold Coast (Amended up to October, 1952). (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Printing Dept. 1952. Pp. 23.)

The rules of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, which began to function in 1951 under the new constitution, were drafted locally. In events not covered by the rules, reference is made to the House of Commons practice and to Erskine May. On February 17, 1953, the rules were amended mainly in reference to the procedure on appropriation bills. The Debates, which "shall be in the English language," are issued both in daily parts and in sessional volumes. In addition, a daily journal report is printed under the title *Minutes*. The daily time of sitting for the Assembly is from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.—J.B.C.

Public Administration in Malaya. By S. W. JONES. (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953. Pp. vii, 229. \$3.00.)

Public Administration in Burma: A Study of Development During the British Connexion. By F. S. V. DONNISON. (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953. Pp. vii, 119. \$2.50.)

Organization, methods and problems of public administration considered mainly in terms of its historical development in these two areas; about one-third of the Malaya volume is concerned with postwar affairs; the Burma study concludes with the end of British control.

Report on Mao's China. By FRANK MORAES. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1953. Pp. vii, 212. \$3.75.)

A perceptive report by the editor of *The Times of India*, who travelled briefly but widely in Red China in 1952 as a member of an Indian cultural delegation. While acknowledging significant economic and administrative advances, he laments the restraint and orthodoxy forced upon China's intellectuals and bureaucrats.

Utopia Ltd.: The Story of the English New Town of Stevenage. By HAROLD ORLANDS. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1953. Pp. xv, 313. \$4.50.)

Study by an American anthropologist of the effort to carry out the New Towns Act, 1946, and of its impact on one of the towns to be developed. Interplay among local and regional interests, national policy, ministry, and Development Corporation is shown.

The British Parliament. By STRATHEARN GORDON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. 247. \$4.25.)

New edition of a volume first issued in 1945 by the Hansard Society. A chapter on "Criticism of Parliament" and some useful tables have been added.

The Russians in Focus. By HAROLD J. BERMAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1953. Pp. xii, 209. \$3.00.)

A concise handbook of factual information on a number of facets of Soviet society and life, written by a research associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. It fulfills well its purpose, which is to provide the general reader with a basic minimum of knowledge about Soviet ways of life.

The Soviet Impact on Society: A Recollection. By DAGOBERT D. RUNES. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. xiii, 202. \$3.75.)

The bulk of the volume consists of a rather unsystematic discussion of various aspects of life in Soviet Russia prior to World War II (introduced by a few comments on Marxian teaching), while a few chapters deal with early communist attempts to take over in Hungary, Bavaria and China. The book was written 15 years ago.

South Africa. By JAN H. HOFMEYER. REVISED BY J. C. COPE. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc. 1953. Pp. x, 253. \$3.75.)

A new edition of this standard volume by the late South African political leader. The older work has been brought up to date and four new chapters have been added.

Africa: A Study in Tropical Development. By L. DUDLEY STAMP. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1953. Pp. vii, 568. \$8.50.)

A geographer's social-ecological study of the entire continent. The emphasis is on human needs and the resources available to satisfy them. Includes charts, maps, illustrations.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

General

Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Summarization of the First Annual Public Administration Field Conference; Montevideo, Uruguay; February 15-19, 1953. Prepared by the participants and published at Montevideo, Uruguay; February 24, 1953 (mimeo).

McWhinney, E. Le Droit Constitutionnel Comparé: Science de la Politique. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. April-June, 1952.

Rasch, E. Die Staatliche Bürokratie im Modernen Gesellschaftlichen Leben. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*. May, 1953.

Spann, R. N. Thoughts on Administrative Case-Study. *Public Administration*. Spring, 1953.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Abrahamson, G. Die Sozialen Dienste in Grossbritannien. *Wirtschaftsdienst*. December, 1952.

Aris, R. Die Verfassungsrechtliche Entwicklung in Grossbritannien seit 1933. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

Brooke, H. Conservatives and Local Government. *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

Bulmer-Thomas, I. How Conservative Policy is Formed. *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

Conservative Party. Research Department. Local Government Elections, 1953. London, Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1953.

Cotter, C. P. Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience. *Stanford Law Review*. April, 1953.

Goldman, P. County and Borough; Problems of Local Government in England and Wales. London, Conservative Political Centre, 1952.

Harvey, L. G. The Party in Local Affairs. *National Municipal Review*. May, 1953.

Hollis, C. The British Constitution in 1952. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1953.

———. Katholizismus in England. *Aussenpolitik*. May, 1953.

The Improbability of Local Government. *Fortnightly*. May, 1953.

Kelly, D. W. The Administration of the National Coal Board. *Public Administration*. Spring, 1953.

Maude, A. The Conservative Party and the Changing Class Structure. *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

United Kingdom: Parliament and Procedure. *Round Table*. March, 1953.

Colonial Areas

Carnell, F. Closer Association in British South-East Asia. *Eastern World*. May, 1953.

A Constitution for the Caribbean. *Economist*. April 11, 1953.

Gatty, R. Fiji: Colony in Transition. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1953.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report on Nigeria for the Year 1951. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953.

Southern Rhodesia. High Commissioner. The African in Southern Rhodesia. Glasgow, Robert MacLehos & Co., 1952.

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Draft Federal Scheme. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1952 (Cmd. 8573).

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Report by the Conference on Federation held in London in January, 1953. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953 (Cmd. 8753).

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federal Scheme Prepared by a Conference held in London in January 1953. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953 (Cmd. 8754).

Uganda. Secretariat. Community Development in Uganda. *Journal of African Administration*. April, 1953.

Commonwealth of Nations

Anjaria, J. J. India's Five-Year Plan. *Current History*. June, 1953.

Basu, S. The Public Service Commission in India. *Public Administration*. Spring, 1953.

Bendheim, E. "Apartheidpolitik" in Südafrika. *Aussenpolitik*. June, 1953.

Cherry, H. D. The Constitutional Philosophy of India. *India Quarterly*. October-December, 1952.

L'Évolution Constitutionnelle du Commonwealth. *Documentation Française—Notes et Etudes Documentaires*. November 26, 1952.

Herbert, H. W. The Future of Politics in Australia. *Australian Quarterly*. March, 1953.

India. Planning Commission. First Five Year Plan. Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1953.

India: The Five Year Plan. *Round Table*. March, 1953.

Pakistan: The Constitutional Controversy. *Round Table*. March, 1953.

Pauling, N. G. Labour and Politics in New Zealand. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. February, 1953.

United States. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report of Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand and Indochina. 83d Cong., 1st sess., Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Western Europe

Angier, J. The French Law on Industrial Ententes. *Cartel*. April, 1953.

Battelli, M. Il Referendum e l'Iniziativa Popolare in Svizzera. *Il Politico*. April, 1953.

Beria, G. L'Évolution Constitutionnelle Française depuis 1944. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

Boussenoit, G. L'Assemblée de l'Union Française, son Rôle, l'Élargissement de ses Pouvoirs. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January, 1953.

Campion, Lord. European Parliamentary Procedure. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1953.

Canada. Department of National Health and Welfare. Health Insurance in Sweden. Ottawa, 1952.

De Visscher, M. P. L'Évolution du Droit Public Belge de 1930 à 1950. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

France and the French Union. *Round Table*. March, 1953.

Frisch, A. Bedeutung des Mittelstands in der Französischen Sozialstruktur. *Wirtschaftsdienst*. March, 1953.

Gide, P. Le Projet Français de Loi Anti-Trust et les Expériences Étrangères. Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1953.

Gonidec, P. F. Les Assemblées Locales des Territoires d'Outre-Mer. *Revue Juridique et*

Politique de l'Union Française. July–September, 1952.

Guiton, R.-J. Probleme der Französischen Union. *Europa Archiv*. April 5, 1953.

Herlitz, N. Swedish Administration Law. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Historicus. La Vita Politica Italiana. *Rivista di Politica Economica*. February and April, 1953.

L'Organisation de la Sécurité Sociale en Belgique. *Bulletin d'Information et de Documentation de la Banque Nationale de Belgique*. March, 1953.

République Française. Ministère de l'Intérieur. Les Élections Législatives du 17 Juin 1951. Paris, Documentation Française, 1953.

Sorensen, M. Problèmes Politiques Contemporains du Danemark. *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*. October–December, 1952.

Tesaro, A. Il Disegno di Legge per la Riforma Elettorale. *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico*. November–December, 1952.

Van der Pot, C. W. Die Entwicklung des Öffentlichen Rechts in den Niederlanden. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

Central Europe

Adamovich, L. Die Entwicklung des Österreichischen Verfassungsrechts seit 27. April 1945. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

Die Ausbeutung der Menschlichen Arbeitskraft in der Sowjetzone. Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1952.

Bonn, M. J. Potential Dangers in Germany. *Contemporary Review*. March, 1953.

Haas, D. Abschluss und Ratifikation Internationaler Verträge. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*. May, 1953.

Hurter, E. Anti-Cartel Law Debate in West Germany. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. April, 1953.

Kalisch, W. Grundrechte und Berufsbeamtentum nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*. May, 1953.

Nipperdey, H. C. La Loi Allemande sur l'Organisation Constitutionnelle de l'Établissement. *Droit Social*. February, 1953.

Ortlieb, H. Der Kampf um Wirtschaftsdemokratie und Mitbestimmung. *Wirtschaftsdienst*. December, 1952.

Pilgert, H. P. The West German Educational

System. Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953.

Plischke, E. Berlin: Development of its Government and Administration. Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952.

Rechenschaftsbericht über die Deutsche Finanzpolitik 1949-1953. Bonn, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1953.

Redslob, R. La Charte de Bonn, son Caractère en Doctrine Constitutionnelle. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. July-September, 1952.

United States. Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Elections and Political Parties in Germany, 1945-1952. Prepared by Policy Reports Secretary, Office of Executive Secretary, 1952.

Wenke, H. Education in Western Germany. Library of Congress. Reference Department. European Affairs Division. Washington, 1953.

Wunderlich, F. Codetermination in German Industry. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Constitution de la République Populaire de Bulgarie. Sofia, 1948.

Declaration on the Aims and Tasks of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. *Yugoslav Review*. March-April, 1953.

Djordjevic, J. Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia. *American Slavic and East European Review*. April, 1953.

Yugoslavia's New System of Government. *Fortnightly*. April, 1953.

Draft Statute of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. *Yugoslav Review*. March-April, 1953.

Gallas, J. Social Security in the Peoples' Democratic Republics. *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association*. December, 1952.

Ivanovitch, M. La Loi Constitutionnelle sur les Fondements de l'Organisation Sociale et Politique de la République Fédérative Populaire de Yougoslavie et sur les Organes Fédéraux du Pouvoir. *Questions Actuelles du Socialisme*. January-February, 1953.

Kasanzeff, A. Soviet Communist Propaganda. *Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and the Institutions of the USSR*. No. 3, 1952.

Katsarov, C. Die Entwicklung des Öffent-

lichen Rechts in Bulgarien während und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, N.F., Vol. II, 1953.

Kryniski, G. I. Management Problems in Soviet Public Enterprise as Indicated by Arbitration Awards. *American Slavic and East European Review*. April, 1953.

Meissner, B. Die Gesetzgeberische Tätigkeit des Obersten Sowjets der USSR und die Entwicklung der Sowjetexekutive von 1949-1953. *Europa Archiv*. May 20, 1953.

Paikert, G. C. Hungary's National Minority Policies, 1920-1945. *American Slavic and East European Review*. April, 1953.

Reshetar, J. S. National Deviation in the Soviet Union. *American Slavic and East European Review*. April, 1953.

Schlesinger, R. Notes on the Changing Functions of Party Congresses. *Soviet Studies*. April, 1953.

Schulz, L. Die Neue Verfassung Rumäniens, eine Entwicklungsstufe zum "Vollsozialismus." *Europa Archiv*. April 5, 1953.

Schwarz, S. M. New Light on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *Problems of Communism*. No. 2, 1953.

Seton-Watson, H. The Colonial System of the USSR. *Commentary*. May, 1953.

"Soviet Imperialism." *Round Table*. December, 1952.

Sukiennicki, W. Soviet "Elections" in Poland. *Eastern Quarterly*. January-April, 1953.

Wiles, P. The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Wolfe, D. W. The Struggle for the Soviet Succession. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Wynne, W., Jr. The Population of Czechoslovakia. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. International Population Statistics Reports Series P-90, No. 3. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Yugoslavia. *British Survey*. April, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Badeau, J. S. The Emergence of Modern Egypt. *Foreign Policy Association Headline Series*. Number 98. March-April, 1953.

Documents Concerning Constitutional Development in the Sudan and the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government Concerning Sudan. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953. (Cmd. 8767).

Farah, R. A. The Arab Church in Israel. *Muslim World*. October, 1952.

Lents, W. Sondervollmachten für Mossadegh. *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. November, 1952.

———. Die Verstaatlichung der Ölindustrie in Iran. *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. October, 1952.

Martin, J. W. Some Aspects of National Budget Administration in Turkey. *Public Finance*. No. 1, 1953.

Rife, D. C. The Peoples of the Sudan. *Middle East Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Speiser, E. A. Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East. *Middle East Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Southeast Asia

Bailey, S. D. Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952.

Cady, J. F. Independent Burma. *Current History*. April, 1953.

Central Banking in Southern Asia. *Far Eastern Survey*. April 22, 1953.

Donnithorne, A. G. The Chinese in Indonesia. *Eastern World*. April, 1953.

Ingber, D. The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. *Fortnightly*. February, 1953.

A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in the Kingdom of Thailand. Results of a Reconnaissance Survey of Public Administration in Thailand conducted under Contract Arrangements with Mutual Security Agency by Public Administration Service. May, 1952 (mimeo).

United States. Department of State. Office of Intelligence Research. Research on Southeast Asia. Washington, April, 1953.

Pacific and Far East

Barber, C. H. China's Political Officer System. *Military Review*. July, 1953.

Barnett, A. D. China's Road to Collectivization. *Journal of Farm Economics*. May, 1953.

———. Social Controls in Communist China. *Far Eastern Survey*. April 22, 1953.

Bryn-Jones, D. Japan's General Election 1952: an Interpretation. *Contemporary Japan*. Nos. 7-9, 1952.

Burke, A. W. A Note on the Emerging Administrative Structure of the Post-Treaty Japanese National Government. Occasional Papers, Center for Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor) No. 3, 1952.

Chao, Kuo-Chün. Chinese Land Policies. *Current History*. June, 1953.

Chen, T. Hsi-en. The Marxist Remolding of Chinese Society. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Douglas, L. H. Recent Elections in a Japanese Prefecture. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.

Grad, A. J. Land and Peasant in Japan. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952.

Haring, D. G. Japanese National Character. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1953.

Hsia, R. Price Control in Communist China. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.

Ikematsu, F. Political Parties Today and Tomorrow. *Contemporary Japan*. Nos. 7-9, 1952.

Kondo, Y. The Land Reform in Japan. Tokyo. National Research Institute of Agriculture. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Bulletin No. 2. 1952.

Langer, P. F. Japanese Communism; an Annotated Bibliography. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.

Sakata, T. The Peace Treaty and Independence of the Japanese Economy. *Midwest Journal*. Winter 1952/53.

Salazar, M. Philippine Labor Unions. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1953.

Ukai, N. Japanese Election Results Reconsidered. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1953.

United States. Department of State. Office of Intelligence Research. Research on China. Washington, April 1953.

———. Department of State. Office of Intelligence Research. Research on Japan. Washington, April, 1953.

Van Briesen, F. Japan seit der Niederlage. *Aussenpolitik*. June, 1953.

Ward, R. E. Some Observations on Local Autonomy at the Village Level in Present-Day Japan. *Far Eastern Quarterly*. February, 1953.

Latin America

Constitutional Law for the Republic of Cuba, April 4, 1952. Habana, Publicaciones Lewis, 1952.

Hillekamps, C. H. Bolivien unter der Nationalistischen Welle. *Aussenpolitik*. April, 1953.

Le Auguste, Y. La Séparation des Pouvoirs dans la Constitution Haïtienne. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle*. July-September, 1952.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-1939. By Nicholas Mansergh. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xx, 481. \$8.00.)

In this volume students of international affairs, as well as specialists on the British Commonwealth, are presented with a welcome addition to the series of studies inaugurated by Professor Hancock. Though Professor Mansergh's topic is the critical period in between the enactment of the Statute of Westminster and the outbreak of World War II, his treatment appropriately includes both earlier and later events for the sake of perspective. The Commonwealth thus surveyed was undergoing the transition consequent upon the recognition of Dominion status and the decentralization of authority over foreign policy. Their claims to equality and independence duly recognized, the member-nations, no one of whom possessed the means to assure its own defense, were quickly confronted with the brutal realities of Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. Their responses, both several and collective, form the theme of this book.

The record with which its contents deal provokes various reflections. In studying almost any aspect of the nineteen-thirties—those years, as has been said, that the locusts ate—one's impressions of the then bankruptcy of British statesmanship are forcibly renewed. No glimmer of greatness breaks through the dark void separating the era of Lloyd George from that of Churchill. Nor did the field of Commonwealth relations form any exception. In the interwar decades only Balfour, presiding at the Conference of 1926, was able to shed luster on the ceremony that conferred on former colonies the title-deeds to nationhood. But he in any case was a lone surviving Victorian, and no true product of the twentieth century; and the mantle he left after him was draped on narrower shoulders.

For their part, the premiers of the Commonwealth countries, except New Zealand's Savage, share responsibility for applauding and abetting the policy of appeasement from wholly diverse, yet curiously concurrent, motives. Serving their apprenticeship on unfamiliar problems in a time of unparalleled grimness, they, too, misjudged the men, events, and institutions, with which they had to work. Yet in September, 1939, all of them discovered that their dominant interest was to ensure that

Britain should survive. All save Eire, whose vision of wide horizons was blocked by the sight of Ulster.

Of these matters Professor Mansergh offers a masterly analysis. His chapters embrace both the overall structure of the Commonwealth and the external relations of its component parts. He is at his best in the impartial exposition of rival viewpoints; in the handling of diplomatic documents, conference records, and legislation; and in his careful following of policies as they unwind themselves. The reader never loses interest; never fails to grasp the meaning from a style that is perfectly adapted to its content; and never ceases to admire the scholarship that has integrated so complex a subject. Some criticisms, however, are in order. Even though another volume of this series deals with economic policy up to 1936, Professor Mansergh still pays less heed than he might to economic factors. Only by painstaking search will the reader discover, in some brief and scattered lines, that a major depression existed in the early nineteen-thirties. He will not discover at all that the dominions reacted to the depression with a drive to industrialize which profoundly affected their politics, internal and external. He will peruse an elaborate chapter on South Africa, which contains but one casual and incidental reference on the salient fact that the Europeans are there outnumbered by four to one and which omits all discussion of different attitudes toward native policy. These shortcomings limit the comprehensiveness of the treatment, but still leave it admirable and indispensable in what the author has set out to cover.—LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

International Shipping Cartels: A Study of Industrial Self-Regulation by Shipping Conferences. BY DANIEL MARX, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 323. \$6.00.)

International economic policy is becoming increasingly important in the field of American foreign policy. A careful study of a major feature of the organization of the oceanic shipping industry is therefore to be welcomed by political scientists. In this descriptive analysis of shipping conferences the author, Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College and a former official of the War Shipping Ad-

ministration, has provided such a study. Concerned neither to praise nor to blame, he has described the basic economics of the industry, the history of shipping conferences (inter-company agreements) since the first was organized in 1875 to regulate the trade between India and the British Isles, governmental investigations in various lands of these conferences, and plans and machinery for regulating conferences and their activities.

While the work is of primary interest to transportation economists, four aspects of it should appeal to political scientists. One is the detailed explanation of the many ways in which political factors have prevented the most economic development and operation of the international shipping industry. Considerations of national defense and national prestige have caused overbuilding and produced a multitude of protective devices ranging from outright subsidies through tonnage quotas to regulations stipulating the currency in which payments are to be made (pp. 38-44). A second is the attempt to cope, through investigations and various types of national legislation, with the monopolistic or oligopolistic conference agreements which stem from the cut-throat price competition arising in large part from the existence of surplus tonnage (pp. 45-136). A third is the recent postwar effort to develop an Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, a project paralleling the International Trade Organization and suffering the same fate (pp. 272-79). Lastly—although the author does not develop this point—the wartime efforts to achieve the most efficient use of the shipping resources of the western allies (pp. 5, 165, 272-73) deserve attention because they suggest how important would be the development of a similarly rational method of husbanding and marshalling the shipping resources of the North Atlantic powers for the duration of the cold war.

The author's primary conclusion (pp. 303-4) is that under the state system only minor improvements can be made in the present conference system for regulating prices and avoiding the disastrous effects of unrestricted competition in the international shipping industry. Sound as this conclusion appears to be, considered as an economist's verdict, the political scientist may well inquire whether the time has not come when national economics must give way to alliance eco-

nomics.—MARSHALL KNAPPEN, *University of Michigan*.

The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1952. EDITED BY C. H. ALEXANDROWICZ. (Madras: University of Madras. 1952. Pp. xii, 316. Rs. 10.)

In this volume, the first of an annual series patterned after the well-known year books of the London Institute of World Affairs, a group of Indian scholars and a few foreigners who have special ties with India have made an important contribution to the study of international relations, international law, and international economics. The book contains seventeen articles, nine "research papers in the form of notes," a very useful summary of Indian decisions on international law, book reviews, a list of agreements entered into by the Government of India from August, 1947 to early 1952, and lists of books and articles on international affairs published in India in 1950, 1951, and 1952.

The articles and notes are a varied assortment indeed. The opening article on "India and the Balance of Power" by G. S. Bajpai, a famous Indian diplomat who is now Governor of Bombay, calls attention to the relation between politics and power, and argues that "A strong India is . . . necessary not only for the defence of its neutrality in the event of a world war but also for the effective pursuit of an independent foreign policy founded on her ideals" (p. 7). Harishwar Dayal, a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, explains some of the difficulties and problems in organizing the Indian Foreign Service to meet the heavy demands placed upon it after independence. Professor Harrop A. Freeman of Cornell University, the only American contributor to the volume, argues that international administrative law "contains a wealth of material which can be utilized to guide international action" (p. 47). Professor Balakrishna of Madras University performs a useful service by calling attention to conditions now existing in underdeveloped countries which in all likelihood will "cause a progressive deterioration" in their economic status and to certain social prerequisites for economic change. The editor, in an interesting essay, stresses "two conflicting tendencies . . . in the international field, one of promoting constructive relations by developing more international strata, and another of promoting social and economic policies through State

interference which intensifies the importance of vertical barriers" (p. 94). Professor K. A. N. Sastri of the University of Mysore presents some suggestive comments on "International Law and Relations in Ancient India." M. Ruthnaswamy, eminent Indian historian and former Vice-Chancellor of Annamalai University, deals with a very different subject, namely the international ideas of Leibnitz. Dr. U. R. Ehrenfels, now of Madras University, writes about war and human nature on the basis of his anthropological researches in India. Dr. J. D. N. Versluys, at present head of UNESCO's work in the social sciences in South Asia, discusses "Contradictory Tendencies in Indonesia," an area where he has had long experience. In his notes on the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, Professor N. C. Bhattacharya of the Scottish Church College, Calcutta, expresses the opinion that the new regime in China is actively seeking to develop "associations with Asian countries, particularly India, so as to reduce the extent of her present dependence on the U.S.S.R." (p. 233). Among the many decisions which are digested by C. Keshava Rao the case of *Indian and General Investment Trust Ltd. v. Rajah of Khalikote* (A.I.R. 1952. Cal. 508), in particular, should be noted by specialists in private international law.

Professor C. H. Alexandrowicz and his associates of the University of Madras have shown commendable enterprise and skill in planning and producing a work of almost uniformly high quality. It should be of interest to all students of international affairs, in India and elsewhere.—NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania*.

India in World Affairs, August 1947-January 1950: A Review of India's Foreign Relations from Independence Day to Republic Day. By K. P. KARUNAKARAN. (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1952. Pp. xi, 407. Rs. 15.)

To meet the need for sound and objective studies of India's foreign policy, the Indian Council of World Affairs has decided to sponsor a series of volumes, to be issued periodically, on India in world affairs. The present volume, prepared by a Research Associate of the Council, is the first in this series. For the most part it is a sober and rather pedestrian account of the major problems and developments in international affairs with which India was particularly concerned during an event-

ful two and a half years. The author has examined the pertinent documents with painstaking care, and his brief summaries are often excellent. The book is in no sense a profound analysis of the mainsprings of India's foreign policy, although it contains useful chapters on "The Indian National Movement and World Affairs," "Factors in India's Foreign Policy," and "The Awakening of Asia in Recent Times." More than one-third of the volume deals with questions relating to the United Nations. The only other matters which are given detailed treatment are relations with Pakistan, racial discrimination in South Africa, and problems of external economic relations. On the whole the treatment is fair and objective; but the author presents some surprising interpretations of various aspects of American foreign policy, of the provisions of the UN Charter regarding non-self-governing territories, of the FAO, and of the early attempts to work out a program of assistance for underdeveloped countries. There are also several factual errors.

The manuscript of the present volume went to the press some two years prior to its publication. It is to be hoped that subsequent volumes in the series, some of which are already in preparation, will appear more promptly. The Indian Council of World Affairs should be congratulated for sponsoring a series that has been launched so auspiciously and that will make available significant background information for those who wish to probe more deeply into the factors shaping Indian foreign policy.—NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania*.

Yankee Diplomacy: U. S. Intervention in Argentina. By O. EDMUND SMITH, JR. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953. Pp. iii, 196. Cloth \$3.00, paper \$2.00.)

This study, while essentially a history of U. S.-Argentine relations during World War II and the postwar period, strikes at the very heart of general hemispheric harmony. The U. S., in its militant determination to maintain the fiction of hemispheric solidarity upon a democratic base, not only played into the hands of the supernationalists in Argentina, but aroused the old suspicions of the Latin-American world in general and raised grave doubts concerning the sincerity of the U. S. as the Good Neighbor. By our coercive policy toward Argentina, we revived the long-laid

ghost of "intervention," and in so doing violated the most cherished principle of inter-American cooperation—the doctrine of nonintervention.

As this volume makes unequivocally clear, the U.S., by its inconsistencies and pressure tactics, did a distinct disservice to hemispheric solidarity. Although our goals were commendable, we failed to exercise scrupulous care in the methods by which we attempted to attain them. The series of improvisations, of proddings and pin prickings, succeeded only in further exacerbating inter-American relations without seriously deterring the Argentine nationalists.

The reviewer is in general agreement with the thesis of the author, highly critical of U. S. policy as he is; but, as the author suggests, the time may be near when some collective inter-American action must be taken in cases of flagrant denial of fundamental human rights within a sister republic. The international community cannot long afford to ignore repeated violations of basic human rights, but the protection of such rights must be a community endeavor.

This volume, although well documented, regrettably has no index or bibliography.—HORACE V. HARRISON, *Emory University*.

Economic Planning for the Peace. BY E. F. PENROSE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xiv, 384. \$7.50.)

The economic advisor to Ambassador Winant in London during the war traces the involved planning and political negotiations (primarily between the United Kingdom and the United States) leading up to raw materials controls, UNRRA, economic policies for occupied Germany, the projected ITO, the Bank and the Fund, etc. The result is a highly useful recapitulation that praises the major accomplishments but criticizes the failure to recognize the fundamental changes finally revealed by Europe's economic crisis of 1947.

The Year Book of World Affairs, 1953. PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1953. Pp. xv, 427. £2 2s.)

The seventh volume in this series includes a dozen articles touching upon such diverse subjects as the cold war, British Africa, the Soviet Communist party, Indonesia, the un-

derdeveloped areas, the Indian Constitution, and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case.

International Politics: The Western State System in Mid-Century. BY FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. (New York: McGraw-Hill Co. 1953. Pp. xvii, 577. \$6.00.)

A fifth edition of this veteran text, considerably reduced in size although following the arrangement of earlier editions. Still pessimistic about man's ability to control himself, Professor Schuman offers world government or a return to the "Age of Reason" as alternatives to war, although the war may be indefinitely postponed inasmuch as modern weapons make "victory" for either side a doubtful prospect.

Traité de Droit international public: Avec mention de la pratique internationale et suisse. Tome I. BY PAUL GUGGENHEIM. (Genève: Librairie de l'Université, Georg & Cie S.A. 1953. Pp. xxviii, 592.)

This is the first part of a two-volume textbook for Swiss students of public international law. The French edition is based on an earlier German edition published in 1948. The author is an adherent of the normative theory of law and of the monistic theory based on the primacy of international law. The outline of the first volume does not deviate in any substantial way from the usual arrangement followed in other European textbooks of public international law. Of main interest for the American reader are various references to Swiss practice.

Elements of American Foreign Policy. BY LARRY L. LEONARD. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1953. Pp. xvi, 611. \$6.00.)

A well-chosen collection of readings, many extremely timely, so arranged as to illustrate the constitutional issues, the policy-making process (executive, legislative and public), the evolution of U. S. policies, and the problems of the present day.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1935. Volume I, General, The Near East and Africa. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1953. Pp. xcvii, 1074. \$4.25.)

A volume of miscellany highlighted by the decline (after four years) of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, some interesting

general reporting from European capitals, and the Italo-Ethiopian war.

Foreign Policies of the United States. By HOLLIS W. BARBER. (New York: Dryden Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 614. \$5.25.)

An introductory text that mixes some brief historical background with a broader discussion of events of the past two decades; nearly 200 pages is devoted to the United States and the United Nations.

The United States and India and Pakistan. By NORMAN W. BROWN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. x, 308. \$4.50.)

Maintaining the high standards set by previous volumes in this series, Professor Brown has written an excellent and thorough introduction to the problems, politics, and internal development of these two South Asian countries, and with due regard to the religious backgrounds and the experience with British rule. Only one chapter is concerned specifically with U. S. relations.

America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941. By WAYNE S. COLE. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 305. \$3.50.)

Interesting recent history—based on official records, press reports, private papers and interviews—of the organization and methods of the America First Committee around which were grouped the most vigorous opponents of U.S. intervention in World War II.

Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies: Instructions and Despatches, Volume I, 1816-1850; Volume II, 1850-1861. Edited by HOWARD R. MARRARO. (New York: S. F. Vanni (Ragusa). 1952. Pp. xiv, 683; xxi, 781. \$35.00.)

An obvious labor of love, these two volumes of official correspondence will be of interest to those concerned with early U. S. diplomacy or 19th century Italian history. A lengthy introduction sketches Italian-American relations up to the end of World War II.

Europe and the United States in the World Economy. By ROBERT MARJOLIN. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1953. Pp. xiv, 105. \$2.00.)

Lectures delivered at Duke in 1951 by the Secretary General of the Organization for

European Economic Cooperation, reviewing the results of the Marshall Plan, the economic impact of the Korean war upon Europe, the problems of European integration, and U.S.-European economic relations.

Southeast Asia in the Coming World. Edited by PHILIP W. THAYER. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 306. \$4.75.)

Papers presented to a 1952 Johns Hopkins conference on Southeast Asia by U.S. officials and scholars and by representatives of the area; economics, culture, law, and U.S. relations with the region are the topics emphasized.

Asia and the West. By MAURICE ZINKIN. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1953. Pp. xii, 304. \$3.50.)

A slightly revised edition of a 1951 volume, sketching contemporary developments in all the Asian countries against the traditional social backgrounds and emphasizing the economic factor in the Asian "revolutions."

The Suez Canal in World Affairs. By HUGH J. SCHONFIELD. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. x, 174. \$4.50.)

More than a century of political and military activity over this vital waterway is described by a British writer, who points out the essential difficulty of reconciling Egypt's wish to control the canal with the commercial and military importance of the canal to certain other nations.

Germany Plots with the Kremlin. By T. H. TETENS. (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc. 1953. Pp. x, 294. \$3.75.)

Using as his evidence excerpts from German newspapers, public and confidential statements of certain German groups, and other materials, the author claims that Germany is planning "a treacherous sell-out of Europe to Moscow" and pleads for an immediate re-examination of our basic policies on Germany. The author's conclusion is that, unless we can reach a reasonable settlement with Russia, the United States should remain in Germany until a new generation of Germans can be trusted or until we have made the other European powers strong enough to prevent the resurgence of aggressive German militarism without our help.

When Peoples Speak to Peoples: An Action

Guide to International Cultural Relations for American Organizations, Institutions, and Individuals. BY HAROLD E. SNYDER. (Washington: American Council on Education. 1953. Pp. xiii, 206. \$3.00.)

Declaring that "international relations are human relations" and that international understanding can only follow cultural understanding, the author describes his work with the Commission for International Education and the Commission on the Occupied Areas, and offers suggestions for other agencies working in this field.

Wings for Peace: A Primer for a New Defense.

BY BONNER FELLERS. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1953. Pp. 248. \$3.50.)

A retired infantry general now views air power—as deterrent and as means of quick retaliation—as the main weapon in the United States' struggle to restrain the Soviet Union.

Strategy for Survival. BY JOHN E. KIEFFER. (New York: David McKay Co. 1953. Pp. xiii, 306. \$4.00.)

A former Georgetown lecturer, now an Air Force colonel, explains what must be done to defeat the enemy and to survive in World War III; complete with battle maps and plans for occupation.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Arnold, G. L. The Cold War. *Twentieth Century*. March and April, 1953.

Boitel, Michel. Situation et Problèmes Actuels de la Fonction Publique Internationale. *Politique Étrangère*. February–April, 1953.

Focsaneanu, Lazar. Les Conséquences Internationales des Nationalisations. *Politique Étrangère*. February–April, 1953.

Hertz, Frederick. Historical Understanding Between Nations. *Contemporary Review*. May, 1953.

Kallen, Horace M. Social Philosophy and the War of the Faiths. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.

Lima, Alceu Amoroso. The University and the International Community. *Thought*. Spring, 1953.

Smith, Walter B. Practicalities of Power. *Department of State Bulletin*. May 11, 1953.

Tucker, Robert W. Faith, Reason, and Power Politics. [Review article.] *World Politics*. April, 1953.

United States

Auerbach, Frank L. The Visa Function under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. John H. Schaar.

Department of State Bulletin. May 4, 1953.

Cardoso, Michael H. Foreign Aid Legislation: Time for a New Look. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Winter, 1953.

Cohen, Bernard C. Foreign Policy-making: Modern Design. [Review article.] *World Politics*. April, 1953.

Dulles, John Foster. The First 90 Days. *Department of State Bulletin*. April 27, 1953. The Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements. *Ibid.* April 20, 1953.

Knight, Ridgway B. U. S. Objectives in Western Europe. *Department of State Bulletin*. June 1, 1953.

Morton, Thruston B. At the Crossroads of U. S. Trade Policy. *Department of State Bulletin*. May 4, 1953.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. Atomic Weapons and American Policy. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Reorganization of Foreign Aid and Information Programs. *Department of State Bulletin*. June 15, 1953.

Richardson, Channing B. The United States Mission to the United Nations. *International Organization*. February, 1953.

Rostow, W. W. Notes on a New Approach to U. S. Economic Foreign Policy. *World Politics*. April, 1953.

Steiner, H. Arthur. The United States and the Two Chinas. *Far Eastern Survey*. May, 1953.

Strange, Major Russell P. Atlantic Conference: The First Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting. *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. April, 1953.

Latin America

Christensen, Asher N. et al. Latin America Today. [A Symposium] *Current History*. March, 1953.

Military Assistance to Latin America. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 30, 1953.

Puerto Rico's New Self-Governing Status. *Department of State Bulletin*. April 20, 1953.

Quintanilla, Luis. Pan Americanism and Democracy. Inter-American Monographs, No. 1. Boston University Press. 1952.

Rippy, J. Fred. British Investments in Latin America: A Sample of Profitable Enterprises. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Spring, 1953.

Commonwealth of Nations

Amery, Julian. A Conservative View of the Commonwealth. *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

Mansergh, Nicholas. The Commonwealth in Asia. *Behind the Headlines* (Toronto). March, 1953.

Munro, D. K. New Zealand and the New Pacific. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Pearson, L. B. Canada's Northern Horizon. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Younger, Kenneth. The United Nations and the British Commonwealth. *United Empire*. March-April, 1953.

Western and Central Europe

Alphand, Hervé. The "European Policy" of France. *International Affairs*. April, 1953.

Collins, Ellen. The Saarland; Key to European Unity. *World Affairs*. Summer, 1953.

de Bieville, Marc. Contribution Métropolitaine aux Dépenses de l'Union Française. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1953.

Die Neutralitätspolitik in Schweden. *Internationale Spectator* ('s-Gravenhage). May 13, 1953.

East, W. Gordon. The Mediterranean: Pivot of Peace and War. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Fernsworth, Lawrence. Spain in Western Defense. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. French Attitudes toward Western European Unity. *International Organization*. May, 1953.

The Future of the Saar. *World Today*. May, 1953.

Germany and World Peace; A German Social Democratic View. *World Today*. April, 1953.

Harris, Chauncey D. and Wülker, Gabriele. The Refugee Problem of Germany. *Economic Geography*. January, 1953.

Marcusse, Ludwig. European Anti-Americanism. *Partisan Review*. May-June, 1953.

Marvaud, Angel. L'Actualité du Portugal. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January and February, 1953.

Review of the Austrian Treaty Problem. *Department of State Bulletin*. June 8, 1953.

Schechtman, Joseph B. Postwar Population Transfers in Europe; A Survey. *Review of Politics*. April, 1953.

Von Schenck, E. La Suisse et l'Europe Naissante. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 66, 1953.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

Deutscher, Isaac. The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *International Affairs*. April, 1953.

Fedotov, George. The Fate of Empires. *Russian Review*. April, 1953.

Goodman, Elliot R. The Soviet Union and World Government. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Haffner, Sebastian. The Meaning of Malenkov. *Twentieth Century*. May, 1953.

Lissitzyn, O. J. Recent Soviet Literature on International Law. *American Slavic and East European Review*. December, 1952.

Morris, Bernard S. The Cominform; A Five-Year Perspective. *World Politics*. April, 1953.

Réflexions sur une Fédéralisation de l'Europe Danubienne. *Politique Étrangère*. December, 1952-January, 1953.

Rudzinski, Aleksander W. Soviet Peace Offensives. *International Conciliation*. April, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Alexander, Mark. Middle Eastern Battleground. *Twentieth Century*. March, 1953.

Fartache, Manoutchehr. Le Développement Économique et les Problèmes Politiques du Moyen-Orient. *Politique Étrangère*. February-April, 1953.

Gardiner, Arthur Z. Problems of Trade with the Middle East. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 23, 1953.

Hargreaves, J. D. Idealism in African Politics. *Twentieth Century*. May, 1953.

Landau, Rom. Moroccan Profiles; A Nationalist View. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1953.

Liddell Hart, B. H. The Defense of the Middle East. *Harper's*. April, 1953.

Monroe, Elizabeth. Middle Eastern Contrasts: Egypt and Iraq. *International Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Pinon, René. Panislamisme et Offensive de l'Asie. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. April 1, 1953.

Sablier, Edouard. La Signification de l'Affaire du Pétrole Iranien. *Politique Étrangère*. February-April, 1953.

Shwadran, Benjamin. The Seventh United Nations Assembly and the Palestine Question. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. April, 1953.

Siegfried, André. The Suez: International Roadway. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Swanzy, Henry. French North Africa. *Twentieth Century*. May, 1953.

Varagnac, A. Construire l'Eurafrrique. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 68, 1953.

Pacific and Far East

Ballantine, Joseph W. The Future of the Ryukyus. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Braibanti, Ralph J. D. The Outlook for the Ryukyus. *Far Eastern Survey*. June, 1953.

Green, O. M. Whither Mao Tse-tung? *Fortnightly*. May, 1953.

Harper, Norman D. Pacific Security as Seen from Australia. *International Organization*. May, 1953.

Hornbeck, Stanley K. Korea—In Perspective. *World Affairs*. Summer, 1953.

Hudson, G. F. Will Britain and America Split in Asia? *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Lattimore, Owen. The New Political Geography of Inner Asia. *Geographical Journal*. March, 1953.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. The Free World's Responsibility for Korean Reconstruction. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 23, 1953.

McAuley, James. Australia's Future in New Guinea. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Meile, Pierre. Le Problème des États Himalayens. *Politique Étrangère*. December, 1952-January, 1953.

Quatrième Point contre Kominform Asiatique. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1953.

Silvain, René. Perspectives Nouvelles en Extrême-Orient. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. April, 1953.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. Status of Red China. *Editorial Research Reports*. April 28, 1953.

Wood, F. L. W. The Anzac Dilemma. *International Affairs*. April, 1953.

Southeast Asia

Nguyen Van Tam. Les Réformes au Viêt-Nam. *Politique Étrangère*. December, 1952-January, 1953.

Tayyeb, Ali. Geo-Economic Trends in South Asia. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1952.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. War in Indo-China. *Editorial Research Reports*. April 3, 1953.

Colonial Policy

de Carbon, L. La Communauté Européenne et les Territoires Dépendants. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 68, 1953.

La Fédération de Rhodésie et du Nyasaland. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère*. January, 1953.

Pépy, D. Les Rapports entre l'Outre-Mer et la Communauté Européenne. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 68, 1953.

Thornton, A. P. Colonial Policy and Colonial Politics. *Fortnightly*. June, 1953.

International Economic Policy and Relations

Brown, William A., Jr. Sterling Convertibility and Some Related Problems. *American Economic Review*. May, 1953.

de la Fortelle, Robert. Les Problèmes Monétaires de l'Europe. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1953.

Gudin, Eugenio. Le Problème de l'Équilibre Économique International et les Tendances Actuelles du Fonds Monétaire International. *Politique Étrangère*. December, 1952-January, 1953.

Haberler, Gottfried. Reflections on the Future of the Bretton Woods System. *American Economic Review*. May, 1953.

Harrod, Roy F. Imbalance of International Payments. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*. April, 1953.

Hartland, Penelope. Private Enterprise and International Capital. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. February, 1953.

Lamb, Beatrice P. Trade—And Aid. *Public Affairs Pamphlet*, No. 195. April, 1953.

Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick. Sterling Converti-

bility. *South African Journal of Economics*. March, 1953.

Nakasian, Samuel. The Security of Foreign Petroleum Resources. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Neisser, Hans P. The United States Demand for Imports. *American Economic Review*. May, 1953.

Nelson, James R. and Palmer, Donald. United States Foreign Economic Policy and the Sterling Area. Center for International Studies, Princeton University. 1953.

Patel, I. G. Monetary Policy in Postwar Years. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*. April, 1953.

Tischendorf, Alfred P. British Investments in Latin American and African Mines; A Study of Contrasts. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Spring, 1953.

"A Trade and Tariff Policy in the National Interest"; Summary of the Bell Mission's Report. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 23, 1953.

International Law

Carlston, Kenneth S. Codification of International Arbitral Procedure. *American Journal of International Law*. April, 1953.

Dickinson, Edward D. The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. Part II. April, 1953.

Downey, William G., Jr. The Law of War and Military Necessity. *American Journal of International Law*. April, 1953.

García-Mora, Manuel R. The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

Gutteridge, J. A. C. The Repatriation of Prisoners of War. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Jones, Harry L. International Judicial Assistance Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1953.

Naujoks, Herbert H. Compacts and Agreements between States and between States and a Foreign Power. *Marquette Law Review*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Pella, Vespasian V. The Question of the Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court. *Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January-March, 1953.

Reibstein, Ernst. Von Grotius zu Bynkershoek. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. March, 1953.

Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz. Rechtsbeziehungen zwischen Internationalen Organisationen und den Einzelnen Staaten. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. March, 1953.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Bailey, Gerald. The Seventh Assembly of UNO. *Contemporary Review*. April, 1953.

Chisholm, Brock. Barriers to World Health. *International Conciliation*. May, 1953.

Dawson, A. A. P. The United Nations and Full Employment. *International Labour Review*. May, 1953.

Eagleton, Clyde. Excesses of Self-Determination. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1953.

Haas, Ernest B. The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism; Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System. *International Organization*. February, 1953.

Leriche, Anthony. Les Langues Diplomatiques à l'Organisation des Nations Unies. *Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January-March, 1953.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Maintaining Charter Standards for International Civil Servants. *Department of State Bulletin*. April 27, 1953. The United Nations: A Place to Promote Peace. *Ibid.* May 4, 1953.

Loftus, Martin L. The International Monetary Fund. 1951-1952; A Selected Bibliography. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*. April, 1953.

Marcovitch, Lazare. The Veto Power. *Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January-March, 1953.

Mudaliar, Sir Arcot. World Health Problems. *International Conciliation*. May, 1953.

Rees, Elfan. The Refugee and the United Nations. *International Conciliation*. June, 1953.

Wood, Bryce. The Court, the Charter and the Secretariat; Recent Books on International Organization. *International Organization*. February, 1953.

Military and Security Questions

Bonnefous, Edouard. Communauté Européenne et Pacte Atlantique. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1953.

Ismay, Lord. NATO: The Right Road to Peace. *Department of State Bulletin*. March 23, 1953.

Walton, Clarence C. Background for the European Defense Community. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1953.

Regional Organizations

Coblentz, William K. An Appraisal of the Schuman Plan. *American Bar Association Journal*. March, 1953.

de Bieville, Marc. Union Française et Communauté Européenne. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. April, 1953.

Les Débuts de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère*. January, 1953.

Frenay, H. Mars 1953 à Strasbourg. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 68, 1953.

Motives and Methods of European Integration; a German Government View. *World Today*. April, 1953.

Mouskhély, Michel. Les Suppléants à l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe. *Revue de Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Étranger*. January-March, 1953.

Padover, Saul K. and Leonard, L. Larry. Europe's Quest for Unity. *Headline Series*, No. 97. 1953.

La Ratification du Traité Instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère*. January, 1953.

Vernon, Raymond. The Schuman Plan. *American Journal of International Law*. April, 1953. Launching the European Coal and Steel Community. *Department of State Bulletin*. June 8, 1953.

DOCUMENTS

General and Miscellaneous

Council of Europe. Library and Documentation Center. Bibliographical and Documentary Information Bulletin No. 13. Strasbourg, March, 1953.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Report. UN, 1953. (U.N. Doc. E/2360, 12 March 1953.)

International Court of Justice. Index to the Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions, and Orders. The Hague, 1952. (Sales No. 98.)

Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions, and Orders. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (United Kingdom/France). Order of 29 January 1953. The Hague, 1953. (Sales No. 99.)

Nathan Associates, Inc. Preliminary Report on Economic Reconstruction of Korea, Prepared for the United Nations Reconstruction Agency. Washington, 1952. (U. N. Doc. UNKRA/AG/13, 15 December 1952.)

Saar Government. Office of Information.

The Saar: Key to European Unity. Saarbrücken, 1953.

United Kingdom. Central Office of Information. The Disarmament Question 1945-53. London, 1953.

Commonwealth Relations Office. Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Report by the Conference on Federation held in London in January, 1953. Cmd. 8753. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1953.

World Health Organization. The Work of WHO in 1952: Annual Report of the Director General. . . . Geneva, 1953. (Official Records of the WHO, No. 45.)

United Nations

Economic and Social Council. Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries; Integrated Economic Development. Working Paper by the Secretary-General. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2384, 25 March 1953.)

List of Inter-Governmental Organizations in the Economic and Social Fields, 1953 Edition. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2361, 4 February 1953.)

Relations with Inter-Governmental Organizations. Report by the Secretary-General. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2366, 17 February 1953.)

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Annual Report . . . 9 February 1952 to 14 February 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/CN.11/372, 14 February 1953.)

Economic Commission for Europe. The Commission's Programme of Work for 1953/1954. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/ECE/159, 27 January 1953.)

Economic Survey of Europe Since the War. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/ECE/157, February, 1953.)

Reports from the Committees . . . [of ECE] on Their Activities. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/ECE/153, 27 January 1953.)

Economic Commission for Latin America. A Study of Trade Between Latin America and Europe. . . . UN, 1953. (Sales No.: 1952. II. G.2, January, 1953.)

UNICEF. General Progress Report of the Executive Director. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/ICEF/221, 15 March 1953.)

General Assembly. Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Report . . . February 1951 to 15 September 1952. UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2222.)

International Law Commission. Second Report on the Regime of the Territorial

Sea, by J. P. A. François, Special Rapporteur. UN, 1953. (Doc. A/CN.4/61, 19 February 1953.)

Secretariat. Department of Public Information. Background Papers. No. 72: The India-Pakistan Question (Doc. ST/DPI/SER. A/72, 31 December 1952); No. 75: Disarmament (Doc. ST/DPI/SER. A/75, 20 February 1953.)

Secretary-General. World Economic Situation. Aspects of Economic Development in Africa. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2377, 20 March 1953.)

United States

Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report of the Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Indochina, . . . May 12, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. H. Rep. No. 130. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Ammunition Supplies in the Far East. . . . Testimony by James A. Van Fleet and Others. . . . Hearings. . . . 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Committee on Foreign Relations. Agreements Relating to the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. Hearings . . . April 7 and 8, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Hearing . . . April 9, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Report . . . to Accompany S. Res. 84, Remonstrating against Treatment of Minority Groups by Russia and Her Satellites. February 25, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, S. Rep. No. 47. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Mutual Security Act of 1953. Hearings . . . May 5 . . . 29, 1953. Report . . . on S. 2128. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, S. Rep. No. 403, June 13, 1953. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Report. . . . June 15, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, S. Rep. No. 406. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

St. Lawrence Seaway. Hearings on . . . S. 589 . . . April 14 . . . May 21, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations. Report of Senator Alexander Wiley, February 25, 1953.

83rd Congress, 1st Session, S. Doc. No. 25. Report of Senator Theodore Francis Green, February 25, 1953. *Ibid.*, S. Doc. No. 27. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Testimony of General Alfred M. Gruenther. Hearing . . . April 1, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Committee on Government Operations. State Department Information Program. Voice of America. Hearings . . . pursuant to S. Res. 40. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Committee on the Judiciary. Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings . . . on S. J. Res. 1 . . . and S. J. Res. 43. . . . February 18 . . . April 11, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Department of the Interior. Office of Territories. Report on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the Period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952, Transmitted . . . to the United Nations pursuant to Article 88 of the Charter. . . . Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Department of State. The Austrian Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Tactics. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5012.)

Greece: Strong Defenses at a Strategic Crossroad. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5040.)

Military Assistance to Latin America. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4917.)

Regional Organizations. . . . Europe and the North Atlantic Area. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4944.)

Report on the Near East. Address by the Secretary of State June 1, 1953. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5088.)

Report on the Operations of the Department of State (under Public Law 584). Message from the President. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. H. Doc., No. 115. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

High Commissioner for Germany. Report on Germany. September 21, 1949-July 31, 1952. . . . Cologne, 1952.

Mutual Security Agency. Economic Strength for the Free World. Report . . . by the Advisory Committee on Underdeveloped Areas. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

President. The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954. Basic Data Supplied by the Executive Branch. May 5, 1953. [Committee Print]. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism. BY WALDEMAR GURIAN. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1952. Pp. 189. \$3.25.)

Professor Gurian's brief study sheds a great deal of light on the ideological aspects of Soviet Communism. The study consists of three chapters, comprising, together with the conclusion, 105 pages of text; in addition there is an extremely valuable appendix presenting one of the best brief collections of documents and source materials available on Soviet doctrine. The major thesis of the book, set forth systematically in the first chapter, but implicit throughout, is that Bolshevism is not merely a political and economic doctrine but a social and political religion. The author strongly suggests in the first chapter and explicitly states in his conclusion, that the utopianism inherent in Bolshevism must result in tyranny.

Many students may disagree with Professor Gurian in his explanation of Bolshevik totalitarianism, but few will fail to benefit from his penetrating analysis of the intellectual roots of Communist fanaticism and dynamism. One of the merits of his approach is that he brings out vividly the intolerant mood with which Lenin approached opponents, an attitude which has been retained by the Communists. This may seem an obvious point, but many otherwise excellent studies of Soviet politics have failed to achieve their maximum effect because they neglected these emotional and psychological aspects of the subject. It should be pointed out that, unlike many other writers, Gurian emphasizes the continuity of Bolshevism. In his view, Lenin and Stalin were orthodox Marxists, and Lenin was no more "humanitarian" than his even more literal-minded but perhaps more cunning successor.

Under the heading of the "Soviet Reality" of Bolshevism, Gurian presents a history of Bolshevik ideology and of the Soviet regime. Perhaps the most interesting part of this, the longest chapter in the book, is the material bringing out the peculiarly Russian aspects of Bolshevism. A great deal of insight and erudition is compressed into a short compass in this chapter. While the author is strongly anti-Communist, he does not make the common mistake of under-estimating either the power or the achievements of the Soviet regime. At the same time, he brings out forcefully the psychological and moral price paid for these

achievements. One of the most interesting concepts advanced by Professor Gurian is that Bolshevism practice requires the creation of an "artificial reality" which is systematically and ruthlessly substituted for the knowledge which would result from freedom.

Throughout the book, but particularly in the last chapter entitled "Bolshevism as World Power," Gurian displays understanding of the circumstances which have enabled the rulers of the Kremlin to exert influence outside the borders of the U.S.S.R. He believes that the mythology of Soviet "anti-imperialist imperialism," with other aspects of the Soviet image as projected to the outside world, has won adherents not only because of the energy and skill with which it has been propagated, but also because this doctrine carried to its logical conclusions powerful currents of modern thought. In developing this concept, the author presents some very interesting comparisons between the Soviet and Nazi forms of totalitarianism. Professor Gurian's presentation of the world power of Bolshevism makes sobering reading. It is balanced at the end of the book by an expression of confidence. The author feels that by meeting the challenge of Communism, the non-Bolshevik world can sharpen its social conscience and improve itself.

Professor Gurian has made a valuable contribution to the literature on Soviet Communism. His study serves the double purpose of presenting effectively one of the major points of view from which Communism can be criticized, and of providing a highly readable introduction to the study of the Soviet system, particularly on the ideological side.—FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN, *Yale University*.

The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx. BY PETER GAY. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xvii, 334. \$4.50.)

This is a very readable account of the life of Eduard Bernstein and the evolution of his thinking. It is disappointing, however, insofar as "the dilemma of democratic socialism" is concerned. Dr. Gay takes the position that both the Revisionists and their Marxist opponents were unduly dogmatic: the Revisionists were wrong in believing that the attainment of socialism is always possible by democratic parliamentary means, and the Marxists

were wrong in insisting that socialism is never possible except by revolutionary means. He thinks that the Revisionist thesis was sound for England and unsound for Germany, and that the feasibility of socialism by democratic methods depends on the political structure of the state concerned. To the Marxist primacy of the economic, therefore, Dr. Gay opposes the primacy of the political.

Dr. Gay's analysis is disappointing in that it does not take into account the evolution of the economic goals of socialism since Bernstein's day. Socialism today differs from Marxism in much more than tactics, and that difference should vitally affect his diagnosis of the German situation.

Although this may not have been the author's intention, this book shows how far a man's ideology is from being governed by ideological considerations alone. It shows admirably how changes in position with regard to the truth of the opinions we hold are circumscribed and slowed down by a lifetime of associations and friendships, and how a man's reputation as a thinker and party leader is in the nature of an investment which is not lightly to be discarded. It was difficult and painful for Bernstein to readjust his opinions to bring them into line with the conclusions toward which facts and logic were drawing him, and so it is for all those who take their ideas seriously enough to affiliate themselves with movements committed to their realization.—RENE DE VISME WILLIAMSON, *University of Tennessee*.

Government Information and the Research Worker. Lectures Delivered at a Vacation Course of the University of London School of Librarianship and Archives in April 1951. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY RONALD

STAVELY. (London: Library Association. 1952. Pp. 228.)

The twenty-four papers by representatives of various ministries and other agencies stress in the main "publications and resources of their ministries that are likeliest to be of value to the specialist worker," and constitute in a way a guide to the official publications of the executive branch of the British government.—J.B.C.

Freedom and Authority in Our Time: Twelfth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. EDITED BY LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, R. M. MACIVER, AND RICHARD McKEON. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. xvi, 767. \$6.00.)

Papers and discussion comments prepared by seventy-five program participants at the Twelfth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held in New York City in September, 1951.

The Philosophy of J. S. Mill. BY R. P. ANSCHUTZ. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 184. \$3.00.)

A brief review and analysis of Mill's utilitarian and democratic philosophy and his system of logic.

The Substance of Politics. BY A. APPADORAI. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. x, 524. \$2.50.)

Sixth edition—revised to take account of changes in recent years in India, France, Germany, Italy, and Newfoundland—of a comprehensive, concisely-written introduction to political science.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

POLITICAL THEORY

FRANCIS G. WILSON

University of Illinois

History and Criticism

Abel, Darrel. Hawthorne's Skepticism About Social Reform. *University of Kansas City Review*. Spring, 1953.

Adams, Arthur E. The Character of Pestel's Thought. *American Slavic and East European Review*. April, 1953.

Alfieri, V. E. I Due Aspetti della Teoria del

Conoscere in Democrito. *Athanaeum*. 30/iii-iv. 1952.

Alföldi, Andreas. Die Geburt der Kaiserlichen Bildsymbolik. *Museum Helveticum*. April, 1953.

Almagro, Martín. La Dimensión Universalista de la Prehistoria. *Arbor*. March, 1953.

Baron, Hans. A Struggle for Liberty in the

Renaissance (II). *American Historical Review*. April, 1953.

Beharriell, Frederick J. Schnitzler's Anticipation of Freud's Dream Theory. *Monatshefte*. February, 1953.

Bestor, Arthur E., Jr. Patent-Office Models of the Good Society: Some Relationships between Social Reform and Westward Expansion. *American Historical Review*. April, 1953.

Betts, R. R. Some Political Ideas of the Early Czech Reformers. *Slavonic and East European Review*. December, 1952.

Bock, Hellmut. Common Sense als Lebenshaltung und Philosophie in England. *Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen*. 189/2-3. 1953.

Böckmann, Paul. Die Bedeutung Nietzsches für die Situation der Modernen Literatur. *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*. 79/1. 1953.

Bortolaso, G. Vincenzo Gioberti nel Centenario della Morte. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. April 18, 1953.

Buck, August. Die Krise des Humanistischen Menschenbildes bei Machiavelli. *Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen*. 189/4. 1953.

Chadbourn, Charles, C. Jr. Regent Curtis and His Crusade for the Ideals of Democracy. *New York History*. April, 1953.

Chadbourn, Richard M. Renan and Sainte-Beuve. *Romanic Review*. April, 1953.

Chevallier, Jean-Jacques. Jean-Jacques Rousseau ou l'Absolutisme de la Volonté Générale. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

Cranz, F. Edward. Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Christian Thought. *Speculum*. April, 1953.

Crook, J. A. Some Remarks on the Augustan Constitution. *Classical Review*. March, 1953.

Destler, Chester M. The Opposition of American Businessmen to Social Control During the "Gilded Age." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. March, 1953.

Ehrenberg, Victor. *Imperium Maius* in the Roman Republic. *American Journal of Philology*. April, 1953.

Farré, Luis. El Pensamiento de Santayana. *Cuadernos Hispano-americanos*. December, 1952.

Figueres, Léo. Les Maîtres du Socialisme Scientifique et le Blanquisme. *Cahiers du Communisme*. April, 1953.

Fiorot, Dino. Sul Pensiero Filosofico di Jacques Robert Turgot. *Nuova Rivista Storica*. September-December, 1952.

Fitch, Robert E. John Dewey—The Last Protestant. *Pacific Spectator*. Spring, 1953.

Frisch, Morton. The Classical Attack on the French Revolution. *Classical Journal*. April, 1953.

Garaudy, Roger. Sur les Sources Françaises du Marxisme. *Cahiers du Communisme*. April, 1953.

Gomme, A. W. The Interpretation of ΚΑΛΟΙΚΑΓΑΘΟΙ in Thucydides 4.40.2. *Classical Quarterly*. January-April, 1953.

Hanke, Lewis. Bartolomé de las Casas, Existencialista? *Cuadernos Americanos*. March-April, 1953.

Harding, Joan N. Oscar Wilde and Ernest Renan. *Contemporary Review*. May, 1953.

Harris, Abram L. Veblen as Social Philosopher: A Reappraisal. *Ethics*. April, 1953.

Heller, Peter. Nihilist into Activist: Two Phases in the Development of Bertolt Brecht. *Germanic Review*. April, 1953.

Holmer, Paul L. Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory. *Ethics*. April, 1953.

Hours, Joseph. L'Idée Européenne et l'Idéal du Saint-Empire. *L'Année Politique et Economique*. January-March, 1953.

Irasusta, Julio. La Obra de Pereyra. *Estudios Americanos*. February, 1953.

Jacquot, J. Sébastien Castellion et l'Angleterre. *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*. XV/1. 1953.

Jaeger, Werner. Alabanza de la Ley. Los Orígenes de la Filosofía del Derecho y los Griegos. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1953.

Keller, Abraham-Charles. Michel de l'Hopital and the Edict of Toleration of 1562. *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*. XIV/2. 1952.

Knapp, Frank D., Jr. Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857. *Hispanic American Historical Review*. February, 1953.

Kristeller, Paul Oskar. El Mito del Atelismo Renacentista y la Tradición Francesa del Libre pensamiento. *Notas y Estudios de Filosofía*. January-March, 1953.

Leroy, Maxime. Augusto Comte y el Proletariado. *Cuadernos Americanos*. March-April, 1953.

Lopez, Robert S. An Aristocracy of Money in the Early Middle Ages. *Speculum*. January, 1953.

Low, J. M. A Regional Example of the Mercantilist Theory of Economic Policy. *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*. January, 1953.

- Lukacs, Georg. Einführung in die Ästhetischen Schriften von Marx und Engels. *Sinn und Form*. V/I. 1953.
- Magrath, Oswin. St. Thomas' Theory of Original Sin. *Thomist*. April, 1953.
- Meadows, Paul. On the Dynamics of Power: A Case Study. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. March, 1953.
- Merlan, Philip. Abstractions and Metaphysics in St. Thomas' *Summa*. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Mercier, Roger. La Théorie des climats des "Reflexions Critiques" à "L'Esprit des Lois." *Revue d'Histoire Littéraire de la France*. January-March, 1953.
- Miller, James W. The Development of the Philosophy of Socrates. *Review of Metaphysics*. June, 1953.
- Miller, Perry. Emersonian Genius and the American Democracy. *New England Quarterly*. March, 1953.
- Morrison, J. S. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* i.6: the Encounters of Socrates and Antiphon. *Classical Review*. March, 1953.
- Morrow, Glenn R. Plato's Conception of Persuasion. *Philosophical Review*. April, 1953.
- Negri, Guglielmo. La "Oceana" di Harrington nell 'Evoluzione Costituzionale Britannica. *Il Politico*. December, 1952.
- Ostrander, Gilman M. Emerson, Thoreau, and John Brown. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. March, 1953.
- Padover, Saul K. Madison as a Political Thinker. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.
- Pio Corrêa, M., Jr. O Bem-Estar Social na Antiguidade. *Revista do Serviço Público*. July, 1952.
- Popkin, Richard H. Joseph Glanvil: Precursor of Hume. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Prothro, James W. Business Ideas and the American Tradition. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.
- Pugh, George W. Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. *Louisiana Law Review*. March, 1953.
- Raumer, K. Von. Sully, Crucé und das Problem des Allgemeinen Friedens. *Historische Zeitschrift*. February, 1953.
- Raven, J. E. Sun, Divided Line, and Cave [Plato]. *Classical Quarterly*. January-April, 1953.
- Richardson, Walter C. British Fabianism Since 1914. *Thought*. Spring, 1914.
- Rifkin, Lester H. Aristotle on Equality: Criticism of A. J. Carlyle's Theory. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Rinehart, Keith. John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography*: Its Art and Appeal. *University of Kansas City Review*. Summer, 1953.
- Rossiter, Clinton. The Uses of Early American History. *Antioch Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Rotenstreich, Nathan. Hegel's Image of Judaism. *Jewish Social Studies*. January, 1953.
- Rouquette, Robert. The Evolution of the French Church. *Thought*. Spring, 1953.
- Sarason, Bertram D. Edmund Burke and the Two Annual Registers. *PMLA*. June, 1953.
- Schmitt, H. A. and Weston, J. C., Jr., Ten Letters to Edmund Burke. *Journal of Modern History*. March, 1953.
- Schramm, Percy Ernst. Wie sahen die Mittelalterlichen Herrschaftszeichen aus? *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*. XXXV/I. 1953.
- Shanahan, William O. The Social Outlook of Prussian Conservatism. *Review of Politics*. April, 1953.
- Siguán, Miguel. Freud Desde Dentro. *Arbor*. April, 1953.
- Silberner, Edmund. German Social Democracy and the Jewish Problem Prior to World War I. *Historia Judaica*. April, 1953.
- Strémoukhoff, Dimitri. Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine. *Speculum*. January, 1953.
- Sutton, Robert B. The Phrase *Libertas Philosophandi*. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Tooley, M. J. Bodin and the Mediaeval Theory of Climate. *Speculum*. January, 1953.
- Villaseñor, Raúl. Luciano, Moro y el Utopismo de Vasco de Quiroga. *Cuadernos Americanos*. March-April, 1953.
- Vucinich, Alexander. The First Russian State: An Appraisal of the Soviet Theory. *Speculum*. April, 1953.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. The Polish Precursors of Federalism. *Journal of Central European Affairs*. January, 1953.
- Westin, Alan Furman. The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement, and the Campaign of 1896. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.
- Wevell, Basil H. Von. Die Sowjetunion und die Lehre A. T. Mahans. *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. March, 1953.
- Williams, Frank B., Jr. The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in the South, 1870-1901. *Journal of Southern History*. November, 1952.
- Wolin, Sheldon S. Richard Hooker and English Conservatism. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.
- Woodhouse, H. F. The Authenticity of

Hooker's Book VII. *Church History*. March, 1953.

Zall, Paul M. Lord Elden's Censorship. *PMLA*. June, 1953.

Zeitlin, Solomon. The Names Hebrew, Jew and Israel: A Historical Study. *Jewish Quarterly Review*. April, 1953.

Legal Theory and Public Law Issues

Chenot, Bernard. L'Existentialisme et le Droit. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. The Philosophy of Law of the Epicureans. *Thomist*. April, 1953.

Connell, Francis J. Morality and Modern Marriage. *St. John's Law Review*. May, 1953.

Elorduy, P. Eleuterio. Orientaciones en la Interpretación de las Doctrinas Jurídicas de Suárez. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1952.

Hutton, A. J. W. Usurpation of Political Power (An Analysis of the "Steel Seizure" Case). *Dickinson Law Review*. March, 1953.

Katz, Wilbur G. Responsibility and Freedom. *Journal of Legal Education*. 5/3. 1953.

Le Bras, Gabriel. Les Problèmes du Temps dans l'Histoire du Droit Canon. *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger*. 30/4. 1952.

Quintano Ripolles, Antonio. Posibles Consecuencias Penales del Existencialismo. *Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales*. September-December, 1952.

Yankwich, Leon R. Aspects of Roman Civil Law. *Southern California Law Review*. April, 1953.

Special Study and Analysis

Aguilar Navarro, Mariano. Norteamérica, Democracia, Europa. *Estudios Americanos*. February, 1953.

Allemann, Fritz René. Le Systeme des Partis Politiques. *Documents*. April, 1953.

Andreae, Wilhelm. Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit in der Wirtschaft. *Neues Abendland*. May, 1953.

Armstrong, A. MacC. Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy. *Philosophical Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Arndt, Hans J. Demokratie und Aussenpolitik-Amerikas Demokratisches Credo in der Feuerprobe. *Frankfurter Hefte*. April, 1953.

Aron, Raymond. Burnham et la Politique de Libération. *Preuves*. May, 1953.

— En Quête d'une Philosophie de la Politique Étrangère. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

— The Diffusion of Ideologies. *Confluence*. March, 1953.

Bailey, Sydney D. Bolshevism and Nihilism. *Fortnightly*. March, 1953.

— The Revision of Marxism. *Quarterly Review*. April, 1953.

Barbu, Z. Marxist Philosophy and European Thought. *Philosophical Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Barcia Trelles, Camilo. Mit Washington oder Moskau? *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. January, 1953.

Battershaw, Brian. The New American Revolution. *Dublin Review*. First Quarter, 1953.

Bendiner, Robert. The Liberals' Political Road Back. *Commentary*. May, 1953.

Borkenau, Franz. Stalinismus—und was Weiter? *Neues Abendland*. April, 1953.

Bowman, Ward S. Jr. Toward Less Monopoly. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. March, 1953.

Brown, Bernard. Morris Cohen's Search for Justice. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.

Bruculeri, A. Il Mito della Civiltà e del Progresso. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. March 7, 1953.

Carleton, William G. A More Responsible Party System? *Yale Review*. Spring, 1953.

Chen, Theodore Hsi-en and Chen, Wen-Hiu. The "Three-Anti" and the "Five-Anti" Movements in Communist China. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1953.

Cohen, Felix S. Human Rights: An Appeal to Philosophers. *Review of Metaphysics*. June, 1953.

Communism [Various Articles.] *L'Age Nouveau*. February, 1953.

Conde, Francisco Javier. Introducción a la Antropología de Xavier Zubiri. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1953.

Conservative Party [Various Articles.] *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

Cook, Thomas I. and Moos, Malcolm. Hindrances to Foreign Policy: Individualism and Legalism. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1953.

Curran, Francis X. Protestant Parochial Schools. *Thought*. Spring, 1953.

Daniélou, J. Le Protestantisme dans des Voies Nouvelles? *Études*. May, 1953.

Delmas, Claude. De La Kleinstaaterei au Reich. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. April, 1953.

Drachkovitch, Milorad M. La Social-Démocratie et les Mouvements Totalitaires. *Cahiers de Bruges*. December, 1952.

Duclos, Jacques. La Lutte pour la Paix,

- l'Indépendance Nationale, les Libertés Démocratiques et les Revendications Populaires. *Cahiers du Communisme*. March, 1953.
- Edinger, Lewis J. German Social Democracy and Hitler's "National Revolution" of 1933: A Study in Democratic Leadership. *World Politics*. April, 1953.
- Fagin, N. B. Dostoevsky's Underground Man Takes Over. *Antioch Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Firebaugh, Joseph J. Freedom and the Humanities. *Educational Forum*. May, 1953.
- Frankel, Charles. Empiricism and Moral Imperatives. *Journal of Philosophy*. April 23, 1953.
- Frankl, Victor E. Logos and Existence in Psychotherapy. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*. January, 1953.
- Geiger, George R. Dewey and the Experimental Attitude in American Culture. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. January, 1953.
- Geiger, L. B. Métaphysique et Relativité Historique. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. October-December, 1952.
- Glücksberg, Charles I. Literary Existentialism. *Arizona Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.
- Goodman, Elliot R. The Soviet Union and World Government. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.
- Gould, Julius. Political Justice. *Cambridge Journal*. April, 1953.
- Gray, J. Glenn. Heidegger Evaluates Nietzsche. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Gruhle, Hans W. Psychologie und Rechtswissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 109/1. 1953.
- Hambleton, George. The Essence of Freedom. *Dalhousie Review*. Winter, 1953.
- Hamel, Walter. Die Bekenntnisfreiheit. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 109/1. 1953.
- Hand, Learned. Freedom and the Humanities. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*. Winter, 1952-53.
- Handcock, W. D. The Function and Nature of Authority in Society. *Philosophy*. April, 1953.
- Haring, Douglas G. Japanese National Character: Cultural Anthropology, Psychoanalysis and History. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Haroutunian, Joseph. Christian Faith and Metaphysics. *Journal of Religion*. April, 1953.
- Hazard, John N. A Political Testament for Stalin's Heirs. *International Journal*. Spring, 1953.
- . Soviet Property Law and Social Change. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.
- Haer, John L. Conservatism and the Rural-Urban Continuum. *Rural Sociology*. December, 1952.
- Hess, M. Whitcomb. Conant's Big-Business Fascism. *Catholic World*. April, 1953.
- . Subjectivism and the Superstate. *Catholic World*. May, 1953.
- Hudson, G. F. Professor Toynbee Surrenders the West. *Commentary*. May, 1953.
- Inge, W. R. Archaism and Futurism. *Philosophy*. April, 1953.
- Jaeger, Hans. Neo-Faschismus in Deutschland. *Deutsche Rundschau*. 79/2. 1953.
- Jaspers, Karl. Le Sens de l'Histoire. *La Table Ronde*. April and May, 1953.
- Joannes, Victor. Le Travail Idéologique et Politique dans le Domaine de la Littérature et des Arts. *Cahiers du Communisme*. February, 1953.
- Jolivet, R. Maurice Blondel et la Pensée Existentielle. *Études Philosophiques*. 7/4. 1952.
- Kallen, H. M. Social Philosophy and the War of the Faiths. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.
- Kirk, Russell. The Plight of American Minds and Hearts: Notes by an Anomic. *Sewanee Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Kempski, Jürgen Von. Über den Liberalismus. *Merkur*. April, 1953.
- Kennedy, Stetson and Kay. Le Travail Forcé aux États-Unis. *Les Temps Modernes*. March, 1953.
- Koch, Adrienne. Toward an American Philosophy. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Kolb, William L. A Social-Psychological Conception of Human Freedom. *Ethics*. April, 1953.
- Kroeber, A. L. The Delimitation of Civilizations. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April, 1953.
- Lavau, Georges E. Pourquoi les Français n'ont pas de Politique. *Esprit*. March, 1953.
- Lefort, Claude. Le Marxisme et Sartre. *Les Temps Modernes*. April, 1953.
- Lerner, S. Libertà di Culto e Ordine Pubblico. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. March 21, 1953.
- Letwin, Shirley Robin. Utilitarianism: A System of Political Tolerance. *Cambridge Journal*. March, 1953.
- Lewis, Gordon K. America and the New

- British Radicalism. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1953.
- Löwith, Karl. Heideggers Auslegung des Ungesagten in Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist Tot." *Die Neue Rundschau*. 64/1. 1953.
- Matl, Josef. Economía, Sociedad y Cultura del Sovietismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1953.
- Megay, Edward N. Lysenkoism and the Stateless Society. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.
- Meland, Bernard E. Interpreting the Christian Faith within a Philosophical Framework. *Journal of Religion*. April, 1953.
- Miller, J. A Political Economy of Socialism in the Making. *Soviet Studies*. April, 1953.
- Mitscherlich, Alexander. Massenpsychologie ohne Ressentiment. *Die Neue Rundschau*. 64/1. 1953.
- Mothershead, John L., Jr. Freedom of the Mind and American Higher Education. *Educational Record*. January, 1953.
- Murray, J. C. L'Eglise et la Démocratie Totalitaire. *La Vie Intellectuelle*. April, 1953.
- Murray, R. J. K. An Analysis of Society. *Philosophy*. April, 1953.
- Murillo, Ferrol, F. Consideraciones sobre la Democracia. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1952.
- Neumann, Franz L. Zum Begriff der Politischer Freiheit. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 109/1. 1953.
- Nixon, Charles R. Freedom vs. Unity: A Problem in the Theory of Civil Liberty. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1953.
- Paniker, Raimundo. El Patriotismo Cristiano. *Estudios Americanos*. March, 1953.
- Pende, Nicola. Biopsicologia e Politica. *Nuova Antologia*. April, 1953.
- Perry, Ralph Barton. What Does it Mean to be Free? *Pacific Spectator*. Spring, 1953.
- Radkey, Oliver H. An Alternative to Bolshevism: The Program of Russian Social Revolutionism. *Journal of Modern History*. March, 1953.
- Ramiro Rico, Nicolás. La Soberanía. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1952.
- Redlich, Fritz. The Business Leader as a "Daimonic" Figure. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. January, 1953.
- Richter, Hans. Die Parteien im Demokratischen Staat. *Deutsche Rundschau*. 79/3. 1953.
- Robinson, Dwight E. Economics and "the Possibility of Civilization"; Four Judgments. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. February, 1953.
- Röpke, Wilhelm. Die Freier der Penelope. *Deutsche Rundschau*. 79/4. 1953.
- Rossi, A. Théorie des Démocraties Populaires. *Preuves*. May, 1953.
- Schürch, Ernst. Der Internationale Kommunismus von Innen Betrachtet. *Neue Schweizer Rundschau*. April, 1953.
- Sessions, Robert E. The Modern Mind in Management. *Current Economic Comment*. May, 1953.
- Siegfried, André. Philosophie de la Publicité. *La Revue de Paris*. April, 1953.
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. The Highbrow in American Politics. *Partisan Review*. March-April, 1953.
- Schmaus, Michael. Continuidad y Progreso en el Cristianismo. *Cuadernos Hispano-americanos*. December, 1952.
- Schneider, Frederick D. Collingwood and the Idea of History. *University of Toronto Quarterly*. January, 1953.
- Schwartz, Edward. Eliot's *Cocktail Party* and the New Humanism. *Philological Quarterly*. January, 1953.
- Schweinitz, Karl de, Jr. Free Enterprise and Democracy. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.
- Seippel, Joachim H. A Comparative Study of Truth in Existentialism and Pragmatism. *Journal of Philosophy*. April 9, 1953.
- Sperber, Manes. Idéologie et Société. *Preuves*. April and May, 1953.
- Swanson, G. E. The Approach to a General Theory of Action by Parsons and Shils. *American Sociological Review*. April, 1953.
- Tauber, Kurt P. The Free University in an Open Society. *Harvard Educational Review*. Winter, 1953.
- Torres Martinez, Manuel de. El Futuro de la Política Social. *Cuadernos de Política Social*. No. 18, 1952.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. Weltgeschichte in Universaler Schau. *Universitas*. April, 1953.
- Tucker, Robert W. Faith, Reason, and Power Politics [Niebuhr]. *World Politics*. April, 1953.
- Utey, T. E. Majority Rule. *Fortnightly*. April, 1953.
- Valdeiglesias, Marqués de. La Revolución Conservadora en Alemania. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1953.
- Vecchio, Giorgio del. Die Zwecke des Staates und der Rechtsstaat. *Universitas*. March, 1953.
- Voegelin, Eric. The Oxford Political Philosophers. *Philosophical Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Wagener, Maja. The Formation of the Masses as One Origin of Totalitarianism. *Cahiers de Bruges*. December, 1952.

Wolf, Georg. Psychoanalyse als Ideologie.

Deutsche Rundschau. 79/3. 1953.

Wright, David M. Democracy and Economics in American Ideology. *Confluence*. March, 1953.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

Costa, A. Massucco. Le Applicazioni in Pedagogia e in Politica della Dottrina di K. Lewin. *Il Politico*. April, 1953.

Deutsch, Karl W. On Communication Models in the Social Sciences. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Gini, Corrado. Intorno all'uso dei Modelli nelle Scienze. *Rivista di Politica Economica*. January, 1953.

Oppenheim, Felix E. Rational Choice. *Journal of Philosophy*. June 4, 1953.

Perryman, J. N. On the Meaning of "Democracy." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Tustin, A. Do Modern Mechanisms Help us to Understand the Mind? *British Journal of Psychology*. February, 1953.

Research Methods and Organization

Katz, Leo. A New Status Index Derived from Sociometric Analysis. *Psychometrika*. March, 1953.

Mann, Floyd and Likert, Rensis. The Need for Research on the Communication of Research Results. *Human Organization*. Winter, 1952.

Social Relations Skills in Field Research. *Journal of Social Issues*. 1952. #3 (whole number).

Symposium: Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics. *American Statistician*. April-May, 1953.

Motivation and Personality

Harvey, John. The Content Characteristics of Best-Selling Novels. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Jahoda, Gustav. Social Class Attitudes and Levels of Occupational Aspiration in Secondary Modern School Leavers. *British Journal of Psychology*. May, 1953.

Kerlinger, Fred N. Behavior and Personality in Japan. *Social Forces*. March, 1953.

Kolb, William L. A Social-Psychological Conception of Human Freedom. *Ethics*. April, 1953.

Mandelbaum, David G. On the Study of National Character. *American Anthropologist*. April-June, 1953.

Miroglio, Abel. Le Discernement de L'Objet dans les Études de Psychologie des Peuples. *Revue de Psychologie des Peuples*. 1952, #4.

Mishler, Elliot G. Personality Characteristics and the Resolution of Role Conflicts. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Reissman, Leonard. Levels of Aspiration and Social Class. *American Sociological Review*. June, 1953.

Scodel, Alvin and Mussen, Paul. Social Perceptions of Authoritarians and Non-Authoritarians. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. April, 1953.

Smith, M. Brewster. Conference on Non-Intellective Determinants of Achievement. *Items*. June, 1953.

Smith, Patricia Cain. The Curve of Output as a Criterion of Boredom. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. April, 1953.

Opinions and Attitudes

Case, Herman M. Guttman Scaling Applied to Centers' Conservatism-Radicalism Battery. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1953.

Congalton, A. A. Social Grading of Occupations in New Zealand. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.

Krugman, Herbert E. The Appeal of Communism to American Middle Class Intellectuals and Trade Unionists. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Leiserson, Avery. Notes on the Theory of Political Opinion Formation. *American Political Science Review*. March, 1953.

Lipset, S. M. Opinion Formation in a Crisis Situation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Miller, Warren E. Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-51. *American Political Science Review*. March, 1953.

Steiner, Ivan D. Some Social Values Associated with Objectively and Subjectively Defined Social Class Memberships. *Social Forces*. May, 1953.

Taft, Ronald. The Shared Frame of Reference Concept Applied to the Assimilation of Immigrants. *Human Relations*. 1953, #1.

Tannenbaum, Percy H. The Effect of Headlines on the Interpretation of News Stories. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Weiss, Walter. A "Sleeper" Effect in Opinion Change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. April, 1953.

Group Behavior

Banerjee, D. N. Political Ideologies and Political Behaviour. *Modern Review* (Calcutta). December, 1952.

Berkowitz, Leonard. Sharing Leadership in Small, Decision-Making Groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. April, 1953.

Cohen, John. Study of Committees and Conferences. *Public Administration*. Winter, 1953.

Comrey, Andrew L.; Pfiffner, John M.; and Beem, Helen P. Factors Influencing Organizational Effectiveness, II. The Department of Employment Survey. *Personnel Psychology*. Spring, 1953.

Cook, P. H. and Wyndham, A. J. Patterns of Eating Behavior: A Study of Industrial Workers. *Human Relations*. 1953, #2.

Green, James W. and Mayo, Selz C. A Framework for Research in the Actions of Community Groups. *Social Forces*. May, 1953.

Haythorn, William. The Influence of Individual Members on the Characteristics of Small Groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. April, 1953.

Jackson, Jay M. The Effect of Changing the Leadership of Small Work Groups. *Human Relations*. 1953, #1.

Jaques, Elliott. On the Dynamics of Social Structure. *Human Relations*. 1953, #1.

Kobre, Sidney. How Florida Dailies Handled the 1952 Presidential Campaign. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Kunnath, Jerome G. and Kerr, Willard A. Function Analysis of Thirty-Two American Corporate Boards. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. April, 1953.

Langrod, Georges. Line, Staff, Auxiliary Services. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. 1952, #3.

Maccoby, Nathan and Hymovitch B. The Effects of Rank on Human Relations. *Air University Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1952-53.

Maier, Norman R. F. An Experimental Test of the Effect of Training on Discussion Leadership. *Human Relations*. 1953, #2.

Miller, Mungo. The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout Prediction. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Perlmutter, Howard V. Group Memory of Meaningful Material. *Journal of Psychology*. April, 1953.

Pfiffner, John M. Research in Organization Effectiveness. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1953.

Sheets, Alfred. Member Participation and Consumer Cooperatives. *Sociology and Social Research*. September-October, 1952.

Showel, Morris. Political Independence in Washington State. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Stokes, William S. Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1952.

Story, M. L. Defining the Administrative Function. *Journal of Educational Research*. January, 1953.

Strauss, George and Sayles, Leonard R. Occupation and the Selection of Local Union Officers. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1953.

Suchman, Edward A. Socio-Psychological Factors Affecting Predictions of Elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Sykes, Gresham. The Structure of Authority. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Theodorson, George A. Elements in the Progressive Development of Small Groups. *Social Forces*. May, 1953.

Willerman, Ben and Swanson, Leonard. Group Prestige in Voluntary Organizations: A Study of College Sororities. *Human Relations*. 1953, #1.

Wyatt, S. A Study of Output in Two Similar Factories. *British Journal of Psychology*. February, 1953.

Culture and Institutions

Barlowe, Raleigh. Land Reform and Economic Development. *Journal of Farm Economics*. May, 1953.

Berelson, Bernard. Democratic Theory and Public Opinion. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Boskoff, Alvin. Postponement of Social Decision in Transitional Society. *Social Forces*. March, 1953.

Carlin, Edward A. Intangible Property as a Tool for Analyzing the Relationships Between Government and Private Enterprise. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. February, 1953.

Centers, Richard. Social Class, Occupation, and Imputed Belief. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1953.

Cony, Edward R. Conflict-Cooperation Content of Five American Dailies. *Journalism Quarterly*. Winter, 1952.

Grossack, Martin. A Study of Attitudes Toward American Policy in Germany. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1952.

Halsey, A. H. and Gardner, L. Selection for Secondary Education and Achievement in Four Grammar Schools. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.

Hazard, John N. Soviet Property Law and Social Change. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1953.

Hope, John, II. Industrial Integration of Negroes: The Upgrading Process. *Human Organization*. Winter, 1952.

Papi, Giuseppe Ugo. Pianificazione Economica in Regime Democratico. *Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia*. November-December, 1952.

Prothro, E. T. and Melikian, L. Social Distance and Social Change in the Near East. *Sociology and Social Research*. September-October, 1952.

Schulz, T. and Wiles, P. Earnings and Living Standards in Moscow. *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*. September-

October, 1952.

Siegfried, André. La Psychologie des Relations Anglo-Allemandes. *Revue de Psychologie des Peuples*. 1952, #4.

Staats, Elmer B. The Government Sector of the American Economy. *American Political Science Review*. March, 1953.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Burkhead, Jesse. Changes in the Functional Distribution of Income. *Journal of American Statistical Association*. June, 1953.

Frankel, Charles. Empiricism and Moral Imperatives. *Journal of Philosophy*. April 23, 1953.

Jarman, T. L. Dilemma in Modern Education. *National and English Review*. January, 1953.

Koivisto, W. A. Value, Theory, and Fact in Industrial Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1953.

Peacock, Alan T. Theory of Population and Modern Economic Analysis. *Population Studies*. November, 1952.

de Schweinitz, Karl, Jr. Free Enterprise and Democracy. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.

Shepherd, Geoffrey. What Should Go Into the Parity Price Formula? *Journal of Farm Economics*. May, 1953.

Singer, H. W. Obstacles to Economic Development. *Social Research*. Spring, 1953.

Steer, W. S. Measuring the Public Services. *Public Administration*. Winter, 1952.

Steiner, Jesse F. Japan's Post-War Population Problems. *Social Forces*. March, 1953.

Walhout, Donald. Objectivity and Value. *Journal of Philosophy*. May 7, 1953.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

BOWEN, E. R. *The Cooperative Road to Abundance: The Alternative to Monopolism and Communism*. New York: Henry Schuman. 1953. Pp. xiii, 169. \$3.00.

BOYD, JULIAN P. (ED.), BUTTERFIELD, LYMAN H. AND BRYAN, MINA R. (ASSOC. EDS.). *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Vol. 5: 25 February 1781 to 20 May 1781. Vol. 6: 21 May 1781 to 1 March 1784. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xxxv, 705; xxxvi, 684. \$10.00; \$10.00.

BOYLE, GEORGE. *Father Tompkins of Nova Scotia*. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons. 1953. Pp. xii, 234. \$3.00.

BRYSON, LYMAN (ED.). *Facing the Future's*

Risks: Studies Toward Predicting the Unforeseen. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1953. Pp. viii, 318. \$4.00.

BÜHLER, OTTMAR, NEUMARK, FRITZ, AND LADEMANN, FRITZ. *Internationaler Steuerbelastungsvergleich. Band II*. Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik. 1952. Pp. 178.

CRAVEN, WESLEY FRANK AND CATE, JAMES LEA (EDS.). *The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume Five: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xxxvii, 878. \$8.50.

EATON, JOHN. *Economics of Peace and War:*

- An Analysis of Britain's Economic Problems.* New York: International Publishers. 1953. Pp. 112. \$1.50.
- EEBERT, MARY LOIS AND SCHNEPP, GERALD J. *Industrialism and the Popes.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons. 1953. Pp. xxii, 245. \$3.50.
- FERNET, VICE-AMIRAL. *Aux Côtés du Maréchal Pétain: Souvenirs (1940-1944).* Paris: Librairie Plon. 1953. Pp. vii, 309.
- FOURASTIÉ, JEAN. *Le Grand Espoir du XX^e Siècle.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. xxviii, 245. 560 fr.
- GALBRAITH, W. O. *Colombia: A General Survey.* New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953. Pp. vii, 140. \$2.50.
- GEMMELL, JAMES AND BALSLEY, HOWARD L. *Principles of Economics.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Co. 1953. Pp. xiii, 589. \$4.75.
- GOLDMAN, ERIC F. *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xlv, 503. \$5.00.
- HARDER, LELAND AND HARDER, MARVIN. *Plockhoy from Zurich-Zee: The Study of a Dutch Reformer in Puritan England and Colonial America.* Newton, Kansas: Board of Education and Publication, General Conference Mennonite Church. 1952. Pp. x, 255.
- HART, B. H. LIDDELL (ED.). *The Rommel Papers.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1953. Pp. xxx, 545. \$6.00.
- HERZFELD, HANS (REVISED BY). *Die Moderne Welt: 1789-1945. II. Teil: 1890-1945.* Braunschweig: Georg Westermann. 1952. Pp. viii, 392.
- JOHNSON, F. ERNEST (ED.). *American Education and Religion: The Problem of Religion in Schools.* New York: Harper and Brothers. 1953. Pp. ix, 211. \$2.00.
- MCCORMICK, ROBERT R. *The American Empire.* Chicago: Chicago Tribune. 1952. Pp. 120. \$2.50.
- MCNALL, EDWARD. *David Starr Jordan: Prophet of Freedom.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 243. \$5.00.
- MEDIGER, WALTHER. *Moskaus Weg Nach Europa: Der Aufstieg Russlands zum Europäischen Machtstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen.* Braunschweig: Georg Westermann. 1952. Pp. xv, 744.
- MEDLIN, WILLIAM-KENNETH. *Moscow and East Rome: A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia.* Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestlé. 1952. Pp. xv, 252.
- MINER, HORACE. *The Primitive City of Timbuctoo.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xix, 297. \$5.00.
- NAFTALIN, ARTHUR, NELSON, BENJAMIN N., SIBLEY, MULFORD Q., AND CALHOUN, DONALD C. (SELECTED, WRITTEN, AND EDITED BY), PAPANDEOU, ANDREAS G. (ASST.). *An Introduction to Social Science: Personality, Work, Community.* Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1953. Pp. xlvii, 373.
- PARKES, HENRY BAMFORD. *The United States of America: A History.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1953. Pp. xlv, 773. \$5.75.
- POUND, ROSCOE. *The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times with Particular Reference to the Development of Bar Associations in the United States.* St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1953. Pp. xxxii, 404. \$5.00.
- SEELY, CHARLES S. *Philosophy and the Ideological Conflict: An Analysis of Idealism and Materialism and the Influence of These Philosophies on the Over-All World Struggle between Capitalism and Socialism.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. vii, 319. \$5.00.
- SOMERVELL, D. C. *Modern Britain: 1870-1950.* London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. Distributed by the British Book Centre, New York. 1953. Pp. ix, 266. \$2.75.
- THOMSON, S. HARRISON. *Czechoslovakia in European History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2nd ed. 1953. Pp. x, 485. \$7.50.
- TIMMONS, BASCOM N. *Portrait of an American: Charles Gates Dawes.* New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1953. Pp. vi, 344. \$5.00.
- UNITED NATIONS: ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST. *Mobilization of Domestic Capital in Certain Countries of Asia and the Far East.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. xii, 239. \$1.50.
- VON MISES, LUDWIG. *The Theory of Money and Credit.* New Haven: Yale University Press. New edition. 1953. Pp. ix, 493. \$5.00.
- WORCESTER, DEAN A., JR. *Fundamentals of Political Economy.* New York: Ronald Press Co. 1953. Pp. xv, 594. \$4.50.
- WORKING PARTY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The Economic Development of Mexico.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 392. \$10.00.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The International Political Science Association, in conjunction with a meeting of its executive committee, sponsored a Round-table Conference on Comparative Public Administration in Paris, June 10-12, organized by Taylor Cole of Duke University. At a session on "New Areas for Research in Public Administration," Dean Edward H. Litchfield of Cornell University and Charles S. Ascher of the Public Administration Clearing House presented the current thought of a subcommittee on comparative administration of the committee on public administration of the American Political Science Association and the results of the Conference on Comparative Administration convened by Public Administration Clearing House in September, 1952. Other political scientists taking part from the United States were: Mrs. Jane Clark Carey, now resident in Rome; Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard University; and John A. Vieg, Pomona College. About twenty-five participated, including political scientists from Brazil, India, and Israel, as well as Western Europe.

The New England Political Science Association held its annual meeting at Amherst College, May 9, 1953, with an estimated 125 in attendance. The morning session discussed "National Interest as a Goal in International Relations," with a panel comprising Professors Earl Latham, Amherst College, chairman; Arnold Wolfers, Yale University; Karl Loewenstein, Amherst College; Sigmund Neumann, Wesleyan University; Alan Burr Overstreet, Smith College; McGeorge Bundy, Harvard University; and Daniel Cheever, Harvard University. The panel in the afternoon session on "The Role of Public Opinion in the Making of Foreign Policy" consisted of Professors Robert Dahl, Yale University, chairman; Ruth Lawson, Mount Holyoke College; Walter Filley, Wesleyan University; and John Wahlke, Amherst College. The following officers were elected for 1953-1954: Professor Earl Latham, Amherst College, president; Professor Andrew Nuquist, University of Vermont, vice-president; Professor Donald Matthews, Smith College, secretary-treasurer; The Rev. George A. Higgins, Holy Cross, Professor Athern Dagget, Bowdoin, Professor

Lowell Field, University of Connecticut, members of the executive council.

The Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists was held May 7-9 at Michigan State College with an attendance of 261 persons. The theme of the conference was "Group Relations in the Political Process," which was the topic of the address by David B. Truman of Columbia University at the opening general session. Pendleton Herring, President of the American Political Science Association, addressed a luncheon meeting on the activities and plans of the Association. A general round table on the subject "Is Pressure Group Activity Contrary to the Public Interest?" was also included in the program. Sectional round-table discussions were held on the following topics: "Theory of Group Relations," "Methods and Techniques in the Area of Parties, Elections and Public Opinion," "Influence of Organized Groups on Foreign Policy," "Groups in Federal-Municipal Relations," and "The Law and Its Relationship to Social Groups." The officers selected by the conference included: Harry W. Voltmer of DePauw University, president; Jasper B. Shannon of the University of Kentucky, vice-president; A. LeRoy Bennett of Michigan State College, secretary-treasurer; Wilfred E. Binkley of Ohio Northern University and Rudolph E. Morris of Marquette University, members of the executive council. The 1954 meeting of the Conference will be held at the University of Iowa, April 29 through May 1.

The Western Political Science Association met on March 30 and 31, on the campus of the University of Southern California. The following are the Association's newly elected officers: president, John Swarthout, Oregon State College; vice-president, Herman Trachsel, University of Wyoming; council members: Paul Hadley, University of Southern California; Egbert Wengert, University of Oregon; Curtis Martin, University of Colorado; and Totton J. Anderson, ex-officio. Officers retaining their positions for another year include secretary-treasurer Allan R. Richards, University of New Mexico, and council members Thomas Barclay, Stanford University; M. R. Merrill,

Utah State Agricultural College; and Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington. In 1954 the Association will hold a joint meeting with the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association at Oregon State College, Corvallis, Oregon. The Association amended its constitution to provide that the retiring president will serve in an ex-officio capacity on the executive council for a one-year period.

The Sixth Annual Meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association was held at the University of Washington, April 10-11, 1953. "Research and Revaluation" was the general theme of the meeting, which gave attention to revised policies under the new Administration. Four round tables were devoted to the following subjects: "Sectional and Economic Aspects of American Foreign Policy," "Political Characteristics of the Pacific Northwest: A Challenge to Research," "Conservatism Revisited," and "Natural Resources Research." New officers elected for 1953-54 are: Maure L. Goldschmidt, Reed College, president; Kline Swygard, Oregon State College, vice-president; Jonathan R. Cunningham, Spokane County, Washington, Planning Commission, secretary-treasurer. New members of the executive council include: Daniel O. Ogden, Jr., Washington State College; Boyd A. Martin, University of Idaho; and Waldo Schumacher, University of Oregon. Among the resolutions adopted by the Association was the following: "Resolved that the American Political Science Association hold its annual meeting in 1956 and each fifth year thereafter in one of the eleven Western states." Copies of this resolution were sent to the executive council of the American Political Science Association for consideration.

Political science teachers of institutions which form the University Center in Georgia (Agnes Scott College, Emory University, Oglethorpe University, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and the University of Georgia) assembled for the first time in May on the campus of Emory University. Professor Cullen B. Gosnell of Emory was elected chairman of the group. Morris W. H. Collins, Jr., assistant professor of political science at the University of Georgia, was elected vice-chairman, and Catherine S. Sims, associate professor of history and political science at Agnes Scott College, was elected secretary. Plans were made for the group to assemble at least twice each year to discuss common problems faced in the

teaching of political science in the University Center institutions.

The Sixth Annual Conference of the William Edgar Borah Outlawry of War Foundation on "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace" was held at the University of Idaho on March 18, 1953. The attention of the conference was directed to the Mutual Security and Technical Assistance Programs as positive projects in solving the problems of war and peace. A paper by William L. Shirer, entitled "America's Role in Building Global Prosperity and Peace," was presented to the Foundation. "Building Peace and Prosperity in Asia" was the subject of a second address delivered by Kenneth Lindsay, and H. L. Keenleyside, Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration, United Nations, also addressed the conference on "The Impending Crisis." More than one hundred students and scholars representing study and interest groups through the entire Northwest attended the conference. Following each address there was a series of panel discussions relating to the major subject under consideration.

The department of political science and the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, jointly sponsored a two-session institute on "The Illinois General Assembly" during the latter part of April. The principal speakers were Warren L. Wood, Speaker, and Paul Powell, Minority Leader, of the House of Representatives; and George E. Drach, Majority Whip, and William J. Lynch, Minority Leader, of the Illinois State Senate. The purpose of the institute was to promote a better understanding on the part of University students of legislative procedure and of the role of political parties in the General Assembly.

A Management Conference was held June 4-5, 1953, at the University of New Mexico under the joint sponsorship of the University, the Society for Public Administration, and the Federal Personnel Council. Harold O. Ried of the University of New Mexico was the presiding chairman and Edward P. Ancona was the chairman of the committee on arrangements. Principal speakers were: Tom L. Popejoy, president of the University of New Mexico; Wallace S. Sayre, City College of New York; Milton M. Mandell, U. S. Civil Service Commission; Paul R. Beall, Air Research and Development Command at Baltimore; Elwood M. Brooks, president of the Central Bank and Trust Company of Denver; T. E. Shea, general

manager of the Sandia Corporation at Albuquerque; Albert H. Rosenthal, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Denver; and H. N. Oldham, operating manager of the Southern Union Gas Company, Dallas. The theme of the conference concerned human relations in management, especially as it influences policy formation. Because of heavy attendance, active support from both public and private organizations, and grass-root demand, the University of New Mexico intends to make the conference an annual event and to expand its program of conferences and related activities in the social sciences.

The problem of fitting lawyers, engineers and other "specialists" for important managerial positions in both industry and government was discussed during a special six-weeks executive development conference, sponsored by the School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University. John J. Corson, manager of the Washington office of McKinsey and Company and former director of the U. S. Employment Service, directed the program, with the assistance of Richard E. Neustadt, assistant professor of public administration, School of Business and Public Administration. The teaching staff was drawn both from the faculty of the School and from outside specialists. The latter included: James D. Mooney, president of the F. L. Jacobs Company and formerly president of General Motors Overseas Corporation; James M. Mitchell, former U. S. Civil Service Commissioner and now deputy assistant secretary for manpower and personnel in the Department of Defense; Earl Brooks, assistant dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations; Carl J. Friedrich, professor of government at Harvard, and others. The group of twenty-five representatives of middle and top business and governmental management met together in a series of seminars from July 13 through August 22. Among the topics considered were policy formulation and administration, personnel and human relations, finance, economic and political trends, and managerial responsibility.

The Citizenship Clearing House for Southern New York held its first annual conference on "The University and Student Political Par-

ticipation" on April 24-25 at the New York University Law Center. Representatives from fifteen colleges and universities in the Southern New York area attended and prominent persons holding public and party office participated in the proceedings. The principal address was delivered by the Honorable Emanuel Celler. Professor Ray F. Harvey, director of the Citizenship Clearing House for Southern New York, presided.

The annual meetings of the Social Science Section of the Ohio College Association were held in Columbus, March 19-20. Harvey C. Mansfield, president for 1952-53, arranged the program, featuring a panel discussion of movie censorship in Ohio; papers by Professors John F. Cady of Ohio University and Kazuo Kawai of the Ohio State University, on current problems in Southeast Asia and in Japan; and a debate on the role of the minority party in national politics in which Professor Norton E. Long of Western Reserve University participated. Professor Donovan F. Emch, University of Toledo, was elected vice-president for the coming year and Mona Fletcher, Kent State University, secretary-treasurer.

The Pennsylvania State College held its Second Institute of World Affairs and International Cooperation during the summer session, June 30 to August 8. A three-credit course on International Understanding, open to graduate and advanced undergraduate students, was given by Dr. Richard Heindel, on leave from his position as deputy director of the UNESCO Relations Staff of the Department of State in Washington, D. C. The Institute offered several supplementary programs, including a three-day conference on the Point Four and Technical Assistance Programs; weekly lectures by prominent specialists, including Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States, and Professors Hans J. Morgenthau, Otto Klineberg, and F. S. C. Northrop; weekly round tables by Penn State faculty members on various problems of international affairs; and special programs featuring international films, music, and art. Elton Atwater, associate professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State College, was the general coordinator of the Institute activities.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The University of Puerto Rico is currently celebrating its 50th anniversary and several

political scientists have been active in this event. The President of the University is Dr.

Jaime Benitez, who received his professional training in political science at the University of Chicago. Professor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University is a member of the University's board of trustees. Among those to whom honorary degrees were given in the March and June convocations were President Grayson Kirk of Columbia University and Professor Rexford Tugwell of the University of Chicago. Marshall Dimock, a visiting professor at the University during the second semester of 1953, gave a public address on "The Place of the University in the Community" as part of the 50th anniversary ceremonies.

This University now has a total enrollment of around 12,000 students, a budget of nearly \$11,000,000, and a faculty of 600. Most of this rapid increase has occurred during the past ten to fifteen years. The University now has first-class medical and law schools and professional schools of every kind. Like the University of Chicago and similar institutions, the University of Puerto Rico is divided structurally into divisions dealing with the social sciences, the physical sciences, the humanities, etc.; these divisions are served by a general college emphasizing integrated knowledge and broad cultural preparation. An unusual feature is the integration of most of the professional schools with the divisions of the University with which they are logically associated. Thus, for example, the Schools of Public Administration, Social Work, and the Institute of Labor Relations are headed by supervisory officials, but all report to, and have their policies determined by, the Dean of the Social Sciences, Dr. Pedro Muñoz Amato. Dean Muñoz Amato was trained in political science at the Universities of Chicago and Harvard and was the director of the research staff that helped draft the Commonwealth Constitution of Puerto Rico. He is presently a visiting professor at the Vargas School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro, which operates in conjunction with the United Nations program in public administration.

Another feature of the University of Puerto Rico is its Social Science Research Center, headed by Dr. Millard Hansen, formerly of the University of Chicago. This integrated research program has a current annual budget of approximately \$100,000 and is engaged in basic research which is related to Puerto Rico's development program. Samples of recent studies are labor relations (Lloyd Rey-

nolds, Yale), retail distribution problems (J. K. Galbraith, Harvard), family life in Puerto Rico (Reuben Hill, University of North Carolina), and population studies (Paul K. Hatt, Northwestern University, and Melvin Tumin, Princeton University). Several of the major continental foundations, such as Carnegie and Rockefeller, have been active in the support of this work. Recently the director of the Center, Millard Hansen, edited a special issue of *The Annals* entitled, "Puerto Rico, A Study in Democratic Development."

The University has also become one of the main world centers of Point Four training. During the past few years, students from no less than fifty-two countries have done work at the University of Puerto Rico. In addition, close relations are being established with Latin-American countries. During the current semester, for example, there are students from Bolivia, Brazil, and other countries of Latin America, studying in the School of Public Administration. This School has ten full-time instructors and an additional five who are drawn from the government, making it one of the largest programs of its kind in the United States.—MARSHALL E. DIMOCK.

A team of historians and political scientists at the Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University, has undertaken an exploration of the process of political integration. The method used by the team involves historical case studies in six areas where major processes of political integration or its opposite have taken place, plus the development of an analytical framework to serve as a guide in the search for relevant data in each case and as a basis for deriving common inferences from the several cases. The areas studied are the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Swedish-Norwegian union, and the Austro-Hungarian empire.

The political scientists are Professor Richard Van Wagenen, director of the Center, and Professor Karl W. Deutsch, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is currently spending a year at Princeton on this project. The historians are Professors Robert A. Kann of Rutgers University, Raymond E. Lindgren of the University of Wisconsin, Sidney A. Burrell of Barnard College, and Maurice duP. Lee of Princeton, and Dr. Martin Lichterman and Dr. Francis L. Loewenheim. Meetings have been held with

scholars of various disciplines on the Princeton faculty and elsewhere while the case studies are proceeding.

The intermediate object of the study is to obtain clues from history as to how independent political units became so closely integrated into larger units that they formed security-communities, in the sense that war ceased within their borders. The ultimate object is to apply these findings to the present problem of international organization, including at the outset the special problem of Western European integration.

The University of Minnesota has received a grant from the Citizenship Clearing House, affiliated with the Law Center of New York University, for the establishment of a local citizenship clearing house in Minneapolis. The local program will be in charge of Professors A. N. Christensen and Arthur E. Naftalin.

The Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Georgia conducted a four-weeks basic training course for highway patrolmen in May and June, 1953. This was the first step in what is projected as a comprehensive police training program at the University of Georgia.

The Carnegie Corporation has announced a grant of \$90,000 to Northwestern University to be expended during a three-year period in development of the graduate and undergraduate curriculum in political science. The grant was made after submission of a statement of plans for curricular revision which was prepared by a committee of the political science department under the chairmanship of Professor Roland Young. The preliminary statement of the department's goals in curricular revision include:

For graduate instruction and training: (1) Greater emphasis on a comprehensive preparation as distinguished from narrower specialization in the requirements for the Ph.D. degree; (2) the preparation of a small number (perhaps four) core courses for graduate students only, all of which will ordinarily be taken by each candidate for the Ph.D., and which collectively will examine the main items of literature and confront the student with main areas of inquiry in government and politics; (3) planning of seminars which provide training for empirical inquiry and theoretic analysis in various problem-areas of political science; (4) a more satisfactory relating of instruction and training in political science to graduate in-

struction and training in other social science departments of the University; and (5) a more fruitful utilization of the results of contemporary research and thoughtful writing in the instruction and training of graduate students.

For undergraduate instruction and training: (1) Generally, the replacement of courses of narrower or more specialized subject matter by a smaller number of courses of more central concern; (2) the preparation of a foundation course for undergraduates which supplies fundamental knowledge and theory and develops the concepts which appear to be most essential for examining political phenomena, whether in later courses or in non-academic situations; (3) the preparation of courses for seniors which require them to utilize their instruction in political science and other subjects in examination of significant contemporary problems; and (4) a more satisfactory adjustment of attention to individual student needs with the exigencies of large student enrollments.

The funds made available by Carnegie Corporation will make possible, among other things, the following: (1) replacement of the Northwestern faculty in its teaching obligations while they are engaged in curriculum development; (2) bringing to Northwestern for limited periods of time persons with significant academic and non-academic experience who will contribute to curriculum development and the current teaching and training program; (3) conferences in which small groups examine problems in graduate and undergraduate instruction and training; and (4) visits by Northwestern faculty to other colleges, universities, and non-academic centers where important developments are taking place in teaching and research.

The American University has announced a second unit of the Washington Semester, a cooperative honors program administered by the American University in cooperation with other colleges throughout the country. Colleges and universities now participating in the Washington Semester are: Alfred, Augustana, Boston University, Cornell College, Davidson, Drew, Earlham, Grinnell, Hunter, Lake Forest, Monmouth, Nebraska Wesleyan, Park, Pennsylvania College for Women, Rockford, Rollins, Shepherd, Simpson, Stetson, Swarthmore, Redlands, Valparaiso, Washburn, Washington College, and Western Reserve. Robert L. Goostree has been appointed

assistant professor of political science and public administration to serve as academic director of Unit II of the Washington Semester. William E. Biggs will continue as academic director of Unit I. Lowell H. Hattery will serve as coordinator of the program.

CONGRESSIONAL INTERNE PROGRAM

After an intensive series of screenings and interviews by twelve regional boards throughout the country, six Congressional Internes were selected in mid-June to start their work in Washington, D. C. on September 1. This is the first year that the Association has sponsored a Congressional Interne program, which is being carried forward on a three-year experimental basis. Competition for the next group of Internes will be announced early in 1954.

Those named in the first group of Congressional Internes are the following:

Mrs. Marie S. Carl, St. Augustine, Fla., is a graduate of Clark College of Atlanta, Ga. She received a master's degree from the University of Michigan and an LL.B. from the Yale School of Law.

Abraham Holtzman, Los Angeles, Calif., is a graduate of Los Angeles City College, and also received an A.B. and an M.A. from the University of California at Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard and is an instructor in the department of government at Dartmouth College.

Mavis A. Mann, Morgantown, W. Va., is a graduate of West Virginia University and received a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina. She is an assistant professor of government at West Virginia University.

Harry H. Ransom, Sewanee, Tenn., is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, with an M.A. degree from Princeton. He was an instructor in the department of political science at Vassar College from 1948-1952, and is completing his Ph.D. at Princeton.

Ben F. Reeves, Bowling Green, Ky., is a graduate of the University of Kentucky, and completed a year of graduate work in political science at that university. He is a political reporter for the *Louisville Courier-Journal*.

H. Bradford Westerfield, Hamden, Conn., is a graduate of Yale with highest honors. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard, where he is now an instructor in the department of government.

The following alternates were announced, in addition to the six successful candidates:

Otto P. C. Press, Minneapolis, Minn., is a graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism, with a master's degree from the University of Minnesota.

Robert S. Friedman, Urbana, Illinois, is a graduate of Johns Hopkins, and is an assistant in political science at the University of Illinois.

Rob Roy Ratliff, Joplin, Mo., is a graduate of American University, where he also holds a master's degree and has been a lecturer in the department of political science.

Marvin A. Harder, Wichita, Kansas, is a graduate of the University of Wichita and has a master's degree from Columbia. He is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Wichita.

Francis M. Carney, Los Angeles, Calif., is a graduate of the University of Southern California, with a master's degree from Stanford. He is a teaching assistant at the University of California at Los Angeles.

The six Congressional Internes appeared on various panel discussions at the Annual Meeting of the Association. Their first two months will be spent in handling inquiries at the Legislative Reference Service and in getting an intensive orientation in the problems to face them in their later work with congressional committees and in the offices of House and Senate Members. Considerable time is being spent in meetings with Capitol Hill officials, and in acquainting the Internes with the literature with which they will deal in their work. Weekly seminar meetings are being held throughout the year, enabling the Internes to discuss their varied experiences and meet with congressional staff and other experts.

Three of the Internes are being assigned to House Committees and three to Senate Committees, according to their own preferences and the availability of openings. The demand from both committees and individual members of Congress has far exceeded the supply of Internes. About March 1, 1954 the Internes will commence their work in the offices of individual Members of Congress, those having worked with House Committees being assigned to Senators and vice versa. By chance rather than design, assignments are being made to three Democratic and three Republican Members.—KENNETH W. HECHLER.

The library of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation has been donated to the University of California (Los Angeles) and will be administered by the

Bureau of Government Research. Valuable materials in the library include the Franklin Hichborn Collection on California legislation and politics, and papers on direct legislation, state and local planning, and municipal government in California.

The Institute for Social Research of Oslo, Norway, has announced the joint award of first prize to Quincy Wright, of the University of Chicago, and Fred Cottrell, of Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, for essays submitted on the subject "The Relevance of Research to a Science of Peace." The amount of the award was ten thousand kroner. The contest was open to scholars in all parts of the world and many areas were represented in the entries. The winning essays will be published shortly.

James K. Pollock, professor and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Michigan, assisted by three members of the departmental staff, Henry Bretton, Daniel S. McHargue and Frank Grace, directed a field survey of the 1953 Bundestag elections in the German Federal Republic. The project, financed by a foundation grant, was designed both for the purpose of studying a crucial election in a pivotal country and to provide training in the techniques of field research in the area of parties and elections.

At the request of the Air Force ROTC, Rowland Egger of the University of Virginia, Robert S. Rankin of Duke University, and Kenneth W. Hechler of the Association office, spent May 4-6 at the Air University reviewing text material for the Air ROTC course in "International Tensions and Security Organizations."

Charles S. Ascher, chairman of the department of political science, Brooklyn College, and associate director, Public Administration Clearing House, during the summer participated in a round table of the International Political Science Association on comparative administration in Paris; in the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities in Vienna, where he talked on "The U. N. and Local Government"; and the Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Istanbul, where he served as rapporteur for a session on "Ethics of the Civil Service."

Arnold Brecht, of the New School for Social

Research, who had been a ministerial director in German ministries from 1921 to 1933, has been honored by the Bonn Government through a retroactive appointment to state secretary (retired) in recognition of his services to the Weimar Republic.

William S. Carpenter, professor of politics, Princeton University, addressed the New York Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration at Albany on February 11, 1953, on "Current Problems of Civil Service Reform."

Asher N. Christensen, of the University of Minnesota, served during the week of June 1-6, 1953, as one of a panel of political scientists, representing the field of American government, in an exploration of the possibilities of adult education through television facilities at Iowa State College.

Karl W. Deutsch, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the field of political science. In February he moved to Princeton University for a year to work with a group of historians and political scientists at the Center for Research on World Political Institutions. During the spring he gave a number of talks on communication theory and social science at the University of Toronto, Columbia University, and other institutions.

Oscar Jászi, professor emeritus of political science at Oberlin College and former chairman of the department, was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by that institution at the 120th anniversary commencement exercises on June 8. The citation was as follows: "Oscar Jászi, staunch champion of the rights of man, wise and experienced author and scholar in the theory and practice of state-craft, beloved and inspiring teacher of generations of Oberlin students: in the name of Oberlin College I confer upon you the degree of Doctor of Laws."

Walter H. C. Laves, vice-president of the Governmental Affairs Institute, has been appointed secretary-general of a conference on "Organization and Administration of Public Enterprise in the Industrial Field" to be held under the auspices of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the Far East. The conference, jointly sponsored by the UN Technical Assistance Administration, ECAFE, and

the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, will be held in Rangoon in March of 1954. Mr. Laves has been in South Asia during July of this year to consult with the governments of the area concerning their needs and interests in the Conference.

Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University, spent the summer of 1953 at the University of Tokyo giving lectures on American political thought before the Seminar in American Studies, under the joint auspices of the University of Tokyo and Stanford University.

Dean E. McHenry, professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), delivered an address on "Professors and Politics" at the Conference on Citizen Participation in Politics held at International House, Berkeley, California, in April, 1953. The University of California (Berkeley) was host institution to the conference, which was sponsored by the Citizenship Clearing House.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, who is now in India as a visiting professor on a Fulbright grant, delivered a series of twelve lectures on international affairs at Lucknow University during the last week in February, under the auspices of the law faculty and the department of political science. In March, he visited the University of Ceylon and Madras University under the auspices of UNESCO. At each of these universities he gave lectures and consulted with officials of the administration and with members of the faculty. Later in March he went to West Pakistan, where he consulted with administration officials and faculty members of the University of the Punjab, Forman Christian College, and Government College in Lahore; he delivered a lecture at the Law College of the University of Peshawar, and participated in a four-day "Colloquium on Learning in the Twentieth Century" at Peshawar University,

under the joint sponsorship of the University and the United States Education Foundation/Pakistan.

George A. Peek, Jr., assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, was the 1953 recipient of the 1919 Literary Class Award which is given annually to the outstanding teacher among the junior professors in the College of Literature, Science and the Arts. The award carries a stipend of \$1000.

Frances Perkins, former Secretary of Labor (1933-1945) and U. S. Civil Service Commissioner (1946-1953), served as visiting lecturer at the University of Illinois during the period from April 13 to May 22, 1953. Miss Perkins appeared under the joint sponsorship of the department of political science, the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, the School of Social Work and the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. In addition to one general university lecture on "The Roosevelt I Knew," Miss Perkins conducted fourteen seminar sessions on subjects in the general fields of federal civil service, labor, social security, and political pressures on administration.

Lindsay Rogers, of Columbia University, delivered the Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago during the spring of 1953.

Donald C. Stone, former special assistant to the Director for Mutual Security, has been appointed President of Springfield College, Springfield, Massachusetts.

Eric Voegelin has recently been designated a Boyd Professor, a newly created category of professorships at Louisiana State University for recognizing distinguished and outstanding services to scholarship.

Paul W. Wager, professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, has been elected to the Chapel Hill Board of Aldermen for a term of four years.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Henry J. Abraham has been promoted to assistant professor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Robert Agger, recently of the University of Oregon, has been given a one-year appoint-

ment as instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina.

Benjamin Aksin, Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science and Constitutional Law and Dean of the Law School at the Hebrew

University in Jerusalem, filled a visiting professorship at the University of Michigan during the summer of 1953. He lectured on the government of Israel and participated in public law seminars in the University of Michigan School of Law.

Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., who has served during the past two years in the American Embassy in Rome, has returned to Williams College as professor and chairman of the department of political science.

George I. Blanksten, of Northwestern University, is on leave of absence until January, 1954, participating in a study of the effect of Point Four programs upon the countries of Latin America. This investigation is being financed by the Ford Foundation and is being directed by Professor Theodore W. Schultz of the University of Chicago.

W. Theodore Bluhm, of the University of Rochester, has accepted an appointment at Brown University as instructor of political science.

Frank R. Brandenburg, instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, has been awarded the Frederic Courtland Penfield Travelling Fellowship and the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Fellowship for Research on Political Parties in Mexico. During 1953-54 he will be on leave from the University of Pennsylvania to spend the year in Mexico.

Ben G. Burnett, formerly a member of the faculty at Kent State University, has accepted a position as instructor of political science at Whittier College, beginning in September, 1953. His work will include courses in Latin-American government and politics.

James M. Burns has been promoted to the rank of full professor at Williams College.

Paul Camp, personnel adviser to the Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service, has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor of public administration at the American University.

William N. Cassella has been awarded the National Municipal League Staff Fellowship for 1953-54 and is on leave from the department of political science at the University of Missouri for that period.

H. Paul Castleberry, assistant professor of

political science at the State College of Washington, will spend the 1953-54 academic year at American University in Cairo under a Fulbright award lecturing in the field of international relations.

David T. Cattell has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

James C. Charlesworth, professor of political science and supervisor of the educational program of the Institute of Local and State Government at the University of Pennsylvania, assumed the presidency of the American Academy of Political and Social Science on June 1. He was elected to this post upon the retirement of Dr. Ernest Minor Patterson, internationally noted economist who served as president of the Academy since 1930. During the past several years Professor Charlesworth has been identified with the work of the Academy as associate editor of *The Annals*.

John L. Chase, recently of Brown University, has been given a one-year appointment as visiting lecturer in political science at the University of North Carolina.

Harwood L. Childs, professor of politics, Princeton University, has been granted a year's leave of absence to accept an appointment to the faculty of the School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro for 1953-54. The School was established by the United Nations in cooperation with the Brazilian Government and the Vargas Foundation in 1952 in connection with the Technical Assistance program of the U.N. Professor Childs will give lectures and seminars in government public relations.

James B. Christoph, instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, has been granted a Fulbright award for a year's study at the London School of Economics. He plans to study the political rights of state workers in Great Britain.

Dorothy I. Cline, assistant professor of government at the University of New Mexico, was recently appointed a member of the newly created Advisory Board to the New Mexico Land Commissioner's Office.

Morris H. Cohen has been promoted to associate professor of government at Clark University. Mr. Cohen, who returned to Clark in the fall of 1952 after a year in Washington,

D. C. and Chicago on a Ford Foundation grant, was director of a program of a team of civic leaders from Neumuenster, Germany, who spent two weeks in March, 1953 in Worcester under the sponsorship of the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Joseph D. Cooper, executive director, Salary Stabilization Board, is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

Brownlee S. Corrin has been reappointed to the staff of the political science department of Goucher College. During 1953-54, he will present a course in politics using the internship technique in political party offices and civic organizations in the Baltimore area.

Edward S. Corwin, formerly of Princeton University, has accepted an appointment as visiting professor on the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research. During the second semester of 1953-54, Professor Corwin will teach at Whittier College where he will offer work in contemporary aspects of national constitutional law.

L. Gray Cowan, assistant professor of government at Columbia University, has been granted a two-years' leave of absence to undertake a study of comparative colonial administration in the British, French and Belgian territories of Central Africa.

Winston W. Crouch, University of California (Los Angeles), has been named President of the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. Professor Crouch has also been appointed to the board of trustees of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation.

Robert F. Cushman has resigned his assistant professorship at the Ohio State University to become associate professor at New York University, where he will give the graduate courses in public law at Washington Square.

A. P. Daggett, of Bowdoin College, was a visiting professor at Columbia University during the summer session.

Melvin D. Davidoff, head, Research and Analysis, Test Development Section, U. S. Civil Service Commission, is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

James C. Davies, Carnegie Fellow in Political Science at the University of Michigan

Survey Research Center, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the California Institute of Technology.

Herbert A. Deane has been appointed assistant professor of government at Columbia University.

John T. Dempsey, who has spent the past two years in graduate work at the University of Michigan, has rejoined the staff of the department of political science at the University of Detroit.

Nicolas de Rochefort is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

Conley H. Dillon, who has been on leave in Washington with the Office of Price Stabilization, resumed his duties in June as professor and head of the department of political science at Marshall College.

Richard W. Dodge, who has recently completed his doctorate at the University of Michigan, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of social studies at Case Institute of Technology.

Paul S. Dull resumed his duties in September at the University of Oregon after a year's sabbatical leave. Professor Dull spent the major part of the past year in Japan studying the impact of the war, occupation, and recent political changes in local government in Japan.

John Eaves, Jr. has been awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship to study at the School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London.

Charles P. Edwards, formerly of the University of Connecticut and Tufts College, is teaching this year in the department of government at the University of New Hampshire.

Harold E. Engle, who is completing his dissertation for the doctorate at Columbia University, has joined the staff of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions at Princeton University for the year 1953-54 as research assistant. Mr. Engle was with the Center on a half-time basis during the past year.

David G. Farrelly, assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), has received a grant from the Social Science Research Council to supervise an undergraduate student project on California electoral behavior.

Milton Feder has been appointed pre-doctoral instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Russell H. Fifield, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who is spending a sabbatical year studying foreign policy in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, has been appointed to a consultants'hip on this area in the U. S. Department of State.

Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., assistant professor of politics, Princeton University, has returned from a year in Paris under a Social Science Research Council Faculty Fellowship and a Bicentennial Preceptorship. While in France he worked on particular aspects of the French foreign policy under the Fourth Republic.

Peter Gay has received an appointment as assistant professor in Columbia College.

John J. George, professor of political science at Rutgers University, was a visiting professor at Emory University during the summer quarter, 1953.

Frank K. Gibson, formerly an instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina, has been appointed to a research assistantship in the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Virginia.

Juanita Gibson, instructor in the School of Public Administration at Florida State College, spent the academic year 1952-53 on work toward the doctorate at the University of Michigan.

E. Drexel Godfrey has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at Williams College.

Ralph M. Goldman, who has been staff and editorial associate on the American Political Science Association's Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations, has been appointed to the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.

Charles H. Goodman, research psychologist, Department of the Air Force, has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor of public administration at the American University.

D. Thurston Griggs, recently a lecturer in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, joined the faculty of Drew University in September as assistant professor of international relations.

Bertram M. Gross, research consultant to the Public Affairs Institute and legislative consultant to Senator James E. Murray of Montana, will serve for the next two years as planning adviser on the Economic Advisory Staff in the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, commencing in July, 1953.

C. P. Harper has been advanced to a full professorship in political science at Marshall College.

Henry C. Hart, of the University of Wisconsin, has received a Ford Foundation grant for the year 1953-54 to study river-valley developments in India.

Ray F. Harvey has been appointed head of the department of government in the Graduate School of Arts and Science of New York University.

Alexander Heard, of the University of North Carolina, will be released from the major portion of his teaching duties during the next two years to make a study of "Money in Politics" which is being financed by a grant to the Institute for Research in Social Science by the Stern Foundation.

John G. Heinberg, professor and chairman of the department of political science, University of Missouri, was a visiting professor of political science during the 1953 summer session at the University of Nebraska.

Charles M. Hersh has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science and public administration at the American University.

Edward J. Heubel, of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Reed College.

Chesney Hill, professor of political science at the University of Missouri, has been granted leave for the fall semester to join the civilian faculty of the National War College, Washington, D. C., where he will be a member of the international affairs committee.

John Perry Horlacher has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania to succeed Dr. Charles C. Rohlfing. Dr. Horlacher has been on leave of absence for two years as chairman of the Regional Wage Stabilization Board in Philadelphia.

Charles D. Hounshell, assistant professor of

political science at Emory University, will be on leave during 1953-54 under a Ford Foundation grant to study international relations at Princeton University.

Ronald F. Howell, who received his degree from the Johns Hopkins University in 1952, and has been in Europe during the past year studying European federation, has accepted an instructorship at Emory University for the academic year 1953-54.

Ralph K. Huitt, of the University of Wisconsin, has received a Faculty Fellowship for the year 1953-54 from the Fund for the Advancement of Education. He will spend a year in Washington studying the Congress.

Charles S. Hyneman has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University for a two-year period, beginning September 1, 1953.

David L. Jickling has been appointed instructor in the department of government and international relations at Carleton College.

Jack T. Johnson, who had been on leave of absence from the department of political science at the state University of Iowa, has resigned and will continue in his post with the Office of Civilian Defense in Washington, D. C.

Frank Jones, who was on a leave of absence with the Office of the High Command in Germany, resumed his duties in July, 1953, as associate professor of political science at the University of Utah.

Joseph E. Kallenbach has been advanced to a full professorship in political science at the University of Michigan.

Herbert Kaufman, recently a lecturer in government at the City College of New York, has been appointed to an assistant professorship in political science at Yale University.

David C. Knapp has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of New Hampshire to teach in the areas of public administration and state and local government.

Martin Kriesberg, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture, is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

Allan A. Kuusisto, assistant professor of government at the University of New Hampshire, will be in Finland during the next academic year on a Fulbright research grant.

Robert Lacour-Gayet, head of the department of history and government of St. Johns University, has been chosen president of the *Société des Professeurs Français en Amérique*.

Lionel H. Laing has been promoted to a full professorship in political science at the University of Michigan.

Robert S. Lancaster, assistant professor of political science at the University of the South, has been appointed Dean of Men in the College of Arts and Sciences.

Robert E. Lane, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, has been awarded a Faculty Fellowship by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, and will be on leave of absence for the academic year 1953-54.

John W. Lederle resumed his duties in September as professor of political science and director of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan. During the past year he served as director of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines.

Carl Leiden returned to Marshall College in September after spending a year at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan, on a Fulbright appointment. He has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science.

Werner Levi, University of Minnesota, spent the summer in Europe where he taught an international seminar in France and gave a paper before a meeting of the International Sociological Association in Liege.

Gordon K. Lewis, formerly of the University of California (Los Angeles), taught in the 1953 summer session at Michigan State College.

Ernest M. Linton retired on July 1, after having served in the department of government at Indiana University for 40 years. Professor Linton began his service in the department as the first graduate assistant when the department was separated from the department of history and political science in 1914. During recent years his teaching has been concentrated in the field of international relations.

Harvey C. Mansfield, on leave from the Ohio State University, is a member of the visiting civilian professorial staff at the National War College, Washington, D. C., for the fall term.

Edward T. McCormick, president of the American Stock Exchange and former Securities and Exchange Commissioner, has accepted an appointment as a special lecturer in finance for 1953-54 in the School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University.

William M. McGovern, of the department of political science at Northwestern University, returned on September 1 from a year's leave of absence which he spent as a member of the faculty of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island.

William Reynolds McIntyre, a graduate student in political science at the University of Michigan, has been awarded the Exchange Fellowship and will attend Queen's University, Belfast, Ireland, during the academic year 1953-54.

Edward McWhinney, lecturer in law and political science at Yale University from 1951 to 1953, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at that institution.

Robert O. McWilliams, who recently completed his doctorate at the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

Dwaine Marvick has been appointed to a part-time lectureship in political science at the University of Michigan for 1953-54. He will also serve as research associate in the Institute of Public Administration assigned to the Phoenix Project.

Wallace Mendelson, professor of political science at the University of Tennessee, has been granted a leave of absence for the 1953-54 academic year to serve as research assistant to Mr. Justice Frankfurter.

James W. Miller, of the political science department at Michigan State College, has been advanced to a full professorship.

Lyman Moore, executive officer, National Institute of Mental Health, is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

Forrest D. Murden, Jr. returned to Colum-

bia University in September as administrative assistant in the School of International Affairs after serving three years with the U. S. Mission to the United Nations.

James N. Murray, of the department of political science at Northwestern University, taught the summer session at Mexico City College, Mexico City, Mexico.

Fred W. Neal, assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, will be a visiting lecturer at the University of Michigan during 1953-54 while continuing work toward his doctorate in political science.

Rita W. Nealon, of New York University, has been appointed associate director of the Citizenship Clearing House for Southern New York.

H. C. Nixon has been promoted from lecturer to professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. He taught during the second half of the summer session at Duke University.

Clark Norton, professor of political science at DePauw University, taught at West Virginia University during the summer session.

Georges Parthemos, who recently received the doctorate at the University of North Carolina, joined the staff of the department of political science at the University of Georgia in September. He will teach courses in political theory and has assumed the editorship of the *Georgia Local Government Journal*.

Tibor Payza, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Detroit, has been designated director of the newly established Center for Human Relations at that institution.

Roy V. Peel, past director of the Bureau of the Census, was appointed, on May 4, 1953, professor and head of the department of political science and director of the Institute of Government at the University of Utah.

Nathaniel Peffer is spending his sabbatical leave from Columbia University as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

Whitney T. Perkins, recently of the University of Denver, has accepted an appointment at Brown University as associate professor of political science.

J. Cass Phillips has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

R. Vance Presthus, associate professor of political science at Michigan State College, taught in the 1953 summer session at San Diego State College.

Segundo V. Linares Quintana, until recently a professor at the Universities of La Plata and Buenos Aires, Argentina, is serving as Burton Craige Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of North Carolina during the fall semester.

Robert S. Rankin, professor and chairman of the department of political science at Duke University, was a visiting professor at Columbia University during the summer session.

Joseph M. Ray was appointed, effective June 1, 1953, as the first civilian chief of the Information and Education Branch, Personnel Services Division, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Dr. Ray is on leave from the University of Maryland, where he served as Dean of the College of Special and Continuation Services. He was formerly head of the department of government and politics at that university.

John S. Reshetar, lecturer in politics at Princeton University, has been awarded a Faculty Fellowship by the Ford Foundation and will be on leave for the academic year 1953-54.

J. William Robinson, chairman of the department of political science and international relations at Whittier College, will be on sabbatical leave of absence during the school year 1953-54.

Jack W. Rodgers has been advanced from instructor to assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

Victor G. Rosenblum has returned to the University of California at Berkeley as assistant professor of political science and supervisor of the Office of American Institutions, after seven months in Washington as staff associate with the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Clinton Rossiter, of Cornell University, has been granted a Guggenheim fellowship for a study of conservative political thought, and will be on sabbatical leave for the academic year 1953-54.

E. E. Schattschneider, professor of government at Wesleyan University, has been appointed visiting lecturer at Yale University for the year 1953-54.

S. Rezazadeh Shafaq is serving as a visiting professor at Columbia University.

Chandler Shaw, professor and head of the department of history and political science at Bethany College, taught at West Virginia University during the summer session.

Hale T. Shenefield has returned to the Program Office of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Washington after a year as program officer with the ICA-IIAA in Santiago, Chile.

John C. Shover, manpower specialist, Office of Under Secretary of the Navy, is serving as a professorial lecturer in public administration at the American University.

Thomas W. Simons, of the State Department, will return to Columbia University in 1953-54 to lecture in the Center of Pakistan Studies.

Ralph Smuckler, of the political science department at Michigan State College, has been advanced to the rank of assistant professor.

Albert Somit has returned to New York University as associate professor of government and associate director of the Falk Program of Training in Active Citizenship. Professor Somit has just completed a tour of duty as Psychological Warfare Intelligence Officer with the United States Army in Europe.

O. Glenn Stahl, executive vice-chairman, Federal Personnel Council, has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor of public administration at the American University.

Harold Stein, recently staff director of the Inter-University Case Program and consultant to the Public Administration Clearing House, has been appointed director of a three-year Twentieth Century Fund research project on civil-military relations. During the academic year 1953-54 he will also be visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

John B. Stewart has received an appointment as assistant professor of government at Barnard College.

Paul D. Stewart has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Marshall College.

Albert L. Sturm resumed his duties in September as professor of political science at West Virginia University after serving as visiting professor at the University of Michigan the past year. During the summer months he was acting director of the Institute of Public Administration at Michigan.

Joseph L. Sutton has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Indiana University and will teach courses in world politics, Far Eastern government and Far Eastern political thought.

Rinehart John Swenson has retired from New York University after having served for thirty-three years. Professor Swenson was formerly chairman of the department of government in Washington Square College and head of the government department in the Graduate School of Arts and Science.

Sterling Tatsuji Takeuchi is spending his second year as visiting lecturer at Columbia University in the East Asian Institute and the department of public law and government.

Joseph Tanenhaus, instructor at Wells College, has been appointed assistant professor of government at New York University.

Philip B. Taylor, Jr. has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Michigan.

Morgan Thomas has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

Kenneth W. Thompson, of the University of Chicago, accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1953.

Edwin Timbers, who recently completed his graduate work at the University of Michigan, has been appointed assistant professor of government at St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York.

Lois Torrence has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the American University.

R. J. Tresolini has been advanced to the rank of associate professor of political science at Lehigh University. During the summer, Professor Tresolini directed a research study carried on by students from funds provided by the Social Science Research Council.

Amry Vandenbosch, of the University of Kentucky, will hold the Burton Craige Professorship of Jurisprudence at the University of North Carolina during the spring semester of 1954.

Clement E. Vose, who has been an instructor in government at Beloit College during the past academic year, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor in the department of political science at Western Reserve University.

John C. Wahlke, of Amherst College, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, effective September, 1953.

H. O. Waldby, on leave of absence from Florida State University, is serving for one year as visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, assigned to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Edwin W. Webber resigned his position as instructor of social sciences at Gulf Park College, Gulfport, Mississippi, to accept a research fellowship and to complete work for the Ph.D. degree at Tulane University.

Henry Wells, recently of Yale University, has been appointed visiting professor and research associate, School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico, for the academic year 1953-54.

Wilhelm Wengler, of the Free University of Berlin, was a visiting professor at Columbia University on a Ford Foundation grant during the spring session.

Ferdinand Westphalen, of the University of Vienna, was a visiting professor at Duke University during the spring term.

John P. Wheeler, Jr., formerly a graduate student at Florida State University and Syracuse University, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of political science at Middlebury College.

Howard B. White, associate professor on the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, has received an advanced studies grant from the Ford Foundation and will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1953-54.

Allen S. Whiting, of the political science department at Northwestern University, will

spend next year studying Chinese government from basic points in Formosa and Hong Kong. His research is being financed by the Ford Foundation.

Robert F. Wilcox, of the department of political science at San Diego State College, taught in the 1953 summer session at Michigan State College.

Charlotte Williams, of Middle Tennessee State College, has accepted a one-year appointment as visiting lecturer in political science at Vanderbilt University to teach courses in public law and jurisprudence.

Henry Williams has accepted a graduate research fellowship at Columbia Law School for 1953-54.

Harold Winkler has been reappointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley).

S. Joseph Wodka, graduate student at the University of Michigan, was a member of the teaching staff in the department of history and government at Central Michigan College of

Education at Mt. Pleasant during the summer term.

Francis D. Wormuth, professor of political science at the University of Utah, will be on leave during 1953-54 on a Ford Fellowship at Yale, observing relationships between the Law School and the social sciences in Yale's experimental program.

Paul Ylvisaker, of Swarthmore College, has been appointed staff director of the Inter-University Case Program, to succeed Harold Stein. The Program's headquarters were moved on July 1, 1953, from Washington to Swarthmore where Professor Ylvisaker will divide his time during the coming academic year between the teaching of political science and the case project.

Roland Young, of Northwestern University, was a visiting professor at Columbia University during the summer session.

Harold Zink, of the Ohio State University, was a visiting professor of political science at Duke University during the spring term.

IN MEMORIAM

Emerson David Fite, professor emeritus of political science at Vassar College, died in Poughkeepsie on May 17, 1953, at the age of seventy-nine.

Professor Fite was born in Marion, Ohio, in 1874. He received the bachelor's degree from Yale in 1897, and the doctor's degree from Harvard in 1905. Before coming to Vassar in 1913, Professor Fite had held teaching positions at the Mt. Hermon School, Harvard University, and Yale. He was Vassar's first professor of political science and he remained at Vassar until his retirement in 1944.

Professor Fite was a distinguished scholar. He broke new ground with his *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War* (1910) and *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* (1911). His *History of the United States*, published in 1916, was widely used in secondary schools in the United States and many an American schoolboy knew his "Fite." His other publications included *The United*

States (with Archibald Freeman, 1923); *A Book of Old Maps* (1926); and *Government by Cooperation* (1932).

Professor Fite was not only a scholar; he was also an indefatigable public servant. He was elected Justice of the Peace in 1928; and from 1934 to 1943 he served the Poughkeepsie area as a member of the New York State Legislature. His outstanding achievement as Assemblyman was the Fite Civil Service Law.

Mr. Fite stimulated in his students a genuine interest in political science, particularly in the fields of international law and constitutional law. In his teaching of American government, because of his first-hand experience with politics and politicians, he was able to bring life and substance into the classroom.

He will long be remembered by his students and his colleagues as a good teacher, a gentle friend, a kindly neighbor, and a wise counselor. —C. GORDON POST.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

At the Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association in Washington, D. C., September 10-12, the following officers were elected for 1953-54, or took office: President, Ralph J. Bunche (United Nations); President-Elect, Charles McKinley (Reed College); Vice Presidents, Taylor Cole (Duke University), J. A. C. Grant (University of California, Los Angeles), Claudius O. Johnson (Washington State College); Secretary, Harvey C. Mansfield (The Ohio State University); Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield (Cornell University); new members of the Council (two-year term): Manning J. Dauer (University of Florida), Earl Latham (Amherst College), Arnaud Leavelle (Stanford University), Dayton D. McKean (University of Colorado), J. Roland Pennock (Swarthmore College), C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago), Wallace S. Sayre (City College of New York), Dwight Waldo (University of California, Berkeley). Continuing members of the Council, elected last year, are Walter H. Bennett (University of Alabama), Hugh A. Bone (University of Washington), Robert A. Dahl (Yale University), David Fellman (University of Wisconsin), Victor Jones (Wesleyan University), Jack W. Peltason (University of Illinois), Emmette S. Redford (University of Texas), and Clinton Rossiter (Cornell University).

Copies of panel papers delivered at the Annual Meeting may be purchased for \$.50 each by writing to the Washington Office.

ANNOUNCING
THE 1953 EDITION OF
THE *DIRECTORY*
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Available December, 1953

We are now accepting orders for the new *Directory*
at the following rates:

For members, per copy:	For non-members, per copy:
\$3.00 paper bound	\$4.00 paper bound
\$4.00 cloth bound	\$6.00 cloth bound

Address orders to:

The American Political Science Association
1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

New | **The Great Powers and Eastern Europe**

John A. Lukacs, Chestnut Hill College and La Salle College

Never before has there been so broad and so penetrating a study of the critical area that is Eastern Europe. This book is distinguished by its vigorous style and its sound reliance on widely scattered primary sources in seven languages. Much of its material is here used in book form for the first time; a good deal of it is based on important documents made available since 1945. Avoiding a country-by-country treatment, the author employs a very interesting chronological-horizontal approach. The text is fully documented and contains an extensive bibliography.

Widely Used **Roots of Political Behavior** **Introduction to Government and Politics**

Richard Carlton Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, Princeton University


This unique text represents a departure from the timeworn institutional approach to political science. It provides the opportunity for imaginative and stimulating teaching. It stimulates intelligent inquiry on the part of the student. The authors have brought together writings by recognized authorities which show how all the social sciences relate to political behavior. Their introductory discussions reflect keen understanding of political patterns. There is a brief commentary on each essay and its author. *Roots of Political Behavior* is available with either a cloth or a paper cover.

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY

• COLLEGE DIVISION, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N.Y.

Political Science Texts

Frederic A. Ogg and Harold Zink



MODERN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Revised Edition

The political backgrounds and basic problems of Britain, the U. S. S. R., France, Germany, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, and Japan form the basis of this comparative study and are treated as prototypes of the kinds of governments which they represent. The book compares corresponding elements of the various governments with one another and especially with pertinent, corresponding elements in the government of the United States.

August, 1953

William H. Riker

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

Professor Riker has written this new government text that analyzes our political institutions as an answer to the question: "How can the democratic ideal be achieved in American practice?"

In his introduction, the author discusses democracy in terms of these contributions to political literature: *Pericles' Funeral Oration*, *The Agreement of the People*, *The Declaration of Independence*, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, and the *Gettysburg Address*. All these documents are reproduced in full in the appendix.

The organization and order of subjects grows out of the definition of democracy in Chapter I which states that the method of democracy is "electoral responsibility."

1953

428 pp.

paperbound, \$2.25

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

by DAVID EASTON, *University of Chicago*

Professor Easton discusses some of the problems that confront political scientists if they are to develop a systematic science. He considers broad concepts by virtue of which the subject matter of political science can be identified and organized. He examines the kinds of data essential to a proper description of any political event. And he analyzes the relation of moral judgments to the study of political theory. Serious students of politics should find this book stimulating and useful for its reflective view of the state of American political science today.

5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$, cloth, 320 pages, \$4.00 text

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

by HERBERT A. SIMON, *Carnegie Institute of Technology*,
DONALD W. SMITHBURG and VICTOR A. THOMPSON,
Illinois Institute of Technology

As political scientists experienced in administrative problems, the authors have drawn upon the latest researches in human relations—both psychological and sociological—for this study. They thus combine a realistic analysis of what actually goes on in public administration with a clear theoretical understanding of the *why* and the *wherefore*.

5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$, cloth, 582 pages, \$5.50 text

THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION

by DAVID B. TRUMAN, *Columbia University*

THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS re-examines the whole gamut of political behavior from party platforms to judicial opinions. It shows how pressure groups influence, and are influenced by, the activities of political parties, legislatures, presidents, governors, bureaucrats, and judges. It looks into the various problems within the groups, and attempts to determine the influence of group propaganda upon public opinion.

5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$, cloth, 544 pages, \$5.00 text

Examination copies on request

ALFRED A. KNOFF, *Publisher*

501 Madison Avenue

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT

New York 22



A NEW TEXTBOOK IN **COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT**

EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Edited by **TAYLOR COLE**, *Duke University*

CONTENTS

THE SOVIET ORBIT

1. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics *by* **Julian Towster**
2. The People's Democracies of Eastern Europe *by* **C. E. Black**

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

3. Germany *by* **Sigmund Neumann**
4. Italy *by* **Renzo Sereno**

THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

5. Great Britain and the Commonwealth *by* **Taylor Cole, David Deener, and Alexander Brady**
6. France *by* **Gordon Wright**

6½ x 9½ inches, clothbound, 699 pages, \$6.00 text

Examination copies on request

ALFRED A. KNOFF, Publisher
COLLEGE DEPARTMENT

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

~~CHANCE CHANCE CHANCE CHANCE CHANCE~~



PRACTICAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The ICMA Municipal Management Series

Eight up-to-date texts that treat public affairs from the standpoint of the chief administrator. Written by men of broad management experience, they stress techniques and best administrative practice. They are broad in scope and widely used in the college classroom as well as in municipal in-service training.

The Technique of Municipal Administration.	601 pp., Third Edition, 1947
Municipal Personnel Administration.	435 pp., Fifth Edition, 1950
Municipal Finance Administration.	491 pp., Fourth Edition, 1949
Local Planning Administration.	337 pp., Second Edition, 1948
Municipal Fire Administration.	498 pp., Fifth Edition, 1950
Municipal Public Works Administration.	458 pp., Fourth Edition, 1950
Municipal Recreation Administration.	516 pp., Third Edition, 1948
Municipal Police Administration.	468 pp., Third Edition, 1950

"My experience with the ICMA manuals in group training for municipal officials and in graduate courses at the University has demonstrated that the texts are authoritative, comprehensive, and stimulating. They train administrators and students how to think about municipal problems and how to solve them."—ARTHUR W. BROMAGE, *Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.*

Here are a few of the many educational institutions that have adopted these texts:


Columbia University	University of Denver	University of California
University of Kansas	University of Michigan	University of Pennsylvania
Syracuse University	New York University	Wayne University

*Single copies \$7.50. Discounts on classroom orders.
Order copies on 10-day approval.*

THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION

1313 East 60th Street

Chicago 37, Illinois



new book announcements

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. New Fifth Edition

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College. 577 pages, \$6.00

An authoritative restatement of the elements of international law, diplomatic practice, pacific settlement, and international organization. The text includes discussion of power politics, Nationalism, and Imperialism which contains in the discussion problems of Soviet aggrandizement, colonial unrest, the "Point Four" program, and the international economic dilemma confronting the Atlantic communities. Further topics considered are the Korean War, the United Nations, collective security, and global federation. It provides factual data necessary to the understanding of the present world scene.

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By L. LARRY LEONARD, New School of Social Research. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 611 pages, \$6.00

With a well integrated narrative which intertwines the author's writings with document and readings, this book offers much more than a recitation of contemporary diplomatic history. It gives the student an *understanding* of contemporary American policy by showing how it is made, its historical roots, and its basic tenets at the present time.

FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT FEAR

By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Foreign Policy Association. 220 pages, \$3.75

In a call for a new American foreign policy which coincides with the new administration, this book offers both an assessment of the realities of world affairs today, and a penetrating demonstration of how they can be faced by a consistent long range policy. It concludes with a brilliant section setting forth six areas upon which to build a policy with positiveness and initiative.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By GERARD J. MANGONE, Swarthmore College. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. Ready in January.


A brilliantly written basic text, this volume presents an outstanding survey of international organizations, their origin, development, and structure. It extends its coverage throughout history, but with particular emphasis on the 19th and 20th centuries. Through examination of international organizations in full historical perspective, their contributions and importance are fully seen and appreciated, and directions of change and potential growth toward world order are indicated.

Send for copies on approval

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street

New York 36, N. Y.



International Studies

Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary Between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia

By Stephen D. Kertesz. A case history of totalitarian conquest told from the other side of the looking glass. The author, who served in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry during the war and postwar years, blends his personal experience with the story of Hungarian diplomacy in the shadow of the swastika and the red star.

Sept. 30, \$4.75

Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics

Edited by Waldemar Gurian. A basic survey of Soviet expansionism by N. Timasheff of Fordham, Michael Pap of Notre Dame, W. Weintraub of Harvard, R. Pipes of Harvard, F. Barghoorn of Yale, and Ling Nai-jui.

\$3.75

Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology

By Hans Kohn. A history of Slav nationalism from its beginnings after the Napoleonic Wars to its climax in and after World War II.

\$6.25

The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government: 1945-1951

By M. A. Fitzsimons. An analysis of Labour's foreign policy aspirations and performance.

\$3.25

Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism

By Waldemar Gurian. A clear and cogent treatment of the realities of Russian Communism and its appeal as a secular religion.

\$3.25

Christian Democracy in Italy and France

By Mario Einaudi and François Goguel. A study of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy and the MRP, the party of the Fourth French Republic.

\$4.00

Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy

By F. A. Hermens. An important volume on the effects of Proportional Representation between 1918 and 1950.

\$4.00

At all bookstores

University of Notre Dame Press — Notre Dame, Indiana

OXFORD BOOKS

The Electoral System in Britain 1918-1951

By D. E. Butler. The first section of this authoritative book discusses in detail the problems connected with the British electoral system during the last thirty years. The second part examines the actual mechanics (including cost and the effect of the university and business franchises), the implications, and results of the last nine general elections, casting a new light on major political issues. 232 pages. \$4.25

Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950

By Peter Calvocoressi, assisted by Sheila Horden. Introduction by Arnold Toynbee. The conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in Europe and in Asia. Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 580 pages. 3 maps in color. Text maps. Index. \$12.00

Documents on International Affairs 1949-1950

Selected and edited by Margaret Carlyle. A supplement to the survey that includes the most vital texts of the period, arranged under the same general headings. Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 812 pages. \$12.50

Afghanistan: Second Edition

A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia

By Sir William Kerr Fraser-Tytler. Who will control Afghanistan's vital mountain range, the Hindu Kush, which divides Central and Southern Asia, and commands the approaches to India? Always a politically important question, the author stresses its implications and gives a brilliant, concise survey of political developments in Central and Southern Asia up to the end of 1951. Illustrated. Maps. Index. 386 pages. \$6.00

British Government

By Hiram Miller Stout. A complete picture of Great Britain today, in which a prominent political scientist surveys her present political system in the light of wartime and postwar changes. Mr. Stout discusses today's problems of nationalization and Commonwealth relations and the modern functions of the Monarchy, Parliament, the Cabinet, and the Civil Service. "His pages are packed with information, printed in a clear style."—*Saturday Review Syndicate*. 448 pages. Trade edition, \$7.00. College edition, \$5.00

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

114 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.

Publishers of Fine Books for over Four Centuries



Princeton

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy

By **ROBERT PAUL BROWDER**. An absorbing narrative of the events which led up to the dramatic arrival of Litvinov in Washington in 1933, and of the collapse into discord and disillusion which was to follow. This first full-length account of the negotiations presents a new picture of the pressures that existed for and against diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. \$5.00

The Diplomats, 1919-1939

Edited by **GORDON CRAIG** and **FELIX GILBERT**. This diplomatic history of the 20 interwar years is the first book to examine that period through the eyes of the men entrusted with the negotiations in the capitals of a darkening world. The distinguished contributors cover 30 of the most important diplomats of the time, including Curzon, Ribbentrop, Mussolini, Chicherin, Hughes, Litvinov, Matsuoka, Bullitt, and Kennedy. "A really impressive achievement. The best informed, most authoritative, and most provocative treatment of diplomatic history presently available for the period indicated."—*William L. Langer, N. Y. Times*. 720 pages, illustrated, \$9.00

Economic Planning for the Peace

By **E. F. PENROSE**. This book shows how deeply the peace plans of World War II, beginning as early as 1941, were affected by political conditions, by wartime developments, and by personalities such as Roosevelt, Morgenthau, Keynes, Churchill, and Winant. It reveals how great successes were attained, saving Europe from immediate post-war disaster, while there were grievous errors which led to the crisis of 1947.

"One of the most significant personal documents on wartime and postwar international negotiations that has come to my attention."—*Ben B. Seligman*. \$7.50



Order from your bookstore, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS



A pioneering study

of a major political force

NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

By **KARL W. DEUTSCH**, *The Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

This significant work, offering a structural and qualitative analysis of the forces of nationalism, paves the way for eventual measurement and prediction in the field. In manuscript form, it was awarded the Sumner Prize in Political Science at Harvard University in 1951.

The book cuts across many fields to investigate such important questions as *when* and *why* nationalistic ideas and policies are accepted and supported by large numbers of people, and *what* makes people cling to their nationality or change it for another. Focusing new concepts in communication theory on the basic problems of nationalism for the first time, it suggests techniques for measuring and verifying the ability of a people to communicate, and applies these methods to questions of long-range national development.

Many of the pertinent research results and methods which have become available in the various social sciences since World War II are utilized. The analysis includes empirical and statistical data from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as from Europe and the United States.

Published in Association with THE TECHNOLOGY PRESS,
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1953 292 pages \$5.00

New light on the "dark continent"

AFRICA: A Study in Tropical Development

By **L. DUDLEY STAMP**, *University of London*

Here, one of the world's foremost geographers provides a key to a continent as rich in significance for present world affairs as it is in resources—and complexities. The book treats Africa first as a continent, then systematically explores individual countries and regions. Rigorously covering climates, soils and vegetation, population growth, and economic development, it points out the relationship between geographical environment and the temperament and activities of Africa's inhabitants. Vividly clarifying Africa's role in the modern world, the book shows the transition from the old to the new in industry, sociology, politics, and mores.

1953 568 pages \$8.50

Send for On-Approval Copies

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc. **440 Fourth Ave.** **New York 16, N. Y.**

Champion Campaigner

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By HAROLD F. GOSNELL

Rich with new material, *Champion Campaigner* is the story of a remarkable political career, told by a man who knows, and is thoroughly acquainted with, the intricacies of politics. He is co-author with the late Charles E. Merriam of *The American Party System*, Fourth Edition, The Macmillan Company, and eight other books on politics and elections.

"... This work will not only become highly useful to teachers and students of party politics but will appeal to the general reader, for it is written in the language of the layman.

"The author has done a magnificent job of integration and documentation in this and all other sections of the book. The development of the Roosevelt personality and campaign techniques prior to 1942 is not well known to readers, and herein lies a major contribution of the book . . . Notwithstanding its terseness, it is probably the best statement of the reasons why FDR was a champion campaigner."—Hugh A. Bone, *Annals of the American Academy*.

"This is a remarkably successful book in that Mr. Gosnell carefully limits himself to this one rather narrow segment of the Roosevelt record and yet manages to tell a story that is always unified and significant."—R. K. Carr, *New York Herald Tribune*.

"... Interesting, objectively written and informative book."—Karl Schriftgiesser, *New York Times*.

"Yet the book contains within brief compass an interesting history of the Roosevelt campaigns. It will be of especial value to those who are too young to have lived through the Roosevelt era. . . . *U.S. Quarterly Book Review*.

\$3.50

AT ALL BOOKSTORES

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.

Fourth Edition
AMERICAN
STATE
GOVERNMENT

by
W. BROOKE GRAVES

D. C. HEATH
AND COMPANY

SALES OFFICES: NEW YORK CHICAGO SAN FRANCISCO ATLANTA DALLAS
HOME OFFICE: BOSTON

COMPLETELY revised, the *Fourth Edition* of this standard text reports and analyzes significant developments in the forward movement of the states since World War II. Resetting and extensive rewriting have modernized and streamlined the entire presentation. Changes are particularly striking in such chapters as those on legislative service agencies, the governor, the military establishment and civilian defense, fiscal management and the revenue system, constitutional protections, local government, and intergovernmental relations. 957pp. \$6.25

HOW HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION

By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. This is an authoritative presentation of the evolution of human rights and their appearance in the constitution. Professor Chafee is one of the leading interpreters of our liberal heritage.
Published in 1952 74 pages \$2.50

**THE SUPREME COURT: VEHICLE OF REVEALED
TRUTH OR POWER GROUP, 1930-37**

By Alpheus Mason. As the first thorough analysis of the Supreme Court packing controversy and the situation which led up to it, this volume sheds new light upon the judicial process.
Ready in October, 1953 60 pages \$2.50


**THE GASPAR G. BACON LECTURES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
1940-1950**

A ten-year volume containing lectures by Arthur N. Holcombe, Henry S. Commager, Allan Nevins, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, Louise Overacker, Carl Swisher, Owen Roberts, Charles Fairman, and Harrison Tweed.
Ready in October, 1953 541 pages \$6.00

BOSTON UNIVERSITY PRESS

685 Commonwealth Avenue

Boston 15, Mass.



Just Published!

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BASIC DOCUMENTS

By ELMER PLISCHKE

Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland

How many times have you wished that you could put your hands on that copy of a legal warrant or other document, which you had been saving to use in class but which is out of the file? That complaint need not arise again, for here in a compact form are all of the illustrative displays that are needed, and when used to supplement any standard text no student need ever say he has never seen an example of a legal document.

This valuable text, with approximately 230 key items, offers a new and refreshing approach to study of major functional topics of international affairs. Facsimile reproduction of material enhances the reader's understanding of the "how" as well as the "what" and "why" of foreign relations—helps make of it a living, practical subject.

- **CONCISE CHAPTER INTRODUCTIONS** point out the interrelationships of the various documents.
- **CHARTS** show the machinery for conduct of international relations, structure of foreign offices, diplomatic missions, international conferences, the United Nations, and other international organizations.
- **SERIES OF SEQUENTIAL DOCUMENTS** illustrate the making of treaties, operation of international organizations and conferences, handling of war crimes, and the beginning and termination of wars.
- **GROUPS OF DOCUMENTS DESCRIPTIVE OF ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES** are included—recognition of states and governments, acquisition and disposition of territory, resolution of disputes, and arms limitations.
- **FACSIMILES** of diplomatic and consular credentials.
- **FULL TEXTS** of the League of Nations Covenant, the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the Charter of the Organization of American States are included.

This supplementary text for courses in **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS** and **INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**, may also be used for courses in **INTERNATIONAL LAW**, **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION**, and **DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**. History courses, such as **DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**, **AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**, **MODERN WORLD AFFAIRS**, etc., will find this book useful.

208 pp. approx.—6 x 9—Charts and Facsimiles—Paper

Send for copies on approval



The American Political Science Review

VOL. XLVII

DECEMBER, 1953

NO. 4

ON THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT*

PENDLETON HERRING

As the American Political Science Association nears the half century mark of its existence it seems appropriate to consider the broad significance of a professional group devoted to the study of government. Political science as a subject of systematic inquiry started with Aristotle but as a profession it has won its greatest recognition in the United States and within our generation. One fact is clear: no other country in the world today has so large, so well-trained, so competent a profession dedicated to the teaching and analysis of government.

Whatever the current climate of opinion may be, these are the men and women who, from day to day in classroom and study, must explain in lectures and in writing the nature of political systems, foreign and domestic. This profession, which has flourished so greatly in the last fifty years, is now a part of our national strength: it is the core of that broad and continuing study of government and thoughtful concern with politics vital to the successful operation of free institutions. I want to tell you why I think the study of governmental matters and a wider understanding of political problems has a fresh urgency for us as a nation and the bearing this in turn has on the development of political science as a discipline.

I

To study is to apply intellect. To apply intellect is to give thought free rein. This is obviously dangerous—it particularly endangers clichés, stereotypes, and folk wisdom—such as where there is smoke there must be fire—an obvious non sequitur to anyone who has tried to burn damp autumn leaves or to read dull freshman themes!

Folk wisdom is not enough nor can experience alone be relied upon for political guidance. Native wit and leisurely whittling will not reduce today's political problems to handy manageable size.

The intimate politics of the cracker barrel have been replaced by the grim politics of the atomic pile. Common sense, energy, and good will

* Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association at its forty-ninth annual meeting in Washington, D. C., September 10, 1953.

are still needed but new complexities call for new skills and fresh knowledge.

Today, basic questions of national destiny and of world stability are bound up with phenomena quite beyond the day-to-day experience of most citizens. A rational response and a responsible attitude in such a situation can best come as the consequence of thought applied to knowledge. As government extends to matters far beyond the familiarity gained through participation, or direct observation, the conscious effort at understanding—that is to say, the study—of government becomes vitally important.

Such an attitude implies that a suspended judgment is called for on a great many issues. It demands an adult, mature approach to matters that are commonly treated with emotional indulgence of partisan feelings. It belies those who seek national security in secrecy even on those matters better known to our enemies than to the public and it calls for giving citizens whatever information is basic for making sound governmental decisions.

This attitude toward the realm of the political is easier to describe than achieve. It is not enough that self-government reflect the wishes of the governed, however shortsighted or selfish be these demands. We cannot rest content with government that is merely representative, as if representation in itself were the ultimate goal. Self-government must be effective government if it is to be adequate to its present-day responsibilities. Self-government is not simply a process of the wish fulfillment of articulate publics. It is the adjustment of many wills, *not only* to each other and among competing groups but also to such hard facts as the productive capacity of the country, our stage of technological advance, the limits of economic strength, the demands of national security, and the policies of our allies. Intelligent and responsible public reactions are called for both to face the threats of aggressive enemies and to hold the friendship of other nations.

Will our political skills and knowledge keep pace with the demands for orderly adjustment of human relationships that are imposed by advancing technology and the demands for responsible leadership imposed by our world position?

Such questions go far far beyond partisan competition where the objective is to throw the rascals out. Moreover, technological advance and increased productivity as victories of mind and management can be brought to nought by governmental failure. We must understand our politics and succeed governmentally because the final pay-off today and for the future is in terms of effective political behavior.

The place obviously to start is with a more realistic understanding of our own political system, our political goals, assumptions, and routines. Should we acquire the habit of now and again analyzing our national objectives—could we picture for ourselves such strivings as a political process—we might gain that sense of detachment which is the beginning of statecraft.

There are those few who talk as though the intricacies of politics and self-government did not demand special study. They seem to regard government as a sub-division of industry placed somewhere between public relations and cost accounting; or that corner of an otherwise cleanly laboratory where the drains are clogged and the blowers rattle.

Turning from those who already know the answers, we encounter others who don't even know the relevant questions to ask. Many such are among the traditional voters following to the polls the partisan tracks of their grandfathers: and often serving to sustain congressional committee chairmen capable of keeping legislation in rigid deep-freeze for prolonged periods.

And then there are those who care neither for questions nor answers (save perhaps on give-away programs). Little is known precisely of these citizens—our sounding devices report their existence as vast layers of protein, submerged in varying depths of inertia. They are said to be the habitual prey of bigger fish.

In any event, I think that most of us see with clarity today that our political problems are not to be disposed of by miracles of leadership. We are all in the same boat and buffeted by the same world storms. To suggest, as some do, that our governmental craft should be exchanged for an improved model more responsive to the helm is beside the point. Our hope must lie in better seamanship. Furthermore, riding today's rough waters offers little occasion for that type of complacency called partisan recrimination: while one party mans the oars the other must bail—too breathless to murmur "I told you so."

We turn with renewed faith to such fundamentals of self-government as:

- Respect for fact and knowledge as the basis of opinion;
- Tolerance in order to give scope to the interplay of viewpoints;
- A rational sense of conviction that leads the way to decision;
- Loyalty to those processes of government that guard our basic values;
- And as guides for action—liberty, justice, truth, and that attitude of mind suggested by the words compassion, charity, and humility.

These fundamentals of self-government are based on a high faith in our fellow man—on mutual trust. We are ready to accept the fallibility

of human reactions because, as Americans, we believe that there is no other form of rule more satisfactory than self-government. The implications of our political faith are, as Judge Learned Hand has so wisely said, "among the most unwelcome that men are called upon to accept. They are that truth is attainable only by trial and error, and a readiness ever to re-examine and reappraise. That does violence to our deepest animal bent, which demands some immediate and positive response to any emergency. Doubt and scrutiny, the most serviceable of man's tools, were the last that he acquired. He has never quite reconciled himself to their use; they are always repellent and painful."

II.

In view of the emphasis in this introductory statement upon the heightened importance for all of the study and understanding of government—of the application of mind to politics—I would like next to consider more closely the teaching of political science, the place of research, and the development of governmental studies from the standpoint of both the nation and our profession.

The study of government must proceed from the values that make the Republic secure and free. Teaching enlightened by these values has never been more meaningful. Because the constant study of government is integral to the successful operation of our institutions, the teaching of political science is a high calling and one that remains squarely within the tradition of liberal education. Entry upon the field opens the way to a rich literature or, to put it another way, fosters acquaintance out of the past with men of wisdom, of learning, of courage, and also at times of style and wit. Few fields of knowledge, indeed, can draw upon such a range of talent reflecting both high aspiration and worldly shrewdness.

To this historic store of literary, philosophic, and juridical thought, join the more recent systematic and descriptive studies of government and politics and add, further, the chance to gain some understanding of current problems, and the ever-increasing attractiveness of political science as a field of study is readily seen.

Every teacher of this subject cannot but convey to his students a sense of his own convictions. The highest form of teaching is that in which the teacher performs as a scholar and shares with his juniors in learning his own excitement and sense of integrity in the pursuit of knowledge. I see no need on the teacher's part to proselitize for citizenship or indoctrinate democracy. I think rather, of Chaucer's scholar, of whom it was enough to say—

And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche.

The vitality and substance of what is taught and what is to be learned rests in the constant refreshment of the subject matter. Here, research is of the essence, not only to keep vivid and meaningful the materials of teaching but also to keep the teacher alert and confident. The teacher may become a sage to his students and an unchallenged authority in his classroom; as a research scholar, he finds himself competing with fellow-specialists. Such discipline is the best safeguard against smugness. The teacher who limits his activities to the classroom risks becoming a pundit in a puddle. In his research pursuits, he must test his strength in swifter waters and with mature competitors. If there were no other reasons, research could be well justified as a device for keeping a teacher on his mettle and subjecting him to the judgment of his fellow specialists.

By and large, as this group knows so well, time for research must be found in the intervals of heavy teaching loads. Of necessity, research often is an avocation rather than a central preoccupation. From the standpoint of research careers, the time for men devoting their attention to the analysis of governmental problems contrasts very unfavorably indeed with the man-hours available for market research in business and advertising firms or investment research in brokerage houses, or for the study of production and improved technology in industry. There must be a wider public recognition that research into governmental affairs is too important to remain a marginal activity.

Big democracy needs to know itself. Big business, big labor, and big agriculture all find large-scale, systematic data-collection and analysis too useful to do without. The conduct of large-scale operations calls for large-scale fact-gathering and fact-analysis.

In terms of hard, statistical data, we know much more about hog production than voting behavior; or soil conservation than money in elections. Much more effort is given to compiling indices to determine the cost of living than to following trends of opinion on world affairs. When we stop to consider the range and variety of political data that could be gathered by using much the same method of collection applied to industrial, agricultural, and similar affairs, we realize that the potentialities for studying political phenomena have scarcely been scratched. It may seem paradoxical that governmental statistics have been an orphan child in the Census Bureau and highly questionable from the standpoint of Congress but such indices lack, of course, the firm and direct parental support accorded, for example, the census of manufactures. (And parents have their problems, too!)

Once we go beyond the records made available, so to speak, as a by-product of the governmental process, the raw materials suitable for

basic research are more difficult to come by. An excellent illustration of the kind of reporting best done upon the initiative of political scientists themselves is the study of delegations to our national party conventions. This effort, which was carried on under the auspices of this Association and which has won the collaboration of so many members throughout the United States, demonstrates what political scientists can do for themselves. We have in this Association a device, ready and at hand, that could become a highly significant method of reporting and communication. Another illustration is the Inter-University Case Program. Here is a cooperative method for gathering fresh teaching materials and data suggestive of new leads and new insights.

While political scientists have devised ways and means of adding to the basic information that is needed for research into governmental processes, the task is so large that support from official agencies and from private foundations is essential. Recent experience indicates that this support will often be granted when specific plans are drawn up and concrete projects offered for consideration. The problems of present-day government call for more systematic, better-supported, and larger-scale fact-gathering if political scientists are to do their jobs effectively and if citizens are to understand the nature of their political institutions.

From where we stand at the present moment, granting the importance of more and better data and accepting the diversity of the field, what are the directions for development? In terms of both research strategy and for practical usefulness, I think a strong case can be made for greater attention to a comparative approach across the wide range of political science—comparative public law, comparative political philosophy, comparative political institutions and governmental systems, comparative political behavior whether of individuals or societies.

We have found, in trying to explain our political institutions to peoples in other countries, that there is not nearly enough in the literature of American government and democracy that is suitable for export. Can it be that, in the past, we have been so much concerned with piecemeal reports or fragmented studies of our own system that we have missed analyzing as fully as we should the larger picture—the factors that have made this country so relatively strong, productive, and free? We have urged free elections upon other nations without, apparently, a full awareness on our side or theirs of all the component social, economic, and political factors that enter into responsible government. We are beginning to realize the integral nature of industrial structure, tax policy, class mobility, educational opportunity, and technological

change. Motivations toward work, toward investment and consumption, toward savings and private philanthropy, are all part of the matrix of a workable, competitive, political system.

In our relations with the rest of the world, we are fully mindful of the proximity created by modern means of transportation. Such means are well suited to the exchange of persons, and the mass media of communication are ideally suited to propaganda. We tend to overlook or minimize the fact that readier physical access merely aggravates the cultural differences that separate us. Perhaps, also, in comparative studies, the time dimension could be given more attention than it has heretofore. Here again, people essentially unchanged in culture since the Middle Ages are now expected to do business with nations formed in the forces of the Industrial Revolution.

Careful studies that dealt comparatively with the cultures and ideologies, the historical development, and the whole complex of forces that seek final expression politically would lead not only to a better understanding of the countries of the world with which we must deal but should likewise enable us to understand ourselves better. Moreover, our own federal system provides unusual scope for the study of comparative politics, election behavior, lawmaking, and the administrative and judicial process. Problems of urbanism, comparatively approached, are more stimulating and suggestive. Here is a direction for growth which could put to use existing skills and available resources without waiting upon revolutionary advances in systematic methodology. The practical necessity of a common frame of reference becomes immediately obvious if comparisons are to be made at all. There must be some conception of a unit of comparison, and hence some thought to the process that the units create. This, in itself, prompts the search for uniformities. When situations are analyzed comparatively, field work becomes necessary, the imagination is enlarged by contact with new situations, and facile solutions are more readily seen as superficial.

To urge comparative study and field work, or to call for more fact-gathering, more case-collecting, more systematic recording, more statistical compilation, or to argue for more opportunities and careers for research scholars, without at the same time recognizing the need for better techniques of analysis would mark no genuine advance. Improved methods of research must be a continuing concern.

Research, as unbridled empiricism, offers little beyond the practical utility that specific findings may have for an immediate purpose. The story of the Tower of Babel takes on new meaning if we think of those ancient builders as rank empiricists—diligent, aspiring, but doomed to

failure by the conception of their task and the ensuing confusion of their tongues. There must be theoretical work that guides the analyst to seeking hypotheses for verification or for discard. And, between the data-gathering and the concept-building, there must be rigorous attention to methodology. In a word, I think we will all welcome the increased awareness there seems to be today among political scientists of the importance of theory if research is to be significant and its findings are to be cumulative. In this context I do not conceive of theory as philosophy: as the ordering of values in order to provide a rational justification of political power, but rather theory as a conceptual scheme for the analysis and ordering of empirical data on political behavior. "By a theorist," as Whitehead writes, "I do not mean a man who is up in the clouds, but a man whose motive for thought is the desire to formulate correctly the rules according to which events occur."

I realize that theory of a systematic and analytical character does not arise as a consequence of exhortation. There is ground, however, for real hope in finding within this Association today, especially among younger political scientists, an alertness to theory, not as an overarching system, but rather for disclosing focal points where empirical findings suggest uniformities and offer a basis for generalization. Encouraging, also, is their impatience to push forward with jobs of concrete research, their readiness to talk shop, and to compare notes concerning better methods of inquiry. There is, I think, less solemn disputation about science with a big "S" and less drawing of discouraging comparisons between political science and the stereotypes held by laymen as to what the natural sciences are supposed to be. There is, rather, an attitude of mind that James Conant has so well described as "scientific." "Science," he writes, "is a dynamic undertaking directed to lowering the degree of the empiricism involved in solving problems; or, if you prefer, science is a process of fabricating a web of interconnected concepts and conceptual schemes arising from experiments and observations and fruitful of further experiments and observations" (*Modern Science and Modern Man* [New York, 1952], p. 62).

As thinking advances along these lines, we may begin to see the possibility of an economy of inquiry developing for the guidance of empirical work. A conceptual scheme, by its nature, points to certain questions as crucial and thereby offers standards of relevance. All this means a more devoted effort to formulate hypotheses, to order evidence, to pose alternatives, rather than defend positions or advocate solutions. We find more attention given to analysis and less to prescription or recommendations on the basis of inadequate evidence. The objective becomes

not the assertion of universal laws or the establishment of basic principles but, rather, the verification of propositions presented with sufficient accompanying data so that other investigators may, if they choose, make comparable inquiries and reject, affirm, or modify the original propositions. It is such an attitude of mind that prepares the ground for investigators to achieve major break-throughs: this happens as empirical findings become cumulative and open the way to fresh theoretical formulations.

This concern with political analysis I find encouraging and significant. But it is, admittedly, a trend rather than an accomplishment, an attitude of mind rather than a system. The concern here is with a level of analysis, not as deep as the well of metaphysics, nor as wide as the church door of morals. It is one corner in the large and busy field of governmental studies where the frequenters, it is assumed, have already worked out for themselves elsewhere some reasonably satisfactory personal philosophy of life and of politics. They have their political loyalties and policy preferences, but they choose not to pursue these ends in this particular corner. Like any good club, it does not undertake to preempt the ties of family, church, or country.

The systematic analysis of political behavior and political processes is a significant growing edge of knowledge for our field. But it is better approached with an air of curiosity about politics than a desire to improve. It is a subject for the teasing needle rather than the tuning fork.

Political philosophy will continue to deal with ultimate aspects of authority in the state. We would probably all agree that government is concerned with authority, and authority has little meaning if divorced from ethical considerations. It may be argued that advances in analytical skills will eventually produce highly significant objective findings for guidance concerning values and morals in politics. How to use such data will remain a value judgment.

It is important to avoid the footless disputes that can arise from confusing the distinctive purposes of political philosophy and systematic political analysis. To argue their relative merits is to ask which leg is better. Both are needed for standing erect and moving forward in the world of practical affairs. Those studying politics and government, by the very nature of their subject matter, employ both normative and analytical approaches and often find collaboration with diverse specialists from other disciplines and professions very fruitful.

Granted, likewise, the importance for political scientists to specialize in fields of inquiry such as constitutional law or utility regulation or agricultural policy or international affairs, all of which call for informed

judgment on matters of public policy. Certainly, today there are many questions of policy and ethics that must be answered, but to which political analysis in any rigorous sense can offer little.

For quite some time to come the advance of political science is best pictured as a widespread skirmish line of small and brave platoons. And, as we know, some at times seem to rely upon heavy verbal barrages to protect, if not to screen, their efforts. The important fact, however, is the probing, the exploring, the quest that is under way.

While all this variety is stimulating, it renders difficult of achievement for political science as a special discipline what some students of the history of science refer to as "intellectual autonomy." Recurrently, there has been a struggle within fields of knowledge to organize in accordance with the evidence within its own domain and to rule out extraneous issues that cannot be resolved within the limits of the field as defined. For example, a hundred years ago or less, geology found itself preoccupied with "material proof of the existence of God through evidence of the direct interference of Providence in the determination of earth history."

Today, such a concern would be regarded as obviously irrelevant by geologists and, I daresay, by most theologians also. If political science develops into an ever more rigorous discipline, less attention will be devoted to speculation about imponderables, not because such matters are of any less intrinsic importance but rather because students of government, through improved methods of observation and analysis within the technical confines of political science, will view as more rewarding and significant their resultant findings. The microscope and the telescope opened up stranger worlds than ever pictured in the legends of Prester John. In other words, the outcome, I think, will turn upon methodological inventiveness rather than conversion through the dialectical skill of any one school of thought.

The practical, down-to-earth nature of most governmental problems and the pragmatic temper of political scientists in the United States protect us from much extraneous disputation. At best, "intellectual autonomy" for political science is a distant goal.

Although it may be difficult to define political science precisely as an autonomous body of knowledge and method, *political scientists* have proved their usefulness in a great variety of ways, both in practical affairs and research. Furthermore, the teaching of government is frequently refreshed by direct contact with the subject matter through participation in governmental affairs by political scientists. Such experiences broaden, stimulate, and bring a test of reality to academic inquiry.

The incomplete data available suggest that nearly half the membership of this Association are engaged in applying their political science training in pursuits other than teaching. In the light of experience, what types of training have proved most useful? What is the full range of career opportunities? In what skills are men best trained? What attracts students to graduate study in the field? In learning more about political scientists we may learn more about political science.

My second main theme, then, has been to point out that as we clarify and develop political science as a discipline we both serve our professional needs and perform the vital function of helping our democracy to know itself better.

This faces the profession with both responsibilities and opportunities. We cannot afford to ride personal hobbies, to hawk panaceas, to pass glib judgments, to take positions on mere partisan grounds. Normative questions must be thought through to their fundamental philosophic bases: here clear thinking rather than training in any preferred discipline seems most relevant.

As political scientists, we have the duty to search out the relevant facts of politics, to develop methods of analysis that reveal basic relationships, and to lay bare the political realities.

III

As voters understand such matters ever more clearly, they will, I believe, appraise shrewdly those individuals who seek to further their own interests through exploitation of public concern with the Communist contagion. The theory of "government by conspiracy" can spread a virus of mutual mistrust more enervating and difficult to eradicate than the red rash now so worrisome.

Once, bedding was burned for contamination of yellow fever: books more recently were burned for taint of Communism: in confusion and futility.

When will the transmission of erroneous information and propaganda be given a bit of the same cool, intelligent treatment as that devoted to infectious germs and political demonology be replaced perhaps by political epidemiology?

Witchdoctors, true to type, respond appropriately to the public attention they are accorded. They earn their publicity, however unfairly, by making news. And we buy it:

for which of you will stop
The vent of hearing when loud Rumour speaks?

Amid the present contrived excursions and alarums, it is a little difficult to picture John Q. Public settling down with a good book, say, on

the religious wars of the 17th century. I can, however, imagine an eventual state of mind that would make a whodunit seem more worth while than a who-thought-it, a who-joined-it, a who-isn't-saying, or a who-won't-tell. A feeling of boredom may help—so will a sense of humor; but behind all this, may I say MALARKEYISM, are problems of government that call for fresh examination.

We must go from the symptoms to the causes. A deep cause, I think, is a failure to understand the forces operating in the world around us. Why do so many Americans feel threatened? Is it the stubborn complexity of world problems and the difficulties arising from ideological differences and international rivalries that lead them to seek scapegoats among their fellow-countrymen? From the standpoint of efficient government, security clearances are necessary but so is the maintenance of administrative morale and the prestige of the public service.

We emerge victorious from a great war, stronger and more productive than ever before: the leader of the free world. Yet those who foster timidity, malice, suspicion, and penury seem able to weaken the operation of our representative institutions.

What do we witness only too often: emotional frustration built high upon ignorance. Those who picture the atomic bomb as a ready device for removing all wrong people if dropped in the right places apparently cannot understand why this simple operation has not already been performed. Faced with complex imponderables, man creates explanations: Zeus throws thunderbolts, bombs create tornadoes, the misguided or discarded enthusiasms of a few teachers or actors threaten the Republic!

Why assume that the conspiracy of Communism is best exposed where the limelight shines brightest? Hard training, sober judgment, and systematic effort is required to disclose and analyze adequately the designs of Soviet Imperialism. The exposure of these maneuverings is a job for specialists and requires high intelligence.

Moreover, this approach does not involve the risk of defeating our own ends by encroaching upon the traditional rights of citizenship. On the other hand, the practices of foreign dictators and domestic demagogues indicate that both draw their strength by playing upon ignorance, fear, and malice. Their sowing of suspicion and mistrust weakens normal human relationships and prepares the way for the further spread of their personal influence. Above all, they arrogate to themselves the testing of what constitutes loyalty to the state. The dictator grasps control of the instruments of power. Whether the demagogue becomes much more

than an ugly noise depends upon the strength of the support he can attract.

"The forces of intolerance and demagoguery are greedy forces and unrestrained," as George Kennan has so well said. "There is no limit to their ambitions or their impudence. They contain within themselves no mechanism of self-control."

Democratic government offers no automatic control of such forces. The checks and balances of our system, legal procedures and judicial review, the competition of interest groups and political parties, federalism and sectional politics, are all barriers to those who would consolidate dictatorial powers in their own hands. But the ultimate protection from the demagogue and the conspirator rests in the capacity of each citizen to weigh and to judge. The mechanism for democratic self-control is the citizen's inner control: his knowledge of government, his shrewd political judgment, his capacity to turn from emotional appeals and fears to a sensible estimate of the situation. These provide the safeguards against domestic demagoguery. A thoughtful and hard-headed approach to affairs governmental constitutes the base upon which security from foreign threats is erected.

In summary, then, I see manifestations current in politics that constitute a retreat from reason, and, to retreat from reason today is to relinquish faith in our capacity for self-government.

Clearly, many of the problems that confront us as citizens transcend the limits of present knowledge. Yet our political behavior and political wisdom or folly will be of determinant importance in all. All involve the study and understanding of government and political forces.

For example:

Much more needs to be known concerning social change, whether through revolutionary movements or adjustments demanded by the advances of technology.

Much more must be learned about the use of our human resources for the great variety of tasks that call for highly trained people; and this involves among other things holding and rewarding effective public servants.

A better understanding is called for of how to foster basic scientific inquiry and venturesome research and how to encourage bold creative thinkers, within our traditions of equality, of mass production, and material success.

There is need to study how best to integrate military strength within our democratic way of life for the maintenance of national security.

And, finally, more attention should be given to the burdens borne by lawmakers in our state legislatures and in Congress. Here is the high point in that continuum of relationships of voter to voter, to local officials, to elected representatives, and on through the stages and processes that make self-government operative.

This sense of the continuity and interrelatedness of the workings of self-government is best taught by political science. We have a long way to go before we know our political system in full measure; but study points the way and analytical skill provides the vanguard.

In conclusion, I say to you: at a time when world responsibilities demand courageous and constructive action, we cannot as citizens permit confidence in our public instrumentalities to be weakened or faith diminished in our capacity as a free nation to direct public policies to the enhancement of justice and liberty at home and abroad.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST*

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

United Nations

Let me first of all thank you most heartily for your kind invitation to this luncheon. As an old hand in the political science field myself, I take a special pleasure in this opportunity of establishing contacts with your Association. Need I tell you that no occasion offering me such an opportunity could have been more welcome than this one because of the honour which you bestow today upon Ralph Bunche. The election of Dr. Bunche as President of your Association is a high tribute to his personal qualities and achievements. I am proud to be present here today to join in that tribute.

The political scientists had a great share in the creation of the United Nations Organization. And they are doing much in the classroom, in publications, and by their daily influence on public affairs to explain, to strengthen, and to help the Organization. Meeting you here today it is natural for me to try to explain how the United Nations' world looks from the inside to a social scientist who long ago had to abandon scientific work but who, in the back of his mind, in whatever job he has had to try, has given much thought to the challenge that the special activities in which he was engaged presented to his scientific imagination and conscience.

The area covered by your Association is very wide—certainly as wide as, but probably not any wider than that covered by the United Nations. On one of the frontiers of UN activities we find the highly specialized economist working with his statistical tools, at another frontier the expert on public relations and their psychology. At still another frontier is the diplomatic expert with his background in international political history. And at a fourth frontier you have the man specializing in problems of internal administration and institutional developments.

The United Nations and its activities reflect acute needs of our time. The diversification and the scope of its various problems and efforts mirror the diversification and problems of the present social and political situation. In this way the United Nations' experiences are indicative of the challenge of our time to the social sciences and the social scientists.

In many respects what is done in the United Nations is to apply to practical problems of today conclusions drawn in studies already made in various spheres of the social sciences. In other cases the United Nations embarks upon pioneer work, elaborating its own approaches and presenting practical conclusions to be studied by—and perhaps also challenged by—the independent social scientists. I am tempted to describe the situation in the famous phrase of Max Weber: to a large extent the United Nations is living off truth, as established

* Address delivered by the Secretary-General before the American Political Science Association at its forty-ninth annual meeting in Washington, D. C., September 11, 1953.

by the social scientists, but it has also to live for truth, in its creative intellectual and practical activities.

I think that the spheres in which the United Nations, and those working inside its Secretariat, have the greatest wealth of new material to offer to the social scientists for their studies are first, the sphere of institutional problems, proper to a world-wide international administration, and second, that of diplomatic techniques and of international relations as elaborated in an international body, serving all countries irrespective of the split of our world and the differences of national interests represented among the governments by which it has been established.

It would take me too far to go into any detail. It would, indeed, be presumptuous on my part to try to do so. My imagination as an ex-teacher of the University of Stockholm may lead me into temptation, but twenty years of political life have not dulled my scientific conscience nor muffled its warning against large conclusions from inconclusive evidence.

However, let me indicate briefly the nature of the problems I have in mind in the two specific spheres to which I have referred—problems which seem to me to present a challenge to the social scientists.

I imagine that a few of you have already given some thought to the very peculiar organizational and institutional problems developing in an international administration. One of those problems has recently had the honour of figuring even in the newspaper headlines. I refer to the implications of a truly international status for such an administration, a status of full independence. Other problems which affect the day to day work and are just as important, are scarcely noted by the public and certainly only partly known to those scientists who are interested in the field of public administration. Let me mention a few of them briefly.

In the United Nations Secretariat we have nearly sixty different nationalities represented. None of us can make ourselves entirely free from our own background, and why should we? Is not the national accent and the national experience very often a great asset in international cooperation? It certainly is, but at the same time it may introduce an element of division. It may tend to split what should be a unity into separate compartments. For the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his collaborators it is necessary to find ways to make the national elements an asset, to overcome the divisive influences and try to create a unity in which the diversity of the national backgrounds of the members of the administration are fully respected and preserved, but in such a way as to be an asset, rather than a liability in the work. I am sure it must be evident to you how difficult and challenging a problem this is.

Another problem in international administration is closely connected with the ways in which such an administration is influenced by different administrative traditions and national legal ideologies. I would like to give you a practical example of significance. In the United Nations Administration as it is now set up, you find a blend between administrative traditions typical of various parts of the world. For example from the American administrative

practice the United Nations has derived a tradition calling for a high degree of specialization, from the European side a tradition calling for a high degree of permanency of employment and professional flexibility. The American system of specialization, as is well known, creates a need for a comparatively larger number of officials. But this number varies from time to time both upward and downward as changes are made in policies and programs and this in turn leads to less emphasis upon, and fewer safeguards for, permanency of tenure. The European system, on the other hand, works with a smaller number of officials and the employees are supposed to be able to adjust to a variety of different responsibilities. This European system makes it possible to give to employment a high degree of permanency, wherein the tendency to rigidity is counterbalanced by the flexibility of service. When you combine such traditions, as is being done in the United Nations, you are really trying out a new technique, natural in the light of prevailing circumstances, but fraught with difficulties, and so far insufficiently explored. By methods of trial and error we have to work towards an equilibrium between the various elements, adjusted to the special needs of a universal international administration.

The general problem just mentioned leads up to a whole series of questions which will have to be settled in the light of further experience. Let me mention only two. How is the specialized scientific expert to be fitted into the framework of the international administration? What is his proper function and what kind of status should he be given? And further, how is the problem created by the aging of specialized employees—a problem facing all administrations—to be solved in an international administrative system?

But let me leave this field and say just a few words also about the sphere where the United Nations Administration is pioneering in fields where it may be said to break new ground for the political scientists. Traditional diplomatic techniques are in principle, of course, bilateral. That is true even if many nations happen to be represented at the conference table. A truly multilateral approach to diplomacy does not come into being until an instrument is created which represents a denationalized platform for negotiations or a denationalized instrument for a number of governments. In the Annual Report to the Eighth Assembly I have said that I believe we have only begun to explore the full potentialities of the United Nations as an instrument for multilateral diplomacy, especially the most fruitful combinations of public discussion on the one hand and private negotiations and mediation on the other. I added that the opportunities are there to be tested and used.

This is a fascinating field where the experience of classical diplomacy, the successes and the errors of the League of Nations and of the United Nations, and the knowledge of the technique and psychology of a public debate utilizing to the full the modern media, all have to be taken into account by the political scientist as well as by those who are put in positions where they have to explore possibilities by action. Looking at my present job from the point of view of the social scientist, but looking at it also just as much from the point of view of somebody deeply engaged in the common effort to save peace and to build a

world of peace, I cannot find any part of my present task more challenging than the one which consists in trying to develop all the potentialities of that unique diplomatic instrument which the Charter has created in the institution called the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

At this point I would like to depart from the beaten track of my prepared text and venture into wider fields even at the risk of losing my way.

I called the Secretariat and the institution named the Secretary-General instruments the full potentialities of which should be further explored. Instruments for whom? Well, of course, for the governments, but to be handled by the men and women assigned to the various posts in the Administration. I would not say anything here about *how* they are using the instruments. That would take me into the field of policy-making which I think is more properly discussed from other platforms. But I would like to indicate *what* they need as a background for the proper handling of the instruments, because these needs throw light on the challenge of our time to the political sciences in the spheres where the United Nations is in no way a pioneer but gratefully may reap where others have sown.

The Secretary-General—and I use him as a symbol for all of the Secretariat—is facing a public relations problem of a delicate and difficult nature. He is not out to “sell” anything. His is not a propaganda operation. But he has to try to reach the minds and hearts of people so as to get the United Nations’ efforts firmly based in public reaction. As I said, we are not selling anything, but we feel that what we are doing is something that should have the support of the simple reactions of plain men, if we manage to tell them our story in the right way. So, the question of public relations to the Secretary-General develops into a question of human relations.

Human relations. The United Nations has to activate in its support people’s urge to live together and work together in peace and decency. For that reason the United Nations has to try to create a new awareness of human and national interdependence. In order to be able to do so it will have to understand what makes so difficult the development of such an awareness. It will have to understand—and challenge—the fear that motivates so much of human action, the fear that is our worst enemy but which, somehow, seems to taint at least some corner of the heart of every man.

So the Secretary-General of the United Nations is led into very wide fields which are under the reign of political science. In his efforts he may have to enter the world of “An American Dilemma” and the land of “The Lonely Crowd,” and he must give such knowledge its proper background in the broodings of the de Tocquevilles and Schumpeters.

When tackling the question of interdependence the United Nations must try to analyze for itself what determines group relations of the kind which international political history so often mirrors. I have already mentioned the element of fear, but there are other factors. We would be misled if we thought about international relations only in terms of diplomatic history. Economic policies and power politics are other forces at work in the background. We

move here in the shadow of Burckhardt. We have to listen to those who analyze the dynamics of the great population movements and the national revivals. Finally we may arrive at a point where we have to analyze the situation with the finest tools of political economy in order to see how material factors determine or clash with human reactions.

You may feel that my departure from the beaten path has led me very far, indeed, when I try to cover in one sweeping movement spheres studied by the theoretical economist, the historian, and the student of the human mind. However, all the parts of political and social science are linked together. The man mastering all the various aspects does not exist. But each of us may be able to make a contribution and so to build up a picture which, although far from complete, gives us a rough map of the waters that we have to sail.

The ultimate challenge to the political sciences—and to us all—is whether man shall master his world and his history or let himself be mastered by a world and a history which after all is made by man. There cannot be more than one reply to this question. Man must master his world, but in order to do so, he must know it.

I have already taken much too much of your time, and yet I have only mentioned very superficially a few of the aspects of the challenge of our time to the social scientists, as reflected in the work and experience of the United Nations. I ask myself if there has ever been a period where the social scientists have had a greater task than today, where the challenge has been broader and more inspiring, and where the results achieved are potentially of greater significance.

In concluding let me add this. Recognizing the important part you as social scientists and as teachers and research scholars have played, are playing, and will play also in the future, it is from my point of view imperative for the United Nations and for its Secretary-General to establish and develop the closest possible working relationship with the group you represent. We are grateful for your help and count heavily on it for the future and I give you the pledge that to the extent the Secretariat of the United Nations can help you in return we will be happy to do so.

THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION*

HENRY L. BRETTON

University of Michigan

Following the general election of September, 1953, the German Social Democratic party (SPD) finds itself in the role of a sole opposition party, a phenomenon in modern German politics. Confronted by a nearly solid phalanx of anti-socialist parties, the SPD approaches a period of crisis and of continuous strain. The ability of the Government to marshal an absolute majority at all times and a two-thirds majority when need be, threatens to relegate the party to virtual legislative impotence. Yet there are several factors militating for the continued existence of the SPD as a vigorous opposition party. Not having to compete with an irresponsible Communist organization in Western Germany, the SPD can be considered as the principal representative of the working class. Furthermore, its long history, its highly developed organizational apparatus, the discipline and devotion of its rank and file, coupled with the will to attain power, make the SPD a factor of relative significance in German as well as in European politics.¹

On the other hand, the dynamics of the East-West conflict, and especially Germany's geographic and political relation to it, tend to affect the political fortunes of the party somewhat adversely. The international situation represents a deadly challenge to the SPD and its survival as an influential political organization may well depend upon its ability to generate a counterforce to the pressures exerted upon Germany by the super-powers. It is to throw some light on this aspect of the SPD's existence that the present article was written.

A British Socialist, attempting to give his party a new political orientation, observed that it was the task of a socialist foreign policy to exercise restraints on the policy of the Atlantic Powers. "We must first accept the Cold War as the central fact of twentieth century politics (just as class war was the central fact of nineteenth century politics) and then disprove the prophets who prove that it must end in World War III."² There are strong indications that German Social Democracy has accepted the "central fact" and has made it the basis of a foreign policy program which, for the present at least, tends to lead that party in the direction of nationalism.

* Parts of this article are based on the results of a field trip to Germany to study the 1953 election under the direction of Prof. James K. Pollock. The author gratefully acknowledges the generous grant by a private foundation which made that trip possible. Plans call for an extensive publication on various aspects of the German election by the several members of the research team at the University of Michigan.

¹ It must be noted, however, that between the years 1949 and 1951 dues-paying membership dropped from 736,218 to 649,529. *Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1950-1951* (Bonn, 1952), p. 170.

² R. H. S. Crossmann, "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism," *New Fabian Essays* (London, 1952), p. 32.

The trend toward nationalism, or parochialism, within the socialist international movement is in itself an old one. In that respect, it can be said that the history of German Social Democracy is but an illustration of the general rule. Quite contrary to the spirit that led Karl Marx to raise the battle cry, "Workers of the world, unite," German Social Democracy had very early in its existence developed a distinct partisanship for the German state.³ Long before the outbreak of the Great War, which Marx failed to foresee, German Socialists had made it unmistakably clear where they intended to take their stand in the event of an armed international conflict.⁴

Following World War I, when the SPD found itself temporarily in possession of power, its leaders joined the chorus of those demanding that German sovereignty remain untouched and unimpeded. Even though the party, as the responsible element in the government of the day, was obliged to accept the peace settlement, it went on record, nevertheless, as being in favor of revision, or even renunciation, as soon as the requisite power potential was at the country's disposal.⁵ This attitude of belligerence, even defiance, toward the powers which had just defeated imperial Germany was not at all out of character. It was caused by a combination of circumstances—not entirely different from those prevailing after 1945—which saw a young Republic, socialist dominated, intent upon making a stand against a capitalist alliance, and a socialist party eager to preserve the constitutional framework on the scene of its first great success.

It was not long after the founding of the Weimar Republic that the SPD was called upon to defend Germany's national sovereignty against what might well be called "the free enterprise international." During the Ruhr occupation the great industrialists, wishing to ignore the position of the SPD in national politics, proceeded to negotiate a settlement with the occupation powers. With the fate of the Republic seemingly at stake, the leadership of the party showed itself to be the real prop of national state sovereignty. Karl Severing, Prussian Minister of the Interior, declared that it was necessary, in order to defend the republican form of government, "to concentrate all the forces making for the preservation of the State, in order to transform the disintegrated German people into a nation."⁶ It was ironical indeed that a party so vigorous in its defense of the state, so forceful in its advocacy of national socialism, so determined to maintain national unity, had to see some of these objectives realized—temporarily at least—by its arch foe, Hitlerism. It is perhaps that fact, combined with the pressures generated by the Cold War, which shaped

³ For a discussion of the transformation of socialism, see Henry de Man, *The Psychology of Socialism* (New York, 1927), Ch. 11; Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-1921* (New York, 1949), Ch. 1; and Denis Healey, "Power Politics and the Labour Party," *New Fabian Essays*, pp. 161-79.

⁴ SPD, *Protocoll des Parteitage* 1907, as cited in Berlau, p. 46.

⁵ Germany, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Stenographische Berichte*, Band 327, pp. 1408-9 (July 9, 1919).

⁶ Karl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, 2 vols. (Köln, 1950), Vol. 2, pp. 464-66, 480-81.

the foreign policy concepts and ideas of the new SPD of post-concentration-camp days.⁷

Looking back and attempting to provide a practical answer to the question why a party, once so strongly supported by the electorate, had permitted power to slip from its grasp, the leadership might very well have arrived at the conclusion that the party had failed to read the signs of the times. Although it had already become identified with nationalism in many respects, it had primarily, for sentimental reasons, and in tribute to a mythical international solidarity of workers, kept one foot in the camp of internationalism. It had thus become identified with every international scheme advanced to guarantee the peace and international cooperation, and had consequently been saddled with responsibility for international measures designed to prevent Germany's return to power. It was clear that such a reputation militated against success at the polls in a modern nation-state.⁸

The new Social Democratic party, licensed to operate in the Western zones, showed very early that it did not intend to forget the bitter lessons of the past.⁹ In spite of the fact that there was widespread support for a policy of "euro-peanization" among the liberated Germans, the SPD moved cautiously in the treacherous waters of internationalism. Its leadership had, of course, never denied that a universal interest of the working classes existed, at least in the abstract. What they had denied—by word and action—was that the international of economic interests led necessarily to an international of political interests. The German Socialists, perhaps more than any other group, realized that the international of class interests was confronted by the moral and political fact of an international relationship which was poisoned by the psychological consequences of the myth that all the responsibility for a war lies with one or the other group of belligerents.¹⁰ This was, of course, more true in 1945 than it had been in 1919. In the latter case there had at least been some doubt about the German guilt, whereas no such doubts existed after World War II. The bitterness generated by the German occupation forces was bound to manifest itself in hostile attitudes toward all Germans, socialists and anti-socialists alike. Furthermore, there was the fact of an essentially capitalistic alliance of Western powers tending to resist economic reforms along socialist lines. Finally the German Socialists, along with most of the other socialist parties of Europe, had come to recognize the inadequacies of economic determinism as a key to the political behavior of the masses.¹¹ Something else had to be added to the party's ideological equipment and past experience seemed to indicate that

⁷ See Erich Matthias, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation* (Stuttgart, 1952), esp. pp. 246-56.

⁸ See Fritz Erler, *Soll Deutschland Rüstent?*, SPD pamphlet, pp. 53-55; also Arthur Rosenberg, *Geschichte der deutschen Republik* (Karlsbad, 1935), pp. 101-9; and Matthias, p. 62.

⁹ For a competent discussion of the events leading to the merger of the Communist party and the SPD in Eastern Germany, see J. P. Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-50* (London, 1951), Ch. 4.

¹⁰ de Man, *The Psychology of Socialism* (cited in note 3), p. 306.

¹¹ Francis W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (New York, 1934), pp. 135 ff.

further nationalization of socialism was the answer. Thus, continued transition of German Social Democracy from a nominally internationalist party to one more openly dedicated to national orientation was recognizable, in outline, at the beginning of the postwar period.

A taste of things to come was provided in the relatively unobtrusive *Leitsätze*, laid down to guide the party's postwar strategy.¹² A more aggressive attitude became apparent with the developments leading to the creation of a new German state. At its annual meeting in 1948, the party went on record as demanding "a full and equal" participation by Germany in all European undertakings, an end to dismantling actions, and particularly the cessation of Allied interference in German "internal affairs."¹³

The early local elections of 1946 and 1947 had indicated that the party was within reach of obtaining a majority in the federal parliament to be elected. Under those circumstances it was decided that precautionary steps had to be taken to prevent the introduction, or re-introduction, by capitalist circles of economic devices the purpose of which was to remove commercial and industrial controls from the jurisdiction of a future German government. Since it was suspected that the Marshall Plan was just such a device, the party expressed opposition to it. The same applied to the Ruhr Statute. Likewise, a statement on the question of German rearmament bristled with defiance and put the party on record with a resounding "no."¹⁴

The national elections scheduled to take place in the fall of 1949 provided the impetus for a stepped-up campaign. Aside from the element of personal urgency displayed by the party's dynamic chairman, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, it became quite apparent that the course which the party was to follow from then on would ultimately take it further into the troubled waters of nationalism. An attempt was made to rally a majority of the German electorate behind the party. Because it was a matter of record that a strictly socialistic appeal would not produce a majority in Germany, the appeal was broadened to include nationalism and patriotism as well. It seemed that all feasible precautions were being taken to avoid a recurrence of the catastrophe of 1933 which had brought the dictatorship of Hitler and the incarceration or execution of socialist leaders.

As the Basic Law neared its completion, Schumacher denounced what he called interference by the Occupation Powers and demanded adoption of the document without the amendments which had been proposed by the Military Governors.¹⁵ Determined to avoid the errors of 1918 and 1919, the party took pains not to become too closely identified with the new constitution. It was feared that unqualified acceptance of the Basic Law would lead to the charge that the party shared responsibility for the East-West split of Germany. Also,

¹² Kurt Schumacher et al., *Das Programm der Opposition*, SPD pamphlet (Hanover, 1949), p. 43.

¹³ *Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1948-1949* (Hanover, 1950), pp. 114-15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁵ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950), p. 431.

in view of the fact that the Western Allies had seen fit to urge the adoption of certain constitutional features, it was deemed to be strategically sound to convey the impression that the Basic Law had been accepted under duress. With reference to the probability of future debates on the subject of constitutional paternity, a resolution attacked "the far-reaching identity of views between the ruling clique of the CDU/CSU and the Occupation Powers regarding the structure of a German State."¹⁶ When the final vote on the completed Basic Law was taken, the SPD voted in the affirmative, but with the understanding that the document was to be of temporary validity and that under existing circumstances (i.e., as a result of Allied pressures) it had to be accepted as a lesser evil.¹⁷

Considering the widespread desire among Germans living in the Western parts to see their country unified once again, it was, of course, only natural for a party seeking mass support to campaign on the issue of unification. At the time the issue lent itself ideally to political exploitation, since approximately twenty per cent of the population in the three Western zones came from the Russian zone, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and from other points east of the great international divide.¹⁸ But the political potentialities of irredentism were not the only considerations that led to the vigorous campaign for unification and against every Allied move which tended to interfere with that goal. Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg had traditionally been areas of strong socialist majorities. There was reason to assume that these areas, if joined to the rest of the Republic, would assure the SPD a majority in an all-German parliament.¹⁹ The politico-religious aspects of the split were also of great significance. The ascendancy of catholicism in German politics as a direct result of the loss of predominantly protestant areas was being viewed with grave concern by the traditionally anticlerical Left.

The new face of the party was further revealed by charges that the Allies contemplated the subjugation of Germany to a state of virtual peonage, and that a movement was afoot to detach German areas, such as the Saar, from the mother country.²⁰ Especially revealing were the remarks of the party's chairman concerning the denazification proceedings wherein he demanded that prosecution of "followers" be brought to an end on the grounds that mistakes committed by these people were no worse than those which had been committed by "big statesmen of the major powers in the early days."²¹

The elections to the federal Parliament did not bring the desired majority.

¹⁶ Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS), *Documents on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution* (Berlin, 1949), p. 134; also, *Was Wir Wollen*, SPD pamphlet, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1948-1949*, pp. 12-18, 138-39.

¹⁸ See "The Political Aspects of the Refugee Problem," Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), *4th Quarterly Report*, pp. 30-34 (July-Sept., 1950).

¹⁹ *Socialist International Information*, Vol. 2, p. 13 (Nov. 22, 1952); also OMGUS, *Government and Its Administration in the Soviet Zone of Germany* (1947), pp. 27-38.

²⁰ *New York Times*, July 10, 1949, p. 10.

²¹ *Ibid.*, July 24, 1949, p. 3; *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1950-1951*, p. 16.

Instead, the SPD had to be satisfied with the role of an opposition party.²² However, the returns indicated that the party had managed to keep its share of the refugee and expellee vote, that its appeal to the traditionally nationalistic lower middle class had at least been partially successful, and also that it could continue to count on the overwhelming support of the workers.²³ It was hoped that the margin of victory in the general election of 1953 would be obtained from the young voters and from those who were dissatisfied with Adenauer's foreign policy.

The foreign policy views of the leading opposition party were first summarized in a sixteen-point resolution adopted by the party's Executive Committee on August 29, 1949.²⁴ The statement itself was cautiously phrased and lacked the flamboyance of general campaign oratory. It was a sweeping statement though, and touched upon every known issue involving Germany's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. What was most significant, however, was the failure to incorporate some references, meaningful and specific, to Western European integration, or to a United States of Europe. It was also noteworthy that the statement failed to include the traditional call for international solidarity of the working class.

The first great opportunity to voice the party's foreign policy approach came with the debate on the new Adenauer Government's declaration to the Bundestag on September 21, 1949.²⁵ Dr. Schumacher took great pains to exploit the Government's inability to state certain foreign policy demands forcefully and openly. With this approach he set the pattern for the strategy to be followed by the party in parliament and in the country at large. Pointing to the Occupation Statute, the Ruhr Statute, the Oder-Neisse Line, the frontier adjustments in the West, the Saar, and Franco-German relations in general, the party chairman voiced strong demands for change or improvement of Germany's international position. "It is high time," he stated, "to point out that back in 1945, the SPD was for quite a long time the only party to oppose the Oder-Neisse Line. . . ." He criticized Adenauer's failure to outline "any plan or conception for a progressive German foreign policy." In general, his attack was purely negative. There was no attempt to present to the Bundestag an out-

²² The SPD elected 131 representatives of a total of 402 in the Bundestag and held 20 of the 43 seats in the Bundesrat. The party's strength in the lower house entitled it to the chairmanship of several committees, of which the Committee on the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs and the Committee on All-German Affairs were the most important for present purposes. The leadership in the former body was assumed by Carlo Schmid, the party's leading foreign policy expert. The leadership of the parliamentary delegation itself was left in the hands of Kurt Schumacher, who was assisted by Erich Ollenhauer and Carlo Schmid. For election statistics, see HICOG, *Elections and Political Parties in Germany, 1945-1952* (Bad Godesberg, 1952); also "Die Bundestagswahl am 14 August 1949," *Statistik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 10 (Wiesbaden, 1952).

²³ See Otto Kirchheimer and Arnold H. Price, "Analysis and Effects of the Elections in Western Germany," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 21, p. 568 (Oct. 17, 1949).

²⁴ The Dürkheimer Program, in *Das Programm der Opposition* (cited in note 12), p. 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-39.

line of an alternate foreign policy. His was the typical opposition maneuver designed to embarrass the Government without offering a helping hand.

Turning his attention to the then forthcoming accession of Germany to the Council of Europe, and with reference to international projects in general, Schumacher advised the Government that, as a matter of principle, "the underlying thesis of German foreign policy should be that important material considerations [i.e., vital national interests] should never be jeopardized merely to meet an urgent deadline."²⁶ This not only represented a clear departure from the policy of fulfillment pursued by the party between the wars, but also augured a return to *Realpolitik* as a means of achieving the realization of national objectives. It meant that the SPD would insist that a full measure of advantage be extracted from a given international situation before concessions would be made by a German government.

The third SPD speaker participating in that great debate, Carlo Schmid, developed the neo-nationalist line even more clearly. Addressing himself to the central thesis of the Adenauer Government's foreign policy, namely, close cooperation with the West, he lashed out against what he termed "a further application of the Wilhelmstrasse tradition which seeks to offer Germany as a tool to the West." With a distinct anti-American edge, he noted that influences were at work to impose "extra-European" concepts upon the European community. In that connection, the occupation "was not designed to protect Germany but represented instead an interventionist act the purpose of which it was to give the Allies an opportunity to do certain things which normally could only be done by Germans." He concluded from the foregoing that it would be necessary to develop a "German foreign policy" to be distinguished from the type of policy that was merely an expression of foreign wishes. "Anti-nationalism," he observed, "did not require that a German foreign policy had of necessity to be a function of the foreign policy of other countries, East or West."

Did Germany possess the power potential necessary to pursue an independent foreign policy? Dr. Schmid provided an answer: "One should not underestimate the means at our disposal. One should not forget that in certain areas and in certain situations there is a potential superiority of the vanquished over the victor."²⁷ To leave no doubt as to the meaning of these words, he stated, paraphrasing Cavour: "Italia farà da sè, Germania farà da sè." It was perhaps no more than a logical consequence of such politics when the head of the party insinuated, from the floor of the Bundestag, that Chancellor Adenauer had been guilty of treasonable conduct by failing to take advantage of Germany's strong bargaining position.²⁸

The bitter exchange between the Chancellor and the leader of the opposition had been caused in part by the signing of the so-called "Petersberg Protocol."²⁹

²⁶ Germany, *Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte* (hereafter cited as *Bundestag*), 6 Session, p. 42 (Sept. 21, 1949).

²⁷ *Bundestag*, 10 Session, pp. 183-84 (Sept. 29, 1949).

²⁸ *Bundestag*, 18 Session, pp. 525-26 (Nov. 24, 1949).

²⁹ HICOG, *1st Quarterly Report*, Appendix VII (Sept.-Dec., 1949).

Under the resulting agreements, the federal government had obtained certain concessions in return for a German pledge to apply for membership in the International Ruhr Authority. In the course of the ensuing discussions, the SPD took the position that the Protocol required formal ratification by the Bundestag on the grounds that it constituted a treaty in the sense of Article 59 (Par. 2) of the Basic Law.³⁰ The strategy to utilize the Basic Law as a brake on the Government's foreign policy operations was to become a major weapon in the arsenal of the opposition party.³¹

The issue of German rearmament, raised earlier, flared to a fully grown controversy when the Chancellor was careless enough to permit himself to be interviewed on that delicate subject.³² The SPD swung into action immediately. As far as the basic principles of armed defense were concerned, there was, of course, no real issue. The party was neither pacifist nor oblivious of the real danger threatening from the East.³³ What was at issue was primarily the question of German equality in the proposed defense system. It was a matter of politics, not of morals. The tendency to hold the Allies incapable of living up to their pledges also contributed to the resistance. The party insisted that the Allies commit themselves more fully and without reservations to the defense of Germany proper. Without iron-clad guarantees and real commitments, so it was maintained, German rearmament would inevitably tend to provoke the Soviet Union into precipitating the very actions which the scheme was supposed to prevent.³⁴ Furthermore, it was suggested that the Allies desired West-German participation in the European defense system because such a development would tend to block further efforts to bring about the unification of all of Germany.³⁵

Strong evidence that the SPD was moving in a new direction, internationally speaking, presented itself in connection with the Council of Europe. Here the socialist opposition was just as adamant as in the case of rearmament. The lessons of the past, so it seemed, were not going to be ignored. The orthodox approach that had in the past seen socialist parties underwrite any scheme de-

³⁰ *Bundestag*, 18 Session, p. 487 (Nov. 24, 1949). The party promptly submitted its case to the newly created Federal Constitutional Court; see Elmer Plischke, *The West German Federal Government* (HICOG, 1952), p. 119.

³¹ *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1950-1951*, p. 11.

³² *Bundestag*, 24 Session, pp. 734-35 (Dec. 16, 1949).

³³ For a discussion of the SPD's position on the subject of militarism, see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags*, Band 391, pp. 857 ff. (Dec. 16, 1926); see also Erler, *Soll Deutschland Rüsten?* (cited in note 8), pp. 5-6.

³⁴ *Bundestag*, 24 Session, pp. 735-36. There was also, of course, the important consideration of political control. From the SPD's point of view it was of vital importance that the new army was formed and organized while a Socialist government was in a position to keep a close eye on it; see also Klaus-Peter Schulz, *Deutschland und die Verteidigung Europas*, SPD pamphlet, pp. 12-13.

³⁵ Cf. the debate on the European Army, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 2 Session, pp. 85 ff. (Aug. 11, 1950). On another occasion, Carlo Schmid portrayed the situation rather bluntly when he observed: "It would be better to be bolshevised dwelling in an undamaged house than to be bolshevised as a cripple living in a hole in the ground." HICOG, *5th Quarterly Report*, p. 5 (Oct.-Dec., 1950).

signed to advance international cooperation gave way to a more realistic, albeit a more parochial attitude. As one spokesman put it: "It is necessary to make it clear, whether the SPD is a new party or whether it is the old 'me-too' party."³⁶ The alignment of international political forces under the impact of the cold, ideological war, was different from that which had prevailed during the years following World War I. For the SPD, it was to be Germany first and then Europe, for the conservatism of the ruling circles in Western Europe did not inspire the socialist leadership with confidence.³⁷

From the point of view of a German party struggling to attain power amidst the ruins of what had once been a veritable citadel of nationalism, active support of the Council of Europe and identification with international projects of dubious purpose seemed strategically unsound. The SPD could not well afford to overlook the effects which conservative economic planning, within the framework of a European regional organization, would inevitably have upon their class interests—and upon their political fortunes, for that matter. Nor could they dare close their minds to the fact that no matter how effective an international organization Europe could create, the fear psychology of a country like France was bound to break through; the resultant manifestations would inevitably open the floodgates to German nationalistic excesses.³⁸

In their refusal to subordinate domestic political considerations and class interests to the demands of European cooperation, the German Socialists were not alone. They could certainly count on similar trends among their fellow-socialists in Britain and in France, and probably in all other European countries.³⁹ It had become quite apparent that the early enthusiasm, so fervently espoused at international congresses during the immediate postwar period, had since been supplanted by an attitude of excessive caution and reserve.⁴⁰

In order to ward off the inevitable charges of hypernationalism, Carlo Schmid developed a suitable dialectic reply. He argued that what appeared to be internationalism in European politics was in reality the sum total of nationalistic aspirations in certain victor countries. The SPD would therefore be delinquent in its duties if it failed to warn the German people against "political decoys,

³⁶ *Sopade* (Sozialdemokratische Parteikorrespondenz), No. 898, p. 44 (June, 1950).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

³⁸ *Bundestag*, 9 Session, p. 158 (Sept. 28, 1949), and 145 Session, p. 5781 (May 31, 1951); Kurt Schumacher, *Macht Europa Stark*, SPD pamphlet (Hanover, 1951), p. 17.

³⁹ See the statements by the representative of Great Britain, Mr. Lee, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 1 Session, p. 290 (Aug. 17, 1949); the representatives of France, André Philip, 3 Session, pp. 246-47 (May 10, 1951), and Raul Reynaud, p. 254 (May 11, 1951).

⁴⁰ Cf. Great Britain, Labour Party, *Report of the Forty-Eighth Annual Conference* (London, 1949), p. 224; see also Carlo Schmid on the subject of European unity, *Socialist International Information*, Vol. 2, pp. 11-14 (Nov. 22, 1952). The SPD delegation to the Council of Europe voted against every one of the crucial proposals before that body. On every important issue they voted against the other half of the German delegation; see Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 2 Session, p. 165 (Aug. 11, 1950); p. 913 (Nov. 24, 1950); and p. 549 (Aug. 26, 1950).

sailing under false flags."⁴¹ According to Dr. Schmid, the "true internationalism" was that type based upon a strong, united, and independent Germany, and including not only Britain and Scandinavia, but also Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest.⁴²

It was but the logical consequence of the foregoing that the SPD rejected the economic proposals which became known as the Schuman Plan. Although the initiative for a pooling of resources had come from SPD circles as well as from France,⁴³ it became clear, once the proposals had been incorporated into a concrete plan, that the brain child did not show the characteristics expected by the parent.⁴⁴ As soon as the French Foreign Minister had formally proposed the merger of the French and German steel and coal industries on May 9, 1950, a reply from Schumacher indicated that the proposals had fallen considerably short of SPD thoughts on the subject of international economic cooperation. Schumacher indicated in fact that he saw in the Plan a direct challenge to German national interests.⁴⁵ Since there was ample ground for complaint on Germany's part, if national interests were taken as a basis for criticism, and because the Government was honor-bound to promote the Plan for reasons of high policy, the SPD, as the opposition party, was able to utilize the Plan as a means of gaining political advantage in the German arena.⁴⁶

It was claimed that the Plan represented an ill-concealed attempt to shackle Germany's industrial capacity to the advantage of the comparatively free industries of France, Belgium, and Italy.⁴⁷ One spokesman went so far as to suggest that the various other functional organs of European regional cooperation represented nothing but French political and diplomatic schemes disguised in "European clothing." More to the point was the observation that the Schuman Plan was but one step in the direction of a European federation, the real purpose of which was the creation of a supra-national authority to control Germany by majority vote.⁴⁸ To strengthen the case against the Plan, the SPD employed the identical weapon used by the nationalists of old, namely, the cita-

⁴¹ Carlo Schmid, *Die Aussenpolitik der SPD*, SPD pamphlet, p. 5.

⁴² Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 2 Session, p. 87 (Aug. 11, 1950); and *Bundestag*, 10 Session, p. 184 (Sept. 29, 1949).

⁴³ *Bundestag*, 10 Session, p. 185.

⁴⁴ A woman delegate went so far as to call the Plan "an illegitimate child of *marx oeconomicus*"; *Bundestag*, 103 Session, p. 3755 (Nov. 16, 1950).

⁴⁵ *Sopade* (cited in note 36), pp. 32-33; see also Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 2 Session, pp. 211-12 (Aug. 14, 1950).

⁴⁶ The SPD's position with respect to the Schuman Plan has been described in the following party publications: *Was Weisst Du Vom Schuman Plan?*; *Der Schuman Plan Führt Nicht Nach Europa*; Erich Ollenhauer, *Deutschland und der Schuman Plan*; Kurt Schumacher, *50 Jahre mit gebundenen Händen*; and *SPD und der Schuman Plan*. All of the foregoing pamphlets were published between 1951 and 1952. See also *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1950-1951*, pp. 258-60.

⁴⁷ *Bundestag*, 161 Session, p. 6517 (July 12, 1951).

⁴⁸ *Bundestag*, 176 Session, pp. 7216-17 (Nov. 22, 1951); 182 Session, pp. 7611 ff. (Jan. 9-11, 1952). The SPD voted against the Plan, which passed the Bundestag 232 to 143, with 3 abstentions.

tion of points made by the French Government in its endeavor to steer the project through the French National Assembly.⁴⁹

A subsequent publication on that subject, prepared for the 1953 election campaign, constituted the bitterest SPD attack on European integration so far made. It depicted the Schuman Plan as an outgrowth of a conspiracy designed to make German unification more difficult. It charged that the Plan amounted to a plot to render Germany less capable of competing with France on the world coal and steel market. In support of that thesis, it pointed out that the German coal-producing industry had been carefully deprived of its principal features of economic stabilization while France had been allowed to retain her stabilizing syndicates, such as the *Comité des Forges*. These "suicidal" economic practices, the publication pointed out, had been further aggravated by discriminatory taxation and contribution schemes which militated even more against German equality in this alleged venture in European unity.⁵⁰

The resistance to economic measures of the type involved in the Schuman Plan was firmly backed—if not largely inspired—by the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). Walter Freitag's partisan attack on the Government's policy during the election campaign was symptomatic of the close relationship of the SPD and the DGB on matters of fundamental importance to the working class. Addressing himself to the government-authorized sale of industrial properties to non-German interests, the chairman of the powerful Trade Union Federation accused Adenauer and his coalition of treasonable conduct.⁵¹ Again, it was the suspicion that the free enterprise international was conspiring against the workers that brought the DGB to the support of the socialist movement.

The SPD's attitude toward French efforts to alienate the Saar territory from Germany was partly motivated by the desire to make political capital out of the Saar issue and partly by the fear of losing the Saar mines to the unbridled influence of West-European capitalist interests.⁵² In 1950, the German delegation to the Socialist International caused the conference to adopt a resolution wherein the German claims to the coal-producing Saar were cautiously recognized by the member parties.⁵³ Similar steps were taken in the Council of Europe. In Germany itself, the SPD never ceased to point out that Adenauer's policy of European integration had not yet led to a satisfactory solution of the thorny Saar question. The SPD opposed all attempts to rob Germany of that vital source of raw material, including the various proposals to "europeanize" the disputed area.⁵⁴ Such schemes, Ollenhauer pointed out, were nothing but camouflaged attempts at annexation. The seizure of the Saar by France would

⁴⁹ *Frankreich und der Schuman Plan*, SPD pamphlet.

⁵⁰ *Götterdämmerung beim Schuman Plan*, SPD pamphlet (Bonn, 1953).

⁵¹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 22, 1953, p. 3.

⁵² The SPD's position on the Saar question is conveniently found in *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1950-1951*, pp. 77-83; see also the SPD pamphlets *Die Europapolitik der SPD* (Bonn, 1953), pp. 25-27; *Protocoll, SPD Wahlkongress 10 Mai 1953* (Bonn, 1953), pp. 43-47; and *Neuer Vorwärts*, Aug. 21, 1953, p. 11.

⁵³ *Jahrbuch der SPD*, pp. 256-57.

⁵⁴ *Die Europapolitik der SPD*, pp. 26-27.

tend to justify Soviet Russia's actions concerning the Oder-Neisse line in the East, and the SPD would never consent to either.⁵⁵

Perhaps the most conclusive test of the SPD's intentions was provided by the resolutions adopted at the Second Congress of the Socialist International. Here it was not a matter of accepting ideas and concepts of capitalistic origin, for here the SPD was among ideological friends. However, proposals to go on record in support of collective security and of European integration found the SPD just as adamant as when these ideas had been advanced by representatives of the free enterprise system.⁵⁶ It almost seemed as though German Social Democracy had become the champion of a divided Europe and that German national objectives were crowding international objectives off its agenda.⁵⁷

Concerning the proposed "Contractual Agreements," to take the place of a peace settlement with Western Germany, the attitude of the SPD was a foregone conclusion. The terms of the agreement were assailed as soon as they became public.⁵⁸ It was alleged, as in the case of the Schuman Plan, that the provisions tended to place excessive burdens upon Germany, while the treaty partners stood to profit by the same terms.⁵⁹ Furthermore, it was pointed out that the signing and ratification of these conventions would in the end have the opposite effect upon world peace from that which the originators claimed for it. The signing of these agreements would actually tend to provoke rather than prevent Soviet aggression.⁶⁰ It was charged that France, the "clerical power," and the "CDU clique at Bonn," had combined forces to bring about the permanent mutilation of the German nation.⁶¹ Kurt Schumacher, with matchless

⁵⁵ *Protocoll, SPD Wahlkongress* (1953), pp. 25-26.

⁵⁶ *Socialist International Information*, Vol. 2, pp. 11-12 (Oct. 25, 1952); also *Sopade*, No. 927, pp. 67-69 (Nov., 1952); and *Fact* (the Labour party monthly), Vol. 10, p. 6 (Nov., 1952).

⁵⁷ On April 3, 1952, when pressed on the subject of international socialist solidarity, Ollenhauer made it unmistakably clear that the SPD would not consider itself bound by resolutions adopted at meetings of the International. *Bundestag*, 204 Session, p. 8790 (April 3 and 4, 1952); see also "Sozialistische Internationale," in *Jahrbuch der SPD, 1950-1951*, pp. 256-71.

⁵⁸ *Bundestag*, 214 Session, p. 9414 (May 23, 1952). For the text of the several agreements and related documents see U. S. Senate, *Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany* (etc.), 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952); also Edward H. Litchfield and Associates, *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), Appendix N. The SPD's position on the agreements has been laid down in these publications: *Die Fesseln der Deutschen Politik: General-Vertrag und EVG-Vertrag*, SPD pamphlet; and *Handbuch sozialdemokratischer Politik* (Bonn, 1953), pp. 71-74.

⁵⁹ *Bundestag*, 214 Session, p. 9414 (May 23, 1952).

⁶⁰ "The unification of Germany remains more important to the peace of the world than any selfish policy of Western integration," Kurt Schumacher, *Newsweek*, Vol. 39, p. 36 (June 30, 1952); see also Ollenhauer, *Vor Entscheidungen für Jahrzehnte*, SPD pamphlet (Bonn, 1952), pp. 16-19.

⁶¹ *Bundestag*, 222 Session, p. 9874 (July 10, 1952). The speaker raised the question of compatibility between the EDC Treaty and the Franco-Russian Pact of 1944 and expressed the fear that France, pursuing the line established by that pact, would one day seek an agreement with the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany and German unity; see *Die Fesseln der Deutschen Politik: General-Vertrag und EVG-Vertrag*, p. 20.

zeal, observed that "whoever signs these treaties is no longer a German," paraphrasing as it were, and apparently with studied deliberation, a similar charge hurled at the signers of the Treaty of Versailles by the supernationalists of the interwar period.⁶²

It was the question of rearmament, however, which produced the greatest controversy. In the opinion of a majority of the SPD's leaders, Germany's integration into the Western defense system endangered the cause of German unification, a cause upon which the very survival of the party depended. Furthermore, because the Adenauer Government stood committed to European integration in general, and because unification had widespread popular appeal, it became mandatory for the SPD's strategists to map out an election campaign on the basis of "unification versus integration," or "negotiation [with the Russians] before rearmament." Stalin's death, the Berlin riots of June 17, 1953, and the intra-party struggles in the Soviet Union strengthened the belief of some SPD leaders that the time for negotiation and unification had actually arrived.

The attack on the European Defense Treaty had begun in earnest in January, 1952. At that time, the SPD had raised the issue of constitutionality and had caused the Bundestag to request an opinion from the Federal Constitutional Court. The question was whether any federal legislation regulating the participation of Germans in a European armed force would be compatible with the Basic Law.⁶³ This maneuver served to delay ratification of the treaty.

The detailed argumentation against rearmament in general, and against the principle of European military integration in particular, ranged over a wide field. The principal argument, of course, was that the EDC militated against unification: "an armed and integrated West Germany would cause the Soviets to keep at least the East of Germany out of this system."⁶⁴ The "policy of strength" pursued by the Adenauer Government—and by the Western Allies—had to give way to a kind of collective security that spelled security for the Soviet Union as well as for the West.⁶⁵ The EDC did not guarantee Germany's security in view of unsettled political conditions in Western Europe (e.g., France and Italy). Instead, it raised the somber prospect of an application of scorched-earth tactics to the German area in the event of an Allied withdrawal.⁶⁶ Addressing himself to the military security aspects of the proposed defense system, Fritz Erler wondered about "the direction in which Italian and French tanks with their communist crews will shoot when Russia attempts to move."⁶⁷ Furthermore, as long as Germany did not enjoy unrestricted sovereignty, matters of defense were the responsibility of the Allies. More to the point was

⁶² Bundestag, 222 Session, p. 9902.

⁶³ Bundestag, 190 Session, p. 8115 (Feb. 7, 1952).

⁶⁴ *Die Europapolitik der SPD* (cited in note 52), p. 16.

⁶⁵ *Handbuch sozialdemokratischer Politik*, p. 115; also Ollenhauer, *New York Times*, Aug. 13, 1953.

⁶⁶ Ollenhauer, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Aug. 24, 1953.

⁶⁷ *Hersfelder Nachrichten*, Aug. 29, 1953.

the argument that the dual arrangement, whereby Germany was to become part of a European defense force but not of NATO, would result in the reduction of German military contingents to the status of "foreign legionnaires."⁶⁸ It was also argued that because "democracy means decision on vital national questions by the people," any attempt to deprive the people of such rights constituted a threat to democracy. To leave decisions on questions of vital national interests to a "foreigner" (i.e., to the Supreme Commander of NATO) was "anti-democratic."⁶⁹ Thus, the internationalism inherent in the projected European Defense Community was held by the SPD to be incompatible with the requirements of popular sovereignty.⁷⁰

There was evidence of some confusion or lack of agreement among the leadership on questions of campaign strategy concerning the exploitation of the armament issue. While party chairman Erich Ollenhauer charged that German rearmament was primarily a device to bolster anti-democratic forces in the Bonn Republic,⁷¹ other speakers protested that the SPD was not, in principle, opposed to rearmament and was, in fact, not opposed to entering NATO if Germany was offered admission.⁷² However, the principal controversy within party ranks appeared to be on the subject of "neutralism." There seemed to be a conflict between the radical, anti-American, neutralist elements on the one hand, and the more moderate, pro-Western forces on the other. Much of the party literature on the subject points to a reluctance to promote German neutralism to the point of national self-destruction. The majority of the leaders seem to be too realistic to believe that the foreign policy of Switzerland can be applied successfully to German conditions.⁷³ On the other hand, some leaders have taken the position that nothing, absolutely nothing, should be done to prejudice negotiations with Russia on unification. This includes a refusal by Germany to allow herself to be committed to one or the other camp.⁷⁴ The resulting dichotomy caused the party some embarrassment at the height of the election campaign.

On August 28, at a much-debated press conference, Fritz Erler stated that the formation of an all-German government was a matter of great urgency.

⁶⁸ *Bundestag*, 190 Session, pp. 8110 ff., 8185 ff.

⁶⁹ Erler, *Soll Deutschland Rüsten?* (cited in note 8), p. 32; see also *Vor Entscheidungen für Jahrzehnte* (cited in note 60), p. 16.

⁷⁰ Erler, pp. 36 ff. The vote on a resolution favoring a German defense contribution was 204 for and 156 against. The latter group included the SPD, the Communists, the Federalist Union, and Independents. *Bundestag*, 190 Session, p. 8248. During the election campaign, Ministerpresident Zinn of Hesse went so far as to suggest that a future German government should commit all current treaties to the wastepaper basket and proclaim Germany's independence immediately. *Hessischer Presse-Dienst*, June 6, 1953.

⁷¹ *Protokoll, Wahlkongress* (1953), p. 24.

⁷² E.g., Dr. Fritz Baader, *Deutschland Union Dienst* (Bonn), July 27, 1953.

⁷³ *Aktions-Programm der SPD* (Dortmund, 1952), p. 12; see Schumacher, *Macht Europa Stark* (cited in note 38), pp. 28-29; and Ollenhauer, *Protokoll, Parteitag* (1952), p. 38.

⁷⁴ See Schmid, *Die Aussenpolitik der SPD* (cited in note 41), p. 19; and Ollenhauer, *Bundestag*, 204 Session, p. 8765 (April 3-4, 1952).

This, of course, was nothing new and all parties were in agreement on that point. Speaking for the neutralist segment of the party leadership. Erler, however, added that such a government should be formed "even if [it] would not be given freedom of action concerning the conduct of its own international relations." He explained that an agreement with the Soviet Union could only come about if the latter had assurances about the direction in which an all-German government would move internationally. This would require a Four-Power agreement to the effect that Germany would not be allowed to join one or the other military bloc. This spelled a serious break in party solidarity and Ollenhauer hastened to offer a thinly veiled correction. Specifically referring to Erler's remarks, he noted that the SPD would reject any attempt to restrict the freedom of action of a future German government by the imposition of automatic strictures against treaty arrangements.⁷⁵

Did the SPD leaders believe it possible to put the German issue on a siding while the fury of the Cold War spent itself elsewhere? Carlo Schmid seems to have been so inclined when he told the Second Congress of the Socialist International:

Of course, we have no illusions about the Russians. But Four-Power agreement is not impossible. The Russians have certain interests within the sphere of world politics which it may be possible to satisfy, thereby compensating them for loss of influence elsewhere. But negotiations require patience, a tremendous amount of patience—just as the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.⁷⁶

If one matches this thesis with Schmid's evaluation of Germany's strategic position and bargaining power, one must conclude that some SPD leaders had at last arrived at a *Realpolitik* of their own.⁷⁷ The Soviet Union was to be compensated for a loss of influence in the Central European area by concessions elsewhere, presumably in such places as Korea or in the general sphere of diplomacy and armament.

The indecision governing the party's position on the question of neutralism extended to its attitude toward the United States. It was clear to the older and cooler heads among the leaders that violent outbursts of anti-Americanism would only assist the Soviet propaganda machine. There were, however, indications of intervention by Americans and the opportunity to derive electoral advantages from pointing this out to the German voters was not to be missed. The outcome of the tug of war between the "anti-imperialist," anti-American element, and the pro-Western traditionalists was a campaign of moderate hostility toward the United States.

While some campaign speakers sought to pin a "made in U.S.A." label on the Government's foreign policy, representing Adenauer variously as an American "hireling," "servant," or "spokesman," others merely criticized American intervention in German affairs. Ollenhauer himself, as the principal spokesman for the party's Executive Committee, complained that the party was forced

⁷⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 29, Sept. 1, and Sept. 4, 1953.

⁷⁶ *Socialist International Information*, Vol. 2, p. 13 (Nov. 22, 1952).

⁷⁷ See *Bundestag*, 204 Session, p. 8773.

to operate "under the pressure of American influence upon German public opinion."⁷⁸ Secretary of State Dulles' pre-election statement forecasting dire consequences for Germany if Adenauer was defeated was bitterly resented by many Social Democrats.⁷⁹ Yet a poster depicting President Eisenhower assisting a diminutive Chancellor to climb on a horse, and prepared for just such an exigency, was never released for general distribution.

Observations by party leaders after the defeat at the polls were more poignant. The Adenauer victory was attributed to popular acceptance of the Chancellor's strong personal ties to the United States and to a widespread desire among German voters to be associated with a stronger partner than had been the case in the two world wars.⁸⁰ While a spokesman for the SPD in Lower Saxony ascribed the Adenauer victory to a conspiracy among "high finance, big industry and the armaments interests backed by the American Government,"⁸¹ a party paper in the Ruhr accused the voters of servility and an utter lack of political sophistication for having been fooled by the "Dulles-Intervention."⁸²

The story of the SPD is the story of a party imbued with the will to attain the highest human ideals and to make Germany safe for social justice and democracy. But it is also the story of a party which, but for the brief period of Kurt Schumacher's leadership, failed to adjust itself to the requirements of political reality. Following the disaster of 1933, a brief attempt was made to overhaul the party and its organization and to substitute new, aggressive foreign policy concepts for the shopworn shibboleths of yore. An attitude seemed to emerge which fired the imagination of wide circles among the voting public.

However, the international situation produced forces that proved to be far more powerful than those at the disposal of an opposition party without the experience of government and operating under the handicap of a divided leadership. The East-West conflict created issues which transcended the doctrine-bound, frequently pedestrian ideological offerings of the SPD and threatened to grind the party down to the size of its sister party in neighboring France.

Under the pressures generated by the Cold War, both communists and anti-communists have made considerable progress towards the abolition of the traditional concepts of national sovereignty. In this setting, socialists in general are likely to take a third position because of certain basic differences which separate them from both major ideological camps. The French socialist leader, André Philip, put the situation thus:

⁷⁸ *Protokoll, Wahlkongress* (1953), p. 26; see also *Berliner Montagsecho*, April 27, 1953; Ministerpräsident Zinn, *Freiheit* (Mainz), May 8, 1953; and Ollenhauer, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Aug. 17, 1953.

⁷⁹ See *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1953.

⁸⁰ *SPD Pressedienst* (Bonn), Sept. 7, 1953.

⁸¹ *Neuer Vorwärts* (Hanover), Sept. 11, 1953.

⁸² *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung* (Essen), Sept. 8, 1953.

The difficulties confronting the socialist parties are real enough, and socialists in their different parties do not always react to their fundamental problems in the same way. It is true that international socialism is today undergoing a crisis in its doctrines in the sense that after having been for so long in the opposition, it has at last reached power within the national framework and has achieved deep-seated and large-scale social reforms.

Now it so happens that the more it has achieved within this national framework, the more it finds itself cleaving to it at the very moment when the national framework has been outmoded by events.⁸³

The SPD cannot fit itself into the framework of present Western European integration. The existing and projected functional agencies of European co-operation impress the German Socialists as being mere instruments of power politics, developed by reactionaries at home and abroad in order to set up an organizational bulwark against advancing socialism. While instances of Soviet aggressiveness in Europe tend to emphasize the Russian-Communist twin danger over matters of class warfare, a temporary easing of international tensions inevitably returns the party's attention to its own struggle with capitalism.

It was at such a point in history that the party experienced the Adenauer landslide. While it is true that it managed to hold its own in terms of its percentage of the total vote, it is also true that it failed to attract new votes from the other parties or from the substantial reservoir of new voters.⁸⁴

Whatever the reasons for the relative defeat may have been—and neither West Germany's present prosperity nor Chancellor Adenauer's personal popularity can be ignored—it would seem that the party was not adequately prepared to fight an electoral campaign on foreign policy issues. It would appear that it lacked unified direction and competent policy guidance to enable it to assert itself against the two super-powers in the sphere of ideological combat: the communist and the free enterprise internationals. Attempting to present itself to the voters as being anti-communist but not entirely pro-Western, i.e., attempting to resist one ideological force without accepting the other, the SPD became the butt of both.

⁸³ Consultative Assembly, *Reports*, 3 Session, pp. 246-47 (May 10, 1951).

⁸⁴ In 1949 the SPD polled 6,934,975 or 29.2% of all valid votes cast. In 1953 it polled 7,939,774 (second) votes or 28.8% of the total. Thus, although it registered an overall gain of 15% over 1949, its share of the total vote dropped by 0.4%. The party's representation in the *Bundestag* increased from 131 seats to 151. However, its share of the total membership dropped from 32.6% to 31.0%. Since there are only six parties represented in the second *Bundestag*, and because the four established coalition parties (CDU/CSU, FDP, DP, Center) have now been joined by the relative newcomer, the refugee party (GDB/BHE), the SPD faces an almost solid bloc of 69% on most legislative issues. The situation in the upper house, the *Bundesrat*, has also undergone a change to the detriment of the SPD. Whereas the party had a majority of seats in that body prior to the election, changes in the political composition of several state governments have resulted in the transfer of control of the *Bundesrat* to the Government side. Cf. *News From Germany*, Vol. 7 (Sept.-Oct., 1953), No. 9.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: A SYMPOSIUM

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

H. DUNCAN HALL

Historical Advisor, British Embassy

I

The British Commonwealth of Nations is the oldest international organization of states in existence. Its uniqueness lies in its unbroken historical continuity, the loyalty of its members to each other, their solidarity on vital matters of common concern, the fluidity of their machinery for dealing with such matters, and their abhorrence of constitutional contracts within the family of the Commonwealth. These are its features so far as we can see them yet in the perspective of history. This article will discuss some of these features and advance an hypothesis for research on the nature of Commonwealth.¹

Continuity, with change but without revolution, has been the British political formula for the Commonwealth. The evolution of the Commonwealth was one of the long-range consequences of the American Revolution. In a broad historical sense the Commonwealth is the *lesson* that Britain drew from that revolution. There have been other examples in history, such as Rome and Spain, of the expansion overseas of a people and of its concepts, language, traditions, and institutions. But only in the case of the Commonwealth has historical continuity been maintained without catastrophic change or revolution. It is true that revolution severed the main branch of the first British Empire. The cause of that revolution was the still unresolved deadlock between executive and legislature which had caused the revolt under Cromwell in the preceding century. The cause was removed by the new political invention of parliamentary or cabinet government. Thus a new nation of the Commonwealth could grow beside the United States. And such is the strength of common language, traditions and interests, that today there is no stronger line of union in the structure of world politics than that between the two halves of the English speaking world.

As happens often in human affairs the two parties in the common experience of the revolution emerged from it with quite different assumptions. Neither assumption was fully conscious; but each party relied on its own assumption as a basic element in its political thinking. The British assumption—slowly formed, but very clear when formed—was the inevitability of change: that there could be no continuity in relations with the colonies unless there was freedom, consultation, and association, and elasticity in any institutional ar-

¹ Terminology is a real difficulty. "British" is used in different senses for both the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. And "Commonwealth" itself, though a fine old Saxon word, is "untranslatable in any foreign language." L. S. Amery, *My Political Life*, 2 vols. (London, 1953), Vol. 2, Ch. 12. On "Members" and "Countries" of the Commonwealth, see Professor K. C. Wheare's article in this symposium.

rangements. The American assumption was the inevitability of disruption. Thus from revolutionary days to the present time the first instinctive reaction in the United States to an important change in the Commonwealth has been almost always to ask: Is it breaking up?

If history has always answered "no" to this question, it was because the function of change has been to preserve continuity by releasing from restraint the forces making for unity. It was not easy for American observers to discern the strength of these forces in the family from which they had broken away. They were indeed under a sort of inner compulsion to belittle such forces and so were prone to see changes as "crises." Moreover, it has been change rather than continuity that has made the headlines in a world in which the ceaseless deluge of "news" tends to blur the more durable realities. Thus "*Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose*," might well be taken as a guide for the next decade of Commonwealth studies.

Ça reste la même chose. So great and continuous have been the changes in these last decades that we are in danger of becoming absorbed in change and forgetting the continuity. Thus most of the public discussion on the Commonwealth, in the interwar years, and even to some extent since the last war, has been preoccupied with the more negative aspects of status. Public declarations and the literature on the Commonwealth have tended to concentrate on a single feature, the complete freedom and independence of its members and the absence of contractual bonds between them, so that a habit has been formed of interpretation in negative terms. Even Commonwealth Prime Ministers, after their periodical meetings, have tended to preface their public accounts of what happened with negatives. Thus after such a meeting several years ago the Canadian Prime Minister began by saying: "The Commonwealth is not a political unit. It is not an alliance. It has no common policies. . . ." Such negatives are often, as in this case, a preface to some very positive statements. In the older parts of the Commonwealth they may do little harm, since the positive aspects of the Commonwealth are well understood and, even though rarely discussed, are nevertheless the fundamental assumptions of the national life. But analysis in terms of negatives can be misleading in the newer parts of the Commonwealth and outside it. And it can be misleading to students in universities. The political scientist who is uncomfortable in the presence of imponderables finds it easy to list the things which the Commonwealth is not, but much more difficult to describe its real nature. He can note the lack of all the normal traditional forms of international organization—the absence of a covenant or charter, of internal treaties, of councils, assemblies, and secretariats. He may explain the constitutional theory of the Crown, the forms of legislation, and the nature of the Cabinet system—and yet leave the student with the feeling that the Commonwealth is little more than negatives, and that forms and symbols of unity like the Crown are not really matters of present substance but just picturesque relics of the past.

In politics it is never safe to dismiss doctrine, theory, and symbol with words like "mere." The student who does so in his approach to the Commonwealth

will see only the surface waves and miss the deep political currents. Thus the extension throughout the Commonwealth of the British system of cabinet government had an important consequence; it helped to spread in all parts a sense of responsibility. The theory was and is that all government in the Commonwealth—save in India—is government by the Crown. Ministers are Ministers of the Crown. The Opposition is "Her Majesty's loyal Opposition," which is always schooling itself for the responsibility of office when its turn comes to carry on the Queen's Government. The Queen makes laws by and with the advise and consent of the legislators whom she has caused to be summoned to Parliament. The theory of unity has always been more than "mere" theory, no matter what subtle metaphysics we may sometimes hear about a multiplicity of Crowns and Queens.* The theory has carried with it, always and everywhere, concepts and symbols of unity; and through such ideas and symbols there is a constant flow of communications, of relations and feelings which generate political forces. In the Commonwealth the man in the street and the statesman have known this and have not been bothered by the fact that these forces cannot be easily measured. Mr. Churchill drew attention to them in 1939 in the months before the Second World War:

Some foreigners mock at the British Empire because there are no parchment bonds or hard steel shackles which compel its united action. But there are other forces far more compulsive to which the whole fabric spontaneously responds. These deep tides are flowing now. They sweep away in their flow differences of class and party. They override the vast ocean spaces which separate the Dominions of the King.

The "deep tides" flowed with great force throughout the First World War. And between the wars most of the leaders of the Commonwealth knew that they still flowed deep down, little affected by any surface waves of disunity or contrary winds. In times of crisis such as war, or a great public ceremonial like the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, they reach the surface and are visible in the actions, attitudes, and feelings of large bodies of men and women. In normal times the "deep tides" are less manifest. No doubt there are many signs of them (if we could make the right kind of analysis) in much of the action of everyday life. Their continued existence deep down in the basic assumptions of the people is signalled in the flow of communications, by the use of words, ideas and symbols. More will be said on these matters in the final sections of this article.

Ca change. Yet there has never been anything static about the Commonwealth in the past, and the process of change was never more marked than today with the opening of the door to new Members in Asia and Africa. The

* In December, 1952, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand agreed on a formula expressly designed to preserve the historical and legal unity of the Crown: "Elizabeth . . . of the United Kingdom. . . Australia, (Canada) (New Zealand). . . Queen. . . " (Italics added.) Mr. Menzies, who pressed this point strongly, has revealed the reason. No part of the Commonwealth save the United Kingdom has an Act of Succession. "Legally the Queen is Queen of Australia because she is Queen of the United Kingdom." R. G. Menzies, *Many Nations: One Crown*. Daily Telegraph, June 1, 1953. On the titles, see Professor Wheare's article in this symposium.

Commonwealth bridge between Asia and the West is of great importance to the free world. But it introduces into the Commonwealth a new element—that of deep cultural differences.

The older Commonwealth that has stood the test of two world wars has a common culture and social heritage. It is European, mainly British, in its cultural background. Only along two lines of cultural difference—French and British in Canada, Dutch and British in South Africa—has the Commonwealth in the past shown any sign of structural weakness.³ These at most are minor cultural differences within the larger cultural unity of the Western World.⁴ In the older Commonwealth (though it continues to prefer for itself informality to contractual arrangements) unity is strengthened by the drawing together of Europe and North America, as shown in the development of NATO and steps towards European Union. The new Asian members of the Commonwealth, with a very different social heritage, are as yet little affected by the unifying forces at work in the West. Whether they will come closer to or tend to pull away from the older Commonwealth cannot be foreseen. Signs of divergent tendencies are not lacking. One sign is the elimination of the Crown from the government of India. Another sign is the divergent trends shown in India's foreign policy. The fact that, unlike any other members of the Commonwealth, India and Pakistan have direct land connections with Communist Asia, seems in the long run more likely to strengthen than weaken their ties with the Commonwealth. And here the determining factor might well be the rapid transformation of China into a great military power, poised on their northern frontiers.

In one sense the enlargement of the Commonwealth in Asia carries on a process which began a hundred years earlier following the publication of Lord Durham's Report in 1839. But the circumstances are utterly different. India and Pakistan are ancient peoples, with a history and civilization older than Europe. The colonies overseas that received responsible government in the mid-nineteenth century were recent settlements of Europeans, who had carried overseas the culture, traditions, and sentiments of their homelands. They were new and plastic communities which were as yet only in the beginnings of their separate histories. Responsible government in the colonies was profoundly influenced by these circumstances. It meant much more than the constitutional expedient whereby the local executives in the areas of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and later South Africa were made responsible to the local legislatures. It liberated forces that made for unity rather than dissent. In 1861 Merivale,

³ How extreme nationalism, rooted in history rather than in cultural differences, could impede the working of the Commonwealth system, has been shown by the case of Eire, which withdrew from the Commonwealth, after creating almost an unbridgeable gulf by official neutrality (not shared by scores of thousands of its citizens), in a war in which the existence of the Commonwealth was at stake. The historical feud with Britain died quickly amongst the Irishmen who by migrating to the Dominions were no longer (in Toynbee's phrase) "condemned by Fate to go on living upon fields sown with dragon's teeth and watered with blood."

⁴ These are themes which Professor Brady has illuminated in his *Democracy in the Dominions* (Toronto, 1952) and his article in this symposium.

Permanent Undersecretary of State for Colonies, described the effect: "The cessation, as if by magic, of the old irritant sores. . . . Confidence and affection towards the 'home'." (As Britain was called by new and old settlers alike.) "*Loyalty*, becomes the common watchword of all. . . ."⁵ The new sense of responsibility did not stop short at the boundaries of the local community; it began to spread outwards to cover the whole area of a colony's sentiments and interest, to embrace the entire family of the Commonwealth.

Once the sense of responsibility was created, and experience in its exercise acquired, no ultimate limit could be set to the powers of the overseas parts of the Commonwealth. On the eve of the First World War they had taken over responsibility for all local matters and for most aspects of external affairs—including trade, migration, and naval defense. Only the final issues of peace and war for all parts of His Majesty's dominions were still in the hands of the United Kingdom. The complete solidarity of the Commonwealth during the war, and the immense responsibilities undertaken by the Dominions regardless of sacrifice, made inevitable the extension of the principle of responsible government to foreign affairs. Thus responsible government, which began as responsibility for local affairs, ended as responsibility also for Commonwealth and foreign affairs. The century which marks the birth and coming of age of the British Commonwealth of Nations witnessed a bold new voyage of political exploration. It was undertaken by British and Dominion statesmen, who knew they could sail their ships together, and were confident they could discover new and wider realms of unity. The present voyage of political discovery towards the greater Commonwealth is undertaken with no less courage, but it is a voyage into the unknown. One of the unknown elements is whether the peculiar political system of the Commonwealth can work in this wider context.

That system began with the design and enactment of a second political invention—the Durham Report and Responsible Government. The system culminated in a third period of political invention which solved the problem of reconciling final equality with formal unity, by creating a Commonwealth bound by constitutional conventions and unwritten rules, but without formal constitutional contracts.

II

This third period can be said to have begun in 1917, culminated in the Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, and come to an end roughly with the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The core of the problem was how to complete responsible government by extending it to the field of foreign affairs; in other words, how to make the Dominions completely equal in status—though of course not in stature—with the United Kingdom, without disrupting the Commonwealth. Full Dominion status, some people argued, was incompatible with Imperial or Commonwealth Unity. The formal dilemma was not new. It had appeared far back in the 19th century in the phrase "Federation or disintegration"; and the idea of Imperial Federation was argued forcefully before and dur-

⁵ *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies*, 1861 ed., Vol. 2, p. 641.

ing the war of 1914-1918. Neither Britain nor the Dominions wanted to have anything to do with either horn of the dilemma. Disruption was unthinkable. Federation meant replacing the informality of the family relations of the Commonwealth by an elaborate constitutional structure. A written constitution was abhorrent to the English constitutional tradition. Even the lesser contract of a traditional alliance was ruled out as quite unsuitable to the special nature of the Commonwealth.

The matter was discussed in the Imperial Conference of 1917. It was agreed that the problem was "too important and intricate" to be settled during the war and that a special Constitutional Conference should be devoted to it after the war. The resolution provided for both autonomy and unity. The Dominions were to be fully "autonomous nations" with the "right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations." But they were to be "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth" and that Commonwealth was to have "effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine."

Thus the resolution of 1917 merely set out the twofold objective of an "Imperial Commonwealth" composed of "autonomous nations," without suggesting how these two apparent opposites could be reconciled.⁶ At the end of 1918 the Prime Ministers found themselves confronted with a need for immediate decisions and actions in the field of foreign affairs which would set the pattern of the postwar world for many years to come. Public opinion throughout the Commonwealth was insisting that the Dominions should be equal partners in the peacemaking, as they had been equal partners in the war. Without waiting for any constitutional conference the Governments proceeded, in typical British fashion, to make a series of *ad hoc* decisions which secured for the Dominions, not only representation at the Peace Conference, but also equal participation in the signing and ratification of the Peace Treaties, and membership in the League of Nations.

Once more resort was had to the Crown, and its reserve of powers, unfettered by statute law, on which responsible government had drawn so freely in the past. In the field of foreign affairs executive action is based on the old common law prerogative of the Crown, and thus constitutional conventions could have free play. A new doctrine was enunciated by the Dominion Prime Ministers in a memorandum circulated by Sir Robert Borden to the British Empire Delegation in Paris: "The Crown is the supreme executive in the United Kingdom and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the advice of different Ministries within different constitutional units." In accordance with this doctrine the King, acting constitutionally on the advice of his Dominion Ministers, appointed Dominion plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conferences and for the signing of the treaties, and likewise ratified the treaties on Dominion advice.

* A massive demonstration of how the opposites could be reconciled in action, if not in theory, was given by the Prime Ministers during the next two years in the more or less continuous sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet, and the British Empire Delegation in Paris. •

In the parliamentary debates preceding ratification, the Canadian and South African Governments were pressed by the opposition for explanations. They were asked to explain the constitutional basis on which they had proceeded and to justify their claim that the Dominions had achieved a new status of "absolute equality" with other nations. The opposition in each case took the line that in fact nothing had changed, since in law the Dominions were still dependencies. In their replies the Governments relied upon a distinction, to which Sir Robert Borden had drawn attention in 1917, between "legal authority and constitutional right." New conventions of the constitution, they argued, had made it no longer constitutional for the King to act for the Dominions, or for the United Kingdom Parliament to legislate for them, without their advice and consent.

But the argument did not satisfy the opposition in South Africa and Canada. Australia and New Zealand were quite satisfied with their status, and public opinion was suspicious of constitutional change which might weaken the unity of the Empire. This feeling was also shared widely in Canada. But on one thing all parties in all parts of the Commonwealth were in agreement—their dislike and distrust of anything like a written constitution for the Commonwealth. This was a sound political instinct, with a great deal of history behind it—not only the history of the British constitution, but also the history of the Commonwealth. For the Commonwealth owed its existence to the wisdom of the Colonial Office and the Parliament at Westminster in resisting steadily all proposals to set out in any act of Parliament a division between Imperial and local powers of government. The same instinct prevented the holding of a Constitutional Conference as proposed in the Resolution of 1917. It also led the British Government to defeat the Irish attempt in 1921 to insert in the Anglo-Irish Agreement a definition of Dominion status. And when finally in 1926 the Imperial Conference declared the constitutional conventions on which the Commonwealth was based, it prefaced its Report by saying it was "of the opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a Constitution for the British Empire."⁷ Even the degree of definition which that Report gave was regarded by more than one Commonwealth statesman as "a misguided attempt . . . to reduce to written terms something which was a matter of the spirit and not of the letter."⁸

Already in 1920, however, it was clear that the solution could be neither a statute, nor a constitution, nor a written agreement. It had to be something in the nature of a declaration of constitutional right, drawn from the past history of the Commonwealth and projected into the future. It was these considerations which led to the proposals in my study *The British Commonwealth*

⁷ The Prime Minister of Australia (Mr. Bruce), speaking at the opening of the Conference, said: "It would be disastrous to attempt to lay down something in the nature of a written constitution that is going to govern us in the future. It is quite impossible for an Empire progressing continually, as we are, to have such a document. If we had had it in the past, either it would have been torn up or it would have destroyed the Empire." (Cmd. 2769, 1927.)

⁸ Mr. Menzies in the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in 1937.

of Nations, published in the autumn of 1920. The book proposed that the old distinction between legal power and constitutional right should now be carried to its logical conclusion. The formal unity of the Commonwealth depended on the legal authority of the Imperial Crown and Parliament in all parts of the Commonwealth. The practical exercise of these legal powers had been restricted—fenced in, as it were, without being destroyed—by particular declarations of constitutional right which had marked each of the main stages in the growth of responsible government. What was needed to complete the process was to round off these particular declarations by a "general declaration of constitutional right" covering the whole field of government—executive, legislative, and judicial.

Such a declaration, backed by the authority of a Constitutional Conference, and with a minimum change in the law, would place the Dominions on a footing of complete constitutional equality with the United Kingdom. At the same time it would leave intact the two great instruments by which out of a single state a Commonwealth of Nations had been created. Both instruments now served and would continue to serve as symbols of its unity; one, the Crown, was the historical source, in constitutional theory and law, of the authority of all the Governments of the Commonwealth; the other, the Parliament at Westminster, was the source of their Parliaments with all their procedures and traditions.

This proposal for a "general declaration of constitutional right" was taken up and endorsed by General Smuts in a long memorandum entitled "The Constitution of the British Commonwealth," written and privately circulated in the spring of 1921.⁹ It was designed to serve as a blueprint of the Commonwealth, as his famous memorandum of December, 1918 had served as the blueprint for the League of Nations. A "fundamental alteration" had taken place recently in the basis of the British Empire, and a new name should mark this "epoch making departure." He therefore suggested "a new name for our group, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations."¹⁰ His study anticipated not only the principles, but also most of the important detail, of the later constitutional developments, from the declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 to the Statute of Westminster. Delay in the settlement of Dominion status, General Smuts urged, was "fraught with grave dangers," including the danger of separatist movements in the Commonwealth. Constitutionally the Dominion Parliaments had complete legislative authority, as their governments had complete executive authority; and Dominion status had received international

⁹ The memorandum was referred to in speeches by General Hertzog and General Smuts in the South African Parliament on March 16, 1927 (*Cape Times*, March 17); see Lowell and Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (Boston, 1927), pp. 614-15; C. N. Van den Heever, *General J. B. M. Hertzog* (Johannesburg, 1946), pp. 208-21, and N. Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1939* (London, 1952), pp. 10-15.

¹⁰ The "new name" was first used officially in December, 1921 in article 3 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Official endorsement by the Commonwealth as a whole dates from the 1926 Imperial Conference.

recognition. But there was as yet no settled practice, and there was still a good deal of obscurity about the whole position:

Foreigners find it difficult to understand the unwritten British Constitution, in which precedents mould and expand the constitution, and the legal aspect is nothing and the constitutional aspect everything. . . . Other people find it difficult to grasp the difference between legal theory and constitutional practice in the Empire and to see how the law of the constitution is moulded and finally abrogated by the practice of the constitution, and how, without a change of the law, a British Colony becomes in constitutional fact an independent state. These abstruse matters might be cleared up in some formal way which would show the true nature of the Dominion status as distinct from legal archaisms. It has been suggested by Mr. Duncan Hall in his interesting book on the British Commonwealth of Nations, that a declaration of constitutional rights should be made which would explain the new developments in the Dominion status, remove obscurities, set at rest doubts and abrogate what is obsolete—a declaration, in fact, which would become a precedent and a most important amendment of the unwritten law of the constitution. Such a declaration would set out that, as a matter of constitutional right, the British Parliament has no legislative power in respect of the Dominions; that the King has no more constitutional right of vetoing Dominion Bills than he has in respect of British Bills; and that the King in his Dominion Government has in respect of foreign affairs affecting the Dominions the same constitutional right that he has as King in his British Government in respect of the United Kingdom. Other points might also be covered by such a declaration, which would definitely settle the new constitutional basis on which the Commonwealth rests and explain that basis to all the world. I heartily endorse Hall's suggestion which seems to me the easiest constitutional means of settling the international status of the Dominions, without changing the unwritten flexible character of the constitution of the British Commonwealth. If the suggestion is adopted, the declaration could be drafted by the Imperial Cabinet, considered and passed by the Imperial Conference and by them presented to the King in a formal address for his acceptance.

General Smuts then set out in detail the necessary changes in the constitutional conventions, in the law, and in the machinery of the Commonwealth. A resolution which the forthcoming Imperial Conference could put before the Constitutional Conference should cover, he suggested:

the practical recognition of the equality of statehood of the Dominions with the United Kingdom, and the methods of conference and consultation to be adopted in future in respect of common policies and concerns of the Commonwealth.

The resolution would provide, *inter alia*:

that legislation of the British Parliament be passed (a) giving power of amendment in respect of their constitutions to the Dominions, (b) extending their legislative jurisdiction beyond their territorial limits, and (c) abrogating the Colonial Laws Validity Act in its application to future Dominion legislation. The resolution should further provide that a Declaration of Rights be printed by the Constitutional Conference for the acceptance of the King, providing (a) that the British Parliament has no constitutional right of legislation in respect of the Dominions, (b) that the Royal veto is in the same constitutional position in the Dominions as in the United Kingdom, (c) that the Dominions have direct access to the Sovereign without the intervention of any British Secretary of State, and (d) that the international rights of diplomatic representation of the Dominions is unquestioned.

Other important proposals included a change in the position of the Governor-General. He would become "simply and solely a Viceroy, representative of the Sovereign," and would no longer correspond with a British Secretary of State.

On the side of machinery General Smuts thought the Commonwealth needed "three organs of conference and consultation": (1) a "quadrennial Commonwealth Congress" attended by representatives of parliamentary oppositions as well as by Ministers and holding its meetings in rotation round the Commonwealth; (2) a "biennial Prime Ministers Conference," and (3) a "continuous Dominions Committee," to carry on between the Prime Ministers' meetings, aided by a Commonwealth Secretariat.

This memorandum, prepared in anticipation of the Imperial Conference of June, 1921, was not published. The idea of a declaration of constitutional right was discussed at the conference. But the opening speeches (which were published), had made it clear from the outset that the proposal of 1917 for a constitutional conference had run foul of the fear of a written constitution. The British and Australian Prime Ministers opposed a special conference, and it was decided that "having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional conference."¹¹ By 1925, however, the attitude of the British Government had changed. The new Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Mr. L. S. Amery, was convinced that fruitful cooperation depended on getting rid of "every last vestige" of inequality, and that the next ordinary Imperial Conference was the proper body to deal with these matters. "It was to this end that the preparatory work of the Dominions Office was for many months directed."¹²

General Hertzog, who succeeded General Smuts as Prime Minister' studied the Smuts memorandum in 1926, and, his biographer says, was "struck with the similarity of the views there expressed to his own." In speeches and letters before the meeting of the Imperial Conference of 1926, he pressed for a declaration of the constitutional rights of the Dominions, which (as he put it in a letter to Mr. Amery) would clear up "the fundamental facts of the Dominions' independent status and make those known to the world." When the Conference opened he presented a long draft declaration round which the discussions of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee revolved.¹³ After much exchange of drafts and counterdrafts, and discussions between the Prime Ministers and the other members of the Committee, the text of the Declaration emerged in the published Report of the Committee with the single, famous sentence in italics defining the "position" and "relation" of Great Britain and the Dominions:

Their position and mutual relations may readily be defined. *They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in*

¹¹ Cmd. 1474, 1921.

¹² L. S. Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 2nd ed. (London, 1953), p. 128.

¹³ See Van den Heever, *op. cit.*, who gives texts of the drafts. His account (followed by Mansergh) places all the emphasis on Hertzog's role and none on the most important part played by the Dominions Office. For an authoritative account of the 1926 Conference, see Amery, *My Political Life* (cited in note 1), Vol. 2, Ch. 12. Mr. Amery (to whom I am indebted for an advance copy of his chapter and for valuable comments on the present article) reveals that the italics used in the Declaration of 1926 were due to a typographical slip; they caused the sentence to be quoted frequently out of context, thus overemphasizing the negative aspects of the Declaration. Speeches in 1926 referring to the "declaration of constitutional right" include: Hertzog, *Cape Times*, May 17, December 8, 14; *Rand Daily Mail*, December 21; and Smuts, in Union Parliament, May 29.

*any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*¹⁴

This sentence was true of the Commonwealth in 1926 and still is today. One of the states that agreed to it (now the Republic of Ireland) is no longer a member of the Commonwealth. Another, after a further constitutional evolution, emerged as two new members of the Commonwealth, India and Pakistan. For India, and soon perhaps Pakistan, the phrase "common allegiance to the Crown" should read "the common symbol of the Crown." A complete historical commentary on the Declaration would take in the constitutional history of the Commonwealth that led up to it, and the steps that implemented it in the subsequent years. It would deal with the statutes,¹⁵ the voluminous reports of expert committees and conferences, the thousands of unpublished dispatches and telegrams exchanged by the governments, together with a mass of records of negotiations, understandings, and agreed procedures.

This history cannot yet be written. But when it is written—in a later period and climate—there will be, I venture to suggest, much change in perspectives and in our contemporary judgments. The role of some of the leaders and the countries they led will look different. Canada, under the leadership of Mr. Mackenzie King, will appear from the records to have been less interested in the twenties and thirties in constitutional issues and matters of status, and much more concerned about the positive sides of the Commonwealth than may have seemed at the time.¹⁶ The voice and counsel of New Zealand, often dismissed at the time as a mere immature echo of Britain, may seem to have been more mature and wise, more consistently realistic and constructive in its attitude to the Commonwealth and its place in world affairs, than that of any other Dominion. Under General Hertzog South Africa, on whose soil fate had sown some dragon's teeth, will be judged to have been even more preoccupied with and legalistic about questions of status, but at the same time much more helpful and cooperative towards its fellow Commonwealth members, than it seemed to contemporaries. As for Eire in this period, the full extent of her cold passion to be free of England, at no matter what cost to the Commonwealth, will be revealed.

But perhaps the greatest revaluation will come from the massive evidence showing that the active builder of the mature Commonwealth was more Britain than the Dominions. For the evidence will demonstrate the use made by all the members of her great political experience, her vision and faith in the Commonwealth idea; it will show her great and ceaseless activity in playing the role of coordinating element—consulting with her fellow members, ascertaining their views, informing them of hers, negotiating, conciliating, maintaining with them over the years a vast system of communications with scores

¹⁴ Cmd. 2768.

¹⁵ Above all the Statute of Westminster on which Professor Wheare's *Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status*, 5th ed. (London, 1953) is the authoritative study.

¹⁶ E.g., in the thirties. In 1926 the Canadian Prime Minister did not come to the Conference prepared to raise the issue of status. See Canadian Parliamentary Debates, March 29, 1927, p. 1742, and Amery's chapter (cited in note 1).

of thousands of dispatches and telegrams. And, in a natural shifting and maturing of values, the history of status will shrink back into a shorter chapter making room for the more positive aspects—association, cooperation, things done together, solidarity in time of trouble.

III

Having stated the negations, the things that the Commonwealth is not, the Prime Ministers in 1926 hastened to add that this was only part of the truth. About the rest of the truth, however, they had little to say, except that:

The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life blood. Free cooperation is its instrument. . . .

The last words turned back to the phrase in the Declaration: "freely associated," to which General Hertzog had clung all through the negotiations as the essence of the Commonwealth. In fact, all the essential phrases except one were qualified by the word "free" or "freely." The one exception was the phrase about the Crown, where there was unity without qualification. For the rest the changes are rung on freedom: freedom from a written constitution; freedom in association and cooperation; freedom from formal machinery, procedures, institutions; freedom from treaties or alliances; freedom from written guarantees of mutual assistance. The words of the Commonwealth's own leaders seem thus to justify at first sight the observation of the constitutionalist who searches this constellation in vain for the normal and familiar signs of structure. He reports a seeming void, with no lines of structure visible between the members; though he notes that the individual members of the constellation have far-reaching written contracts with other nations—all save one of them with the United Nations, Britain and Canada with NATO, Australia and New Zealand with the United States in ANZUS.

Yet structure there is, and much of it. Although it is unusually informal and fluid, it is definite enough to require the 400 pages of concise and authoritative description which it has received in a recent book.¹⁷ And that book still left chapters unwritten. Perhaps they cannot be written, since fluid institutions and processes, like those of the Commonwealth, do not leave much in the way of fossilized remains for the student of their history. One of the difficulties is that the Commonwealth does not transact its business in the glare of publicity which marks the United Nations or American government. Its business goes on in closed conferences of Prime Ministers, heads of departments, parliamentary meetings, in endless committees and "working parties," in continuous streams of dispatches and telegrams from which leakages are very rare. About this large-scale internal system of communications by dispatches, telegrams, and circulation of confidential working papers, minutes, and reports, the student

¹⁷ Heather J. Harvey, *Consultation and Cooperation in the Commonwealth* (London, 1953).

can find little information. He might note the statement of the Dominions Secretary in the House of Commons after the Munich crisis in 1938, that in the first ten months of 1938 no less than 398 circular telegrams had been sent to the Dominions on foreign affairs, some 150 of them in the month of September alone. But the statement gives him no information about telegrams that were not circular or about dispatches. It says nothing of the volume of incoming telegrams and dispatches from the Dominions; and it is silent about the numbers of telegrams circulating in many *other* series, such as defense, treaty relations, constitutional relations, economic and financial questions. Nor is much information available about the constant, but little advertised, circulation of key personnel within the Commonwealth, the movement of Ministers, officials, members of Parliament, and officers of the armed forces. Most of the key people know each other, meet not infrequently, are in constant touch with opposite numbers, and are accustomed to team work.

Even a family cannot conduct its affairs without some rules. The Commonwealth has such rules, even if most of them are unwritten. Something is done, or is not done; it is not cricket. A few basic rules have been recorded in resolutions of conferences of Prime Ministers. And the rules in some cases have been circulated to the governments and ratified by them, for example, in matters concerning relations with other countries, and especially the negotiation, signature, and ratification of treaties. The basic rule in foreign relations is that the governments must keep each other informed. No agreements should be negotiated with a foreign government without consideration of their possible effect on other members of the Commonwealth or on the Commonwealth as a whole. A government should inform the other members well in advance of any such negotiations, so that if any one of them considers that its interests are affected, there is time for it to express its views or, if need be, to join in the negotiations. Where several governments are taking part in negotiations at the same time, there should be the fullest possible exchange of views before and during the negotiations. One member must not involve another in any active obligations without first obtaining its assent.¹⁸ Such rules are simple enough, but a study of their application, of the glosses on them, of treaty procedure as it has actually developed, of the "case law" that has grown up over the years, would fill a substantial volume.

At the heart of the family system of the Commonwealth is a fundamental assumption of mutual aid in time of trouble. This is nothing written down in any charter, covenant, or treaty. It is what an Australian Prime Minister once called "an unwritten treaty of mutual guarantee."¹⁹ Britain has stated on a number of occasions in the past that she would go to the aid of a member of the Commonwealth if attacked. Other members of the Commonwealth have acted on the same assumption of mutual aid, and have joined with Britain in a common front against an aggressor. It is part of the freedom of the Common-

¹⁸ Cmd. 2768, 1926 and cmd. 1987, 1923.

¹⁹ Mr. Bruce in the Australian Parliament, August 3, 1926.

wealth that neutrality is possible; but it may be assumed that neutrality in a Commonwealth war is incompatible with continued membership in the Commonwealth. The members who joined in the war in 1939 had made no pledges and no secret agreements. But it was not for nothing that in the years before 1939, when the Dominions were establishing direct diplomatic arrangements with foreign countries, each such appointment was prefaced by a standard agreed notification to the foreign government concerned. The notification stated that the arrangement did not mean any departure from the principle of the "diplomatic unity" of the Commonwealth, "that is to say, the principle of consultative cooperation amongst all His Majesty's Representatives, as amongst His Majesty's Governments themselves, in matters of common concern." All the governments, before the war, had prepared in concert a "war book," setting out the steps required for coordinated action in case of war. Except in Dublin, the war books were all taken out and acted upon simultaneously in all the capitals of the Commonwealth, as the governments, one after another, made their separate decisions to fight.

In all the parliaments, in September 1939, there was discussion. There was parliamentary unanimity in Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, and in Canada only a single adverse vote. In South Africa there was a decisive majority for what was, as General Smuts put it to Parliament, a decision of interest and ethics: "We should do the proper thing and align ourselves with our friends." There was again a high degree of parliamentary unanimity in the Commonwealth when it once more was faced with aggressive war in Korea in July, 1950.

In an article published in this REVIEW in 1942 (Vol. 36, pp. 1128-35) an account was given of "the Community of the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth," as it existed in that year. Since the war this unique community of parliamentarians has greatly expanded. A new description, "the Commonwealth of 100 Parliaments," will soon be justified. Already the total number of parliaments, including all those with an elected or unofficial majority, is close on 90. The number of parliaments which have branches of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is now over fifty and increases steadily year by year. In 1949 the parliaments gave their relationship a more definite form by setting up regular organs: the Commonwealth Parliamentary Council, meeting at least once a year, and a General Meeting which is convened during the biennial Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference. The organization has, *mirabile dictu*, a written constitution and a permanent secretariat. These bodies constitute the first pieces of regular machinery, jointly provided and jointly financed by the Commonwealth parliaments themselves, for regular consultations between them. This machinery has been in full operation since 1950. The regular Parliamentary Conferences, attended by upward of 100 delegates from some fifty parliaments, and the Council meetings attended by some 25 members, are held each time in another capital of the Commonwealth.²⁰ The

²⁰ Thus in form and substance the parliamentary machinery of the Commonwealth now goes beyond the "Commonwealth Congress" envisaged by General Smuts in 1921.

meetings afford an opportunity for the parliamentarians of the Commonwealth to know their Commonwealth. In the meetings and the extensive visits in which the delegates live and travel together, they get to know, to respect, and usually to like each other. The meetings air differences in frank talk in private. They never end in resolutions or formulæ. But out of all this comes a good deal of friendship and greater like-mindedness. In such meetings there is, as the writer can bear witness, a feeling of belonging together. At the last Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Ottawa in September, 1952, all the delegations, including those of India and Pakistan, spoke in terms of the "family of the Commonwealth." The use of the term "family" by parliamentarians of all the different countries and colonies of the greater Commonwealth began at the first full parliamentary conference held after the war in 1948. A scene witnessed then in the banqueting hall of Edinburgh Castle was that of a hundred Commonwealth parliamentarians with arms linked singing "Auld Lang Syne" to the sound of bagpipes, and closing with "God Save The King." The Commonwealth has never tried to set up a Commonwealth Parliament, as a year later at Strasbourg Europe was beginning to do. Its aim has been rather to create a community of parliamentarians.

It was significant that the first great ceremony on the eve of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, was the entertainment of the Queen, the new "Head of the Commonwealth" and "Head of the Family," at a luncheon given to her on May 27, 1953 in Westminster Hall by the representatives of over fifty Commonwealth parliaments, acting through the Commonwealth Parliamentary Council and Association. Six of the Prime Ministers were present. This, too, was a family gathering, in which that term was used frequently; and there was all the spirit, and the absence of formality, appropriate to such a gathering. To witness such an event is to be reminded how far-reaching are the symbols of unity in the Commonwealth. For government in each part of the Commonwealth save India is government of the Queen and Parliament; so that constitutionally the parliamentarians, including the Ministers of the Crown, who met in this gathering in the Hall of Rufus, were members of a body corporate. In theory the body corporate under the Crown includes the people. When the Prime Minister of Australia (Mr. Menzies) describes the Commonwealth in the phrase: "We are one people," he has in mind the wider body corporate formed by all those within the allegiance. And both bodies share the common symbol of the Crown and are united not only by common tradition but by identification with the symbol and the person of the sovereign—each of the Commonwealth communities within itself, and the Members of the Commonwealth to each other. Thus the Canadian Prime Minister greeted Mr. Churchill in Ottawa in January, 1952 with the words:

The Crown is more than the symbol of our association in the British Commonwealth; it is also the symbol of unity in each of our nations. It is in the name of our common King that we discharge in both countries the responsibilities of government.

See discussion on an Imperial Assembly in Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (London, 1920), pp. 306-15.

Not many days later (February 7) on the death of the King and the accession of the new Queen, Mr. Churchill said:

The Crown has become the mysterious link, indeed I may say the magic link, which unites our loosely bound but strongly interwoven Commonwealth of Nations, states and races.

IV

The Commonwealth is "strongly interwoven" by such intangibles that Sir Winston Churchill, who knows the uses and meanings of words, speaks of them as "mysterious" and "magic" and, in the passage cited above, as "deep tides." General Smuts, who also knew the meaning of words, spoke of the Commonwealth in the Union Parliament as not held together like empires in the past by law and sovereign authority: "Here is an entirely new condition—no central force, but psychology, which is more powerful, the soul of a group of nations."

Important material for a case study in the use of symbols in the Commonwealth is to be found in the Christmas broadcasts which were begun by King George V in 1932 and carried on by George VI and now by Queen Elizabeth. Such linking of all the Commonwealth peoples by radio occurs on other occasions, and the Queen has made a number of such broadcasts in recent years. In the ceremony of the Coronation the oath was a pledge made directly to the peoples, heard by them all and witnessed by many on television and in films. In the Christmas broadcasts the symbols of the Crown and of the family are closely interwoven.

The broadcast of King or Queen is prefaced always by the Christmas Journey in which the British Broadcasting Corporation conducts its listeners round the Commonwealth. In the Journey the audience travels from country to country, from one typical family to another, until in the words of the announcer it completes the circuit of the "family of the Commonwealth." For a whole hour link is added to link until the idea emerges clearly of the Commonwealth as a union of individual families. Then the Journey ends with the announcement of the "Head of the Family, Her Majesty the Queen." The King spoke, as the Queen now speaks, in the double role of Head of the Commonwealth and Head of the Royal Family. The Queen comes to each listening family as Head of the Commonwealth Family, and of her own personal family, which thus becomes the central and representative family of the Commonwealth. The Sovereign speaks always in terms of Christmas as the festival of the home: "From my home to yours," "to you in your homes." Thus the Commonwealth as a family of nations in the older sense is reinforced by the newer conception of the Commonwealth as a union of individual families gathered around the Queen. The symbols of Crown and family are not of course identical or of equal force in all parts of the Commonwealth. The symbols are joined together on such occasions in a natural response to the listeners who have joined them together consciously in their own minds. Eyewitness accounts of what happens on such occasions, in audiences large and small, all agree that those who share both the event and the symbols become visibly a more closely knit community. They are drawn

together by the process of identification with the same objects and symbols.

"Symbol" as defined in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "is the term given to a visible object representing to the mind the semblance of something which is not shown but realized by association with it." (The object need not be visible; it is enough if a word or emblem suggests an idea or an image to the mind.) What in the case of the Commonwealth is the "something which is not shown but realized by association"? It is a complex of memory, experience, and tradition drawn from the past of the peoples of the Commonwealth, which they carry forward in the present in their minds, suffused with emotion and sentiment. Statesmen have simpler words for it; as Burke: "My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron."²¹ Or as Lord Balfour put it in words found on his desk after his death.

Whence comes the cohesion of the Brit. Emp.?

- 1) Patriotism. Loyalty. Custom.
- 2) Religion. Race. Pride in various manifestations.
Habit. Language.

*Mere law is the weakest of all bonds.*²²

The political and institutional structure of the Commonwealth has been built, and continues to develop, round this living core of tradition and culture. The enlarged Commonwealth, if it is to endure, will have to add its ideas, traditions, and symbols to the common stock. A society which fails to preserve its historical core of tradition, or to adapt it to new circumstances, cannot long endure. For the older Commonwealth, which continues, with its cohesion little affected, within the larger Commonwealth, such master symbols as Crown and Family will retain their force. For an Asian Republic within the Commonwealth such a phrase as "Head of the Commonwealth" has less meaning. If one asks a well informed Indian what is the content of the phrase, he is likely to answer: "It means Nehru. The trusted leader says it is good, and therefore the people accept it." Symbols are never static; and they take hold only if they serve a purpose. If there is a persistent will to build up a larger Commonwealth, additional symbols will, indeed must, be found. For the elimination of the Crown as a constitutional link between certain Members and the rest of the Commonwealth—a step which once taken can never be retraced—is likely to prove in the long run a far more serious cause of disunity than has yet been realized.

General Smuts, in the memorandum cited above, suggested as part of his proposals that "some great symbol should mark the equal statehood of the Dominions and their entry among the nations of the world. This could best be done by their adoption of a distinctive national flag for each in addition to the Union Jack or other common symbol of imperial unity and allegiance." It is significant that a suggestion for a Commonwealth flag, as an additional Com-

²¹ Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America, 1775.

²² *The Times* (London), Dec. 14, 1936. For a recent discussion of the significance of tradition see the symposium "Tradition in Culture and Politics," Part I, *Confluence*, Vol. 2, pp. 1-65 (Sept., 1953).

monwealth symbol of unity, was made (in private conversation) by a leading Indian parliamentarian during the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference at Ottawa last year.

V

These reflections lead to a new conception which is put forward as possibly a useful clue for studies on the nature and meaning of the Commonwealth. It is put forward with some risk of misunderstanding—partly because it is too complex to be presented fully in a short article, without the necessary qualifications and explanations; and partly because within the Commonwealth it may seem merely to be a statement of the obvious, since it expresses unspoken assumptions. In Commonwealth countries with somewhat different assumptions, and in countries outside the Commonwealth, the conception may not at first carry conviction.

It may be prefaced by an historical comment. A political system like the United States consists of two essential elements, ideological and institutional. The institutional structure, the constitutional and governmental machinery, is controlled and regulated by the ideological element—the political ideas, doctrines, and beliefs of the people, their historical traditions, and the complex of political symbols, which are both channels of communication and bonds of union within the system. Political unity results from the constant flow, through these channels, of ideas and symbols, of communications both vertically between leaders and people, and horizontally amongst the people themselves.

The American Union began with a revolution which destroyed important common symbols. The union of the Commonwealth evolved without revolution. It kept its symbols intact. The central thread of its history is the process of broadening its common traditions and symbols, especially that of the Crown and the Family. Its history is that of an expanding unity. The emerging nations developed together their common heritage of political and legal ideas, institutions, procedures, and symbols. Thus great changes were possible in the constitutional structure without breach of essential unity of thought or purpose, or the weakening of common symbols.

The Commonwealth thus remained rich in common ideas and traditions, similar political institutions and procedures, and common symbols. It was able to reduce its legal structure on the constitutional side almost to the vanishing point; but on the other hand it was able to build up new common institutions or procedures of an extremely fluid kind which depend for their efficiency on the strength of its common ideas and its effective system of communications.

The United States substituted a massive political structure for the loose bonds that the Revolution destroyed. It replaced the Crown—which through the allegiance had provided the sole basis for any common citizenship amongst the 13 Colonies—by a Flag, a Constitution, and federal institutions. To these impersonal symbols the people, by a popular myth-making process, added a

personal symbol—Uncle Sam.²² For the new ideology and its symbols to become deeply rooted in the national traditions, a century was needed. One result of the whole process is that the United States has a stronger emphasis, in its governmental structure, on precise legal definitions and procedures than occurs in any other of the English-speaking countries.

The conception to which this historical comment serves as preface may be stated simply. The Commonwealth owes its historical continuity, its unity, and its successful functioning largely to the following facts: The governing elements of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the groups in each state which carry on the work of government—the Ministers of the Crown, the members of Parliament, the law officers, the members of the civil services and of the armed forces—are linked together in corporate fellowship by common ideas, traditions, feelings, ideals, and interests, and by the common symbols which both signify and cement their unity. The Crown in whose name (save in India) governments govern, parliaments legislate, officials and members of the armed forces act, and to which the individual renders allegiance, serves both as a master symbol of unity, and as a corporate link between the governments and peoples of the Commonwealth, and the vast community of individual British subjects or Commonwealth citizens.

If the study of this theme needed a text, it could well be the words of Burke, who as much as any was the spiritual father of the British Commonwealth:

Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions and your suspending clauses are the things that hold together the great contexture of this mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to those vulgar and mechanical politicians who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles, which in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned have no substantial existence, are in truth everything and all in all.

²² See Philip D. Jordan, *Uncle Sam of America* (St. Paul, 1953).

THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

K. C. WHEARE
All Souls College, Oxford

I

The structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations is peculiar. If it did not exist, you could not invent it. Its peculiarities reveal themselves at once if we try to find an answer to what looks like a fairly simple question, namely: How do we know whether a country is inside the Commonwealth or outside it? This question has never been very easy to answer. It is not enough to say that a country is within the Commonwealth if it is one of the Queen's dominions. That is quite true so far as it goes. It covers the cases of such important countries of the Commonwealth as the United Kingdom itself, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan, Ceylon, and the British West Indian Colonies. But it will not suffice to describe the position of such countries as Malaya, or Nigeria, or Uganda, or the Gold Coast, or Kenya, or Tanganyika. Large parts or all of the territories of these countries are not part of the Queen's dominions, strictly speaking. They are either protected states (as in Malaya) or protectorates (as in most of the African territories) or, as in the case of Tanganyika, Trust Territories under the United Nations. What we must say of these countries of the Commonwealth is not that they are part of the Queen's dominions but that they are under the Queen's protection or jurisdiction.

Until a few years ago it was possible to say of all the countries of the Commonwealth that they were either part of the King's dominions or under the protection and jurisdiction of the King. India consisted for the greater part of territory that was part of the King's dominions but it contained also an important part—the Indian Native States—whose territory was not part of the King's dominions but whose rulers were under the protection of the King. We can see, however, that the distinguishing mark of countries in the Commonwealth was some connection with the Crown; their government was carried on under the Crown, in the name of the King, within the jurisdiction of the King. To adopt the words of the Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, the countries of the Commonwealth were all "united by a common allegiance to the Crown." There were a few border-line cases, like the New Hebrides, a condominium in which the King's jurisdiction was shared with another sovereign (in this case France), or Eire (after 1937), where government was not carried on in the King's name but where some place was still found for the King in the conduct of the country's external affairs. But though there might be doubts about cases, there was no doubt about the criterion. The test was the relationship to the Crown and where doubts arose, they were doubts about whether in a particular case the relationship existed.

Although this sort of answer worked quite well until a few years ago, it will suffice no longer. It is true that it still applies to all the countries of the Com-

monwealth except one, but since that one contains three times as many people as all the others put together it is plain that an answer which fails to take account of it, fails altogether. India is undoubtedly a country of the Commonwealth. India, equally without doubt, does not regard itself as a part of the Queen's dominions nor under the jurisdiction of the Crown;¹ it does not owe allegiance to the Crown, directly or indirectly; its government is not carried on in the name of the Queen. India, since January 26, 1951, when its present Constitution was proclaimed, has been a republic. By what sign now are we able to determine whether a country is inside the Commonwealth or outside it? Is there a common sign? Or are there different signs?

Let us pause for a moment to ask whether we are entitled to be asking this sort of question. Why should there be a sign or symbol? Is there any reason in logic or experience why countries which are linked together in a Commonwealth should exhibit some sign or symbol of the link? Why is it not enough for a country to say: "I am a country of the Commonwealth" and for the other countries of the Commonwealth to say: "Yes, you are"? Surely that is enough. You can belong to a club which has no badge, either because its members do not want a badge or because they cannot agree about the design. Or you can belong to a club which has a badge, but you may not choose to wear it. It is no necessary consequence of the Commonwealth that it should have a sign or signs. The association is distinct from any signs or symbols of the association. It seems necessary to assert these rather obvious points because it is often assumed that unless the Commonwealth exhibits some sign or symbol, some badge which all its countries wear, it cannot really be a Commonwealth; it must have disintegrated. There is no logic behind this assertion.

Having cleared this misconception away, it is proper to go on to say that in fact the countries of the Commonwealth have, up to now, chosen to exhibit a sign or symbol of their association, though they were not logically required to do so, and this sign or symbol is the Crown or, as some of them would prefer to say, the Queen. It is possible to say, therefore, that the criterion of whether a country is inside the Commonwealth or outside it is now whether it recognizes the Queen as the symbol of its association with the other countries in the Commonwealth, and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth. And this sign distinguishes India no less than the other countries of the Commonwealth. But for India there is no question of the jurisdiction of the Queen; it is the Queen as a symbol only which India recognizes. The Queen or the Crown means in law and in practice a great deal more in the other countries of the Commonwealth than it does in India, but in all the countries it means at least this—the symbol of association.

The position becomes a little clearer when we recall the steps India took when it contemplated setting up a republican constitution. At a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, held in London in April, 1949, India

¹ Sir Ivor Jennings believes that the territories which were formerly part of British India still remain dominions of the Crown technically. See W. I. Jennings and C. M. Young, *Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1952), p. 148.

"informed the other governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that under the new Constitution which is about to be adopted, India shall become a sovereign independent Republic." To this statement of intention the government of India added an expression of a wish. It "declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations." India wished, in spite of intending no longer to owe allegiance to the Crown or to be a part of the King's dominions, to continue to be a Commonwealth country. And then it took a further step, not logically necessary, as I have tried to argue, but not less important on that account. The government declared India's "acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free association of its [the Commonwealth's] independent member nations and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth." So much for India's side of the arrangement. It wished to be a Commonwealth country still; it was prepared to have a symbol of its association and it was prepared to accept the King as that symbol.

On the other side, the other governments of the Commonwealth declared that they accepted and recognized "India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration." At the same time they asserted that the basis of their own membership was not thereby changed. The Crown or the King might be no more than a symbol of association to India, but it continued to mean what it had always meant to the other countries. They remained part of the King's dominions or under the King's protection or jurisdiction as before. A study of the declaration of this Commonwealth Conference of 1949 illustrates clearly, I believe, the distinction between the association of the Commonwealth and the symbol of that association, though it illustrates also that, so far as India was concerned, there was to be a connection between the two in the person of the King as Head of the Commonwealth.

II

A word has crept into the exposition of the last three paragraphs which deserves some more explicit treatment and that is the word "Member." In the declaration of the Commonwealth Conference of 1949, reference was made to India's "full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations" and to the other independent "Members" of the Commonwealth. Now a Member of the Commonwealth is not the same thing as a country of the Commonwealth. In the current terminology of Commonwealth affairs, it is customary to speak of each distinct political unit in the Commonwealth as a country of the Commonwealth, and the term applies as much to the United Kingdom and India as to Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Jamaica, Malaya, or Nigeria. All told there are about 50 countries of the Commonwealth, each with its own government, usually under a governor or governor-general representing the Queen. It is only the fully-self-governing countries of the Commonwealth that are described as "Members" and there are eight of them—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. All the other countries of the Common-

wealth fall short, in a greater or lesser degree, of full self-government, some like Southern Rhodesia, Jamaica, the Gold Coast, or Nigeria coming close to self-government, others like Bechuanaland or Somaliland being further away from autonomy. Most of the non-self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are dependent in some degree upon the United Kingdom, but some others depend upon other Members, as New Guinea does upon Australia, for example. It is agreed, however, that all are entitled to aspire towards self-government and independence, and that it is the essence of the Commonwealth to become some day an association in which it will be not only a Commonwealth of countries but a Commonwealth of Members in which no country is dependent upon any other country.

The eight Members of the Commonwealth stand, then, upon an equal footing with each other. They are sovereign, independent nations, or, to quote again from words used in the Declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926, they are "in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." The position of these self-governing countries in the Commonwealth is different from that of the others. They can be described again in the words of the Declaration of 1926 as "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." This means that, being self-governing, they are in a position to be self-determining, and they are free either to associate with or dissociate from the Commonwealth. What India did openly and deliberately in 1949 other members have done implicitly or explicitly upon their attainment of independence.

It does not follow from this that, because the self-governing Members of the Commonwealth are freely associated, the non-self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are held within it by force. It would, in fact, be rare to find in the dependent countries of the Commonwealth any strong body of political opinion aiming at leaving the Commonwealth. But there are strong movements for self-government and when self-government comes it brings with it the right to decide whether the country shall stay within the Commonwealth or not. That is the meaning of the free association of the Members of the Commonwealth.

It is in the light of this free association of the self-governing Members of the Commonwealth that the Queen as the symbol of their free association and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth, must be considered. In this symbolic sense, the Queen or the Monarchy is an essential institution and the only essential institution of the Commonwealth as a whole. A country in the Commonwealth, then, displays this badge of its association, and by this mark you can tell that it is in the Commonwealth and not outside.

III

While it is absolutely valid to say of the Members of the Commonwealth that they are equal in status, each independent of the other, that they are freely associated and that they recognize the Queen as the symbol of this free association, and, as such, Head of the Commonwealth, it would be misleading

to leave it at that. For in this unity there is a diversity, a variety, and an individuality which give meaning to the unity.

The diversity in unity can nowhere be better illustrated than in the matter of the Royal Style and Titles. It is apparent that if the Members of the Commonwealth agree that they will have a common symbol of their association and if that symbol is a monarch, it is a matter of common concern to them all who the monarch is to be and what that monarch is to be called. In other words, they are commonly concerned in the law touching the Succession to the Throne and the Royal Style and Titles. They recognized this many years ago and consequently at the Imperial Conference of 1930 they resolved that "inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position of all the Members of the Commonwealth in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the parliaments of all the Dominions as of the parliament of the United Kingdom." This declaration was later approved by the parliaments of all the Members of the Commonwealth and it finds a place in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster, 1931. This declaration, however, is not a rule of law; it is a usage or convention of the Commonwealth which is accepted as binding in practice by all the Members. It has been followed on all the subsequent occasions upon which changes in the law of Succession and in the Royal Style and Titles were undertaken.

When the declaration was made in 1930 the Royal Title ran: "George V, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India." It will be noticed that this title (which was proclaimed in this form in 1927) by its reference to "Ireland" avoided mention of the fact that Ireland was divided between the Irish Free State, at that time a Member of the Commonwealth, and Northern Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The title adopted a compromise on Ireland which did not please everybody.

The first change in this title was undertaken in 1948 when, as a result of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, India and Pakistan were set up as independent Members of the Commonwealth. But the grant of independence naturally made the title of "Emperor of India" rather out of date. It was decided consequently to remove this phrase from the Royal Titles. The parliaments of all the Members of the Commonwealth agreed that this should be done,² and it was accordingly carried out by proclamation on June 22, 1948.

When India decided to become a republic and when in 1949 the King's position as Head of the Commonwealth was explicitly recognized, it became clear that further changes in the Royal Title would be needed. The accession of Queen Elizabeth on February 6, 1952 brought the opportunity to consider

² See statement of Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister, in House of Commons *Debates*, Vol. 452, col. 2379.

the position. Already some Members, in proclaiming the Queen's accession, showed that they were ready for changes, but the variety in the forms which they adopted in their proclamations showed the diversity of the Commonwealth once more. In London the government of the United Kingdom described the Queen as "Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of this Realm and of all Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith." The phrase "Head of the Commonwealth" was used also in the proclamations issued in Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Ceylon. India issued no proclamation but the Prime Minister addressed a message to the Queen welcoming Her as "the new Head of the Commonwealth." In South Africa and Canada, the phrase "Head of the Commonwealth" was not used. Instead she was proclaimed "Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Queen, Defender of the Faith," and in addition there were added, in the case of Canada, the words "Supreme Liege Lady in and over Canada" and in the case of South Africa, "Sovereign in and over the Union of South Africa." It is interesting to observe that Canada and South Africa, both always in the forefront in asserting independence, should have adopted the old-fashioned formula while the United Kingdom and the other Members should have broken new ground. Strictly speaking, Canada and South Africa were acting correctly. They recited the Queen's title as it was established by law.

The divergence in the form of the proclamations made it clear, however, that it was time to discuss the question of the title and the matter was accordingly taken up at a Commonwealth Conference in December, 1952, and a declaration was issued. It was agreed, in the words of the communique:

"that the present Title is not in accord with current constitutional relations within the Commonwealth, and that there is need for a new form of title which will, in particular, reflect the special position of the Sovereign as Head of the Commonwealth. [The Governments] concluded, after full consideration, that in the present stage of development of the Commonwealth relationship, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position that each member country should use for its own purposes a form of title which suits its own particular circumstances but retains a substantial element which is common to all. They agreed that the various forms of the Title should, in addition to an appropriate territorial designation, have as their common element the description of the Sovereign as Queen of Her other Realms and Territories and Head of the Commonwealth."

As a result of this declaration, the parliaments of the Members of the Commonwealth³ passed legislation to authorize a form of title for the Queen in respect of each of them and in due course proclamations were issued on May 29, 1953 in the capitals of the Members of the Commonwealth bringing the new titles into effect simultaneously in respect of the different Members. It is worth while to set them out in order so that the resemblances and the differences may stand out.

United Kingdom. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and of Her other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.

³ Except India (see below).

Canada. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.

Australia. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom, Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.

New Zealand. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Her other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.

South Africa. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of South Africa and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.

Pakistan. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of the United Kingdom and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.

Ceylon. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Ceylon and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.

It is interesting to speculate upon the differences of principle and of sentiment that lie behind these differing titles. To start with, the Queen's title in respect of the United Kingdom has been amended to take account of the partition of Ireland, and there is a specific reference to Northern Ireland. It will be noticed that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all wished to lay some stress upon the fact that their own Queen was also the Queen of the United Kingdom and they made specific reference to this fact in the titles they chose. In this way we may think they chose to stress their association in a *British* Commonwealth, which is, perhaps, of particular significance in the case of Canada, for a large proportion of its population is not of British stock, but of French stock. The same three members chose also to recite the Queen's title as "Defender of the Faith," following the United Kingdom in this matter. In South Africa—no less staunch in the Christian faith than these other Members—it was decided nonetheless to drop the title "Defender of the Faith." Nor does South Africa follow the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand in using the phrase "by the Grace of God," preferring perhaps to think that the Queen holds her position by act of parliament. It was not surprising, of course, that in Moslem Pakistan and Buddhist Ceylon the title of Defender of the Faith should be omitted as inapplicable, and there too no use is made of the phrase "by the Grace of God."

It is significant, also, that in South Africa and Ceylon no reference was made explicitly to the United Kingdom in the titles adopted, though that country is included in the reference to "Her other Realms and Territories." The majority of South Africans are not of British stock, and the government of the Union has laid great stress upon the fact that the Queen is Queen of South Africa in a distinct and separate capacity. Ceylon has naturally followed the same plan. Pakistan's choice of title is significant not only for what it omits, but also for what it contains. It is at first sight very surprising that in the Pakistan title there is an explicit reference to the United Kingdom but no explicit reference to Pakistan itself! The explanation, it may be suggested, is that Pakistan is engaged upon drawing up her new Constitution and it is still to be decided whether she will adopt a republican form of government or con-

tinue to be a monarchy. In these circumstances it was no doubt wise to make no explicit reference to Pakistan but to describe the Queen truthfully enough as "Queen of the United Kingdom and of Her other Realms and Territories," one of which, if you choose to be explicit, is Pakistan. If Pakistan should become a republic, the title is still correct, though Pakistan will no longer be one of "Her Realms and Territories."⁴

It will be noticed that India has not proclaimed a title for the Queen. Her view, apparently, is that as the Queen has no legal position in India, there is no need for her to be given a title in respect of India. There is no doubt much force in this view. It may be suggested, however, that India could well have followed the Pakistan formula without in any way compromising her republican status. For understandable political reasons, however, the Indian government has not openly associated itself with the proclaiming of a title for the Queen in respect of India. For her the Queen is Head of the Commonwealth, by agreement between the Members, and it requires no legal document to say so.

These details of the Royal Titles may seem trivial and their discussion pedantic.⁵ Yet they illustrate the importance which Members of the Commonwealth attach to the Crown, and the individuality which they exhibit in their relations to it. The unity and diversity of the Commonwealth can hardly be better illustrated than in these titles.

IV

The peculiarities of the structure of the Commonwealth can be illustrated further by the attitudes of its members to another of its fundamental principles—equality of status, the sovereign independence of each Member. Here, as in the case of the principle of the common recognition of the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth, the Members adopt their own individual attitudes for reasons which satisfy themselves. When the principle of equality of status was explicitly acknowledged at the Imperial Conference of 1926, it was realized that in fact it did not conform to the letter of the law as it then stood. The Parliament of the United Kingdom could, for example, pass laws extending to the other Members of the Commonwealth, and if it did so those laws prevailed over the laws of the other Members insofar as they conflicted. This was one of a number of matters in which, in law, the other Members of the Commonwealth were not equal in status with the United Kingdom. Some of the Mem-

⁴ Since these words were written Pakistan has tended to become a republic.

⁵ One footnote may be added, which may interest those who have followed the controversy in the United Kingdom as to whether the Queen should be described in Scotland as Elizabeth I or Elizabeth II. Apparently Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Ceylon, and Pakistan, for whom the Queen is certainly the first Elizabeth to reign over them as distinct Kingdoms, were content to describe her as the second Elizabeth! Yet the case for describing the Queen as Elizabeth I of South Africa is surely as strong as the case for calling her Elizabeth I of Scotland. The argument does not appear to have been invoked by the Scottish Nationalists.

I may add that I regard the Scottish argument as historically strong. It might equally well be applied to the overseas members of the Commonwealth.

bers—Australia and New Zealand, for example—did not mind particularly about this; others, such as South Africa and the Irish Free State, thought that it should be put right at once. Accordingly, adjustments were made in legal and administrative arrangements and in particular an act—the Statute of Westminster, 1931—was passed in the Parliament of the United Kingdom to remove those legal inequalities. The Parliament of the United Kingdom undertook to pass no law in future applying to the other Members of the Commonwealth unless expressly requested to do so, and it was provided that the parliaments of the other Members should be empowered to repeal or amend any British acts extending to them. In this way the parliaments of all the Members of the Commonwealth were placed upon an equal footing.

Yet it is interesting to notice that to-day, as in 1926, while some Members of the Commonwealth have taken complete steps to assert their legal equality, others have not bothered very much about it. Thus at one extreme India has adopted a constitution which declares, in a phrase reminiscent of the American Constitution, that “we, the people of India . . . do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.” In Australia, New Zealand, and Canada on the other hand, the constitutions claim their force of law not, as in India, from the authority of the people, but from the fact that they were enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. What is more, in Canada some important parts of the Constitution—the British North America Act, 1867—can be altered still only by an act of the Parliament at Westminster. Pakistan, while preparing its new Constitution, has lived since 1947, when it achieved independence, under a British act of parliament, the Government of India Act, 1935, adapted to its present needs. Ceylon’s Constitution is established by British orders in council. In South Africa, on the other hand, it is maintained that the Constitution, though originally a British law, now owes authority to its having been re-enacted in 1934 by the South African Parliament.

Corresponding to these differences in attitude to their constitutions go differences in attitude to the British Parliament. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand occasionally ask the British Parliament to make a law to extend to them, under the terms of the Statute of Westminster; other Members do not.

The members of the Commonwealth have differed, too, in their attitude to appeals from their courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, inasmuch as it is in practice usually composed of British judges and sits in London, might be regarded as a United Kingdom institution. While India (1949), Pakistan (1951), South Africa (1950), and Canada (1949) have abolished appeals, Australia, New Zealand, and Ceylon retain them, though they could remove them whenever they wished.

Indeed all these legal inequalities are capable of removal whenever a Member of the Commonwealth desires it. Some choose to bring the letter of the law into line with the principle of equality; others are content if the law is so administered that it does not result in inequality in practice. All are agreed and are indeed adamant upon the principle of equality, and if the law conflicts with that principle it must be nullified or paralyzed by constitutional usage and

convention, or if that is not possible—and sometimes it is not—then the law must be altered.

V

It has been explained already that not all the countries of the Commonwealth are classed as Members of it. Only the fully self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are Members. Does this mean that whenever any country of the Commonwealth becomes self-governing it is automatically a Member if it chooses to remain in the Commonwealth, freely associated? The answer to this question is not yet clear. It is claimed by some Members of the Commonwealth—and with some justification—that the decision as to whether a Commonwealth country is to be a Member of the Commonwealth must depend not only on the willingness of that country to become a Member but upon the willingness of the other Members to accept her. If this were not so, they argue, it would mean that the United Kingdom, for example, by granting self-government to one dependent country after another, would increase the number of Members of the Commonwealth without consulting its fellow Members. For a Member like South Africa this is a particularly serious matter. If, by unilateral British action, the Gold Coast and Nigeria became self-governing, and thereby Members of the Commonwealth, South Africa's position would be affected and she claims the right to be heard on this subject.

There can be little doubt that the decision as to whether new Members should be admitted to the Commonwealth is a matter of concern to all the existing Members. What is equally clear, however, is that Britain is committed to developing the countries of the Commonwealth at present dependent upon her to full self-government in due course. It is certain, therefore, that a delicate situation will arise if any other Members of the Commonwealth should be unwilling to accept these countries when they attain self-government, if they then declare themselves willing to be Members. And it is still unknown whether such matters are to be decided by a majority or whether a veto shall be conferred upon each Member.

Yet it is clear that if Commonwealth countries become self-governing and if they wish to remain in the Commonwealth, their only proper status is that of full Members. There can be no place in the Commonwealth for second-class Members. Nonetheless, there are problems ahead as the advance of self-government continues, and they are problems which arise quite apart from the sort of objections which South Africa might feel towards the growth of self-government among African countries like the Gold Coast or Nigeria. They arise, for example, from the nature and functions of a Member of the Commonwealth. One of the rights and duties of a Member of the Commonwealth is to consult with other Members on matters of common concern and in particular to take part in the working of various Commonwealth institutions through which cooperation is maintained, the chief of which is the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, formerly known as the Imperial Conference. The Commonwealth Conference consists at present of eight

Members, though by custom Southern Rhodesia has also attended meetings. It is clear, however, that if the number of Members increases, the Conference will become a large gathering. Is there not a danger that if its numbers increase to more than, say, a dozen or fifteen members, its effectiveness will suffer? Thus if each West Indian Colony became self-governing, followed by each African Colony, and thereafter by the colonies in South East Asia and the Pacific, would not the Conference become completely unwieldy? Moreover, would there not be something unreal in a gathering at which small communities sat down side by side on a footing of formal equality with countries carrying some weight and responsibility in the world, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, India, and Australia? To ask this question is, indeed, to ask whether it is not unreal to grant self-government to these individual small communities, seeing that they are quite unable to stand alone in the world unaided. Would they not raise a problem not only for the Commonwealth Conference but also for such international bodies as the United Nations? Could dozens of small nominally self-governing states expect to be admitted to the United Nations?

Questions of this kind have led to the view that, if Commonwealth countries desire to advance to self-government and if they wish that self-government to be real and effective and not nominal, they should consider associating themselves together, in federations perhaps, and thus enter into the international world as stronger units than they could hope to be if they remained separate. Federations of this kind would be economically strong and politically substantial. From the Commonwealth point of view such associations of countries would clearly deserve to be Members and would be entitled to a say in the Commonwealth Conferences. At the same time, by federation or some other form of union, they reduce the number of individual units sitting around the Conference table and avoid the difficulties of an unwieldy gathering. From this point of view the establishment of the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland which has just been inaugurated, and the project for a British Caribbean Federation of many of the Commonwealth countries in that area, which was endorsed at a Conference in London in April, 1953, are important developments. It is along lines of this kind that some solution may be found to the problem of reconciling the acknowledged British policy of granting self-government to dependent Commonwealth countries, with maintaining a Commonwealth Conference of Members who can and will cooperate effectively in matters of common concern. Members of this sort of standing would deserve also a place in the United Nations, where consultation and cooperation between Commonwealth countries is a matter of the greatest importance.

VI

What sort of association is the Commonwealth then? The constitutional lawyer finds it very difficult to say. There is for him no legal link binding the whole association together. The international lawyer, who deals more in conventions, might find material upon which he could construct an argument that the Commonwealth was in some way like a league or alliance. Yet the material

would be scanty. The Members are bound by no exclusive treaties. Their strongest obligations, in international law, to each other arise from their membership in such bodies as the United Nations Organization or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and these obligations are, of course, not binding upon all Members of the Commonwealth—Ceylon has not yet been admitted to UNO and only Canada and the United Kingdom are members of NATO—nor are they exclusive Commonwealth obligations, for other countries share in them.

The lawyer can tell us little about the nature of the Commonwealth. When its statesmen attempt to describe it they call it a "club" or they call it a "family." Each term has its value. "Club" is appropriate to the use of the term "Members" of the Commonwealth. A club illustrates particularly the ideas of equality of status and freedom of association, and stresses also the fact that membership involves not only willingness to join but also willingness on the part of existing members to accept. It suggests also social intercourse and friendship, common sympathies and interests, mutual assistance and goodwill among people of differing characteristics. The Commonwealth is founded on these ideas.

The idea of a family brings in other notions. It reminds us that the Commonwealth countries have been associated together in history for many years; that for some of the countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada to a large extent and South Africa to less extent, England, Ireland, Wales and Scotland are mother countries. For others, like India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, the United Kingdom may have been a step-mother! There is a lot of family history in the Commonwealth, some happy, some difficult. Now it is understood that as the daughters and step-daughters grow up, they may take their place at the family council table if they wish and be accorded a full say in family matters. The relationship of mother and daughter is passing; it is a family of sister-nations or a brotherhood of nations which the Commonwealth has become. As time passes more Commonwealth countries will attain self-government and more faces will appear at the family table.

On this analogy all the Commonwealth countries belong to the same family; the Members are those who choose freely, when they come of age, to join in the family councils. If we look at the Commonwealth in this way, it makes it harder to say that when a Commonwealth country becomes self-governing, it may not, if it wishes, become a Member and join in the family councils, for after all it belongs to the family as a matter of family history. It may well claim the right to share in the family councils, and, if it does, it is not easy to deny it that right. Of course it is well known that in family life, people do sometimes prefer not to take part in family councils; they cut themselves off from their family's affairs. And likewise, families sometimes decline to have anything to do with some of their relations.

The position of Eire illustrates this aspect of the Commonwealth considered as a family. Eire clearly belongs to the Commonwealth as a matter of history. It is part of one of the mother countries of the Commonwealth. But, as a result of family quarrels, it has decided that it does not wish to take part in the family councils; it ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth in April, 1949, reject-

ing at the same time its recognition of the Crown as the symbol of its association with the other Members. Yet, though Eire takes no part in family councils and declines the rights and duties of a Member of the Commonwealth, there are interesting signs still to be detected that it belongs to the Commonwealth family. Thus, by an arrangement between Eire and other Commonwealth countries, Irish citizens are treated in Commonwealth countries upon the same footing as citizens of those Commonwealth countries; and Eire offers reciprocal privileges to Commonwealth citizens. This arrangement, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, is dictated, of course, by considerations of mutual advantage and common-sense, for so many Irish citizens live and work in Britain. Thus we have the anomaly, as odd as any in the Commonwealth itself, that Eire is not a Commonwealth country and it is not a foreign country. Irish citizens are not Commonwealth citizens and they are not aliens. The anomaly is carried a little further by the fact that whereas the Members of the Commonwealth are represented in each other's capitals by High Commissioners, Ireland is represented therein by an Ambassador, but the Irish Ambassador in London conducts his relations with the government of the United Kingdom not through the Foreign Office, as would a foreign country, but through the Commonwealth Relations Office as do the Members of the Commonwealth!

The analogy of the Commonwealth as a family adds something valuable therefore to the idea of the Commonwealth as a club. It helps to explain some of the difficulties and anomalies in the Commonwealth as well as some of the virtues and strengths. For some of the Members, like Australia and New Zealand, perhaps, it means more than for others like India and Pakistan. In some Members like South Africa the fact that some of its citizens, such as the English-speaking South Africans, place great emphasis upon the Commonwealth as a family relationship leads other citizens, such as the Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, to distrust and dislike it and to feel, perhaps, as many Nationalists in South Africa do, that even the idea of the Commonwealth as a club has its dangers.

For my part I think the notion of the Commonwealth as a family helps to explain its nature with remarkable accuracy and insight. It adds to our understanding of the way the Commonwealth works some factors of psychology and sentiment which the idea of a club does not provide, and which are of very great strength and importance. Not least, too, the family analogy helps us to understand the position of Eire, which in itself is often a clue to the understanding of the Commonwealth. The position of Eire in relation to the Commonwealth reminds us that while not all those who have belonged to the Commonwealth family will wish to be Members of it when they obtain self-government, it does not necessarily follow that they will cut themselves off entirely from their family. And perhaps the family analogy, and the Irish case in particular, can help us to understand, too, the relations between the British Commonwealth and that other Commonwealth which once belonged to the same family—our near relations in the United States of America!

NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: SOME GENERAL TRENDS

ALEXANDER BRADY
University of Toronto

I

The two dynamic political forces in the British Commonwealth¹ are those of nationalism and democracy, and they are in close alliance. This fact is most evident in the older dominions, which were colonized from the British Isles, or, in the case of Canada and South Africa, partially colonized also from France and Holland. The genesis of their nationality was evident when as colonies they gropingly aspired to become autonomous political communities, standing on their own feet, seeking to shape their own future, not isolated from the metropolitan power, but also not subservient to it. In them the prevailing concept of a nation has been that of a people organized to achieve within the state the ends of popular freedom and political order. Owing to the liberating and levelling ways of the frontier, a new land provided special scope for the ideas and sentiments of democracy and hence the more readily generated among the people a potent sentiment for itself.

The close link between nationalism and democracy has been excellently illustrated in Australia and New Zealand. In Canada also it has been real, although somewhat less secure, for, owing to the dual cultures of the people, there has been some ambiguity about the nature of nationality. In South Africa the ambiguity is even greater. In the three Asian states of the Commonwealth the soil and environment for nationality and democracy have been different, but here also, as I shall attempt to show, the two concepts and the two movements have been allies.

The older dominions exhibit in development significant if often subtle differences, the product of special environment and history. But they possess in common one salient feature: they are in a self-conscious stage of nation-building, and hunger in the modern world to achieve a deeper political and economic unity. With them the sense of nationality does not resemble, as in older nations such as Britain and Holland, a powerful and spontaneous instinct quietly impelling their people. On the contrary, their consciousness of nationality, espe-

¹ A brief comment on nomenclature is relevant to a discussion of the modern British Commonwealth. The simple term "Commonwealth" is now coming to replace "British Commonwealth," and in the Queen's titles, as recommended by the dominion Prime Ministers in December, 1952, it received explicit sanction. But the adjective will always be useful in order to avoid ambiguity. The term "dominion" to designate a fully self-governing member of the Commonwealth is in some official circles now avoided, but in the absence of an adequate substitute its convenience is obvious. In this article my concern is only with the full member states of the Commonwealth, but a related theme of immense interest is that of the emergent nationalities of the African colonies, which afford comparison and contrast with the nationalities of the dominions.

cially in critical times, assumes an anxious, clamant, insistent character. It seems concerned above all to demonstrate its own arrival and its own strength, and its eager demonstrations may suggest a doubtful maturity. One historian remarks of Canada as a national unit that "it is so obviously prefabricated that everyone knows it." But actually, through its spokesmen, it seeks to avoid the appearance of prefabrication. As commonly with youth, these communities endeavour to imitate impressive models, and inevitably the models are the European nations, especially Britain and France, and to a less extent the United States. They are keen to emulate the British and French strength of patriotism and pride in achievement. The early exponents of their nationalism scorned the fact that they were merely citizens of a colony; they wanted to be citizens of a nation, and reap the material benefits and spiritual satisfactions that were assumed to accompany this more dignified and significant status. Born in reaction against colonial inferiority, dominion nationalism was promptly stimulated by the advances in autonomy and in turn furthered these advances. At intervals it was doubtless fostered by the patronizing attitudes towards colonial life of some publicists and public men in Britain, although such attitudes were hardly necessary to ensure its growth. The merging of scattered colonies into the large federations of Canada and Australia was partly at least the achievement of a nationalist aspiration. It was assumed that a bigger political unit would provide more solid foundations for a great nationality in the future, and in turn the nationalist emotion would make government possible over wide areas. Seldom in the last century was this idealism more eloquently expressed than in the writings and speeches of an emigrant Irish rebel of 1848, D'Arcy McGee, who sought to inspire his contemporary Canadian colonists, absorbed in their petty squabbles, with the nationalist faith which as a youth he derived from Thomas Davis and other early exponents of nineteenth-century Irish patriotism.

These communities, unlike Britain, seldom take their nationality for granted. Their politicians are ever eager to place it prominently on the electoral stage; they make it the basis for programs and actions of a varied and sometimes irrelevant nature. All this is doubtless natural enough and wholesome enough. It helps to integrate and unify people scattered in extensive territories. Its success varies with circumstances. In Australia, which happily possesses a continent to itself, nationalism for evident reasons encounters fewer daunting difficulties than in Canada and South Africa. The Canadian national problem is peculiarly complex. There is the bi-national or bi-cultural fact of French and English. There is also the weighty circumstance of proximity to the United States, with its powerful and inescapable influences on Canadian cultural life, making it appear difficult for the community to attain many distinctive achievements, except its own political existence. Owing to the facts of North American civilization, Canadians who set store by material development—and most do—must inevitably be nationalists of a qualified type. They can do, and have done, many things alone; they are responsible for achievements that inspire national pride and create national myths, but there are other goals that they

cannot readily reach alone, and for material advantage they must seek collaboration with the people across their southern border. To the United States they must look for markets, capital, techniques, incoming tourists, and defensive support. There are numerous other things for which they need not rely upon their neighbours, but in fact they find it difficult to ignore the precedents set by a very vital people ten times more numerous who live alongside them under North American conditions. There is no compelling need for them to imitate Americans in football or in the programs and methods of university study, but admittedly they often do. Intellectuals resent and decry this cultural permeation, but deep in the popular mores it steadily and silently proceeds; it penetrates the protective walls which the more exclusive nationalist would erect. The task of creating a culturally distinctive nation of the type which in Western Europe required centuries is obviously difficult in North America, since the two chief territorial states have common cultural roots, common material tasks, somewhat similar geographic regions, and are both very sensitive to the same currents of modern industrialism. Inevitably they tend to move in unison.

Canada's response to American influence is usually interpreted as a bending on her part to the compulsion of geography, or an acceptance of geographic destiny, just as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa also bend to geography, although in other ways. While there is a Canadian nation in the making, there is also a North American community in the making, shaped profoundly by the modern means of production and communication on land, in the air, and in the ether. In saying this I am far from suggesting, as Goldwin Smith was wont to do more than fifty years ago, the futility of Canada's national aspirations. The aim of creating in the northern half of the continent a distinctive nation ensures for its people an invigorating incentive, and wins for them an impressive triumph: the political structure of modern Canada, with modes of rule and systems of law different from those in the adjoining republic. Thus the striving to achieve a Canadian nationality enriches the political experience in the English-speaking world and adds to political life in North America a valuable variety. All this is not futile, except possibly to a special type of Manchester liberal like Goldwin Smith in his pessimistic moods.

Yet the most marked and significant feature of Canadian political nationality is one shared with the other older dominions: a strong sense of intimate external relationships, especially with Britain and the United States. Canada by its intrinsic nature is always aware of outside bonds even if some Canadian nationalists are not, for as a community it has grown up harmoniously within a broader community and in close, friendly contact with its neighbour. In this matter it is like Australia and New Zealand, which no less are distinct political nationalities, deeply influenced by local environment, but also cultural segments of the English-speaking community in the world, conscious parts of this larger whole, and invigorated by the continuous flow of blood within the whole. No other contemporary states probably possess so strongly as these countries the awareness of sharing in a stream of life larger than that within their own

frontiers. The governing facts of their peculiar political and economic evolution have saved them from a narrow isolationism. Into the new world (whether America or the South Pacific) they originally brought an inheritance from the old, and no revolution has obliterated their sense of affinity with the old.

But in Canada and South Africa another aspect of nationalism is significant. These states, from one point of view, are dual cultures under one government. There have been those who sought an ultimate if gradual merging of the two strains into a Canadian nation and a South African nation with a common culture in each, like that of Britain to which the English, Scots, and Welsh all contribute. But in neither country is this ideal of a comprehensive nationality realized, nor is it likely to be realized in the near future. The unity is still confined mainly to the sphere of politics, although its frontiers are being extended. While the dual cultures within the political nation share much in common, they are also distinctive. Hence the fervid talk of French nationalism and Afrikaans nationalism in which English-speaking peoples are not expected to participate. The consequence in each dominion has been the making of formal agreements on cultural matters, essential to ease tensions and enable the representative state to operate. Such agreements, especially on language and education, have never ceased to create political problems and political frictions, although on the whole they have worked remarkably well. Nevertheless the separate nationalities survive, with their inward-looking loyalties and their ever lively fear for the survival of their cultures. The currents of modern social change may often arouse their apprehensions lest valued elements of the culture will be swept away. Sometimes they are influenced by imagined grievances which become the most acute grievances. A sense of historic wrong rooted in popular imagination obstructs the rational method in politics, hampers a feeling for present realities, and may even threaten a belief in the basic methods of democracy. For the minority type of nationality the passion to survive may become the one all-absorbing passion, and then its claims will certainly challenge the larger demands of the state.

There is little space here to compare in this matter the experiences of Canada and South Africa, other than to remark that over the last eighty years Canadian federalism has tended to lessen internal tensions, for its legal rigidity is commonly protective of diverse cultural groups; it gives them on the whole some feeling of enduring security. It ensures a certain stability above the shifting majorities of contemporary politics. But federalism is more effective in harmonizing dual cultures if wedded to liberalism. Nothing more promptly reduces the temperature of fanatical zeal than the presence of a liberal attitude of conciliation and all that it implies; nothing is a better solvent of passion. Such is the fact which Canadian political experience would seem to demonstrate. Fortunately the most influential spokesmen for the French in Canada, from Lafontaine in the middle of the last century to Mr. St. Laurent today, have paid warm tribute to British liberal philosophy. It was Henri Bourassa, a brilliant and consistent champion of the French cause, who declared: "I am a Liberal of the English school. I am a disciple of Burke, of Fox, of Bright, of Gladstone, and of

all those Little Englanders who have made England and the Empire what they are today." To him the reconciling agent in the relations of the two peoples was the liberal and pluralist philosophy.

In South Africa the same philosophy, represented in the practical ideas and action of diverse men, such as Merriman, Schreiner, Botha, Smuts, and both Hofmeyrs, likewise helped to compose cultural differences within the one state and create a political nation. But in contrast to the Canadian, the South African environment, with its millions of tribalized and detribalized natives, its polyglot society, and its conflicting cultures, has been much less friendly to the liberal spirit. Moreover South African history, with its painful events and their legacy of rancour, has made many Afrikaners more intense and less compromising in their nationalism than the French of Quebec. An inflamed emotionalism brings to the state sharper strains and stresses, and is accentuated inevitably by those hard problems involved in incorporating the numerous natives into the community, whether as citizens, quasi-citizens, or merely a labour caste.

Nationalism in the Asian states of the Commonwealth, despite its very different social environment, has one obvious resemblance to that in the older dominions. Here too, as already noted, it came to be linked with a democratic movement. There were (and are) varied and conflicting strains of thought and sentiment amongst both Hindus and Muslims, some of which were hostile to democracy. But the most influential leaders of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent have been mainly an intellectual, middle-class elite, inspired by the literature and accomplishments of British liberalism and Western democracy and anxious to create a liberal, and in some degree a social democratic state. British policy itself was headed in that direction, for in the twentieth century it was designed gradually to prepare the Indian community for self-rule. The victory of nationalism was to be a victory for the people. Some, like Pandit Nehru, hoped that it would no less be a victory for what he called "the conquering scientific culture of modern civilisation." Gandhi's appeal was somewhat different, less rationalist, rooted in tradition and religion, and emphatic that "independence must begin at the bottom, so that every village can be a republic." Admittedly his theory of the state was vague and ambiguous. He was a mystic who often dispensed with logic, the spiritual prophet of a cause rather than its political philosopher. But his ideal was a national state organized broadly on democratic lines, a state wherein all the more harsh distinctions of superiority and inferiority would duly disappear.²

Indian nationalists in their final triumph signalized attachment to the democratic ideal by rejecting communalism in favour of equality for all, eliminating the ancient rule of the princes, and drafting a constitution which is a remark-

² Contradictions appear in Gandhi's social thinking. Despite his attack on the system of untouchability, he defended in certain writings the Hindu system of hereditary caste and hereditary occupations. He usually offered subtle reasons for his distinctions, but the working of his mind often made the more Western type of democrat, like Pandit Nehru, impatient, as the latter candidly admits in his *Autobiography*.

able charter of political liberties. One may say charter advisedly because, unlike most constitutions, it prescribes not merely laws to be obeyed but ideals to be realized. A concrete result was the enfranchisement of 175 million people, mostly illiterate, and the holding of elections on a scale unprecedented in the annals of democratic states. In Pakistan and Ceylon steps have also been taken, although not identical, to create political nationalities on a democratic basis, and in the three the parliamentary form of government is adopted and the precedents of Westminster accepted.

But it would be unrealistic not to recognize that, while in these Asian countries the nationalist ideal is linked with the democratic, there are also differences, no less significant because frequently subtle, between the outlook and operative forces in the nationalities of what may be called for convenience the dominions of the East and the West. India, judged by population, is the second largest state in the world. With a prolific people and great potential power it is inevitably anxious to play a special role in Southern Asia or indeed in Asia as a whole. It feels animated by attitudes of mind different from those in the West, and confident that it can draw from its own peculiar wells of inspiration. It is not, like the dominions which had been colonies, a land settled in recent centuries, but an ancient society awakened by revolutionary change to new visions of importance. The springs of its own life and environment give it a different national interest, the focus of which is Asia, whereas to the Western members of the Commonwealth Asia is secondary. It is not unnatural if in the utterances of some Indian nationalists we detect a missionary note. Nor is it unnatural that while at present India is a happy member of the Commonwealth, it cannot owing to indigenous cultural conditions feel that it is an intimate brother of the older dominions. It is a member of the Commonwealth but without sentiment. Nor can it like the older dominions wish to be fully integrated with and dependent upon the great English-speaking community. It is inevitable that it should desire to be more independent. It may not (it does not) at present possess sufficient sinews of material power to pursue a course of outright independence, but that fact does not alter the direction of its spirit.

As long as India is guided by Pandit Nehru and middle-class leaders of his type, this fact may not be of much concern to the Commonwealth. But tomorrow Indian nationalism may not know a Nehru, educated in the West, with a world view, a political skill, and a sophisticated mind. Democracy wedded to nationalism is likely in time to throw up leaders of a less aristocratic quality, who come from the masses and are more directly swayed by the indigenous impulses and conceptions among millions of peasants and workers, and the expression of such impulses will be determined by a changing social situation. In this social situation the three Asian countries differ markedly from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, for the configurations of their social structure still reflect age-old elements of hierarchy, wide gaps remain between rich and poor, in India the iron bonds of caste had long existed, and the spirit of caste is not yet dead. Unlike the older dominions they did not experience the levelling and homogenizing influence of sparse settlement on agrarian and pastoral frontiers,

not to mention the deep experiences of mind and spirit which British society underwent in the two centuries before the colonists crossed the oceans. Despite technical borrowings from the West, they have not in like degree reaped the material benefits of advanced techniques applied to production. Mass poverty and congested lands are still predominant issues. The peasant, deriving precarious returns from primitive modes of cultivation, remains a social fact. The implications of such circumstances for nationalism and democracy are obvious. An emphasis on economic and social goals, present already in Gandhi's program, becomes stronger in contemporary Indian nationalism, and is reinforced by the rise of communism in China. The special form of this welfare collectivism in the future and the manner whereby it affects the nature of party leadership are crucial for Indian democracy. The significance of economic development to the political life is emphasized in the claim of the UNESCO report on *Compulsory Education in India* that the cost of educating every Indian child would take three-quarters of the total income of the central government and of all the state governments, a burden that at present the country cannot carry. Hence the first step to ensure the compulsory education of all children involves a large increase in the wealth-producing power of the Indian economy.

II

The visible part of the British political inheritance in the contemporary Commonwealth is the presence of popular parliaments legislating in accordance with the traditions and privileges of their prototype at Westminster, searching diligently in the venerable volumes of Erskine May for suitable precedents, and on occasion deciding by vote the life or death of a government in harmony with the principle of ministerial responsibility. Here certainly is impressive evidence of British political influence. Yet a closer look at these solid parliamentary regimes indicates that they do not always operate precisely like their model. Nor could one expect them to do so. The conditions of a society and the attitudes of its people, including their public morality, must determine how an institution will work. When in the nineteenth century British parliamentary institutions were carried overseas, many other things did not and could not accompany them. The most important of these was the British social system, especially that portion of it called "the governing class," composed at the upper levels of men with much intellectual cultivation who had leisure to devote themselves to public affairs and to become adept in the parliamentary art, obedient to significant but unwritten rules of conduct. More important than their skill was a certain liberality of mind, or relative freedom from rigid dogmas, in interpreting the interests of the widening public which they were called upon to represent. They did not commonly consider themselves as intellectually demeaned by agreeing to compromises, or by altering programs in response to the shifting currents of opinion outside. They accepted compromise less as a treason to principle than a valued principle in itself. Thus they demonstrated

* H. G. Saiyidain, J. P. Naik, and S. Abid Husain, *Compulsory Education in India* (UNESCO, 1952).

that parliamentary government could function successfully in an industrial society where change had become the law of life.

No dominion acquired the equivalent of such a governing class. The social conditions of frontier communities were hostile to it, as they were hostile to the British class system in general. In truth these communities were often unfriendly even to any pronounced traits of intellectual cultivation in their politicians, for they did not wish them to be mentally removed from ordinary folk. "We have faith in education," remarked Carl Becker of his fellow Americans, "but not too much in the educated." A Canadian or Australian might aptly make the same admission. The intellectual in politics, unless possessed by an overpowering geniality, is likely to be suspect. There have been exceptions, but they hardly do more than prove the rule. Such popular attitudes are now much less pronounced but they survive.

The dominions suffered from this lack of an experienced and educated political class. The losses are not measurable, but in the past were shown often enough in the ineptitude of party leadership, the mistakes of law-makers, and the incompetence of administration. They were partly illustrated in the tardy establishment of efficient systems of financial control and in the belated application of intelligent rules for utilizing and conserving natural resources. But one would indeed be naive to think that a native governing class, even one so astute as the British, would have saved these countries from all political errors. We can only assume that the losses would have been less. However, this is mere speculation. Constituted as they were, the dominions were not in the position to produce skilful political elites like that of Britain, and the remarkable fact is that they fared as well as they did with their homespun politicians. Fortunately at certain critical times they possessed men of genuine political vision, fortitude, and wisdom. One will not in vain search for evidence of such qualities in the Debates on Confederation in the legislature of the Canadas in 1865, or in the discussions of the National Australasian Conventions of the nineties. In them there is little political philosophy of the academic kind and little sophisticated theory; but there is ample evidence of strong empirical minds coping with problems. This fact is perhaps the one most to emphasize. In their tough empiricism the dominion communities retained the significant essentials of the British political tradition. The theory to which they commonly respond is that shaped by a constant sense of actuality past and present. They exhibit the characteristic British zeal for pruning the branch but sparing the root.

Such remarks must refer to the older dominions. It is still premature to generalize with assurance about parliamentary government in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. To the political life of these countries, as noted already, the British liberal and empirical tradition was introduced by those who aroused the people to national consciousness. The parliamentary system of Westminster was taken as the prototype for the new states. The Indians established a republic, but not on the American pattern; it conforms closely to the essential principles of British constitutional monarchy, and its president acts as an uncrowned monarch. Throughout the constitution there is an evident endeavour to achieve some-

thing of that English balance between the claims of individual and state and to uphold the rule of law.

Yet one cannot help asking about India whether the constitution in itself, so British in conception, is sufficient to preserve the traditions of liberal democracy and whether these traditions are likely to be destroyed or transformed by the social and emotive forces prevalent in the sub-continent. Will the almost daily compromises and little evasive ingenuities of parliamentary practice, which have enabled the system at Westminster to survive, withstand the peculiar and potent pressures which the Asian environment is likely to create? Will the spirit of liberality so essential for democratic compromise take and retain firm hold on the masses and their leaders? At present no certain answers are possible. But it is evident that some discerning Indians watch with concern the course of political development. Even when elated by what already has been accomplished, they cannot disguise their anxiety for the future. A brilliant educationalist and independent thinker, the late Dr. C. R. Reddi of Mysore, saw in India countless hindrances to good citizenship which called for great and sustained efforts to overcome.⁴ He saw these hindrances most of all, despite the triumph of the nationalist movement, in the absence of a vital sense of unity or national oneness. "It is not that the idea of unity is not there, but the feeling and the will are feeble." "To proclaim unity is not the same thing as to possess it. Localism and communalism of different kinds exist, even within Hindu society itself; they influence conduct, and are only too capable of political exploitation in the future. Wide and embarrassing variations in culture remain. The spirit of constitutionalism, the lifeblood of the democratic state, is not indigenous to the country, and in some respects was inhibited rather than fostered by certain phases of the struggle for national independence. Among the masses violence is often quickly resorted to for trivial ends or for no rational ends whatever. In the early summer of 1953 a farthing increase in the second class fares of Calcutta's transport occasioned riots that cost ten lives and the destruction of many trams, trains, and buses. The tactic of civil disobedience is turned to purposes that would shock its author, Gandhi. For the masses active rebellion is easier than passive resistance. Public opinion produced from the play and interplay of opposing and reasoned views needs ampler scope than it yet possesses. Party government in the strictly British sense can hardly develop as long as Congress retains a position of overwhelming predominance.

It is not surprising that a Communist movement acting on Stalinist ideas has established itself in India, since among the masses dismal poverty, widespread illiteracy, and harsh class distinctions, especially in the countryside, give its exponents scope. In the national and state elections of 1951 the Communists won many successes, notably in the southern states of Hyderabad and Travancore, and in the national parliament they constituted with some allies the chief and critical opposition to the Congress party. The social circumstances of the sub-continent peculiarly favour application of Lenin's prescription for

⁴ See his article "Basic Conflicts in Indian Politics," *The Hindu*, January 26, 1950.

joint legal and illegal activities. Communists have been quick to exploit in southern areas, such as the Telangana, the bitter passions of aggrieved peasants, and have abetted violence with arson as appropriate measures against landlords and administrators. In India, as in the West, some intellectuals and humanitarians are lured to communism, not merely by its claim to further social betterment, but also by the sacrifices and perils associated with a revolutionary cause. The contemporary experiment in China is not likely to lessen their number. Often the intellectuals may at the outset have been liberal nationalists who moved rapidly and far to the left, for, as M. N. Roy has remarked from his own deep experience, "Communism in Asia essentially is nationalism painted red." But for democracy the most dangerous social fact in India that Communists will continue to exploit is the poverty and depression of the peasants, combined with the lingering elements of the caste system in the villages. Exploitable also is the intensity of local sentiments. It is characteristic that behind the scenes the Communist party should seek to make political capital out of the movement for linguistic provinces, although before 1947 they had opposed the linguistic movement. Whatever adds to frustration in the existing state will increase the opportunities of the party.

In Pakistan, the second largest Asian state in the Commonwealth, democracy faces similar difficulties. Here also the nation is rent into heterogeneous elements. The Bengalis, Punjabis, Pathans, and Sindhis possess their distinctive loyalties and their conflicting claims. An uncompromising provincialism has found in communism an ally, which seeks to undermine respect for the law and order of the new state. Pakistan was founded to ensure that Muslims would possess a land wherein they were free to regulate their lives according to their peculiar culture and traditions. But unfortunately the Muslim community in itself, like many other large and ancient religious communities, is splintered into sections of divergent outlook, and bitter factions influence popular passions. In March, 1953, riots in the Punjab, motivated by religious fanaticisms, cost over one hundred lives.⁵ Mullahs extreme in their zeal pretend to present the only correct principles of Islam and to cleanse Islamic practice from the impurities of modernism, but in resorting to intimidation they contribute to bitter popular strife. The reactionaries usually have contempt for the civil administration, contending for a regime in which the mullahs would wield decisive power. In this situation hot sectarian passions militate against the temper and methods of democracy. To other weaknesses in the state must be added the perilously unbalanced character of the Pakistanian economy. Some eighty per cent of the population dwell in villages and work on the land at low standards of life. Little of the two main products of jute and cotton are processed in the country, and sharp fluctuations in their external demand promptly affect for good or ill the health of the entire economy. Such facts contribute to

⁵ In October, 1951 one of the able founders of Pakistan, the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was the victim of an assassin's bullet, and in the subsequent months civil disorders multiplied.

political insecurity, and to some Pakistanis suggest the need for disciplined rule on the lines of Kemalist Turkey.

Thus within the two major Asian states of the Commonwealth grim and challenging facts confront those who seek to rule by the methods of democracy, but there is little evidence that the genuineness of their political faith is impaired. A remarkable political experiment, a direct product of British imperialism in the past, continues in keeping with its original plan.

III

A political fact common to all the major countries of the Commonwealth and imposing on the parliamentary system a severe strain is the increasing activity of the state. This collectivism is a product of powerful pressures in Western civilization, not least in modern democracy itself, with its tendency to make the state an agency for serving the populace in miscellaneous ways, guarding it against the ills of unemployment, easing for it the burden of ill-health and old age, and protecting for it, or pretending to protect, the values of human personality against the harsh operation of economic law.

The pronounced and direct action of the state in the economy came first of all in the democracies of the Commonwealth overseas. In the sixties of the last century Walter Bagehot wrote of his countrymen: "We look on state action, not as our own action, but as an alien action; as an imposed tyranny from without, not as the consummated result of our organized wishes." But when these words were penned the colonial communities were viewing the state, not as an enemy but as a friend, through whom railways were built, canals constructed, and varied aids provided to colonists in exploiting the resources of a new land. From that day to the present this collectivist trend has continued and deepened. In the twentieth century, with the coming of democracy in Britain, the state here also, as discerning observers like Matthew Arnold and Charles Dilke prophesied, extended its activity, and by 1939 was providing more advanced and comprehensive social services than those prevalent in the dominions except New Zealand. Then in the late forties there followed the rapid ventures in nationalization of the Labour Government, which admittedly in some respects merely engaged the state in enterprises, such as railways and electric generation, that for more than a generation had been managed by agents of the state in Australia and New Zealand. But the power of the collectivist concept is now probably stronger in Britain than elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Its effect on public attitudes is becoming profound.

This marriage of democracy and collectivism has meant for parliamentary government a rapid growth in executive and administrative action, an enlargement in the tasks of the legislature, an increased tendency at the same time for ordinary members of parliament to lose control in the making of public decisions, a frequent difficulty in pinning down responsibility for public acts, and generally a vast increase in the authority of public servants over what had been the private affairs of citizens. In all these countries similar institu-

tional problems are created by the advance of collectivism. They are no less, indeed perhaps even more, acute in India than in Canada; no less evident, although of much smaller magnitude, in New Zealand than in Britain. A crucial issue is the necessity for a defined and logical relation between the varied actions taken by the state and also for a fund of patience and knowledge in those who press for action—a usual and sad lack in the doctrinaire. Joseph Schumpeter has aptly remarked that in a democracy the proponents of reform "must be content to stand in an orderly breadline; they must not attempt to rush the shop." On the politician is thrown the immense burden of controlling the ill-judged proposals of the electorate. Unfortunately he himself may initiate many such proposals.

Along with the institutional developments and owing to technical progress, we witness also some tendencies in society which seem to minimize the significance of the individual and to merge him or melt him into masses and crowds, subject to common stimuli and susceptible to possible manipulation by those, whether public or private, who control the agencies for communicating thought and suggestion, such as the producers of large newspapers, films, broadcasting, and television.

In the dominions as elsewhere many disturbing questions may be raised about these tendencies and developments in parliamentary institutions and contemporary society, and the extent to which they seriously threaten the achievement of democracy. It is not difficult to create Frankenstein monsters, as some modern writers have done, out of the massive organization of modern life whether in the increasing growth of collectivism within the state or in the parallel growth of powerful bodies that through technical methods affect the thought and sensations of the masses. It is not, however, the scholar's task to create Frankenstein monsters, but simply to note tendencies and assess experiences. The general fact of interest here is that the whole purpose of modern democracy is to render power responsible to the community, and the rise within it of new aggregations of power does not make its purposes irrelevant, but does increase greatly its difficulties and challenge acutely its leadership. The states of the Commonwealth possess diverse environments, history, and culture and such variety makes all the more severe and important the test to which they are now subjecting the parliamentary method as a mode of achieving political responsibility. While the success of these experiments will be determined most of all by local circumstances and cultures, it will also be affected by the political vitality and achievements of Britain itself in its new ventures of democratic and liberal socialism. No doubt also in future years, more than in the past, the dominions will learn directly from one another, for they have in common enough institutions to render adaptations useful and feasible, and between them the channels of communication have greatly improved. But it is Britain that will continue to exert the most significant although imponderable influence on all the other countries which originally derived from it parliamentary institutions and political thought. For them it will long remain a unique reservoir of political experience in self-government.

NEUTRALIZATION AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

FRED GREENE

Williams College

Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the free world has made erratic but continuous progress in its effort to achieve military parity with the Communist bloc. Success in this enterprise and the realization of a "situation of strength" would bring to the fore the problem of serious negotiations with Soviet Russia. Several analysts, including Winston Churchill, have already made strong pleas for reviving the "lost art" of diplomacy as a means of obtaining some settlement of the Cold War.¹

Speaking in a somewhat different military context, before the U.S.S.R. developed the atomic bomb but prior to the Western rearmament effort, Churchill observed:

We may be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot last. . . . It is not only here in Europe that there are these iron curtains, and points of actual collision . . . I believe it right to say that the best chance of avoiding war is . . . to bring matters to a head with the Soviet Government, and, by formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settlement.²

Without yielding to undue optimism, we may agree that as the time for negotiation approaches, it is appropriate to re-examine the techniques and devices of traditional diplomacy in order to estimate their utility in this context. One device which could contribute toward the attainment of an equilibrium is the concept of neutralization and its application to potential buffer states along the East-West frontier.

There is a disposition today to regard neutrality as obsolete on the grounds that collective security has virtually eliminated it as a status under international law. Yet neutrality in whatever guise has persistently reappeared during the crises of this century, and it gives every indication today of possessing a surprising degree of vigor. The related condition of neutralization cannot therefore be dismissed as a specialized version of an outdated legal position.

Neutralization is of particular interest because a state can become neutralized only if the major powers participate in the process. Hence, unlike neutrality, the question of neutralization would involve the United States and the Soviet Union in direct diplomatic negotiations, in which an accommodation would be sought by both sides. It is with a view toward estimating its utility in the near future that we must examine the record and present status of neutralization.

Although the policy of erecting barrier states has long been used by strong

¹ Among these are George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951), pp. 92-95, and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1948), pp. 419-30, 438-45.

² *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Vol. 446, House of Commons, Jan. 23, 1948, cols. 560-61.

powers, the subtle concept of neutralization by international agreement is of recent origin. As commonly understood, neutralization is the artificial creation of a condition of neutrality, and a state so affected is "one whose integrity has been permanently guaranteed by international treaty, conditionally on its maintaining a perpetual neutrality save in its own defense."³ This concept refers of course only to those political areas within which the power to decide between war and peace resides. Interdiction of acts of war in such delimited areas as bodies of water and special zones may better be called demilitarization or "military neutralization."⁴

Historically, the idea of interposing neutral areas between large powers received little more than passing consideration during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the scramble for power and territory was intense.⁵ Attempts to neutralize a partly partitioned Poland in 1791 and Malta in 1802, although abortive, foreshadowed the procedure followed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when, for the first time, multilateral treaties were devised to guarantee the perpetual neutrality of several areas.⁶

Thereafter, the principle was applied rather liberally throughout the nineteenth century, the most notable examples being Belgium in 1831 and Luxembourg in 1867.⁷ Belief in its efficacy was evident from the attempts made to prescribe it for such widely scattered areas as Samoa and the Congo, and it was incorporated in the organic statute of Albania as late as 1913.⁸ Many violations of solemn pledges during the First World War, the most famous being the "rape" of Belgium, indicated the apparently illusory nature of neutralization guarantees.⁹ These were openly repudiated or simply ignored in the decade that followed. However, the total inadequacy of alternative systems during what proved to be merely an interwar period resulted in an increased desire by many states, especially the weaker ones, to remain neutral at all costs, and so again directed attention to the possible value of neutralization by agreement.

It must be admitted at the outset that neutralization, as a constructive concept in international politics, is basically of secondary importance, with its operational scope limited to situations in which a rough balance of power pre-

³ James L. Brierly, *Law of Nations*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1936), p. 95.

⁴ Hersch Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law*, 8th ed., 2 vols. (London, 1935), Vol. 1, p. 201; James H. Marshall-Cornwall, *Geographic Disarmament* (London, 1935), p. 46. Thomas J. Lawrence, *Principles of International Law*, 7th ed. (Boston, 1923), pp. 590-92, discusses the ambiguous uses made of the term "neutralization."

⁵ Malbone W. Graham, Jr., "Neutralization as a Movement in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 21, pp. 79-94, at p. 81 (Jan., 1927).

⁶ In addition to Switzerland, Savoy, Moresnet, and Cracow were neutralized.

⁷ Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 2 vols. (London, 1905), Vol. 1, p. 144, maintained that "neutralized states . . . are a product of the nineteenth century only and it remains to be seen whether neutralization can stand the test of history."

⁸ These are detailed in Green H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 8 vols. (Washington, 1940), Vol. 1, pp. 69-73.

⁹ Belgium and Luxembourg were invaded by Germany, while the inviolability of Corfu and the Congo was violated by the Allies.

vails. Any estimate of its usefulness must be undertaken on the assumption that maintenance of a balance of power, in the present multilateral sovereign state system, is a vital prerequisite for the prevention of war. Thus the stabilizing effect of neutralization in international relations can best be judged by the contributions it makes toward maintaining an equilibrium in the balance of power.

A study of the feasibility of neutralization therefore depends in great part on an analysis of the use that major powers can derive from its application. Equally important, however, is an estimate of the risks encountered and benefits derived by small powers, the actual subjects of neutralization. Reference to the workings and failures of previous endeavors may indicate what conditions are most suitable for neutralization, and what type or form has the best prospect of durability.

I. THE LARGE POWERS AND NEUTRALIZATION

The impetus for employing neutralization comes, not from the small states, but from their more powerful neighbors. The latter, during a period of relative balance, are motivated by the desire to eliminate latent threats inherent in the power vacuum caused by the existence of these weaker states. The major factors which determine the neutralization of a state are its relatively small size and geographic location in a strategic position. Its fate, essentially beyond the small state's control, is of great interest to important neighbors who fear the consequences of its falling into the hands of potential enemies.¹⁰ Neutralization is not applicable, however, in countries located well within the orbit of one power.¹¹ There is a tendency to terminate it peacefully in an area no longer considered a potential sore spot, or where the pressure of contending forces has relaxed.¹²

Resort to neutralization in a critical zone of rivalry has often been motivated by what we would call a policy of "containment." In order to thwart the territorial ambitions of an expansionist power, a solution of committing it, along with others, to respect the neutrality of a small neighboring state may prove effective. In 1815, Sardinia, Holland, and Switzerland were bolstered as a means of containing France without strengthening a rival great power. The

¹⁰ George G. Wilson, "Neutralization in Theory and Practice," *Yale Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 474-86, at p. 481 (April, 1915). Roberto Regala, *Neutralization and the Philippines* (Manila, 1935), in discussing neutralization of the Philippines, points to their strategic location and the need to maintain an equilibrium in the balance of power (p. 16).

¹¹ The neutralization of Honduras in 1907, at the suggestion of the United States, was intended to keep Central America at peace and thereby forestall any occasion for European intervention in the Panama Canal area. In 1923, when the Western Hemisphere seemed secure, the status was dropped.

¹² Quincy Wright, "Neutralization of Corfu," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 18, pp. 104-8, at pp. 104-5 (Jan., 1924). Neutralization still applied to Corfu and Paxos, but not to the United States of the Ionian Islands after Greece annexed them in 1864. See Marshall-Cornwall, *Geographic Disarmament* (cited in note 4), p. 32, on the status of Cracow, neutralized from 1815 to 1846.

central importance of Switzerland was acknowledged by a multilateral treaty guaranteeing both its territorial integrity and perpetual neutrality.¹³

Even where the danger of hegemony is not of immediate concern, neutralization can relieve tensions created by unexpected developments. When the Belgian revolution of 1830 broke the Dutch dike against France, neutralization proved a safer recourse than forced reunion with Holland or complete freedom which might have led to union with France. This solution, sponsored by England and Prussia, was guaranteed by all the major European powers.¹⁴ Luxembourg, when similarly guaranteed, no longer served as a major irritant in French-German relations.¹⁵

Once in effect, neutralization can also serve to lubricate and smooth the operation of day-to-day diplomacy. For it gives legal right to signatory countries not otherwise directly involved in a dispute to oppose attempted revision of an earlier compromise. This procedure can effectively handle outward thrusts of power and attempts to upset an equilibrium, without signifying "undue" interference, when no state believes it has achieved a preponderance of power.

Since Russian diplomacy has been marked by intense suspicion, and, when it suits Soviet purposes, by a strict interpretation of legal rights and duties, the lever of intervention offered by a multilateral guarantee of neutralization would be most salutary. In practice, it would be analogous to the present multilateral treaty regulating the control of the Dardanelles which allows Turkey, under Russian revisionist pressure, to appeal to other signatories and receive their stiffening support.¹⁶ Similarly, Soviet requests for bases on Spitzbergen were countered by Norwegian reminders that such a move would violate the demilitarization treaty of 1920.¹⁷ In addition, signatories can control the changes that do occur, and negate attempts to alter significantly major power relationships. The knowledge that a change in status will entail concessions on some other point could in itself act as a deterrent to revision.

¹³ In the case of Switzerland, it is debatable whether it was neutralized or whether its self-imposed perpetual neutrality was merely recognized. See F. W. Baumgartner, *Neutralization of States* (Bulletins 24 and 25 of the Departments of History and Political and Economic Science, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario), Bull. No. 24, pp. 5-36; Gordon E. Sherman, "Neutrality of Switzerland," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, pp. 241-50, 462-74, 780-95 (April, July, Oct., 1918).

¹⁴ Efforts to check Russian expansion resulted in the military neutralization of the Black Sea and the Aaland Islands in 1856. See Johan O. Söderhjelm, *Démilitarisation et Neutralisation des Îles d'Aland en 1856 et 1921* (Helsingfors, 1928); and Charles N. Gregory, "Neutralization of the Aaland Islands," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, pp. 63-76 (Jan., 1923).

¹⁵ Karl Strupp, *Neutralisation, Befriedung, Entmilitarisierung* (Stuttgart, 1933), pp. 98 ff.; Gordon E. Sherman, "Permanent Neutrality Treaties," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 24, pp. 217-64, at p. 238 (Jan., 1915). On the other hand, the intensity of the Austro-Serbian dispute, and its relation to great power rivalries, so overshadowed the six-power guarantee of Albania in 1913 that the treaty was discarded within one year.

¹⁶ See Ahmed S. Esmer, "The Straits: Crux of World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, pp. 290-302 (Jan., 1947).

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, Jan. 10-12 and 13-18, 1947.

Neutralization likewise reflects recent efforts in international law to define aggression and judge the legality of any use of force by procedural rather than less tangible substantive criteria. The definite time-and-space obligations created by a treaty of neutralization greatly simplify that task.¹⁸ It has even been argued that violation of a neutralized zone would "furnish a particularly clear and objective basis for judgment: it would be founded on the violation of a definite provision of international law; it would facilitate the reaching of a decision by the guaranteeing states and it would make certain the foundation of a coalition against an attacking power."¹⁹

Although a definition of aggression is important, the central issue remains the reluctance of states to take up arms against an obvious aggressor when their own interests are not immediately affected. In this context, neutralization received strong support because it was held to possess significant deterrent value:

The intention underlying both the collective and individual guarantees was that a sufficient number of powers should be involved in a share of the responsibility for preserving the integrity of the neutral territory in question; the moral pressure of public opinion or the actual fear of powerful military intervention would, it was hoped, deter any one power from violating an arrangement which was made in the interests of the greater number.²⁰

The great reliance on guarantees of perpetual neutrality to prevent future violations was therefore based on the definite enforcement commitments made by the large powers, who might otherwise be indifferent to or disinterested in a threat to the area in question.

The ultimate deterrent value of the threat of intervention must be judged by measuring it against the military advantages derived from a violation. Unfortunately, the one clear case in which such a problem arose could hardly be called a clinical study, since the German decision to invade Belgium in 1914 was reached, in part, because it was felt in Berlin that England would not live up to its commitments to defend Belgium.²¹ This line of reasoning was somewhat curious, since England's traditional interest in the Scheldt estuary meant that the Belgian guarantee was in accord with British "high" policy. Perhaps more to the point was the German General Staff belief that British forces could not influence the military campaign in the West even if intervention was contemplated.²²

It is precisely on fulfillment of pledges of assistance that the failure of neutralization was so pronounced. Logically, a guarantee of neutrality in per-

¹⁸ Quincy Wright, "Outlawry of War," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 19, pp. 76-103, at p. 85 (Jan., 1925).

¹⁹ Charles de Visscher, *Stabilization of Europe* (Chicago, 1924), p. 116.

²⁰ Marshall-Cornwall, *Geographic Disarmament* (cited in note 4), p. 31.

²¹ Although Lord Grey felt that continental military obligations were essential for British security, he failed to make this absolutely clear to the Germans. Byron Dexter, "Lord Grey and the Problem of an Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 298-309, at pp. 303-9 (Jan., 1952).

²² See Hajo Holborn in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward M. Earle (Princeton, 1944), pp. 189-205.

petuity is a somewhat unreasonable procedure. Fundamental changes in the structure of interstate relations and the balance of power may occur long after the conclusion of the treaty and make fulfillment literally impossible.²³

Unwillingness to act may stem from a changed concept of one's vital interests in the problem area. When a guarantee is extended primarily to prevent a war, a signatory would not act if a conflict occurred later and the belligerent powers violated the treaty. Moreover, a blanket commitment might oblige a power to fight over an unimportant area against an ally, should the latter be an aggressor. The uneasiness engendered by this impractical rigidity was reflected in Britain's claim that it had to aid Luxembourg only in concert with all other signatories. Since this included the potential violators, France and Prussia, England's position became ambiguous, if not meaningless.²⁴

Britain, logically, lacked confidence in the Belgian neutralization treaty and in 1870 concluded identical treaties with Prussia and France promising to war against the side violating Belgian territory. But even the British did not feel automatically bound to aid Belgium at any time.²⁵ The distant powers, Russia and Austria, quickly asserted a willingness to respect, but not defend, Belgium's neutrality, thereby diminishing the effect of their guarantee to the point of extinction.

Clearly, the efficacy of the treaty cannot be assumed to depend upon the number of guarantors committed, and a poor selection can, in fact, destroy its value. From the point of view of the large powers, before "entangling" guarantees are tendered, a careful and realistic appreciation of interests must be made, entailing chiefly a clear understanding of what areas, coming within the security zones of two or more powers, are considered vital.

Furthermore, the reliability of such arrangements depends upon periodical review and reappraisal of pledges taken.²⁶ Even a carefully assumed obligation will not be honored later solely on legal grounds. Only renewed support of a treaty of neutralization on the grounds of national self-interest will ensure adherence in a crisis.

The obstructive myth of perpetuity should be discarded and the value of time limitations must be freely admitted. Since all treaties face the problem of changed conditions, this qualification does not invalidate the basic utility of neutralization. Furthermore, extreme caution and flexibility must be exercised in the choice of areas, if neutralization is to support the balance of power and serve to maintain peace. Indiscriminate application in situations in which it had little or no chance of success has greatly harmed its prospects elsewhere.²⁷

²³ F. W. Baumgartner, *Neutralization of States* (cited in note 13), Bull. No. 25, p. 26.

²⁴ Harold J. Tobin, "Is Belgium Still Neutralized?", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 26, pp. 514-32, at p. 523-24 (July, 1932).

²⁵ Prime Minister Gladstone in House of Commons, Aug. 8, 1870, cited in Wilson, "Neutralization in Theory and Practice" (cited in note 10), pp. 478-80.

²⁶ See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1942), Vol. 2, pp. 785-86.

²⁷ The term was unfortunately used as a palliative to soften an onerous servitude when the Black Sea was "neutralized" in 1856. Sir Thomas E. Holland, *Studies in International*

II. NEUTRALIZATION AND THE SMALL STATES

An important security consideration to the guaranteeing powers, neutralization involves the very survival of the smaller states. The latter must weigh evident benefits of neutralization against its far-reaching implications, the fear of inferior status, and the danger of involvement in great power rivalries. Serious though the risks may be, a realistic analysis indicates that small powers alone are quite incapable of defending themselves, and in fact depend largely for their existence upon great power tensions and rivalries.²⁸ Any refinement and legal codification of that condition could conceivably add to their security. Neutralization would also afford them an opportunity to obtain recognition of the fact that they do not want to become involved in the vicissitudes of international politics.

The effect of neutralization upon the legal and sovereign rights of small nations is of considerable importance. The chief restraint imposed on neutralized states is the removal of the rights to go to war and to enter into alliances or treaties of guarantee which might cause them to fight in defense of territory other than their own.²⁹ These restrictions help the neutralized states avoid conflicts and so do not seem to be unbearable burdens. In addition, it has been widely held that neutralized states cannot cede or annex any territory without the consent of the guaranteeing powers, since these actions alter their international position.³⁰

In other matters the neutralized state should not be further restricted since it must retain control over its domestic and foreign affairs. Neutralization, then, should have no detrimental influence over the legal rank and position of the guaranteed state.³¹ The latter is free to make trade, customs, and other agreements with foreign powers and can even rule over colonial possessions.

A guaranteed state has the right to arm and to fortify its frontier, for a nation must be prepared to defend itself to the best of its ability if neutralization is to have any meaning.³² Deployment of armed strength, however, must be executed in as impartial a manner as possible. Germany argued that the Belgians had violated their neutrality in 1914 by concentrating their main defense works along the German border, though the majority of their routes of communication were with France. Moreover, defense preparations were made in consultation with the British. In 1939, Switzerland distributed its

Law (Oxford, 1898), p. 275; Sir John Fisher Williams, "The Permanence of Treaties," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 22, pp. 89-104 (Jan., 1928).

²⁸ Edgar Bonjour, *Swiss Neutrality* (London, 1946), p. 18, acknowledges this explicitly.

²⁹ It can be argued that the restriction on war destroys state sovereignty. Paul Schweizer, *Geschichte des Schweizerischen Neutralität* (Frauenfeld, 1895), insisted that Switzerland always had the right to make any treaties it wished. Cyrus F. Wicker, *Neutralization* (London, 1911), pp. 57-58, maintained that only defensive alliances were permissible.

³⁰ Strupp, *Neutralisation, Befriedung, Entmilitarisierung* (cited in note 15), pp. 279-89; Emanuel Descamps, *L'Etat Neutre à Titre Permanent* (Paris, 1912), pp. 215-17.

³¹ Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law* (cited in note 4), p. 203.

³² The dismantling of the great fortress of Luxembourg—for the reason that the Grand Duchy was too valuable to fall into French or Prussian hands—was an exception.

troops evenly along its French and German frontiers, although the danger lay in only one direction.

It can be concluded that servitudes and impairment of sovereignty are not to be found in the obligations of neutralization as these are legally defined and understood today.³³ Anxiety arises from the persistent fear that neutralization makes a state inferior to others. Historically, the imposition of neutralization on states contributed greatly to this belief. For example, Belgium was not even consulted, and opposition to neutralization there, at least initially, was quite strong.³⁴

Other dangers lie in the imposition of unsound restrictions and the attempt by powerful neighbors to use the treaty as a lever for prying into the internal affairs of the guaranteed state.³⁵ Proponents of the sovereignty of small states devised a theory of "autonomous neutralization": perpetual neutrality resulted only from the volition of a state, with international guarantees merely recognizing an existing fact.³⁶ This concept of self-neutralization places no international obligations or restraints upon neighboring states and therefore has little political or legal value.³⁷ Still, this theory underlines, in exaggerated fashion, the need for the guaranteed state to desire this status if neutralization is to work effectively. The more deep-rooted it is in the history of a state, the more the nation's leaders will strive to maintain neutrality in an international crisis.³⁸

In brief, then, an effective guarantee must satisfy the neutralized state by restricting only its freedom to engage in hostilities and to gain or cede territory. It must be applied to a state which is willing to protect and defend its guaranteed inviolability. Moreover, the guaranteeing states should be unam-

³³ Clair F. Littell, *Neutralization of States* (Meadville, Pennsylvania, 1920), and Helen Reid, *International Servitudes in Law and Practice* (Chicago, 1932), p. 229.

³⁴ Belgium was neutralized to "maintain the peace, repose and good order of Europe" according to the Prussians. Tobin, "Is Belgium Still Neutralized?" (cited in note 24), p. 523. See also a German propaganda booklet, *The Neutrality of Belgium: Its Origin and Violation* (1915), which declared that Belgium is "a state of an inferior order to those states on which neutrality is not imposed" (p. 7).

³⁵ Austria, for example, tried to deprive Switzerland of its right of asylum and to prevent the creation of a federal republic. Bonjour, *Swiss Neutrality* (cited in note 28), pp. 70-71, 79, 101.

³⁶ Stewart M. Robinson, "Autonomous Neutralization," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 11, pp. 607-16, at pp. 607-8 (July, 1917). The most ambitious project was that advanced by Fedor de Martens, "La Neutralisation du Danemark," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 5th series, Vol. 18, pp. 314-35, at pp. 333-35 (Dec. 15, 1903). He proposed a barrier of self-neutralized states northward from Belgium.

³⁷ Wilson, "Neutralization in Theory and Practice" (cited in note 10), p. 483, outlines a plan by the Interparliamentary Union in 1911 to give some outside support to perpetual neutrality, which is highly unstable as a unilateral statement. Neutralization seemed detrimental enough so that Honduras formulated a "voluntary" declaration of perpetual neutrality in order to preserve its honor and integrity. See Salvador R. Gonzalez, "Neutrality of Honduras and the Question of the Gulf of Fonseca," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 10, pp. 509-42, at p. 511 (July, 1916).

³⁸ This point, however, has been unduly stressed at the expense of geographic-strategic considerations in contrasting the history of Swiss and Belgian neutrality.

biguously committed to a treaty of the "respect and cause to be respected" type, which theoretically signifies efficient sanctions.³⁹

Appraisal of the benefits of neutralization has been made difficult by the extravagant claims that it frees small states from the dangers of aggression and the heavy burden of military preparations. It was even held that as the number of neutralized states grew, the possibilities of war would become more remote in geometric proportions.⁴⁰ After such grandiose pretensions, the events of 1914 brought neutralization under sharp attack. Defensive alliances were preferred because they seemed to give more protection and imposed no legal restrictions. This trend away from neutralization compacts was symbolized in the French-Belgian alliance of 1921. In theory, an alliance differs entirely from the concept of neutrality and its implied hope of avoiding war; in actual practice, the small vulnerable state expects its ally to be at least a match for a potential aggressor and thus prevent war.

Alliances also suffer from rigidity and are no more reliable than a neutralization agreement when radical changes shake the balance of power. As evidence of this we have only to recall the wholesale abrogation of treaties after 1932: France's abandonment of its own post-1918 alliance system, Switzerland's flight to neutrality after participating in the ill-fated League sanctions of 1935, and Belgium's withdrawal from the 1921 agreement.⁴¹

In the last analysis, the value of both neutralization and alliances to a small state depends upon the ability and willingness of the "protector state" to honor its pledge. There is no justification for concluding that an alliance is more reliable than a carefully considered commitment to support the neutralized status of a small state. It can even be argued that, where applicable, a multilateral guarantee of neutralization is more reassuring to the guaranteed state. It signifies mutual obligations which cannot be avoided merely by a unilateral change in intention, as well as the identity of interests found in alliances.⁴² More respect for the guarantee of neutralization, or at least for the law behind it, has been shown than for alliances. Germany eventually admitted that its campaign of 1914 violated the Belgian and Luxembourg treaties of neutralization, and the Weimar Republic did not consider unjust, as it did other exactions, indemnities imposed on these grounds.⁴³

³⁹ Graham, "Neutralization as a Movement in International Law" (cited in note 5), p. 91.

⁴⁰ See Erving Winslow, *Neutralization: America's Opportunity* (Boston, 1912), pp. 8-9; and "Neutralization," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 2, pp. 366-86 (April, 1908); Camille Piccioni, *Essai sur la Neutralité Perpétuelle*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1902), pp. 175-76.

⁴¹ See the report drawn up by the Commission of Information constituted by His Majesty Leopold III on July 14, 1946, "The Belgian Tragedy," *Entente*, Vols. 75-76, pp. 6-39 (1948). See also Charles C. Hyde, "Belgium and Neutrality," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 31, pp. 81-85, at p. 82 (Jan., 1937); Hans Morgenthau, "End of Switzerland's Differential Neutrality," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 32, pp. 558-62, at pp. 558-60 (July, 1938).

⁴² Wicker, *Neutralization* (cited in note 29), p. 61.

⁴³ "Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace," *International Conciliation*, No. 143, pp. 1203-1339, at p. 1269 (Oct., 1919).

III. PRESENT APPLICABILITY

To determine the applicability of neutralization treaties today involves more than an analysis of their intrinsic merit. Account must also be taken of the changed attitude toward neutrality which has arisen since neutralization was developed in the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ Then, neutrality was an enviable position duly recognized in international law, and neutral rights were strongly defended by non-belligerents, especially the United States. In that era all belligerents were equal before the law, and their wars were looked upon as unavoidable facts of international life. Involvement, under these circumstances, could be judged in the national interest as wise or foolhardy. But the drive to outlaw aggressive wars after 1918 led to a new outlook: that wars were struggles between aggressors and those nations whose rights were violated.⁴⁵ If belligerents are considered criminals or policemen, neutrality, which thus means indifference to the successful prosecution of a crime, comes to be regarded as obsolete or even immoral. In such a frame of reference, the general serviceability of neutralization seems to vanish.

Of even greater importance has been the development of international organizations to prevent or punish criminal resort to war. Ideally, organized efforts at collective security enable large powers to quell violations of the peace and still afford small states ample protection. The security which the League of Nations seemed to offer was attractive enough to induce even neutral powers to drop their precarious impartiality and join its ranks.⁴⁶

Under the Charter of the United Nations, all but the "veto nations" apparently surrendered to the Security Council the right to direct the use of their armed forces. This revolutionary step may have been based upon the assumption that major power agreements would ensure successful action, whereas disagreements would mean a veto, thereby allowing the small states freedom of decision. The likelihood that a "concert of powers" system would be unable to operate effectively is emphasized by this inability to make legal provision for joint collective action by the remaining states, should one major power oppose a decision to act.

The new American security program in Europe and the Far East shows a marked shift from dependence on global collective security toward the adoption of regional alliance structures based on the principle of collective self-defense. Heavy reliance for freedom of action is placed upon Article 51 and the "inverted veto," which can prevent the Security Council from blocking joint defensive operations. The legitimacy of this position is not questioned, for surely the Charter cannot be construed as an instrument to facilitate the plans

⁴⁴ V. M. S. Crichton, "The Prewar Theory of Neutrality," *British Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 9, pp. 101-11 (1928).

⁴⁵ James L. Brierly, *The Outlook for International Law* (Oxford, 1944), pp. 78-82, discusses this point.

⁴⁶ Bonjour, *Swiss Neutrality* (cited in note 28), pp. 112-14, points out the closeness of the Swiss vote to join the League and the deep regard Switzerland had for its impartial neutrality.

of an attacking force. But it appears equally certain that this theory of action underscores the weakness, not the strength, of the concept of collective security as originally understood.⁴⁷

The Korean War involved collective action under the Charter in most bizarre circumstances, but without invalidating the argument that collective security is not a practical policy in international affairs. The term itself has come to signify simply an anti-Communist coalition. It can be emphatically argued, as this writer would, that it is in the interests of all non-Communist states to join forces under this banner. But the record clearly demonstrates that collective military measures were not unanimously undertaken even within the free world, in spite of the powerful argument that a universal response to the United Nations' call for aid to South Korea would have had overwhelming psychological and military effects. Moreover, at the end of three years of war, such an alignment of the non-Communist world, especially regarding Asia, seems no less remote.⁴⁸

If a system of collective action fails to maintain the peace, and willingness to assume the necessary obligations is not generally forthcoming, it would appear erroneous to describe collective security as the paramount factor considered by individual nations in formulating their foreign policies. In the event that they find the practical application of collective action inadequate, some small states may desire to assume a posture of neutrality and perhaps have this status bolstered by the process of neutralization. For neutrality, though dethroned from a position of near-veneration, is still desirable on grounds of self-preservation. As already noted, small countries hesitate to become involved in disputes when defeat of the aggressor is doubtful. Moreover, few join the aggressor when he appears to be stronger, but try to remain neutral as long as possible.⁴⁹

It remains the task of the major powers to determine when and where an agreement on neutralization would best suit their own interests. The anti-aggression forces today cannot muster overwhelming power; however, the potential aggressors are far short of that preponderance which would induce a wholesale movement by the lesser powers to neutrality. Since the defensive forces are strong enough to permit some expectation of stability, they can agree to the neutralization of certain small exposed powers without causing or reflecting a deterioration in their position. Admittedly this entails the loss of possible allies, but one's defensive strength is not necessarily enhanced by the accretion of such uncertain and vulnerable elements. For example, the extension of the British

⁴⁷ See Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1951), pp. 513-29. The legal basis of the Russian alliance structure is also arrived at by indirection—through Article 107, dealing with protection against the defeated Axis powers.

⁴⁸ Lawrence K. Rosinger, *India and the United States* (New York, 1950), Chs. 3, 9, discusses pre-Korean War relations; Shao Chuan Leng, "India and China," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, pp. 73-78 (May 21, 1952), describes India's attitude after June, 1950; see also Werner Levi, *Free India in Asia* (Minneapolis, 1952), Chs. 6, 7.

⁴⁹ Arnold Wolfers, "In Defense of the Small Countries," *Yale Review*, Vol. 33, pp. 201-20, at p. 215 (Dec., 1943).

alliance structure to include Poland and Rumania in the spring of 1939 did little to increase the security of Western and Central Europe.⁵⁰ It would appear that the status of small border states—as allies or neutralized bodies—is of less significance than the existence of an equilibrium among the major powers.

From the point of view of large powers, the relaxing effect of neutralization of small, centrally located states may contribute to the maintenance of peace. Admittedly, the very existence of such small states creates a power vacuum, which is all the more acute because modern military techniques have made it most difficult to render timely assistance. They cannot be swallowed up by large powers without precipitating a crisis; nor do their own inclinations or the attitudes of their stronger neighbors make feasible a policy of combining them into larger units.⁵¹ Their mere existence therefore creates a problem, though not an insoluble one, since the vulnerability of these nations becomes extreme only when the power relationship of the larger states becomes unbalanced. In this case no nation, large or small, is secure.⁵²

In situations which are amenable to neutralization, a multilateral guarantee can reduce some of the tension, because of the certain knowledge that a potential opponent is not using such territory as a base of operations. In the highly charged environment of the Cold War, verification of proper behavior in the small state would undoubtedly necessitate clandestine investigation, by espionage and other means. However, the United Nations organization itself might well find such "police activity" within the scope and spirit of the Charter, and within the limits of its present capabilities. Perhaps the Peace Observation Commission, established under the Uniting for Peace Program, and on which Russia is represented, could be vested with such regulatory authority.⁵³

In spite of the military strength of the great powers and the mobility of modern warfare, effective interdiction of small, key areas would be of considerable military and psychological value in an age in which bases for launching atomic or rocket attacks are of tremendous importance.⁵⁴ However, the territorial application of neutralization must be undertaken in a pragmatic manner, rather than approached as part of a grand design. Its feasibility must vary according to the locale and the occasion.

It does not appear that a great power like Germany can be effectively neu-

⁵⁰ See for example the critical comments of Lloyd George on this issue, *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, House of Commons, May 19, 1939, cols. 1815-18.

⁵¹ Even the consideration of a Communist Balkan federation at Bled in 1947 by Dimitrov of Bulgaria and Tito of Yugoslavia was strongly opposed by Soviet Russia.

⁵² See Wolfers, "In Defense of the Small Countries" (cited in note 49), pp. 211-12. This can be used as an effective counter-argument to the proposition advanced by Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York, 1942), pp. 20, 461-63, that the days of the "power vacuum" small state are numbered.

⁵³ The Peace Observation Committee is to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Nov. 3, 1950, Resolution A, Part B, No. 3.

⁵⁴ On technical developments see James Baxter, *Scientists Against Time* (Boston, 1947), Ch. 13, and Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York, 1949), Chs. 8-10.

tralized. Various publicists have argued that only unity and neutralization can reduce tension in this dangerous area.⁵⁵ Persistent Soviet proposals along these lines and the more daring Russian suggestion that Germany also be allowed to rearm further intensified this issue.⁵⁶ The Western attempt to integrate Western Germany into the Atlantic Community is, in turn, presented as a policy to prevent an independent Reich from embarking upon dangerous ventures or falling into Russian hands.⁵⁷

Evidently, the temptation on both sides to dominate so great a prize as Germany would be so strong that neither would allow a neutralization guarantee to control its policies. The alignment of Germany on one side or the other would bring such rich rewards in terms of the effect on the balance of power that an effort to neutralize it would strain the utility of this device to the breaking point. Moreover, Germany cannot be compared to a small, non-aggressive state with no revisionist demands or ability to impose its will upon others. Even if Germany stayed aloof from Cold War entanglements, its neighbors would be concerned over its foreign policy to a degree which would make neutralization an essentially unreal status.

Austria and Korea, two small partitioned states, offer more fruitful soil for consideration. Regardless of original purpose, the very act of partition and the extension of wartime pledges to restore the independence of these states reveal the deep interest of the major powers in their fate. Austria is evidently too important strategically for Russia to accept a peace treaty which would both end its zone of occupation and free the Austrians to join an American alliance.⁵⁸ The problem is simplified by the original Soviet approval of a single Austrian government. Without an Austrian Communist government, there is no question of the loss of terrain or prestige which would be involved if "Communist territory" had to be yielded.

The relative clarity of the Austrian issue merely accentuates the difficulties in Korea. It is also a locale of strategic importance, although this appreciation was overshadowed by the ideological overtones of the U.N. action there.⁵⁹ The difficulty of unifying the country during the Cold War has been infinitely mag-

⁵⁵ Two leading exponents of this view were Walter Lippmann and James Warburg.

⁵⁶ Soviet Russia proposed the unification, demilitarization, and neutralization of Germany in notes of Nov. 3, 1950 and Feb. 5, 1951. See also Mr. Gromyko's statement at the Paris Big Four meeting on March 5, 1951. The issue of an armed neutralized Germany, brought up in the Soviet peace treaty draft, was again emphasized in the Soviet note of April 10, 1952. See *New York Times* for dates cited.

⁵⁷ The Department of State, *Germany 1947-9*, Publication 3556 (1950), gives a detailed, documentary account of the political development of Western Germany.

⁵⁸ There have been over 280 sessions held on an Austrian treaty. See for example the charge by General Suiridov of Sept. 27, 1951 that the West was creating a war bridgehead in Austria. *New York Times*, Sept. 28, 1951. See also the Western note of March 13, 1952 on an abbreviated treaty and the Soviet rejection note of Aug. 15, 1952.

⁵⁹ The position of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in a note of Sept. 26, 1947 by James Forrestal, that America had little strategic interest in maintaining troops and bases in South Korea, was qualified by the remark that our military position would be impaired if a Soviet assault could be mounted against Japan from South Korea. See *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1952.

nified by events since 1950.⁶⁰ Yet the Korean War has revealed the existence of a balance of power and the inability of either side to gain control over a peninsula which has become invested with so much geographic and symbolic importance. The intensity of the ideological and political hostility which exists between the two Koreas, the aggressive use of force by the North, and the expansionist aspirations of the South clearly indicate that a "coalition" or a peacefully unified state is unlikely to occur.

There is no absolute obstacle to neutralizing both halves of a partitioned Korea and keeping each sector from operating as a base for a major power or planning further warfare against the other. United Nations policy and the economic and military dependence of South Korea upon foreign aid may influence that government's program. However, there is the question of getting a Communist state to accept foreign intervention of any sort. The problem should not be minimized, but the Korean case is in a class by itself since neutralization can be tied in with an international settlement of the war. Under such circumstances "foreign intervention" would not appear as a gratuitous gesture. Certainly some radical solution is required to bring stability to a partitioned, unhappy peninsula which is the focal point of attention of four major powers—Soviet Russia, Japan, China, and the United States.

The temporary neutralization of Iran at the Teheran Conference of 1943 indicates that such a step may be useful in this troubled land. Historically, Iran has been in the twilight area where Russian and British spheres were regulated by a series of *ad hoc* accommodations.⁶¹ In view of the vulnerability and strategic importance of Iran today, and in light of the present popular temperament, a position of neutrality by treaty would appear to benefit the major powers as well as the guaranteed state itself. In terms of locally oriented problems, the disposition of the oil issue is the most difficult task. The present American attitude would prevent a package deal which tied neutralization to a multilateral agreement to share petroleum production; however, should the Western position deteriorate further, such an arrangement would not be so far-fetched.⁶² Neutralization can operate basically within the framework of a rough equilibrium of power, not only on the international scene but also as reflected in domestic Iranian affairs and in the Iranian conception of its foreign policy. Within such a broad outline the oil negotiation may be used, not as an aggravating factor, but as an additional instrument to attain a settlement through detailed adjustments of conflicting national interests.

⁶⁰ See Department of State, *Korea 1945 to 1948*, Publication 3305, Far Eastern Series 28 (1948), especially the addresses of Andrei Gromyko and John Foster Dulles on the establishment of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. (Annexes 6 and 7, pp. 51–65.)

⁶¹ See for example Rogers P. Churchill, *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907* (Cedar Rapids, 1939), pp. 212–68.

⁶² This likelihood would increase should the Soviet economy reach a stage in which "ruble diplomacy" could operate in Iran in the form of monetary loans, sales of essential materials, and efforts to purchase oil.

Another possibility along the extended southern line of containment is the new state of Burma, at present vigorously inclined toward "neutrality in the Cold War." This attitude stems from a deep-rooted antagonism to imperialism and reflects strong xenophobic tendencies, though these are not as vitriolic or explosive as in Iran. The government is modifying its extreme position of total isolation from the West and is cautiously engaging in some economic and cultural contacts.⁶³ It can be argued that statutory recognition of Burma's desire for neutrality might alleviate its fears of entanglement and so strengthen the country's non-political ties with Britain and the West. If tactfully approached, this policy may further accelerate the growing stability of Burma's democratic regime, and thus contribute to the security of a state which is only now emerging from a long civil war.⁶⁴

The central location of Burma makes its fate of interest to the Big Three as well as to India and China. The role of India is of paramount importance and the lead in this matter may well fall in its direction. Seemingly, the safety of Burma is of direct and vital concern to the Indian government; yet the latter's neutralist tendency, indecision, and fear of joining a bloc have led it to avoid even a purely regional defense pact for Southeast Asia. India is hesitant even to commit itself to the support of Burma's independence and territorial integrity.⁶⁵ Perhaps this project would be the most effective means of drawing India out of its shell, and make the act of neutralization feasible by giving it realistic support in terms of the existing power relationships in that part of the world. Thus a South Asian equilibrium in the balance of power may be crystallized by means of a pacific measure to guarantee the existence of a small, vulnerable state.

At the other geographic extreme, the stability of Scandinavia may be furthered by the neutralization of Finland. The key state here is Sweden, whose successful tradition of neutrality was reflected in its effort, during the N.A.T.O. negotiations, to draw Norway and Denmark into an independent defensive bloc.⁶⁶ One reason for the absence of a "people's democracy" in Finland may be that it might induce Sweden to terminate its neutral status. As the European

⁶³ See Werner Levi, "Union in Asia?", *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 19, pp. 144-49, at p. 146 (Aug. 18, 1950); and Maurice Zinkin, *Asia and the West* (London, 1951), pp. 103-7.

⁶⁴ On the internal problems of Burma see James S. Furnivall, "Twilight in Burma: Reconquest and After," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 22, pp. 3-20 and 155-72 (Mar., June, 1949); Edward M. Law Yone and David G. Mandelbaum, "Pacification in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 19, pp. 182-87 (Oct. 11, 1950), and "The New Nation of Burma," *Ibid.*, pp. 189-94 (Oct. 25, 1950).

⁶⁵ See for example Vidya Prakash Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1950), p. 45, on India's opposition to making any military commitment, though "deeply interested in the security of the Pacific region."

⁶⁶ Bruce Hopper, "Sweden: A Case Study in Neutrality," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, pp. 435-49 (April, 1945); Herbert Tingsten, *The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1918-1939* (London, 1949), pp. 174-218. On Sweden's negotiations with Denmark and Norway, see *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 8, 12, 13, 30, 31, 1949 and Feb. 13-16, 19, 22, 1949.

military situation draws closer to a balance, Russian interest in Swedish neutrality may increase further.⁶⁷

Swedish opposition to a violation of a neutralized Finland would not be as serious as a similar Indian response with regard to Burma. Still, it is the strongest Scandinavian power and possesses an efficient, modern air force.⁶⁸ Moreover, neutralization depends upon overall interests which deter signatories from carrying a rivalry into a specific locale, as well as upon the sanctions which can be directly applied there. An attempt to neutralize Sweden itself, however, would be politically impractical. Unlike states victimized by the two world wars, Sweden, like Switzerland today, would consider such an act an unwarranted interference in its domestic affairs.

The case of Finland brings to mind Czechoslovakia, the state with which it was coupled in the mind's eye before 1948. The stunning subversion of that democracy raises the question of whether neutralization is at all possible with the danger of internal Communist pressure so prominent.⁶⁹ However, Communist party efforts to bring states into the Soviet orbit will continue in any event, and will be no less dangerous if the device of neutralization is not applied. A multilateral guarantee of neutrality might even have some curative value by outlawing efforts to subvert a government in the interests of a foreign power. Past experience with Soviet treaty guarantees of this sort would certainly give no grounds for hope that such abstentions would be forthcoming. Nevertheless the United Nations might be given "watchdog jurisdiction" in this matter as well as in the field of clandestine bases of operations. Moreover, other signatories to the treaty of neutralization would have served notice that such action would affect their vital interests and that countermeasures might be forthcoming. Neutralization thus would not encourage acts of subversion and might even serve as a deterrent factor.

The chances of neutralizing a Russian-oriented Communist state at present are far-fetched because of the proximity of these nations to the Soviet frontier, the interior lines of strategic communication enjoyed by the Soviet bloc, and the very tight control exercised from Moscow throughout the satellite area. In the future, however, Soviet policy might lead to extended commitments in certain areas, and the power available to retain full control over another sensitive region might not be forthcoming. Simply by way of a hypothetical example, further adverse developments in the Balkans may beset Russia during a period of grave anxiety in the Far East or Central Europe. Under such circumstances,

⁶⁷ See, however, Arthur Spencer, "Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 651-59 (July, 1952).

⁶⁸ See *Jane's All the World Aircraft 1948*, ed. Leonard Bridgman (London, 1948), pp. 19a, 199-204 c.

⁶⁹ Ivo Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia 1944-1948" and "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 345-72 and pp. 511-32 (April, July, 1950); Barry Brannen, "The Soviet Conquest of Rumania," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 466-87 (April, 1952). Cf. Arthur Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, pp. 301-9, at pp. 302-5 (Jan., 1953).

the neutralization of Bulgaria might not be completely beyond the realm of possibility. Parenthetically, it may be observed that a neutralized Yugoslavia today would certainly have been an improvement, from the Soviet standpoint, over events as they developed after the break with Tito.

The theory and practice of neutralization, as here posited, must not be confused with the potentially disastrous implication of a *neutralist* policy. This latter approach would cut deeply into the non-Soviet camp and ruin any chance for the free world to reach parity with the Soviets in the field of military strength. Clearly, the liberal application of neutralism can serve to wreck the free world through faint-heartedness.⁷⁰ But to attribute these drawbacks to neutralization is to use the doctrine of guilt by association. Neutralization of potential or actual centers of friction would not diminish the chances of attaining a balance of power but might rather reflect and reinforce such an equilibrium.

To match power with power all along the great East-West frontier is simply to invite greater friction and conflict along these marchlands. To separate the direct impact of power wherever possible through the device of a neutralized buffer may well be a contribution to peace, if undertaken when a general balance of power prevails.

This is not to say that neutralization is now feasible at all suggested points. The popularity of a universalist collective security through the United Nations does not create a favorable atmosphere at present. Nor would neutralization protect the inviolability of a guaranteed territory once a war broke out, all the less so because of the very great value it would have as a base of operations. Nevertheless, for the stabilizing and constructive role it can play, neutralization is worthy of careful reassessment and practical application in the future.

⁷⁰ The danger of neutralism was noted in the *First Annual Report to the Standing North Atlantic Treaty Organization* from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Paris, 1952), p. 9. See also Royal Institute of International Affairs, Study Group, *Atlantic Alliance* (London, 1952), pp. 16-24.

THE DEVELOPING FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES

DAVID F. CAVERS
Harvard University

In the academic year 1939-40, it would have taken a hardy prophet to forecast that the field of international legal studies was destined soon to become a major growing point in American legal education. Yet, for that reason and because it was the last year before World War II registered its impact on law school faculties, students, and even curricula, it provides a useful baseline from which to measure the developments that have since been taking place in this field among American law schools.

The law school work offered in 1939-40 which could be fitted within the category of international legal studies was represented by courses and seminars in International Law, Comparative (and Roman) Law, and Conflict of Laws.¹ A brief survey of these offerings will lay bare the grounds for pessimism as to the prospects for progress at that time.

The Discouraging Situation in 1939-40. The study of International Law had received great impetus after World War I when the long debate over the League of Nations and World Court, plus the host of issues arising out of the War itself, gave the subject both widespread current interest and considerable professional importance. During the twenties law teachers took an active role in the intellectual development which came in response to these stimuli and joined, under the leadership of Judge Manley O. Hudson, in the magnificent cooperative enterprise which came to be known as the Harvard Research in International Law. Begun in 1927, this was carried forward over a span of 12 years; indeed, in 1939-40, some work was still continuing on the Research. However, the thirties, with their steady deterioration in world relations, had taken their toll. The vision and enthusiasm of the twenties had been dimmed, if not extinguished.

An index to the attitude prevailing in 1939-40 is the number of courses in International Law then being offered in American law schools. In that year, of the 90 law schools in the United States that were members of the Association of American Law Schools, only 18 offered courses in International Law. Moreover, young men had not been coming into the field as teachers. Of the 22 professors

¹ The term "international legal studies" has not been generally employed in legal education. At the Harvard Law School we have resorted to it in response to our need for a term sufficiently comprehensive to include work in these three subjects and in some new areas for law study into which we have been venturing. Our conception, moreover, is broad enough to cover the study, say, of American corporation law by a Swedish legal scholar or of Swedish corporation law by an American scholar. Inevitably either scholar's efforts involve the process of comparison and some progress toward international understanding. In other words, legal studies may be rendered "international" by reason of the nationality of the persons engaging in them.

and lecturers listed as teaching the 18 courses, only five were under forty years of age. Although I do not have the data, I am sure that the number of students per course was generally small.

International Law stood in isolation from the rest of the law curriculum. Nothing led up to it and, save in a very few schools, nothing led on from it.² Moreover, confined as they ordinarily were to a single course, its teachers were faced with difficult problems of development and emphasis. To have focussed attention on the crumbling edifice that had been erected to keep the peace and extend the rule of law would have involved their instruction in all the tensions of the times while diverting work from those questions which most frequently had affected private litigants and for which conventional legal materials were most abundant. The choice, not unnaturally, was to select for study substantive problems arising in the relations of states which, though significant perhaps in terms of legal doctrine or of the interests of individual citizens, usually lay apart from the vital public issues of the interwar period.

Since the course in International Law could seldom be regarded as preparatory to advanced law study in special problem areas, no such work as a rule being offered, there was little incentive to develop the subject primarily as a tool course. If emphasis could have been laid upon the processes and instrumentalities through which affairs among nations are ordered in roughly the same way that stress has been placed upon procedures in courses on Administrative Law, the lack of more challenging substantive problems might have been compensated for. However, this approach was scarcely inviting so long as there were virtually no courses or seminars in which the newly acquired tools could be put to use.

Discouraging as was the picture with respect to International Law, the outlook for Comparative Law was bleaker still, but with this difference: though International Law had at one time given promise of achieving a place of major importance in the American law curriculum, the place of Comparative Law had always been both peripheral and obscure. In the fifteen Association schools in the United States which offered instruction in that field in 1939-40, the customary offering was a single seminar, although, in four schools, work in Roman Law was also offered. Seven other schools offered instruction in Roman Law only.

The study of Comparative Law can, if successfully pursued, equip the student with techniques for comparing his own law with the laws of other countries and also for comprehending the basic institutions and processes of other legal systems which the student cannot hope to master in their entirety. These techniques will enable the student acquiring them to work more understandingly and effectively on problems involving other legal systems and with lawyers trained in those systems. As a by-product of the pursuit of these methods, the student will also acquire some knowledge of foreign law. But pedagogical considerations will require his teacher, if able only to offer a single course, to focus

² The Harvard Law School, one of the exceptions, offered only Judge Hudson's seminar in International Law Problems in addition to his main course.

on a few segments of the systems being compared, selecting those that promise the most rewarding exercises in the use of the techniques. The topics chosen will ordinarily confine the teacher to a limited range in exploring the rich relationships between the legal systems studied and the other institutions of the societies in which they exist or the values which those societies cherish.

This predicament was a real one before the war since only a single course or seminar in Comparative Law was being offered in those few schools which provided any instruction in the subject whatever. It was as if colleges were to offer instruction in French grammar but not in French literature. No doubt enrollments suffered. Moreover, since the course was offered in the final year of law study, such insights as the successful student might attain were seldom forthcoming until his chance to use them in his law school study was nearly over. Hence the full potentialities of the comparative techniques as tools for law school work, either on American problems or on those involving foreign laws, could seldom be realized and then only by a very few. The subject was commonly regarded as an ivory tower, except in Louisiana where the state's distinctive legal system required a continuous interchange between the Anglo-American and the Roman Law traditions.³

As for the Conflict of Laws—or Private International Law as it is generally known outside the Anglo-American system—the situation in the American law schools was quite different from that prevailing in the other two fields. All law schools offered courses in Conflicts, and in most schools these were taken by nearly all third year students. However, the courses did little to whet the student's interest in international problems or to broaden significantly his acquaintance with other legal systems. The 48 American states provided such a plenitude of legal conflicts that the bulk of the cases studied arose out of wholly American controversies. The most significant exceptions were cases involving the effect of Russian confiscation decrees and the effect of fluctuating foreign exchange rates in determinations of liability. However, the Conflicts course provided neither adequate time nor an appropriate context for developing, through the medium of these problems, any significant appreciation of the role of law in international affairs. Instead the principal concern of its devotees was either to erect comprehensive systems for choice of law or to take apart the systems which other people had erected.

The Response to the Postwar Situation. The wartime period itself was not, of course, one in which progress could have been expected of the law schools in any field; survival was their chief institutional concern. However, when the

³ The volume of useful work being done across the lines of legal systems differing in major degree was unimpressive, not only in the United States but abroad as well. In Europe the amount of work devoted to Comparative Law was far greater than in the United States, but much of the work done there involved the comparison of the laws of various Continental nations. This actually called for little more exacting comparative analysis than has long been a commonplace in law study in American law schools, where the existence of 49 American jurisdictions, plus those of the common law members of the British Commonwealth, made it a matter of course to use a comparative method within the confines of the Anglo-American tradition.

law faculties reassembled in 1946, it was evident that the intervening years had opened up a wide range of new opportunities in the international field.

Not only had the United Nations come into being with the United States a member state, but we had large commitments throughout the world with no early prospects of their liquidation. A vast task of reconstruction impended, and it was evident that major efforts would be required to reestablish world trade on a basis that would permit the economic rehabilitation of the war-ravished countries. "Point Four" had not been enunciated, but, as is shown by the formal title of the World Bank—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—the nations recognized that rehabilitation was not enough and that a program of economic development would be called for.

The response to these events naturally has varied from law school to law school, depending on each school's prewar program, the composition of its post-war faculty, its library resources, and the professional opportunities open to its graduates. In the aggregate, using quantitative yardsticks, the change has been a major one. Thus, in 1952-53, out of 110 Association schools in the United States, the total offering courses in International Law was 50, and the number of teachers was 67.⁴ Nearly three-fifths of them had been teaching the course for five years or less, and most of these teachers are relatively young men.

In Comparative Law, the number of law schools offering instruction had risen to 22 and the teachers to 32. This figure was offset in part by the fall in the schools offering Roman Law from eleven to six, a drop which probably reflected some shifting to Comparative Law and so may have testified to a livelier and less academic interest on the part of teachers and students.

Conflict of Laws remained a "must" course for most students, but there is little evidence that its study has been internationalized to any substantial degree. More change in subject matter has taken place in the courses on International Law into which new material on international organization has been introduced, in greater or less degree, at least in many of the schools in which separate courses in the latter subject have not been added to the curriculum. Comparative Law has also responded to the new stimuli. There is an invigorating degree of experimentation in teaching methods and materials designed to give greater vitality to the subject.⁵ In a few schools work in the subject now ranges beyond the Civil Law tradition to include the comparative study of Soviet Law.⁶ Moreover, a number of law schools have recently joined with the

⁴ My data are based on *Teachers' Directory—Association of American Law Schools 1952-1953* (West Pub. Co.), reinforced by a survey of a not quite complete or wholly up-to-date collection of law school catalogs. The margin of error would not be wide.

⁵ In 1949 Professor R. B. Schlesinger of Cornell edited the first casebook on Comparative Law to be published. Professor A. T. von Mehren of Harvard has case materials in preliminary form, to be published next year. A number of other teachers have developed mimeographed materials for the use of their classes.

⁶ Professor John N. Hazard of Columbia has been the pioneer in this development. He has prepared mimeographed "Cases and Readings on Soviet Law" (1950). Professor Harold J. Berman of Harvard uses, in conjunction with his *Justice in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), a novel case collection published this year, Berman and Konstantinovskiy, *Recollected Cases of a Soviet Lawyer* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

American Foreign Law Association in creating a learned society, chiefly for the purpose of publishing the *American Journal of Comparative Law*, a quarterly now completing its second volume.

A rough indication of the spread of interest in the international field can be given by listing the law schools sponsoring the new periodical.⁷ The work in these schools does not follow a common pattern. At Columbia, for example, it seems to be centering in the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law which, after having long led a straitened existence, has been able since the war to extend its offerings. In the graduate program of the New York University Law School, the great reservoir of experts in international legal practice in New York City has been tapped to provide a wide range of offerings, some of which cut across the traditional course lines. The School also offers an intensive course in our law for a selected group of Latin American lawyers.⁸ At Yale, the work has been given a distinctive cast by the use in International Law, taught (*sub nom.* The World Community and Law) by Professor Myres S. McDougal, of the analytic apparatus which he and Professor Harold Lasswell have devised⁹ and by the philosophical approach to "world law" of Professor F. S. C. Northrop. The expansion of interest in the field is exemplified by the creation at Southern Methodist University Law School of "The Law Institute of the Americas."

Against these encouraging developments, some countervailing considerations must be weighed. Though the number of law schools offering International Law courses has nearly trebled, the total still represents less than half the Association schools,¹⁰ and this despite the greatly enhanced importance of the subject. Enrollments as a rule are small; in no school is the subject required to be taken by all the students. Moreover, since in most schools only a single course is still offered, the teachers, under the resulting pressures on time, have tended to give priority to traditional subject matter against the claims of new developments less clearly "legal" in character. In Comparative Law, only one-fifth of the Association schools as yet offer instruction, and again the single offering remains common. The costs of foreign law library collections, moreover, are likely

⁷ The *Journal*, edited by Professor Hessel E. Yntema of the University of Michigan Law School, is published at that university. Sponsor members make financial contributions to its operation. The sponsoring law schools are at the following universities: California, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Georgetown, Harvard, Indiana, Louisiana State, Miami, Michigan, New York, Southern Methodist, and Yale. Among the sustaining members are the Universities of Puerto Rico and Utah and Loyola University at New Orleans.

⁸ A recent announcement of the Institute of Comparative Law established at New York University under the direction of Professor Bernard Schwartz indicates that this program is being extended to students from other areas.

⁹ For an application, in general terms, of Professor McDougal's methods to another part of the international field, see McDougal, "The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 1, p. 24 (1952).

¹⁰ The significance of this datum may be diminished by information which I lack concerning the number of law schools giving their students credit for International Law courses offered by political science departments.

to inhibit the extension of instruction and research in this subject much beyond its present bounds.

A school-by-school description of the offerings of the law schools mentioned above and the other law schools which are going beyond the still prevalent three-course pattern would reduce this article to a forbidding composite of law school catalogs. On the other hand, to superimpose generalization on the diversity of experiments which are now taking place would be to conceal those distinctive elements in the work which are most likely to give it importance. The dilemma is one from which escape may best be found in concentrating on the experience of a single school. This tactic, moreover, will enable the writer to report the developments in the only school with which he can claim full familiarity: the Harvard Law School.

Postwar Planning at the Harvard Law School. In 1946, a committee of the Harvard Law School faculty under the chairmanship of Professor Lon L. Fuller had initiated a comprehensive reexamination of the School's educational program, a study which was to result two years later in proposals for an extensive revision of the School's curriculum that has since been carried out. While that study was in process, it became apparent that the changes both in world affairs and in our country's place in them had drastically altered the needs for, and the potentialities of, international legal studies. It was also apparent that an adequate response to this change would give rise to many difficulties peculiar to this area of education and research. As a consequence, the responsibility for examining the problems of this area was reposed in a special committee of which at first Professor Fuller and subsequently the author were chairmen.

The new committee's approach to its task reflected an attitude that was already dominant in the thinking of the main committee: increased emphasis on the lawyer's function as planner, counselor, and negotiator and less on his role as advocate. With this shift in emphasis had also come a different attitude toward law itself or, more specifically, toward legal doctrine.

The systematic study of legal doctrine has so long been central to legal education that an approach which diminishes the relative importance of its mastery as an objective of study may well appear subversive of professional standards. Actually, however, the Harvard committees were merely registering a gradual but long-continued trend in interest of legal educators which perhaps can be best illustrated by the kinds of questions they are coming increasingly to ask. "What is the law?" is yielding primacy to "What is the problem?" And often the problem is not the lawyer's but the client's problem, whether the client is Mr. X, Y Inc., or the sovereign state of Z. And when the problem is identified, the "law" relating to it may or may not be clear, but, in either event, it is not likely to be decisive of the next question—the client's—"What do I do now?" Ordinarily, in discharging his counseling function, the lawyer has many avenues to explore, a variety of competing interests to identify and appraise, a number of alternatives to assess in working out ways for the accommodation of these interests. Within limits set by the law and using the instrumentalities it provides,

he can seek to establish new patterns of relationships, new processes for preventing or resolving conflicts, new ways of order for his client and for those with whom his client deals. In this work there is much room for lawyer-made law.¹¹

A willingness to recognize these functions of the lawyer as relevant to legal education gives rise to difficulties no law school has fully solved, and the processes of change thus inspired have in the main been molecular and interstitial. However, they have been undermining the conception of a law curriculum designed by reference to "branches of the law." Individual and social problems tend to cut across the "branches." Another consequence has been a growing recognition that to give an answer to "What is the problem?" or to "What do I do?" requires that the law teacher and student take into account a wider range of phenomena than was once thought germane to their studies. Political pressures, psychological factors, business practices, sociological and economic data and theory, all are likely from time to time to become pertinent and important.

In international legal studies, these considerations have special force.¹² The "law" is likely to be uncertain; the range of alternatives wide; and the opportunities for resort to lawyer-made law many.¹³ Whether he is an adviser to a government office or to a private business concern, the lawyer is likely to have a creative function to perform which will oblige him to reckon with many factors that fall outside the traditional compartments of International Law and Comparative Law. That being the case, the criteria for planning a program of instruction and research may be formulated more accurately in terms of problem areas than branches of the law.

On this assumption, the committee sought to organize plans for the instruction and research which it wished to foster in terms of problems or problem areas to the solution of which lawyers and legal scholars might make important contributions. The efforts to devise effective mechanisms for the establishment of a just and peaceful world order presented one such problem area. The efforts to foster healthy world economic and social development provided another. Finally, the need to equip lawyers to cooperate with lawyers trained in legal systems other than their own presented a third problem area which had to be attacked at least coincidentally with the attack on the other two. Failure to es-

¹¹ "... a great deal of the law under which all of us live and work in these United States is written, not by Congress and the state legislatures or by the courts and the administrative agencies, but by American lawyers, sitting in their offices, striving to carry out the lawful wishes of their clients." Cavers, "Legal Education and Lawyer-Made Law," *West Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 177-85, at pp. 177-78 (June, 1952).

¹² The danger that constricting conceptions of law may lead to a distorted picture of its role in world affairs is vigorously exposed by Professor McDougal of Yale in his comment on the views of Kennan and Morgenthau who deprecate the "legalistic" attitude of Americans toward international affairs. Myres S. McDougal, "Law and Power," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46, pp. 102-14, at p. 103 (Jan., 1952).

¹³ A few days after writing this sentence, I discussed an intricate legal problem with the general counsel of a body which has operations on a global basis. At the end of our talk, he remarked: "Of course, I always include clauses in our contracts that should make the question irrelevant." For the important interests involved, these clauses will represent the law—lawyer-made law. Cf. note 11.

establish understanding and communication across the lines of different legal systems will impede progress toward world order and economic development.

Obviously areas thus broadly conceived could aid little in the practical problems of selection; they embrace a far wider range of conceivable subjects for study than any law school curriculum and research program could sensibly include. But the task of selecting subjects was only one of many which would be encountered in seeking to translate the committee's conception into an actual operating program. Problems of teaching staff, student selection and programs, and teaching materials, all promised to be difficult. With respect to research, the need for institutionalized work far out-ran the Law School's previous experience with such operations. Moreover, it was clear that the work could not be handled in the economical fashion that has traditionally characterized American legal education. Financial considerations would be important.

The committee declined to be restricted in its speculations by the limits of the funds available to the School. Instead it undertook to draw a prospectus of the type of institution that might be created if a sudden benevolence were to remove the financial obstacles to its realization. In this prospectus most of the difficulties noted above were resolved—on paper. The exercise was stimulating, but the plans remained on the drawing boards. It was not until the ending of the Law School's accelerated program for veterans in 1949, the institution of the revised curriculum, and some increase in the School's faculty that any substantial enlargement of the offerings in international legal studies could be attempted. And, since no sudden benevolence had removed financial restraints, the initial steps taken were only such as were possible within the limits of the School's existing resources.

The decision to expand our offerings in the field confronted us with the difficulty of subject selection that we had apprehended. Fortunately, however, we were not constructing a program leading to a special degree: we did not have to prescribe so many units of this, plus so many units of that, and so on. We did have to decide whether, given the competing demands on teachers' and students' time and on research resources, a particular subject was worth including in the curriculum or worth supporting as a research project.

Needless to say, in making this determination the interest and equipment of members of the faculty who were available to teach new courses were factors of prime importance. Moreover, we have had long-run gains in mind. We have wanted to open up problems as to which we could hope not only for reasonable present returns but also for the steady accumulation of increments of knowledge. We need to build up our intellectual capital. We also have been seeking where possible to plan work in one course or seminar so as to reinforce work done in another and to plan a like relationship between instruction and research. Probably we have given less thought to the specific occupational goals of our students than might have been expected. As we have observed the utterly diverse activities of lawyers, especially American lawyers, in this field, we have lost the illusion of capacity to prescribe for our graduates' future employment.

The Expansion of the International Curriculum. The effort to carry out a

problem approach did not mean that the traditional courses in the field were superfluous. On the contrary, International Law became of special importance as a source of tools needed in resolving problems presented in other courses and seminars. Moreover, since that course, as long conducted, could not well accommodate much of the new material on world organization that has proliferated under the United Nations, the School had since 1946 provided a short basic course on World Organization. The School had also reinstituted work in Comparative Law in 1949 by providing a course on Introduction to the Civil Law and another on Comparison of the Soviet and American Law. Moreover, the revised curriculum was so constructed that all these courses were available for election in the second year, leaving to the student greater freedom to elect other courses utilizing them in his third year.¹⁴

Despite these beginnings, it is fair to say that it was not until 1951-52 that the expansion of the School's offerings reflected the new conception of the School's objectives in the international field. In that year, fourteen courses and seminars were offered under the rubric of International Legal Studies (Conflict of Laws not being counted because of its domestic bias). The next year more were added, and some of those offered the first year were materially revised. Now in the third year of the development, we are offering a total of eighteen courses and seminars. To give order to what in an alphabetical listing might have seemed sheer miscellany, we have grouped these offerings by reference to our three problem areas. A survey of the offerings in each may be of interest.

In the category of "Problems of World Order" fall the basic course and the seminar in International Law, both of which had been taught for many years by Judge Hudson.¹⁵ Since the war, Professor Louis B. Sohn has been doing pioneering work in this area. He has developed, in addition to his basic course in World Organization, three one-semester seminars dealing respectively with special problems in the development of world order (e.g., disarmament, international criminal law, Charter revision), with international administration, and with regional agreements.

In the area we have styled "Problems of the World Economy" are some of the most fruitful opportunities for the use of a problem approach. In 1952-53, for example, four seminars were offered which related to international trade and investment. One seminar, directed to Legal Problems of World Trade, first considered the various contractual forms of international commercial transactions and then moved to the role of government controls in international commerce. Two other seminars were devoted to problems of overseas investment. One of these dealt with the subject in terms of United States policies

¹⁴ As was noted above, Conflict of Laws had always been taken by nearly all third year students, and no change was made with respect to it, except, for greater program flexibility, to supplement the full-year course with one-semester courses in both the first and second semesters.

¹⁵ His place is being filled this year by Visiting Professor Clive Parry of Cambridge University.

and measures to promote and protect investment by Americans abroad; the other, concerned with foreign investment generally, examined the effects of the laws of recipient countries and also international policies and measures. Still another seminar was directed to a comparative study of tax laws, with special emphasis on those laws affecting international trade and investment.

None of these seminars could have been fitted exclusively into the traditional International Law or Comparative Law compartments. The portions falling into each varied widely. Moreover, last spring the four teachers¹⁶ offering the seminars concluded that they had been endeavoring to slice up an essentially integral subject matter. As a result, this year all four teachers are joining in a single course in the first semester, dealing with problems posed by business transactions involving more than one country and utilizing business cases drawn from the experience of an American corporation which opened its files for case study this past summer. After a general background has been laid by this common course, each of the teachers will then offer in the second semester his own seminar on the same subject that he had covered separately the year before, and the students taking the common course will elect among these four offerings.

One of the most successful of the new seminars in the economic area was that offered on the European Coal and Steel Community by Professor Robert R. Bowie, who had been close to the development of the Community during his nearly two years of service as General Counsel to High Commissioner John McCloy. As a supranational entity created to attack a vital international economic problem and using for this end instruments drawn from the legal experience of many nations, the Community is ideally suited to such study.¹⁷

No apt phrase has come to hand to denote the problems of understanding and communication involved in professional cooperation, so we have rather lamely labelled this third area "Comparison of Legal Systems." Under it have been placed two second-year courses mentioned above, Professor von Mehren's course on Introduction to Civil Law, and Professor Berman's on Comparison of American and Soviet Law. In the third year, however, we have been offering two seminars on comparative constitutional law: one by Professor von Mehren on Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Action, comparing the American system with those of France and Germany; the second on Problems of Federalism.

The seminar on Problems of Federalism has always been taught by a group of teachers. In its first year, emphasis was placed on the handling in court decisions of problems in the apportionment of power between federal and state governments. In the next year, attention was shifted to problems of European federation, reflecting the federalism research (described below) which had been

¹⁶ Professors Harold J. Berman; Kingman Brewster, Jr.; Louis B. Sohn; and Stanley S. Surrey. They are being aided this year by a Teaching Fellow, Mr. Richard N. Gardner.

¹⁷ This seminar had to be suspended for this year when Professor Bowie was granted leave to head the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and to serve as its representative on the Planning Board of the National Security Council.

directed jointly by two of the teachers participating in the seminar, Professor Bowie of the Law School and Professor Carl Friedrich of the Department of Government. This year, Professor Bowie's place will be taken by Professor Arthur E. Sutherland.¹⁸

Another way to attack the barriers to professional understanding is illustrated by a seminar in Comparative Legal Research in which, under Professor von Mehren's direction, students trained in one legal system are assigned legal research problems which would be relatively simple but for the fact that the work must be done in the law of another system. The experience of actually working with legal materials of an unfamiliar system is calculated to reveal similarities and differences, not merely in the substance of the relevant laws, but, more importantly, in what the lawyers of the other system regard as significant in seeking to resolve problems arising under it.

The Students in International Legal Studies. The array of courses and seminars that has just been surveyed represents no settled pattern. Changes are certain to occur; in a field as diverse and undeveloped, the danger of digging ruts is still remote. But how well these studies will advance understanding of the problems considered is not simply a matter of aptness of their subjects. They must be examined from the standpoint of the students who enroll in them. And on this score, it is important to differentiate between American students and those from other countries.

At Harvard most of the American law students who elect offerings in international legal studies are candidates for the LL.B. degree. This means that they must devote most of their work to courses dealing exclusively with American or Anglo-American municipal law. At virtually all American schools, the first year of the law curriculum is prescribed and contains no work in the international field. In the second year at Harvard, any one of several half courses in that field (e.g., Introduction to the Civil Law) may be elected and, by permission readily obtained, one of the required full courses may be put over for a year and International Law substituted. In the third year the range of election is greater, but most students will not then elect more than, say, two full courses or seminars (or their equivalent) among international legal studies, some of which may be offered outside the Law School.¹⁹

This means that seldom will a student obtain an LL.B. degree with more than fourteen semester hours of international legal studies to his credit, and many will have taken less. Is this a little learning, possibly dangerous and at best unprofitable? We believe quite the contrary, and our confidence reflects

¹⁸ This seminar could easily have been listed under "Problems of World Order." However, it provides a good medium to foster understanding among lawyers with differing backgrounds who are concerned with the common problems of federation. The fact that a seminar may reasonably fall under two of our headings we regard as a virtue of the seminar. We set no store by our scheme of classification.

¹⁹ The Harvard Law School allows its students up to six hours credit toward the LL.B. degree for courses taken outside the Law School. The Dean's permission is required but this is ordinarily granted for work in areas adjacent to the law curriculum.

an awareness (which most of our students share) of the limitations as well as the potentialities of instruction in so unbounded and diversified a territory.

We make no pretense of graduating men who are masters of International Law or who are expert in all or even most of the legal aspects of foreign investment or trading or who are at home in any foreign legal system. They will have acquired some segments of "the law" pertaining to the subjects they have studied but, as is also true of domestic law, learning of this sort depreciates rapidly. What we can hope to give them in more lasting form is an acquaintance with the problems characteristic of a subject—the client's problems as well as the lawyer's; a sense of the need to identify the interests at stake; some feeling for the relevant in a welter of facts; increased resourcefulness in searching out ways of attack; some technical competence in handling materials. In seminars, of course, writing a paper may lead to a command of the learning within its topic's bounds, but ordinarily these are narrow, and the paper's chief reward for its author may lie in its contribution to durable knowledge of the types just noted.

Despite fundamental similarities, there is enough difference in the problems tackled in international legal studies from those of the typical domestic course that the carry-over of skill and understanding from the latter to the former may not be easy. Moreover, our uncertainty in this regard is probably shared by most of our graduates. The man who has concentrated on domestic studies in his law school may hesitate later on to venture into unfamiliar territory.²⁰ Or, still worse, time having dimmed his sense of the differences, he may display that tendency to parochial legalism that has been manifesting itself painfully in some American lawyers in the Congress and out. We feel hopeful that participation, however limited, in international legal studies will serve at least as a corrective or preventive of these attitudes.

We entertain more affirmative hopes. If we can draw each year a group of able American students into this field, and develop their powers to handle some of its problems, we believe they will in time have a considerable impact on American legal thought and practice in international matters. We believe, too, that this preparation will yield American lawyers who are much more effective in their dealings with their counterparts in other countries. These men will not be numerous, but their influence, exerted through a variety of occupational channels, could be far-reaching.

For the American student who seeks an LL.M. or an S.J.D. in this field, more time will, of course, be available for concentration, since he will have dispatched his necessary work in American law. Needless to say, as a source of such men we look hopefully to the spread of strong courses in International

²⁰ This hesitation probably is ill-founded. A capacity for self-education on the job has enabled many law graduates to do distinguished work on international assignments for which they had had no special preparation either in law school or in practice. But ordinarily it takes the exigency of war or some professional emergency to induce the venture. And even the successful must overcome handicaps.

Law and Organization and in Comparative Law in law schools not offering graduate programs so that those who come to us and other law schools for graduate work can begin at an advanced level.²¹

The students who come from other countries to American law schools do so chiefly as graduate students, having completed their quite different courses of law study abroad, and often having also engaged in apprentice training or even law practice or government service. At Harvard we are getting from thirty to forty or more such students each year, coming from all parts of the world on this side of the Iron Curtain.

Some of these men come with specific study objectives in American domestic law. Whatever the subjects they have chosen, these men will be engaging in international legal studies. Indeed, their work might well represent a greater experiment in comparative study than the study of courses or seminars in the international curriculum, since in many of the latter they could better rely on the learning they brought from their homes. For this reason, our policy has been to induce, where possible, students from other countries to take at least some of their work in the domestic courses.

One of the main objectives of most students from abroad is to come to know Americans, particularly American lawyers, and to comprehend the way they think and the language they talk. But in the course of this process they are teaching as well as learning, and naturally the international studies offerings, with their relatively small enrollments and their inter-mixture of American and foreign students, provide a good vehicle for this two-way process of communication. The student's lot is not an easy one, and those who come from countries where English is not the native language are often so handicapped that lost motion is inevitable when they undertake work in an American law school. Consider the array of special difficulties that confronts them.

First, they must adjust to the demands of a new and sometimes exacting environment. Second, they must learn to rely on a language which is not their own and to do so well enough to satisfy law's need for exactness in expression. Third, they must cope with a new legal system, one having quite different source materials from those that most of them are used to studying. Fourth, they are up against an unfamiliar method of education, one in which the teacher must often seem to them bent on confusing rather than informing his students. Finally, the student from abroad encounters philosophical differences which are reflected in our attitudes toward law and law teaching: our reluctance to be authoritative, or to accept authoritativeness in others; our prevailing

²¹ Mention should also be made of an arrangement that is still in its infancy by which students may combine work as candidates for the M.A. degree in International Affairs or in Regional Studies with the study of law. A student may satisfy the requirements of the second year of work for the M.A. by pursuing a suitable program of law study in the international field, using fully the privilege of taking some work outside the Law School. He may take his basic first year's work for the M.A. immediately before either the first year of law study or the third, the latter alternative being perhaps the more fruitful. Since no student under this plan has yet reached the critical third year of law study, its merits remain untested in academic experience.

indifference to system-building; our concern with facts and practical consequences; and our frank recognition of the persistence of legal uncertainties and the relativity of many legal norms.

The stream into which he is plunged must seem turgid indeed to the student from abroad, who often comes from swimming in the carefully filtered waters of an artificial pool which his teachers have constructed for him. Here, however, we believe that the experience which these students undergo in our law schools will, in the long run, prove a helpful one both for them and for their countries. In a world in which the rate of innovation in social institutions and arrangements is constantly increasing and in which traditional rights are under continuous pressures, there is need for lawyers to play a responsible, resourceful, and, indeed, an aggressive part. We suspect the American lawyer has come to play a more active role in governmental and business affairs than his European counterpart²² partly because of the difference in his legal education—though, of course, the difference in his legal education itself partly reflects the American lawyer's different role.

Teaching Staff. What a law school might find it wise to do if it were to build a faculty in international legal studies from the ground up is a problem which we have not had to face at Harvard. Only three of those now teaching the course seminars outlined above came to the Law School primarily to teach in the international field²³ and only one man in the entire group is confining his teaching to those offerings. As a general rule, our experience suggests that it is advantageous for the teachers concerned to keep one foot on the (relatively) firm ground of American municipal law.

Professor Sohn is the only member of the Law Faculty who was first educated in law abroad. No doubt, in an ideally staffed school, a higher proportion of men with overseas legal education and experience would be called for. But we have hesitated to sacrifice the American law teaching tradition to acquire greater knowledgeability of foreign legal thought and institutions. Though we recognize that the methods we have developed for instruction in Anglo-American case law are not fully applicable to the special materials and problems often encountered in the international legal seminars, nonetheless we believe that the basic approach of the American law teacher to his subject is distinctive and worthy of extension in this area.

As has been suggested earlier in this paper, the American law teacher has come increasingly to a functional, as distinguished from a conceptual, approach to legal problems. He is impatient with tendencies to emphasize verbal factors. He is likely to stress the importance of facts and difficulties involved in their acquisition. Given the virgin character of much of the field, his reluctance to attempt a search for broad generalizations or doctrinal formulations has much to commend it at this time. Moreover, for the student from abroad, the shock treatment to which he is usually exposed by his teachers here may rid him of

²² Disregarding the flood of men and women who do not go beyond the undergraduate course in law and who enter business or government administration in non-legal positions.

²³ Professors Berman, Sohn, and von Mehren.

some conceptual fixations that would otherwise hang on to handicap him. Our approach, however, is likely to prove antipathetic to many teachers of law from other countries. Perhaps, therefore, in our present developmental stage, we and other American law schools would be wiser to rely primarily on teachers with extensive American legal training,²⁴ including some who have superimposed this on training in another system of law.²⁵

As the program develops, increasing resort to Visiting Professors from abroad (especially from England and the Dominions) as well as the tonic presence of Visiting Scholars from a variety of countries and in a number of fields should help us avoid provincialism. But, if the change in attitudes that we believe law study here tends to induce in students from other countries is to be healthful, there must be two-way communication and understanding. Our law teachers must learn the foreign students' conception of the role of law and the lawyer in their societies, and the social, economic, and political facts which underlie it. That can be done partly through association here, but it will probably entail a greater amount of work abroad by our law teachers than heretofore has been customary.²⁶

Materials for Study. For most American law schools the effort to develop a rounded program in international legal studies would encounter a serious economic problem at the outset: library costs. Few American schools have foreign collections of substantial size. The Harvard Law School owes to the foresight of deans and faculties of past years the initiation of its law collection on virtually a universal scale. As a result, its 800,000 volume Law Library now includes substantially complete collections of the official issuances and the legal periodicals of most countries, reinforced by most of their legal treatises. Harvard's International Law collection also is exceedingly strong, approaching 100,000 volumes in size.

Even the possession of such tremendous collections leaves many problems.

²⁴ Convinced that American law students could best be introduced to the Civil Law systems by an American teacher with a background of American law study, the faculty persuaded Arthur von Mehren, soon after his graduation, to go abroad with the rank of Assistant Professor for two years of law study. He stayed three, spending one year in Zurich, one in Berlin working on German law for OMGUS, and one in Paris. He has since been appointed Professor of Law.

²⁵ The development of international legal studies in the United States in recent years owes much to the reinforcement of our faculties by European law teachers who came here to escape Nazi aggression. A number of them have achieved distinction in American law and have become masters of American teaching methods. But such a source of scholarly and teaching talent, we can only hope, will not be a continuing one.

²⁶ A helpful device to this end was tested for the first time in June, 1953 when a group of five teachers from the Harvard Law School went to Austria to teach 55 students in a brief session on American law and legal institutions offered by the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies. The students came from most of the countries of Western Europe and included judges, law teachers, governmental officials, and practicing lawyers and students, ranging in age from 21 to 50. Though the session lasted for only four weeks, the association of teachers and students was very close, and the former felt that they gained from it at least as much as they gave. We hope to repeat the session next year, drawing on different teachers. Probably not all of them will be from Harvard.

One, of course, is the problem of language. If all students were expert in English and at least one other language, translation needs would still be serious since the "other languages" would vary and works of interest to a seminar would certainly range beyond the linguistic capacities of some of its members. To reduce materials to English is expensive and time-consuming, and we have been able to do this only to a limited degree.

A second difficulty lies in the fact that on many important problems there has been no effort to make systematic studies, across national lines, of the materials that are available. When researchers dig into these subjects they have to begin from scratch or nearly so, and they lack the many law-finding devices available in this country. In work of this sort we have been able to make only small beginnings.

Still another difficulty lies in the fact that a problem-oriented program in international legal studies must deal with the phenomena of law in action. Much work would be at growing points in the law where official legal materials are few. Even governmental regulations are sometimes hard to reach—for example, exchange regulations which many countries do not make public in their entirety. Moreover, many of the measures in which we would be interested are embodied in private arrangements and agreements. To reach these instruments, case studies of business experience are necessary, and we have made only a start in this direction.

Many of the problems with which venturers into this field would have to concern themselves call for the expertise of other disciplines than the law. Obviously, for a number of studies economic data would be of critical importance; others would require information of the kind that political scientists or sociologists can best provide. In addition, the law teacher may well require the analytical help of his bretheren in the social studies. Although most of the interdisciplinary seminars we are offering lie in the domestic field, we have been benefiting from the aid which Professor Carl Friedrich of the Department of Government is rendering us in the seminar on Federalism. Other opportunities for similar arrangements are likely to arise. Moreover, there is a small but growing flow of graduate students from the social sciences into the new seminars.

The Role of Research. Given the difficulties in supplying materials for study, expansion in research activities would clearly be a necessity in international legal studies even if its only excuse were to enlarge the intellectual capital for courses and seminars. Fortunately, however, research projects can be designed which not only will minister to this need but also will contribute knowledge needed in attacking significant international problems.

Many of the difficulties of organizing research in this area have already been suggested by what has been remarked in other connections, but there is one factor of peculiar difficulty for a law school, namely, personnel. The number of able men with experience and interest in international problems who are also equipped to work in more than one language and more than one legal system is small indeed. The demand for such abilities having been steadily increasing,

the pressure on the existing supply has grown acute. To staff a research project, especially where participation does not carry with it academic tenure, becomes a very difficult enterprise. As the prestige of research in this field grows, this personnel problem may diminish, but now it represents a real impediment to growth. Most continuing research projects may have to recruit men without specific training, using training-in-service as a way to overcome the current short-handedness.

Since 1951 the Harvard Law School has been the seat of a number of research projects in the international field which exemplify some of the kinds of work that can be done in the area. Four of these will be briefly noted here.

1. *Studies in Federalism.* At the request of leaders of the European Movement, Professor Robert R. Bowie of the Law School and Professor Carl Friedrich of the Department of Government joined in organizing a staff of lawyers and political scientists to prepare a series of studies of problems of federalism as disclosed in the experience of a number of federal states. The task was undertaken for the American Committee on United Europe with a grant provided by the Ford Foundation for the purpose. The team gathered by Professors Bowie and Friedrich represented the federal states of Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, as well as the United States. Professors Paul A. Freund, Louis B. Sohn, and A. E. Sutherland of the Law Faculty also contributed to the work, which was hurried to completion so that its products might reach the committee of jurists working on the draft constitution for Western Europe. Most of the resulting studies were published in French about six months from the start of the work.

2. *The International Program in Taxation.* Believing that comparative studies can aid materially in modernizing inefficient and inequitable revenue laws, the Law School is cooperating with the Fiscal Division of the United Nations in instituting research in taxation, with special emphasis on the problems of the under-developed nations. Studies of the relation of taxation to investment in Latin America were requested by the Fiscal Division, and work in this area is continuing. Preliminary work is also being directed to the problems of agricultural taxation, which loom large in the under-developed countries. Clearly related to the Program's research activities (in which a staff economist and a foreign business management expert from the Graduate School of Business Administration have joined) is a newly organized training course for junior officials in ministries of finance in a number of countries. Some of them have been sent to us by the United Nations and some by the United States government. This work includes some instruction in regular courses and some additional work directed by the Program's staff and tailored to the special needs of the trainees. This Program is one which we believe will gain steadily in usefulness if funds to establish it on a permanent basis can be obtained. At present the research is being operated on a grant of \$200,000 from the Ford Foundation for a three-year period.

3. *Legal Impediments to American Investment in Extractive Industries Abroad.* This was a short-term project undertaken by a member of the Law School Faculty, Professor Kingman Brewster, Jr., under a Law School contract with the President's Materials Policy Commission in the summer of 1951. The work required interviewing officials in a considerable number of firms in extractive industry in the United States, most of which had some investments abroad. Through the interview process much was learned about laws both here and abroad thought to impede overseas investment in extractive industries. The inquiry has also proved invaluable to Professor Brewster in his seminar on investment problems.

4. *The Cooperative Research for Israel's Legal Development.* Upon learning of the needs of the State of Israel for comparative law research to aid its efforts to modernize the miscellany of laws it has inherited from past regimes, the Law School undertook to establish a research unit which would enlist the help of scholars at Harvard and at other

universities. Under the direction of Mr. Joseph Laufer, a lawyer trained both on the Continent and in the United States and who had also lived in Palestine, the project has been able to make considerable contributions to the Israeli legislation program while, at the same time, providing an excellent example of the comparative technique in the solution of practical legal problems. The project staff benefits from contacts with Israel through the Director's annual visit to that country and the coming of Israeli lawyers to work at Harvard. Recently, an Israel Supreme Court Justice and a lower court judge were at Harvard for nearly two months and still more recently the Attorney General of the State spent several weeks here at work on a new code of evidence for which he had provided the basic draft.

In the future we see increasing opportunities to combine training and research for men of some maturity and specialized experience who come to the Law School for work in the field of that experience. They can scarcely be expected to rely wholly on the regular offerings of courses and seminars. To tailor programs to their needs, however, faculty or staff members must be available to give direction to the special work. In compensation, the visitors themselves can often contribute to our knowledge of their own laws and administration in ways which we ourselves would find it hard to duplicate.

A Long-Range View. What has been described above is the very early stage of a development which, if it is to realize its potentialities, must do so over a considerable period of time. Given such a span, however, it may not be too much to expect the emergence in a few law schools of programs of law study which would be organized on a world as distinguished from a national basis. In the United States we have long distinguished the "national" from the "state" law schools on the grounds chiefly that the former have drawn their students from many states, that they have given no special emphasis to the law of any one state, and, in more recent years, that they have emphasized the legal problems of the federal government. It would not be too great a stretch to apply those criteria to the work I have been describing and to conclude that we have the beginnings of a "world" school.

However that may be, it seems clear that the number of institutions which can develop extensive programs of work of the sort described cannot be large. It is important nonetheless that a number of schools join in the work since the tasks are far beyond the competence of a single school; indeed it requires the participation of a number of nations. But, whenever a good beginning can be made in one school, the likelihood of similar developments in other institutions is greatly enhanced.

As certain areas of international legal studies become better disciplined and the pioneering schools thoroughly train more men in their study, other law schools should find it possible to draw on these centers for both materials and personnel. Such has been the American experience in the development of a number of the fields of federal law that now bulk so large in the modern law school curricula. A development along these lines would provide a broader base for the education of men in international legal studies while leaving the primary responsibilities for research and advanced study centered in the relatively few institutions equipped to discharge them.

THE POLITICAL THEORY IMPLICIT IN SOCIAL CASEWORK THEORY

ALAN KETH-LUCAS

University of North Carolina

The political theory implicit in social casework theory can be defined, for purposes of this discussion, as the theory of the relationship between man and society on which professional social casework is consciously predicated, or that theory of the relationship which is logically implied by social casework practice. This theory is not often consciously articulated and we must look for it, therefore, in those presuppositions underlying casework theory which are frequently accepted uncritically, if not wholly unconsciously. This practice obviously cannot be carried on without basic (although perhaps not entirely conscious) presuppositions about what man is like and consequently about what society can or ought to do for him.

The presuppositions underlying social casework theory, although important in any context, have acquired a new significance to the extent that social casework has increasingly become a government function. During the past twenty years literally millions of people in the United States have been brought into a new relationship with officials of their local, state, and national governments—namely, the relationship of client and social caseworker. Governmental social casework today affects the lives of more than five and a half million recipients of public assistance, a quarter of a million children receiving public child welfare casework services, some 300,000 juvenile delinquents, and an uncounted number¹ of veterans and other persons “receiving services”—a total not far from, and possibly greater than, five per cent of our population. Moreover, the trend has been consistently upwards.

While the number of persons involved in itself lends new significance to the presuppositions underlying social casework theory, there are other aspects of even greater importance. People are impelled into a relationship with a social caseworker because they are in trouble. The caseworker is the medium through which the client may have to establish his right to enough money to avoid starvation, or with whom he must treat in matters as vital to his happiness and rights as separation from his wife, loss of custody of his children, commitment to an institution, sterilization, or a radical change in his manner of living. The fact that in some of these cases there must also be a legal determination does not remove the possibility that the client may acquiesce in very real infringements of his rights in order to obtain immediate and urgent ends.

Moreover, those persons who come into a relationship with the social caseworker as a client are for the most part politically and socially impotent. Although there has been some change in the last two decades in the relative

¹ Surprisingly, no unified count of recipients of either public or private casework services seems ever to have been made. Figures quoted here are from recent issues of the *Social Security Bulletin* and the *Social Work Year Book*.

positions of client and caseworker, and some beginnings of political organization among client groups (notably among old age recipients in California and Oklahoma), by and large the client group is politically powerless and socially humble. It is far more likely, therefore, to be persuaded to yield its rights than would other groups in the community and, for the same reason, to suffer the loss of its rights with a minimum of protest from the public at large. Traditional thinking about "the poor," which tends to identify poverty with defects in character, is also likely to sustain this public indifference.

The increased professionalization of social work is another factor of great importance in estimating the significance of the political theory implicit in social casework theory. As social work becomes increasingly professionalized, the theories of social needs and goals developed by the profession become more and more esoteric, and consequently less easily understood and less susceptible to the control of public opinion. Because the practice of social work has increasingly become a governmental function affecting the lives and rights of millions of individuals, because the client group is relatively impotent politically and socially, and because the practice of social work is increasingly in the hands of highly trained specialists whose theories are not easily understood or checked by public opinion, it has become more important than ever to examine critically the presuppositions underlying modern social work practice—if only to bring them to the light of day, where those concerned with the rights of people may be aware of the issues involved.

It is the professional literature of social casework, and particularly that of its acknowledged leaders, that will be briefly examined here, with a view to discovering the implications for human rights contained in it. No distinction will be made between theory developed ostensibly for public and private social work. This would indeed scarcely be possible. The professional field is more or less unified. Professional schools train workers for both fields without distinction. Practitioners move from one field to the other and back again, with little consciousness of difference, and indeed the initial leadership in public social work was provided by the private family field. Moreover, many so-called "private" agencies are quasi-governmental in nature, especially since community funds have developed what might be called "voluntary-involuntary" taxing methods through the pressures of employers and public opinion.

The existence of large-scale government social welfare programs raises, of course, important theoretical questions about the proper functions of government which have been more or less widely debated. But the Welfare State cannot be judged solely in terms of its political and economic philosophy, for much of its character will depend upon the thinking and actions of those governmental officials who come into direct contact with the people whom the state claims to serve. So powerful for good or ill is the relationship between giver and recipient that what these officials conceive to be the nature of man and his proper relationship to society cannot but profoundly affect the whole question of man's liberties and rights.

Since the sixteenth or early seventeenth century, the rights of paupers and

of other persons unable in some way to manage their own affairs have not received much attention from political thinkers. The state took little heed of the plight of those financially or emotionally "unadjusted" to society—to use a modern term—until the end of the sixteenth century, and then its measures were largely repressive. The basic assumption of the Elizabethan poor laws is that poverty, unemployment, or other social distress is the direct result of sin, and in particular of the sin of sloth. As late as 1935 paupers could be deprived of all civil rights in a number of American states, could lose their natural rights to their children, and were deliberately held to an insufficient standard of living under the doctrine of "less-eligibility," in the hope that this would spur them to greater effort.² Calvinism, which suggested that these deficiencies of character were foreordained, further removed necessity for considering the political or natural rights of a group who were generally assumed to be inferior by Divine disposition or to have wilfully forfeited what rights they had. As one writer puts it:

Society had a need to place outside of itself those who were not economically successful, and employed social case workers to see that it was not troubled by these individuals and their families.³

Liberal thought appeared to have followed the Donatists and Locke rather than the Early Fathers in making a man's property something to which he had a natural right as the fruit of his labor, and to deny it to those who could not, or would not, labor. Social work developed an educative, moralizing concept in the work of the Friendly Visitors, who were, moreover, very conscious of their superiority over those whom they served. An early nineteenth-century writer says, in words which would have been equally applicable to the early years of the twentieth:

Let the moral sense be awakened and the moral influence be established in the minds of the improvident, the unfortunate and the depraved. Let them be approached with kindness and an ingenuous concern for their welfare; inspire them with self-respect and encourage their industry and economy. . . . Those are the methods of doing them real and permanent good.⁴

Neither political nor natural rights were believed to be involved. Social work was conceived of as a reformatory activity—until 1916 the annual conference of social workers was known as the Conference of Charities and Corrections.

Modern social casework thinking dates in general from the publication in 1917 of Mary Richmond's *Social Diagnosis*.⁵ Miss Richmond's major contribution to the field was her scientific approach to the problems of social maladjustment. For earlier attitudes of repression or education, Miss Richmond substituted one of minute, objective study of each individual case. She pro-

² See Arthur P. Miles, *An Introduction to Public Welfare* (New York, 1949), pp. 24-76, and many other sources.

³ Bertha C. Reynolds, *Re-Thinking Social Case Work* (San Diego, 1938), p. 7.

⁴ *Annual Report of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, 1818*, quoted in Edward T. Devine, *The Principles of Relief* (New York, 1904), p. 292.

⁵ Mary Richmond, *Social Diagnosis* (New York, 1917).

posed a system of social diagnosis and treatment akin to that of medicine, in which the social worker gathered evidence of all sorts, and from all sources, evaluated its reliability, and prescribed treatment. Her "questionnaire" to be used in studying the situation of a neglected child, for example, contains one-hundred and ten items, some of them as complex as the following:

Is parental discipline rigid to the point of cruelty? Is punishment given . . . in anger, or is self-control exercised? Is punishment frequent, over severe, of unnatural or cruel form, dictated by perverted religious ideas, etc.? Is there abusive treatment not associated with the idea of punishment?⁶

The initial effect of this scientific approach was to enlarge the rights of the client. He was freed from the stigma of moral inferiority. He was no longer held responsible for all that had happened. He could demand the professional attention of the caseworker for his individual problem. He was given a part, even though a small one, in his own treatment. Miss Richmond, in another work, defined casework as "the art of doing different things for and with different people by cooperating with them to achieve at one and the same time their own and society's betterment,"⁷ and stated that "the most successful case work policies are encouragement and stimulation, the fullest possible participation of the client in all plans and the skillful use of repetition."⁸ There had been, in fact, a switch of interest on the part of the caseworker from society to the client. Philip Klein notes this shift some fifteen years after the publication of *Social Diagnosis*:

By virtue of its new scientific character the perspective of all social work shifted from an "external" view previously held by social reformers, theorists and philanthropists alike, in which the poor, the sick, the criminal or the neglected child appeared mainly in contrast to the normal and quantitatively solid mass of population, to an analytic view as if from the angle of the client himself. The social worker in this new conception was no longer an agent serving the social mechanism so much as an instrument of adjustment manipulated in the interest of the client and upon the physical and social environment of the client.⁹

This might be thought of as a liberating process. Nevertheless there were two principles of Miss Richmond's thinking which should be kept in mind in the light of their later implications. These were her deterministic view of man's behavior and her theory of the "wider self" or "the whole man." Both are apparent in the following quotation:

Individual differences must be reckoned with in every field of endeavor, but the theory of the wider self, though it has of course other implications, seems to lie at the base of social case work. We have seen how slowly such work has abandoned its few general classifications and tried instead to consider the whole man. Even more slowly is it realizing that the mind of man (and in a very real sense the mind is the man) can be described as the sum of his social relationships.¹⁰

⁶ *Social Diagnosis*, p. 410.

⁷ Mary Richmond, "The Social Case Worker in a Changing World," address given at the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, 1915, reprinted in *The Long View*, a posthumous collection of articles (New York, 1930), pp. 374-75.

⁸ Mary Richmond, *What is Social Case Work?* (New York, 1922), p. 256.

⁹ "Social Work," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1933), Vol. 14, p. 168.

¹⁰ *Social Diagnosis*, p. 368.

Almost concurrent with Miss Richmond's writings, but largely unnoted by her, came the emphasis on a new type of scientific approach. The basis for this was Freudian psychiatry, which gained tremendous impetus from the discoveries of the neuro-psychiatric services of the Army in World War I. Its impact on civilian social work is perhaps best described in Virginia Robinson's *A Changing Psychology in Social Case Work*, published in 1930. The emphasis on analytical psychiatry resulted, as Miss Robinson shows, in even greater attention to the client's own feelings and in an even stronger deterministic theory of man's nature. It also gave birth to the concept of treatment relationships modelled on that of psychoanalysis, in which the client must take responsibility for much of his own cure. Psychiatric knowledge could result in two different kinds of relationship, either "a point for point relationship in which the worker manipulates the client's inner life as before she manipulated the environment," or "relationship as a new environment which gives the client opportunity to work out his own problems."¹¹ To the latter concept Miss Robinson gave her allegiance.

It was, however, the depression beginning in 1929 that did most to promulgate rights for the poor and to upset current traditions about the connection between character and social success. Quite obviously men were unemployed, in need, and suffering, who bore exemplary characters. Quite obviously, too, these men were not of an inferior social class. Their rights were of importance, and we have in the Social Security Act of 1935, and particularly in its public assistance provisions, the birth of a new philosophy of man's right to a decent standard of living. These provisions assume the right of all individuals who have suffered certain catastrophes, such as blindness, old age, or the loss of a parent, to assistance which will bring their total income up to some locally determined minimum subsistence level. Moreover, this right is an objective one which cannot be conditioned on any requirement to act in any specific way, or to reform oneself, or to be any more moral or more responsible than what is demanded of the rest of society. As the assistant legal counsel of the Federal Security Agency wrote:

Law never seeks to buy behavior. It seeks to give rein to moral law. It seeks to allow the individual to benefit or suffer from his choices and sacrifices as freely as possible. This is quite inconsistent with the idea that behavior should enlarge or diminish legal rights. Law insists that the free exercise of rights is essential to democratic equality.¹²

The implications of this philosophy are clear. Man is seen as a rational being, who for the fuller exercise of his powers needs, among other things, a decent standard of living. He is therefore both entitled to this help and trusted to use it—not with the blind trust of Marx or Fourier that because he has a better financial situation he will become immediately moral, but in the sense that man as a whole is rational enough to make use of opportunity. Nor is this the

¹¹ *A Changing Psychology in Social Case Work* (Chapel Hill, 1930), pp. 183–84.

¹² A. Delafield Smith, "Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and Freedom of the Individual," *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 9, no. 8 (Aug., 1946).

creation of a "new" natural right, but rather a right that has come into prominence because the increasing complexity of the economic system does make it less possible for man to achieve this right by his own efforts. Such a right may not have been recognized by the writers of the Constitution, for instance, because in an agrarian society there were few people who could not provide for themselves, and government therefore may not have needed to concern itself with it.

Such a concept, and in particular the concept that such a right should not involve a reciprocal obligation to spend wisely, or to be moral (over and above the morality of the rest of the population), has been widely attacked. It has been said to be one of the social work concepts that is least well understood by the public at large:

These ideas run counter to some of the most deeply ingrained traditional economic and welfare concepts of Western civilization. Many tenets of Christendom support the private enterprise system in the belief that economic aid provided by other than one's own endeavor or that of his family is by nature a gratuity that should be classified as charity rather than as a right. This culturally 'inherited' conviction results in the belief that the use of the tax power for this purpose makes the government a benefactor and thereby gives those who administer such funds the duty of regulating and sitting in judgment on the behavior of legally qualified recipients of funds not individually earned. . . . It is even contended that public assistance recipients should not be allowed to live in a manner that endangers their health lest they become a still greater expense to the public, and that procreation should be restricted for the same reason. No such limitation is put upon other citizens.¹³

Lewis Meriam, in his *Relief and Social Security*, concludes that those who are in need should be divided into two classes, those who are "reasonably competent to manage their own affairs" and those whose "need results in part from their inability to manage their own affairs." The former should not "have just as much freedom in handling the money that comes to them from the public treasury as they have in handling the resources they have earned by their own efforts" (unearned money includes social insurance, since premiums are not actuarial), but, since "the objective of the state should be to develop and sustain the personal independence and self-sufficiency of its citizens," it will exercise sparingly its "right to supervise" and "will avoid wherever possible governmental interference." The second group, however, "should be subject to the supervision of competent, professionally trained, public employees and payments should be contingent upon suitable use and application of the public funds provided."¹⁴

Mr. Meriam is concerned primarily with the redistribution of wealth which he feels to be involved, and which he states "appears to do violence to the principle that the government should not interfere further than is necessary with the freedom of the individual to use his earnings and his property as he

¹³ Ernest Hollis and Alice L. Taylor, *Social Work Education in the United States* (New York, 1951), pp. 205-6.

¹⁴ *Relief and Social Security* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1946), pp. 865-67.

sees fit within the limits of the law."¹⁵ He does not, seemingly, regard supervision by competent, professionally trained public employees as contrary to man's natural rights. Nor does he apparently fear that the judgment, presumably to be made by these same competent employees, as to whether a man is capable or not of managing his own affairs is likely to be capricious, or might be unlimited in scope (since it is the person and not the money which is to be supervised), or might not conduce to personal independence and self-sufficiency. It should perhaps be made clear that the philosophy of public assistance is not that morality or responsibility is unimportant. Public welfare agencies have often been accused of fostering immorality and irresponsibility because they do not use public relief as a means to make men moral or responsible. Putting aside the question of whether this is possible, the philosophy of public assistance in the writings of such leaders as Hoey, Kahn, Marcus, and Smith is quite clearly that morality and responsibility are matters of personal conscience or should be left to such agencies as the church or the schools. Only where the law is transgressed should they be the concern of government. They are not and should not be matters to be decided by public officials outside the law or required as the price of a minimum standard of living.

The importance to social casework of the Social Security Act was two-fold. In the first place, it gave, somewhat incidentally, an enormous impetus to governmental social work. By insisting on the criterion of need, and thus individual although not individualized treatment for those covered by its public assistance provisions, it provided the basic clientele for new, vastly enlarged state and local welfare departments. These in turn have proved focal points for programs having little to do with the Act. The county public welfare departments in North Carolina, for instance, carry a minimum of forty-seven distinct functions, only four of which come under the public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act, although twenty others have some general relation to its broad child-welfare provisions. North Carolina counties also give every month non-financial service to some 18,000 persons, and provide another 7,000 families with other financial assistance not under the auspices of the Act. In the second place, the Act appeared to give emphasis to the theory of self-determination, which had, as we have seen, begun to develop alongside a belief in psychic determinism. We should not forget, however, that the Act enunciated general and not individual rights and that social casework is an individualizing science. The legal rights established in the Act presumed recipients to be self-directing, rational beings. Casework, despite its apparent acceptance of these rights, was learning largely from a psychology that held man to be basically irrational. It is true that in actual practice many people found it difficult to understand or to make full use of their legal rights—they were ambivalent or confused, and needed help. But—and this is the crucial question—is the responsibility of the caseworker the restricted one of helping them understand and make use of the services available, should they wish to do so, or does the caseworker have the responsibility of making people happy, whether or not they consciously wish

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 838.

to be made so? If social casework is "individual therapy through a treatment relationship"—Miss Robinson's 1930 definition¹⁶—is it not the responsibility of the state to make use of the vast number of new relationships created by the Act to promote this therapy? If a profession has scientific knowledge of what causes maladjustment and believes that it has the means to correct it, should it not strive to do so everywhere it can?

On this question of the social worker's responsibility, the field of social casework split. Some workers, it is true, did not recognize the implications of this division. To them it was merely a difference between two schools of psychiatry—that of Rank, which postulated an integrative force known as "the Will," and that of Freud, which did not. A pamphlet published in 1950 which sought to compare the basic concepts of the two schools, which it claims to be technically irreconcilable,¹⁷ attributes the difference almost solely to the system of psychiatry followed. Nevertheless, the two psychiatries imply a very different relationship between man and his government. Equal weight will be given here to the theories of the two schools, not because they are quantitatively equal—of more than fifty graduate professional schools in Canada and the United States, not more than three at the most can be considered to belong to the "functional" group—but because the minority view offers what appears to be the only logical alternative to the dominant and positivistically motivated school.

The concepts of the functional (or Rankian) school, which is represented largely by writers such as Kenneth Pray, Herbert Aptekar, Virginia Robinson, Grace Marcus, and Jessie Taft,¹⁸ can best be summed up in the words of the first of these:

Such an approach . . . starts with the primary assumption that the applicant has personality and social strengths—perhaps latent or unorganised, perhaps blocked, confused, or distorted, but also perhaps directly available for use, if given outlet through clarification and appraisal of available alternatives. This approach clings steadily to the conception that this individual . . . carries responsibility for his own life as a whole and must continue to carry it. . . . It is his own will, his own capacity for growth and change, his own selective use of his experience, . . . that determine the outcome. The worker, with all his knowledge and skill, cannot determine—cannot even predict—that outcome. The worker can only accept responsibility for rendering a service which the applicant sees as appropriate to his need, and for initiating and sustaining a process, within the service relationship, which

¹⁶ *A Changing Psychology in Social Case Work* (cited above, n. 11), p. 187.

¹⁷ Family Service Association of America, Committee to Study Basic Concepts in Casework Practice, *A Comparison of Diagnostic and Functional Case Work Concepts: Report*, ed. Cora Kasius (New York, 1950), p. 13.

¹⁸ See Kenneth Pray, *Social Work in a Revolutionary Age* (Philadelphia, 1949); Herbert Aptekar, *Basic Principles of Social Case Work* (Chapel Hill, 1941); Virginia Robinson, *Supervision of Social Case Work* (Chapel Hill, 1936), and *Dynamics of Supervision under Functional Controls* (Philadelphia, 1949), as well as the book already quoted; Grace Marcus, *The Nature of Service in Public Assistance Administration* (Washington, Federal Security Agency, 1947); Jessie Taft, *A Functional Approach to Family Case Work*, of which she was editor, and the volumes of the *Journal of Social Work Process* published by the Pennsylvania School of Social Work between 1939 and 1946; as well as articles by all the above-named in the *Journal of Social Casework*, *The Social Service Review*, *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, etc.

enables the client to exercise his will and use his powers with greater freedom, with less fear, with more insight and clarity, as to both the purpose and consequence of action.¹⁹

Ruth Smalley, another respected practitioner of this school, elaborates on the restriction of the social caseworker's role:

The social worker makes no assumption that the person who comes to her is incapable of understanding or solving his problem, or that by virtue of having one problem he has many, or that if he has many, he must deal with them all in order to receive help with any. The old "social class" psychology out of which, however kindly, one person takes responsibility for another has gone out with the new social casework.²⁰

The relation of this type of social casework help to the legal rights enunciated in the public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act is clear both implicitly and explicitly. The Act must not be used as an excuse to render social services to persons who do not desire them. Grace Marcus expresses it thus:

In administering assistance as a right, the agency is bound not to use the individual's economic helplessness for purposes that have not been generally declared and defined even though these purposes are presumably inspired by interest in the individual's welfare or the welfare of his dependents.²¹

A source of help, however, can be found in the process of administering public assistance as in the administration of any service. The caseworker, supported by the functional structure of the agency—hence the name given to the school—helps the client face his feelings in relation to what is happening to him in the service and thus clarifies for him both his feelings and the reality of the choices open to him. To quote Miss Marcus again:

Social workers have come to recognize that when, at this point of crisis, the individual faces the reality of his own helplessness to meet his needs unaided, he is making a significant move towards taking hold of himself and his affairs. . . . We have been finding the means for this service in that body of requirements, policies, procedures and standards that at first aroused such profound misgivings in us.²²

It is perhaps typical of the age, and a reminder that social casework is by nature pragmatic and ameliorative, that it was found necessary to defend this approach to human problems from the charge of being "unscientific." Jessie Taft distinguishes between the scientific nature of results and method:

For instance, one of the criticisms most commonly expressed is that the functional theory is unscientific. No one to my knowledge has ever tried to show specifically that the practice on which this theory relies is lacking in helpfulness to the client in obtaining the service for which he applies, nor that this helpfulness, where it seems to be demonstrated, is not connected with an understanding of the process involved and with a conscious, consistent use of that understanding. If by "scientific procedure" one means not so much the complete reliance on a deterministic causality as the recognition of a universality based on

¹⁹ Kenneth Pray, "A Restatement of the Generic Principles of Social Casework Practice," in *Social Work in a Revolutionary Age* (cited above, n. 18), pp. 249-50.

²⁰ "The Relation of the Social Casework Process to the Purpose of a Public Assistance Program," a paper given at the New York State Conference on Social Welfare, 1948.

²¹ Grace Marcus, *The Nature of Service in Public Assistance Administration* (cited in n. 18).

²² Grace Marcus, "The Psychological Problem in Providing Assistance as a Public Service," paper given before the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Feb., 1946.

verified comprehension of the nature or law of the particular process in question, then this approach is scientific.²²

This defense was largely occasioned by the violent attack on the functional school by Gordon Hamilton at the 1941 National Conference of Social Work²⁴ in which Dr. Hamilton gave formal expression to the "organismic" (now known as the "diagnostic" or Freudian) point of view which is held by a large majority of social caseworkers today.²⁵ This school continues Mary Richmond's concept of treatment and diagnosis, although treatment and diagnosis are now conceived of primarily in psychoanalytical terms. Miss Hamilton affirms her belief that:

The base of social work is potentially scientific; that the social sciences allied with the physical sciences must increasingly throw light on social needs and social improvement; that the organic and psychogenetic theory of personality is fundamental.²⁶

How closely social casework is identified with psychotherapy can be seen in the following statement:

We have said that there is no essential difference between casework and therapy. The question will follow: Is there a difference between the psychiatric therapy of the social worker and that of the psychoanalytic therapist? We answer: There is no qualitative difference. . . . The differences are quantitative.²⁷

The positivist base of this theory is abundantly apparent. Miss Hamilton writes: "I must also remind you that we can only have schools of thought *before* conclusive scientific data are secured. As knowledge advances in a given area, speculation diminishes."²⁸ We can even find the Law of the Three Stages recast in the form of a progression from the counselling of the priest; through counselling by means of the non-analytical psychologies, to counselling by means of the newer analytical disciplines.²⁹ Man is seen as a victim of pressures, external and internal, which prevent his living a "normal life." Florence Hollis expresses it thus:

Man with his individual needs lives within an external world of reality in which he seeks to satisfy these needs. This he can do only as he learns to adjust to the social and physical

²² Jessie Taft, introd. to *A Functional Approach to Family Case Work* (cited above, n. 18), p. 5.

²⁴ "The Underlying Philosophy of Social Casework," reprinted in *Principles and Techniques in Social Case Work; Selected Articles, 1940-1950*, ed. Cora Kasius (New York, Family Service Association of America, 1950), pp. 7-22.

²⁵ Major writers in this school are Gordon Hamilton, *The Theory and Practice of Social Casework* (New York, 1940; 2nd ed., 1951); Florence Hollis, *Social Casework in Practice* (New York, 1940); Bertha Reynolds (see above, n. 3); Fern Lowry; Lucille Austin; and Dorothy Hutchinson. Most of the significant writing of the last three is in article form. Some writers (such as Charlotte Towle, whose *Common Human Needs*, published by the Federal Security Agency in 1945, was withdrawn in answer to the objections of the American Medical Association) use the vocabulary of this school but are, in their underlying concepts, eclectic or even nearer to the functional point of view.

²⁶ "The Underlying Philosophy of Social Casework" (cited above, n. 24), p. 10.

²⁷ Helen Ross and Adelaide M. Johnson, M.D., "The Growing Science of Casework," reprinted in *Principles and Techniques in Social Case Work* (cited above, n. 24), pp. 52-3.

²⁸ Hamilton, "The Underlying Philosophy of Social Casework" (cited in n. 24), p. 9.

²⁹ Robert Waelder, "The Scientific Approach to Casework with Special Emphasis on Psychoanalysis," reprinted in *Principles and Techniques, etc.*, pp. 24-25.

laws of this world. He may fail and need the help of a case worker either because of a lack of adjusting power within himself or because he is subjected to unusual pressures from the environment.³⁰

Miss Hamilton, while specifically denying the concept of a norm, describes the function of the caseworker as "enabling another to realize his own capacities for change and growth"—which she describes as "the greatest gift anyone can offer." This however, she rewrites significantly in the next sentence as "change, growth and *adaptation to reality*." The underlying assumption is clear. Reality is something which the caseworker knows because of his scientific training. "One cannot," writes Miss Hamilton, "release such energies unless the worker himself has been taught systematically how to understand the nature of motivation."³¹

Yet self-determination is still professed by caseworkers. Thus the essentials of casework, according to Miss Hollis, are the self-determination of the client, the "acceptance" (or tolerant understanding) of the worker, the worker's objectivity, or self-knowledge, and finally, knowledge. "Without adherence to the principle of self-determination," she writes, "without self-understanding, no amount of theoretical knowledge will be of much help. But built on top of these things such knowledge is essential."³² Again:

Case work seeks "to assist families and individuals in developing both the capacity and the opportunity to lead personally satisfying and socially useful lives." This multiple objective is most likely to be achieved if the case worker recognizes that the client must be in control of the guiding of his own life. . . . It is important that the client's right of self-determination exists *until it is demonstrated that the exercise of this right would be highly detrimental to himself and others*.³³

The worker decides whether a citizen may exercise what is in the same sentence described as a right.

Miss Hamilton herself distinguishes between people who are "relatively self-directing," and those who are "less capable, weakened, or seriously handicapped,"³⁴ thus echoing Mr. Meriam in a slightly different setting. Not the client's control of his money, but far more personal decisions may be denied to him if the caseworker believes him to be "less capable." Self-determination has, in fact, had to retreat before the growing conviction of caseworkers that man is irrational. One group after another is declared incapable of making its own decisions. Unmarried mothers were among the first to be professionally so classified. Dorothy Hutchinson writes:

In my opinion the majority of these mothers are unable, if not incapable of making their own independent decisions without skilled case work service. . . . It is true that even with-

³⁰ Florence Hollis, *Social Casework in Practice*, p. 264.

³¹ Hamilton, "Helping People—The Growth of a Profession," 1948, reprinted in *Principles and Techniques in Social Case Work*, p. 89.

³² Hollis, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. Italics added.

³⁴ Hamilton, "Helping People" (cited above, n. 31), p. 89.

out guidance, she *will* make a decision but this is one which will be determined by unconscious factors and most always to the detriment of the baby and defeating to herself.³⁵

Taking over of decision for the client is predicated on the theory that people do not know what they want, and therefore need help in finding this out. A recent writer who includes the parents of difficult children among those who cannot be trusted with their own decisions remarks:

The client frequently is not in a position to evaluate his problem clearly by virtue of his own closeness to it. We all accept the premise that an essential element of all therapeutic relationships is that the helping person is outside the problem and can therefore see it more clearly.³⁶

Even where the client is presumed to be capable of some choice, the choice of method and of goals of treatment falls on the worker. Every case has a "treatment plan" determined on the basis of the client's "need" and his "treatability." Lucille Austin, writing of one type of casework service which she calls "insight therapy," says:

The main technical problems center around the selection of appropriate cases, the selection of the central problem to be brought under treatment, the development of interpretative techniques which aid the client in gaining understanding of unconscious feelings and motivations . . . and the kind of environmental activity that can be appropriately introduced. . . .³⁷

The client apparently cannot choose either for what he needs help or how he is to be helped. Miss Austin does not make clear that she is writing, as she may be, only about clients who come to a family agency of their own free will and request help for specific problems. Whether she is or not, what she teaches has been accepted by the profession as a whole as applicable to those who come to any agency for any purpose, even one largely unconnected with what the agency sees as the trouble.

Thus, while a caseworker may respect the legal right of a public assistance recipient to spend his money as he will, a control over the client's life returns through the concept of the "whole man." So basic is this concept to the philosophy of the diagnostic caseworker that it is difficult to find it stated explicitly in any recent work. It is perhaps illustrated most clearly in the publications of the United States Children's Bureau. We noted earlier that the functional school accepted only a partial, limited role in the lives of clients. The diagnostic school accepts not only responsibility for the whole client, but whole responsibility for him. As one writer puts it, after describing the contributions of the church, the school, and the physician:

³⁵ Dorothy Hutchinson, "Re-examination of Some Aspects of Case Work Practice in Adoption," *Child Welfare League of America Bulletin*, Vol. 25, pp. 4-7, 14 (Nov., 1946).

³⁶ Lionel C. Lane, "The 'Aggressive' Approach to Preventive Casework with Children's Problems," *Social Casework*, Vol. 33, pp. 61-66 (Feb., 1952), at p. 65. This article is the most explicit of a number that have appeared recently from the New York area advocating a more "aggressive" casework approach in cases involving children who show incipient behavior problems.

³⁷ "Trends in Differential Treatment in Social Casework," in *Principles and Techniques in Social Case Work* (cited above, n. 24), p. 337.

Case work service is the thread that weaves through the complicated strands of these programs and ties their strength into a pattern of unified service for the child and his family.³⁸

Another writes of the worker in the public assistance program:

... we case workers must be on good working terms with the schools so they will feel free to turn to us when there is trouble that cannot be handled adequately in the school or directly with the mother. We can assist by helping interpret the situation to the parent, who is often too insecure, because of his own limited knowledge and experience or because of over-identification with his child, to work effectively with the school, or who has carried over his own childhood antagonisms to his child's schooling.³⁹

This may be compared with the views of the former chief of the Bureau of Public Assistance:

When the agency discusses a problem of health with the family physician, or housing with the landlord, or of a child's behavior with the teacher, the intrusion into any one of these community relationships, even by the most skilful worker, may impair the normal function of the family.⁴⁰

Even though one of the last two statements relates to service requested by the school and the other to service initiated by the worker, depreciation of the role of the parent and the assumption of responsibility for the lives of assistance recipients are implicit in the former. This depreciation of the client is also apparent in the writings of practitioners who speak of the children of public assistance clients as "wards of the community," or state that 93 per cent of families receiving aid to dependent children need "additional services," but are not to be allowed to fall into that category "in which problems are obvious to the worker but . . . appear not to be subject to social treatment"—such cases are to be referred to protective agencies who will presumably solve their problems—or finally, that public assistance with its unpleasant concomitants of investigation and its quasi-charitable nature, from which it can never quite escape, should be preferred to an extension of social insurance because the clients in this case would not be receiving "services."⁴¹

Yet diagnostic casework insists on its democratic nature. To quote Miss Hamilton again:

³⁸ Elizabeth Deuel, "The Content of Child Welfare Services," in *Child Welfare at the Crossroads*, U. S. Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency, 1949. It is interesting to note within the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (formerly the Federal Security Agency) the predominantly functional approach of the Bureau of Public Assistance and the equally strong diagnostic or organismic views of the U. S. Children's Bureau.

³⁹ Frieda W. Riggs, "In the Service of Children," *Journal of Social Casework*, Vol. 28, pp. 21-26 (Jan., 1947), at p. 23.

⁴⁰ Jane M. Hoey, quoted by Josephine M. Gandelman, "Care of Children in Their Own Homes," *Round-Up* (Proceedings of the Southwestern Regional Conference, American Public Welfare Association, Fort Worth, 1949), p. 64.

⁴¹ Quotations all from *Public Welfare*, respectively from Rudolph T. Danstedt, "A Possibility for Social Rehabilitation," Vol. 10, pp. 46-48 (April, 1952); Constance M. Swander, "A Study of Services Needed in a Public Assistance Caseload," Vol. 5, pp. 194-99, 215 (Sept., 1947); and Marjorie J. Smith, "The Place of Services in the Public Assistance Program," Vol. 9, pp. 161-63, 170 (Aug., 1951).

Casework has an honorable record in our democracy and must play a significant role in any free society. That casework would be meaningless in any but a free society I am sure you agree, for casework postulates values in individual development for full socialized capacities.⁴²

Miss Reynolds had also seen in social casework's new-found psychiatric knowledge the hope of a new democracy. She had, however, insisted on accepting this knowledge with due humility.⁴³ This may tend to illuminate what appears to be a disparity between consciously expressed ends and the implications of recommended practice. The passages quoted from Miss Hutchinson and Mr. Lane show little humility, nor is it humble to believe that one has within one's grasp a key which may finally solve all problems, including those of the ends as well as the means. It is possible that Miss Reynolds was so much concerned with obviating the more obvious types of oppression—commands, persuasions, and threats—that she failed to see what Mr. Lane calls “the subtle [authority] that goes with professional skill and knowledge of the dynamics of human behavior.”⁴⁴ Miss Reynolds, in her latest book, seems a little defensive. She entitles one chapter “Is Diagnosis an Imposition?” She believes that it is not because it “is not imposing the thinking of a stranger with alien interests, but weaving together the threads that both client and case worker draw from life and work on together.”⁴⁵ This, however, postulates an equality between client and social worker that is hard to make effective, particularly where social differences actually exist, and requires that the social worker claim no special competence. It would appear more likely that diagnostic casework is turning from “relationship as a new environment which gives the client opportunity to work out his own problems” to “a . . . relationship in which the worker manipulates the client's inner life”—the two directions in which Miss Robinson saw that it might develop—because a positivistic approach to the problems of man's nature cannot remain humble for long. The claim to special competence has clearly been made.

At this point the basic tenets related to practice of these two schools of thought may be summarized as our material discloses them. Names in parentheses refer to the authors of articles quoted.

Functional

1. Sees man as a rational being, potentially, at least, capable of making choices about his social life himself. (Pray)
2. Believes that man's right to make these choices or to refuse to make them, except

Diagnostic

1. Sees man as basically irrational and increasingly believes that he must be helped to make choices which will, in the last analysis, be what he would have made if he were rational. (Hutchinson, Lane)
2. Sees man's right to make choices to be dependent on whether society, through

⁴² Hamilton, “The Underlying Philosophy of Social Casework” (cited above, n. 24), p. 7.

⁴³ Reynolds, *Re-Thinking Social Case Work* (cited above, n. 3), p. 7.

⁴⁴ Lane, article cited in n. 36.

⁴⁵ Reynolds, *Social Work and Social Living* (New York, 1951), p. 109.

when required to do so by law, is a right which can only be removed by legal proscription, as in the case of an imbecile. (Smith, Hoey)

the caseworker, believes that this is in his interest. (Hollis)

3. Believes that the outcome of social service must be unpredictable in the individual case. (Pray, Taft)

3. Believes that goals for treatment in which the client's participation is pragmatically valuable should be devised in every case. (Austin, Hollis, Hamilton)

4. Accepts responsibility only for immediate and partial problems. (Marcus, Smalley)

4. Accepts responsibility for "the whole man," and "whole" responsibility for him. (Deuel)

5. Sees man's ability to make choices as arising from exercise of his will. (Pray)

5. Believes that man can be rational only as he becomes "adjusted to reality". (Hamilton, Hollis)

6. Claims no scientific knowledge of what human beings are, but does claim that its methods are empirically valid. (Taft)

6. Claims scientific knowledge of human beings and believes that ultimately this knowledge will be complete. (Hamilton)

The society implied by the writings of the functional school is one in which man has freedom of choice as far as the state's right to dictate that choice is concerned; is constrained only by the rule of law, or of his own conscience; has political and natural rights, and is in no way subjected to the direction of others because he may become socially or financially in need of help. The state, through its welfare agency, is seen as both providing certain benefits to which a man has legal rights and offering help in making use of these services. No man is required to use help if he does not want it. He is free to reject help at any point that he desires. Nor is he constrained to receive more help than he asks for—service along with assistance or psychotherapy with relief. The very acceptance of a limited and partial responsibility on the part of the agency also recognizes implicitly the place of other reformatory or helping influences in man's life: religion, education, or the law.

Diagnostic social work, on the other hand, believes that it has, or will be able to find, the ultimate explanation of man's nature in psychoanalytic theory. Although it professes a belief in democracy, the freedom to which it looks forward is a freedom from neurosis and its goal is a person who makes "satisfying social relationships" or is "adapted to reality" and is therefore presumably more rational than he would be if left alone. This implies that those who need the services of the state in any social matter are sick and can only be made well through the help of a class of trained, objective, neurosis-free officials. In this only the social worker or the psychiatrist is effective. Other disciplines, such as education, the law, and the church are reduced to the status of tools to be used by the social worker as instruments in this "freeing" process.

This philosophy has demonstrably resulted already in a number of practices which are basically inimical to liberty in its political sense—such as the ignoring of due process of law in the juvenile courts and the invasion of privacy where the social worker believes the client not to know his own need for service.

Parents have been refused access to children whose legal custody they have never lost where the worker believes this to be in the child's interest. The real danger does not lie, however, in the well-intentioned infringements of personal liberty that have already taken place, which are certainly no worse but rather better than what happened when "the poor" were thought of as sinners without rights. It lies more in the fact that once a positivist science becomes the rule of law, or once a group in our society arrogates to itself the right to judge or to treat another by the findings of such a science, no end to the process is in sight. What happens depends almost entirely on the good will of the self-appointed "social physician." As the supposed knowledge of this group advances, the relation of patient and doctor tends inevitably to a benevolent or paternalistic dictatorship by those who possess the acceptable knowledge. While we can accept this in relation to our bodies, something very different happens when the subject of the treatment becomes not only our daily needs but our most vital human relationships. Such a power, too, is never free from the danger of becoming irresponsible. In less scrupulous hands, positivist science can be perverted to serve bad as well as worthy ends, and since the only appeal is to the science itself or to the human failings of those who administer it, there is no way to check its growth. Particularly might this be so where the "science" in question is one about which there can be such wide disagreement as there is about modern psychiatry, and which postulates man to be basically irrational. *Quis custodiet custodes?* Which irrational man shall decide what true reason is?

While it is true that most social workers have some feeling for human rights, and that psychoanalytic theory at the present upholds these rights for their pragmatic value, it may well be questioned what guarantees exist that this state of affairs will continue. Already some tendency to minimize rights is apparent. In view of the pervasive nature of the powers involved and the increasing number of persons affected, this cannot but give rise to concern.

REASON AND POWER IN BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

GERALD STOURZH

University of Chicago

Perhaps no period of modern history has been more a victim of generalization than the Age of Enlightenment. The worship of reason and progress and belief in the essential goodness and perfectibility of human nature are most commonly associated with the 18th century climate of opinion. Many of the stereotypes which have been applied to it have automatically been transferred to Benjamin Franklin. Already to contemporaries of his old age, Franklin seemed the very personification of the Age of Reason. Condorcet, who had known Franklin personally, summed up his description of Franklin's political career as follows: "In a word, his politics were those of a man who believed in the power of reason and the reality of virtue."¹ In Germany, an admirer was even more enthusiastic: "Reason and virtue, made possible through reason alone, consequently again reason and nothing but reason, is the magic with which Benjamin Franklin conquered heaven and earth."² This is also the judgment of posterity. F. L. Mott and Chester E. Jorgensen, who have so far presented the most acute analysis of Franklin's thought and its relationship to the intellectual history of his time, do not hesitate to call him "the completest colonial representative" of the Age of Enlightenment.³ Unanimous agreement seems to exist that Franklin was "in tune with his time."⁴

This essay will attempt to show that these generalizations, instead of illuminating the essence of Franklin's moral and political philosophy, tend rather to obscure some of the mainsprings of his thought and action. Our investigation rests upon the assumption that man's understanding of politics is inseparable from his conception of human nature. Consequently, this reappraisal of Franklin's political thought will subject his views on human nature to close scrutiny; it is hoped that this procedure may lead to a rejection of some of the clichés to which he has fallen victim.

¹ *Oeuvres du Marquis de Condorcet*, eds. A. Condorcet O'Connor and M. F. Arago, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (Paris, 1847-49), Vol. 3, p. 420.

² Georg Forster, "Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1790," in "Kleine Schriften," *Georg Forsters sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. by his daughter, 9 vols. (Leipzig, 1843), Vol. 6, p. 207.

³ *Benjamin Franklin, Representative Selections with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes*, eds. F. L. Mott and Chester E. Jorgensen (New York, 1936), p. xiii.

⁴ Carl Becker, review of the Franklin Institute's *Meet Dr. Franklin*, in *American Historical Review*, Vol. 50, p. 142 (Oct., 1944). Cf. Henry Steele Commager's statement that it was the faith in reason which gave unity to Franklin's life. "Franklin, the American," review of Carl Van Doren's *Benjamin Franklin*, in *New York Times Book Review*, Oct. 9, 1938, p. 1. Charles A. Beard explicitly referred to Franklin as an outstanding example of American writers on progress. Introduction to J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York, 1932), p. xxxvii.

I. THE "GREAT CHAIN OF BEING"

Many of the notions which are commonly applied to the 18th century, such as the belief in progress and in the perfectibility of human nature, are significant chiefly with respect to the currents of thought and action related to the American and French Revolutions, and do little to deepen our understanding of earlier developments. So it is to the first half of the 18th century that we must now turn. We are prone to overlook the extraordinary difference in age which separated Franklin from the other Founding Fathers of the Republic. Franklin was born in 1706, twenty-six years before Washington, twenty-nine years before John Adams, thirty-seven years before Jefferson, thirty-nine years before John Jay, forty-five years before James Madison, and fifty-one years before Alexander Hamilton.

Franklin's fame as a social and natural philosopher rests mainly on the achievements of his middle and late years. One needs to remember, however, that he was a moral philosopher long before he became a natural philosopher and before he advised his fellowmen how to acquire wealth.⁵ At the age of twenty-two, he formed a "club for mutual improvement,"⁶ the Junto, where great emphasis was laid on moral or political problems. Whether self-interest was the root of human action, whether man could attain perfection, whether "encroachments on the just liberties of the people"⁷ had taken place—all these things were matters of discussion at Franklin's club. Already at the age of nineteen, during his first stay in London, he had printed his first independent opus, *A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain*.⁸ This piece

⁵ Even after having achieved world-wide fame as a natural philosopher, he observed that we deserve reprehension if "we neglect the Knowledge and Practice of essential Duties" in order to attain eminence in the knowledge of nature. *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Henry Albert Smyth, 10 vols. (New York, 1905-7), Vol. 4, p. 22. (Hereafter cited as *Writings*.)

⁶ *Autobiography, Writings*, Vol. I, p. 22.

⁷ James Parton, *Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Boston, 1897), Vol. I, p. 160. See also *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 89. The authors who so far have most closely scrutinized Franklin's political thought do not see the relevance of many of the younger Franklin's remarks on human nature, arbitrary government, or the nature of political dispute to his concept of politics. See M. R. Eiselen, *Franklin's Political Theories* (Garden City, N. Y., 1928), p. 13; R. D. Miles, "The Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin," unpub. diss. (Univ. of Michigan, 1949), p. 36; *Benjamin Franklin, Representative Selections* (cited in note 3), p. lxxxii. The most recent work in this field, Clinton Rossiter's "The Political Theory of Benjamin Franklin," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 76, pp. 259-93 (July, 1952), pays no attention to Franklin's conception of human nature and his attitude towards the problem of power and the ends of political life. Rossiter's contention (p. 268) is that Franklin "limited his own thought process to the one devastating question: *Does it work?*, or more exactly, *Does it work well?*" Franklin, however, like everybody else, had certain ends and goals in view, and the question "Does it work?" is meaningless without the context of certain basic desiderata.

⁸ This little work has been omitted in the Smyth edition of Franklin's writings, because "the work has no value, and it would be an injury and an offence to the memory of Franklin to republish it." *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. vi. It is, however, reprinted as an appendix to Parton, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, and has since been republished independently with a bibliographical note by Lawrence C. Wroth (New York, 1930).

showed that no trace was left of his Presbyterian family background. The secularization of his thought had been completed.⁹ Gone were the Puritan belief in revelation and the Christian conception of human nature which, paradoxically, included the notion of the depravity of man, as well as of his uniqueness among all created beings.¹⁰ Franklin's *Dissertation* shows that he was thoroughly acquainted with the leading ideas of his time. The early decades of the 18th century were characterized by the climate of opinion which has been aptly called "cosmic Toryism."¹¹ Pope's *Essay on Man* and many pages of Addison's *Spectator*—both of which Franklin admired—most perfectly set forth the creed of a new age. Overshadowing everything else, there was joy about the discoveries of the human mind, which had solved the enigma of creation:

Nature and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night:
GOD said, *Let Newton be!* and all was Light.¹²

The perfection of that Great Machine, the Newtonian universe, filling humanity with admiration for the Divine Watchmaker, seemed to suggest that this world was indeed the best of all possible worlds. Everything was necessary, was good. Pope's "Whatever is, is right," is the key phrase of this period. The goodness of the Creator revealed itself in His giving existence to all possible creatures. The universe "presented the spectacle of a continuous scale or ladder of creatures, extending without a break from the worm to the seraph."¹³ Somewhere in this "Great Chain of Being," to use a favorite phrase of the

⁹ See Herbert Schneider, "The Significance of Benjamin Franklin's Moral Philosophy," *Columbia University Studies in the History of Ideas*, Vol. 2, p. 298 (1918).

¹⁰ In his *Autobiography*, Franklin acknowledges his debt to Shaftesbury and Collins for becoming "a real doubter in many points of our religious doctrine." *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 244. The question of Franklin's attitude toward the great moral philosophers and of their influence upon him is considerably more difficult to determine than the same question with regard to John Adams or Thomas Jefferson. With the exception of authors named in the *Autobiography*, comments on books Franklin read are extremely rare. His library has not been preserved; there is, however, a list of books known to have been in Franklin's library at the time of his death (compiled by Dr. George Simpson Eddy in Princeton University; photostat in the library of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia). See also Mr. Eddy's article, "Dr. Benjamin Franklin's Library," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, new series, Vol. 34, pp. 206-26 (Oct., 1924). Except for comments in some English pamphlets, there exist nothing like the voluminous marginal notes of John Adams and Jefferson. Also he was not able to keep up a correspondence like Adams' or Jefferson's, discussing great problems from the perspective of a long life in retirement after the great events of their lives had taken place. Immersed in public business almost until his death, Franklin does not seem to have had much time left over for reading. Benjamin Rush told John Adams that "Dr. Franklin thought a great deal, wrote occasionally, but read during the middle and later years of his life very little." October 31, 1807, in Benjamin Rush, *The Letters of Benjamin Rush*, ed. L. H. Butterfield, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1951), Vol. 2, p. 953. For a compilation of the authors with whom Franklin was acquainted, see Lois Margaret MacLaurin, *Franklin's Vocabulary* (Garden City, N. Y., 1928), Ch. 1, and *Benjamin Franklin, Representative Selections* (cited in note 3), p. lv.

¹¹ Basil Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background* (London, 1940), Ch. 3, *passim*.

¹² Pope's epitaph intended for Newton's tomb.

¹³ Willey, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

period,¹⁴ there must be a place for Man. Man, as it were, formed the "middle link" between lower and higher creatures. No wonder, then, that Franklin chose as a motto for his *Dissertation* the following lines of Dryden:

Whatever is, is in its Causes just,
Since all Things are by Fate; but purblind Man
Sees but a part o' th' Chain, the nearest Link,
His Eyes not carrying to the equal Beam
That poises all above.¹⁵

The consequences of the conception of the universe as a "Great Chain of Being" for Franklin's understanding of human nature are highly significant. To be sure, man had liberated himself from the oppression of Original Sin, and in his newly established innocence he hailed the Creator and praised the Creation. But if the depravity of human nature had been banished, so had man's striving for redemption, man's aspiration for perfection. There was nothing left which ought to be redeemed. Indeed, in the new rational order of the universe, it would not seem proper to long for a higher place in the hierarchy of beings. Man's release from the anguish of Original Sin was accompanied by a lowering of the goals of human life. "The imperfection of man is indispensable to the fullness of the hierarchy of being." Man had, so to speak, already attained the grade of perfection which belonged to his station. From the point of view of mortality, then, what this amounted to was a "counsel of imperfection—an ethics of prudent mediocrity."¹⁶

Quiet contentment with, and enjoyment of, one's place in the Great Chain of Being must have been a comforting creed for the wealthy and educated classes of the Augustan Age:

Order is Heav'n's first law; and this confess,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest,
More rich, more wise.¹⁷

This was not the optimism of progress, which we usually associate with the eighteenth century. It was an optimism of acceptance;¹⁸ for the rich and complacent, the real and the good seemed indeed to coincide.

Not so for Benjamin Franklin. Late in his life, in 1771, he referred to "the poverty and obscurity in which I was born and bred." His innate desire for

¹⁴ See A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936). This brilliant analysis of that complex of ideas has been applied to Franklin only once, although it offers important clues for an understanding of Franklin's conception of human nature. Arthur Stuart Pitt in "The Sources, Significance, and Date of Franklin's 'An Arabian Tale,'" *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, Vol. 57, pp. 155-68 (March, 1942), applies Lovejoy's analysis to one piece of Franklin's and does not refer to relevant writings of Franklin's youth in which this idea may also be found. Pitt's article is valuable in pointing out the sources from which Franklin could have accepted the idea directly, namely Locke, Milton, Addison, and Pope.

¹⁵ Parton, *Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin* (cited in note 7), Vol. 1, p. 605.

¹⁶ Lovejoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 200.

¹⁷ Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man," Epistle 4, in *Selected Works*, Modern Library ed. (New York, 1948), p. 127.

¹⁸ Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

justice and equality, his keen awareness of existing conditions of injustice and inequality, finally his own experience of things which he could not possibly call just or good—for instance, he tells us that his brother's "harsh and tyrannical treatment of me might be a means of impressing me with that aversion to arbitrary power that has stuck to me through my whole life"¹⁹—all this contravened the facile optimism of the Augustan Age.

Franklin, indeed, accepted the cosmological premises of his age (as witness the above quoted motto of the *Dissertation*). But his conclusions make the edifice of "Cosmic Toryism"—so imposing in Pope's magnificent language—appear a mockery and an absurdity. Franklin's argumentation was simple enough: God being all-powerful and good, man could have no free will, and the distinction between good and evil had to be abolished. He also argued that pain or uneasiness was the mainspring of all our actions, and that pleasure was produced by the removal of this uneasiness. If followed that "*No State of Life can be happier than the present, because Pleasure and Pain are inseparable.*" The unintentional irony of this brand of optimism cannot be better expressed than in young Franklin's conclusion:

I am sensible that the Doctrine here advanc'd, if it were to be publish'd, would meet with but an indifferent Reception. Mankind naturally and generally love to be flatter'd: Whatever soothes our Pride, and tends to exalt our Species above the rest of the Creation, we are pleas'd with and easily believe, when ungrateful Truths shall be with the utmost Indignation rejected. "What! bring ourselves down to an Equality with the Beasts of the Field! With the *meanest* part of the Creation! 'Tis insufferable!" But, (to use a Piece of *common Sense*) our *Geese* are but *Geese* tho' we may think 'em *Swans*; and Truth will be Truth tho' it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful.²⁰

The dilemma which confronted him at the age of nineteen is characteristic of most eighteenth-century philosophy: "If nature is good, then there is no evil in the world; if there is evil in the world, then nature so far is not good."²¹

Franklin cut this Gordian knot by sacrificing "Reason" to "Experience." He turned away from metaphysics for the quite pragmatic reason that his denial of good and evil did not provide him with a basis for the attainment of social and individual happiness:

Revelation had indeed no weight with me, as such; but I entertain'd an opinion that, though certain actions might not be bad *because* they were forbidden by it, or good *because* it commanded them, yet probably these actions might be forbidden *because* they were bad for us, or commanded *because* they were beneficial to us. . . .²²

To achieve useful things rather than indulge in doubtful metaphysical speculations, to become a doer of good—these, then, became the principal aims of Franklin's thought and action.²³

This fundamental change from the earlier to the later Enlightenment—from

¹⁹ *Autobiography, Writings*, Vol. 1, pp. 226, 247 (n.1).

²⁰ Parton, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 617.

²¹ Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven, 1932), p. 69.

²² *Autobiography, Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 296. See also *Writings*, Vol. 7, p. 412.

²³ See *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 341; Vol. 2, p. 215; Vol. 3, p. 145; Vol. 9, p. 208; Vol. 10, p. 38.

passive contemplation to improvement, from a static to a dynamic conception of human affairs—did contribute to the substitution of the idea of human perfectibility for the idea of human perfection—a very limited kind of perfection, as we have seen; but it was by no means sufficient to bring about the faith in the perfectibility of human nature. Something else was needed: proof that “social evils were due neither to innate and incorrigible disabilities of the human being nor the nature of things, but simply to ignorance and prejudices.”²⁴ The associationist psychology, elaborating Locke’s theory of the malleability of human nature, provided the basis for the expansion of the idea of progress and perfectibility from the purely intellectual domain into the realm of moral and social life in general. The Age of Reason, then, presents us with a more perplexing picture than we might have supposed.

Reason, after all, may mean three different things: reason as a faculty of man; reason as a quality of the universe; and reason as a temper in the conduct of human affairs.²⁵ We might venture the generalization that the earlier Enlightenment stressed reason as the quality of the Newtonian universe, whereas the later Enlightenment, in spite of important exceptions, exalted the power of human reason to mold the moral and social life of mankind.²⁶ Franklin’s “reason,” as we shall see presently, is above all a temper in the conduct of human affairs.

This discussion is important for a correct understanding of Franklin’s position in the center of the cross-currents of the Age of Enlightenment. The fact that the roots of his thought are to be found in the early Enlightenment is not always realized, or, if realized, not always sufficiently explained. Julian P. Boyd, in his introduction to Carl Becker’s biographical sketch of Franklin, states that Franklin and Jefferson believed “that men would be amenable to rational persuasion, that they would thereby be induced to promote their own and their fellows’ best interests, and that, in the end, perfect felicity for man and society would be achieved.”²⁷ These ideas are certainly suggestive of the later Enlightenment, and appear to be more applicable to Jefferson than to Franklin. Carl Becker himself asserts, somewhat ambiguously and with undue generalization, that Franklin “was a true child of the Enlightenment, not indeed of the school of Rousseau, but of Defoe and Pope and Swift, of Fontenelle and Montesquieu and Voltaire.”²⁸ There is little evidence that this school prophesied the achievement of perfect felicity for man and society.

Bernard Mandeville, a personal acquaintance of Franklin, joined the chorus of those who proclaimed the compatibility of human imperfection and the

²⁴ Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (cited in note 4), p. 128.

²⁵ This distinction is Roland Bainton’s. See his “The Appeal to Reason and the American Revolution,” in *The Constitution Reconsidered*, ed. Conyers Read (New York, 1938), p. 121.

²⁶ Cf. A. O. Lovejoy’s statement: “The authors who were perhaps the most influential and the most representative in the early and mid-eighteenth century, made a great point of reducing man’s claims to ‘reason’ to a minimum.” “‘Pride’ in Eighteenth Century Thought,” in *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore, 1948), p. 68.

²⁷ Carl Becker, *Benjamin Franklin* (Ithaca, 1946), p. ix.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

general harmony. "Private Vices, Public Benefits" was the subtitle of his famous *Fable of the Bees*, which Franklin owned and probably read. Mandeville's paradoxical doctrines must have been a powerful challenge to Franklin's young mind. "The Moral Virtues," Mandeville asserted in terms reminiscent of Machiavelli, "are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride." While arguing that men are actuated by self-interest and that this self-interest promotes the prosperity of society as a whole, Mandeville maintains a rigorous standard of virtue, declaring those acts alone to be virtuous "by which Man, contrary to the impulse of Nature, should endeavour the Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of a Rational Ambition of being good."²⁹

By making ethical standards so excessively rigorous, Mandeville rendered them impossible of observance, and indirectly (though intentionally) pointed out their irrelevance for practical life. The very rigor of his ethical demands in contrast to his practical devices suggests that Mandeville lacked "idealism." This was not the case with Franklin. The consciously paradoxical Mandeville could offer no salvation for the young Franklin caught on the horns of his own dilemma. Shaftesbury, Mandeville's *bête noire*—whose works were already familiar to Franklin—had a more promising solution. In his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit* (1699), Shaftesbury had asserted that man by nature possesses a faculty to distinguish and to prefer what is right—the famous "moral sense."

Franklin's option for Shaftesbury was made clear from his reprinting two dialogues "Between Philocles and Horatio, . . . concerning Virtue and Pleasure" from the *London Journal* of 1729 in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* of 1730. In the second dialogue, reason was described as the chief faculty of man, and reasonable and morally good actions were defined as actions preservative of the human kind and naturally tending to produce real and unmixed happiness. These dialogues until recently have been held to be Franklin's own work; however, a reference in the *Autobiography* to a "Socratic dialogue" and "a discourse on self-denial," traditionally interpreted as concerning the two dialogues between Philocles and Horatio, recently has been shown to concern two pieces published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* of 1735. The first piece is a dialogue between Crito and Socrates, never before correctly attributed to Franklin, in which he asserted that the "SCIENCE OF VIRTUE" was "of more worth, and of more consequence" to one's happiness than all other knowledge put together; in the second piece, a discourse on self-denial, Franklin combated the (Mandevillean) idea that "the greater the *Self-Denial* the greater the Virtue." Thirty-three years later, Franklin was still following Shaftesbury when he exhorted: "Be in general virtuous, and you will be happy." However, we shall see later that Franklin, in the last analysis, was not as far removed from Mandeville's pessimism as these cheerful views would suggest. His was a sort of middle position between Mandeville's "realism" and Shaftesbury's "idealism."³⁰

²⁹ Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1924), Vol. 1, pp. 48-49, 51. Franklin owned Mandeville's work, according to a list in the Mason-Franklin Collection of the Yale University Library. He was introduced to Mandeville during his first stay in London. *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 278.

³⁰ The proof that the two dialogues between Philocles and Horatio were not written

II. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The restraining influence of the idea of the Great Chain of Being retained its hold on Franklin after his return to a more conventional recognition of good and evil. In his "Articles of Belief" of 1728 he said that "Man is not the most perfect Being but one, rather as there are many Degrees of Beings his Inferiors, so there are many Degrees of Beings superior to him."²¹ Franklin presented the following question and answers to the discussions in the Junto:

Can a man arrive at perfection in his life, as some believe; or is it impossible, as others believe?

Answer. Perhaps they differ in the meaning of the word *perfection*. I suppose the perfection of any thing to be only the greatest the nature of the thing is capable of. . . .

If they mean a man cannot in this life be so perfect as an angel, it may be true; for an angel, by being incorporeal, is allowed some perfections we are at present incapable of, and less liable to some imperfections than we are liable to. If they mean a man is not capable of being perfect here as he is capable of being in heaven, that may be true likewise. But that a man is not capable of being so perfect here, is not sense. . . . In the above sense, there may be a perfect oyster, a perfect horse, a perfect ship; why not a perfect man? That is, as perfect as his present nature and circumstance admit.²²

We note here the acknowledgment of man's necessarily "imperfect" state of perfection. However, it is striking to see that Franklin refused to employ this theory as a justification of the status quo. Within certain bounds, change, or progress for the better, was possible. Many years later, Franklin was to use exactly the same argument in the debate on the status of America within the British Empire. A pro-English writer had presented the familiar argument of "Cosmic Toryism" (and of conservatism in general, of course): "To expect perfection in human institutions is absurd." Franklin retorted indignantly: "Does this justify any and every Imperfection that can be invented or added to our Constitution?"²³

This attitude differs from the belief in moral progress and perfectibility. There are, however, some passages in Franklin's later writings, better known than the preceding ones, which seem to suggest his agreement with the creed of moral progress and perfectibility. Two years before his death, looking with considerable satisfaction upon the achievements of his country and his own life, he explained to a Boston clergyman his belief in "the growing felicity of mankind, from the improvements in philosophy, morals, politics"; he also stressed "the invention and acquisition of new and useful utensils and instru-

by Franklin and the identification of the two other pieces have been furnished by Alfred O. Aldridge, "Franklin's 'Shaftesburian' Dialogues Not Franklin's: A Revision of the Franklin Canon," *American Literature*, Vol. 21, pp. 151-59 (May, 1949). See also *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 343; Vol. 2, pp. 168-69. The discourse on self-denial is printed in *The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. John Bigelow, 10 vols. (New York, 1887-88), Vol. 1, pp. 414-17. The last quote, written in 1768, is in *Writings*, Vol. 5, p. 159.

²¹ *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 92; see also Vol. 10, p. 124 and note 14, above.

²² *The Works of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Jared Sparks, 10 vols. (Boston, 1836-40), Vol. 2, p. 554.

²³ Franklin's marginal notes in [Matthew C. Wheelock], *Reflections Moral and Political on Great Britain and the Colonies* (London, 1770), p. 48. Franklin's copy in the Jefferson Collection of the Library of Congress.

ments" and concluded that "invention and improvement are prolific. . . . The present progress is rapid." However, he immediately added: "I see a little absurdity in what I have just written, but it is to a friend, who will wink and let it pass."²⁴

There remains, then, a wide gulf between this qualified view of human progress and the exuberant joy over the progress of man's rational and moral faculties so perfectly expressed in the lines of a good friend of Franklin's, the British non-conformist clergyman and philosopher, Joseph Priestley:

Whatever was the beginning of this world, the end will be glorious and paradisiacal beyond what our imaginations can now conceive. Extravagant as some people may suppose these views to be, I think I could show them to be fairly suggested by the true theory of human nature and to arise from the natural course of human affairs.²⁵

Franklin himself was well aware of this gulf. He distinguished sharply between man's intellectual progress and the steadily increasing power of man over matter, on the one hand, and the permanency of moral imperfection, on the other. He wrote to Priestley in 1782:

I should rejoice much, if I could once more recover the Leisure to search with you into the works of Nature; I mean the *inanimate*, not the *animate* or moral part of them, the more I discover'd of the former, the more I admir'd them; the more I know of the latter, the more I am disgusted with them. Men I find to be a Sort of Beings very badly constructed, as they are generally more easily provok'd than reconcil'd, more disposed to do Mischief to each other than to make Reparation, much more easily deceiv'd than undeceiv'd, and having more Pride and even Pleasure in killing than in begetting one another.

He had begun to doubt, he continued, whether "the Species were really worth producing or preserving. . . . I know, you have no such Doubts because, in your zeal for their welfare, you are taking a great deal of pains to save their Souls. Perhaps, as you grow older, you may look upon this as a hopeless Project."²⁶

One is struck by the remarkable constancy of Franklin's views on human nature. In 1787 he tried to dissuade the author of a work on natural religion from publishing it. In this famous letter, we may find the quintessence of Franklin's concept of human nature. There is little of the trust in human reason which is so generally supposed to be a mark of his moral teachings:

You yourself may find it easy to live a virtuous Life, without the Assistance afforded by Religion; you having a clear perception of the Advantages of Virtue, and the Disadvantages of Vice, and possessing a Strength of Resolution sufficient to enable you to resist common Temptations. But think how great a Proportion of Mankind consists of weak and ignorant Men and Women, and of inexperienced, and inconsiderate Youth of both Sexes, who have need of the Motives of Religion to restrain them from Vice, and support their Virtue, and retain them in the Practice of it till it becomes *habitual*, which is the Great Point for its Security. . . . If men are so wicked as we now see them *with religion*, what would they be *if without it*?²⁷

²⁴ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 651. See also Vol. 9, pp. 489, 530; Vol. 1, p. 226.

²⁵ Quoted by Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (cited in note 4), pp. 221-22.

²⁶ *Writings*, Vol. 8, pp. 451-52.

²⁷ *Writings*, Vol. 9, pp. 521-22. See also Vol. 2, pp. 203, 303, and Vol. 9, pp. 600-1.

One is reminded of Gibbon's approval of conditions in the Rome of the Antonines, where all religions were considered equally false by the wise, equally true by the people, and equally useful by the magistrates.

III. THE BELIEF IN "REASON"

Reason as a temper in the conduct of human affairs counted much with Franklin, as we shall see later. However, reason as a faculty of the human mind, stronger than our desires or passions, counted far less. Often Franklin candidly and smilingly referred to the weakness of reason. In his *Autobiography*, he tells us of his struggle "between principle and inclination" when, on his first voyage to Philadelphia, his vegetarian principles came into conflict with his love of eating fish. Remembering that greater fish ate the smaller ones, he did not see any reason why he should not eat fish: "So convenient a thing it is to be a *reasonable creature*, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do."³⁸

Reason as a guide to human happiness was recognized by Franklin only to a limited degree.

Our Reason would still be of more Use to us, if it could enable us to *prevent* the Evils it can hardly enable us to *bear*.—But in that it is so deficient, and in other things so often misleads us, that I have sometimes been almost tempted to wish we had been furnished with a good sensible Instinct instead of it."³⁹

Trial and error appeared to him more useful to this end than abstract reasoning. "We are, I think, in the right Road of Improvement, for we are making Experiments. I do not oppose all that seem wrong, for the Multitude are more effectually set right by Experience, than kept from going wrong by Reasoning with them." Another time he put it even more bluntly: "What assurance of the *Future* can be better founded than that which is built on Experience of the *Past*?"⁴⁰ His scepticism about the efficacy of "reason" also appears in his opinion that "happiness in this life rather depends on internals than externals; and that, besides the natural effects of wisdom and virtue, vice and folly, there is such a thing as a happy or an unhappy constitution."⁴¹

There remains one problem with regard to Franklin's rather modest view of the power of human reason in moral matters: his serenity—some might call it complacency—in spite of his awareness of the disorder and imperfection of human life. Sometimes, it is true, he was uneasy:

³⁸ *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 267. See also Vol. 5, p. 225, and Vol. 9, p. 512.

³⁹ *The Letters of Benjamin Franklin & Jane Mecom*, ed. Carl Van Doren (Princeton, 1950), p. 112.

⁴⁰ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 489, and Vol. 4, p. 250. On another occasion Franklin acknowledged the weakness of reason by the use of a pungent folk saying: "An Answer now occurs to me, for that Question of Robinson Crusoe's Man Friday, which I once thought unanswerable, *Why God no kill the Devil?* It is to be found in the Scottish Proverb, '*Ye'd do little for God an the Dell' were dead.*'" To John Whitehurst, New York, June 27, 1763. Unpub. letter in the Mason-Franklin Collection of the Yale University Library. Cf. also Vol. 3, pp. 16-17, Vol. 4, p. 120, and Vol. 6, p. 424.

⁴¹ *Writings*, Vol. 3, p. 457. See also Vol. 9, p. 548.

I rather suspect, from certain circumstances, that though the general government of the universe is well administered, our particular little affairs are perhaps below notice, and left to take the chance of human prudence or imprudence, as either may happen to be uppermost. It is, however, an uncomfortable thought, and I leave it.⁴³

But on another occasion Franklin felt obliged to quiet the anxieties of his sister, who had been upset by his remark that men "are devils to one another":

I meant no more by saying Mankind were Devils to one another, than that being in general superior to the Malice of the other Creatures, they were not so much tormented by them as by themselves. Upon the whole I am much disposed to like the World as I find it, & to doubt my own Judgment as to what would mend it. I see so much Wisdom in what I understand of its Creation and Government, that I suspect equal Wisdom may be in what I do not understand: And thence have perhaps as much Trust in God as the most pious Christian.⁴⁴

Indeed, Franklin's pessimism does not contain that quality of the tragic sense of life which inevitably presents itself wherever a recognition of the discrepancy between man's actual depravity and the loftiness of his aspirations exists.

We suggest a threefold explanation for this phenomenon: first of all, as we have pointed out, the complex of ideas associated with the concept of the "Great Chain of Being," predominant at the time of Franklin's youth, worked in favor of bridging this gulf by lowering the goals of human endeavor. Secondly, the success story of his own life taught him that certain valuable things in human life can be achieved. Thirdly, we cannot help thinking that Franklin himself was endowed with that "happy constitution" which he deemed a requisite for true happiness in this life.

IV. THE PASSION OF PRIDE

Having discovered that Franklin acknowledged the imperfection of human reason and consequently the existence and importance of the passions to a greater degree than one might have supposed, let us specify in greater detail his insight into the nature of the two outstanding passions of social life, the desire for wealth and the desire for power—avarice and ambition. "That I may avoid Avarice and Ambition . . . —Help me, O Father," was Franklin's prayer in the "Articles of Belief" of 1728.⁴⁵

The universal fame of Poor Richard and the description of Franklin's own "way to wealth" in his *Autobiography* (Franklin's account of his life ends with his arrival in London in 1757 for the first of his three great public missions in Europe) have led many people to see in Franklin only the ingenious businessman pursuing thrift for thrift's sake and money for money's sake. Nothing could be further from the truth than this conception. To be sure, he recognized the existence and the nature of avarice in unequivocal terms: "The Love of

⁴³ Rev. L. Tyerman, *Life of the Rev. George Whitefield*, 2 vols. (London, 1876), Vol. 2, pp. 540-41, quoted in *Benjamin Franklin, Representative Selections* (cited in note 3), p. cxxxvi.

⁴⁴ *The Letters of Benjamin Franklin & Jane Mecom* (cited in note 39), pp. 124, 125-26. See also *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 61; Vol. 4, p. 388; Vol. 9, p. 247.

⁴⁵ *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 99.

Money is not a Thing of certain Measure, so as that it may be easily filled and satisfied. Avarice is infinite; and where there is not good Oeconomy, no Salary, however large, will prevent Necessity."⁴⁵ He denied, however, that desire for more wealth actuated his work. His early retirement from business (1748) to devote himself to the higher things of life—chiefly to public service and scientific research—seems to prove this point.

Franklin considered wealth essentially as means to an end. He knew that it was not easy "for an empty sack to stand upright." He looked upon his fortune as an essential factor in his not having succumbed to corruption.⁴⁶ In a famous and often quoted letter to his mother, Franklin said that at the end of his life he "would rather have it said, *He lived usefully* than *He died Rich*." At about the same time (two years after his retirement) he wrote to his printer friend William Strahan in England: "London citizens, they say, are ambitious of what they call *dying worth* a great sum. The very notion seems to me absurd."⁴⁷

On the other hand, the motive of power and prestige found much earlier recognition in Franklin's writings; he even confessed candidly that he himself was not free from this desire and from the feeling of being superior to his fellowmen. At the age of sixteen, in his first secret contributions to his brother's *New-England Courant* (he wrote under the pseudonym Mrs. Dogood), he gave a satisfactory definition of what we nowadays would call lust for power, and what was in the eighteenth century called Pride:

Among the many reigning Vices of the Town which may at any Time come under my Consideration and Reprehension, there is none which I am more inclin'd to expose than that of *Pride*. It is acknowledged by all to be a Vice the most hateful to God and Man. Even those who nourish it themselves, hate to see it in others. The proud Man aspires after Nothing less than an unlimited Superiority over his Fellow-Creatures.⁴⁸

As Arthur O. Lovejoy has pointed out, the idea of Pride was frequently contemplated during the earlier half of the eighteenth century.⁴⁹ There are two different, though not unrelated, conceptions of Pride. First of all, it means "the most powerful and pervasive of all passions," which manifests itself in two forms: self-esteem and desire for the admiration of others. The second conception is closely connected with the idea of the Scale of Being; it means the generic Pride of man as such, the sin against the laws of order, of gradation, the revolt of man against the station which has been allotted to him by the Creator.

These different conceptions of Pride are indeed inseparable. In Franklin's own writings, the accent is on the first rather than on the second meaning.

⁴⁵ *Writings*, Vol. 5, p. 325.

⁴⁶ *The Letters of Benjamin Franklin & Jane Mecom* (cited in note 39), p. 123.

⁴⁷ *Writings*, Vol. 3, pp. 5, 6. Cf. Benjamin Rush to John Adams: "The Doctor was a rigid economist, but he was in every stage of his life charitable, hospitable, and generous." August 19, 1811, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush* (cited in note 10), Vol. 2, p. 1093.

⁴⁸ *Writings*, Vol. 2, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁹ Lovejoy, "Pride in Eighteenth Century Thought," (cited in note 26), p. 62-68.

This topic runs through his work like a red thread. In 1729, at the age of 23, he wrote that "almost every Man has a strong natural Desire of being valu'd and esteem'd by the rest of his Species."⁵⁰ Observations in a letter written in 1751 testify to his keen psychological insight:

What you mention concerning the love of praise is indeed very true; it reigns more or less in every heart, though we are generally hypocrites, in that respect, and pretend to disregard praise. . . . Being forbid to praise themselves, they learn instead of it to censure others; which is only a roundabout way of praising themselves. . . . This fondness for ourselves, rather than malevolence to others, I take to be the general source of censure. . . .⁵¹

Quite revealing with regard to our discussion is Franklin's well-known account of his project of an "Art of Virtue." His list of virtues to be practiced contained at first only twelve: "But a Quaker friend having kindly informed me that I was generally thought proud . . . I added *Humility* to my list. . . . I cannot boast of much success in acquiring the *reality* of this virtue, but I had a good deal with regard to the *appearance* of it."⁵² His account of his rise in Pennsylvania's public life and politics reflects his joy and pride about his career. In 1737 he was appointed Postmaster of Philadelphia and Justice of the Peace; in 1744 he established the American Philosophical Society; in 1748 he was chosen a member of the Council of Philadelphia; in 1749 he was appointed Provincial Grandmaster of the Colonial Masons; in 1750 he was appointed one of the commissioners to treat with the Indians in Carlisle; and in 1751 he became a member of the Assembly of Pennsylvania. He was particularly pleased with this last appointment, and he admitted candidly that his ambition was "flatter'd by all these promotions; it certainly was; for, considering my low beginning, they were great things to me."⁵³

There is no change of emphasis with respect to Pride during his long life. The old man of 78 denounces the evil of Pride with no less fervor, though with more self-knowledge, than the boy of 16:

In reality, there is, perhaps, no one of our natural passions so hard to subdue as *pride*. Disguise it, struggle with it, beat it down, stifle it, mortify it as much as one pleases, it is still alive, and will every now and then peep out and show itself; you will see it, perhaps, often in this history; for even if I could conceive that I had compleatly overcome it, I should probably be proud of my humility.⁵⁴

Furthermore, the experience of English political life which he acquired during his two protracted stays in England (from 1757 to 1762, and from 1765 to 1775) made an indelible impression on his mind. The corruption and venality in English politics and the disastrous blunders of English politicians which

⁵⁰ *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 108.

⁵¹ *Writings*, Vol. 3, pp. 54-55.

⁵² *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 337.

⁵³ *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 374. For Franklin's acknowledgment of his own political ambition, see *Writings*, Vol. 5, pp. 148, 206, 357; Vol. 9, pp. 488, 621.

⁵⁴ *Autobiography* (end of the part written in Passy, France, 1784), *Writings*, Vol. 1, p. 339.

Franklin traced back to this cause⁵⁶ probably were the main reasons why he advocated at the Federal Convention of 1787 what he himself said some might regard as a "Utopian Idea": the abolition of salaries for the chief executive. The reason he gave for advocating such a step has hitherto not been appreciated as being of crucial importance for an understanding of his political thought:

There are two Passions which have a powerful Influence in the Affairs of Men. These are *Ambition* and *Avarice*; the Love of Power and the Love of Money. Separately, each of these has great Force in prompting Men to Action; but when united in View of the same Object, they have in many minds the most violent Effects. Place before the Eyes of such Men a Post of *Honour*, that shall at the same time be a Place of *Profit*, and they will move Heaven and Earth to obtain it.⁵⁸

It has never been pointed out that this scheme of what might be called the "separation of passions" had been ripening in Franklin's mind for several years. The first expression of it is to be found early in 1783.⁵⁷ In 1784 he mentioned it several times, and it is in these statements that we find one of the few allusions to the concept of checks and balances in Franklin's thought. He recommended: "Make every place of *honour* a place of *burthen*. By that means the effect of one of the passions above-mentioned would be taken away and something would be added to counteract the other."⁵⁸

V. THE NATURE OF POLITICS

Franklin's frequent praise of the general welfare did not blind him to the fact that most other people had a much narrower vision than his own. "Men will always be powerfully influenced in their Opinions and Actions by what appears to be their particular Interest," he wrote in his first tract on political economy, at the age of twenty-three.⁵⁹ Fortunately, one of the very few memoranda and notes dealing with the studies and discussions of young Franklin which have come to our knowledge directly concerns this problem. Franklin himself, in his *Autobiography*, gives us the text of "*Observations on my reading history, in Library, May 19th, 1731*" which, in his words, had been "accidentally preserv'd":

That the great affairs of the world, the wars, revolutions, etc., are carried on and affected by parties.

That the view of these parties is their present general interest, or what they take to be such.

That the different views of these different parties occasion all confusion.

That while a party is carrying on a general design, each man has his particular private interest in view.

That as soon as a party has gain'd its general point, each member becomes intent upon

⁵⁶ *Writings*, Vol. 10, p. 62. See also Vol. 5, pp. 100, 112, 117, 133. See also *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press, 1758-1775*, ed. Verner W. Crane (Chapel Hill, 1950), pp. 59, 164, 232.

⁵⁷ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 591.

⁵⁸ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 23.

⁵⁹ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 170. See also *ibid.*, pp. 172 and 260.

⁶⁰ *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 139.

his particular interest; which, thwarting others, breaks that party into divisions, and occasions more confusion.

That few in public affairs act from a mere view of the good of their country, whatever they may pretend; and, tho' their actings bring real good to their country, yet men primarily considered that their own and their country's interest was united, and did not act from a principle of benevolence.

That fewer still, in public affairs, act with a view for the good of mankind. . . .⁶⁰

These lines do not mirror Shaftesbury's benevolent altruism; Franklin's contention that men act primarily from their own interest "and . . . not . . . from a principle of benevolence," "tho' their actings bring real good to their country," strongly suggests the general theme of Mandeville's work: "Private vices, public benefits."

Many decades after the foregoing observations, the contrast between Franklin's views on politics and those of the enlightened rationalism of contemporary France is clearly expressed in a discussion with the French physiocrat Dupont de Nemours. Dupont had suggested that the Federal Convention be delayed until the separate constitutions of the member states were corrected—according to physiocratic principles, of course. Franklin mildly observed that "we must not expect that a new government may be formed, as a game of chess may be played." He stressed that in the game of politics there were so many players with so many strong and various prejudices, "and their particular interests, independent of the general, seeming so opposite," that "the play is more like *tric-trac* with a box of dice."⁶¹ In public, and when he was propagandizing for America in Europe, Franklin played down the evils of party strife: after the end of the War of Independence he conceded somewhat apologetically that "it is true, in some of the States there are Parties and Discords." He contended now that parties "are the common lot of Humanity," and that they exist wherever there is liberty; they even, perhaps, help to preserve it. "By the Collision of different Sentiments, Sparks of Truth are struck out, and Political Light is obtained."⁶²

In private, Franklin did not conceal his suspicion that "unity out of discord" was not as easily achieved as his just quoted method of obtaining "political light" might suggest. But he certainly did not believe that passions and prejudices always, or even usually, overrule enlightened self-interest. He held that "there is a vast variety of good and ill Events, that are in some degree the Effects of Prudence or the want of it."⁶³ He believed that "reasonable sensible Men, can always make a reasonable scheme appear such to other reasonable Men, if they take Pains, and have Time and Opportunity for it. . . ." However, this dictum is severely limited by the conclusion: ". . . unless from some Circumstance their Honesty and Good Intentions are suspected."⁶⁴ That Franklin thought those circumstances to exist frequently, we learn from a famous mes-

⁶⁰ *Writings*, Vol. 1, pp. 339-40. Cf. also Vol. 2, p. 196, and Vol. 4, p. 322.

⁶¹ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 659; see also p. 241.

⁶² *Writings*, Vol. 10, pp. 120-21. See also Vol. 4, p. 35.

⁶³ *Writings*, Vol. 7, p. 358.

⁶⁴ *Writings*, Vol. 3, pp. 41-42.

sage to George Washington, written in France in 1780. He told Washington how much the latter would enjoy his reputation in France, "pure and free from those little Shades that the Jealousy and Envy of a Man's Countrymen and Cotemporaries are ever endeavouring to cast over living Merit."⁶⁵

Although Franklin himself talked so much about "Common Interests," he could be impatient when others built their arguments on this point. He observed that "it is an Insult on common sense to affect an Appearance of Generosity in a Matter of obvious Interest."⁶⁶ This belief in self-interest as a moving force of politics appears with rare clarity in marginal notes in a pamphlet whose author argued that "if the Interests of Great Britain evidently raise and fall with those of the Colonies, then the Parliament of Great Britain will have the same regard for the Colonists as for her own People." Franklin retorted:

All this Argument of the Interest of Britain and the Colonies being the *same* is fallacious and unsatisfactory. Partners in Trade have a *common* Interest, which is the same, the Flourishing of the Partnership Business: But they may moreover have each a *separate* Interest; and in pursuit of that *separate* Interest, one of them may endeavour to impose on the other, may cheat him in the Accounts, may draw to himself more than his Share of the Profits, may put upon the other more than an equal Share of the Burthen. Their having a common Interest is no Security against such Injustice. . . .⁶⁷

VI. DEMOCRACY

It is fair to ask how Franklin's views on the above matters square with his avowal of radically democratic notions after 1775. In view of the foregoing, Franklin would not, it seems, agree with the underlying assumptions of Jeffersonian democracy, stated by Jefferson himself: "Nature hath implanted in our breasts a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses . . ." It was also Jefferson who believed "that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice."⁶⁸ On this faith in the rationality and goodness of man, the theory of Jeffersonian democracy has been erected. Vernon L. Parrington said of Franklin that "he was a forerunner of Jefferson, like him firm in the conviction that government was good in the measure that it remained close to the people."⁶⁹ Charles A. Beard, discussing the members of the Federal Convention, tells us that Benjamin Franklin "seems to have entertained a more hopeful view of democracy than any other member of that

⁶⁵ *Writings*, Vol. 8, p. 28. Cf. the expression of the same idea 36 years earlier in *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 242.

⁶⁶ *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press* (cited in note 55), p. 183.

⁶⁷ Marginal comments in *Good Humour, or, A Way with the Colonies* (London, 1766), pp. 26-27. Franklin's copy is in the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. This comment is reprinted in *A Collection of the Familiar Letters and Miscellaneous Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Jared Sparks (Boston, 1833), p. 229.

⁶⁸ Jefferson to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814, and to Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823, quoted by Adrienne Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1943), pp. 19, 139.

⁶⁹ Vernon L. Parrington, *The Main Currents of American Thought*, 3 vols. (New York, 1930), Vol. 1, pp. 176-77.

famous group."⁷⁰ All this must seem rather strange in view of the none too optimistic conception of human nature which we have found in Franklin. His radically democratic views after 1775—before that time his outlook seemed essentially conservative—baffled contemporary observers as it has later students.

There is, as a matter of fact, plenty of evidence of Franklin's sincere devotion to monarchy during the greater part of his life. It was the most natural thing for him to assure his friend, the famous Methodist preacher George Whitefield, that a settlement of colonies on the Ohio would be blessed with success "if we undertook it with sincere Regard to . . . the Service of our gracious King, and (which is the same thing) the Publick Good."⁷¹ Franklin loved to contrast the corruption of Parliament and the virtues of George III. To an American friend, he said that he could "scarcely conceive a King of better Dispositions, of more exemplary virtues, or more truly desirous of promoting the Welfare of all his Subjects."⁷²

Another "conservative" aspect of Franklin which cannot be glossed over lightly is his acceptance of the Puritan and mercantilistic attitude towards the economic problems of the working class. Throughout his life he was critical of the English Poor Laws. He deplored "the proneness of human nature to a life of ease, of freedom from care and labour," and he considered that laws which "compel the rich to maintain the poor" might possibly be "fighting against the order of God and Nature, which perhaps has appointed want and misery as the proper punishments for, and cautions against, as well as necessary consequences of, idleness and extravagance."⁷³ This was written in 1753. But as late as 1789, long after he had come out for the political equality of the poor and for a radical theory of property, he still confirmed to an English correspondent that "I have long been of your opinion, that your legal provision for the poor is a very great evil, operating as it does to the encouragement of idleness."⁷⁴

Franklin's endorsement of democracy is most emphatically revealed in his advocacy of a unicameral legislature for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as for the federal government. The issue of unicameral versus bicameral legislative bodies—an issue much discussed in the latter decades of the eighteenth century—reflected faithfully, as a rule, the clash of views of two different theories of human nature and of politics. The bicameral system was based on the principle of checks and balances; a pessimistic view of human nature naturally would try to forestall the abuse of power in a single and all-powerful as-

⁷⁰ Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (New York, 1913), p. 197.

⁷¹ *Writings*, Vol. 3, p. 339. See also Vol. 2, pp. 377-78; Vol. 4, pp. 94, 213.

⁷² *Writings*, Vol. 5, p. 204. See also Vol. 5, p. 261. Another sign of Franklin's anti-radical attitude during his stay in England is his disgust with the Wilkes case. See *Writings*, Vol. 5, pp. 121, 133, 134, and 150. Also *Letters and Papers of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson, 1753-1785*, ed. Carl Van Doren (Philadelphia, 1947), p. 139.

⁷³ *Letters and Papers of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson, op. cit.*, pp. 34, 35.

⁷⁴ *Writings*, Vol. 10, p. 64. See for an elaboration of his arguments "On the Labouring Poor," *Writings*, Vol. 5, pp. 122-27, and "On the Price of Corn, and Management of the Poor," *Writings*, Vol. 5, pp. 534-39.

sembly. On the other hand, most of those who trusted in the faculties of human reason did not see the necessity for a second chamber to check and harass the activities of a body of reasonable men.

In the case of Franklin, however, this correspondence of political convictions with views on human nature is lacking. He was the president of the Pennsylvania Convention of 1776 which—almost uniquely among the American states—set up a unicameral system. This, of course, filled many of the French *philosophes* with great joy. Franklin, they supposed, had secured a triumph of enlightened principles in the new world. Condorcet, in his "Éloge de Franklin," had this to say:

Franklin's voice alone decided this last provision. He thought that as enlightenment would naturally make rapid progress, above all in a country to which the revolution had given a new system, one ought to encourage the devices of perfecting legislation, and not to surround them with extrinsic obstacles. . . . The opinion contrary to his stands for that discouraging philosophy which considers error and corruption as the habitual state of societies and the development of virtue and reason as a kind of miracle which one must not expect to make enduring. It was high time that a philosophy both nobler and truer should direct the destiny of mankind, and Franklin was worthy to give the first example of it.⁷⁶

As a matter of fact, it has since been shown that Franklin, who at the time of the Pennsylvania Convention also served in the Continental Congress, played a minor role in the adoption of the unicameral system. The unicameral legislature was rooted in the historical structure of Pennsylvania's proprietary government.⁷⁶ This, however, is irrelevant from our point of view, since Franklin endorsed and defended the unicameral system in his "Queries and Remarks respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsylvania," written in November, 1789.⁷⁷

In the opposition to checks and balances and a second chamber, Franklin's most famous companion was Thomas Paine, author of *The Age of Reason*. This similarity of views between Franklin and one of the most vocal spokesmen of the creed of reason and the perfectibility of man perhaps contributes to the misinterpretation of Franklin's position among the eighteenth-century philosophers. Paine's arguments against the system of checks and balances and for a single house were characteristic of the later Enlightenment:

Freedom is the associate of innocence, not the companion of suspicion. She only requires to be cherished, not to be caged, and to be beloved is, to her, to be protected. Her residence is in the undistinguished multitude of rich and poor, and a partisan to neither is the patroness of all.⁷⁸

This argument, of course, presupposes the rationality and goodness of human nature. We might perhaps agree with Paine that "no man was a better judge of

⁷⁶ *Oeuvres de Condorcet* (cited in note 1), Vol. 3, pp. 401-2.

⁷⁶ See J. Paul Selsam, *The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776* (Philadelphia, 1926), and Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History*, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1934-38), Vol. 3, p. 320.

⁷⁷ *Writings*, Vol. 10, pp. 54-60.

⁷⁸ "A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Present Situation of their Affairs" (Dec., 1778), in *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, ed. Philip S. Foner, 2 vols. (New York, 1945), Vol. 2, p. 284.

human nature than Franklin,"⁷⁹ but Paine certainly did not have Franklin's conception of human nature.

The reasons for Franklin's almost radical attitude in 1776 and 1787 appear in his own writings. One thing seems certain: belief in the goodness and the wisdom of the people is *not* at the root of his democratic faith. This idea is quite foreign to Franklin. Discussing the Albany Plan of Union in 1754, he thought that "it is very possible, that this general government might be as well and faithfully administered without the people, as with them."⁸⁰ Nor did he fundamentally change his view in the last years of his life. "Popular favour is very precarious, being sometimes *lost* as well as *gained* by good actions." In 1788, he wrote publicly that "popular Opposition to a public Measure is no Proof of its Impropriety."⁸¹ What a strange democrat it was who told the Federal Convention that "there is a natural Inclination in Mankind to kingly Government."⁸² The most plausible and popular reason for belief in democracy, then, is eliminated.

On the other hand, Franklin did not believe in the intrinsic goodness of the wealthy or the wisdom of the powerful; he had no liking for aristocratic government, be it by an aristocracy of wealth or an aristocracy of birth. He was scornful of the House of Lords and thought "Hereditary Professors of Mathematicks" preferable to hereditary legislators because they could do less mischief.⁸³

It is noteworthy that in the whole of Franklin's work only one reference to Montesquieu can be found; and that concerns his ideas on criminal law. Separation of powers, the role of the aristocracy in a healthy society—these are doctrines which never took possession of Franklin's mind.

The antithesis between Adams, under the influence of Harrington, and Franklin, chiefly influenced by his own experience, is remarkably complete. Adams wrote:

It must be remembered that the rich are *people* as well as the poor; that they have rights as well as others; they have as clear and as *sacred* a right to their large property as others have to theirs which is smaller; that oppression to them is as possible and wicked as to others. . . .⁸⁴

Franklin mounts a formidable counterattack:

And why should the upper House, chosen by a Minority, have equal Power with the lower chosen by a majority? Is it supposed that Wisdom is the necessary concomitant of Riches . . . and why is Property to be represented at all? . . . The Combinations of Civil Society

⁷⁹ "Constitutional Reform" (1805), *ibid.*, pp. 998-99.

⁸⁰ *Writings*, Vol. 3, p. 231. See also p. 309.

⁸¹ *Writings*, Vol. 9, pp. 564, 702. In 1788, Franklin repeatedly said that there was at present the "danger of too little obedience in the *governed*," although in general the opposite evil of "giving too much power to our *governors*" was more dreaded. *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 638; and Vol. 10, p. 7.

⁸² *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 593.

⁸³ *Writings*, Vol. 6, pp. 370-71. For other attacks on the principle of hereditary honors and privileges, in connection with the Order of the Cincinnati, see *Writings*, Vol. 9, pp. 162, 336.

⁸⁴ Quoted by Zoltán Haraszti, *John Adams and the Prophets of Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 36.

are not like those of a Set of Merchants, who club their Property in different Proportions for Building and Freightening a Ship, and may therefore have some Right to Vote in the Disposition of the Voyage in a greater or less Degree according to their respective Contributions; but the important ends of Civil Society, and the personal Securities of Life and Liberty, these remain the same in every member of the Society; and the poorest continues to have an equal Claim to them with the most opulent. . . .⁸⁵

It is this strong objection against the attempt to use—openly or covertly—a second chamber as a tool of class rule which seems to underlie Franklin's disapproval of the bicameral system. Franklin, it should be pointed out, was aware of the necessity and inevitability of poises and counter-poises. This is shown by his attempt, referred to above, to create a sort of balance of passions, checking avarice with ambition. There exist some, though quite rare, allusions to a balance of power concept in his utterances on imperial and international relations. The most pointed and direct reference to the idea of checks and balances, however, may be found in an unpublished letter to a well-known figure of Pennsylvania politics, Joseph Galloway, in 1767. Franklin discussed and welcomed a new Circuit Bill for the judges of Pennsylvania. He suggested and encouraged an increase in the salaries to be granted by the Assembly for the judges to offset the nominating and recalling powers of the Proprietor: "From you they should therefore receive a Salary equal in Influence upon their Minds, to be held during your Pleasure. For where the Beam is moveable, it is only by equal Weights in opposite scales that it can possibly be kept even."⁸⁶

Consequently, the arguments of Thomas Paine or the French *philosophes*, which derive their validity from assumptions about the goodness or rationality of human nature, do not hold in the case of Franklin. In a brilliant recent essay it has been suggested that "despite the European flavor of a Jefferson or a Franklin, the Americans refused to join in the great Enlightenment enterprise of shattering the Christian concept of sin, replacing it with an unlimited humanism, and then emerging with an early enterprise as glittering as the heavenly one that had been destroyed."⁸⁷ As far as Franklin is concerned, however, the alternatives of Calvinist pessimism and the "unlimited humanism" of the European Enlightenment do not really clarify the essential quality of his political thought. His thought is rooted in a climate of opinion which combined the rejection of the doctrine of original sin with a rather modest view of human nature.

It seems, then, that the desire for equality, rather than any rationalistic concepts, offers the clue to an adequate understanding of those elements in Frank-

⁸⁵ "Queries and Remarks . . .," *Writings*, Vol. 10, pp. 58-61. For Franklin's disagreement with the bicameral system of the United States Constitution, see *Writings*, Vol. 9, pp. 645, 674. The paradox of Franklin's attitude is thrown into relief if one considers that even Jefferson, in his *Notes on Virginia*, raised his voice against the dangers of an "elective despotism," and exalted "those benefits" which a "proper complication of principles" would produce. *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York and London, 1904-5), Vol. 4, p. 19.

⁸⁶ April 14, 1767, in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

⁸⁷ Louis Hartz, "American Political Thought and the American Revolution," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 48, pp. 321-42, at p. 324 (June, 1952).

lin's political thought which at first sight appear inconsistent with his not too cheerful view of human goodness. His striving for equality also suggests a solution to the thorny problem of reconciling his democratic views after he had decided for American independence with his faithful loyalty to the Crown before that date. The American interest obliged him to fight against Parliament—an aristocratic body in those days—while remaining loyal to the King; in recognizing the King's sovereignty while denying the Parliament's rights over the Colonies, Franklin by necessity was driven into a position which—historically speaking—seemed to contradict his Whig principles. The complaining Americans spoke, as Lord North rightly said, the "language of Toryism."⁸⁸ During the decade before 1775 Franklin fought for the equal rights of England and the Colonies under the Crown. But his desire for equality went deeper than that. In his "Some good Whig Principles," while conceding that the government of Great Britain ought to be lodged "in the hands of King, Lords of Parliament, and Representatives of the whole body of the freemen of this realm," he took care to affirm that "*every man* of the commonalty (excepting infants, insane persons, and criminals) is, of common right, and by the laws of God, *a freeman*" and that "the poor man has an *equal* right, but *more* need, to have representatives in the legislature than the rich one."⁸⁹ It has not been widely known that Franklin, in a conversation with Benjamin Vaughan, his friend and at the same time emissary of the British Prime Minister Lord Shelburne during the peace negotiations of 1782, has confirmed this view. Vaughan reported to Shelburne that "Dr. Franklin's opinions about *parliaments* are, that people should not be rejected as electors because they are at *present* ignorant"; Franklin thought that "a statesman should meliorate his people," and Vaughan supposed that Franklin "would put this, among other reasons for extending the privilege of election, that it *would* meliorate them." It was Franklin's opinion, Vaughan thought, "that the lower people are as we see them, because oppressed; & then their situation in point of manners, becomes the reason for oppressing them."⁹⁰ The fact is that Franklin's overriding concern for equality foreshadows the attacks of the socialism of later generations on the absolute sanctity of private property:

All the Property that is necessary to a Man, for the Conservation of the Individual and the Propagation of the Species, is his natural Right, which none can justly deprive him of: But all Property superfluous to such purposes is the Property of the Publick, who, by their Laws, have created it, and who may therefore by other Laws dispose of it, whenever the Welfare of the Publick shall demand such Disposition.⁹¹

Franklin's previously quoted speech in the Federal Convention provides us with an essential insight: he expressed belief in "a natural Inclination in Mankind to kingly Government." His reasons are revealing: "It sometimes relieves

⁸⁸ Quoted by G. H. Guttridge, *English Whiggism and the American Revolution* (Berkeley, 1942), p. 62.

⁸⁹ *Writings*, Vol. 10, p. 130.

⁹⁰ Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne, November 24, 1782. Benjamin Vaughan Papers in the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. Photostat in the Benjamin Vaughan Collection in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

⁹¹ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 138 (written in 1783). See also Vol. 10, p. 59.

them from Aristocratic Domination. They had rather one Tyrant than 500. It gives more of the Appearance of Equality among Citizens; and that they like."²² Equality, then, is not incompatible with monarchy.

From all this a significant conclusion may be drawn. It is an oversimplification to speak of Franklin's "conservatism" before 1775 and of his "radicalism" after 1775. Professor MacIver illustrates the conservative character of the first stage of American political thought preceding the appeal to natural rights by reference to Franklin, who, in spite of his later attacks on the Order of the Cincinnati, "nevertheless clung to the principle of a hereditary, though constitutional monarchy, until the tide of revolution rendered it untenable."²³ The term "conservative" does not do justice to the possibility of paying faithful allegiance to a monarchy and still disliking aristocracies of heredity or wealth. Because of his innate desire for equality, as well as his defense of the American cause against the encroachments of Parliament, Franklin found it much easier to be a monarchist. Monarchy, rather than aristocracy, was compatible with those elements of his thought which after 1775 made him a democrat.

Another of the factors which, while not incompatible with monarchical feelings, contributed greatly to Franklin's acceptance of democracy, is the belief which he shared with Hume that power, in the last analysis, is founded on opinion. "I wish some good Angel would forever whisper in the Ears of your great Men, that Dominion is founded in Opinion, and that if you would preserve your Authority among us, you must preserve the Opinion we us'd to have of your Justice."²⁴ He thought that "Government must depend for it's Efficiency either on Force or Opinion." Force, however, is not as efficient as Opinion: "Alexander and Caesar. . . received more faithful service, and performed greater actions, by means of the love their soldiers bore them, than they could possibly have done, if, instead of being beloved and respected, they had been hated and feared by those they commanded." Efficiency, then, became an argument for democracy. "Popular elections have their inconvenience in some cases; but in establishing new forms of government, we cannot always obtain what we may think the best; for the prejudices of those concerned, if they cannot be removed, must be in some degree complied with."²⁵

It has rarely been noticed how detached Franklin, the greatest champion of democracy in the Federal Convention, was from the problem of the best government. His speech at the conclusion of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention may give us a clue to the perplexing problem of why he gave comparatively little attention to the theoretical questions of political philosophy and devoted almost all his time to the solution of concrete issues. He stated his disagreement with several points of the Constitution, nevertheless urging general allegiance and loyalty to its principles. Asking his colleagues to doubt a

²² *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 539.

²³ R. M. MacIver, "European Doctrines and the Constitution," in *The Constitution Reconsidered* (cited in note 25), p. 55.

²⁴ *Letters and Papers of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson* (cited in note 72), p. 145 (written in 1764). See also *Writings*, Vol. 6, p. 129; Vol. 9, p. 608.

²⁵ *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press* (cited in note 55), p. 193; *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 56; Vol. 3, p. 228. See also Vol. 3, 231; Vol. 5, p. 79.

little their feeling of infallibility, Franklin summed up the experience of his life: "I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no *form* of government but what may be a blessing to the people, if well administered."⁹⁶ Perhaps in speaking these words he was thinking of one of the favorite writers of his younger days, Alexander Pope:

For Forms of Government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.⁹⁷

VII. THE DUALITY OF FRANKLIN'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

There are two outstanding and sometimes contradictory factors in Franklin's political thought. On the one hand, we find an acute comprehension of the power factor in human nature, and, consequently, in politics. On the other hand, Franklin always during his long life revolted in the name of equality against the imperfections of the existing order. He himself stated the basic antithesis of his political thought: Power versus Equality.

Fortunately, Franklin's notes on the problem at hand have been preserved; they are to be found in his marginal comments to Allen Ramsay's pamphlet, *Thoughts on the Origin and Nature of Government*, which presents the straight view of power politics. Franklin rebelled against the rationalization and justification of the power factor. "The natural weakness of man in a solitary State," Ramsay proclaimed, "prompts him to fly for protection to whoever is able to afford it, that is to some one more powerful, than himself; while the more powerful standing equally in need of his service, readily receives it in return for the protection he gives." Franklin's answer is unequivocal: "*May not Equals unite with Equals for common Purposes?*"⁹⁸

In the last analysis, Franklin looked upon government as the trustee of the people. He had stated this Whig principle in his very first publication as a sixteen-year-old boy⁹⁹ and he never deviated from it. So in opposition to Ramsay's doctrine, according to which the governed have no right of control whatsoever, once they have agreed to submit themselves to the sovereign, Franklin declared the accountability of the rulers:

If I appoint a Representative for the express purpose of doing a business for me that is for *my Service* and that of others, & to consider what I am to pay as my Proportion of the Expense necessary for accomplishing that Business, I am then tax'd by my own Consent.— A Number of Persons unite to form a Company for Trade, Expences are necessary, Directors are chosen to do the Business & proportion those Expences. They are paid a Reasonable Consideration for their Trouble. Here is nothing of weak & Strong. Protection on one hand, & Service on the other. The Directors are the Servants, not the Masters; their Duty is prescrib'd, the Powers they have is from the members & returns to them. The Directors are also accountable.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 607.

⁹⁷ Pope, "Essay on Man," Epistle 3, *Selected Works* (cited in note 17), p. 124.

⁹⁸ [Allen Ramsay], *Thoughts on the Origin and Nature of Government* (London, 1769),

p. 10. Franklin's copy in the Jefferson Collection of the Library of Congress. (My italics.)

⁹⁹ "Dogood Papers," *Writings*, Vol. 2, p. 26. Cf. *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press* (cited in note 55), p. 140.

¹⁰⁰ Marginal notes to Ramsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

Franklin refused to recognize that power alone could create right. When Ramsay declared that according to nature's laws every man "in Society shall rank himself amongst the Ruling or the Ruled, . . . all Equality and Independence being by the Law of Nature strictly forbidden . . .," Franklin rejoined indignantly, "I do not find this Strange Law among those of Nature. I doubt it is forged. . . ." He summarized Ramsay's doctrine as meaning that "He that is strongest may do what he pleases with those that are weaker," and commented angrily: "A most Equitable Law of Nature indeed."¹⁰¹

On the other hand, Franklin's grasp of the realities of power inevitably involved him in moral and logical ambiguities of political decision. At times he expressed the tragic conflict of ethics and politics. Characteristic of the peculiar contradiction within his political thought was this statement three years before the Declaration of Independence on England's prospects in the Anglo-American conflict: "*Power* does not infer *Right*; and, as the *Right* is nothing, and the *Power* (by our Increase) continually diminishing, the one will soon be as insignificant as the *other*."¹⁰² In this instance, obviously, he was trying to make the best of both worlds. But there were times when he was only too well aware of the conflict of these two worlds. In a passage which seems to have escaped the notice of most students of his political thought, Franklin observed that "*moral and political Rights sometimes differ, and sometimes are both subdu'd by Might*."¹⁰³

The measured terms of Franklin's political thinking present a striking contrast to the optimism and rationalism which we usually associate with the Age of Enlightenment. Franklin's insight into the passions of pride and power prevented him from applying the expectation of man's scientific and intellectual progress to the realm of moral matters. To be sure, he would not deny the influence of scientific insights upon politics, and he thought that a great deal of good would result from introducing the enlightened doctrines of free trade and physiocracy into international politics. But Franklin, unlike many of his friends in France, was never inclined to consider these and other ideas as panaceas. The mutual adjustment of interests would always remain the chief remedy of political evils. It was in this domain that reason, as a temper in the conduct of human affairs, made its greatest contribution to his political thought. Moderation and equity, so he had been taught by his experience (rather than by abstract reasoning) were true political wisdom. His belief that the rulers ought to be accountable, together with his more pragmatic conviction that force alone, in the long run, could not solve the great problems of politics, brought forth his declaration of faith that "Government is not establish'd merely by *Power*; there must be maintain'd a general Opinion of its *Wisdom* and *Justice* to make it firm and durable."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

¹⁰² *Writings*, Vol. 6, p. 87.

¹⁰³ *Writings*, Vol. 8, p. 304. (My italics.)

¹⁰⁴ *Benjamin Franklin's Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Carl Van Doren (New York, 1945), pp. 184-85. Cf. *Writings*, Vol. 4, p. 269; Vol. 7, p. 390.

PURPOSES, PROCEDURES, AND OUTCOMES OF THE COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT ON CONVENTION DELEGATIONS*

PAUL T. DAVID

The Brookings Institution

The official beginnings of the Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations date from the opening of the project office at the Association's headquarters in Washington on March 10, 1952. But the project had roots reaching far back into previous activities. Two committees of the Association had made suggestions for activities similar to those eventually put under way by the project: the Committee on Political Parties and the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching. In September, 1951, following the Association's meeting in San Francisco, the then chairmen of those committees, Bertram M. Gross and Claude E. Hawley, began actively seeking means of organizing field work and creating teaching materials on the forthcoming preconvention campaigns and national political conventions of 1952. For a time it appeared that a project along those lines might be organized under the auspices of the Brookings Institution; and the director of the present project became involved in the conversations. Later it became clear that if the project were to be organized at all, it would probably need to be under the Association's own auspices, although the cooperation of the Brookings Institution was an important factor in early planning.

By November, 1951 the Executive Director of the Association had cleared a draft proposal with the other officers and began negotiations with several foundations. One of those foundations, although uninterested itself, passed on the proposal to Dr. Will W. Alexander, an adviser of a newly established family foundation in New Orleans. He expressed interest and was given a formal submission under date of January 10, 1952. His principals approved the initial grant of \$30,000 to the Association for the project on March 8, 1952.

Since then the project has developed with a logic of its own through several expansions, reorganizations, and refinancings. It is being completed in close association with the Brookings Institution, which is underwriting the final stages of central office staff work. A five-volume, 48-state report will be published by the Johns Hopkins Press under the title *Presidential Nominating Politics in*

* This is an abbreviated version of a paper prepared at the request of the officers of the Association and was discussed by one of the panel groups at the forty-ninth annual meeting of the Association, Washington, D. C., September 10, 1953. The literature of research administration does not contain many published case histories of a kind that would be useful to those who find themselves involved in planning or approving new research ventures in the social sciences that are comparable in scale and complexity to the present one. The present story has been told in some detail and with extensive use of the underlying documentation in the hope that it may be useful in a wider context, as well as in future administrative and policy discussions of the Association. The writer has served as director of the project here described since its inception.

1952. Several hundred members of the Association and students have participated in various stages of the project. Approximately a hundred will receive recognition as principal contributors to the regional volumes of the report.

I. PURPOSES

From the first the project was envisioned as a multi-purpose affair. Purposes were spelled out in some detail in the prospectus. It was hoped that project results would make a contribution to: (1) party and public policy, (2) university, college, and secondary school instruction, and (3) research methodology.

Research Contributing to Policy. The reasons for studying the delegates and delegations are indicated in the following paragraphs which appeared in the proposal¹ in a more extended context:

The unique character of the American political conventions is largely to be found in their unpredictability. In most other countries, the likely outcomes of a political convention are well known before it meets. Sometimes we think we know what an American convention will do; but there is always the possibility of surprise. The conventions next year have unusual possibilities. It is reasonable to assume that what a national convention will do is affected by the decisions that go into the choosing of state delegations, delegation leaders, and individual delegates. We know that the method of choosing delegates varies widely from state to state. The states using the primary have no standard system. Neither is there uniformity among the states using state conventions to select their national convention delegates, nor among the few that leave matters to their state committees. Even where the law is much the same, practice can be very different. The decisions affecting delegation behavior are correspondingly difficult to trace to their roots. They require careful local study.

The national convention is the one place where some sort of uneasy combination must be brought together from the politics of the Presidency, of the Congress, of the 48 state governments, and of the many local political machines. To understand the combination we must understand the pieces of which it is made up. The pieces are not the delegations, but rather the political factions and power centers that lie back of them. Since those factions and centers come into action during the months in which delegates are being selected and committed, that period offers an excellent opportunity to learn substantially more about the political atlas of the United States.

The proposal then followed with two pages of questions on which it seemed desirable to have more information about delegates and delegations, discussed available research facilities, outlined a research plan, and indicated tentative plans for project reports. It was through the eventual reports that it was hoped the project would contribute to party and public policy. A part of the commentary on this prospect was as follows:

Party leaders need facts and analysis. Very few of them are familiar with the political mechanics of all 48 states—unless they have already been through the education that comes from managerial responsibility for a presidential campaign. Citizens concerned with governmental improvement on a nationwide basis need facts and analysis even more. They do not have the working politician's ready access to other politicians for word-of-mouth information. They are more likely to be trapped by the easy assumption that what is true for one familiar area is also true for others. No one has ever written an accurate

¹ "A Proposal to Study the Delegates and Delegations Attending the National Political Conventions in Chicago in July 1952," 8 pp. mimeo., undated, prepared December, 1951.

layman's guide to the national politics of the 48 states. The present project will not produce a complete political atlas, but it would be a start in that direction. The research findings of the project will be made available as rapidly and as completely as possible. . . . After the conventions, the project staff would revise and assemble all of the project materials that warrant publication in some permanent form. . . . The final results of the project could be expected to include at least one readable report, as well as a body of research material for continued use by scholars. The report should bring the findings of the project to the attention of opinion leaders and party officials. The research materials, whether published in book form or otherwise, will find their way into further research and scholarly writing.

Development of Teaching Materials. The prospective contributions of the project to teaching materials were predicted with some confidence:

The project as a whole would provide invaluable material for teaching purposes, a basic objective of the Association. In even the earliest working stages, the project plan would suggest analytical methods that could be applied to a currently interesting subject. These methods could be used in any class or seminar on political parties during the period of the pre-convention campaigns. The interviewing would provide a specialized form of research training for the political scientists and graduate students who participate. The completed state reports would go directly into the teaching materials for future years in the co-operating institutions. They could be made available to other educational institutions on both secondary and higher education levels in every part of the country. The national reports would be directly useful as teaching material as soon as published. The tabulations and analyses would soon be absorbed into the textbooks in the course of the revisions they perennially undergo.

Research Methodology. The project contemplated field work undertaken simultaneously in many scattered sections of the country, and was thus clearly beyond the normal competence of individual scholars and institutions. This was one of the major reasons for organizing the project under the auspices of the Association. In going ahead with the project, the officers of the Association were largely motivated by a desire to test the feasibility of such research; and this was recognized in the proposal:

While the project should yield useful results of immediate interest, its experimental nature also must be emphasized. The project as a whole will be an experiment in a type of co-operative research that has not often been attempted. We believe it important to measure the effectiveness of group research undertaken in far-flung portions of the country by means of professional organization. We expect to accept some calculated risks in using research methods that may or may not work to our full satisfaction. The more successful the project is in its immediate outcomes, the more certain it is that four years from now it will be regarded merely as a working model for a better project in 1956. The progress of science depends upon research work that can be duplicated, repeated, and improved upon by using the results of one project in organizing the next one. It would be strange indeed if that principle were not applicable in the present case.

Political Parties as a Subject for Research. In presenting the proposal, the Association also put the matter in a broader framework. After referring to the work and outcomes of the Committee on Political Parties, the following statement was made:²

² The American Political Science Association (APSA), letter from Dr. Edward H. Litchfield, Executive Director, to Dr. Will W. Alexander, January 10, 1952, 6 pp. mimeo.

The Committee's work, however, even the controversies it has engendered, have served to demonstrate the need for more information. As a matter of fact, the whole field of political parties is one that we consider neglected so far as scholarly and scientific investigation is concerned. Foundations and individuals have given their support mainly for research into the formal institutions of the government. The structure of Congress, the civil service, the budget system, the organization of the executive branch of the federal government, many aspects of state and local government have all been the subject of highly organized and often of liberally financed inquiries. By comparison, little financial assistance has been provided from any source for a massing of the facts and a careful analysis of the political processes upon which American democracy depends.

We recognize that many citizens are dissatisfied, pessimistic, and cynical about the political parties. But we see no reason to believe that the parties are either immune to change or incapable of improvement. If this were in fact the case, it would be hard to believe that reform could be successful for other aspects of government, since the parties are so basic. Actually, the parties have changed considerably in recent decades, and we believe that the processes of change can be accelerated. Change would be facilitated by a more general recognition that the parties are the instruments through which the people can seek to obtain the kind of government they want. Subject to a final screening by the electorate, it is the parties that produce the personnel to whom the Constitution gives authority in the making and the execution of the laws.

The Executive Director then commented on the current timeliness and strategic possibilities of the proposed project, on the facilities of the Association for carrying it on, on the alleged qualifications of the project director to be supplied by the Brookings Institution, and on the details of project financing. He concluded by saying:

Cooperation will doubtless be variable from state to state; but for most states, we are certain that the profession will rally to the active support of this kind of a project. There is good reason for believing this: each cooperating institution would be provided with help and a plan for a specific piece of research of direct local significance. From the point of view of the institutions, the national value of the project as a whole would be merely an extra bonus and a means of giving added prestige to the local effort. The project would have useful local results independently of its success for the country as a whole; that is why we can be so certain of the cooperation on which the project will depend.

Purposes of the Donors. The donors were under no compulsion to make any statement of their own purposes in making the grant. From informal conversation, however, it may be deduced that they had purposes even broader in some respects than those contemplated by the Association. As persons with long-term civic interests, they had come to feel a deep concern over the future of government in America. The thought had occurred to them that possibly some improvement in the attributes and status of political science as a profession would eventually be helpful in the improvement of government. The proposed project seemed potentially to offer the promise of useful experiences for those members of the profession who participated. Even if the eventual published reports and other substantive outcomes were disappointing, it could still be hoped that the project would increase the number of political scientists who would go out into the world of reality to observe, experience directly, and report on the political turmoil of 1952. Accordingly, after securing excellent advice and after undoubtedly being told with some authority that the project might quite likely be a failure, the donors went ahead and made their grant.

II. PROCEDURES

No complicated or particularly novel methodologies in the narrower sense of the term have been used in the Cooperative Research Project at any time. Yet the project may come to be regarded as a milestone in developing the methodology of the profession. It has pioneered in developing techniques for two kinds of accomplishment, both of which seemed in advance to include many elements of the impossible: (1) the mobilizing of a far-flung army for research on what was essentially a voluntary basis, and (2) the effective use of the results of voluntary research in developing an integrated national report. The voluntary aspect of participation in the Cooperative Research Project has been its most unique characteristic. It has had consequences at every stage and was largely responsible for the elements of unpredictability that have led to many unanticipated changes in administrative plans. This aspect of the project did not come about wholly by accident, but the extent to which it was to dominate the project was certainly not expected at the beginning.

Original Working Plan. The working plan of March, 1952 was scaled down considerably from earlier notions. It was already too late to do many things that might have been attempted in November, 1951, or even January, 1952, before the beginning of the second semester of the academic year. In particular, a plan for state project directors each of whom would take a consolidated assignment for both political parties in his state was abandoned in favor of the individual state delegation as the unit of assignment. The plan was mainly built around a budget allotment for fifteen case studies of as many delegations. Delegations were selected tentatively in terms of primaries vs. state conventions as the means of delegate selection, importance of the state, regional distribution, and prospective academic availabilities. By the end of March, case studies had been set in motion for the Republican delegations of Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Washington, and Oregon, and for the Democratic delegations of New York, Georgia, Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California. Each case study director had made a definite commitment to get in a report by June, had been assured of \$150 to \$250 for travel in the state and other incidentals, and had been promised an honorarium of like amount upon submission of his report. Suggestions on procedure had been circulated.³

An incidental feature of the original plan represented an effort to secure some information on a broader geographic basis in addition to the case studies. Under date of March 12, 1952, the Executive Director sent out a circular letter extending a general invitation to participate in the project. This letter was sent initially to the heads of political science departments in each of two institutions in every state where no case study was contemplated. When recipients regretted, the letter was then sent to another institution. An outline was developed for the hoped-for contents of the case study reports.⁴ This was also sent to project participants at the volunteering institutions; they were told that a "short

³ Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations (CRPCD), "Notes on Procedure in Carrying on Case Studies," March 31, 1952, 8 pp. mimeo.

⁴ CRPCD, "Tentative Outline for a Case Study Report," April 4, 1952, 5 pp. mimeo.

report" conforming so far as feasible to the outline would be appreciated. A small honorarium (\$20) was offered for each "short report."

At that point, the eventual project report was visualized as a book containing about a dozen chapters developed from the best of the pre-convention case study reports, with additional chapters of summary and analysis based so far as possible on all materials received. It had been explicitly agreed with the case study directors that the national project staff would have full freedom to use the materials in any way that seemed most conducive to the production of a suitable national report. Local reproduction or publishing was also contemplated as a possibility for much of the material.

Work at the Conventions. The original plan did not contemplate organized work at the national conventions. But a number of the case study directors made it clear that they intended to follow through with the study of their delegations in the actual convention setting. Other possibilities began to emerge, in view of the tremendous surge of popular and professional interest in the conventions as the time approached. The national staff (project director, assistant, and secretary) moved to Chicago for the entire month of July, bringing along the project files. The University of Chicago provided ample working space at its downtown center, and made housing available for project participants. Both National Committees cooperated by providing periodical press gallery privileges at the conventions for the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. Project participants in the field were assured of a working base, housing, and at least limited facilities if they decided to come to Chicago at their own expense. Volunteers were recruited at the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Roosevelt College, and through the Chicago League of Women Voters. The main objective was to secure further reports on the delegations previously studied in the field. This objective was accomplished for around 25 delegations at the Republican convention and, on a more organized and intensive basis, for about 15 at the Democratic. Modest honoraria were promised for reports, some of which did not arrive until months later.

Results of Open-End Volunteering. In budgeting for the "short reports," it was estimated that possibly as many as 25 would be received. Even after they had been promised in considerably larger numbers, there was doubt as to whether and when they would arrive. Eventually, almost all of those promised were received, but eight pre-convention reports on Republican delegations were received after that convention had opened, and some after it had adjourned. By mid-August, the project was in possession of 68 pre-convention field reports: reports for both delegations from 23 states, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia; reports on Republican delegations only from 10 states; reports on Democratic delegations only from 8 states. Chicago material of some sort was in hand for about 40 delegations. The manuscript materials exceeded 750,000 words; in addition, there were approximately three file drawers of exhibits, documents, and untabulated statistical materials.

The total was an immense body of chaotic but potentially valuable research material. The pre-convention delegation reports were the best organized part

of the mass, but they varied enormously in quality, depth, and coverage. In length they ranged from 6 to 160 pages. Some were carefully documented; others were obviously impressionistic. Many were written by political scientists who had acted as participant-observers, including several actual members of delegations at both national conventions. Others were no more than hasty rewrites from local newspaper sources. The relatively high quality of many of the "short reports" was the great surprise. At least half of them compared favorably with most of the case study reports. All of the case studies produced reports and several of them were excellent pieces of work, but they did not provide the major end-product of field reporting as had been planned and anticipated. Accordingly, in a general review of the situation at the Association's annual meeting at Buffalo, August, 1952, it was agreed that the distinction between case study reports and short reports was meaningless in further planning, and that no special preference could be given to the case study reports as such in developing a publishing plan.

Time Problems of Project Refinancing. The original grant had been negotiated under circumstances that left room for hope of a second grant if the project went well. The project director recommended efforts to secure a second grant in August, as soon as it was possible to take stock of the situation after the adjournment of the national conventions.⁵ The Association put forward a request for a grant of \$24,830 in mid-October and was informed of favorable action around the middle of November. The action at all stages was about as prompt and certainly as favorable as could be expected; many similar negotiations have taken far longer. But for about three months, the project staff was placed in an extremely uncomfortable situation. If there had been a positive and irrevocable decision in early August that no further financing would be forthcoming, a substantial report could nevertheless have been produced by devoting all energies to that objective. It would have involved drastic measures: the ruthless discarding of materials that were valuable but unfinished, a rapid and somewhat arbitrary selection of the most publishable parts of the material, and the construction of a matrix in which they could be organized in symposium fashion. But as long as further financing was a possibility, the project staff was inevitably required to spend much of its time in developing plans and doing the work required to write proposals and compile justifications for a second grant. One of the most harassing aspects of the situation was the administrative necessity for producing immediately some clear and positive statement on how to handle a body of material that was intractable in the highest degree. Time and money were both needed to develop any fully adequate plan for using the material; there was a point at which there was no assurance that either would be forthcoming.

Developing the Model for a State Chapter. During September, 1952 a number of political scientists in the Washington area and elsewhere acted as readers.

⁵ CRPCD, "Report of Progress and Proposed Future Plans," submitted to the Executive Director of the Association by the director of the project, August 19, 1952, 8 pp. mimeo. Attached to Executive Director's annual report as an exhibit.

Each of them reviewed eight or ten of the field reports. All expressed concern over the unevenness of the material and the difficulties inherent in making any comprehensive analysis based on it. The problems of noncomparability arose not only from the variation in observation and reporting, but also from the wide range of experience that had been placed on record. We did not realize it at the time, but actually the difficulty is inherent in trying to draw generalizations from any body of case material. A sympathetic attempt to understand any piece of human experience that is unified in its time, place, and cast of characters can do much to add to insight. Such insight can be very destructive of existing generalizations that have been too easily accepted. But to go on into the construction of new generalizations from case materials is something else again.

By the end of September, we had concluded that before anything else could be done, it would probably be necessary to do three things for a number of the states for which we had relatively ample material: (1) to provide a background for our more specialized material by organizing a limited amount of basic information about the state and its politics, including key facts as to recent election statistics and the like; (2) to prepare a summary of the information that had been reported about the state's Republican and Democratic delegations of 1952, following a standardized pattern so far as possible; and (3) to write a brief review and appraisal of the state's experience in 1952, to facilitate discussion and further study of that particular kind of experience. The project director was the first to try his hand at such an attempt. What was intended originally as a 2,500 word summary of the field reports for a single state, to be prepared hopefully in a week, turned into the labor of a month, with extensive further digging for facts. The draft ran to about 9,000 words, of which approximately two-thirds was condensed and rearranged from the original field reports. Three staff members, recruited on a temporary basis to assist in the summarizing, went through similar experiences on their first state assignments. Extensive staff discussions were held on project objectives, the kind of national report that would be most useful, and the most feasible methods for organizing the existing materials in the direction of such a report. The results were disappointing on the first round of assignments, better on the second. By the third, the work was beginning to shake down into a pattern.

By the end of January, 1953, the technique was stabilized in the "Notes on the Drafting of State Summaries."⁶ Thereafter the general pattern was followed for states that offered no unusual complication. Every state with a presidential primary law has proved to be a special problem, and so have the states that produced the major delegation contests at Chicago. The home states of the candidates for the presidential nomination have also proved to be still another significant special category.

Field Collaboration on Chapter Drafting. Every chapter draft prepared in

⁶ 14 pp. mimeo., issued originally as part of the front matter of "Part 1" of a preliminary and confidential draft of the project report, containing five state chapters, January 30, 1953.

Washington from field reports was prepared initially as a rough draft, with questions interspersed in the text. Frequently we stated the facts as we understood them, then asked: Is this correct? Gaps in data were pointed out with a request for further information. The usual practice was to send two copies of the manuscript in this form to each project reporter in the state with a request for help. Usually we received back a marked-up copy of the draft from each within a month. In some cases the collaboration was somewhat casual, but we were repeatedly surprised at the care and trouble taken by our colleagues in completing and verifying information at this stage. Apparently the questions we were able to raise were often a stimulating challenge. The chapter manuscripts were then mimeographed or hectographed and a supply sent to the field reporters. They usually then secured a reading of the manuscript by qualified critics in the state, mainly political reporters on newspapers and leading politicians in each party. With these comments in hand they sent in a revised or annotated draft for use in the final revision for publication.

Concurrently with this process for the states for which relatively ample field reports were available, a second round of field work was started in November, 1952 to fill out the reports for the other states. No attempt was made at that time to secure universal coverage, but where we had a report on one delegation from a state and none on the other, we solicited a report on the second delegation. And where states of more than average importance were entirely unreported, we made efforts to fill those gaps. As soon as the model for a state chapter was available and sample chapters could be distributed, we urged the use of the model by the project reporters who were still engaged in field work. By March of 1953 we were beginning to receive occasional state chapters that were in substantial conformity with the format. Usually they were more complete in their systematic coverage of the basic data than the original field reports, although with the passage of time some kinds of information were becoming difficult to obtain.

Where chapters were drafted initially in the field as such, we attempted to apply the same standards that we had been developing in the previous pattern of collaboration. Usually this meant some correspondence on points of fact, a condensation of the draft as submitted, and special attention to the sections of review and appraisal. In all of those sections we have attempted to bring in a perspective based on the total body of project experience. In a few instances the job of chapter drafting went back to the field even where relatively complete reports were already on file in the national office. These arrangements were in part a product of desperation, as the Washington staff found itself swamped with more work than it could turn out. We are especially indebted to our colleagues who agreed to labor further in those situations.

Publishing Problem and Solution. Publishing negotiations were begun in February, 1953, as soon as the first group of sample chapters became available. We anticipated the completion of approximately 30 state chapters in publishable form and were doing what we could to insure the inclusion of all the larger and more interesting states in the list. The state chapters most needed

were in many respects the most difficult to bring to maturity. Considered as individual research assignments, the range of difficulty between the most difficult and least difficult state chapters would probably be at least ten to one. In April, the Hopkins Press offered a commercial contract for the prospective book. No subsidy was requested, but the indicated selling price for a large one-volume report would have restricted distribution severely.

In May we faced the issue as to whether there was any feasible way of finishing the job for all 48 states, thereby making it possible to publish in the form of regional volumes. Several interlocking questions were involved: Was it still possible to organize the necessary field work, a year after the national conventions, for the missing states? Could we go back to the original donors for a third grant? Would the 48-state basis improve the publishing prospects sufficiently to make it possible to publish a multi-volume report without a subsidy? The Hopkins Press favored the 48-state, regional-volume pattern and did its best to identify potential markets that would justify publication without a subsidy. In the end, a small subsidy proved necessary, but the Association will eventually receive substantial royalties if the report goes well. The question of a third grant was explored and it was decided that it would be unwise to make the request. Project balances were adequate to pay the publishing subsidy and to provide moderate honoraria for further field work. The Brookings Institution agreed to provide central staff and office facilities after July 1, 1953; it was estimated that the total Brookings financial contribution to the project will be in excess of \$15,000.

The publishing contract was signed in early June on the assumption that the necessary field work could still be organized in all of the more important remaining states. Negotiations were successful and several of the resulting chapters are excellent. Chapter drafting was also undertaken in Washington for several smaller states where further field collaboration proved difficult to arrange. This work was largely completed during July, August, and September.

The Volume I Problem. From the first, project plans anticipated an eventual effort to summarize the entire body of data in various types of comprehensive analysis. Pressures to move immediately in that direction were strong in August and September, 1952, but the chaotic condition of the data at that time seemed to make it impossible. The model for a state chapter was developed in the hope that by standardizing the treatment of what were essentially case materials, nation-wide summaries would eventually become possible. By mid-spring of 1953, the kind of analysis represented by the review and appraisal sections of the individual state chapters was assuming increasing importance. This was a flexible type of approach, geared to the idiosyncrasies of the individual states and their widely differing political patterns. It also assimilated easily a comparative consideration of the experience in two or more states that had special similarities as well as differences.

Publishing discussions, however, inevitably brought to the fore the question as to what general, introductory, and concluding materials were essential in providing a frame for the state chapters. The Volume I now planned is the

result. It will contain three lengthy historical chapters and several other chapters analyzing and discussing the problems with which the report as a whole is concerned. The three historical chapters will include one on the pre-convention campaigns and one on each of the national conventions of 1952.

The Advisory Committee and Its Role. The Association's Committee on Political Parties was originally contemplated as the project advisory body. Unfortunately, that committee was without a chairman during a critical interval and it was too large and scattered a body for the easy financing of meetings from a restricted budget. Several members of the committee were absorbed into the project as active participants, including all three members of the subcommittee on the national conventions. In November, 1952, the Association's officers decided to constitute a new Advisory Committee for the project, composed entirely of persons not previously involved in project operations. The following were appointed: Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman, Louis Brownlow, Richard S. Childs, Alexander Heard, Peter H. Odegard, Louise Overacker, and James K. Pollock. As members of the Association will recognize, this committee includes three past presidents of the Association, two laymen who have made distinguished contributions to the field, the author of the principal book on presidential primaries, and the author of a recent book on Southern politics.

The committee was given two functions by the officers of the Association: (1) to advise the project staff and the Executive Director of the Association on the continuation and completion of the work, and (2) to advise the officers of the Association as to the merits of the project report and its readiness for publication under the sponsorship of the Association. The committee met on December 2, 1952 and reviewed current plans. It discussed the first complete draft of a state chapter and gave general approval to the pattern and scope of the draft as a model for further work. It met again on April 3, 1953, after having received about a dozen of the state chapters in semi-finished form. It approved the chapters for publication, subject to the further efforts to perfect them that were contemplated, and agreed that further state chapters could be cleared with it for publication by correspondence. By November, 1953, the committee had passed most of the state chapters for publication and they had gone to press. A final meeting on the manuscript for Volume I was planned for December 12, 1953.

III. OUTCOMES

Only a preliminary assessment of project outcomes is possible at this time, and the project director may not be the best person to make it. But the major types of existing and potential outcome can be outlined. Perhaps we might look first at the existing intangibles, second at the tangibles, and third at the intangibles of the future.

The Existing Intangibles. A first attempt to assess the intangibles that had already accrued was made in October, 1952 in the statement requesting a

second grant.⁷ There the Executive Director of the Association made the following statement:

In many respects the most important by-product of the project has been the evidence it has provided as to the ability of the Association to conduct large-scale research undertakings. For some time many of use have believed that there was a type of research in our field which could not readily be undertaken either by the individual scholar or by any single institution. This project well illustrates the point. In its prosecution, more than 320 individuals in 41 states, Hawaii and the District of Columbia, have been involved. They conducted 1450 interviews prior to the time of the national conventions and countless interviews during the conventions themselves. They participated in over 300 precinct, county, district and state meetings. We estimate they have already invested over 15,000 hours in the preparation of the field reports, or more than 7½ man years. For projects which are concentrated in time, geographically dispersed, and requiring a breadth and diversity of professional skills and judgment, we feel that Association-organized projects can prove themselves of distinct value, as the present project indicates.

Another by-product has been the identification of a number of able younger scholars who had not previously achieved general professional recognition. In years past we have been a relatively loose and amorphous profession. This has been our best opportunity to discover talent in our own ranks by offering a chance to participate in a worthwhile project that was going on all over the country. Closely related is another significant result of the project. As a result of the working needs of the research, a series of informal relationships have developed among the several hundred persons who have been participating in the undertaking. This network of personal but professional relationships gives promise for continued communication through the years without reference to formal undertakings that may later emanate from this office. In our judgment, the project would have more than justified itself if only as a vehicle for bringing together professional men and women who are scattered in every part of the country, but many of whose professional interests are in common.

The second and most direct type of consequence of the project, of course, has been the substance of the research itself . . . the project has provided a wide variety of formal or informal teaching materials which will greatly improve the quality of instruction in the field of political processes in our colleges and universities. Some of these materials are in the hands of the individual investigators and instructors who first developed them and will be used primarily in improving their own teaching. Other materials have been and will continue to be circulated in typescript or mimeographed form among many of the participants. Beyond this, many of the graduate students who participated in the research learned a great deal from the conduct of the work itself. As a consequence, there is already a large volume of material in circulation in the teaching process in this country which would not have been available had it not been for the work already undertaken. In addition to their value for teaching purposes, the existing state reports are potentially of major importance for use by the civic leaders and legislators who are concerned with the enactment or amendment of state laws on presidential primaries. Many of the authors are currently revising their reports and plan to mimeograph them for local circulation and discussion next winter.

Probably all would agree that the project has made a contribution to the development of the profession and to the personal development of project participants. The extent of that contribution obviously cannot be measured precisely and there will undoubtedly be difference of opinion as to its importance.

⁷ APSA, letter from Dr. Edward H. Litchfield, Executive Director, to Dr. Will W. Alexander, October 17, 1952, 9 pp. mimeo.

The Tangibles. The tangible outcomes of the project include the forthcoming national report in five volumes; a local monograph already in press in Texas and another nearing final form in Louisiana; various local publications elsewhere that have drawn on project materials in one way or another; the mimeographed materials that have circulated internally within the project, including the full text of several of the longer field reports; the collection of research materials represented by the project files in Washington; and the research files in the project centers throughout the country. The report will have to await the judgment of the profession and the public, although many favorable comments have been received on the portions that are in draft from persons asked to review them. Staff members of both national political committees have indicated that the report would become an essential working tool for persons engaged nationally in political organizing activities. Persons who have seen service on the headquarters staffs of candidates for the presidential nomination have made similar comments.

Intangibles of the Future. On the question as to whether or how the project will contribute in the future to the development of the profession, obviously not much can be said without engaging in the sheerest speculation. But it would seem that a project that has been driven through to completion in the form of a published national report will have done whatever it can in that respect. Perhaps the most specific aspect of progress in the profession that can be surmised is the development of a broadly shared research interest in the presidential nominating process, an interest developed through active participation by project personnel from coast to coast. When many minds are at work upon a subject at the same time and learn how to manipulate research techniques that have direct significance for the subject, something important seems likely to happen. The presidential nominating process seems especially useful as a catalyzing research interest because at times it brings almost every other political process within its orbit.

The teaching materials originating in the project will provide useful material of considerable student interest for many different purposes. Among other things, the project may perhaps be considered the first large-scale effort to provide materials for the case method in teaching politics. The project also is almost unique as an attempt to provide a family of related or parallel case materials that can be used comparatively in teaching. The life histories of 104 delegations, bound together in time and function, but differing in almost every other conceivable respect, should provide endless opportunities for exploratory comparisons.

Least predictable of all outcomes is the potential future contribution to the development of public policy. Since the principal feature of the Association's report will be the state chapters, the question mainly is one as to the contribution they can make. On this, the following statement was made some months ago:⁸

⁸ APSA, "Progress Report on Cooperative Research Project," Memorandum from Dr. Edward H. Litchfield to Dr. Will W. Alexander, March 18, 1953, 10 pp. mimeo.

It is clear that we shall reach the end of the present project with less accomplished by way of national analysis of the data and of the problem than we had earlier hoped. On the other hand, we believe that as the material shapes up, it is becoming increasingly evident that the individual state chapters will be more valuable than we had previously thought possible. We are ending each state chapter with a section of interpretive review and appraisal that takes advantage of the knowledge gained by working concurrently and comparatively with a large group of states. These commentaries were originally viewed with misgivings by some of our advisers, who feared that they would be immature, inadequately based, and easily open to attack. With experience, it has proved possible, on the contrary, to produce comment that is pertinent, constructive, and broadly based, even though it does not attempt to settle all questions for all states.

The question remains open as to where public policy will be made in this field in the future. If it continues to be made on a state-by-state basis by state legislatures and party committees, our state chapters may well prove highly influential during the next few years, and particularly while legislative reforms are under consideration in the winter and spring of 1955, when most state legislatures will be in session and will be thinking about 1956. We see no early prospect that a constitutional amendment will be passed, bringing the whole field under federal regulation. Federal legislation may be possible that would have influence even if it has no controlling effect, but is unlikely to pass before 1955 at the earliest. Congressmen concerned with federal legislation may find the state chapters on their own states more interesting than any national analysis, even though such an analysis does of course continue to be needed.

Public policy is made not only by the acts of legislative bodies, but also by the accretion of custom and precedent. If the report comes to be used by civic leaders and others directly involved in politics, it may have a significant influence on the evolution of attitudes and customary behavior. Much of the present chaos in the formal and specific aspects of the presidential nominating process, particularly in the months before the national conventions meet, arises in part at least because so few of the participants are widely familiar with customary practice in states and in the political party other than their own. The existence of an organized body of information on the subject may facilitate some reduction in the extremes of variation and the general introduction of more orderly procedures, thus making the whole process much more comprehensible even if its nature is not greatly changed.⁹

⁹ The project Advisory Committee met on December 12, 1953, completed its review of the manuscript of the report, approved it as meeting appropriate standards of scholarship, and recommended that the report be published by The American Political Science Association. As of December 16, approximately 85 per cent of the five-volume manuscript is in press and over half of it is in galley proof. Publication in April or early May by the Johns Hopkins Press is anticipated.

A NOTE ON TREATY RATIFICATION

CARL MARCY

Arlington, Va.

On June 13, 1952, with two senators on the floor, the Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to the ratification of three treaties which thereby became a part of the supreme law of the land.¹ One of the senators did not vote. The other voiced his "aye" while serving as presiding officer.

The conventions approved by the voice vote of one senator were the Consular Convention with Ireland,² a Protocol Supplementary to the said Convention,³ and the Consular Convention with the United Kingdom.⁴

Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the President shall have power "to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . ." Even though, under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, . . ." how, as a matter of law, was it possible for the Senate, with but two senators on the floor, one of whom did not vote and the other of whom was in the chair, to give its advice and consent to a treaty? And as a matter of policy was the Senate in this case properly discharging its responsibilities?

There has been frequent criticism of the Senate in recent months for alleged failures properly to discharge its treaty functions. Whether this criticism is justified depends upon a careful examination of the facts of each case. In this instance, the three conventions were received by the Senate between 1949 and 1952.⁵ A three-man subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee held public hearings on the pending conventions on May 9, 1952. On May 21, the full Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the conventions to the Senate where they remained on the Executive Calendar until June 13, 1952 when they were approved.

On June 12, Senator Sparkman, who on that day was acting as presiding officer of the Senate and who had acted as chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee considering the conventions, announced as follows: "In his capacity as a Senator, the present occupant of the chair gives notice that in accordance with the understanding between the majority leader and the minority leader, it will be his purpose tomorrow to call up two consular conventions and a protocol which are Nos. 11, 12, and 13 on the Executive Calendar."⁶

June 13 was a Friday. Toward mid-afternoon the majority leader, Senator Johnson of Texas, announced that when the Senate concluded its business for the day it would recess until Monday. Senator Morse then obtained the floor

¹ See *Cong. Rec.*, June 13, 1952, pp. 7343-54.

² Executive P, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

³ Executive F, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

⁴ Executive O, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

⁵ See *Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, S. Doc. 161, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 49-50, for summary.

⁶ *Cong. Rec.*, June 12, 1952, p. 7254.

tion shall be determined by a yea-and-nay vote. . . ."¹³ Senator Lehman discussed this proposed change in the Senate rules at some length, referring briefly to the case discussed here, to the fact that during 1952 the Senate acted upon 5 out of 25 treaties by a roll-call vote (the others being approved by a voice vote), to the approval of the Greek-Turkish protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty with six senators on the floor (because of objection by Senator Gillette and others the protocol was subsequently recalled by the Senate and approved by a roll-call vote), and to Senate approval of a proposed constitutional amendment during a call of the Calendar and without a roll-call vote. On July 20, Senator Knowland, the acting majority leader, announced that the proposal had been discussed with the Majority Policy Committee and said: "As a matter of standing operating procedure in the future, we intend, in connection with all treaties, and on constitutional amendments as well, not only to ask for a quorum call, but to ask for a yea-and-nay vote, at least on the first of a series of treaties. . . . We shall endeavor to follow that policy as a standard operating procedure from now on."¹⁴

¹³ *Cong. Rec.*, July 18, 1953, p. 9380; see pp. 9380-87 for discussion.

¹⁴ *Cong. Rec.*, July 20, 1953, p. 9484; see also *Ibid.*, July 21, 1953, p. 9612 for additional discussion.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE.....	1135
A Selective Survey of Literature on Tibet. Beatrice D. Miller.....	1135
REVIEWS OF BOOKS.....	1152
<i>Crosskey</i> , Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States. ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY.....	1152
<i>Northrop</i> , The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy; <i>Toynbee</i> , The World and the West. GEORGE B. SANSOM.....	1158
<i>Scalapino</i> , Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt. CHITOSHI YANAGA.....	1162
<i>Chang</i> , The Third Force in China. C. P. FITZGERALD.....	1164
<i>Possony</i> , A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution. NATHAN LEITES.....	1166
<i>Sibley and Jacob</i> , Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947. ROBERT K. CARR....	1169
<i>Ross</i> , Why Democracy? J. A. CORRY.....	1171
<i>Martin</i> , Harold Laski (1893-1950): A Biographical Memoir. HERBERT A. DEANE.....	1174
BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	1176
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.....	1176
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT.....	1183
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS.....	1193
POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY.....	1202

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON TIBET*

The literature on Tibet is voluminous and unwieldy. Much of it has been produced by the many travellers who, tempted by the lure of the unknown, have penetrated Tibet's barriers and ventured to explain, usually at length, what makes it mysterious. Another sizeable portion can be ascribed to the long struggle for political control of Tibet. From 1914 until Communist China assumed control of the whole area, political Tibet, i.e., Lhasa-controlled Tibet, was a relatively small segment of cultural Tibet. It was bounded on the north by Sinkiang, on the east by the Chinese provinces of Ch'ing-hai and Hsi-k'ang, on the south by Yünnan, Assam, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and India, and on the west by India, including Kashmir. Cultural Tibet, however, extends over a much greater area, including part of Ch'ing-hai, almost all of Hsi-k'ang, parts of Yünnan and Szechuan, most of the highland areas of Bhutan and Sikkim, northeastern Nepal, and the inhabitants of the Himalayan uplands of India, as well as the eastern part of Kashmir, Ladakh. Thus, for much of the past two centuries parts of cultural Tibet have been under the real, or nominal, control of different parts of great or lesser powers. None of these powers would agree with the others as to the exact definition of the boundaries of their claims.¹ These political divisions of the area help to swell the mass of literature on Tibet with validations of claims for political control and denials of or protests against such claims. They have also rendered some portions of cultural Tibet more or less accessible to travellers and scholars.

With all this embarrassing wealth of material on Tibet, we have still a relative poverty of information. It is hoped that this highly selective survey will help to bring some order out of the confusion. We deal here only with writings of the past twenty-five years, and particularly with sources of special interest to the political scientist.² We begin with some of the more important bibliographic sources.

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Bibliographies concerned exclusively with literature on Tibet are rarely found in Western language publications. Rolf A. Stein's "Récentes études Tibétaines," *Journal Asiatique*, Vol. 240, No. 1, pp. 79-106 (1952), unfortunately

* For a discussion of the literature on the general area, see Robert J. Miller, "A Selective Survey of Literature on Mongolia," this *Review*, Vol. 46, pp. 849-86 (Sept., 1952).

¹ The 1914 treaty agreement between British India, China, and Tibet, setting the eastern boundaries of Lhasa Tibet, was never ratified by the Chinese. Yet, despite the fact that China reckoned Ch'ing-hai and Hsi-k'ang as two of her own provinces, the Chinese Communist government could, and did, claim liberation of Tibet when the Chinese troops marched into Hsi-k'ang.

² Items concerned exclusively with religion and philosophy are not included. The best and most inclusive bibliographic reference for the religious and philosophical literature on Tibet is the *Bibliographie Bouddhique*, 20 vols. (Paris, 1930-1949).

concerns itself with less than a dozen books. This is a scholarly analytic work, but for the non-Tibetanist the majority of the sources mentioned will be of relatively little interest. Robert Fazy, in his less limited study, "Essai d'une bibliographie raisonnée, de l'exploration tibétaine," *Mitteilungen der schweizerischen Gesellschaft der Freunde ostasiatischen Kultur*, No. 2, pp. 3-22 (1940), covers a considerable portion of the travellers' reports from earliest times to the present. One shortcoming is that only works dealing with Lhasa-controlled Tibet are considered.

Since Tibet has occupied much of the interest of the Chinese government in the past decades, it is only natural that Chinese authors have paid considerable attention to sources on this problem area. Several extensive bibliographic articles have appeared in the periodical *Yü Kung* [The Chinese Historical Geography Magazine]. Among these are Wu Yü-nien's "Hsi-tsang t'u-chi lu" [Bibliography of Tibet], *Yü Kung*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 53-63 (Sept. 16, 1935), and the same author's "Hsi-tsang t'u-chi lu shih-i" [Supplement to the Bibliography of Tibet], *Yü Kung*, Vol. 6, No. 12, pp. 107-11 (Feb. 12, 1937). Wu Yü-nien's early effort is supplemented by Fu Ch'eng-yung's "Hsi-tsang t'u-chi lu pu" [Addenda to the Bibliography of Tibet], pp. 65-69 of the same issue of *Yü Kung*. The later article is accompanied by Cheng Yün-ming's "Hsi-tsang t'u-chi-lu tsai-pu" [Further addenda to the Bibliography of Tibet], pp. 95-105 of the February 12, 1937 issue. With the exception of Wu Yü-nien's second article, all the above-mentioned writings list publications in English as well as in Chinese. Unfortunately, most of the English citations are incomplete and many contain serious errors, thereby greatly diminishing the usefulness of these articles.

For more specialized Chinese bibliographic data, the reader is advised to consult Chou Ch'ang-hai, "Chin-tai Kuo-jen Hsi-tsang wen-hua yen-chiu shu-lüeh" [Recent Chinese studies on Tibetan culture], *Chung-yang Ya-hsi-ya*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 60-64 (Oct., 1943); and Yü-nien, "Chin-tai Kuo-jen hsüan-shu chih Hsi-tsang shih-chi" [Recent Chinese contributions to the history of Tibet], *Chung-yang Ya-hsi-ya*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 42-49 (Oct., 1943).

Except for the articles mentioned above, there are no bibliographic aids for work on Tibet comparable to Mr. Chang Chih-yi's "A Bibliography of Books and Articles on Mongolia" (reprinted from the *Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society*, Vol. 37, parts II and III, 1950). However, several of the bibliographic works mentioned in "A Selective Survey of Literature on Mongolia" (cited above), have pertinence also for Tibet. Among these is Robert J. Kerner's *Northeastern Asia; A Selected Bibliography*, 2 vols. (University of California, Berkeley, 1939). While this work covers the literature on Tibet to a lesser extent than that on Mongolia, it is still of great assistance for the Tibetan field, especially in its listing of Chinese, Russian, and Japanese language sources. One will find sources of interest under the rubrics "Northwestern China" and "Frontier Problems," as well as in the section labelled "Tibet." Another important bibliographical source for Tibet is the *Bulletin of Far Eastern Bibliography*, edited by Earl Pritchard (1936-40) and published by the Committee on Far Eastern

Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C. Its successor, the bibliographic section of the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, should also be consulted. The two works by Rudolf Loewenthal, "Bibliography of Russian Literature on China and Adjacent Countries, 1931-1936" (Harvard Russian Research Center, 1949; mimeographed); and "Works on the Far East and Central Asia Published in the U.S.S.R., 1937-47," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 8, pp. 172-83 (Feb., 1949), are useful, although Tibet received far less attention from the Soviet authors than did the other lands of Central Asia.

Of course no listing of bibliographical references for Tibet can afford to omit the excellent and comprehensive bibliography found in Henri Cordier's *Bibliotheca Sinica, Dictionnaire bibliographique des ouvrages relatifs à l'Empire Chinois*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Paris, 1904-1924).

Along with these more general bibliographies, attention is called to the Library of Congress, Division of Orientalia, *Southern Asia: Publications in Western Languages, A Quarterly Accessions List*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1952) and No. 2 (April, 1952), Washington, D. C. Worth mentioning also is the August, 1951 number of the journal *Nachrichten* (published by the Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Hamburg). This number, the first issue of *Nachrichten* since 1945, contains two bibliographic sections. The first, "Bibliographie," pp. 12-17, itemizes all the material dealing with the Orient published in Germany since 1948. It contains some items of interest to the student of Tibetan affairs, especially on Tibet's early history, but is not inclusive. The second article, "Bibliographie zur ostasiatischen Kunst und Archäologie," pp. 17-24, is a brief account of both German and other European language books since 1939, abridged from *Archiv für Ostasien*, Vol. 1 (1948). Further bibliographic data may be obtained from many of the sources to be discussed later.

II. GENERAL TREATMENTS AND TRAVELLERS' WORKS

A relatively small proportion of the literature about Tibet has been written by professional Tibetologists, or by scholars trained in the social sciences. We must rely, in most instances, upon the official, the traveller, the sportsman, the explorer-geographer, and the missionary. These people have produced many writings worthy of consideration here, as well as some which will be mentioned as a precautionary measure.

One of the best known writers on Tibet was the late Sir Charles Alfred Bell, the Englishman who became the unofficial chronicler of the 13th Dalai Lama and one of the prime interpreters of things Tibetan for English and European readers. From 1908 to 1921, Bell was the British Political Representative for Tibet, Bhutan, and Sikkim. When the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1910, Bell had a chance to become well acquainted with him, and the acquaintance formed then continued up to the death of the late Dalai. Thus Bell was in a unique position to gather information about Tibet. To the works by which he is best known, i.e., *Tibet: Past and Present* (Oxford, 1924), *The People of Tibet* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924), and *The Religion of Tibet* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1931), should now be added his *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* (Collins, London,

1946). All his writings have, of course, been influenced by his role as British official and friend of the 13th Dalai. He can hardly be classed as an objective writer when dealing with the political situation in Tibet since the period of British influence, yet he has contributed greatly to our knowledge of political and cultural Tibet.

Sir Frederick O'Connor, in his *On the Frontier and Beyond* (London, 1931), drew upon his years of experience and friendship with the Tibetans, including the late Panchen Lama, to present much of interest and value. David MacDonald, son of an English civil servant who married a Sikkimese, spent over twenty years in constant association with the Tibetan government and its people. He served as the British Trade Agent both in Gyantse and Yatung, and had more opportunity than most officials to become acquainted with Tibetans from all walks of life. His Sikkimese parentage and sound grounding in the Tibetan language also stood him in good stead. Among his many writings *The Land of the Lama, A Description of the Country of Contrasts and of its Cheerful People of Hardy Nature and Curious Customs; Their Religion, Ways of Living, Trade and Social Life* (Seeley, Service and Co., London, 1929) is most useful for data on Tibet. His *Twenty Years in Tibet, Intimate and Personal Experiences of the Closed Land among All Classes of its People from the Highest to the Lowest* (London, 1932) also makes interesting reading. In this volume he presented his impressions of the Western travellers in Tibet who sooner or later sought his assistance. More recently, in a brief pamphlet entitled *Tibet* (Milford, Oxford University Press, London, 1945), he has presented a useful description of the area.

Other members of the Indian Civil Service have also contributed to the store of English literature on Tibet. Many of the more important writings, including Waddell's classic, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamism*, reprinted (Cambridge, 1939), appeared early in the 20th century, or at the end of the 19th, and therefore fall outside of the purview of this article. The reader will find of interest, however, the works of Sir Francis Younghusband, L. A. Waddell, and John Claude White.

A well-written account of Tibetan life and customs as noted in the capital may be found in Frederick Spencer Chapman's *Lhasa: the Holy City* (Chatto and Windus, London, 1938). An abridged version of this account and of Chapman's mountain-climbing experiences, *Helvellyn to Himalaya, including an Account of the First Ascent of Chomolhari* (Chatto and Windus, London, 1940), has recently appeared as Chapman's *Memoirs of a Mountaineer* (Chatto and Windus, London, 1951). A mountaineering companion of Chapman, Marco Pallis, although he did not succeed like Chapman in visiting Lhasa, has written a work which has become almost a modern classic on Tibetan religious philosophy. Pallis' *Peaks and Lamas* was originally printed in London (1939), but according to the author the revised third edition (Knopf, New York, 1949) is the edition to be regarded as authoritative. Apart from its philosophic content, the work also contains much of interest on Sikkim and Ladakh.

Whereas British traveller-authors have generally approached central Tibet

from India, the French approach has usually been from the Chinese border. Foremost among the French authors is the indefatigable Madame Alexandra David-Neel. Madame David-Neel has travelled over much of eastern and central Tibet as well as Sikkim and southern Central Tibet, with only her adopted son, Lama Yongden, as a companion. A confirmed Buddhist, feminist, and French nationalist, she has spared neither British policy nor the Lhasa government in her many works. Her travel accounts are liberally spiced with sharp commentaries on officialdom and on the official British attitude toward her as a woman, and a Frenchwoman at that. Her literary output is matched only by her exploratory and explanatory zeal—and perhaps by her credulity for things miraculous. The work by which she is probably most widely known is *My Journey to Lhasa* (Heinemann, London, 1927), an edition judged superior to the original publication in French, *Voyage d'une Parisienne à Lhasa, à pied et en mendiant de la Chine, à l'Inde à travers le Thibet* (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1927). In addition, her *Tibetan Journey* (London, 1936), which is a translation of *Au Pays des brigands-gentilshommes: Grand Thibet* (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1933), and her *A l'ouest barbare de la vaste Chine* (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1947) comprise the major accounts of her travels and adventures. Her interpretative works include *Magic and Mystery in Tibet* (C. Kendall, New York, 1932), *Initiations and Initiates in Tibet* (Rider and Co., London, 1931), and *Magie d'amour et magie noire: Scenes du Thibet inconnu* (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1937). In all these works, and in the many other titles omitted here, Madame David-Neel's unique understanding and sympathy for Tibetan religious life and thought are manifest. Worth mentioning too is a little book by a young compatriot and protégé of the well-known author. Madame Lafugie's *Au Thibet* (J. Susse, Paris, n.d.) is, as Madame David-Neel aptly remarks in the preface, a beautiful book. Lafugie's expeditions took her through Ladakh, Sikkim, Gyantse and Spiti. Her account is made remarkable by her beautiful sketches and photographs.

One cannot go far into the field of Tibetan studies without coming across two intrepid French travellers of the mid-nineteenth century, the Lazarist Abbés Régis-Evariste Huc and Joseph Gabet. Innumerable editions of the account of their journey from Peking to Lhasa, F. R. Huc's *Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie, le Thibet et la Chine pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846* (Paris, 1850), have appeared. The most valuable edition is *Huc and Gabet, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-46*, translated by William Hazlitt and edited with an introduction by Professor Paul Pelliot, 2 vols. (Broadway Travellers series, Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London, 1928). It requires the expert hand of Professor Pelliot to enable the reader to sift fact from fiction and error, but the account is valuable to the student of Mongolia and of Tibet.

A book by a more recent French missionary is of interest to the political scientist as well as the general reader. Father Francis Gore, of the Missions-Étrangères de Paris, lived for years on the frontiers of Hsi-k'ang and Szechuan and Yünnan. Thirty years of this sojourn, from 1908 to 1938, are recorded in his *Trente Ans aux Portes du Thibet Interdit* (Hongkong, 1939). Many of the chap-

ters of this work have appeared in various journals, such as the *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient*, *La Géographie*, and others. In light of the recent "liberation" of Tibet, Father Gore's observations on Lhasa's reactions to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and the "long march—" which touched Hsi-k'ang in 1936, should be of interest. One intriguing item is that the Communists, like the Tsarist Russians at the turn of the century, tried to equate Tibet's promised land, Shambala, with Russia. Another member of the Missions-Étrangères, Christian Simonnet, reports his experiences along these same frontiers in the 1940's in *Tibet: Voyage au bout de la Chrétienté* (Monde Nouveau, Paris, 1949). For further data on missionaries in Tibet, there is the French survey of the Capuchin missionaries in F. Callaey, *Missionnaires capucins et civilisation Thibétaine* (Études Franciscaines 46, Paris, 1934).

The listing of the works of French travellers and explorers in Tibet would not be complete without mention of Andre Guibaut's account of the second Guibaut-Liotart expedition in Hsi-k'ang, *Tibetan Venture: In the Country of the Ngolo-Seta*, translated by Lord Sudley (John Murray, London, 1947). While much of the book concerns areas covered by other authors, first-hand observations of the life and activities of the Ngoloks are not often found. Another Frenchman, Amaury de Riencourt, has written a not unprejudiced appraisal of Tibet's political position at the time of his trip and of his audiences with the Dalai Lama and his regent, in *Roof of the World, Tibet, Key to Asia* (New York, 1950). A vivid book, it is of special interest, since it deals with events of the past decade, and with the people who had to make the decisions.

Germany also has had its share of travellers in Tibet. One of the most prolific writers in this group is Dr. Wilhelm Filchner, who has made numerous expeditions into the area during the past half-century. Many of his works are of interest only to the geographer or to the Tibetanist proper, but some have a less specialized appeal. In this latter category, one might include *Quer durch Ost-Tibet* (E. S. Mittler, Berlin, 1925); *Om mani padme hum. Meine China und Tibet expedition, 1925-28* (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1929); and *Im Machtbereich des Dalai Lama* (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1944), an abridged version of *Om mani padme hum.* Of unique interest is his *Kumbum Dschamba Ling, das Kloster der hunderttausend Bilder Maitreyas* (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1933), with introductions by Berthold Laufer and Ferdinand Lessing. This work, which Filchner himself describes as a "Baedeker" of the famous lamasery of Kumbum, contains two thousand footnotes, prepared with the aid of Dr. W. A. Unkrig. It is in this massive collection of notes, rather than in the formal bibliography, that one should look for citations of interest. It should be noted that the footnotes do not always acknowledge the actual source of some of the contents of the volume. It is Filchner's *Kumbum Dschamba Ling*, incidentally, and not his earlier work, *Das Kloster Kumbum in Tibet. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte* (E. J. Mittler, Berlin, 1906), literally and figuratively a much thinner book, that one should consult for a really detailed study of the historically important Kumbum.

Lacking Dr. Filchner's years, but vying with his output, is Ernst Schäfer, who spent much of the past twenty years in and near Tibet. Despite its sugges-

tive title, *Dach der Erde* (P. Parey, Berlin, 1937) is only the prologue to his actual entry into Tibet, which is recorded in *Unbekanntes Tibet: Durch die Wildnisse Osttibets zum Dach der Erde, Tibet Expedition, 1934-1936* (Paul Parey, Berlin, 1937). Even this latter volume takes Schäfer only as far west as Batang, and is marred by the author's flagrant nazism. Published later, but based on his participation in the first Brooke Dolan expedition, is Schäfer's *Tibet Ruft: Tibet Expedition, 1931-32* (Berlin, 1942) and *Berge, Buddhas und Bären: Forschungen und Jagd im geheimnisvollen Tibet* (Paul Parey, Berlin, 1933). *Fest der weissen Schleier. Eine Forschung, durch Tibet nach Lhasa, der heiligen Stadt des Gottkönigtums* (Vieweg, Braunschweig, 1949) actually gets Schäfer to Lhasa. This volume was followed by *Über den Himalaja ins Land der Götter. Auf Forscherfahrt von Indien nach Tibet* (Vieweg, Braunschweig, 1950). Of all his books, *Fest der weissen Schleier* is the most interesting. By then (1938-39) Schäfer was on terms of unusual intimacy with the leading personages of Tibet, having come to Lhasa on "invitation." The book is also marked by superb photographs of Lhasa.

Among the more limited works of German travellers are Walter Bosshard's *Durch Tibet und Turkistan, Reisen im unberührten Asien* (Stuttgart, 1930), which concerns northeastern Tibet; W. Lentz's *Auf dem Dach der Welt* (Berlin, 1931), an interesting and informative account; and Emil Trinkler's *Im Land der Stürme. Mit Yak und Kamelkarawanen durch Innerasien* (Leipzig, 1930), translated into English as *Stormswept roof of Asia. By Yak, Camel and Sheep*.

Perhaps the most prolific writer on Tibet is the recently deceased Sven Hedin, but most of the material which he published after 1926 consists of popularized versions of earlier works, or of books adapted for a juvenile following. In these categories fall such titles as *A Conquest of Tibet*, translated by Julius Lincoln (Dutton, New York, 1934); *Eroberungszüge in Tibet* (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1940); *Abenteuer in Tibet* (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1940), a considerably abridged version of the original; and *Im verbotenen Land* (Leipzig, 1937) and *Wildes heiliges Tibet* (Leipzig, 1944), both intended for a young audience. A commentary on Hedin's travels in Tibet is Walter Heichen's *Der Todesgang der Karawane, ein Tatsachenbericht über Sven Hedins Reisen durch Tibet* (Weichert, Berlin, 1936).

Worth at least a glance is Arnold Heim and August Gansser's *Throne of the Gods*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (Macmillan, New York, 1939). Although Heim and Gansser were primarily concerned with mountaineering, they did have an understanding and appreciation of the people with whom they came in contact, and they have enriched their work with extremely good photographs.

It is when we deal with the Italian traveller-explorers in Tibet that we come across a store of some of the most valuable and well-written literature on the area. Many of the Italian authors of informative general travel books also have brought the social sciences to bear upon Tibetan problems and belong in the category of experts in the field of Tibetan studies.

One of the earliest accounts of Tibet we have is Father Ippolito Desideri's story of his adventures early in the 18th century. Entitled *An Account of Tibet*,

The Travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, S.J., 1712-1727, edited by Filippo de Filippi, with an introduction by C. Wessels, S.J. (rev. ed., The Broadway Travellers series, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London, 1937), this work is interesting not only as the report of an early traveller, but also because of the scholarship of De Filippi. Even without the added value of De Filippi's extensive notes and bibliography, however, this volume would be extremely important. It was in the period of Desideri's stay in Lhasa that the first effective Chinese claim to sovereignty over the area was made. Here we have an eyewitness account of the turmoil in Tibetan politics that brought the Manchu empire's forces into the Tibetan capital. Here also we have a very human account of a Tibet which was most hospitable to the foreigners in its confines. For further reports by Father Desideri, there is the collection and publication of his letters by H. Hosten, "Letters and other papers of Father I. Desideri, S.J. . . .," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* (3rd series), *Letters*, Vol. 4, pp. 567-767.

In his *La prima missione Cattolica nel Tibet* (Istituto and Missioni Estere-Parma, Hongkong, 1951), Giuseppe M. Toscano tells the story of the first Catholic missionaries—particularly the Portuguese Father Antonio de Andrade. This work also gives an account of the history of the small states of Guge and Tsaparang, where these first missionaries had established themselves. Much of the data presented are gleaned from de Andrade's reports.

Filippo de Filippi's contribution to the literature on Tibet does not end with his editorship of Desideri's *Account*. As leader of the De Filippi (Italian) expedition to western Tibet in 1913-14, he acquired a first hand knowledge of Tibetan life. *The Italian Expedition to the Himalaya, Karakoram and Eastern Turkestan (1913-14)* (Edward Arnold & Co., London, 1931) is the popular English account of this expedition. One of the most valuable chapters in this volume is that by Giotto Dainelli in which he presents sound ethnographic observations on the Ladakhi. Also of value is the bibliography.

Almost twenty years later Dainelli returned to Ladakh. The account of his return is presented in *Buddhists and Glaciers of Western Tibet*, translated by Angus Davidson (Kegan Paul, London, 1933). Although Dainelli responded to the physical challenge of the great mountains like many others who have braved the rigors of the Himalaya, this book devotes relatively little attention to the "glaciers" and much more to the "Buddhists" of the area. Again the author presents ethnographic data, even more valuable than his earlier observations. His liking and sympathy for the Ladakhi avoids, fortunately, the pitfall of the "noble savage" concept.

Perhaps the outstanding scholar-traveller of the region is Giuseppe Tucci. Many of Tucci's works by right belong in the following section, but even in the realm of "general treatments" he has a special niche. Tucci has led several expeditions into different sections of western and central Tibet, and in 1952 conducted an expedition in Nepal. An account of one of his earlier expeditions is given in *Secrets of Tibet, Being the Chronicle of the Tucci Scientific Expedition to Western Tibet, 1933*, by Giuseppe Tucci and Captain Eugenio Ghersi (Glasgow

and London, 1935). This is translated from Tucci and Gherzi's *Cronaca della missione scientifica Tucci nel Tibet occidentale* (1933), Reale Accademia d'Italia, Viaggi di studio ed esplorazioni 2, (Rome, 1934). A revised and conventionalized narrative version was published in the United States as *Shrines of a Thousand Buddhas, Exploring for Tibet's Hidden Art*, by Tucci and Gherzi (McBride and Co., New York, 1936). A subsequent expedition, in 1935, is presented in Tucci's *Santi e briganti nel Tibet ignoto* (Milan, 1937). Only years later did this eminent Tibetanist receive the necessary permission to travel to Tibet's capital. The story of this at long-last realized expedition appeared as *A Lhasa e oltre, Diario della spedizione nel Tibet* (Rome, 1950).

Outstanding also, but in a different way, is the work of another Italian mountaineer-traveller, Fosco Maraini. His *Secret Tibet* (Viking Press, New York, 1952) contains a most valuable collection of photographs of Tibet and Tibetans. Some of these pictures had appeared earlier—and more expensively—in portfolio form. The present collection includes many new photographs and a well-written text, translated by Eric Mosbacher. Maraini dedicated his book to his “master” Tucci and it bears the same stamp of high quality that has marked other Italian works on Tibet. It also includes a short but good bibliography.

After so many stimulating accounts by European travellers, it is a let-down to turn to the works of Americans. As the worst examples seem to be standard equipment in university libraries, it seems advisable to review some of these writings.

Gordon Bandy Enders had the advantage of growing up in Almora, near the Indian borders of Tibet, and he became acquainted with many of the Indo-Tibetan traders. As a child he made a trip across the border to Rakas Lake, but this seems to have been the total of his penetration into Tibet Proper. His *Nowhere Else in the World* (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1935) takes him all over the world, except into Tibet, despite his preoccupation with the country. The book is filled with annoying inaccuracies and outright errors, even about geography. One might be inclined to dismiss both this effort and his subsequent publication, *Foreign Devil: An American Kim in Modern Asia* (Simon Schuster, New York, 1942), largely a rehash of the period covered in the first book, except that he has laid claim to being the American confidant-advisor, and self-appointed champion, of the late Panchen Lama during the years 1932–37, when the Panchen was in exile in China. He should therefore, perhaps, be read for his accounts of the Panchen's version of Tibetan-Chinese relations.³ In the course of his adulation of the late Panchen, he has attributed to him the “scorched earth” strategy against Japan, and has his hero, practically single-handedly, staving off Japanese aggression in Inner Mongolia.

Another American writer on Tibet with an overdeveloped sense of the dramatic and an underdeveloped devotion to facts is Harrison Forman, author of *Through Forbidden Tibet; An Adventure into the Unknown* (Longmans, Green

³ The late Panchen Erdeni disavowed the claims made on his behalf, in a letter to Basil Crump. See *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. 23, p. 720 (1936).

and Co., New York, 1935). Forman went neither through, nor even into, "forbidden Tibet," but spent his time in the then highly accessible Chinese areas of Lhabrang and Hsining. In his account he conveniently ignores the presence of many other Westerners. As Li An-che stated in his "Through Forbidden Tibet?", *Yenching Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 2, pp. 289-93 (Feb., 1940), this work can only be classed as a novel.

Edwin G. Schary's *In Search of the Mahatmas of Tibet* (Seeley, Service and Co., Ltd., London, 1937) would ordinarily be regarded as completely fantastic, except for the fact that it is true. This young man, blissfully unaware of Tibetan adventuring protocol and without a single companion, porter, or disguise, strolled across western Tibet to become the first Westerner since Desideri to take this west-east route. Aside from the account of this accidental achievement and Schary's naively charming style, the book has little to recommend it.

In a different category is Lowell Thomas, Jr.'s *Out of this World, Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet* (Greystone Press, New York, 1950). The Thomases, father and son, did get into Tibet and to Lhasa; in fact, they went by invitation. Although the number of Westerners to get into Tibet and even to Lhasa was hardly as small as claimed, the fact remains that the Thomases may well have been among the last. It is therefore regrettable that a large part of the book is concerned with their own tribulations. Even so, it does throw a little light upon Lhasa just before the Chinese Communists began Tibet's "liberation."

Another American to receive one of the coveted invitations to Lhasa was Suydam Cutting. As a member of the Cutting-Vernay expedition for the American Museum of Natural History in 1935, he collected many of the items of that museum's Tibetan exhibition. His *Fire Ox and Other Years* (New York, 1940) is an interesting and well-written narrative of his travels in Tibet and its capital, as well as in other lands.

While he did not get into political Tibet, our peripatetic Supreme Court Justice, William O. Douglas, has given us, in his *Beyond the High Himalayas* (Doubleday, New York, 1952), a book definitely deserving of attention for its warm account of the peoples of Ladakh and their neighbors.

Among authors who have written general accounts as well as analytic works on the Tibetan field is George Roerich. His *Trails to Inmost Asia: Five Years of Exploration with the Roerich Central Asian Expedition* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931) is interesting both on Mongolia and on Tibet, though much of the work is distorted and unreliable. The same can be said for another product of this expedition, *Heart of Asia* (New York, 1930), by Nicholas Roerich, the father of the previous author.

One American Tibetanist has even made the ranks of the book-club authors. Robert Brainerd Ekvall, son of an American missionary on the China-Tibet border, spent his early youth in this area of northeastern Tibet, known as Amdo. He too became a missionary to the Tibetans for a period of his adult life, and the accounts of his Tibetan friends presented in his *Tibetan Skylines* (Farrar, Strauss and Young, New York, 1952), a Natural History Book Club

selection, make the sort of reading one finds very rarely in this field. In other works Ekvall has made contributions to the analysis of Tibetan-border culture, but in this series of sketches of individual Tibetans, the reader sees the Tibetan nomads as persons instead of as museum pieces. Ekvall, moreover, deals with the Tibetan "man in the street," or more appropriately "man in the saddle," rather than only with important personages.

Among works by Asiatic authors is Shen Tsung-lien's *Tibet and the Tibetans* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1952). Shen Tsung-lien was the last Chinese Nationalist Resident in Tibet. During his three years in this office Mr. Shen, now residing in the United States, had considerable contact with the officials—both lay and clergy—who composed the Tibetan government. Due to his own high position, he had excellent opportunities to meet and study the Tibetan noble families. For his descriptions of the workings of the government and of high society, his work is decidedly worthwhile, and relatively free from the biases one might expect.

Another Chinese official, Ma Ho-t'ien, who has also written on Outer Mongolia,⁴ has published, in Chinese, a three-volume work, *K'an, Ch'ing Tsang pien-ch'ü k'ao-ch'a-chi* [A record of investigation on the Kansu, Ch'inghai and Tibetan frontier] (Shanghai, 1947). This lengthy diary, which deals with all the border peoples of the area, including the Moslems as well as the Tibetan and Mongol populations, is now being translated into English (by Lincoln Wong of the Inner Asia Project of the University of Washington's Far Eastern and Russian Institute) as *Diary of Travels in the Border Region of Kansu Ch'inghai and Tibet*, for the Human Relations Area Files, Inc. Another Chinese travel account is Liu Man-ch'ing's *K'ang Tsang yao-cheng* [A travel to Hsi-k'ang and Tibet] (3rd ed., Changsha, 1938). As might be expected, the bulk of Chinese material on Tibet is primarily concerned with the "Tibetan problem" and relatively few pieces have appeared which can be classed as "general accounts." One other item of this nature, however, is Chang Ch'ih-seng's "Hsi-tsang Feng-su sho-shih" [A collation of customs of and folkways in Tibet], which appeared in *Chung-yang Ya-hsi-ya*, Vol. 1, pp. 52-61 (July, 1942). In the course of the Inner Asia Project's translation of this work it was discovered that Mr. Chang had lifted his material bodily from Mrs. Louis King's *We Tibetans*, without, of course, any acknowledgements.⁵ Chang Ch'ih-seng is an obvious pseudonym, so there is little chance of discovering what other plagiarisms he may have perpetrated under other names.

Recently published, although based upon expeditions in the period 1902-1914, is Uehara Yoshitaro's *Shin-Sei Iki Ki* [New record of Tibet] (Yukosha, Tokyo, 1937). This major work is based upon the three Otani expeditions.

India also has had its spate of traveller-authors on Tibet. Unfortunately, none of the recent Indian writers can approach the position held by Sarat Chandra Das, one of the best and most prolific sources of Tibetan data for the late 19th and early 20th century. Of the current travel reports, Swami

⁴ See his *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1949), translated by John de Francis.

⁵ This author is preparing an article revealing the details of the plagiarism.

Pranavananda's *Kailās-Mānasarōvar* (Calcutta, 1949) and Pandit Aman Nath's *An Echo of the Unknown or Guide to Ladakh* (Basel Mission Press, Mangalore, 1931) are the most useful for Western readers, especially for the detailed information they present on the areas visited.

Worth noting are three books whose inspiration was derived from individual Tibetans. *We Tibetans* (Seeley, Service and Co., Ltd., London, 1926), by Rinchen Lha-mo (Mrs. Louis King), is a pretty tale of Tibetan life by a Tibetan woman who married a British civil servant. The Tibet of the book bears a strong resemblance to Shangri-la, but slight resemblance to any other versions of Tibetan life which have appeared. S. H. Ribbach's *Dropga Namgyal, Ein Tibeterleben* (München-Planegg, 1949) is a composite and fictionalized biography of a west Tibetan nomad. The third work is Combe's *A Tibetan on Tibet: Being the Travels and Observations of Mr. Paul Sherap (Dorje Zödaba) of Tachienlu* (T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., London, 1926), an extremely valuable contribution.

Access to the Tibetan area now being definitely limited, we can anticipate few additions in the near future. Useful, sometimes first-hand general information may still be obtained, however, especially from *The Himalayan Times* (Kalimpong, India), a small weekly newspaper serving the traders and merchants of the Himalayan area, and from the *India Press Digests* published bi-monthly by the Bureau of International Relations of the Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

III. ANALYTIC STUDIES

While it cannot hope to rival the profusion of travellers' accounts published in the past twenty-five years, the number of analytical studies on Tibet published in this same period is surprisingly large. In view of the recent political importance of Tibet, and the surge of interest which this has caused, it has seemed advisable to restrict the bibliographic suggestions here to those works which have some bearing on the current situation. This restriction, unfortunately, means that some of the best studies which have appeared to date, ranging from the massive and impressive work of Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* (Libreria della Stato, Rome, 1949, two vols. and portfolio), to the short but exciting article by Helmut Hoffman, "Tibets Eintritt in die Universalgeschichte," *Saeculum*, Vol. 1, pp. 258-79 (1950), must be excluded.

Political History. Despite the fascination which the early history of Tibet holds for the scholar, for all practical purposes the seeds of Tibet's present condition were sown early in the eighteenth century. It was then that the Chinese army twice crossed Tibet—once with a young 7th Dalai Lama and once to repel the Gurkhas. After each of these exploits the Ch'ing imperial government tightened its control over Tibet, ultimately reducing the land of the lamas to the status of a Chinese protectorate, a status it was to occupy until the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. It was this century also that witnessed the first tentative steps taken by the British East India Company to cross the Himalayas and to establish relations with the Tibetan hierarchs—steps

which culminated in the Younghusband expedition of 1904-05 and the establishment of Britain's interest in the affairs of Tibet.

For this momentous period we have two especially valuable studies. One, by Luciano Petech, a colleague of Tucci's, *China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century: The History of the Establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in Tibet*, T'oung Pao Monographs, #1 (Leiden, 1950), deals with the internal developments in Tibet which preceded and followed the battle over the rightful successor to the seat of the Dalai Lama.⁶ Petech used the magnificent collection of Tibetan documents that Tucci had acquired, and his work is enriched by material from both Chinese and Tibetan sources. For those interested in Mongol affairs during this same period, this might be classed as a "bonus" book, for it studies closely the role that the Mongols, as well as the Chinese, played in the struggle to control Tibet. Petech has included a very useful bibliography of Chinese, Tibetan, and Western sources, as well as genealogical tables, maps, and charts.

A companion piece to the above is Schuyler Camman's *Trade through the Himalayas: The Early British Attempts to Open Tibet* (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1951). Dr. Camman, in addition to gathering data on the first British opening of the Tibetan oyster, places events in the context of the then current situations in China and in England. He thereby enables us to see the missions of George Bogle (1774) and Samuel Turner (1783) not as isolated events, but against the backdrop of British attempts to trade with China Proper. He also supplies a picture of the workings on the British political scene which were to play their part in giving Tibet almost a century's grace. Camman utilizes both European and Chinese sources, and has appended an annotated bibliography to his work. Other recent data on these British missions to Tibet can be found in D. B. Diskalkar's "Bogle's Embassy to Tibet" (1933) *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, pp. 420-38, which includes previously unpublished letters of Bogle, and in Petech's "Missions of Bogle and Turner according to the Tibetan texts," *T'oung Pao* 39, 4-5 (1950), pp. 330-47. Petech has used the official biographies of the 8th Dalai and the 4th Panchen, or Tashi, Lama and various other contemporaries. Another brief article by Diskalkar, "Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788-1793," *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 19 (1933), pp. 365-66, discusses the events which led directly to China's assuming open control of Tibet.

A Chinese historian, Wu Feng-p'ei, has rendered valuable aid to students of Tibet through his *Ch'ing-tai Hsi-tsang shih-liao ts'ung-k'an ti-i chi* [First collection of historical material on Tibet from the Ch'ing Dynasty] (Shanghai, 1937) and his *Ch'ing chi ch'ou-Tsang tsou-tu* [Memorials concerning Tibet of Ch'ing times] (Changsha, 1938, three vols.). The former work contains data on Indo-Tibetan relations and the latter, as indicated by its title, is a collection of the official memorials concerning Tibet.

These last two sources bring us beyond the eventful 18th century into our

⁶ Father Desideri's *Account* presents his eyewitness version of the occurrences surrounding the first of these invasions.

own era. Several authors have covered the history of Tibet from the 1700's to the 1900's, but the quality of their work does not approach that achieved in the more intensive studies of the earlier period. Among these efforts one should include Dr. Wei-kuo Lee's *Tibet in Modern World Politics (1774-1922)* (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1931), which contains a good collection of information but tends to project modern problems back to the 18th century. The historical section is weakened by the failure to consult the official dynastic histories and their mass of data. Dr. Lee also traces the gradual encroachments by the British in "Ying-kuo chin-lüeh Hsi-tsang chih hsia-tuan" [The beginning of British exploitation in Tibet], *Quarterly Review of the Sun Yat-sen Institute for the Advancement of Culture and Education*, Vol. 2, pp. 228-41 (1935).

Several notches below Dr. Lee's doctoral dissertation is Lai Tze-sheng's *Le problème tibétain* (Pedone, Paris, 1941). Dr. Lai's work deals primarily with Tibet's relations with Britain, although there is a small section on Tsarist Russia and Japan. The author's thesis seems to be that the Tibetans are really Chinese plus a little extra, and that there is no room for argument as to the relationship of Tibet to China: Tibet is just part of the one big family. Lai's work is marred also by an exceedingly poor collection of Western bibliographic sources. Britain's role in Tibet receives more scathing words from Tarakanath Das in *British Expansion in Tibet* (Calcutta, 1929) and from D. Ferestanov in his "Angliiskii imperialism v Tibete" [English Imperialism in Tibet], *Zarubezhnom Vostoke*, 2, 7 (1934), pp. 70-80. A somewhat calmer but decidedly sketchy treatment is to be found in E. T. Williams' *Tibet and Her Neighbors* (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1937).

Perhaps one of the most useful sources on the controversy between China, Britain, and Tibet after the Manchu period is *The Boundary Question between China and Tibet. A Valuable Record of the Tripartite Conference between China, Britain and Tibet, Held in India, 1913-14*, by "A Pekinese" (Peking, 1940). This little book consists of translations of the official papers presented at the Delhi (January 12, 1914) and Simla (April 22 and 27, and July 3, 1914) conferences. They include the claims of the Tibetan plenipotentiary, the Chinese counterclaims, the British proposals, and the general proceedings of the conferences. The book marked the first airing of the actual claims and counterclaims and of the evidence produced in support of each side. The papers are valuable also in that they demonstrate the close records kept by the Lhasa government of its claims for authority. Although it is not specifically stated, one can assume that the texts presented are those of the official translations checked by the officials involved, and not retranslations.

A Chinese portrayal of the two flights of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the first to China to escape the British under Younghusband and the second to India to escape the Chinese, Wu Feng-p'ei's "Ch'ing-chi Ta-lai la-ma ch'u-wang shih-chi k'ao" [A historical study of the flights of the Dalai Lama in the Ch'ing period], *Chung-te hsueh chih*, 5 (1943), pp. 310-45, has been translated by Mr. Perry Chang of the Inner Asia Project for the Human Relations Area

Files, Inc. Further insight into the character of the late Dalai—the first since the famous Fifth Dalai to assume effective temporal control—is afforded by an article which, on the surface, has little political significance. This is René Nebesky-Wojkowitz's "Das tibetische Staatsorakel," *Archiv für Volkerkunde*, 3 (1948) pp. 136–55. In the course of discussing the historic role of the oracle in state affairs, the author reveals the transfer of the oracle from one important monastery to another by the late Dalai, an act which called for an extremely powerful hold over the many factions within and without the ecclesiastic organization.

From the early days of the Chinese Republic until the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Lhasa government had a heyday of relative independence (if we ignore the British mission). With his death this independence again tottered. According to A. J. Hopkinson, last British Political Officer of Sikkim, in his "The Position of Tibet," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. 37, pp. 221–39 (1950) and H. E. Richardson, head of the last British Mission to Lhasa, in his "The State of Tibet," *Ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 112–22 (1951), the Chinese delegation, which officially came only to honor the dead Dalai, stayed for over a decade and definitely wore out its welcome.

The recent events in Tibet, including the "triumphal" return of the young Panchen Lama with his escort of Chinese Communist troops, mark a continuum with the Tibetan policies of the Kuomintang and Manchu governments. These events are much too current to have produced studies with any real perspective, but there has been a veritable rash of articles, including the two last-mentioned British pieces. On the other side of the fence is Dr. André Migot's "Les lamas souverains du Tibet," *France-Asie*, Vol. 66–67, pp. 549–62 (1951); Vol. 68, pp. 684–96 (1952). While primarily a slight treatment of the succession of Dalai and Panchen Lamas up to 1952, this article is interesting for its attempt to prove the "co-sovereignty" of the two incarnations, the right of the Chinese Communists to take over, and the liberality which they have exhibited. Like the Chinese, Migot feels that Tibet's role as a Chinese dependency began in the Yüan Dynasty under Kublai Khan and has continued ever since.

With the establishment of the Republic of India, India fell heir to Britain's interests in Tibet. Both Hopkinson and Richardson served the new nation in their old posts, the former from Sikkim to Gyantze, the latter at Lhasa. As we know, what India inherited here was hardly a peaceful legacy. The *India News Bulletin*, Nov. 14, 1950, contains the text of the notes exchanged between the Peiping and New Delhi governments on the annexation of Tibet. A. C. Banerjee, in his *The Problem of Tibet* (Uttarayan Monographs on Current Affairs, #11, Calcutta, 1951), a pamphlet intended for popular circulation, traces Tibet's foreign relations up to 1950 and presents the opinion of a strong Indian faction on India's rights in Tibet and the position that India should take with China to maintain these rights. A more recent article on India's relations with China and the Tibetan situation is Dr. Shao Chuan Leng's "India and China," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, pp. 73–78 (May 21, 1952).

Tibetan Culture. Before concluding this survey, it seems advisable to mention

a few of the works which tell something about the people and the economy of the area.⁷ Two useful introductions to Tibetan culture in general are to be found in *An Introduction to Tibetan culture*, by Cheng Te-k'un and D. M. Sullivan (West China Union, Guidebook #6, pp. 1-40), and the *Catalog of the Tibetan Collection and Other Lamaist Articles*, published as several pamphlets (1950—) by the Newark Museum, Newark, New Jersey. While both of these works are concerned with their respective museum exhibits of Tibetan material culture, the former also presents a concise account of Tibetan society, and the latter deals with different aspects of Tibetan culture in each of its numbers. To these might be added Robert Bleichsteiner's *Die gelbe Kirche* (Josef Belf, Vienna, 1934), with a French version entitled *L'Eglise Jaune*, translated by Jaques Marty (Paris, 1937). Bleichsteiner's work is useful for its description of paraphernalia and practices of the Yellow Sect of lamaism, and in general surpasses L. A. Waddell's classic, *The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism* (London, 1895). Whereas Waddell was perforce restricted largely to material from the lamaism of Sikkim, which is not of the Yellow Sect, Bleichsteiner was able to discuss directly the official sect of Tibet and Mongolia.

A Chinese anthropologist who has published widely in English, Li An-che, has written a number of articles examining the different lamaist sects from the viewpoint of a social scientist. Included among these, and useful as aids through the maze of sects and cult practices, are "Tibetan religion," in *Forgotten Religions*, edited by Vergilius Ferm (Philosophical Library, New York, 1950), pp. 251-71; "The Bkah-brgyud sect of lamaism," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 69, pp. 51-59 (1949); "The Sakya sect of Lamaism," *Journal of the West China Border Research Society*, Vol. 16, series A (1945), pp. 72-87; "Rnin-ma-pa: the early form of lamaism," *Journal Royal Asiatic Society* (1948) pp. 142-63; and "Bon: the magico-religious belief of the Tibetan-speaking peoples," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 4, pp. 31-43 (1948). The same author deals with the ubiquitous Tibetan monastery in "A Lamastery in outline," *Journal of the West China Border Research Society*, Vol. 14, Series A (1942), pp. 35-68.

One of the most distinctive features of Lamaism is the system of reincarnation and the "Living Buddhas," from the Dalai and Panchen Lamas down to a host of minor incarnations. The methods employed in finding, recognizing, and training these incarnate Buddhas, and their roles in Tibetan life, are discussed by Professor Li-Yu-i in "Hsi-tsang ti huo-Fo" ["The Living Buddhas of Tibet"], *Yenching Journal of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, pp. 117-31 (1948). This very useful article has been translated for the Human Relations Area Files, Inc., by Mr. Perry Chang of the Inner Asia Project at Washington.

⁷ In view of the frequent discussion about differences between "Asiatic" and "Western" minds, it is not inappropriate to mention Dr. Giuseppe Tucci's "Teoria e pratica del mandala con particolare riguardo alla moderna psicologia del profondo," *Psiche e coscienza*, Vol. 12 (1949). In this intriguing article, Dr. Tucci examines one of the most esoteric aspects of Tibetan religion, i.e., its cosmology and the methods employed to achieve "oneness" with the universe, in terms of the Jungian school of psychology.

Regional Studies. While little has been done on Central Tibet by the social scientist, several excellent studies have appeared for particular regions, especially for eastern Tibet and the Sino-Tibetan borders. In this category falls Robert Brainerd Ekvall's *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939). This is a social anthropological study of the interrelations of Chinese, Moslem, nomadic, and sedentary Tibetans in the modern period. A detailed study of the nomadic population of this area is Matthias Hermanns' *Die Nomaden von Tibet. Die sozial-wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der Hirten-Kulturen in Amdo und von Innerasien. Ursprung und Entwicklung der Viehzucht* (Vienna, 1949), which appeared originally as Dr. Hermann's doctoral dissertation under the title, *Die Amdo-pa Grosstibeter; die sozial-wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der Hirtenkulturen Innerasiens* (Freiburg, 1948). This is a major contribution to the studies of nomadism. Also dealing with the nomad population of this area is Yu Hsian-wen's *Report on the Social Conditions of the Nomad Population in the Tibetan area of Northwest China* (in Chinese) (Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1947). A more specialized study for this same Kansu-Ch'inghai region is the work by Li Yü Shih-yü, wife of Dr. Li An-che. In "Tibetan Folk-law," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1950), pp. 127-48, the author draws upon her four years of field experience in the area. In addition to the data on folk-law, a Manchu court edict of 1733 A.D., "Rules of punishment for Tibetans," is presented.

For the region south of Amdo, Li An-che has provided a study of the (then) semi-independent state of Derge, in Hsi-k'ang, in his "Derge: a study of Tibetan population," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 3, pp. 279-94. Hsi-k'ang Proper has been the scene of quite a few investigations. Among these should be included Lin Yueh-hwa's "Social life of the Tibetans in northern Sikang" (in Chinese), *Comet Monthly*, Vol. 1, #1-5 (1945), and Jen Nai-ch'iang's *Hsi-k'ang t'u-ching* [Pictures from Hsi-k'ang], 2 vols. (Nanking, 1933). The first volume deals with Hsi-k'ang geography and the second with the people. A valuable socio-economic study of this area is Ch'en Han-seng's "Frontier land systems in southernmost China. A comparative study of agrarian problems and social organization among the Pai-Yi people of Yunnan and the Kamba people of Sikang" (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949, mimeographed).

For the Ladakh region, the *Relazioni scientifiche della spedizione Filippi nell'Himalaya, Caracorum et Turchestan Cinese (1913-1914)*, 15 vols. (Bologna, 1932-34), written by various members of the expedition, presents a very thorough picture. Perhaps of most pertinence is the volume (VIII) by Giotto Dainelli, *Le condizioni della Genti*, which utilizes official reports of the local government and other documentary sources. The bibliographic appendix is very useful.

BEATRICE D. MILLER.

University of Washington,
Far Eastern and Russian Institute.
Inner Asia Project.

BOOK REVIEWS

Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States. BY WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953. 2 vols. Pp. xi, 708; viii, 709-1410. \$20.00 a set.)

Surely every adult student of the social sciences has, at some time in his career, improved a few shining hours by pondering what might be called the anatomy of achievement. What qualities lift a scholarly enterprise to the level of a "major contribution"? What distinguishes the significant from the routine? In which direction do the frontiers lie, and what sort of striving will push them further? These speculative concerns may indeed die early and be forgotten, like other long, youthful thoughts of graduate school days. An endless prospect of classroom preparations and bluebooks and mortgage payments may jade the questioning spirit; or—better perhaps—a personally sufficient answer may be found somewhere near the foot of the mountain and Olympia proper may be left thereafter to its own devices. But each time a book is hailed, even by its publishers, as a "bombshell" which "remakes history," memories will stir. And if the book, when read, appears to present a challenge remotely justifying the easy encomiums of those who set its type, the old queries may come trooping back.

One of these queries in particular is compellingly brought to mind by an examination of Mr. Crosskey's massive work. Put succinctly, it comes to this: is overstatement a scholarly virtue? To be somewhat more explicit, are significant heights in the social sciences usually achieved most readily by those who adopt an extreme position and dogmatically insist upon its complete validity; who ride a point of view to its utmost conclusion, damning all exceptions and uncertainties? The suggestion is not, of course, that boldness and dogmatism alone can make a mediocre work important, but that the books that change our minds tend to be distinguished by these qualities among others. Certainly there is some ground for believing that this is so. Veblen and Beard, for example, would stand high in any pantheon of twentieth-century masters selected by a consensus of scholarly opinion. Yet Veblen tortured his material unmercifully and sometimes slipped into arrant absurdity in order to draw all phenomena within his construct; and Beard, though a latter-day penitent, in his early works gave his followers little reason to believe that he regarded the "economic interpretation" as less than All. Like instances could be cited at length from amongst greater and lesser thinkers in the history of social analysis. These men made their points powerful by overstating them. Would Veblen have fallen with the same impact on American thought if he had been willing to admit that "pecuniary emulation" was only one among several important motivations in the behavior of "the leisure class"? Would Beard have spawned whole generations of historians if he had carefully qualified his insight that Jeffersonian democracy could be explained in terms of economic interest? Indeed they would not; and extremism in the statement and development of a position is therefore at least excusable and quite conceivably essential, assum-

ing that the basic insight is at all sound. The overemphasis will be corrected by later scholarship, and the solid residue of social understanding will remain. Or so the argument might run.

The bearing of such reflections on Professor Crosskey's book should not be hard to establish. These volumes are so provocative, so daring, and so ably constructed that they merit a fairly extensive even though selective summary, and the relevance to the problem posed in the last paragraph will become abundantly clear as we proceed.

Stated as compendiously as the breadth of the subject will allow, Mr. Crosskey's thesis is as follows: The framers of the Constitution did not, as is commonly supposed, erect a government in which the important powers were divided between the states and the nation. Their purpose was to establish a national government with plenary authority to perform its tasks unrestricted by any consideration of "states' rights" or by any implied bias against general and unspecified governmental power. Within that system the national executive and judiciary were assigned important roles, but Congress was unquestionably supreme. This was the view of the new government contemplated not only by those who framed it but also by the people as a whole who ratified the Constitution, and by all the early statesmen who talked frankly and knew what they were talking about. It is the only view which makes it possible to read the Constitution from first to last as a logically consistent document, instead of as a hodgepodge of discordancies and fictions. This logical interpretation is shown beyond question to be the correct one when we read certain key words of the Constitution in the light of their eighteenth-century meanings rather than in their modern usages. The reasons for the multitude of mis-readings which have persisted and proliferated during the past 150 years are largely political, at least in the first instance: the plain intention of the framers was perverted by the Jeffersonian states' rights school after 1800 so that Republican principles could triumph in the politics of the nation; and the apostasy was carried on by judges who have sometimes erred wilfully and have sometimes been honest victims of misapprehensions foisted upon them by the Jeffersonian heretics.

On the bedrock of this general theme Mr. Crosskey erects a skyscraper of argument; most of the major clauses of the Constitution are analyzed with exhaustive care; evidence is drawn from numberless sources; every brick is fitted painstakingly into the structure so that no rough edge shows. It is quite impossible to recapitulate this discourse in such a way as to do it justice, but perhaps a sketchy treatment of some of the more important matters covered will suggest the flavor of the whole.

The power "to regulate commerce among the several States" was designed, says the author, to endow Congress with full control over all the commercial affairs of the nation without the slightest concern for the question of their "interstate" or "intrastate" character. The word "states" was here used in the societal sense to signify "the people of the states"; under the authority of the clause so construed it was expected that Congress could regulate all trade, including, for example, a private contract between A and B, both residents of

Virginia conducting their business there. The establishment of this plenary view of the commerce power occupies Mr. Crosskey for some 275 pages, and he pursues his prolix and leisurely course in a manner reminiscent of the novels of Anthony Trollope. No point is too small to spend ten pages or so expounding it, no stone is unturned, no sparrow falls unheeded. Pelion is piled on Ossa again and again. The net result is an absolutely staggering mass of evidence, much of which seems to support his interpretation, some of which *may* be consistent with his interpretation, and some of which flatly contradicts his interpretation and must be disposed of by elaborate argument. The author gives no ground; not a scintilla of evidence suggesting that some early statesman might have honestly cherished a contrary or a variant understanding of the clause is allowed to stand.

The "imports and exports," "*ex post facto*," and "contracts" clauses have also been completely perverted in post-ratification history. The purpose of the first was to restrain imposts or duties on commerce between states as well as on foreign commerce; the modern courts are forced to resort to the clumsy and unfounded fiction that the commerce clause of its own force restrains state action in order to accomplish that result. The *ex post facto* clauses were meant to prohibit all retrospective laws, either civil or criminal; and the contract clause was designed to prevent the states from impairing contracts, either retrospectively or prospectively. Since this interpretation of the contract clause would suggest that the states were practically helpless to pass laws at all on the subject of contracts, it follows, says Mr. Crosskey, that the power to legislate prospectively on the contracts field must have been delegated to Congress; thus he further corroborates the broad view of the commerce power already advanced. As with so many of the book's arguments, it is hard to emerge from this discussion without a feeling that the interpretation advanced is a plausible one. But the author is content with no such partial victory: he must insist that "there can be no doubt whatever" (p. 359) that these were the intended constructions. He will admit of no possibility that some of the words used in the Constitution may have lacked the certainty of intention that he finds in them and that the reasoning he employs may not have occurred to the framers. Since that reasoning has been advanced by no one except Mr. Crosskey in 150 years, it might seem just within the range of credence that the framers missed it as well. But there is no room for such an assumption in the edifice of absolute logic that is here constructed.

The restatement of the commerce clause and related provisions by no means completes the author's massacre of traditional federalist presuppositions. The Fathers, he tells us, also intended that Congress should have "general legislative power" enabling it to do the jobs that a sovereign nation might be called upon to do, without troubling itself with the question of specific delegation. The Preamble, which has been regarded as legally nugatory by orthodox judges, was meant to vest Congress with authority to take the action necessary to achieve the preambular objects, resolving any doubts and ambiguities that might be found in the Constitution proper. This becomes plain when we realize that under prevailing eighteenth-century principles of draftsmanship it was

assumed that a general statement of purposes would endow the government concerned with full authority to accomplish those purposes, unless "strong words" in the body of the document qualified that authority. It is not merely possible that the Preamble was added to the Constitution with this end in mind; it is a "manifest certainty" (p. 375). In case there should remain any doubt, however, the intent of the framers to lodge general legislative power in Congress is further attested by the "necessary and proper" clause which, properly understood, re-emphasizes Congress' authority to carry out the preambular objects, and by the "general welfare" clause which in Mr. Crosskey's view clearly grants Congress the right to legislate at large for the welfare of the nation as a whole.

Finally, if there is *still* doubt in the mind of some almost pathologically skeptical reader, the judicial article of the Constitution contains more "oblique internal evidence" to support the plenary view of congressional power. For Article III, correctly read, vests the Supreme Court with the right of final decision "against the state courts as well as the national courts, and with respect, not only to questions of national constitutional statutory, and treaty law, but with respect to questions of state law and Common Law, as well" (p. 658). And since "Congress, like any other sovereign legislature, was authorized to make a complete set of 'rules of decision' for the guidance of its own courts" (p. 670), it follows that Congress was indirectly recognized, in Article III, as possessing "a complete and general legislative power" (p. 673).

The uninitiated might protest that the careful enumeration of congressional powers in Article I has always been thought to preclude the exercise of powers not listed and that the enumeration would have been pointless if the national legislature was assumed already to possess these powers and many more. But the author has an answer for that as he has indeed for most of the objections that come to mind when his thesis is first broached. In most instances, the specific powers were enumerated so as to indicate that they were vested in Congress and *not* in the executive; in other instances the point was to express special limitations on federal power (e.g., the uniformity requirement for naturalization statutes) or to make it indubitably clear that Congress possessed certain authority as against the states (e.g., the taxing power).

As for the Tenth Amendment, that supposed charter of states' rights, it does not in any way belie the ultranationalistic interpretation of Congress' powers; it was admitted even by Madison to be merely declaratory of a state of affairs that already existed; and that state of affairs was the unitary governmental system described in these volumes. The word "delegated" in the amendment does not mean "vested"; it means "vested exclusively," i.e., precluding the states from exercising a concurrent power over the subject; and "reserved" does not mean "retained" but is used to import that the powers in question were "new-created" and dependent for their existence entirely upon the Constitution. By this interpretation the amendment, far from asserting states' rights as against the national government's general power, is seen as *confirming* the view of national authority already advanced.

The foregoing construction of the Constitution (described quite properly by

the publishers as "arresting") has been, the author argues, whittled away unpardonably by judicial construction which has been not only perverse but suicidal as well. The Supreme Court was meant to be a supreme judicial body in the full sense described above, but in a curious spirit of self-destruction it has abdicated its control over state courts; it has ignored the plain fact that the Constitution contemplated a national common law (*Erie Railway v. Tompkins* was "one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental acts in the nation's entire history" [p. 916]); and "the Supreme Court of today . . . is without any conception at all of its own truly intended function as the supreme and general juridical head of the country" (p. 938). Moreover, the original limitations on the states, such as the contracts clause and the full faith and credit clause, have been systematically nullified, and the Bill of Rights, which was meant, except for the First Amendment and a part of the Seventh, to limit all governments (*Barron v. Baltimore* was "without any warrant at all" [p. 1056]) has been held inapplicable to the states. Lastly, the Fourteenth Amendment, which was designed to prevent the states from impairing the freedoms listed in the first eight amendments, has been distorted and tortured beyond all recognition. Meantime, in a perfect orgy of perversity, the Supreme Court has, without justification, claimed an authority that was *not* contemplated by the Constitution—the power of judicial review over acts of Congress. The result of these travesties has been a fictional Constitution without the slightest resemblance to the original model, ill-adapted to the necessities of modern government and productive of endless gratuitous encumbrances for both government and the individual.

Such then is the "true meaning" of the Constitution as Mr. Crosskey sees it, and such is the melancholy fate that has befallen the document as a result of politically inspired misinterpretations. A full-scale critique of this startling exegesis should be, one suspects, the work not of weeks but of years. The discussion is so intricately woven, the sources examined and the constitutional points covered are so numerous, that a definitive evaluation must probably be arrived at cumulatively as the author's data are carefully re-explored and his arguments scrupulously traced and weighed. That the book probably merits such respectful attention is a measure of its achievement, considering the radical unorthodoxy of the views propounded. No summary can provide more than an inkling of the volumes' qualities. The scholarship imbedded in these pages is nothing less than prodigious. The architecture of the analysis built on the original conception is genuinely impressive: it required not only a patient spirit but a creative intellect to fashion this monument of the scholar's art. Individually the arguments presented are often disarmingly ingenious (witness, for example, the reasoning in Chapter 30 which neatly turns upside down the old contention that the deliberate omission of the amendment specifically limiting the states proves that the Bill of Rights applies only to the national government); but beyond that they sometimes reveal a magisterial logical power which is exciting to behold. The style, though sometimes involved and prolix, is usually extremely effective, being infused throughout with the vitality and fire

that a polemical intent so frequently engenders. Indignation and complete self-certainty may nettle the reader, but they may also bring a discussion alive. Forewarned by the author's thesis, one comes to these volumes prepared to scoff, but remains to praise.

Yet admiration should not be overdone, should not obscure the very serious questions that persist after all credit is given for a remarkable tour de force. In order to maintain his position, it is essential for Mr. Crosskey to call James Madison a liar, since in his journal of the Convention and elsewhere Madison is on record with a variant account of the Constitution's intent. And even if this harsh view of the heretofore-supposed father of the Constitution be acceptable to the reader, he may still grow impatient with the author's steady insistence that all early writers who found states' rights in the Constitution were deliberately mendacious, while all who expounded the Crosskey view were plainly sincere. The evidence of a states' rights intention which has traditionally been thought to exist in the antecedents of the Constitution and in the ratification controversy is here treated very sketchily, and full discussion is postponed until a later day when the remaining volumes in Mr. Crosskey's treatise are to be brought forth. Surely the author cannot be criticized for having produced only 1175 textual pages in this installment, and it is easy to believe that he is loading heavy artillery for the next stage of the campaign. But there is no denying that his postponement of these matters gets him out of several tight spots and therefore leaves important doubts in the reader's mind; and it would seem that some of the lengthy argumentation in these volumes could have been compressed to make room for this rather significant issue. Nor, disregarding such historical omissions, is the author's logic always quite so airtight and inevitable as he claims. If the commerce power was meant to be all-inclusive, it is hard to see why the intent was not expressed by simple phrase "to regulate commerce," with no qualifying language at all. If the *ex post facto* clause was designed to prohibit all retrospective laws, it is strange that the same sentence prohibits the retrospective impairment of contracts, especially since Mr. Crosskey constantly insists that nothing in the Constitution is to be taken as accidental or superfluous. And if the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorporate the Bill of Rights, it is odd—again in terms of the author's premise of strict logic—that the framers did not simply say so. This is not to deny that the author *may* be right about his interpretations, especially of the latter two clauses. But it is to deny that his conclusions as to intent are as indisputably evident on logical grounds as he proclaims.

For the trouble is that he does so proclaim them, and we are thus brought back to the question posed at the outset of this review. It is no news to the student of constitutional history that many phrases of the Constitution bear a tenuous relation to their judicial glosses of later years. Until now it has seemed reasonable to assume that some of these cloudy clauses *may* have had a specific aim which scholarship can discover, but that the ambiguity of others is to be explained partly in terms of a conscious intent to keep the meaning vague and leave the full definition to history and partly on the ground of imperfect drafts-

manship. Now we are told, however, not only that every phrase has a precise and discoverable meaning, but that there can be no doubt whatever what those meanings are. The procrustean project is carried through with almost incredible singleness of purpose. But its uncompromising premises compel the author to promise more than he can possibly deliver and, worse, to insist that he has accomplished what he patently has not. The plausible interpretation must become the likely, and the likely must become the certain, to satisfy the self-imposed requirements of the enterprise. Every piece in the puzzle must be fitted snugly to every other, no matter what the strain. The framers must emerge as an assembly of supermen as rigorously logical as the judges after 1820 were fatuously irrational.

The question is whether such an approach is the right approach for this momentous undertaking, whether the understanding of history is best forwarded by these methods. Suppose, for example, that the author had adopted the premise that the document of 1787 was more nationalistic than has usually been believed without, however, assuming that it vested the national government with such a super-abundance of plenary power. Suppose he had admitted that some ambiguities defy analysis and that his interpretation of others, while plausible, might here and there be less than certain. Suppose he had argued that his interpretation explained much, but not necessarily all, and had poured the resources of his fine scholarship and impressive intellect into a defense of this more moderate claim. Would the cause of knowledge have been better or worse served? If the argument advanced in the second paragraph of this review is valid, then the answer is "worse"; but I beg leave to doubt it. The overstatement of a position may sometimes lead to the discovery of truth; but it is more likely, I believe, to compound error. If the position is brilliantly and powerfully set forth, as this one undoubtedly is, its overstatement tends to produce a polarization of hostile camps which war while the truth lies neglected on a no man's land between. It may well be questioned whether the misconceptions fostered by the dogged economic interpretation of American history flowing from Beard were counterbalanced by the insights so inspired. And it may well be felt that the decades spent flinging claims and counterclaims, postponed rather than hastened a full-dimensional analysis. Oscillation between untenable extremes is a peculiarly unlikely way to advance comprehension, however delightfully it may simplify the student's task. Mr. Crosskey's book with all its qualities seems calculated to generate just such an unhappy movement.

ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY.

Harvard University.

The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy.

By F. S. C. NORTHROP. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xii, 362. \$5.00.)

The World and the West. By ARNOLD TOYNBEE. (New York and London: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. vi, 99. \$2.00.)

Professor Northrop being a philosopher and jurist of distinction, his views on the problems of international life should be considered with respect. His present work is an attempt to discover a true basis for the determination of foreign policy. He dismisses national self-interest as a guide. There must be a new science of international relations. First "the character of at least the major individual nations must be determined," and then "a theory of the way to relate the nations can be attempted." Professor Northrop here discerns an analogy with the science of chemistry, in that "an objective sympathetic description and understanding of all the different kinds of chemical materials in the universe is obviously necessary for a chemical science," and "the same is true for any science of international relations which can pretend to be accurate." There is something rather alarming in such an analogy between one of the exact sciences and the new and not yet fully-established "sciences of cultural sociology, cultural anthropology and the philosophy of culture."

The first half of the book is devoted mainly to a description of the culture of the leading Asian countries. Following such authorities as Ehrlich and Sorokin, the author explains that "the normative inner order" of a given society is to be scientifically determined by the "meanings of philosophy held in common by the leaders and majority of its people." Once the normative inner order of each nation is specified, "then the relations between the different nations can be given with similar objectivity." He continues: "To achieve therefore a trustworthy guide for international policy in the contemporary world we shall need to do three things. First the normative inner order of beliefs and habits, which is the living law of each nation or cultural group in the world, must be specified. Second the relation between the normative ideology of each nation or cultural group and that [those?] of all other nations and cultural groups must be determined. . . . Having specified the normative living law of each individual nation or cultural group and having specified also the respective relations between the diverse national normative inner orders, the third task will be that of framing foreign policy and international law in the light of international living principles. Provided this is done, Ehrlich's criterion assures us that the results will be effective."

This piece of lawyer's prose, at first sight almost Euclidean in its logic, is really of a deceptive simplicity. But it will not deceive the cautious reader, who will ask himself whether it is anything more than a labored way of saying that to secure harmony between nations all you need is to know their essential characteristics and to harmonize them. Dr. Northrop would no doubt reply that hitherto we have thought only in terms of our own cultures and have not made an effort to understand other cultures. It is true that statesmen have not as a rule looked for scientific methods of determination. They have preferred empiric judgments, and though it may be argued that this is what accounts for the perils of international life we have no proof. Furthermore, the "inner orders" assumed in Dr. Northrop's analysis are surely not stable and uniform throughout any one nation. Nothing indeed is more patent than the rapid rate

at which cultures are changing and the diversity of "normative inner orders" within single national groups. One of the greatest obstacles to international harmony today is perhaps the rapidity of change—social, economic, and ideological—in modern Asia. Dr. Northrop is of course aware of this difficulty, and points out that "normative principles must be kept continuously in contact with concrete facts." For this purpose he proceeds to analyze the main Asian and Western cultures in a dozen chapters. In these there is much of value—in their obiter dicta rather than in their train of reasoning; and the reviewer's task would be easy and pleasant if he could stop at quoting passages which he has found interesting or instructive. But since the author's thesis depends upon the validity of his method, some critical examination of his arguments is necessary.

For reasons of space it must suffice to take, as an example, his treatment of the broad differences between Asian and Western cultures. He begins with a discussion of "Gandhi's way to peace," and distinguishes a purely Asian "technique of peace," which is (he says) the ancient Bhagavadgita Hinduism with the ancient Aryan contribution of caste, property, and legal codes left out. It is a dependence upon a kind of Buddhist-Gita "middle way," attained by fostering "the all-embracing intuitively felt formlessness common to all men and things." This technique of peace, he affirms, is not peculiar to Gandhi's India. It is the way of early Confucian China and of Buddhist Ceylon. "It is the spiritual source of the unity of the non-Aryan, non-western, Buddhist-Gita, Taoist, Confucian Asia."

Really this gallimaufry is difficult to swallow. Everybody knows that there are very great differences, even stark contradictions, between Asian cultures in general and Western cultures in general. But such a loose assumption as that just quoted is not the kind of thing we expect from a prominent scholar. Nor is it given any support by the dictum "Asia is One," which was an item of deliberate Pan-Asian political propaganda in a work by Okakura Kakuzō (not "Kakasu"), with a preface not, as stated, by the "Hindu Swami Nivedita," but by an Englishwoman, Sister Nivedita.

Asian unity, insofar as it exists, is not a cultural unity. Asians are united only in not being Western. For the present there is a certain unanimity among Asian peoples in their attitude to the West, but even that is a concomitant of political nationalism, and not of identity of thought and feeling about life and society. The cultural differences among them are greater than those that separate Western cultures, which for the most part are rooted in the same soil.

In his chapter entitled "Asian Resurgence and Western Ways," the author discusses the difficulty of combining "a resurgent Asian culture with Western political and economic ways." This is an important question, and Dr. Northrop properly attempts to throw light upon it by discovering some general principle which will account for the "basic contrast" between the two ways of thought. He takes for examination the failure of Chiang Kai-shek to establish a viable modern state. Relying largely upon the writings of Chiang Monlin, he concludes that it was due to a fundamental incompatibility between the "Asian way of

knowing nature," which is intuitive, and the Western way, which is intellectual. Chiang Monlin talks of knowledge which is the fruit of "naive observation," something given by immediate personal experience; and Dr. Northrop adopts this terminology, while emphasizing the Western dependence upon deductively formulated abstract theory.

Obviously there is some truth in these statements, but it is very doubtful whether they furnish a satisfactory explanation of the predominance of science and technology in the Western world. It seems to be the fashion nowadays to make this hard and fast distinction between West and East. But it is a dangerous kind of generalization. Historically it is difficult to defend, since Chinese thought, as shown by the early existence of a great store of knowledge dependent upon exact observation and deduction, can by no means be described as merely intuitive and unsystematic. It is true that, despite really important technological achievements, Chinese theory and practice remained at an empirical level and did not develop into the modern science of post-Renaissance Europe. What the inhibiting factors were is not certain, but it is probable that they resided in the organization of Chinese society. It might be objected that the organization of Chinese society depended upon the Chinese habit of mind; but that is too simple. Neither environment nor habit is constant, nor do they bear to one another a pure relation of cause and effect.

Despite its shortcomings, which include a heavy and at times barely intelligible style, Dr. Northrop's book deserves careful attention. He wants the things that all good, sensible men want, and he has devoted much thought and labor to his subject. But he cannot be said to have found a useful prescription for the taming of the nations. His argument breaks down because of the doubtful nature of his premises. Candor also compels the observation that his judgment falls under suspicion in the light of such lapses as his reproachful references to Mr. Toynbee, whose view of world history may be mistaken, but who is the last person one should accuse of professing the "ethics of power." Like all thoughtful men, Mr. Toynbee recognizes the grim reality of power as a factor in world politics. He does not like it any more than Dr. Northrop does, but he is aware that it is an important element in human affairs, probably more important and more decisive than those "normative inner orders" that Dr. Northrop so sedulously defines and classifies.

Covering less ground than Dr. Northrop's copious work, Mr. Toynbee's small book, *The World and the West*, is a precise and unpretentious piece of historical analysis. Its six short chapters (based upon lectures) trace the relationship between the West and other parts of the world. He asks the Western reader to step out of his native Western skin and look at the encounter between "the World" and "the West" through the eyes of the "great non-Western majority of mankind." Different though the non-Western peoples may be from one another, he will hear them all giving him the same answer. "The West, they will tell him, has been the arch aggressor of modern times, and each will have their own experience of Western aggression to bring up against him. The Russians will remind him that their country has been invaded by Western armies over-

land in 1941, 1915, 1812, 1709 and 1610. The peoples of Africa and Asia will remind him that Western missionaries and traders and soldiers have been pushing into their countries from the coasts since the 15th century."

Mr. Toynbee then recounts in fuller detail the Russian experience, and points out that Peter the Great is the archetype of the "westernizing" reformer who has in the last two or three centuries saved the world from falling entirely under Western domination by forcing the world to train itself to resist aggression by Western weapons. Islam and the West, India and the West, the Far East and the West are treated in subsequent chapters, and the story is rounded off by an examination of the pains and hazards that have everywhere attended the introduction of Western ideas and methods into Eastern societies. It is because he is aware of these difficulties that Dr. Northrop searches for some means of reconciling disparate cultures. But to judge from the recent past the world is not seeking reconciliation with the West. It wants to meet the West on its own terms but with the weapons of the West; and a very simple explanation of the international tension of today is that the West, having dominated the world for centuries, has now—partly through internal strife—lost its relative supremacy of power and thus given the world the desire and the opportunity to turn the tables. The conflict of ideologies supplies a useful rallying cry to urge on the peoples, but it is not the sole or the true cause of the struggle. It is considerations of power and pride that play the leading part.

Mr. Toynbee himself does not make this point. He concludes his survey with a chapter devoted to speculation. He recalls the historic parallel of the ancient world and its Graeco-Roman rulers. He suggests that, as the rise of new religions and the idea of human fraternity were favored in the second century by the very weariness of the clash of cultures, so something like the historic dénouement of the Graeco-Roman story will perhaps be written into the unfinished story of the world's encounter with the West. It may be so.

GEORGE B. SANSOM.

Columbia University.

Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt. BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 471. \$6.50.)

With Japan expected to play an increasingly important role in the free world's fight against Communist aggression, interest in Japanese affairs is mounting. Professor Scalapino's study, which treats comprehensively of the historical development of political parties from their beginnings in the 1870's to the year 1932, is a timely contribution to the understanding of Japanese politics. The volume is the first of its kind in a Western language involving a rather extensive use of Japanese language materials. It is a convincing proof of the fact that for American scholars with command of the language, the field of Far Eastern politics is an underdeveloped area with rich rewards.

As regards the thesis of the work, one may well raise the question: Can a movement be judged a failure if it does not achieve what it never set out to

do? Implicit in the title of the volume is the equating of democracy with the party movement. In supporting the thesis that "the first attempt at democracy" was a failure, Professor Scalapino takes the position that the Japanese party movement had democracy as its clear and avowed goal.

In origin, growth, and nature, the party movement was an extension of the nationalist-royalist movement of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Although overshadowed by the relentless struggle for power by those who had broken away from the ruling oligarchy over issues of national policy, it was a patriotic movement. Democracy was never even remotely the goal of any of the party leaders, not even Itagaki, the founder of the Liberal party and advocate of liberty and popular rights. The political parties and the ruling oligarchy, despite their political antipathy, were united in their conviction that the most urgent goal was the speedy building up of a strong Japan to insure national independence and security. What actually did take place in Japan was modernization propelled by the "omnipresent force of nationalism, which rushed like an angry torrent throughout the whole of Japanese society. . . . The fierce determination to create unity out of conflict, stability out of tension, and build a state which could secure recognition and respect was firmly implanted and encouraged by every resource at the command of the state" (p. 273). Since liberalism was adopted in Japan not in consequence of the convictions, needs, or demands of the people, it served as no more than one of the means, like many of the borrowings from the West, for convincing the Western powers of Japan's readiness to be treated as an equal. It was a mutation with only the form of Western liberalism. It was ever subservient to the state and its aims, and completely devoid of elements of individualism or the dignity of the individual.

The first attempt at democracy was not made until after the surrender in 1945 under Allied military occupation. But with all the help that has and will be given Japan, democracy will be a slow growth at best and will follow a distinct course of development because, as the author emphasizes, there was nothing in modern Japan "which would help to make democratic principles meaningful to the society and effective" (p. 291) and "Western style democracy is the product of an earlier evolution which cannot possibly be duplicated in the modern world" (pp. 397-98).

Despite the forced thesis, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* is a substantial piece of work reflecting the author's familiarity with the subject matter. "The Development of Japanese Capitalism and Its Impact on the Party Movement" (Chap. VII) is, in this reviewer's opinion, the most substantial and rewarding part of the book and contains a number of valuable insights into the nature and development of political parties. An accurate knowledge of the workings of the Japanese political system is not possible without an understanding of the character and development of capitalism. The author provides some of this background information.

The accuracy of some of the assertions will be questioned by students of Japanese history: Kita Ikki is termed "the closest approximation to a Western

Fascist leader" (p. 354, n. 9); Kaneko Kentaro is described as "a leader among the oligarchy" (p. 75); and the statement is made that the tenant peasants "had once shared in the honor of all members of the agrarian class" (p. 102). Some slips in translation and transliteration as well as characters occur: *hijo kikyoku* (p. 289) should read *hijo jikyoku*; *kajin hoken seido* (p. 407) should be *kenin hoken seido*; *naichi* is rendered as "home province" (p. 411) instead of "Japan proper"; *shizoku* is translated as "nobility" (p. 416) instead of "gentry" or "samurai class"; *sosai* is rendered as "officer of supreme council" (p. 416) instead of "head," "leader" or "president"; and Okuda is rendered as Onda (p. 412) and Arisugawa given as Sugawa (p. 401). Most of these are minor points which do not detract from the value of the work as a whole. A less liberal use of Japanese terms throughout the work, however, might have added considerably to the comprehension of the nonspecialist reader.

CHITOSHI YANAGA.

Yale University.

The Third Force in China. By CARSON CHANG. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1952. Pp. 345. \$4.50.)

The Third Force in China is the body of opinion which sincerely strove to set up democratic institutions in Republican China, and which still looks upon the rival authoritarian systems of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek with equal disfavor. Dr. Chang, founder and leader of the Democratic Socialist party, is better qualified than any other Chinese statesman to put forward the point of view of the Chinese democrats, and has in this book not only traced in detail the story of their struggle to liberalize the Nationalist regime, but also, by implication, revealed the cause of their failure.

The democrats had the support of the educated class in China, and the goodwill of China's foreign friends, including General Marshall. But they did not have, at any time, the support of armed force or the goodwill of any important military commander. Their views were consequently ignored both by Chiang Kai-shek and by the Communists. Their political parties were proscribed by the Nationalists and their members imprisoned; now they are either "absorbed" by the Communist regime, or must operate from exile. The author has contributed important facts to our knowledge of the crucial years after the war in which the Nationalist regime went down in defeat. His own part in the negotiations which failed to bring Nationalists and Communists to terms reveals very clearly the underlying factors which frustrated all such efforts. It was not merely the fact that both Nationalist and Communist leaders mutually distrusted each other and had no common program in which both sides believed; it was still more the intractable fact that both parties rested on military power, counted their strength in divisions and not in votes, and refused to yield these solid bases of support for shadowy constitutional rights.

The democrats, such as the author himself, constantly sought to create a constitution which would operate in a legal democratic way, in the belief that such an instrument could control and reduce the tensions between opposed

parties. But in fact such a constitutional political life can only flourish after the extreme tensions between opposed factions have been settled by military force, and the resort to force is no longer equally open to both sides. America had to have both her War of Independence and her Civil War before democracy could operate successfully; British constitutional politics date from the Revolution of 1688—an act of force. Moreover, in these cases one side at least believed in and hoped to establish democratic government; in China neither of the main opposing parties had any such belief or any such intention.

It is natural that Dr. Chang should not always be willing to acknowledge these painful facts, and his unwillingness to do so leads him to find an explanation for China's present situation in secondary causes. His criticism of American postwar policy in China amounts to the charge that the U. S. failed to do in China what Britain had done in Greece at much the same period. Britain was able to secure and reestablish constitutional democracy in Greece because she had the force available both to defend the government against Communist uprisings and to compel the King to restore democratic rule as the price of British support. But Greece is small and China is vast; the scale of the necessary American intervention would have far exceeded the modest forces Britain employed in Greece, and the transformation of the Nationalist government which would have been necessary if popular support was to be won back from the Communists would have been indeed profound. It is also very much to be doubted whether Chinese patriots of any political persuasion would have relished this degree of foreign control and intervention; whether in fact any such attempt would not have played directly into Communist hands by rallying national support to their side.

Dr. Chang regards the Communist's domination of Manchuria as the key to their success and the principal cause of the fall of the Kuomintang. He believes that this situation was planned in advance by the Russians and that only American intervention in Manchuria could have frustrated these long prepared designs. This ignores too many other factors and oversimplifies the course of events in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek lost the war mainly because of the failure of morale among his armies and the withdrawal of popular support from his regime. The decisive battles of the civil war were won and lost inside the Wall, not in Manchuria. Moreover, the Russian policy in Manchuria after the Japanese surrender was ambiguous. The rapid stripping and ruin of the Japanese industrial installations in Manchuria was not the best way of ensuring the triumph of the Chinese Communists; it would have been just as easy for Russia to hand over Manchuria to them intact. Russia did not at first permit the Yenan commanded Communists to enter Manchuria, though she placed no obstacles in the way of the local guerrillas seizing Japanese arms dumps. Russian policy, like our own, shows more evidence of hesitation and improvisation than of long term cool calculation.

Many will hope that Dr. Chang's estimate of the strength of democratic feeling in China is correct and that the ultimate future of the Chinese Revolution lies in constitutional government, but we should be unwise to expect such a

development now or to place any hopes in parties which have once failed. The Chinese have no romantic attachment to lost causes and do not seek for restorations.

C. P. FITZGERALD.

Australian National University.

A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution. BY STEFAN T. POSSONY. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. xx, 439. \$7.50.)

At a time when comfortable illusions about the Soviet Union are again gaining strength in the West, Dr. Possony's analysis of "the nature of the beast" (p. x) is most welcome. He performs a great service in presenting a comprehensive and, I believe, essentially correct picture of the "doctrine of conflict management," the "operational know-how" of communist leaderships.

Particularly, he shows the high and increasing role attributed to violence, and especially war, in the Bolshevik operational code. Both intellectually and politically, Dr. Possony's points in this area are of great importance.

Finding myself in broad agreement with the author, I shall indicate some of the special points about which questions might be raised. (All italics in quotations are by the reviewer.)

1. The author does not always conform to scientific method. Thus he believes that "it is worth recording that, *according to a most knowledgeable German source* 'during the depression years German industry was kept afloat largely because it received substantial orders from the Russians,' especially [sic] gold and raw materials" (p. 204). The matter seems to call either for an analysis of the relevant German figures for 1929-1932 by Dr. Possony himself, or for a quotation from a published analysis by a named reputable economist. Again, Dr. Possony seems to be rather certain that he knows the approximate incidence of various kinds of sanctions imposed in France after the liberation of persons alleged to have been "collaborationists." Yet his certainty is not based on a full study of this contentious and obscure matter either by himself or by another reputable scholar. He simply accepts the figures (which of course may be true) of one partisan French source, without describing its affiliations or examining the various arguments which would affect (favorably or unfavorably) a scientist's estimate of its reliability (pp. 288-89). The author accepts (pp. 279-81) in a similar way the genuineness of purported instructions sent by the executive committee of the Comintern to the Yugoslav party on May 9, 1941. (He gives as his sources Stephen Clissold's *Whirlwind* and Leigh White's *Balkan Caesar*.) If there were space, I could give a number of grounds for my belief that the document is a gross forgery. Another illustration of this type of methodological shortcoming is his arriving at the certainty that a "German-Bolshevik conspiracy" existed between 1914 and 1918 (pp. 42-48). Given the state of the sources, chiefly the so-called Sisson documents, any certainty on the matter is probably impossible; to arrive even at the assessment of probabilities a lengthy critical analysis would have to be executed, and this the author does not attempt.

At various points Dr. Possony makes unusual statements for which he offers no evidence. Thus he affirms that the technique of the so-called expropriations was "invented" by Stalin (p. 12); that in the fall of 1917, when Lenin from his hiding place in Finland called for an immediate seizure of power, his "ideas were received skeptically by the comrades at Petrograd who apparently thought that Lenin was willing to risk his followers while hiding in safety himself" (p. 60); that, in Bolshevik political tactics, "if simple deception cannot be relied upon, double deception must be resorted to. One actually must carry out what one appears to be doing, on the theory that the enemy will assume that one does something else" (pp. 380-81); that "it is within the capabilities of . . . Western policy to transform the iron curtain into a straw mat" (p. 422).

2. While Dr. Possony refers to many details of history which are not objects of contention among specialists, his statements are not always correct. He implies that Maxim Gorky's role at the Capri school was comparable to Lenin's at Longjumeau (p. 118). He speaks of the "decisive link" as "Stalin's concept" (p. 185). He implies that it was the fifth congress of the Comintern in 1924 which was particularly and favorably concerned with the idea of a "workers' government." After citing Nikolayevsky's excellent book about Azev, he maintains that this agent provocateur "operated against the Bolsheviks" (p. 222). He affirms that those who voted for the Mensheviks and the right Social-Revolutionaries in the Russian elections of 1917 "may have had tactical differences with the Bolsheviks, but there was no difference in principle" (pp. 29-30). The truth of this sentence seems to depend on the meaning one decides to give to the ambiguous term "principle." If attitudes towards democracy (in the Western sense) involve "principles," the statement does not seem to be correct. According to the author, "in communist terminology the word 'peace' . . . can denote the non-conflict type of political relationship in a classless society; but whenever the term carries this meaning in communist writings, it is spelled out clearly" (p. 413). Actually, the standard Bolshevik description of "communism" does not contain the term "peace" which is to high-level communists entirely exoteric. (This, by the way, strengthens Dr. Possony's main argument in the matter.)

3. Dr. Possony's interpretations of Bolshevik doctrine are sometimes open to question. Discussing the Comintern congress of 1935, Dr. Possony says that "Dimitrov and his associates hoped that a revolutionary movement could be built on the exploitation of local and temporary grievances without the emergence of an over-all political consciousness. . . . Such a hope was in contrast to the basic tenets of Leninism and Stalinism" (pp. 212-13). But the reduction of the role attributed to the "consciousness" of the "masses" is one of the main trends of Bolshevism—as the author himself implies when he says that "communists gain popular support not through pushing their own platform, but by espousing non-communist ideas" (p. viii).

Repeatedly (cf. pp. 60, 176-77, 214, 417) Dr. Possony presents what he affirms to be typical communist policy calculations as divided into a "thesis," "antithesis" (or "double antithesis") and "synthesis." As he points out, he

introduces in these instances "a type of dialectics which will probably amaze the college professors teaching Hegel and Marx." He adds: "Yet this is how abstract philosophy can be applied in practice." I believe that this particular practice is entirely Dr. Possony's. He offers no evidence to show that "communists draw up their operational plans according to the dialectic scheme" as he presents it—unless all that is involved is the intent simultaneously to strengthen the party and to weaken the enemy (cf. pp. 176–77). But in this case, again, there is no evidence that communists believe they are applying "dialectics" when they are engaging in this nondistinctive mode of planning.

4. In his eagerness to establish certain points the author does not entirely avoid questionable reasoning. In trying to show that the favorable relations between Berlin and Moscow in 1939–1940 were related to earlier manifestations of "the German-Bolshevik conspiracy," he writes: "The fact . . . that Stalin helped Hitler . . . *can be explained logically only* if it is assumed . . . that the Soviets considered the Western powers their most dangerous opponents." "Logically," there are other possibilities: viewing the Nazis as "their most dangerous opponents," the Soviets may have wanted to deflect the Nazis' expansion towards the West, etc. Also, according to Dr. Possony, "Stalin's alliance with Germany . . . is easy enough to understand unless the tenuous ideological differences between nazism and communism are overstressed" (pp. 253–54). What is important here, however, is not whether these differences are "tenuous" to Western antitotalitarians, but to the communist leaders themselves; and on this point Dr. Possony offers no satisfactory evidence.

5. Dr. Possony tends to exaggerate the intellectual level of communist doctrine—a level which has never been high and has been steadily sinking. According to the author "communist techniques of expansion" are "based upon elaborate studies in the humanities and social sciences" (p. v). What are these studies? Also Stalin "has written *many* professional papers on [military] strategy and tactics" (p. 247). Again, what are these papers? In addition, "he is intimately familiar with morale problems." As shown by what subtle analysis of the subjective aspects of war?

6. The influence of Clausewitz on Lenin is exaggerated: "Sometimes between 1913 and 1915 Lenin studied the works of Karl von Clausewitz. . . . Marx gave Lenin . . . a method of analyzing political situations. Clausewitz taught the bolsheviks the secret of operations" (p. 20). However, many of the specifically Bolshevik proclivities in operations had been expressed, in word and act, before 1913.

7. The author pays perhaps too little attention to differentiations of the Bolshevik operational code according to techniques and situations. Thus it may well be that in war it may seem to Bolsheviks "advisable to feign a retreat to lure the enemy into an ill-considered advance" (p. 395). But in situations where violence is not the major device used Bolsheviks are rather adverse to this procedure.

8. Dr. Possony tends to exaggerate the skill which the leadership of the Soviet Union has shown in its external relations. He does not analyze the signifi-

cance of the fact that Moscow did not perceive the imminence of a German attack in the spring of 1941. A ruling group whose major obsession, for two decades, had been an annihilatory attack from without, had throughout the years mistakenly pointed to its imminence. When it finally came, that ruling group was tactically unprepared. Nor does Dr. Possony give an account of the disasters (for Moscow) of the first four months of war. In his conclusion he recalls that "they [the Soviets] escaped destruction only by the skin of their teeth," but in his brief account of 1941-1942 he merely points out that "although the Soviets seemed pleased with their successes against Hitler's blitzkrieg, on close analysis they appear less impressive. . . . Hitler risked attacking the Soviet Union with a relatively weak air force and . . . against a four-fold Russian tank superiority" (p. 255). Dr. Possony mentions figures for German losses in 1941 (p. 256), but, as far as I could discover, he does not indicate his estimates of the damage inflicted on the Soviet forces.

NATHAN LEITES.

Yale University.

Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947. BY MULFORD Q. SIBLEY and PHILIP E. JACOB. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 580. \$6.50.)

This book is an invaluable addition to the literature of American civil liberty. Written by two young political scientists, it should command the close interest and deep respect of all their colleagues, for it is a book in which the political science profession can take great pride. Long, filled with great detail, but always carefully organized and interestingly written, the book tells in exceedingly impressive and authoritative fashion the story of American conscientious objection to military service in World War II. The authors have undertaken their research and reported their findings with seeming accuracy and completeness, with understanding of and sympathy for the conscientious objector, but also with dispassion, balance, and perspective. For this reviewer, at least, no recent work by a political scientist comes any closer to an ideal expression and realization of the interests and talents of our particular discipline. The complexity and profundity of the political problem here under observation, the mountain of data accumulated, and the varied and sophisticated insights of its pages give this book a high value, indeed, for all students of the political process.

No brief review can possibly indicate the scope or excellence of this volume. For one thing, it is a study both of policy making and of administration, and of very great interest in both respects. In Parts 1 and 2, the authors define the problem of conscientious objection in the modern state, giving it historical depth and philosophic perspective, and describe the making of the American policy of World War II. This policy was essentially one of extending objector status to members of organized religious groups whose creeds included objection to war. Such status extended only to those who were opposed to combatant service with the armed forces; it did not extend to those who opposed noncombatant service under civilian auspices (the "absolutists"), and it did not extend

to those whose pacifism had philosophic rather than religious origins. This policy, in the authors' opinion, was an improvement over World War I policy, but it had obvious and serious deficiencies, and was, for example, far less enlightened and sophisticated than British policy.

Part 2 also describes the experience of those objectors who elected the first of three alternatives open to them, noncombatant service within the armed forces. Parts 3 and 4 are concerned with the other alternatives: civilian service under private or governmental (but non-military) auspices; and prosecution and imprisonment for the "absolutists" and also for those men whose claims to other classifications were rejected by draft authorities. Thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses were prosecuted when their claims to IV-D status as ministers of the gospel were rejected. Treatment of the Jehovah's Witnesses was undoubtedly the greatest single failure of the conscientious objector program.

Roughly half of the book deals with the second alternative, for this was the new and important "experiment in tolerance" in our World War II conscription policy. The agency that administered this experimental program, the Civilian Public Service, had a "trinity of participants"—Selective Service, the "Historic Peace Churches" (Mennonites, Brethren, and Friends), and the conscientious objectors. While never meeting with complete failure, the CPS venture steadily deteriorated as the war progressed and was on the verge of collapse as the war ended. "What began as an experiment in tolerance ultimately demonstrated in unmistakable terms the deep and inherent contradiction between the American demand for national security and the claims of individuals for personal liberty of conscience" (p. 11). Selective Service and its director, General Hershey, must share major responsibility for this disappointing result, in the authors' judgment. Lack of understanding of the moral and human forces involved in conscientious objection to war and military service, and administrative inflexibility in adjusting to the realities of the situation, were two of Selective Service's shortcomings. But Sibley and Jacob find no single villain in this story of frustration and intolerance. Blame enough there was for all participants. Congress erred in providing only an original half measure in the way of a humane, sensible statement of policy. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both reacted to the basic problem of conscientious objection with pettiness and truculence and their executive orders reflected this attitude. American public opinion at best tolerated the claims of the conscientious objector by the narrowest of margins, and was frequently indifferent to the civil liberty aspect of the problem, thereby permitting "pockets of influential opinion predisposed to view the objector as an unpatriotic slacker" to influence and control policy making and administration. The Historic Peace Churches made many serious errors in their handling of the problem and were perhaps basically unprepared and ill-equipped to accept the heavy burden of administering the Civilian Public Service camps. (In a challenging and honest passage Sibley and Jacob state their own separate and conflicting answers to the question whether the churches "betrayed religious liberty" by collaborating with Selective Service in administering the program.) Even the objectors, themselves, are

recognized by the authors to have been considerably less than heroes in their own tragic drama.

As a definitive account of American handling and mishandling of a wartime civil liberties problem this volume should find its place on the political scientist's shelf next to Morton Grodzins' admirable analysis of the Japanese-American evacuation program, *Americans Betrayed*. As a profound and compassionate account of the mind and role of the nonconformist in modern society, it fully earns a high place in the Thoreau tradition.

ROBERT K. CARR.

Dartmouth College.

Why Democracy? BY ALF ROSS. TRANSLATED BY DAVID GATLEY-PHILIP. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 249. \$4.50.)

The author of this book is Professor of Public Law in the University of Copenhagen, and the book itself was born out of the Nazi occupation of Denmark. This experience, he says, made him conscious, as never before, of the meaning and value of democracy, and of liberty. In specific political belief, he is a Social Democrat, a democratic socialist, but a democrat first and last. If socialism is shown to be incompatible with democracy, that is the end of socialism for him.

Publishing originally in Danish, he sought translation into English in the hope of showing American readers "that the ideas and aspirations which form the American way of life are in essence the same as those which inspire the West European democracies," and to help the American public to understand that the Social Democrats, in the smaller European democracies at any rate, are more democratic than socialistic.

Whatever may be true of his fellows, there can be no doubt of Mr. Ross's close affinity, one might almost say identification, with the essentials of democratic thought in North America. He would acclimatize overnight. Some of the essentials of his position can best be put negatively. He is not a democrat after Rousseau; he does not believe in a mystical will of the people. Nor does he believe in the possibility of any scientific demonstration of values to which men ought to be compelled to conform. He thus escapes entirely the virus of what has been called totalitarian democracy. He does not believe "that a straightforward common goal [can] be set for all social endeavour. 'The common good,' 'the general interest' . . . are only labels people stick on what they regard at the time as right and reasonable." Even if a certain common final goal, such as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is generally professed, it is a mistake to believe that "it should be possible to prove rationally which is the right way to reach it."

For him, rational absolutes in social matters are out. "All orthodoxy, including the Communist, presupposes a belief in revelation" and "Every canonization . . . leads to stagnation and decay." Nevertheless, he knows what he will fight for: the dignity of man and the freedom of the human spirit. These values, derived from the Christian and humanistic traditions, are, he profoundly be-

lieves, the foundation of Western civilization. Democracy is to him essentially a set of procedures, a method—indeed, the only method—of defending and furthering these values.

"Democracy is a form of government for mature and grown-up peoples who demand that their fate be in their own hands." Free, autonomous, human personality cannot exist, let alone flourish, except where men are conscious of being able to participate in shaping the resolutions that inevitably regulate life in society. Because, in this shaping, men cannot expect a rational demonstration of a single common goal on which all agree, the only course that avoids the indignity of force and violence, "spiritual mutilation," "systematic stunting of spiritual personality" (witness the Nazi occupation), is to enter into discussion and debate for the purpose of reaching a compromise.

"The essential value of discussion lies not in its being a way to truth through the combining of arguments, but in its being a way to compromise, by causing wills to yield to one another." "I prefer an actually worse world to a better one that can be maintained only through oppression, dictation, and force." "The essence of the spirit of compromise is connected with respect for the autonomy of others." It is only where men are genuinely moved by tolerance, mutual understanding, and "belief in some common humanity which unites and is stronger than the particular that divides," that they can live together in peace. How far they can collectivize and rule their life together through politics and government depends on the strength, pervasiveness, and comprehensiveness of the common basis of faith and ideals. (It may well be that a few million Danes, sharing an age-long tradition, may be able to go further in this direction than can a heterogeneous continental society of one hundred and fifty millions.)

Apart from fresh ways of putting it and a strong impression of intense conviction born of experience, there is nothing utterly new about this analysis, but it does certify Mr. Ross as a democrat who has the heart of the matter in him. However, beyond this he is an extraordinarily clear-headed and fair-minded democrat. Democracy, he keeps insisting, is a form of government, a method for regulating the common life of a community. It does not prescribe any particular social or economic structure. For it to work, and to go on working, it must ensure certain specific individual freedoms—the franchise, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of the person. Apart from these, it has no necessary connection with traditional economic liberalism, or with socialism. "It no more sanctions free enterprise than it guarantees freedom from want. The latter is a goal of socialism, not of democracy." He rejects "economic democracy" as a phrase to which no precise meaning can be given. While democracy, as a *political method*, requires specific freedoms it has no necessary connection with social and economic equality beyond the obvious one that persistence of gross social inequalities may break down the community consensus on which democracy always depends. Of all forms of government, it alone must secure general acceptance in the community.

This, of course, is mainly a formal clarification which enables us to see the real issues. The author admits, indeed he insists, that democracy works more

easily under a liberal economy because the economic struggle is in considerable measure kept out of politics. The advance toward socialism means that this struggle gets into politics and sharpens the conflict while at the same time demanding a much wider measure of political agreement. Issues of economic efficiency aside, the central political issue of socialism is the maintaining of the general consensus of the community and the taking of endless political decisions through compromise and majority vote. And the one reacts on the other.

When Mr. Ross comes, in the later part of the book, to discuss specifically the question of the compatibility of democracy and socialism, it is not too clear what he means by socialism, as indeed it could scarcely be within the confines of a short book. He insists that Social Democrats are not now pushing for "total, centralized state socialism," but rather envisage some kind of mixed economy which he does not outline in detail beyond saying that economic decision in his planned economy would be extensively decentralized and that consumers' choice would be maintained through the price mechanism. In this way, he hopes to maintain scope for "considerable initiative and autonomy" (which he recognizes as vital) and to prevent dangerous concentrations of power. Given these conditions, he thinks the essential planning of economic life can be fixed through the democratic processes of discussion and compromise. He brings to his support the fact that the democracies carried through extensive planning for the purposes of total war without destroying democracy.

It may be countered that it is much easier to get agreement for the limited, temporary, overriding aim of winning a war than for permanent peacetime purposes when everyone hopes to enjoy the fuller freedom for which the war was fought. Generally speaking, the author admits this, holding that the new economic order he hopes for has not been realized anywhere, and that discussion is necessarily abstract and speculative. He allows that thinking on these matters, on his side as well as on the other side, may be strongly influenced by "wish-determined preconceptions."

To the reviewer, the author's arguments, as applied to North American conditions, do not improve the plausibility of democratic socialism. As noted above, the problem may be simpler in small homogeneous countries like Denmark. But beyond this, Mr. Ross is strongly disposed to dismiss the case for free enterprise on the ground that genuinely free enterprise is outmoded by the tendency to large scale production and by certain changes in psychological attitudes. To him, deliberate planning is now inevitable, and if it is not public, it will be private. Private planning simply will not be accepted by the community as a whole. The ideology which sanctioned the role of private ownership in economic processes has broken down because it is no longer believed that these private decisions perform an effective function in the life of society. In short, the exercise of social power by the controllers of private property has been discredited. It follows that the community consensus necessary for democracy cannot now be maintained on the basis of the exercise of such power.

Whether or not this judgment is correct, the author has brought us again to the nub of the question. To get government by consent, the exercise of decisive

power, economic as well as political, must be widely believed to be legitimate. The reviewer thinks Mr. Ross may well have put his finger on the main cause of the social instability of Western Europe. What he says may be entirely correct in application to Europe and quite wrong in application to North America. At any rate he goes far with his professed purpose of explaining why Social Democrats in Europe think as they do.

Attention here has been focused on the main theme of the book. It has not been possible to comment on many other points of excellence in it. For example, there is a splendid chapter in which the author takes up the case made against democracy point by point and refreshes the faith of those who hold that democracy is the indispensable political buttress of human dignity. In its fair-minded integrity and its cool penetration, this volume is a very important addition to the literature on the main political issues of our time. As the quotations show, the translator has served the author and his readers with distinction through his clear, flexible, idiomatic English.

J. A. CORRY.

Queen's University.

Harold Laski (1893-1950): A Biographical Memoir. By KINGSLEY MARTIN. (New York: The Viking Press. 1953. Pp. x, 278. \$4.00.)

Kingsley Martin, editor of *The New Statesman and Nation*, aided by his colleague, Norman MacKenzie, has skillfully fashioned a striking portrait of his friend, the late Harold Laski, as well as a warm tribute to his many virtues.

The book is not a full biography and it presents no systematic discussion of Laski's writings. Mr. Martin has selected a number of incidents from the various periods of Laski's life—his childhood in Manchester, the Oxford years, the period of teaching in North America from 1914 to 1920, his career at the London School of Economics, his work in the Labor party, the agitation over Spain and the Popular Front in the late 1930's, the war years, the great victory of Labor in the 1945 election, and the tragedy of Laski's unsuccessful libel action in 1946.

In part, Mr. Martin draws upon his own recollections and upon material supplied by Laski's friends in order to describe the events in which Laski played a part and his reactions to them. More often, however, he lets Laski himself tell the story by giving extensive quotations from his correspondence. Most of these quotations come from the letters to Felix Frankfurter, who was for over thirty years Laski's most intimate friend. Reading excerpts from these letters makes one wish that this correspondence had been published in full, rather than the Holmes-Laski letters. Apart from these letters, one of the most fascinating sections of the book is that in which Mr. Martin gives a summary of and quotations from an unpublished manuscript, *The Chosen People*, an essay on the Jewish problem which Laski wrote before he was twenty years old.

The Laski that emerges from the pages of this volume is a man of extraordinary capabilities as a scholar and a writer; unfortunately, however, these potentialities were never fully realized. It is also clear that he was an inspiring

teacher, a devoted friend and colleague, and a man who willingly spent his limited strength in almost profligate fashion in order to help and encourage the young, the underprivileged, and the obscure. Mr. Martin's picture of Laski makes much of the recent discussion of his "story-telling" and his vanity seem trivial and ungenerous.

Mr. Martin is, however, far less persuasive and enlightening when he discusses and defends Laski's political doctrines and theories. The Marxist faith which he shares with Laski seems to prevent him from achieving a critical perspective from which he can weigh Laski's contributions to political analysis. In one chapter, for example, he repeats and supports the main arguments which Laski presented in *The American Democracy*, published in 1948. The serious criticisms of this book by American reviewers are dismissed with the implication that they attacked the volume because Laski was "radical" and "unorthodox," and not because of his numerous inaccuracies and mistaken judgments.

Similarly, Mr. Martin's comments on postwar American foreign policy reflect the familiar prejudices of the editorial page of *The New Statesman*. He states, for instance, that by the summer of 1947 "General Marshall's Harvard speech offering economic aid from America's surplus to all countries, including the Soviet Union and its satellites, had dwindled into a proposal to aid governments that fought the growth of socialism within their territory" (p. 188). Are we to assume that this category includes the British Labor Government of 1945-1951?

Finally, it is clear that in the period from 1932 to 1939, when his influence was greatest, Laski constantly argued that the capitalist class would resort to violence and fascism rather than permit the instruments of political democracy to be used to achieve socialist measures. He concluded, therefore, that a non-violent transition to socialism was virtually impossible, and he condemned as unrealistic Utopians the leaders of the Labor party who continued to believe in the viability of parliamentary democracy. It is difficult, therefore, to see how Mr. Martin can argue that "long before 1938 it had become the main object of Harold's life to find for Labour in Britain the path to that 'revolution by consent' which he believed to be the only alternative to civil war . . .," and that his career is "the story of a man setting out to provide social democracy with a workable philosophy" (p. 69).

HERBERT A. DEANE.

Columbia University.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings. By HAROLD L. CROSS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 405. \$5.50.)

This is an extremely valuable source book containing the statutes, court decisions, and administrative rulings dealing with access by the public to official records. Harold L. Cross, a specialist on laws affecting journalism, made this study under the sponsorship of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, whose members became aroused by the increasing restrictions on access to official news and documents.

After treating the sources of the law, the author makes a state-by-state analysis of the definitions of the relevant terms, with special attention to the "right of inspection," and then examines the laws and decisions regulating access to various municipal and state records, including "police records," judicial records and proceedings, and legislative and administrative proceedings. He then surveys the federal scene, although the increasing use by Congress of secret hearings draws no comment. Four useful appendices provide digests of the relevant court cases and statutory material so that future investigators in this area will have their labors considerably lightened.

Cross shows that the people's "right to know" is unquestionably one of the most narrowly defined and least effectively protected rights to which Americans can lay claim. This unfortunate fact is not explainable solely by historical factors, although the common law rule denies a general right of access to official records and freedom of the press has never been broadened to include the right to obtain news from official sources. What this study reveals most clearly is the fondness for secrecy of legislatures, courts, and administrative officials. While there has been some improvement in the legal rules regulating access by the public to official records and proceedings, there has been a tremendous increase in the amount of official action around which the curtain of secrecy has been drawn.

While reasonable men might differ with the author concerning details, such as the need for publicity in juvenile court proceedings

where adults are involved or in rape cases, the indictment of official secrecy which Mr. Cross presents is on the whole amply sustained. An immediate solution of this serious problem, as the author indicates, requires action by Congress and state legislatures. It is conceivable that with strong public support, legislative bodies might move to reform administrative practices, but will they recognize and moderate their own predilection for secrecy? And will legislators who find it necessary to "negotiate" with administrative agencies on behalf of their constituents want full publicity even in the administrative sphere? In its essence the problem which Mr. Cross describes so ably in legal terms raises ethical issues of the highest importance.—
W. M. BEANEY, *Princeton University.*

Interstate Cooperation: A Study of the Interstate Compact. By VINCENT V. THURSBY. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1953. Pp. vi, 152. \$3.25.)

This study is a useful addition to the writings on the interstate compact. In seven chapters the author describes the circumstances occasioning the establishment of compacts, the development of relevant judicial opinion, the process of congressional consent, the problem of enforcement, uses of the compact, and its utility and limitations. A final eighth chapter recapitulates conclusions found in the foregoing chapters.

A book of moderate length, this volume does not afford the comprehensive, definitive treatment of the interstate compact that is still needed. To some extent it parallels *The Interstate Compact since 1925*, by Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell, published in 1951 by The Council of State Governments. Well-organized and documented and clearly written, Dr. Thursby's study should be particularly useful to students of constitutional law, state government, and federalism in the United States.

As with the study by Zimmermann and Wendell, this book appears to have been based chiefly on an examination of documents and its emphasis is upon law. Extensive use has been made of newspaper materials and government reports. In appraising the utility and limitations of the compact device, the author has re-

led primarily upon a comparison of views pro and con of commentators on the compact. In the opinion of this reviewer, something more than this is needed in a definitive study. Actual evidence of the effectiveness of compacts in operation might contribute more to understanding and appraisal than the opinions of the late Mr. Laski. Considerations of law need also to be balanced by considerations of politics and administration.

The type of study of the interstate compact which is now needed would require time and resources not available to most individual scholars. Unless funds and other facilities can be marshalled for a direct investigation of the operation of the interstate compact, Professor Thursby's volume and that of Zimmermann and Wendell will probably remain the best points of departure for a study of the compact for some time to come.—LYNTON K. CALDWELL, *Syracuse University*.

Freedom through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power. By ROBERT L. HALE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xvi, 591. \$7.50.)

According to the author, this book follows a line of thought that he has pursued since 1909. Your reviewer is inclined to suggest that Prof. Hale's "line" has developed into a massive ball of twine over the course of 44 years. In an exhaustive fashion, the book is concerned with the broad question of the inequitable distribution of economic liberty that results from government policies, judicial decisions, and the free enterprise system itself.

Divided into five parts, the third and fourth constitute the body of this work. Part I analyzes the coercive factors in our free enterprise society and the resultant economic inequalities. Part II deals with the common-law adjustments of conflicting economic liberties. Part III explores the Constitution as protector of economic liberty and equality. Part IV examines various legislative policies that have been enacted to adjust conflicting economic liberties (wage and hour legislation, rate making, utilities regulation). Part V is a ten-page conclusion containing the author's opinion that legislative bodies "seem to be the organs best suited to make the final choices which government at times has to make between conflicting liberties," although legislative policies should be subject to some degree of judicial control. The author does not say so, but he apparently approves in general what we

have had since the "Constitutional Revolution" of 1937: positive government accompanied by judicial self-restraint.

It is the author's hope that both layman and lawyer will read his volume. Serious-minded laymen will certainly not find the work stimulating. It is a tedious admixture of the simple and the complex. Nearly 600 court decisions are cited; it seems as if all are discussed. There are extensive quotations from judicial opinions. Some sections constitute a full recitation of cases on a particular subject. On certain occasions the author hammers hard on the obvious, taking nothing for granted; at other times his analysis is obtuse.

Mr. Hale's style of writing is heavy. Some pages remind this reviewer of Chief Justice Edward White's elongated sentences. For example, at one point Hale writes three consecutive sentences which average 70 words each (pp. 443-44).

Of course, the author tackled a gigantic subject. He has given us a treatise in political economy. Unfortunately, his inability to refine his materials leaves the reader with the impression that he has seen hundreds of trees but no forest.—DAVID G. FARRELLY, *University of California (Los Angeles)*.

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day Significance. By ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1953. Pp. 144. \$2.50.)

This brief but scholarly and thought-provoking volume comprises the annual Roscoe Pound Lectures delivered at the University of Nebraska in 1952. One chapter views the doctrine of separation of powers comparatively and historically; another deals with the threat to our constitutional system arising from the increased dominance of the national government over the states and of the executive over the legislative branch; and the third deplores the tendency of the courts to abdicate their responsibility for maintaining our traditional scheme of constitutional limitations inherent in the system of separation of powers.

The author, whose many contributions to the science of jurisprudence are widely recognized, presents his subject with an impressive display of learning and zeal. Like a Hebrew prophet of old, he urges a return to the true religion of our fathers from which we have wandered in worship of the welfare state and in our too easy reliance upon an all-powerful executive to lead us through recurring crises.

His plea is essentially for a more vigorous use of the judicial veto to resist current constitutional trends. It is easier to agree with the eminent jurist's diagnosis of our present political institutional ills than to accept without reservation all the remedies for them he proposes. After all, the essence of democracy and limited government, as he admits, is not solely a matter of mechanisms, forms, and formulas; it is also a matter of spirit and substance. And as Justice Stone once said, "Courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have the capacity to govern."—JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH, *University of Michigan*.

The Genius of American Politics. By DAVID J. BOORSTIN. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. 202. \$3.25.)

The writer supports the thesis that "American democracy is unique," that it is the product of the peculiar circumstances of our history and is inexpressible in a philosophy which will sum up our way of life; hence it is not exportable. "The peculiar strengths of American life," he states, "have saved us from the European preoccupation with political dogmas and have left us inept and uninterested in political theory." "It is our experience, not our dogma or our power, that may be the encouragement and the hope of the world," he concludes.

The Citizen Association: How to Organize and Run It and The Citizen Association: How to Win Civic Campaigns. (New York: National Municipal League. 1953. Pp. 64, 64. \$0.75 each, \$1.20 combined.)

Companion handbooks of great practical value to persons interested in successful civic movements. Both are written by Alexander L. Crosby and edited by John E. Bebout, Allen H. Seed, Jr., and Alfred Willoughby. The first deals with such topics as structure, member-

ship, officers and staff, committees, education and publicity, research, publications, appraising and supporting candidates, and finances. It also includes a model set of bylaws. The second emphasizes campaign organization and strategy, and concludes with stories of fifteen significant citizen campaigns in small and large communities.

America; Ideal and Reality: The United States of 1776 in Contemporary European Philosophy. By W. STARK. (New York: Grove Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 127. \$2.50.)

This book, originally published in 1947, presents mainly the varying ideas concerning America of Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Gabriel Bonnet de Mably, François-Jean de Chastellux, and Jean Pierre Briesot.

Jacob Leisler's Rebellion: A Study of Democracy in New York, 1664-1720. By JEROME R. REICH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 194. \$4.50.)

The story of New York politics from 1664 to 1710 with emphasis upon the interim rule of Jacob Leisler between the fall of James II and the assumption of authority by William and Mary. Leisler is portrayed as an early martyr in the emergence of democracy in colonial America.

A Front Row Seat. By NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 304. \$4.50.)

A review of the experiences of a writer and newspaperman who also served for a time in various public capacities and who was close to many important events and personages over a period of forty years. Of special interest are his comments on his Roosevelt relatives, particularly those of the Oyster Bay branch of the family, with whom he is most closely connected.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Hansen, Morris H., William N. Hurwitz, and Leon Pritzker. *The Accuracy of Census*

Results. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Jones, Harold A. *The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Government*. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. Spring, 1953.

Lawton, Frederick J. Legislative-Executive Relationships in Budgeting as Viewed by the Executive. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1953.

Liacos, Paul J. Rights of Witnesses before Congressional Committees. *Boston University Law Review*. June, 1953.

Livingston, William S. The Legal and Political Determinants of American Federalism. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Paulu, Burton. The Smith-Mundt Act; A Legislative History. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

The Presidency. [Symposium.] *Current History*. September, 1953.

Raines, Irving L. Second-Class Postal Rates and Cost Ascertainment. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

State Government

Anderson, Lynn F., and T. E. McMillan, Jr. Financing State Government in Texas. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1953.

Logan, John Wood, and John A. Donaho. The Performance Budget and Legislative Review. *State Government*. July, 1953.

McGee, Vernon A. A Legislative Approach to State Budgeting. *State Government*. August, 1953.

Sly, John F., William Miller, and James A. Arnold, Jr. Michigan State Aid Survey 1953: The Effect of State Aid on Governmental Finance. Legislative Interim Tax and Revenue Study Committee. 1953.

The State Government Survey Committee Report. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 1953.

The Tax Problem. Report of the Tax Study Committee, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 1953.

Local Government

Baker, Gordon E. Cities Resent Stepchild Lot. *National Municipal Review*. September, 1953.

Blair, George S. The Office of County Coroner in Kansas. *Emporia State Research Studies*. June, 1953.

Busby, William C. The Small Council-Manager City. *Public Management*. July, 1953.

Carroll, J. D., Jr. The Future of the Central

Business District. *Public Management*. July, 1953.

Daland, Robert T. Public Recreation as a Municipal Service in Alabama. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, and Alabama Municipal League. 1953.

Funk, Robert L. The High Cost of Municipal Borrowing. *Public Management*. September, 1953.

Hamilton, Randy H., and George H. Deming. Congressional Legislation of Municipal Interest. *Illinois Municipal Review*. August, 1953.

Is This Your County? A Study of Mississippi County Government with Recommendations. Mississippi Economic Council. 1953.

Jones, Victor. Classification of Cities. *Public Management*. July, 1953.

Kerstetter, John R. 1953 State Legislation Affecting Municipalities. *Public Management*. September, 1953.

Masters, Martin M. Norwich—A Streamlined City. *National Municipal Review*. July, 1953.

Modern Management for the City of New York, Vol. II. Report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey. 1953.

Morris, Robert B. Trainees for City Management. *Public Management*. August, 1953.

Olsen, Allan S. Group Training for City Employees. *Public Management*. August, 1953.

Phillips, Joseph. The City That Saved Itself. *National Municipal Review*. September, 1953.

Reed, Edward W., and Henry M. Alexander. The Government and Finance of Counties in Arkansas. Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Arkansas. 1953.

Ricketts, Edmond F. Performance Standards for City Employees. *Public Management*. August, 1953.

Spicer, George W. Manager Counties Evaluated. *National Municipal Review*. July, 1953.

Stene, Edwin O., and George K. Floro. Abandonments of the Manager Plan: A Study of Four Small Cities. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1953.

Virginia County Supervisors' Manual. League of Virginia Counties and Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia. 1953.

Weller, W. Earl, and Craig M. Smith. Sixteen Years of Progress. *National Municipal Review*. September, 1953.

Intergovernmental Relations

Dykstra, Daniel J. Federal Government, State Governments and Natural Resources. *Minnesota Law Review*. June, 1953.

Tort Jurisdiction Over Federal "Islands" within the States. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Braun, Arnold. Limitations on the Control of Public Employees through Loyalty Oaths. *Syracuse Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

Brown, Ralph S., Jr., and John D. Fassett. Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process under the Port Security Program. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1953.

Carr, Robert K. National Security and Individual Freedom. *Yale Review*. Summer, 1953.

Cohen, Benjamin V. Some Comments on the Bricker Amendment. *Northwestern University Law Review*. May-June, 1953.

Corwin, Edward S. The President's Treaty Making Power. *Think*. July, 1953.

Deportation and Due Process. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

Effectiveness of State Anti-Subversive Legislation. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Fairman, Charles. The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

———. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority. (In symposium on *Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States* by William Winslow Crosskey.) *University of Chicago Law Review*. Autumn, 1953.

Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights through Expansion of the Conditioned Privilege Doctrine. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Mason, Alpheus T. The Supreme Court: Instrument of Power or Revealed Truth, 1930-1937. *Boston University Law Review*. June, 1953.

Mendelson, Wallace. The Degradation of the Clear and Present Danger Rule. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1953.

Preuss, Lawrence. On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties. *Michigan Law Review*. June, 1953.

Satterfield, John C., Sr. Constitutional Amendment by Treaty and Executive Agreement. *Mississippi Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Should the Constitution Be Amended to

Limit the Treaty-Making Power? [Symposium by Eberhard P. Deutsch, George A. Finch, Joseph L. Call, Hardy C. Dillard, and Quincy Wright.] *Southern California Law Review*. July, 1953.

Sklar, Richard L. The Fiction of the First Freedom. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Williams, Jerre. The Steel Seizure—A Legal Analysis of a Political Controversy. *Journal of Public Law*. Spring, 1953.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

The Grand Jury—Its Investigatory Powers and Limitations. *Minnesota Law Review*. June, 1953.

The Grand Jury (Special Reference to Illinois). *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*. May-June, 1953.

Hoover, John Edgar. Juvenile Delinquency. *Syracuse Law Review*. Spring, 1953.

Pound, Roscoe. *Cacothies Dissentiendi*: The Heated Judicial Dissent. *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1953.

Vanderbilt, Arthur T. Traffic Law Enforcement and the Sixteen Resolutions of the Chief Justices and the Governors. Institute of Judicial Administration. 1953.

Westley, William A. Violence and the Police. *American Journal of Sociology*. July, 1953.

Winer, Myron S. An Appraisal of Criminal and Civil Penalties in Federal Tax Evasion Cases. *Boston University Law Review*. June, 1953.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Marshall, Hubert, and Robert J. Young. Public Administration of Florida's Natural Resources. Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida. 1953.

Monypenny, Phillip. A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1953.

Shaw, William W. Independent Civil Service Commissions and Executive Power. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1953.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Ader, Emile B. Why the Dixiecrats Failed. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1953.

Grodin, Joseph R. The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation. *Yale Law Journal*. June, 1953.

Pedrick, Willard H. Senator McCarthy and the Law of Libel: A Study of Two Campaign

Speeches. *Northwestern University Law Review*. May-June, 1953.

Pollard, James E. Truman and the Press: Final Phase, 1951-53. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

Price, Warren C. What Daily News Executives Think of Public Opinion Polls. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

Smith, Carl O., and G. Lowell Field. The Responsibility of Parties in Congress: Myth and Reality. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Clawson, Marion. Economic Possibilities of the Public Domain. *Land Economics*. August, 1953.

Lepawsky, Albert. Dams and Democracy. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1953.

Manpower: The Nation's First Resource. National Planning Association. 1953.

Business and Labor

Aaron, Benjamin. Governmental Restraints on Featherbedding. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

Control of Entry into the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry: The FPC and the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Cullen, Donald E. The Taft-Hartley Act in National Emergency Disputes. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. October, 1953.

The Current Status of Workmen's Compensation. [Symposium.] *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. October, 1953.

Daykin, Walter L. Effect of NLRA and Taft-Hartley on the Employer's Right to Hire. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1953.

Eberlein, E. Larry. Judicial Regulation of the Railway Brotherhoods' Discriminatory Practices. *Wisconsin Law Review*. May, 1953.

Emanuel, Louis, III. Unfair Lists as Inducements to Secondary Boycotts under Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. *Yale Law Journal*. June, 1953.

The Federal Employers' Liability Act, Part II. *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Summer, 1953.

Forkosch, Morris D. Formulation and Application of NLRB Orders. *Labor Law Journal*. August, 1953. Part II. September, 1953.

———. The Revival of the Sherman Act and Its Application to Labor Organizations. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1953.

Gross, Norman. Judicial Control of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction in New York. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Laws and Attitudes in the Industrial Development of the South: A Round Table. *Journal of Public Law*. Spring, 1953.

Levinson, David. Legal Aspects of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1953.

Loevinger, Lee. Antitrust and the New Economics. *Minnesota Law Review*. June, 1953.

Malick, Clay P. Some Thoughts on the Public Interest. University of Colorado Studies. June, 1953.

Rehmus, Charles M. The Operation of the National Emergency Provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. *Yale Law Journal*. June, 1953.

Rosenthal, Robert J. Taft-Hartley Limitations on Union Security. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1953.

Stocking, George W. The Law on Basing Point Pricing: Confusion or Competition. *Journal of Public Law*. Spring, 1953.

Strauss, George, and Don Willner. Government Regulation of Local Union Democracy. *Labor Law Journal*. August, 1953.

Agriculture

Shideler, James H. The Development of the Parity Price Formula for Agriculture, 1919-1923. *Agricultural History*. July, 1953.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Altmeyer, Arthur J. The Future of Social Security in America. *Social Service Review*. September, 1953.

Boyer, William W., Jr. Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin Law Review*. March, 1953.

Greenfield, Margaret. Unemployment Insurance for Farm Workers. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1953.

Mandel, B. J. Sampling the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Records. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. September, 1953.

Wickenden, Elizabeth. Observations on Public Welfare in Puerto Rico. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1953.

Military Affairs and National Security

Baldwin, Hanson W. Our Defense Program. *Harvard Business Review*. July-August, 1953.

Butts, A. B. The First Year of the United

States Court of Military Appeals. *Mississippi Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Duffield, Eugene S. Organizing for Defense. *Harvard Business Review*. September-October, 1953.

Grimm, Eugene L. Criminal Justice in the Military Establishment. *Journal of the American Judicature Society*. June, 1953.

Return of Property Seized during World War II: Judicial and Administrative Proceedings under the Trading with the Enemy Act. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1953.

ten Broek, Jacobus. Wartime Power of the Military over Citizen Civilians within the Country. *California Law Review*. Summer, 1953.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. Emergency Drought Program. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Long-Range Agricultural Policy. (Summary by Walter W. Wilcox.) Committee Print. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Reserve Officer Personnel Act. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Assistance and Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Assistance to Schools in Federally Impacted Areas. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Survey of Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (Department of Defense). Hearings. Also House Reports Nos. 633, 634, and 652. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953 (Foreign Operations Administration) (United States Information Agency). Hearings. Also House Reports Nos. 843 (2 pts.) and 844 (2 pts.). 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953 (Council of Economic Advisers). Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 939. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1953 (Payments to Air Carriers). Hearing

before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 940. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Color Television. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Food Standards). Hearing before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 934. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Federal Power Act (Water Conservation Facilities). Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Natural Gas Act (Distribution). Hearing before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Public Health Service Act (Narcotics Addicts). Hearing before a Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Weather Modification Experiments. Hearing. Also House Report No. 1022. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Creation of Commission on Judicial and Congressional Salaries. House Report No. 1057. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Emergency Immigration Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Investigation of the Department of Justice. Hearings before Special Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Omnibus Judgeship Bill. House Report No. 1005. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Patent Extension. Hearing before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Preference Accorded in Federal Employment to Veterans. House Report No. 849. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Public Works. National Highway Study. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Communist Methods of Infiltration (Government-Labor). Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Investigation of Communist Activities in the Albany, N. Y., Area. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. Investigation of Communist Activities in the Columbus, Ohio, Area. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

———. How Our Laws Are Made. By Charles J. Zinn. House Doc. No. 210. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 4, 1952. Compiled by Earl Rockwood under direction of Lyle D. Snader, Clerk of the House. 1953.

House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Atomic Power Development and Private Enterprise. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Cotton Marketing Quotas and Acreage Allotments. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Wheat Marketing Quotas and Acreage Allotments. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Armed Services. Aircraft Procurement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Banking and Currency. Bank Holding Legislation. Hearings. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Disposal of Rubber Plants. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 579. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Foreign Relations. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Government Operations. Security—Government Printing Office. Hearings before Subcommittee on Investigations. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Amending the Natural Gas Act. Senate Report No. 817. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Merchant Marine Studies. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Waterfront Investigation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Workload of the Federal Communications Commission. Hearing. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on the Judiciary. Communist Underground Printing Facilities and Illegal Propaganda. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Interlocking Subversion in

Government Departments. Hearings before Subcommittee on Internal Security. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Committee on Public Works. Amending the Federal Power Act. Hearing before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Tolls on Federal-Aid Highways. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; edited by Edward S. Corwin. Sen. Doc. No. 170. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1953.

Select Committee on Small Business. Future of Irregular Airlines in United States Air Transportation Industry. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 822. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Motion Picture Distribution Trade Practices. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Military Procurement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1953.

Other Federal

Commission of Fine Arts. Art and Government. Report to the President. 1953.

Departments of Agriculture and Commerce. Bureaus of Agricultural Economics and of the Census. Farms and Farm People: Population, Income and Housing Characteristics by Economic Class of Farm. 1953.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book 1952. 1953.

Governments Division. Compendium of State Government Finances in 1952. 1953.

Revised Summary of State Government Finances, 1942-1950. 1953.

Department of Defense. Arctic Bibliography. 3 vols. 1953.

Housing and Home Finance Agency. Comparative Digest of Municipal and County Zoning Enabling Statutes. [1953.]

National Science Foundation. Federal Funds for Science. Parts I and II. [1953.]

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

French Politics: The First Years of the Fourth Republic. By DOROTHY PICKLES. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953. Pp. xii, 302. \$5.00.)

Mrs. Pickles discerns three major features

of French politics during the first six years after World War II (the study closes with the general election of 1951): (1) the gulf between the aspirations of the underground and occupation period and the postwar reality; (2) the

rapid return to prewar patterns of life; and (3) the extent to which the attitudes and events of the first two years determined subsequent developments. The first two years after the War were dominated by plans and ideas about a new order in France; though some of these ideas were quickly realized—e.g., nationalization of key industries—the new order which filled the hopes and dreams of the resistance did not come into being and life returned to the well-worn grooves of the Third Republic. It is rather doubtful, therefore, whether the first two postwar years of French politics really have determined future developments in the manner of the grand outline presented. Actually, the weight of the evidence points in the opposite direction; e.g., the dreams of the occupation period and the years of provisional government have not left many lasting imprints on French politics.

The shift to the right which became apparent even before the election of 1951 has since been accentuated. There is perhaps no better indicator of the shift in French politics since the first years of the Fourth Republic than the fact that during the debate on nationalization a conservative counterproposal was defeated by a vote of 510 to 41, and that the conservative member who formulated the counterproposal and led the conservative opposition to the government nationalization plans was Joseph Laniel, Premier of France in September, 1953.

There are major limitations on the scope of Mrs. Pickles' study. She notes that she has studied events as Frenchmen saw them in their newspapers, party publications, and debates in the legislative chambers, and that she has recounted and analyzed but has drawn no conclusions and has rendered no judgments. She has addressed her study primarily to British readers and comparisons are made with British institutions only. Despite these limitations, *French Politics* is a necessary addition to an admittedly large list of studies on postwar France. Mrs. Pickles eschews facile solutions and weighty judgments on how Frenchmen should put their house in order. She has no arbitrary "working model"—openly stated or slyly insinuated—which she uses to praise or condemn. She has collected evidence and clearly recognized the limits of her enterprise. For this she and Chatham House deserve praise and thanks.—ALFRED DIAMANT, *University of Florida*.

Administration of Justice in Latin America.

By HELEN L. CLAGETT. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1952. Pp. ix, 149. \$5.00.)

This study is valuable to scholars in the field of comparative legal systems as a short, up-to-date descriptive survey of the laws on court organization and procedure in the Latin-American countries. Indeed, this is the only monograph on the subject available in either Spanish or English, although much of the same material is found in general volumes. Those who believe that it is possible to treat the twenty Latin-American countries comparatively are supported by the author, who uses a topical method of presentation. One interesting judgment is that "North American influences in the matter of judicial organization, which were felt and acknowledged in the earlier days of some of the new southern republics have disappeared, leaving but few traces, while European influences have prevailed and still exist with appropriate modifications" (p. 11). There is a selective bibliography of 182 sources.

It should be noted that this is a short treatment of the legal aspects of court organization and procedure, and the political scientist undoubtedly will discover that in some cases the detail is inadequate for clear understanding. Furthermore, this is strictly a legal exercise. "... no attempt has been made to evaluate the success or failure of any country in practice, judged from a realistic viewpoint" (p. vii). And, "In the present work, only written law and decrees have been taken into consideration, and no comments made on whether or not these have ever been flouted, or to what extent they may have been ignored in practice" (p. vii). It is common knowledge among Latin Americanists that there is frequently considerable distance between law and fact in Latin-American government and politics. It is probably fair to state that we do not get very far in understanding "administration of justice" through studying the laws alone. At the very least, however, the laws on court organization and procedure do represent one form of intent or aspiration, and a comparative study of such laws provides us with one facet of a theory of administration of justice in Latin America.—WILLIAM S. STOKES, *University of Wisconsin*.

Perón's Argentina. By GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN.

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 478. \$6.50.)

The literature on recent political and governmental trends in Argentina is rapidly expanding, and, as one might expect, descriptions and analyses of *Peronismo* tend to dominate the scene. To say that Professor George I. Blanksten's contribution, *Perón's Argentina*, is another addition to the rapidly growing documentation of the "new Argentina" is to tell only a part of the story, since the volume which now comes to hand is by far the best and most complete study that has appeared. Whereas others have limited themselves to the description of particular aspects of *Peronismo*, Professor Blanksten made good use of the year (1950-51) which he spent in Argentina as an Area Research Training Fellow of the Social Science Research Council digesting what must have seemed formidable quantities of materials to give us a complete, well-rounded, and well-balanced picture of the present Argentine scene. The fact that the book is also well-written merely adds to the pleasure of its perusal.

Organized in a form which might well be described as a series of closely integrated essays, the author first presents a concise summary of pre-Perón Argentina ("A Book of Introductions"), goes on to describe in somewhat greater detail the rise of Juan Domingo Perón and the movement which bears his name ("A Book of All that Glitters"), and then devotes the last two-thirds of the volume ("A Book of Ideology and Politics") to describing the impact of *Peronismo* on such aspects of Argentine culture and society as the concept of individual liberty, education, the press, radio and the dramatic arts, the rich and the poor, political parties, etc. It is in the last part of the book that the reader will find the most interesting and rewarding material, since it is here that the repressive and dictatorial nature of the regime is most clearly spelled out. Special mention should be made of the chapter entitled "Southern Dialectic," in which the reader will find an excellent explanation of *justicialismo*, the political philosophy which underlies *Peronismo*.—LOUIS G. KAHLE, *University of Missouri*.

English Historical Documents: Volume 8, 1042-1189. EDITED BY DAVID C. DOUGLAS AND GEORGE W. GREENAWAY. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 1014. \$17.50.)

This, the first to appear of a series of thirteen projected volumes covering British his-

tory from 500 to 1914 A.D., is a magnificent addition to any scholarly library. Much more than a series of translated sources for English history in the early years of the Middle Ages, its introduction contains the best short survey of the period extant, and its notes and bibliographies are judicious, extensive, and illuminating. Of particular interest to the political scientist is the fact that now in *one* volume are available fine translations and selections from such works as *The Dialogue of the Exchequer*, *The Policraticus* of John of Salisbury, *Domesday Book*, *Glanville*, Henry II's judicial enactments, and a wealth of representative charters, writs, and other materials from England's storehouse of historical records. Royal administration, religious establishments, legal development, feudal institutions, and political theory all are richly illustrated and explained by contemporaries. This period was the formative one of an Anglo-American political heritage in which Norman discipline mingled with earlier Saxon tradition to form the bones and sinew from which later government developed. It is thus of basic importance to scholars of our political institutions. One can only hope that future additions to this series will come up to the fine standard set by the editors of this volume.—A. R. LEWIS, *University of Texas*.

Tudor Prelates and Politics, 1536-1558. BY LACEY BALDWIN SMITH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 333. \$5.00.)

Students of the English reformation will find intriguing reading in Professor Smith's *Tudor Prelates and Politics*. In a readable and attractive style, the author draws a sympathetic picture of the conservative English bishops from the reign of Henry VIII to the death of Mary. The secular positions occupied by many of the churchmen tended to make them conservative, if not reactionary, in their attitude towards the reformation when its political and social implications became apparent. They thus tended to be in opposition to the liberal reform which clustered partly around the leadership of Thomas Cromwell. In a certain sense, as the author notes, the spirit of their times was not unlike that of ours in that many men of moderate views were compelled by the attitude of their opponents to move to more extreme positions than they might otherwise have been inclined to assume.

The British Parliament. By STRATHMARN GORDON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. 247. \$4.25.)

A new edition of a volume last issued in England in 1948 by the Hansard Society as *Our Parliament*. Useful appendices and a new chapter on criticisms of Parliament have been added.

Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth. EDITED BY SYDNEY D. BAILEY. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. v, 217. \$4.50.)

Reprint of a 1950 issue of *Parliamentary Affairs*, newly edited and brought up to date; several articles have been added. An authoritative account, mainly concerned with parliamentary institutional devices in the dominions.

Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia. By SYDNEY D. BAILEY. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1953. Pp. 100. \$2.00.)

A brief survey of developments since 1947 in Pakistan, India, Burma, and Ceylon, dealing with constitutions, parties, elections, legislatures, and cabinets.

The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick. By S. E. FINER. (London: Methuen & Co. 1952. Distributed by British Book Center, New York. Pp. x, 555. \$9.50.)

A first biography of an important mid-nineteenth-century civil servant and reformer.

Ernest Bevin: Portrait of a Great Englishman. By FRANCIS WILLIAMS. INTRODUCTION BY CLEMENT ATTLEE. (London: Hutchinson. 1953. Distributed by British Book Center, New York. Pp. 288. \$4.50.)

A biography by the author of *Socialist Britain*, based largely on personal reminiscences. Only the last fifth of the book is devoted to Bevin's tenure in cabinet office after 1940.

Manitoba Provincial Municipal Committee. *Report with Memorandum of Recommendations.* (Winnipeg: C. E. Leech, Queen's Printer, 1953. Pp. 184.)

The Committee was set up in May, 1951, with Premier Douglas L. Campbell as chairman, to "study financial and administrative relations between the municipalities and other

public bodies of the province, and the Provincial Government." A brief memorandum by Prof. R. C. Bellan on some general considerations underlying provincial-municipal relations is included in the report, which was presented to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba in February, 1953.—J.B.C.

Publications of the Governments of the North-West Territories, 1876-1905, and of the Province of Saskatchewan, 1905-1952. COMPILED BY CHRISTINE MACDONALD. (Regina, Sask.: Legislative Library. 1953. Pp. 110. Price: \$1.75.)

Saskatchewan, following the pattern of British Columbia, has become the second of the Canadian provinces to have published a relatively full record of its official documents. Pages 102-8 are devoted to the considerable number of crown corporations.—J.B.C.

State of Israel. *Government Year-book 5713 (1952).* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1952. Pp. 485. \$2.50.)

The *Year-book*, which is a rather free rendering of the original version in Hebrew, entitled *Shenaton*, covers the activities of the government of Israel for the greater part of the fiscal year April, 1951 to March, 1952, summarizing the work of the Knesset (Parliament) and of the various ministries as well as including a statistical abstract. The treaties and agreements to which Israel became a party between April 1, 1951 and June 15, 1952 are listed on pp. 150-59, and it is stated on p. 172 that the "first volume of Treaty texts was completed, with the texts of 30 International Conventions and Treaties in three languages." English translations of the principal legislation of the period, including the Nationality Law, are presented on pp. 207-26. Since the official publications of Israel are almost entirely printed in Hebrew, the *Year-book* will be particularly useful for those not reading Hebrew.—J. B. C.

The General Election in the City of Bombay, 1952. By M. VENKATARAMAIA. (Bombay: Vora & Co. Publishers Ltd. 1953. Pp. viii, 169. \$2.00.)

A detailed and extremely interesting description of the 1952 election in India's second largest city; the author describes the constituencies, the candidates (most of whom he interviewed), the campaign tactics, the election issues, and the outcome.

Inventaire des affiches conservées aux Archives de la Marne, Tome I. Politique (1716-1951). By RENÉ GANDILHON. (Chalons-sur-Marne: Archives de la Marne. 1953. Pp. xiv, 495. 1,500 franca.)

For the first time, there is available a good catalogue of much French political source material issued in ephemeral broadside and poster form. Over 6,000 French political broadsides and posters, 1716-1951, are described in the first volume of the *Inventaire* of the Archives de la Marne at Chalons-sur-Marne. The section "Ordres emanant des puissances occupantes" contains some interesting entries. The greater part of the volume is devoted to electoral matters. Future volumes will describe about 25,000 broadsides and posters dealing with economic, legal, military matters, etc.—J.B.C.

Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. *Elections and Political Parties in Germany, 1945-1952.* PREPARED BY POLICY REPORTS SECRETARY, OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. ([Berlin?]. 1952. Pp. 93.)

The report is based on two previous publications of the Office, *Elections in Germany, 1947*, and *Political Parties in Western Germany, 1949*, and gives comparative statistics of the postwar elections, statements about the political parties, and biographies of governmental and political leaders, including the Soviet Zone. A very useful five-page glossary helps elucidate many points.—J.B.C.

Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages. (Bonn. 1952. Pp. 72.)

The rules of the German Bundestag were effective as of January 1, 1952. Articles 96, pars. 3 and 4 were affected by a decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of March 6, 1952; otherwise there seems to have been no change in the rules to the present.—J.B.C.

Landeskalender für Baden-Württemberg 1953. Amtliche Ausgabe mit dem Marktverzeichnis und dem Behördenführer. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 1953. Pp. 112.)

The first official directory for the new Southwest German state of Baden-Württemberg, formed in 1952 by the merging of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, is published in the above, by the Innenministerium. Pages 45-107 are devoted to the directory.—J.B.C.

Ministero dell'interno. Direzione generale dell'amministrazione civile. Divisione servizi elettorali. *Elezioni politiche, 1953. Pubblicazioni n. 1-11.* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato. 1953. 11 vol.)

The series of eleven instructional and informational publications, which were issued by the Electoral Service of the Italian Ministry of the Interior for the 1953 elections to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate of Italy, seems to be intended mainly for administrative use. It includes the electoral laws, regulations, instructions, reproductions of the party symbols, lists of the candidates to both chambers, detailed lists of the electoral units for the elections to the two chambers, etc.—J.B.C.

War and Postwar Greece: An Analysis Based on Greek Writings. PREPARED BY FLOYD A. SPENCER. (Washington: The Library of Congress. 1952. Pp. xv, 175. \$1.15.)

A survey of the political and economic scene in Greece, plus commentary on recent Greek social and cultural developments, derived mainly from a study of materials written in Greek since 1944.

The Arab World: Past, Present and Future. By NEJLA IZZEDDIN WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM E. HOCKING. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1953. Pp. xii, 412. \$6.50.)

The geography, culture, and history of the early Arab world forms a brief introduction to a more detailed study of Arab movements and developments in the 20th century; by an Arab woman whose Chicago Ph.D. is itself testimony to changes in Arab tradition.

State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition. By ALFRED BONNÉ. (New York: The Grove Press. 1953. Pp. xiv, 439. \$6.00.)

A general study of the evolution of Middle Eastern states and institutions of government, considered against the problems created by limited industrial developments and economic change in a relatively stationary agrarian society.

Checklist of Philippine Government Documents, 1950. COMPILED BY THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES. (Washington: The Library of Congress. 1953. Pp. 62. \$40.)

In 1918, the Philippine Library and Museum at Manila issued a *Checklist of publications of the government of the Philippine Islands, September, 1900, to December 31, 1917*. The *Checklist* for 1950 is the first systematic attempt since 1918 to record in separate form the documents of the Philippines.—J.B.C.

Salt for the Dragon: A Personal History of China, 1908-1945. By ESSON M. GALE. (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 225. \$4.00.)

Memoirs of a former American consular official who went to China first in 1908 as a student interpreter and for the last time in 1942 with General Stilwell, and who spent most of the intervening years in China in various official positions.

Soviet Law in Action: The Recollected Cases of a Soviet Lawyer. By BORIS A. KONSTAN-

TINOVSKY; EDITED BY HAROLD J. BERMAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. x, 77. \$1.50.)

This work is a compilation of cases heard in the Soviet courts during the period 1931-41 as recalled by a former professor of law at the University of Odessa, who is now research assistant at the Harvard Russian Research Center. The book is intended as a supplement to Berman's *Justice in Russia*, but is an entity in itself. It provides interesting glimpses of the practical workings of the Soviet legal system.

Modern Foreign Governments. By FREDERIC A. OGG AND HAROLD ZINK. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1953. Pp. xi, 1005. \$6.25.)

A new edition of this standard textbook. Several sections have been rewritten and the whole has been brought up to date.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

General

Beloff, M. The 'Federal Solution' in its Application to Europe, Asia and Africa. *Political Studies*. June, 1953.

Brooks, C. A. S. Human Relations in Administration. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1953.

Casselmann, P. H. Cooperatism and Socialism. *Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Herlitz, N. L'Étude du Droit Administratif Comparé. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1952.

Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten. Die Übertragung Rechtsetzender Gewalt im Rechtsstaat. Diskussion und Ergebnisse einer Arbeitstagung. Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe. Band 12. Frankfurt/Main, 1952.

Kogekar, S. V. Problems of Public Administration. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1953.

Lavau, G. E. Une Panacée Politique: Le Scrutin à la Pluralité des Voix ou l'Idée Fixe de M. Hermens. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

Philonous. The Nature of Public Administration. *Cambridge Journal*. April, 1953.

Rivero, J. Existe-t-il un Critère du Droit Administratif? *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

The Socialist International. London, Labour Party, 1953.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Chester, D. N. Public Corporations and the Classification of Administrative Bodies. *Political Studies*. February, 1953.

Florence, P. S. Consumers' Councils in the Nationalized Industries. *Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1953.

Gaitskell, H. The British Labour Party. *Reporter*. September 1, 1953.

Great Britain. Treasury. Political Activities of Civil Servants. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953 (Cmd. 8783).

Harbury, C. D. The British Approach to Monopoly Control. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. August, 1953.

Haynes, W. W. A Test Case from Britain. Does Nationalization Work? *Harvard Business Review*. March-April, 1953.

Krishnamoorthy, C. R. Organisation and Methods in the British Government. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1953.

The Liberal Party. A Symposium. *Political Quarterly*. July–September, 1953.

Local Government Reorganisation. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1953.

Powell, E. The Myths of the British Constitution. *Confluence*. September, 1953.

Roberts, B. C. Trade Unions and Party Politics. *Cambridge Journal*. April, 1953.

Rodwin, L. British New Town Development: Some Administrative Weaknesses. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1953.

Younger, K. Aussichten des Britischen Sozialismus. *Aussenpolitik*. August, 1953.

Colonial Areas

Amery, L. S. The Crown and Africa. *African Affairs*. July, 1953.

Beloff, M. Democracy in Africa. *African Affairs*. April, 1953.

Carnell, F. G. Malayan Citizenship Legislation. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1952.

Epstein, A. L. The Administration of Justice and the Urban African: A Study of Urban Native Courts in Northern Rhodesia. London, Colonial Office. Colonial Research Studies No. 7. 1953.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Land and Population in East Africa. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953 (Colonial Papers No. 290).

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Hong Kong, 1952. London, H.M. Stat. Off., 1953.

Hawkins, G. First Steps in Malayan Local Government. *Pacific Affairs*. June, 1953.

Hughes, C. A. Semi-Responsible Government in the British West Indies. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1953.

Matson, J. N. The Supreme Court and the Customary Judicial Process in the Gold Coast. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. January, 1953.

Moderation in Africa. *Economist*. August 1, 1953.

Purcell, V. The Position of the Chinese Community in Malaya. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. January, 1953.

Stevens, R. A. Progress in Local Government in the Eastern Region of Nigeria. *Journal of African Administration*. January, 1953.

Whittlesey, D. Kenya, the Land and Mau Mau. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1953.

Williams, D. M. West African Marketing Boards. *African Affairs*. January, 1953.

Wills, C. British Guiana: the Arguments for Federation. *Listener*. July 16, 1953.

Commonwealth of Nations

Australia: State Elections. *Round Table*. June, 1953.

Bendheim, E. Entwicklungsprobleme der Südafrikanischen Union. *Wirtschaftsdienst*. February, 1953.

Bland, F. A. Parliamentary Control of the Purse. *Australian Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Boyer, M. Le Gouvernement Fédéral, ses Fonctions Exécutives et Administratives. *Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne*. Winter, 1952–1953.

Brown, D. M. The Premises of Indian Political Thought. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Canada: The General Election. *Round Table*. September, 1953.

Cohen, J. B. Economic Development in India. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1953.

Commonwealth Relations: The Coronation Conference. *Round Table*. September, 1953.

Development Planning in India. *International Labour Review*. August, 1953.

Gell, C. W. M. The South African Elections. *Contemporary Review*. August, 1953.

Ghosh, R. C. Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of India. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April–June, 1953.

Gorwala, A. D. Report on Public Administration. New Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1951.

Irving, J. A. The Appeal of Social Credit. *Queen's Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

Ispahani, M. A. H. Pakistan within the Comity of Free Nations. *Asian Review*. July, 1953.

Jit, I. India's Five-Year Plan. *Contemporary Review*. August, 1953.

Lewin, J. The Rise of Congress in South Africa. *Political Quarterly*. July–September, 1953.

Linguistic States in India. *Economist*. October 3, 1953.

Masaldan, P. N. Some Principles of Interpretation Employed by the Federal Court of India (1937–1949). *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April–June, 1953.

Messerschmidt, E. A. Pakistan und seine Politischen Kräfte. *Aussenpolitik*. July, 1953.

Mujeeb, M. Indian Education: Retrospect and Prospect. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1953.

Peopling Australia. *Round Table*. June, 1953.

Perry, J. H. Fiscal Relations in the Canadian Federation. *Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation*. No. 2, 1953.

Quinn, H. F. The Role of the Liberal Party in Recent Canadian Politics. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1953.

Reichel, K. F. Die Indische Gewerkschaftsbewegung. *Soziale Welt*. October, 1952.

Rydon, J. The Australian Broadcasting Commission. *Public Administration* (Sydney). December, 1952.

Schuster, G. India's Problems. *Asian Review*. July, 1953.

Sharma, S. R. Sir Ivor Jennings and Constitutional Laws of India. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1953.

South Africa: The General Election. *Round Table*. June, 1953.

South African Institute of Race Relations. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1951-1952. Johannesburg, 1953.

Springs of Canadian Power. A Chatham House Information Paper. New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953.

Taxing Powers in a Federation. A Study of Australian Experience. *Round Table*. September, 1953.

Taylor, N. R. Public Order and Police Power in New Zealand. *Political Science* (Wellington). September, 1952.

Western Europe

Arnal, F. La Crise de la Socialdémocratie en Italie. *Revue Socialiste*. March, 1953.

Berlia, G. La Crise Politique Française de Mai 1953. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

Bieri, E. Föderalismus als Bollwerk der Freiheit. *Internationale Spectator*. August 19, 1953.

Blamont, E. La Revision de la Constitution. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

Bratschi, R. Le Nouveau Régime Financier de la Confédération. *Revue Syndicale Suisse*. April, 1953.

Campbell, P. Vérification des Pouvoirs in the French National Assembly. *Political Studies*. February, 1953.

Dischler, L. Der Auswärtige Dienst Frankreichs. Hamburg, Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Recht. Reihe D. Abt. II. Bd. I. 1952.

Dogan, M. La Stabilité du Personnel Parlementaire sous la Troisième République. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

Donon, J. La Réforme de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française. *Revue Politique des Idées et des Institutions*. April 15, 1953.

Duncan, G. A. Ireland's Welfare State. *Banker*. August, 1953.

Les Elections Sociales Comparées aux Elections Politiques. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

Eriksen, E. Denmark's New Constitution. *Danish Foreign Office Journal*. No. 8, 1953.

The French Union. *British Survey*. June, 1953.

Frumkin, G. Population Changes in Europe since 1939. New York, Augustus M. Kelley. 1953.

H.C.S. Gaullisme in Frankrijk. *Internationale Spectator*. August 19, 1953.

Johannet, R. La Condition Ouvrière en Espagne. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. February 1, 1953.

Kogan, N. The Italian Action Party and the Institutional Question. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

LaSouchère, E. Climat de Crise en Espagne. *Esprit*. March, 1953.

Lorwin, V. R. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Western European Labor Movements. *Industrial Labour Relations Review*. April, 1953.

Lutz, V. The Minister of the Treasury's Survey of the Italian Economic Situation in 1952. *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*. January-March, 1953.

M.K.G. The Italian General Election and its Consequences. *World Today*. August, 1953.

Maleville, G. Observations sur la Réforme Administrative. *Recueil Dalloz*. March 19, 1953.

Maranini, G. Crisi del Costituzionalismo e Autonomie della Costituzione. *Studi Politici*. March-August, 1953.

Marvaud, A. L'Actualité du Portugal. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January-February, 1953.

Morange, G. The Powers of the Government in French Public Finance. *Revue de Science et de Legislation Financières*. October-December, 1953.

Naharro, J. M. The Spanish Tax System: its Problems and its Evolution. *Revue de Science et de Legislation Financières*. October-December, 1953.

Neumann, R. G. Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

L'Organisation Gouvernementale, Administrative et Judiciaire de la France. Paris, La Documentation Française. 1952.

Oud, P. J. The Burgomaster in Holland. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1953.

Outrey, A. Histoire et Principes de l'Administration Française des Affaires Etrangères (I). *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1953.

Plaisant, M. La Revision de la Constitution. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. February 15, 1953.

Pryce, R. The New Italian Electoral Law. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Summer, 1953.

Rogoff, N. Social Stratification in France and in the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Rossi, M. Neo-Fascism in Italy. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1953.

Saintes, Ch. L'Irlande et ses Problèmes. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

Teal, J. T. The Rebirth of Northern Norway. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1953.

Tütsch, H. E. Which Way Italy? *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. July, 1953.

Valitutti, S. Partiti Burocratizzati e Partiti Militarizzati. *Studi Politici*. March, 1953.

Wigg, R. The Italian General Elections. *Contemporary Review*. August, 1953.

Central Europe

Action Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Adopted by the Party Conference at Dortmund, September 28, 1952. Bonn, 1952.

Cornides, W. Materialien zu den Ereignissen des 16. und 17. Juni in Berlin und der SBZ mit Dokumentarischem Anhang. *Europa Archiv*. July 20, 1953.

Czerny, W. F. Der Parlamentarismus der Ersten und Zweiten Republik. *Österreichische Monatshefte*. April, 1953.

Dobrowolny, O. Die Nationalratswahlen im Spiegel der Zahlen. *Österreichische Monatshefte*. March, 1953.

Elsholz, K. Die Soziale Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik. *Deutsche Versicherungs Zeitschrift*. April 20 and May 20, 1953.

Flechtheim, O. K. Reflections on German Communism, Past and Present. *Midwest Journal*. Winter, 1952-1953.

Germans under the Gosplan. *Economist*. September 5, 1953.

Heissenberger, F. The Economic Reconstruction of Austria, 1945-1952. Library of Congress. Reference Department. European Affairs Division. Washington, 1953.

Horstmann, K. Die Gliderung der Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach der Sozialen Stellung auf Grund der Berufszählung 1950. *Soziale Welt*. January, 1953.

Huber, E. R. Bundesexekution und Bundes-

intervention. *Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts*. August, 1953.

Lassalle, C. Les Limites du Contrôle de la Constitutionnalité des Lois en Allemagne Occidentale. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. January-March, 1953.

Lit, M. Unions in Democratic and Soviet Germany. *Monthly Labor Review*. January, 1953.

Mookerjee, G. A Study of German Political Parties: I. *India Quarterly*. January-March, 1953.

Neumann, S. The German Elections—Meaning and Impact. *Foreign Policy Bulletin*. August 15, 1953.

Politische Massnahmen in der DDR seit der Einsetzung einer Sowjetischen Hohen Kommission. *Europa Archiv*. July 5, 1953.

Richter, H. Die Parteien im Demokratischen Staat. *Deutsche Rundschau*. March, 1953.

Servos, I. La Jurisdiction Administrative en Allemagne. *Revue Hellénique de Droit International*. July-December, 1952.

Terhalle, F. Public Finance in Western Germany: the Distribution of Powers between the Bund and the Länder. *Revue de Science et de Legislation Financières*. October-December, 1953.

Tsöbl, J. Die Technik unseres Wahlrechtes. *Österreichische Monatshefte*. February, 1953.

Wlatnig, F. Austria's New Economic Policy. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. July, 1953.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Albjerg, V. L. The Leaders of Soviet Russia. *Current History*. August, 1953.

Caroe, O. Soviet Colonialism in Central Asia. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1953.

Constitution de la République Populaire Roumaine (24 Septembre 1952). *Documentation Juridique Étrangère*. No. 5, 1953.

Daniels, R. V. The Soviet Succession. *Russian Review*. July, 1953.

Djordjevic, J. Die Bedeutung des Neuen Jugoslawischen Verfassungsgesetzes in Jugoslawischer Sicht. *Europa Archiv*. July 20, 1953.

Jedryka, Z. La Récente Réforme Constitutionnelle en Pologne. *Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé*. October-December, 1952.

Kulski, W. W. Class Stratification in the Soviet Union. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1953.

Maurach, R. Das Sowjetrussische Strafrecht 1917-1952. *Osteuropa*. October, 1952.

Meyer, A. G. Soviet Philosophy. *Current History*. August, 1953.

Neal, F. W. Certain Aspects of the New

Reforms in Yugoslavia. University of Colorado Studies. Series in Political Science No. 1. Boulder, June, 1953.

Popluiko, A. Change of the Social Character of Peasantry in the USSR. *Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR*. No. 4, 1953.

Rigby, T. H. Changing Composition of the Supreme Soviet. *Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1953.

Schultz, L. Die Verfassungsrechtliche Entwicklung Jugoslawiens in Westlicher Sicht. *Europa Archiv*. July 20, 1953.

Semenov, N. The Soviet Judicial System as Represented in Diagrams. *Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR*. No. 2, 1953.

The Sovietization of Culture in Poland. Collective Work. Mid-European Research and Planning Centre. Paris, 1953.

Styepanovitch, N. La Loi Yougoslave sur le Contentieux Administratif. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1952.

Timasheff, N. S. The Soviet Peoples. *Current History*. August, 1953.

Waddams, H. The Church in Soviet Russia. *Soviet Studies*. July, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Cumming, D. The U.N. Disposal of Eritrea. *African Affairs*. April, 1953.

Davison, R. H. Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After. *Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Eritrea. Constitutional and Parliamentary Information. Constitution and Act of Federation with Ethiopia. Geneva. June 15, 1953.

Evolution in the Middle East: Reform, Revolt and Change. Addresses Presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs, Sponsored by the Middle East Institute. March 6-7, 1953. The Middle East Institute. Washington. 1953.

Fisher, W. B. Problems of Modern Lybia. *Geographical Journal*. June, 1953.

Guiton, R.-J. Probleme der Französischen Union: Tunesien. *Europa Archiv*. July 20, 1953.

———. Probleme der Französischen Union: Marokko, Aequatorial- und Westafrika, Madagaskar. *Europa Archiv*. September 5, 1953.

Hussein, A. Egypt's New Regime. *Vital Speeches*. August 1, 1953.

Kinross, Lord. Recent Changes in the Arab World. *United Empire*. January, 1953.

Kohn, L. The Constitution of Israel. *India Quarterly*. January-March, 1953.

L.J. Peaceful Change in the Lebanon. *World Today*. April, 1953.

The Land Acquisition Law of 1953 of the State of Israel. *Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Margalith, H. Enactment of a Nationality Law in Israel. *American Journal of Comparative Law*. Winter, 1953.

Plautey, A. La Justice Coutumière Marocaine. *Revue Juridique et Politique de l'Union Française*. March, 1952.

Samuel, E. The Impact of Immigration in Israel. *Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1953.

Sapir, P. The Development of Israel. *Israel and Middle East*. December, 1952.

Sciaky, I. Lo Sviluppo Costituzionale in Israele. *Il Politico*. July, 1953.

Sharon, A. The Planning of Israel. *Israel and the Middle East*. December, 1952.

Silvera, V. De l'Administration Directe et du Contrôle dans le Régime du Protectorat Français en Tunisie. *Revue Juridique et Politique de l'Union Française*. March, 1952.

Social Welfare in Egypt. *Asian Review*. January, 1953.

Thibault, R. The Educational Effort in Morocco. *Asian Review*. January, 1953.

Whittlesey, D. Lands Athwart the Nile. *World Politics*. January, 1953.

Young, A. N. Saudi Arabian Currency and Finance, I. *Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Southeast Asia

Abdulgani, R. Parties and Parliament. *Indonesian Affairs*. October-December, 1952.

Bhargava, G. S. Positive Aspects of Asian Socialism. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1953.

Djojodigoeno, D. Adat Law in Indonesia. *Asian Review*. January, 1953.

Fogg, E. L. Labor Organization in Thailand. *Industrial Labor Relations Review*. April, 1953.

Ingber, D. Indonesia's First Eight Years. *Fortnightly*. August, 1953.

Roy, M. N. Socialism in Asia. *Eastern World*. July, 1953.

Soukhomline, V. La Conférence des Partis Socialistes Asiatiques. *Cahiers Internationaux*. June, 1953.

Thompson, V. Cambodia Moves toward Independence. *Far Eastern Survey*. August, 1953.

Van der Kroef, J. M. The Arabs in Indonesia. *Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1953.

———. Collectivism in Indonesian Society. *Social Research*. Summer, 1953.

———. The Eurasian Minority in Indonesia. *American Sociological Review*. October, 1953.

———. Population Pressure and Economic Development in Indonesia. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. July, 1953.

Van Tam, N. Les Réformes en Viet-Nam. *Politique Étrangère*. January, 1953.

Venkatarangaiya, M. Some Recent Developments in Asia, 1946-1952—Political. *India Quarterly*. April-June, 1953.

Pacific and Far East

Ayusawa, I. Developments in Organized Labor (II). *Contemporary Japan*. Nos. 7-9, 1952.

Chen, T. Hsi-en. Observable Weakness of the Chinese Communist Regime. *World Affairs Interpreter*. Summer, 1953.

Ganguli, B. N. An Analysis of New China's Agrarian Reform Law. *Indian Economic Review*. February, 1953.

Kinoshita, H. Echoes of Militarism in Japan. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1953.

Philippine Land Tenure Reform. Analysis and Recommendations. Special Technical and Economic Mission, Mutual Security Agency. Manila. 1952.

Shuroliff, A. W. The Control of Industrial Labor in Communist China. *Monthly Labor Review*. August, 1953.

Stewart, K. G. The 1953 Japanese Elections. *Far Eastern Survey*. August, 1953.

Yu, F. T. C. How the Chinese Reds Transfer Mass Grievances into Power. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

Latin America

Beals, R. L. Social Stratification in Latin America. *American Journal of Sociology*. January, 1953.

Les Communautés Indigènes du Pérou d'après la Constitution Péruvienne de 1933. *Civilisations*. No. 1, 1953.

Gil, F. G. Responsible Parties in Latin America. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1953.

Hafter, R. P. Communism in Guatemala. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. April, 1953.

L.L. The Political Scene in Ecuador. *World Today*. March, 1953.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. By HANS KOHN. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 356. \$6.25.)

This study, another in the useful publication series of the Notre Dame Committee on International Relations, has long been needed to enable students to evaluate the Soviet resurrection of Pan-Slavism during and after World War II. The volume has three parts. Part I deals with the historical antecedents of Pan-Slavism among the Western and Southern Slavs and the reactions of Western European observers to Russian imperialist Pan-Slavism. In Part II Professor Kohn describes the development of Pan-Slavist ideology among Russian intellectuals; of special interest is his treatment of Pogodin, Danilevsky, Tyutchev, and Dostoevsky—Russian intellectuals who desired to use Pan-Slavism as a vehicle for their own messianism by making Russian and Slav synonymous. Part III is devoted to the role of Pan-Slavism in the World Wars and concludes with a very penetrating analysis of the Soviet regime's crass exploitation of this ideology. The study contains revealing material on the

Slav Congresses of 1848, 1867, 1908, and 1946

Professor Kohn, who has contributed so much to our understanding of the intellectual sources of nationalism, has the unique gift of merging empirical research and broad formulations and of developing illuminating parallels. While one might question the inclusion of the Kalmyks with the Mohammedans (p. 228), one cannot but be impressed with the volume's documentation.

Basic to Professor Kohn's study is the theme of the essential diversity of the Slavic world—a fact which the Pan-Slavists have ignored in failing to recognize the Western orientation of the Croats, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Slovenes, Western Byelorussians, and Western Ukrainians. The author makes it clear that the divisive tendencies which have long been at work in the Slavic world are still evident and make Pan-Slavism as unrealistic as a Pan-Germanism which would include the Dutch and Scandinavians or a Pan-Latinism embracing Belgium, France, Italy, Rumania, Spain, and Latin America.

Professor Kohn's study contains 83 pages of exhaustive and informative bibliographical

notes and is invaluable to all students of nationalism, of Eastern Europe, and of Soviet foreign policy.—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *Princeton University*.

Soviet Imperialism: Its Origin and Tactics.

EDITED BY WALDEMAR GURLAN. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1953. Pp. 166. \$3.75.)

This symposium by seven acknowledged scholars in the Russian field starts with the premise that the Kremlin has been ruthlessly expansionistic and that something ought to be done about it. Soviet political techniques have made their brand of imperialism much more effective and dangerous than old-fashioned tsarist aggrandizement.

Though all contributors agree on this, some of the émigré writers, amazingly enough, assume that the collapse of Bolshevik power is inevitable. N. S. Timasheff pleads that the world at large should "leave the problems arising from the downfall of Communism to the peoples of Russia." And Michael Pap, too, fears outside interference "after the downfall of Bolshevism."

Another surprising note which often recurs in these studies is that tsarist imperialism was not really so bad even when cruelly oppressing Poles and Ukrainians because all the great powers were doing it then—before self-determination became the vogue. In comparison with Communist dictators, the Alexanders and Nicholases may look like amateur tyrants, but it is still hard to think of those autocratic times as "the good old days."

If this symposium were made into a handbook on Soviet imperialism, it might summarize the differences in Soviet and tsarist imperialism as follows: First, Soviet imperialists are less inclined to negotiate their expansion. They favor unilateral action with plenty of armed force. Second, dynamic communism adds strength and terror to its cause by claiming the whole world as its objective. Third, this new imperialism gains power by the Communist propaganda theme of saving the downtrodden workers and colonial peoples from capitalist imperialists. Marxist intranational class struggle is thus transferred to aggressive international conflict between "good" and "bad" powers. Dr. Barghoorn pleads that we must actively combat this part of the Soviet propaganda line. Fourth, Soviet imperialism is much more devastating because minorities like the Ukrainians, Poles, or Mohammedans

are being systematically sovietized or liquidated. Fifth, Great Russian nationalism, through implements of religious, educational, and even military institutions, has become a rallying ideal for the new Soviet Man. And, finally, neighboring cultures are being remoulded as weapons of Soviet national policy. For example, Polish and Chinese popular movements are exploited to serve the new Soviet empire.

Since prognostications on the outcome of the dilemma often fall back on what amounts to faith in human nature, papers of this type read better without recommendations for action.—D. LINCOLN HARTER, *University of Pennsylvania*.

Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy. BY JAMES BURNHAM. (New York: The John Day Co. 1953. Pp. 256. \$3.50.)

Containment or Liberation? is written for those who choose to believe the worst about diplomats and the dilemmas of the "cold war." Not by accident, it was cited against Mr. Bohlen at hearings on his appointment as Ambassador to Moscow. In the prevailing hysteria, it strikes a heavy blow against the professional conduct of foreign policy.

Its beguilement is twofold: it postulates a desirable goal and a simple, unambiguous means of attainment. The subtitle's claim that the book is "An Inquiry" is misleading, for the author's goal is questioned for the first and last time on the title page. Yet, although Mr. Burnham labors painfully by hearsay and innuendo to associate all diplomats with enslavement, he hardly emerges as the sole believer in liberation. "Containment is a teacup edition of the ordinary citizen's normal bias" for remaining on the defensive (p. 31). It is responsible for European neutralism (p. 95), Soviet strength (p. 70), unequal sacrifice in Korea (p. 88), and suspicion of the West (p. 42). Less imaginary objections to containment such as its mere anticommunism, its clash with social revolutions, and the risks of overextending U.S. commitments are studiously ignored. And though he does not recognize it, Mr. Burnham and the diplomats agree that containment in itself is not enough.

But agreement ends here. A prudent foreign policy demands measures to reduce the Soviet empire through redressing the balance of power, disengaging Soviet satellites, and negotiating viable settlements based on legitimate

national interests. This is too tame for Mr. Burnham, who bemoans the restraint of a policy which has resulted in "no plane shot down, no use of diplomatic immunity for spying and subversion, no citizens captured, tortured or imprisoned. . . ." (p. 63). For him the balance of power requires the "encirclement of the Soviet Empire" (p. 114). Liberation must be carried on by political warfare, auxiliary military actions and, in all probability, general war in the future (pp. 223, 130-31, 239).

During the recent presidential election the pro-American journal *The Economist* (London) pointed out: "Unhappily 'liberation' applied to Eastern Europe—and Asia—means either the risk of war or it means nothing." Mr. Burnham is not one to shrink from such a choice. He believes that "most of the successful wars of history have been carried on in other people's territory" (p. 107) and sees no reason for postponing victory. He thinks in military not political categories. His real objection to containment derives from Clausewitz's dictum: "An absolute defense completely contradicts the conception of war" (p. 34). Since both war and politics involve conflict, he falsely imagines they are identical. Not understanding that war represents a breakdown of politics, he has no need for the laws of foreign policy as contained in the idea of the national interest. A far wiser American, John Quincy Adams, warned this country "that by once enlisting under other banners . . . were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition which assume the colors and usurp the standards of freedom." If Mr. Burnham would abandon the implicit assumption of the coming defeat of communism by war, he could turn to the more useful task of determining this country's hierarchy of interests and our capacity as against Soviet power to achieve certain concrete objectives.—KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *Northwestern University*.

The Government of the Catholic Church. BY ELIZABETH M. LYNKEY. (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons. 1952. Pp. x, 99. \$2.00.)

This is a brief, even sketchy, description of the formal structure of world Catholicism. Part I, "The Form and Functions of Church Government," reviews (in about 25 pages) the episcopate, the diocesan organization, and the

papacy. For anyone quite unacquainted with the Church, this very spare introduction can be helpful. Part II, "Local, National, and Supra-National Elements in Church Government," introduces the reader to Catholic missionary work and to the varied organizational devices that have been developed to further it. This is the best part of the book. There is also a brief analysis of national elements in the Church and how these are handled. Part III, "The Church as a World Society," is largely devoted to the distinction between the Church as a religious association and the State of Vatican City as a sovereign geographical unit, all largely written with the debate over U.S. representation to the Vatican in mind. The point of view is explicitly Catholic, and includes some remarkably ingenuous formulations that might be thought charming in a more easy-going world.—PHILIP SELZNICK, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

The Church under Communism. BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. 79. \$6.00.)

Second report of the Commission on Problems of Communism appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, dealing briefly with the condition of church life in the Soviet Union, eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain, and China; the lessons to be learned from the Communist suppression of church organizations; and suggested counteraction against communism which can be taken by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

International Relations: The World Community in Transition. BY NORMAN D. PALMER AND HOWARD C. PERKINS. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1953. Pp. ix, 1270. \$7.00.)

An encyclopedic new text following a familiar outline: descriptions of the nation-state system, of the ways in which nations use their various powers, and of the limited controls on interstate relations precede a survey of international politics from 1900 to 1945; an analysis of economic and political changes in the postwar world is followed by a discussion of the policies of the major powers and of United Nations activities and problems; the concluding chapter asks "Tomorrow: The Same World Still?" to which the answer is, "Roughly, yes." The emphasis on economic subjects is a welcome development in such a text.

Modern World Politics. By THORSTEN V. KALLJARVI AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1953. Pp. xi, 660. \$6.50.)

A third edition, almost completely rewritten, of a well-known text, still organized about the familiar theme that world politics is a struggle for power. The material is arranged so that historical country sections may be omitted if a more general theoretical approach is desired, and such chapter topics as "Aeropolitics" and "Secret Movements, Espionage, and Treachery" provide interesting variation from the usual content.

International Economic Organisations. By C. H. ALEXANDROWICZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Published under the Auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. Pp. xii, 263. \$6.00.)

A professor of both international and constitutional law appropriately brings both these disciplines to bear on this survey of attempts at world economic cooperation, beginning with such subjects as central bank cooperation and cartels and ranging through the interwar years down to the great variety of public postwar organizations.

Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950. By PETER CALVOCCIORESSI. ASSISTED BY SHEILA HARDEN WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 590. \$12.00.)

Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950. EDITED BY MARGARET CARLYLE. (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 796. \$12.50.)

A comprehensive survey of world events during the eventful two-year period bounded by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Chinese intervention in the Korean war; R. G. Hawtrey contributes chapters on economic matters and F. C. Jones sections on Japan and China. The accompanying volume of *Documents* parallels the organization of the *Survey* and is a most complete and invaluable reference work.

The American Road to World Peace. By ALFRED ZIMMERN. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1953. Pp. 287. \$4.00.)

A history of the attempts, successful and otherwise, at world cooperation and organiza-

tion in the 20th century, focused especially on the role of the United States.

The United States and Mexico. By HOWARD F. CLINE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 452. \$6.00.)

The title is misleading. This is not a general discussion of U.S.-Mexican relations, but rather an interpretation of U.S.-Mexican problems since 1910 (127 pp.), superimposed on a more lengthy background discussion of internal developments in Mexico (276 pp.).

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1935. Vol. IV. The American Republics. COMPILED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1953. Pp. lxxxix, 988. \$4.00.)

U. S. mediation helped to end the Chaco war although the prisoner exchange issue was not settled until 1936; four more reciprocal trade agreements were concluded; a revolution shook Ecuador. Once again the documents show how much appalling detail is necessary to handle even small matters.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935. Volume III. The Far East. COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1953. Pp. cvii, 1128. \$4.50.)

China and Japan in a relatively uneventful year. Japan tightens its control over North China, Ambassador Grew warns of Japan's imperial dreams and of the likelihood that the military will override more restrained civilian policies, and Ambassador Johnson describes the military and economic problems of China and internal political movements.

Japan and America Today. By EDWIN O. REISCHAUER ET AL. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 166. \$3.00.)

Papers presented to, and a summary of the discussion at, a conference on Japanese-American relations held in Hawaii in January, 1953; political relations between the two countries and Japan's developing economic and trade difficulties receive major emphasis.

Americans and Chinese: Two Ways of Life. By FRANCIS L. K. HSU. (New York: Henry Schuman. 1953. Pp. xix, 457. \$6.00.)

A Chinese anthropologist, now teaching at Northwestern University, effectively describes

the Chinese character and way of life by contrasting and comparing them with the American.

The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy. By ROBERT PAUL BROWDER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 256. \$5.00.)

Covering the years from 1929 to 1935, this is a study of Soviet-American relations centering around U. S. recognition of the Soviet Union, the negotiations leading to recognition, and the disillusionment that followed.

The Road to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations. By ARTHUR WILLERT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. viii, 184. \$3.50.)

Anglo-American relations during World War I, reviewed mainly around the activities of a rather remarkable young Englishman, Sir William Wiseman, who was nearly as much at

home in the White House as in his own embassy and who is described as President Wilson's and Colonel House's "confidential Englishman"; the author was Washington correspondent for the London *Times* during the period.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D. Vol. V. Poland; the Balkans; Latin America; the Smaller Powers; June 1937-March 1939. COMPILED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1953. Pp. lxxxvi, 977. \$3.25.)

A selection of documents from the German archives covering German relations with the smaller powers of Europe and the Near East, as well as Latin America, from 1937 to 1939; a separate chapter deals with Germany's anti-Jewish legislation as it drew attention from foreign governments.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Haas, Ernst B. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda? *World Politics*. July, 1953.

Nelson, H. I. Uniting the Free World. *International Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Silvain, René. Paix Américaine et Paix Soviétique. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. June, 1953.

United States

Asher, Robert E. The Economics of U. S. Foreign Policy. *Department of State Bulletin*. July 6, 1953.

Carr, Robert K. National Security and Individual Freedom. *Yale Review*. Summer, 1953.

Congress and Foreign Relations. *The Annals*. Vol. 289 (September, 1953).

Fay, Sidney B. The United States Interest in Africa. *Current History*. July, 1953.

* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. John H. Schaar.

Finletter, Thomas K. A New Look at Air Policy. *Atlantic*. September, 1953.

Guérin, Paul. La Politique Extérieure des États-Unis. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. July 1, 1953.

Halle, Louis J., Jr. Policy Making and Career Service. *Foreign Service Journal*. September, 1953.

Johnson, Robert L. Evaluating the Overseas Library Program. *Department of State Bulletin*. July 20, 1953.

Lourie, Donald B. Effects of the President's Reorganization Plans on the Department of State. *Department of State Bulletin*. July 6, 1953.

Schwantes, Robert S. Perspective on Point IV: The Case of Japan. *Far Eastern Survey*. September, 1953.

Stevens, Francis B. U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union. *Department of State Bulletin*. July 27, 1953.

Thomson, David. America and Her Western Allies. *Fortnightly*. August, 1953.

Commonwealth of Nations

Angell, Sir Norman. The Commonwealth

Idea: Past and Future. *United Empire*. July-August, 1953.

Die Australische Buitenlandse Politiek. *Internationale Spectator* ('s-Gravenhage). June 10, 1953.

Lindsay, Kenneth. Challenge to the West: The Role of Britain. *Fortnightly*. September, 1953.

Mansegh, Nicholas. The Commonwealth at the Queen's Accession. *International Affairs*. July, 1953.

Slessor, Sir John. The Place of the Bomber in British Policy. *International Affairs*. July, 1953.

Western and Central Europe

Barrès, Philippe. L'Allemagne et l'Unité Européenne. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. August 1, 1953.

Bidwell, Percy W. How Strong is the New Germany? *Yale Review*. Summer, 1953.

Ce que les Français Pensent des Américains. *Realités* (Paris). August, 1953.

Cobban, Alfred. Security and Sovereignty in French Foreign Policy. *International Journal*. Summer, 1953.

Deener, David R. Internationalism, Party Politics, and the New French Constitution. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1953.

Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M. Can Europe Be Defended? *U. S. News and World Report*. September 11, 1953.

Jacobsen, Pierre. Le Problème des Excédents de Population en Europe. *Politique Étrangère*. July-August, 1953.

Kertess, Stephen. The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy. *Review of Politics*. April, 1953.

Kogan, Norman. Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. *Indiana Law Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Layton, Lord. Little Europe and Britain. *International Affairs*. July, 1953.

Muhlen, Norbert. How the West Betrayed the East German Revolt. *New Leader*. September 7, 1953.

Richert, Ernst. Der Fall Dertinger und die DDR Aussenpolitik. *Osteuropa*. June, 1953.

The Soviet Zone of Germany Today. *World Today*. June, 1953.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

Anthem, Thomas. Russia and the Balkans. *Contemporary Review*. July, 1953.

Athens, Ankara, and Belgrade: Implications of the Balkan Pact. *World Today*. July, 1953.

Howard, Harry N. Greek Questions in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. *Department of State Bulletin*. August 24 and 31, 1953.

Jaray, Gabriel Louis. La Politique Extérieure de Staline de 1943 à 1953. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. May, 1953.

Kafka, Gustav E. Die Sowjetunion und Österreich. *Osteuropa*. June and August, 1953.

Kennan, George F. Russia and the West. *New Leader*. August 24, 1953.

Nineteenth Party Congress and Soviet Foreign Policy. *Foreign Service Journal*. September, 1953.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. Moscow and the West. *Fortnightly*. September, 1953.

The Soviet Union and Finland. *World Today*. August, 1953.

Stone, William T. Negotiating with the Reds. *Editorial Research Reports*. September 17, 1953.

Táborsky, Eduard. Beneš and Stalin—Moscow 1943 and 1945. *Journal of Central European Affairs*. July, 1953.

Wlatnig, Friedrich. Russian Policy in Austria. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. September, 1953.

Middle East and Africa

Ahmad, Nafis. The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950. *Geographical Review*. July, 1953.

Barton, Sir William. Indian Foreign Policy and the Defence of the Middle East. *Quarterly Review*. July, 1953.

The Future of the Suez Canal Zone. *Round Table*. June, 1953.

Jacob, F. M. B. Moroccan Tensions. *Fortnightly*. July, 1953.

Jafri, Fareed. Communism in the Muslim World. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. April, 1953.

The Kashmir Problem: End of a Stalemate? *World Today*. September, 1953.

Lockhart, L. The Causes of the Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. April, 1953.

Loewy, Karl. The Middle East and the Cold War. *Modern Review*. May, 1953.

Longrigg, Brigadier Stephen. The Decline of the West in the Middle East: An Alternative View. *International Affairs*. July, 1953.

Macmillan, W. M. African Growing Pains. *African Affairs*. July, 1953.

Muggeridge, Malcolm. The Middle East Today. *Royal United Service Institution Journal*. May, 1953.

Pacific and Far East

- Asia After Stalin. *Round Table*. June, 1953.
 Belsahw, C. S. Implications of Policy in New Guinea. *Australian Quarterly*. March, 1953.
 Grosbois, Charles. Quatre Mois en Corée. *Politique Étrangère*. July-August, 1953.
 Gull, E. M. The Outlook in the Far East. *Contemporary Review*. April, 1953.
 Henze, P. B. The Strategic Significance of Recent Events in Tibet. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. April, 1953.
 Keefe, Emily C. and Converse, Elizabeth. The Japanese Leaders Program of the Department of the Army. Occasional Paper No. 1. Institute of International Education. Washington, 1952.
 Korea and North-East Asia: An American View. *World Today*. September, 1953.
 Mukherjee, Uma. Sino-Soviet Relations in their Retrospect. *Modern Review*. July, 1953.
 Plunkett, Richard L. China Views Her Russian Tutor. *Far Eastern Survey*. July, 1953.
 Special Section on Korea. *United Nations Bulletin*. August 1, 1953.

Southeast Asia

- Griffiths, Sir Percival. Impressions of a Tour of Self-Governing Nations of South East Asia. *Asian Review*. April, 1953.
 Lacouture, Jean. Le "Contre-feu" Vietnamien. *Politique Étrangère*. July-August, 1953.
 Nicolas, George A. France and the Indo-Chinese War. *International Journal*. Summer, 1953.

International Economic Policy and Relations

- Barber, Clarence L. Sterling Convertibility: A Canadian View. *International Journal*. Summer, 1953.
 Chapman, John F. How Restrictive Are U. S. Tariffs and Quotas? *Harvard Business Review*. July-August, 1953.
 Clayton, G. The Development of British Exchange Control, 1939-1945. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. May, 1953.
 Day, A. C. L. Sterling Convertibility: British Views. *International Journal*. Summer, 1953.
 Hansen, Kenneth R. The Facts of Life about East-West Trade. *Department of State Bulletin*. August 31, 1953.
 Hunter, John M. and Knowles, William H. Ten Problems of Point Four. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Summer, 1953.

International Economic Outlook. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Sciences*. May, 1953.

- Kravis, Irving B. Guideposts for Reciprocal Trade Policy. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May, 1952.
 Mears, Leon A. Private Foreign Investment and Economic Development: Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Puerto Rico. *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Summer, 1953.
 Meyer, Bernard S. Recognition of Exchange Controls after the International Monetary Fund Agreement. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Thompson, Elizabeth M. East-West Trade. *Editorial Research Reports*. June 17, 1953.

Webb, Leicester. The Future of International Trade. *World Politics*. July, 1953.

International Law

- Brunello, Bruno. I Diritti Sociali nella Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti dell'Uomo. *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto*. April-June, 1953.
 Cheng, Bin. Rights of U. S. Nationals In Morocco. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1953.
 Cohen, Benjamin V. Some Comments on the Bricker Amendment. *Northwestern University Law Review*. May-June, 1953.
 Diwan, Paras. Kashmir and the Indian Union: The Legal Position. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1953.
 Graven, J. L'Injustice en tant que Système ou le Droit Menacé. *Revue de Droit International des Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January-March, 1953.
 Hatch, Vermont. The Treaty-Making Power: "An Extraordinary Power Liable to Abuse." *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1953.
 Holman, Frank E. Treaty Law and the Constitution. *Journal Oklahoma Bar Association*. July 25, 1953.
 Mayda, Jaro. The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1953.
 Pearson, Theodore, and Backus, Dana C. Save the Peace Power: Don't Strait-Jacket Treaties. *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1953.
 Preuss, Lawrence. On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties. *Michigan Law Review*. June, 1953.
 Rank, Richard. Modern War and the

Validity of Treaties: A Comparative Study. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Roberts, William H. Corporate Nationality in International Law. *Seminar*. Vol. 10 (1952).

Satterfield, John C. Constitutional Amendment by Treaty and Executive Agreement. *Mississippi Law Journal*. May, 1953.

Taubenfeld, Howard J. International Actions and Neutrality. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1953.

Thomas, Ann Van Wynen and Thomas, A. J., Jr. Theories of Trade in International Law and Their Influence on Air Commerce. *Southwestern Law Journal*. Spring, 1953.

Under Two Flags—Foreign Registry of American Merchantmen. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

Wright, Quincy. The Outlawry of War and the Law of War. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1953.

Yntema, Hessel E. The Historic Bases of Private International Law. *American Journal of Comparative Law*. Summer, 1953.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Cory, Robert H., Jr. Forging a Public Information Policy for the United Nations. *International Organization*. May, 1953.

Elliot, Martha M. The United Nations Children's Fund. *Department of State Bulletin*. August 31, 1953.

Field, Frank. UNICEF—Its Activities and Objects. *Australian Quarterly*. June, 1953.

The Seventh Assembly of the United Nations. *World Today*. June, 1953.

Srivastava, G. P. The U.N.O.: A Better League of Nations? *Modern Review*. June, 1953.

Subversives in the UN; the World Organization as an Employer. *Stanford Law Review*. July, 1953.

Regional Organizations

Austin, Warren R. Etroite Union Morale, Économique et Militaire. *Revue de Droit International des Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January–March, 1953.

Beloff, Max. The "Federal Solution" in Its Application to Europe, Asia and Africa. *Political Studies* (Oxford). Vol. 1. June, 1953.

Dehousse, F. Institutions Politiques de la Communauté Européenne. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 69 (1953).

de Larminat, Gen. and Manet, Oliver. La

Communauté Européenne de Défense. *Politique Étrangère*. July–August, 1953.

The Fight against the Schuman Plan. *International Bulletin of Metal and Engineering Workers* (London). No. 3, 1953.

Mozer, A. Les Partis Socialistes et l'Unité Européenne. *Monde Nouveau Paru*. No. 69 (1953).

Patterson, Ernest M. (ed.). NATO and World Peace. *The Annals*. Vol. 288 (July, 1953).

Philip, M. André. The Socialist Movement, for the United States of Europe. *Europe Today and Tomorrow* (Paris). July, 1953.

Salvadori, Massimo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: A Western View. *India Quarterly*. January–March, 1953.

Urrutia-Aparicio, Carlos. La Organización de Estados Centroamericanos. (ODECA). *Cuadernos Americanos*. July–August, 1953.

Van Den Brink, J. R. M. Benelux at the Crossroads. *Economic Digest* (London). August, 1953.

DOCUMENTS

General and Miscellaneous

Contracting Parties to the GATT. International Trade, 1952. Geneva, 1953. (Doc. GATT/1953-2.)

Council of Europe. Directorate of Information. The European Convention on Human Rights. Strasbourg, 1952.

Food and Agriculture Organization. Programme of Work and Budget for 1954 and 1955. . . . Rome, 1953.

Indonesia, Republic of. Information Office (New York). The Eighth Year of a Free Nation. Mimeo. New York, 1953.

International Court of Justice. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. Ambatielos Case (Greece vs. United Kingdom). Judgement of 19 May 1953. The Hague, 1953. (Sales No.: 104.)

International Monetary Fund. Fourth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. Washington, 1953.

New Zealand. Department of External Affairs. The Colombo Plan: Report of the Council for Technical Cooperation in South and South East Asia for 1952. Wellington, 1953. (Pub. No. 130.)

Pan American Union. Department of International Law. Manual of Inter-American Relations. A Systematic Classification of the Treaties, Conventions, Resolutions, Declara-

tions, and Recommendations Adopted at Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation. Washington, 1953.

UNESCO. Records of the General Conference, 7th Session, Paris, 1952. Resolutions. Paris, UNESCO, 1953.

——— They Can't Afford to Wait; A Story of UNESCO Technical Assistance in South-East Asia. Paris, UNESCO, 1952.

United Kingdom. British Information Services. Reference Division. British Policy in the Middle East: Recent Statements. New York, 1953. (ID 1061, revised.)

——— Central Office of Information. Reference Division. Defense of the Middle East. London, 1953.

——— Human Rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. London, 1953.

——— The Korean Question and the United Nations. London, 1953. (No. R.2648, superseding No. R.2417.)

United Nations

Economic and Social Council. Agenda for the 16th Session. UN (Geneva), 1953. (Doc. E/2472, 1 July 1953.)

——— Annual Report. 15 February 1952 to 25 April 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2405 (E/CN.12/324), 13 May 1953.)

——— Catalogue of Economic and Social Projects of the UN and the Specialized Agencies, 1953. No. 4. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2393, 6 April 1953; Sales No.: 1953.II.D.2.)

——— Report on Freedom of Information, 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2426, 6 May 1953.)

——— Report . . . on the Question of Creating an International Finance Corporation, UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2441, 25 May 1953.)

——— Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2425, May, 1953; Sales No.: 1953.I.22.)

——— UN Programme of Technical Assistance. Report. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2414, 30 April 1953.)

——— Commission on Human Rights. Report of the 9th Session. . . UN (Geneva), 1953. (Doc. E/2447, 6 June 1953.)

——— Committee on Forced Labour. Report. . . UN (Geneva), 1953. (Doc. E/2431.)

——— Economic Commission for Europe. Annual Report . . . Covering the Period from 19 March 1952 to 18 March 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2382 and E/ECE/162, 28 March 1953.)

General Assembly. Financial Reports and

Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 1952. . . UN, 1952. (Doc. A/2392, May, 1953.)

——— Seventh Session. Resolutions Adopted . . . During the Period from 24 February to 23 April 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. A/2361/Add. 1, May, 1953.)

——— Special Committee on Admission of New Members. Report. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. A/2400, 25 June 1953.)

——— UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Report. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. A/2394, 25 May 1953.)

——— International Law Commission. Report on the Limitation of Reduction of Statelessness. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. A/CN.1/64, 30 March 1953.)

International Children's Emergency Fund. Financial Report . . . for the Year Ended 31 December 1952. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. E/ICEF 229, 21 May 1953.)

Secretariat. Department of Economic Affairs. World Economic Report, 1951-52. UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2353/Rev. 1, and ST/ECA/19, April, 1953.)

——— Department of Public Information. Non-Governmental Organizations. Background Paper No. 76. UN, 1953. (Doc. ST/DPI/SER.A/76, 15 April 1953.)

——— Shaping a People's Destiny; the Story of Eritrea and the United Nations. UN, 1953. (Sales No.: 1953.I.18.)

——— Library. Cumulative Index to the Resolutions and Decisions of the Economic and Social Council, 12th to 14th Sessions Inclusive, 1951/1952. UN, 1953. (Doc. ST/LIB/SER.D/44, 19 May 1953.)

Secretary-General. Question of Admission to Membership in the Regional Economic Commissions of States Not Members of the UN. Memorandum. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2458, 8 June 1953.)

——— United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance. . . Report. . . UN, 1953. (Doc. E/2414, 30 April 1953.)

Trusteeship Council. Draft Report . . . Covering the Twelfth Session, 4 December 1952 to 21 July 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. T/L.401, 17 July 1953.)

——— Report . . . to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the Period 2 April 1952 to 21 July 1953. UN, 1953. (Doc. S/3066, 24 July 1953.)

United States

Congress. House. Report of Special Study

Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Indochina. House Rep. No. 412, 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on Foreign Affairs. Chronology of International Events: January 1, 1952–June 30, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Committee Print. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Secretary of State. . . . House Doc. No. 63, 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— World War II International Agreements and Understandings Entered Into During Secret Conferences. . . . 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Committee Print. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. International Organizations and Movements. Hearings. . . . 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on Un-American Activities. Soviet Schedule for War, 1955. Hearings. . . . May 13 and 14, 1953 (Testimony of Jan Bukar). 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Senate. The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents 1943–1953. Senate Doc. No. 74. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on Foreign Relations. European Coal and Steel Community. Hearings. . . . Informal Meeting . . . with Jean Monnet [and other ECSC officials] . . . June 4 and 5, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— St. Lawrence Seaway. Report. . . . Senate Report No. 441. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa. Problem of Arab Refugees from Palestine. Hearings. . . . May 20, 21 and 25, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on Government Operations. Control of Trade with the Soviet

Bloc. Hearings. . . . March 30–May 20, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— State Department Information Program . . . Hearings . . . 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

——— Committee on the Judiciary. Activities of United States Citizens Employed by the UN. Hearings . . . February 19 and April 27, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Department of Commerce. Factors Limiting U. S. Investment Abroad. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

Department of State. Armistice in Korea: Selected Statements and Documents. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5150.)

——— Europe and the North Atlantic Area. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4944.)

——— India: A Pattern for Democracy in Asia. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5095.)

——— Indochina: The War in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5092.)

——— Malaya: Trouble Spot in Southeast Asia. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5061.)

——— Report of the Secretary of State on the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 4928.)

——— Review of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5123.)

——— U. S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1952. Washington, G.P.O., 1953. (Pub. No. 5034; also published as House Doc. No. 222, 83rd Congress, 1st Session.)

——— Office of Intelligence Research. Research on International Affairs. External Research List No. 11.1(B). Washington, Department of State, 1953.

President. Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1953. Washington, G.P.O., 1953.

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

Saints in Politics: The "Clapham Sect" and the Growth of Freedom. BY ERNEST MARSHALL HOWSE. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1952. Pp. xv, 215. \$5.00.)

During the French Revolution and its aftermath, many leaders in the political and economic life of Great Britain, witnessing the violence and excesses accompanying the

Revolution across the English Channel, resolved to fight against all disturbances of the *status quo* in Britain, lest they lead to the same sort of violence and revolution among the people of the British Empire.

The result was the continuance, under inhuman conditions, of the slave trade and of slavery in British possessions and increasing poverty and misery among the new proletariat to which the industrial revolution had given rise in the factory towns and villages of the British Isles.

To mitigate this misery, prominent religious and moral leaders entered the public arena, and demanded a series of important social reforms. One of the most outstanding of these groups was a "brotherhood of Christian politicians," lampooned during their lifetime as "The Saints," and later remembered as "The Clapham Sect," Clapham being the name of the village near London in which many of the leaders of the Sect had their country home. The leader of the group was the great crusader for freedom, William Wilberforce.

Dr. Howse in this volume brings together for the first time a complete description of the activities and personalities of this fascinating and significant group. He tells of their life at home and of their intense campaigns for social change. Most important of these campaigns was that for the abolition of the slave trade from Africa to the British West Indies and for the abolition of slavery itself throughout the British colonies.

The author tells accurately, clearly, and vividly the remarkable story of the "Saints'" long and brilliant fight against this tragic evil. He describes more briefly their successful efforts to establish important missionary and Bible societies, develop Sunday schools and other projects of popular education, revise the East India Charter, improve British "manners," and relieve some of the worst cases of poverty.

Dr. Howse admits the charge that the Clapham Sect gave little attention to the grave economic and social injustices of the day within Great Britain. Wilberforce and his co-workers were, for the most part, wealthy men and conservatives in politics. While not insensitive to the responsibilities of the rich, they supported legislation for the suppression of meetings of mass protest, approved the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and defended the shooting of those who had assembled in St. Peter's field on the outskirts of

Manchester to listen to demands for parliamentary reform. On the other hand, there were, according to the author, extenuating circumstances in the social attitudes of this group. The Clapham Sect had been brought up on the laissez faire philosophy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus, while the knowledge, and in no small part the development, of the hideous factory and mine conditions came late in Wilberforce's life.

Nor did this group ignore all social issues in the homeland. They voted for better factory conditions and for penal reform, and engaged in many enterprises for the wiping out of illiteracy. They likewise developed an effective technique of propaganda that was later applied with much success by many liberal and progressive groups.

Though this volume gives a valuable insight into the history of the times, it would have been far more valuable to the student of history if the author had appraised more carefully the effect of economic, political, social, moral, and international forces in converting the members of Parliament from bitter opponents to enthusiastic supporters of Wilberforce on the slavery issue. The author does quote a paragraph from Dr. Klingsberg's *The Anti-Slavery Movement in England*, which declares that economic changes in the West Indies, the growth of industry and commerce, the abolition of slavery in other countries, and the prospect of gaining universal abolition at the next peace congress, gave added weight to Wilberforce's antislavery arguments. But Dr. Howse nowhere elaborates on these and other forces, nor does he prove his point that the abolition of slavery was due *primarily* to the fervor and brilliant strategy of the Clapham Sect, rather than to the underlying social and economic forces of the day.

The book nevertheless gives the most thorough and scholarly account thus far published of the life and achievements of one of the most remarkable group of intellectual and moral reformers which Britain has produced. A well-selected 17-page bibliography adds to the value of this attractive and, in many parts, deeply moving volume.—HARRY W. LAIDLER, *League for Industrial Democracy*.

Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals: Babbitt Jr. vs. the Rediscovery of Values. BY PETER VIERECK. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 320. \$4.00.)

In this notebook of acute aphorisms on a

variety of Professor Viereck's favorite subjects, the sharpest remarks are directed against the surprising number of intellectuals who demonstrated a marked susceptibility to communism in the thirties and forties. Viereck is disturbed by the baffling paradox of numbers of these intellectuals who had won glory in leading the fight against fascism, only to be shamed by condoning fascist practices when they bore a communist guise. The paradox is explained by the prevalence of what Viereck calls a "new philistinism," the stereotyped avant-garde that in this generation has produced Babbitt among the intellectuals and consequently encouraged cynicism toward the simple and enduring virtues of Western civilization. The moral sense of perceptive men and women was thereby numbed to the point where they were able to overlook communism's disobedience of the moral law that men ought never to be used merely as means.

In this analysis the political and the artistic enemies are the same: irrationalism and obscurantism, slogan and cliché. This affords Viereck the opportunity to carry the attack with the sensitivity and incisiveness of, respectively, literary and social critic, and this is what makes the book especially provocative.

The cure for the value-free intellectual is the re-establishment of contact with the "Graeco-Roman-Christian-Hebrew" tradition whose continuity alone assures freedom. And the need for a "new conservatism," of which Professor Viereck is a leading spokesman, is established because "if you have become convinced that freedom depends on the unbroken continuity of a communal ethical tradition, then you must give the vote also to your ancestors."

Professor Viereck is engaged in a crusade and, unfortunately, the characteristic brutality and violence of crusades is not entirely absent from his book. Quite apart from his style, the classical restraint and balance which Viereck admires is lacking, at least in such details as the description of Italian Christian Democracy as "valiantly democratic" or of Bevan as a socialist who would betray democracy. If it is the price of counterrevolution against totalitarianism to be infected by the methods of the enemy, some apprehension concerning the exact nature of the outcome is justified.

Yet in broad outline this appeal for a neo-Burkean state of mind is very attractive and perhaps the dedication to Winston Churchill

implies with sufficient precision the program Viereck advocates and the passions he seeks to arouse. At any rate, Professor Viereck conducts his campaign predominantly in an intelligent, timely, and original manner.—GERHARD LOEWENBERG, *Mt. Holyoke College*.

Die politische Philosophie des Altertums. By RUDOLF STANKA. (Wien-Köln: A. Seidl. 1951. Pp. 462.)

This volume deals with the political thought of the Ancient Orient, Greece, and Rome, terminating with a brief summary of the significance of early Christian thought as expressed by St. Augustine. The author's treatment is summary in form and follows the traditional approach. Of special interest to American students is the first chapter dealing with the political concepts of the Ancient Orient.

The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism. COMPILED AND EDITED BY G. P. MAXIMOFF. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. 434. \$6.00.)

The selections in this volume are taken chiefly from the later writings of Bakunin. The editor has attempted to group the selections under appropriate headings and thus to present a coherent picture of Bakunin's collective thought on philosophy, society, anarchism, and revolutionary tactics. Many of the selections are presented in English translation for the first time. Introductory essays by B. F. Hosilitz and Rudolph Rucker define the position of Bakunin in political thought, and an essay by Max Nettlau presents a biographical sketch of Bakunin.

Hume: Theory of Politics. EDITED BY FREDERICK WATKINS. (Austin: The University of Texas Press. 1953. Pp. xxx, 246. \$2.00.)

This volume contains Book III, Parts I and II of *A Treatise of Human Nature* and thirteen of the *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary* which deal with political subjects, together with an introduction by the editor summarizing Hume's theories of natural law and government.

Political Thought in France: From the Revolution to the Fourth Republic. By J. P. MAYER. (New York: Grove Press. 1953. Pp. x, 154. \$3.00.)

A reprinting of the revised edition of 1949 of a book first published in 1943, summarizing

French political ideas from 1815 through the period of the Third Republic.

Thomas Paine: *Common Sense and Other Political Writings*. Edited by NELSON F. ADKINS. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1953. Pp. liii, 184. \$.75.)

A paper bound reproduction of the "New Edition" of *Common Sense; The American Crisis*, I and XIII; selections from parts one and two of *Rights of Man*; and the *Dissertation on First Principles of Government*; with an introduction by the editor.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL THEORY

FRANCIS G. WILSON

University of Illinois

History and Criticism

Andrieu, M. Le Sacre Episcopal d'Après Hinomar de Reims. *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*. XLVIII/1-2. 1953.

Atkinson, J. L. Boone. Taine on the French Revolution: A Study in Historiographic Controversy. *Historian*. Spring, 1953.

Bataillon, Marcel. Le "Clerigo Casas," Ci-devant Colon, Réformateur de la Colonisation. *Bulletin Hispanique*. LIV/3-4. 1952.

Baylen, Joseph O. James Buchanan's "Calm of Despotism." *Pennsylvania Magazine*. July, 1953.

Bengston, Hermann. Die Ptolemäische Staatsverwaltung im Rahmen der Hellenischen Administration. *Museum Helveticum*. July, 1953.

Berteloot, J. La Révolution Anglaise de 1688. *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*. XLVIII/1-2. 1953.

Beyer, C.-J. Montesquieu et la Censure Religieuse de l'Esprit des Lois. *Revue des Sciences Humaines*. April-June, 1953.

Birnbaum, N. Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber. *British Journal of Sociology*. June, 1953.

Boccadamo, G. I Papiri Ercolanesi e la Filosofia Epicurea. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. May 2, 1953.

Bornet, Vaughn D. Those "Robber Barons." *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Brock, Peter. Polish Democrats and English Radicals, 1832-1862: A Chapter in the History of Anglo-Polish Relations. *Journal of Modern History*. June, 1953.

Brooks, Robert A. Discolor Aura. Reflections on the Golden Bough. *American Journal of Philology*. July, 1953.

Brown, D. Mackenzie. The Premises of Indian Political Thought. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Cam, Helen M. The Theory and Practice of Representation in Medieval England. *History*. February, 1953.

Campehausen, Hans von. Augustin als Kind und Überwinder seiner Zeit. *Die Welt als Geschichte*. XIII/1. 1953.

Christensen, Merton A. Franklin on the Hemphill Trial: Deism versus Presbyterian Orthodoxy. *William and Mary Quarterly*. July, 1953.

Cicchitti-Suriani, Arnaldo. La Repubblica Sociale Italiana e i "Temporalisti." *Nuova Antologia*. June, 1953.

Colby, Robert A. The Structure of Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* in relation to His Theory of Assent. *Dublin Review*. Second Quarter, 1953.

Cutts, Elmer H. The Background of Macaulay's Minute. *American Historical Review*. July, 1953.

Dagens, Jean. Tradition et Innovation dans les "Pensées" de Pascal. *Rivista di Letteratura Moderna*. January-March, 1953.

Debbasch, Yvan. "Colonia Julia Carthago." La Vie et les Institutions Municipales de la Carthage Romaine. *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger*. 31/1. 1953.

Defourny, P. Histoire et Éloquence d'Après Cicéron. *Les Études Classiques*. April-July, 1953.

Devos, G. B. La Science Supranationale de Louis Bara. [Vermant: Paris, 1953.]

Dexter, Byron. Wilsonian Idealism. *Confluence*. June, 1953.

Feuer, Lewis. Thorstein Veblen: The Metaphysics of the Interned Immigrant. *American Quarterly*. Summer, 1953.

Figueres, Leo. L'Internationalisme Proletarien dans l'Histoire des Manifestations du 1^{er} Mai. *Cahiers du Communisme*. May, 1953.

Finley, M. I. Land, Debt, and the Man of

Property in Classical Athens. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Gilson, E. Éloquence et Sagesse Selon Cicéron. *Phoenix*. Spring, 1953.

Giraud, M. Tendances Humanitaires à la Fin du Règne de Louis XIV. *Revue Historique*. April-June, 1953.

Goffredo, Quadri. Polibio e Machiavelli. *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico*. January-March, 1953.

Gough, J. W. Fundamental Law in the Seventeenth Century. *Political Studies*. June, 1953.

Grant, Robert M. The Earliest Christian Gnosticism. *Church History*. June, 1953.

Grégoire, Franz. L'Attitude Hégélienne devant l'Existence. *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. May, 1953.

Gregor, D. B. Athenian Imperialism. *Greece and Rome*. February, 1953.

Grenier, Jean. Deux Précurseurs de l'État Moderne. *Nouvelle Revue Française*. June, 1953.

Griffiths, J. Gwyn. Βασίλεις Βασίλειος: Remarks on the History of a Title. *Classical Philology*. July, 1953.

Hammen, Oscar. Spectre of Communism in the 1840's. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Hepner, Benoit. History and the Future: The Vision of August Cieszkowski. *Review of Politics*. July, 1953.

Huntley, F. L. Thomas Browne and the Circle Metaphor. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Hutchison, T. W. Berkeley's *Querist* and Its Place in the Economic Thought of the Eighteenth Century. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. May, 1953.

Isham, Chapman. William James and the Ego Problem. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*. April, 1953.

Jannone, Antonio. Sull'Interpretazione d'un Passo di Aristotele. *Giornale Italiano di Filologia*. May, 1953.

Jones, A. H. M. Inflation under the Roman Empire. *Economic History Review*. No. 3, 1953.

Kienast, Dietmar. Der Innenpolitische Kampf in Athen von der Rückkehr des Thukydides bis zu Perikles Tod. *Gymnasium*. July, 1953.

Kirk, G. S. A Problem in Historical Technique: Collingwood and Ionian Physics. *Cambridge Journal*. June, 1953.

Kirk, Russell. Burke and the Philosophy of

Prescription. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Knox, H. M. William Petty's Advice to Samuel Hartlib. *British Journal of Educational Studies*. May, 1953.

Krieger, Leonard. Marx and Engels as Historians. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Laborde, P. Cadalso et Montesquieu. *Revue des Langues Romanes*. LXXI/No. 1952.

Leary, Lewis. Thomas Branagan: Republican Rhetoric and Romanticism in America. *Pennsylvania Magazine*. July, 1953.

Leddy, J. F. Tradition and Change in Quintilian. *Phoenix*. Summer, 1953.

Lenoble, R. L'Évolution de l'Idée de "Nature" du XVI^e au XVIII^e Siècle. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. January-June, 1953.

Lewis, Gordon K. A Forgotten Classic of English Life and Government. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1953.

Maclean, Hugh N. Fulke Greville: Kingship and Sovereignty. *Huntington Library Quarterly*. May, 1953.

MacRae, Donald G. The Politics of Lord Acton. *Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1953.

Mann, Arthur. Gompers and the Irony of Racism. *Antioch Review*. Summer, 1953.

Martine, J.-A. The Evolution of Buddhist Thought (III). *Asia*. June, 1953.

Mates, Benson. Stoic Logic. [University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 26, 1953].

Mayer, J.-P. Tocqueville as a Political Sociologist. *Political Studies*. June, 1953.

Mayer, Theodor. Staat und Hundertschaft in Fränkischer Zeit. *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter*. 17/3-4. 1953.

Mazzocchi, G. Le "Riduzioni" del Paragone: Esperienza Comunista? *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*. May-June, 1953.

McNeil, Gordon H. The Anti-Revolutionary Rousseau. *American Historical Review*. July, 1953.

Mercier, Roger. La Théorie des climats des "Réflexions Critiques" à "L'Esprit des Lois" (II). *Revue d'Histoire Littéraire de la France*. April-June, 1953.

Meyers, Marvin. The Jacksonian Persuasion. *American Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Morand, Paul. Centenaire d'un Oracle

Anarchiste. *Revue de Paris*. August, 1953.

Nowell, Charles E. The Historical Prester John. *Speculum*. July, 1953.

O'Connell, M. P. The Ideas of Henri Bourassa. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1953.

Pamp, Frederic E. Communism and Calvinism. *Journal of General Education*. January, 1953.

Pérus, J. Gorki et Nietzsche en France. *Revue de Littérature Comparée*. April-June, 1953.

Phillips, Harlan B. Charles Beard: The English Lectures, 1891-1901. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Picht, Georg. Platons Lehre Vom Wissen. *Merkur*. August, 1953.

Pinta Llorente, Miguel de la. El Sentido de la Cultura Española en el Siglo XVIII e Intelectuales de la Época. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1953.

Pisani, Vittore. Indisch-griechische Beziehungen aus dem Mahābhārata. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. 103/1. 1953.

Plebe, A. Le Note Hegeliane alla Filosofia del Diritto. *Revista di Filosofia*. April, 1953.

Raeff, M. The Philosophical Views of M. Speransky. *Slavonic and East European Review*. June, 1953.

Ratner, Sidney. The Development of Dewey's Evolutionary Naturalism. *Social Research*. Summer, 1953.

Roberts, David E. Augustine's Earliest Writings. *Journal of Religion*. July, 1953.

Rossi, Mario. Emancipation of the Jews in Italy. *Jewish Social Studies*. April, 1953.

Rossi, P. Il Relativismo Storicistico di Oswald Spengler. *Rivista di Filosofia*. April, 1953.

Rossi, R. J. Bruto, Cicerone e la Congiura Contro Cesare. *La Parola del Passato*. January-February, 1953.

Rouquette, Robert. Charles Maurras et la Papauté. *Études*. June, 1953.

Rudé, G. E. The Motives of Popular Insurrection in Paris during the French Revolution. *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research*. May, 1953.

Schoeck, R. J. Rhetoric and Law in Sixteenth-Century England. *Studies in Philology*. April, 1953.

Schwab, Raymond. Zoroastre Prophète de l'Iran. *Mercure de France*. August, 1953.

Soranzo, G. "Pensieri relativi all'Am-

ministrazione Pubblica dello Stato Pontificio 1845" del Futuro Pio IX. *Aevum*. January-February, 1953.

Stark, Rudolf. Sokratisches in den "Vögeln" des Aristophanes. *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*. 96/1. 1953.

Stammmler, Wolfgang. Deutsche Scholastik. *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Philologie*. 72/1. 1953.

Steinacker, Harold. Die Habsburger und der Ursprung der Eidgenossenschaft. *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*. LXI/1-2. 1953.

Tiernay, Brian. The Canonists and the Medieval State. *Review of Politics*. July, 1953.

Treue, Wilhelm. Franz Theodor Kugler—Kulturhistoriker und Kulturpolitiker. *Historische Zeitschrift*. June, 1953.

Walsh, W. H. On the Philosophy of Hegel. *Philosophy*. July, 1953.

Wardman, H. Imagery and Myth in Renan. *French Studies*. July, 1953.

Whicher, Stephen E. Emerson's Tragic Sense. *American Scholar*. Summer, 1953.

Williams, Forrest. A Problem in Values: The Faustian Motivation in Kierkegaard and Goethe. *Ethics*. July, 1953.

Williams, T. Harry. Abraham Lincoln: Principles and Pragmatism in Politics. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. June, 1953.

Wittfogel, Karl A. The Ruling Bureaucracy of Oriental Despotism: A Phenomenon that Paralyzed Marx. *Review of Politics*. July, 1953.

Wolstein, Benjamin. The Romantic Spinoza in America. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. June, 1953.

Wyler, Julius. The Formation of Swiss Democracy. *Social Research*. Summer, 1953.

Legal Theory and Public Law Issues

Arangio-Ruiz, Vincenzo. Les Documents du Droit Romain. *Museum Helveticum*. July, 1953.

Ashford, Gerald. Jacksonian Liberalism and Spanish Law in Early Texas. *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*. July, 1953.

Bischoff, Ralph F. Minority Rights and Majority Rule. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1953.

Boyer, William W., Jr. Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin Law Review*. March, 1953.

Cohn, E. J. German Legal Science Today. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. April, 1953.

Delbez, L. La Notion Éthique de Guerre.

Revue Générale de Droit International Public. January-March, 1953.

Dürig, Günter. Das Eigentum als Menschenrecht. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft.* 109/2. 1953.

Durham, James A. Crosskey on the Constitution: An Essay Review. *California Law Review.* Summer, 1953.

Gahringer, Robert E. Moral Law. *Ethics.* July, 1953.

Gaudenet, Paul Marie. Derecho Constitucional y Ciencia Política. *Revista de Estudios Políticos.* March-April, 1953.

Guillien, R. Le Droit Devant la Nature. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.* January-June, 1953.

Guisepppe, Guarino. Oggetto, Funzione e Metodo della Teoria Generale del Diritto. *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico.* January-March, 1953.

McManaman, Linus J. Natural Law and American Jurisprudence. *Politica.* IV/2-3. 1952.

Monypenny, Phillip. A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1953.

Peters, Roger Paul. Our Ancient and Sensible Constitution—Professor Crosskey's View. *Notre Dame Lawyer.* Spring, 1953.

Public Emergency Disputes. [Various Articles]. *Temple Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1953.

Roemer, William F. The Loyalty Oath and Freedom to Teach. *Notre Dame Lawyer.* Spring, 1953.

Sauer, Ernest. Sistema de Solidaridad Jurídico Internacional. *Revista de Estudios Políticos.* March-April, 1953.

Stanlis, Peter J. Edmund Burke and the Law of Nations. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1953.

Talle, Henry O. The Case for Economic Freedom. *Iowa Law Review.* Winter, 1953.

tenBroek, Jacobus. Wartime Power of the Military over Citizen Civilians within the Country. *California Law Review.* Summer 1953.

Vedel, Georges. Répression et Droits de l'Homme. *Études.* July-August, 1953.

Vialatoux, J. Réflexions sur la Valeur et la Portée de l'Idée de Droit Naturel International. *La Vie Intellectuelle.* July, 1953.

Wright, Quincy. The Outlawry of War and the Law of War. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1953.

Special Study and Analysis

Arendt, Hannah. Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government. *Review of Politics.* July, 1953.

Arendt, Hannah. Understanding and Politics. *Partisan Review.* July-August, 1953.

Aron, Raymond. Totalitarianism and Freedom. *Confluence.* June, 1953.

Bourde, André. Aspects du Socialisme Anglais Moderne. *Revue Historique.* April-June, 1953.

Brameld, Theodore. The Problem of Anti-Rationalism in Educational Theory. *Harvard Educational Review.* Spring, 1953.

Brogan, D. W. Who is the Enemy? *Virginia Quarterly Review.* Summer, 1953.

Brugman's, H. Réflexions sur le Messianisme Politique et la Tolérance. *Cahiers de Bruges.* June, 1953.

Burgelin, P. Kant et les Fins de la Raison. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.* January-June, 1953.

Burnham, James. The Calculus of Diffusion. *Confluence.* June, 1953.

Clark, Colin. The Future of the Proletariat. *Diogenes.* Spring, 1953.

Coates, J. B. Existentialism. *Philosophy.* July, 1953.

Cobban, Alfred. Security and Sovereignty in French Foreign Policy. *International Journal.* Summer, 1953.

Cogniot, Georges. Une Filouterie Intellectuelle à Peine Rajeunie. *Cahiers du Communisme.* July, 1953.

Cole, G. D. H. What is Socialism? (II) *Political Studies.* June, 1953.

Conde, F. J. Sociología de la Sociología. *Revista de Estudios Políticos.* March-April, 1953.

Cribbin, James J. Theorists and Theories in American Education. *Catholic Educational Review.* June, 1953.

Cusi, Exio. La Doctrina Social de la Iglesia y la Constitución Mexicana. *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos.* April, 1953.

Donahue, Charles. Freedom and Education: The Sacral Problem. *Thought.* Summer, 1953.

Douglas, Wallace W. The Meaning of "Myth" in Modern Criticism. *Modern Philology.* May, 1953.

Eagleton, Clyde. Excesses of Self-Determination. *Foreign Affairs.* July, 1953.

Fiske, John C. Herman Melville in Soviet

Criticism. *Comparative Literature*. Winter, 1953.

Floridi, U. A. Materialismo Dialettico e Critica Sovietica. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. May 2, 1953.

Galbraith, J. K. Eisenhower and the Conservative Revolution. *Commentary*. August, 1953.

Gehlen, Arnold. Die Technik in der Sichtweise der Philosophischen Anthropologie. *Merkur*. July, 1953.

Gall, C. W. M. The Philosophy of Albert Schweitzer. *Cambridge Journal*. July, 1953.

Geopolitik. Was Will die Geopolitik Heute? *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. April, 1953.

Giusso, Lorenzo. Ortega y Gasset. *Litterature Moderne*. March-April, 1953.

Glicksberg, Charles I. Psychoanalysis and Anti-Semitism. *Chicago Jewish Forum*. Summer, 1953.

Godfrey, F. La T. The Idea of the Mean. *Hermathena*. May, 1953.

Grilli, Carlo. Il Confronto fra le Utilità di Più soggetti e la Utilità Pubblica. *Rivista Internazionale di Scienza Sociali*. September-October, 1952.

Harrigan, Anthony. Thoughts on the Managerial Class. *Prairie Schooner*. Summer, 1953.

Harrison, Jonathan. Self-Interest and Duty. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. May, 1953.

Hartt, Julian N. Metaphysics, History, and Civilization: Collingwood's Account of their Interrelationship. *Journal of Religion*. July, 1953.

Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl. Toynbee frente a los Panoramas de la Historia. *Cuadernos Americanos*. May-June, 1953.

Heidegger, Martin. Lección Sobre la Cosa. *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*. April, 1953.

Jaspers, Karl. Freedom and Authority. *Diogenes*. Winter, 1953.

Jemolo, A. C. Per la Libertà Religiosa in Italia. *Nuovi Argomenti*. May-June, 1953.

Jewkes, John. Monopoly and Economic Progress. *Economica*. August, 1953.

Jewkes, John. The Nationalization of Industry. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Summer, 1953.

John, E. Some Questions on the Materialist Interpretation of History. *History*. February, 1953.

Kerr, Clark. The University in a Progressive Society. *Pacific Spectator*. Summer, 1953.

Knight, Frank H. Theory of Economic Policy and the History of Doctrine. *Ethics*. July, 1953.

Kohn, Hans. A Historian's Creed for our Time. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. July, 1953.

Kolb, William R. Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion. *Social Forces*. May, 1953.

Krieger, Carl. Die Stunde des Bürgertums. *Neues Abendland*. August, 1953.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Eric R. V. Catholicism of the Germans: A Profile. *Dublin Review*. Second Quarter, 1953.

Lavau, G. E. La Dissociation du Pouvoir. *Esprit*. June, 1953.

Lener, S. Libertà di Voto, Democrazia, Religione. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. June 2, 1953.

Leonow, M. A. Fragen der Marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie im Lichte vom Stalins Arbeit zur Sprachwissenschaft. *Sinn Und Form*. V/2. 1953.

Limbours, Georges. Pierres d'Exercice Philosophique. *Les Temps Modernes*. June, 1953.

Lopez-Amo, Angel. La Libertad y el Estilo Burgues. *Politeia*. IV/2-3. 1952.

Luce, Henry R. What Makes a Responsible Press? *Pacific Spectator*. Summer, 1953.

Maggi, Raffaello. La Weltanschauung Marxistica nei Riflessi della Critica Psicoanalitica. *Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia*. March-April, 1953.

Marshall, James. Human Foundations of the State and Law. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Marxism. Marxisme et Union Sovietique. [Various Articles] *L'Age Nouveau*. July, 1953.

Mazour, Anatole G. Party Line History. *American Scholar*. Summer, 1953.

Munz, Peter. Historical Understanding. *Philosophical Quarterly*. July, 1953.

Nef, John U. In Quest of Man. *Diogenes*. Winter, 1953.

Oppenheim, Felix E. Rational Choice. *Journal of Philosophy*. June 4, 1953.

Ortega y Gasset, José. Über das Denken. *Merkur*. July, 1953.

Palmer, R. R. Notes on the Use of the Word "Democracy." *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1953.

Perryman, J. N. On the Meaning of Democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1953.

Pettee, George S. Ideology in America. *Confluence*. June, 1953.

Polanyi, Michael. Wissen und Gewissen. *Der Monat*. July, 1953.

- Radakrishnan, Sarvepalli. Geist, Macht-politik und Weltbrüderschaft in Unserer Zeit. *Universitas*. June, 1953.
- Rice, Philip Blair. Ethical Empiricism and Its Critics. *Philosophical Review*. July, 1953.
- Rieff, Philip. Aesthetic Functions in Modern Politics. *World Politics*. July, 1953.
- Ritter, K. B. Freiheit und Verantwortung. *Neues Abendland*. August, 1953.
- Romero, Francisco. Sobre el Romanticismo Filosófico. *Revista Nacional de Cultura*. March-April, 1953.
- Rosenberg, Bernard. Social Science and the Humanists. *American Scholar*. Summer, 1953.
- Roucek, J. S. The Geopolitics of the Mediterranean. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. July, 1953.
- Russo, Luigi. Il Dialogo dei Popoli. *Bel-fagor*. May, 1953.
- Sanchez, J. Heidegger: Existencialista? *Cuadernos Americanos*. July-August, 1953.
- Schweitzer, Albert. Die Idee des Reiches Gottes und Unserer Zeit. *Universitas*. July, 1953.
- Seyppel, Joachim. Dekadenz Oder Fortschritt. [Monograph, 1951. Bronnen-Verlag Schlehdorf OBB.]
- Sieburg, Heinz-Otto. Démocratie et Dictature. *Documents*. July, 1953.
- Sklar, Richard L. The Fiction of the First Freedom. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1953.
- Socius, Job. Capitalism Overhauled. [League for Economic Coordination, 1952.]
- Stewart, W. A. C. Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Education. *British Journal of Educational Studies*. May, 1953.
- Stössinger, Felix. Bolschewismus Oder Revolutionärer Revisionismus. *Frankfurter Hefte*. July, 1953.
- Tavard, George H. The Unconditional Concern: The Theology of Paul Tillich. *Thought*. Summer, 1953.
- Torres Martinez, Manuel da. El Futuro de la Política Social. *Cuadernos de Política Social*. No. 16.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. La Rencontre des Civilisations. *Preuves*. June, 1953.
- Trilling, Diana. America through Dark Spectacles. *Twentieth Century*. July, 1953.
- Viereck, Peter. Dictatorship over the Proletariat. *Dalhousie Review*. Spring, 1953.
- Vischer, Eduard. Über Politische Beredsamkeit im Demokratischen Kleinstaat. *Die Welt als Geschichte*. XIII 2. 1953.
- Vucinich, Alexander. The Role of Power Myths in Soviet Society. *Pacific Spectator*. Summer, 1953.
- Weil, Simone. Luttons-Nous pour la Justice? *Preuves*. June, 1953.
- Wellek, René. Benedetto Croce: Literary Critic and Historian. *Comparative Literature*. Winter, 1953.
- Westra, P. Albert Schweitzers Philosophische en Religieuze Ideeën. *De Gids*. June, 1953.
- Williams, Raymond. The Idea of Culture. *Essays in Criticism*. July, 1953.
- Wiseman, Jack. Uncertainty, Costs, and Collectivist Economic Planning. *Economica*. May, 1953.
- Wolfe, Bertram D. Totalitarianism and History. *Antioch Review*. Summer, 1953.
- Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Otto Von. Typus und Gesetz. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 109/3. 1953.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

- Alchian, A. A.; Enke, Stephen; and Penrose, E. T. Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm. *American Economic Review*, September, 1953.
- Jonas, Hans. A Critique of Cybernetics. *Social Research*. Summer, 1953.
- Mace, C. A. Homeostasis, Needs and Values. *British Journal of Psychology*. August, 1953.
- MacFie, A. L. Choice in Psychology and as Economic Assumption. *Economic Journal*. June, 1953.
- Rose, Arnold M. Generalizations in the Social Sciences. *American Journal of Sociology*. July, 1953.

Shubik, Martin. The Role of Game Theory in Economics. *Kyklos*. 1953, #1.

Research Methods and Organization

Hofstaetter, Peter R. The Actuality Measure in the Study of Public Opinion. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. August, 1953.

Melbin, Murray. The Action-Interaction Chart as a Research Tool. *Human Organization*. Spring, 1953.

Perkins, Walter M. Applicability of Sampling Inspection Techniques in Testing the Quality of the Job of the Public Assistance Visitor. *Social Service Review*. June, 1953.

Shapera, I. Some Comments on Comparative Method in Social Anthropology. *American Anthropologist*. August, 1953.

Spiegelman, Marvin; Terwilliger, Carl; and Fearing, Franklin. The Reliability of Agreement in Content Analysis. *Journal of Social Psychology*. May, 1953.

Motivation and Personality

Bernberg, R. E. Socio-Psychological Factors in Industrial Morale, II. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. August, 1953.

Bilkey, Warren J. A Psychological Approach to Consumer Behavior Analysis. *Journal of Marketing*. July, 1953.

Davis, Louis E. and Josselyn, P. Dudley. How Fatigue Affects Productivity. *Personnel*. July, 1953.

Edwards, Ward. Probability-Preferences in Gambling. *American Journal of Psychology*. July, 1953.

Katona, George. Rational Behavior and Economic Behavior. *Psychological Review*. September, 1953.

Opinions and Attitudes

Fleishman, E. A. The Measurement of Leadership Attitudes in Industry. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. June, 1953.

Kelman, Herbert C. Attitude Change as a Function of Response Restriction. *Human Relations*. 1953, #3.

Lawshe, C. H.; and Nagle, B. F. Productivity and Attitude toward Supervisor. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. June, 1953.

Loewenstein, Karl. The Role of Ideologies in Political Change. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #1.

Riddle, George W. N. Validity of Reader-

ship Studies. *Journal of Marketing*. July, 1953.

Westley, William A. Violence and the Police. *American Journal of Sociology*. July, 1953.

Group Behavior

Brown, William H. An Instrument for Studying Viscidity within Small Groups. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*. Autumn, 1953.

Campbell, Angus; Gurin, Gerald; and Miller, Warren E. Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. June, 1953.

Cartwright, D. The Strategy of Research on International Conferences. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #2.

Chaumont, C. The Evolutionary Aspect of International Organization and International Cooperation. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #2.

Davis, Keith. A Method of Studying Communication Patterns in Organizations. *Personnel Psychology*. Autumn, 1953.

Dodd, Stuart Carter. Testing Message Diffusion in Controlled Experiments. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Dotson, Floyd. A Note on Participation in Voluntary Associations in a Mexican City. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Gerard, Harold B. The Effect of Different Dimensions of Disagreement on the Communication Process in Small Groups. *Human Relations*. 1953, #3.

Goodacre, Daniel M., III. Group Characteristics of Good and Poor Performance in Combat Units. *Sociometry*, May, 1953.

Gross, Edward. Some Functional Consequences of Primary Controls in Formal Work Organizations. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Guetzkow, H. An Exploratory Empirical Study of the Role of Conflict in Decision-Making Conferences. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #2.

Harvey, O. J. An Experimental Approach to the Study of Status Relations in Informal Groups. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Homans, George C. Status among Clerical Workers. *Human Organization*. Spring, 1953.

Key, V. O., Jr. Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio. *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. June, 1953.

Line, W. A Functional Approach to Inter-

national Conferences. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #2.

Mandell, Milton M. The Effect of Organizational Environment on Personnel Selection. *Personnel*. July, 1953.

Mills, Theodore M. Power Relations in Three-Person Groups. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Monypenny, Phillip. A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1953.

Oyen, Orjar and De Fleur, Melvin L. The Spatial Diffusion of an Airborne Leaflet Message. *American Journal of Sociology*. September, 1953.

Roseborough, Mary E. Experimental Studies of Small Groups. *Psychological Review*. July, 1953.

Seeman, Melvin. Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Sharp, W. R. A Check List of Subjects for Systematic Study of International Conferences. *International Social Science Bulletin*. 1953, #2.

Shears, L. W. The Dynamics of Leadership in Adolescent School Groups. *British Journal of Psychology*. August, 1953.

Speroff, B. J. Problems and Approaches in Integrating Minority Group Work Forces. *Journal of Social Psychology*. May, 1953.

Stevens, Carl M. Regarding the Determinants of Union Wage Policy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*. August, 1953.

Turner, Julius. Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1953.

Wax, Rosalie H. The Destruction of a Democratic Impulse. *Human Organization*. Spring, 1953.

Wilson, Robert C.; Beem, Helen P.; and Comrey, Andrew L. Factors Influencing Organizational Effectiveness, III. *Personnel Psychology*. Autumn, 1953.

Culture and Institutions

Adams, Stuart. Trends in Occupational Origins of Physicians. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Andrews, Richard B. Mechanics of the Urban Economic Base. *Land Economics*. August, 1953.

Birnbaum, N. Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber.

British Journal of Sociology. June, 1953.

Davis, Beverly. Eminence and Level of Social Origin. *American Journal of Sociology*. July, 1953.

Farber, Maurice L. English and Americans: Values in the Socialization Process. *Journal of Psychology*. October, 1953.

Feldmesser, Robert A. The Persistence of Status Advantages in Soviet Russia. *American Journal of Sociology*. July, 1953.

Gross, Neal. Social Class Identification in the Urban Community. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Hulicka, Karel. Land Reform and Politics in Czechoslovakia: 1945-52. *Land Economics*. August, 1953.

Kemmerer, Donald L. Financing Illinois Industry, 1830-1890. *Bulletin of the Business Historical Society*. June, 1953.

Mayer, Kurt. Business Enterprise: Traditional Symbol of Opportunity. *British Journal of Sociology*. June, 1953.

Mueller, Kate Hevner and Mueller, John H. Class Structure and Academic and Social Success. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*. Autumn, 1953.

Nash, Edmund. Purchasing Power of Soviet Workers, 1953. *Monthly Labor Review*. July, 1953.

Shimkin, D. B.; and Sanjuan, P. Culture and World View: A Method of Analysis Applied to Rural Russia. *American Anthropologist*. August, 1953.

Shurcliff, Alice W. The Control of Industrial Labor in Communist China. *Monthly Labor Review*. August, 1953.

Taft, Ronald. The Social Grading of Occupations in Australia. *British Journal of Sociology*. June, 1953.

Tumin, Melvin M. Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis. *American Sociological Review*. August, 1953.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Ellis, Howard S. American Economic Aid to Europe in Retrospect. *Kyklos*. 1953, #1.

Fuchs, Ralph F. Our Clients in Mid-Century: Welfare in the Modern State. *Social Service Review*. June, 1953.

de Grazia, Alfred. Mathematical Derivation of an Election System. *Isis*. June, 1953.

Mulgrave, R. A.; and Culbertson, J. M.

The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United States, 1890-1948. *National Tax Journal*. June, 1953.

Myer, Dillon S. Indian Administration: Problems and Goals. *Social Service Review*. June, 1953.

Truog, Emil and Pronin, Dimitri T. A Great Myth: The Russian Granary. *Land Economics*. August, 1953.

Tustin, Arnold. Economic Regulation through Control-System Engineering. *Impact of Science on Society*. Summer, 1953.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ANDERS, GENERAL WLADYSLAW. *Hiller's Defeat in Russia*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1953. Pp. xv, 267. \$4.00.

ANDERSEN, ARLOW WILLIAM. *The Immigrant Takes His Stand: The Norwegian-American Press and Public Affairs, 1847-1872*. Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian-American Historical Association. 1953. Pp. vii, 176. \$3.50.

BARBER, BERNARD. *Science and the Social Order*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. xxiii, 288. \$4.50.

BENDIX, REINHARD AND LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN (EDS.). *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. 725. \$6.00.

CLOUGH, OWEN (ED.). *Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-Table in Empire Parliaments*. London: Butterworth & Co. 1953. Pp. vii, 298. \$5.00.

CRESSEY, DONALD R. *Other People's Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. 191. \$3.00.

DE HOSTOS, EUGENIO CARLOS. *Antologia*. Madrid, Spain: Juan Bravo. Pp. 462.

DE HOSTOS, EUGENIO CARLOS (ED.). *Hostos, Hispano Americanista*. Madrid: Juan Bravo. Pp. 431.

DENNETT, RAYMOND AND DURANT, KATHERINE D. (EDS.). *Documents on American Foreign Relations: Vol. XIII, January 1-December 31, 1951*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 626. \$7.50.

DUROSELLE, J.-B. *Histoire Diplomatique de 1919 a Nos Jours*. Paris: Librairie Dalloz. 1953. Pp. 744.

FERM, VERGILIUS (ED.). *Puritan Sage: Collected Writings of Jonathan Edwards*. New York: Library Publishers. 1953. Pp. xxvii, 640. \$7.50.

FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T. *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1953. 2 vols. Pp. xv, 628, xxiv; viii, 629-1511, xxv-lxxvi. \$15.00.

FRASER-TYTLER, W. K. *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2nd ed. 1953. Pp. xiv, 348. \$6.00.

GISKES, H. J. *London Calling North Pole*. London: William Kimber. 1953. Distributed by the British Book Centre, New York. Pp. 208. \$3.50.

HUGHES, EVERETT C. AND HUGHES, HELEN M. *Where Peoples Meet: Racial and Ethnic Frontiers*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. 204. \$3.50.

KATTSOFF, LOUIS O. *The Design of Human Behavior*. St. Louis: Educational Publishers. 1953. Pp. x, 402. \$5.00.

KLIMOV, GREGORY. TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY H. C. STEVENS. *The Terror Machine: The Inside Story of Soviet Administration in Germany*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. 400. \$4.00.

KRYPTON, CONSTANTINE. *The Northern Sea Route: Its Place in Russian Economic History before 1917*. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R. 1953. Pp. ix, 194.

MARX, KARL AND ENGELS, FREDERICK. *Letters to Americans, 1848-1895: A Selection*. New York: International Publishers. 1953. Pp. viii, 312. \$4.00.

NOBLEMAN, ELI E. *American Military Government Courts in Germany: Their Role in the Democratization of the German People*. Provost Marshal General's School, Military Government Department for ORC Units. 1953. Pp. x, 261.

NOMAD, MAX. *A Skeptic's Political Dictionary and Handbook for the Disenchanted*. New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. xi, 171. \$3.00.

PAWEL, MARTINUS. *Algumas Bases para discussão da Estatização da Medicina, a serviço de uma elevação do nível sanitário de nossa população*. Sao Paulo, Brazil: Martinus Pawel. 1953. Pp. 205.

PRATT, FLETCHER. *Stanton: Lincoln's Secre-*

- tary of War*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1953. Pp. xiii, 520. \$5.95.
- RAUD, VILHILBALD. *Estonia: A Reference Book*. New York: The Nordic Press. 1953. Pp. 158.
- RICHARDS, V. *Lessons of the Spanish Revolution: 1936-1939*. London: Freedom Press. 1953. Pp. 154. 6s.
- ROSE, JOSEPH R. *American Wartime Transportation*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1953. Pp. xi, 290.
- SIMPSON, COLIN. *Adam in Ochre: Inside Aboriginal Australia*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. xiii, 221. \$5.00.
- SUNDERLAND, EDSON R. *History of the American Bar Association and Its Work*. Boston: Survey of the Legal Profession. 1953. Pp. vii, 251.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Forty-ninth Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association:

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of The American Political Science Association convened in the Ohio Room of the Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C., at 9.30 A.M. on Wednesday, September 9, 1953. President Pendleton Herring called the meeting to order. The following officers and members of the Council were present: Charles Aikin, M. Margaret Ball, Walter H. Bennett, Hugh A. Bone, Ralph J. Bunche, Hugh L. Elsbree, David Fellman, John H. Ferguson, John Gange, Pendleton Herring, Lee S. Greene, Victor Jones, Edward H. Litchfield, Dean E. McHenry, Charles McKinley, Boyd A. Martin, Jack W. Peltason, Robert S. Rankin, Emmette S. Redford, Clinton Rossiter, Ivan Stone, and David B. Truman. Past presidents John M. Gaus, Arthur N. Holcombe, Peter H. Odegard, and Henry R. Spencer, and associate director Kenneth W. Hechler were also present.

Since this was the last Council meeting of the present executive director, President Herring read to the Council the letter from the last four Association presidents to Mr. Litchfield, expressing their appreciation for his services as executive director.

Mr. Litchfield reviewed the Association's financial position in the following terms:

a. Last year's revenues were originally estimated at \$95,934.43. Subsequent grants and revenue increases raised the estimate to \$125,264.43. Revenues amounted to \$125,726.34, or an excess of actual revenue over estimated revenue of \$461.91.

b. Expenses were originally estimated at \$95,934.43. Revisions made by the Executive Committee to undertake responsibilities resulting from the additional grants increased the revised estimate of expenditures to \$125,264.43. Actual expenditures totaled \$121,574.49.

c. Actual revenues therefore exceeded actual expenditures by \$4,151.85. Of this, \$2,065.97 is actually earmarked for the completion of the convention delegations study.

The remaining \$2,085.88 reverts to our operating reserve.

d. Our uncommitted and unbudgeted assets at the present time are as follows:

1. General Operating Reserve	\$ 6,302.53
2. General Endowment and Trust Funds.....	23,580.00
3. Bequests outstanding from as yet unsettled estates...	10,000.00

Total \$39,882.53

The Council then considered the proposed budget for the fiscal year 1953-54. The budget contemplates a total revenue of \$122,125.97 as against a total expenditure of the same amount. In proposing this budget on behalf of the Executive Committee, the director called attention to the fact that next year's revenues are more than twice those of three years ago, and that the gap between revenue and expenditures, originally financed by a Carnegie Corporation grant, has now been closed. The Association is now in a position to maintain its program from existing resources. On the motion of Mr. Aikin, seconded by Mr. Redford, the proposed budget was adopted with the understanding that sums might be transferred from item to item by the executive director with the approval of the Executive Committee.

The report of the auditing firm of F. W. Lafrentz & Co., of Washington and New York City, was considered and accepted by the Council. The motion was made by Mr. Jones, seconded by Mr. Bennett, and carried unanimously.

The executive director's report contained a recommendation regarding the need for a long-range investment and financial development policy. On motion of Miss Ball, seconded by Mr. Rossiter, the incoming treasurer was instructed to bring forward a plan for long-range financial development.

President Herring directed the Council's attention to the general question of the functional program of the Association. He noted that in addition to the financial structure of the Association, the problem of the Association's functions had been one of the original issues placed before the Association at the

time of the establishment of the Washington Office. He asked Mr. Litchfield to report on the development of these functions over the last three-year period.

In outlining current activities, Mr. Litchfield noted seven basic functions now performed by various portions of the Association organization.

1. *Research*—While avoiding duplication of the work of individual scholars, research organizations, and educational institutions, the Association has found it necessary to carry on organized research activities. These have been restricted to fields in which the assistance of a large number of persons in many different parts of the country is required for the satisfactory completion of the undertaking. The principal illustration of this type of function is provided by the study of "Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952," financed by a \$55,000 foundation grant and directed by Dr. Paul T. David, on leave from The Brookings Institution.

2. *Training*—The Association has introduced a Congressional Intern Program designed to provide training in the legislative process for younger members of the profession. The first group has been selected and is now in a year's residency in Washington.

3. *Problem Identification and Project Design*—With the aid of a small foundation grant, the Association has now begun to perform the distinctive process of identifying major problems in the field of political science and designing research projects which will aid in the exploration of those problem areas. The director noted that this function was well illustrated in the past year by the completion of the design of a project for the biennial collection of election statistics.

4. *Governmental Affairs Institute*—The Association continues to rely upon its affiliate, the Governmental Affairs Institute, to perform a number of functions which are important to the profession, but which do not logically or appropriately belong within the immediate structure of a membership organization. In the last year the Institute has carried on an extensive exchange program for political leaders from other parts of the world. It has also undertaken contract research involving political science problems.

5. *Service to Government Agencies*—In the last several years the Association has on occasion provided expert advice to the President of the United States and to agencies of the

United Nations. This facility continues to be available whenever it is called upon. Most recently an Association committee prepared recommendations for the White House on the subject of soldier voting.

6. *Personnel*—The national offices continue to provide exchange facilities for members of the profession leaving the government service and returning to academic life and for those who wish to move from one academic position to another. The Personnel Service is growing and now devotes as much attention to the senior positions of the profession as it does to the younger members of the organization.

7. *Communication*—A departmental chairman's newsletter is still relied upon for distribution of essential information. Plans are now going forward for the introduction of another news organ which will more adequately meet the need for extensive communication within the profession as a whole.

The Council noted these actions and expressed its belief that they represent the kind of program which the Association should carry forward.

Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Jones raised the question of giving life memberships to members of the Association, upon retirement, after many years of membership, and it was decided that the Washington Office staff should estimate the cost before any decision was made.

Mr. Rossiter inquired concerning the formal relationship between the Association and the Governmental Affairs Institute. The executive director explained that the Board of Directors of the Institute is made up of past presidents of the Association and an editor of the *Review*, and that no new Board member can be appointed without clearing with the current president of The American Political Science Association. Miss Ball moved that the relationship between the Association and the Institute be studied by the new Executive Committee. The motion was seconded by Mr. Bennett and carried.

President Herring mentioned that Mr. Bunche, Mr. Litchfield, and he had called on President Eisenhower this spring to offer the services of the Association on any project he might wish them to undertake.

The President then asked for suggestions from the Council members as to materials to be included in, and distribution of, a new house organ to replace the departmental chairmen's newsletter. Since 50% of the Association's members are not academic people, and since

circulation of one newsletter to each member of a department of political science does not prove too satisfactory, distribution to the individual members is to be considered. Various factors have also prompted the consideration of combining portions of the News and Notes items currently appearing in the *Review* with material in the new newsletter. Mr. Bennett made a motion that the staff of the Washington Office estimate the cost of preparing and mailing this new type of house organ and report the findings to the Board of Editors of the *Review*, and that this report together with the comments of the Board of Editors be forwarded to the Council as soon as possible. The motion was seconded by Mr. Rossiter and carried.

The 1953 edition of the *Directory of the American Political Science Association* was discussed. Mr. Redford expressed the hope that all books written by Association members might be listed, but it was agreed that as well as being costly, publication would be delayed, if members must be contacted again. Mr. Litchfield explained that the *Directory* unit, with its editor and Advisory Committee, functioned autonomously, the same as other Association projects. After some suggestions from the Council members, it was moved by Mr. Greene that the Council approve the publication as noted in the motion of the Advisory Committee of the *Directory* at its meeting on July 15, 1953. It was also suggested by Mr. Greene that the staff of the Washington Office take note of the discussion of the Council. President Herring put the motion to the Council members that the following excerpt from the Minutes of the Advisory Committee be approved. The motion carried.

"After full consideration of the financial limitations on staff, and limitations on time available, the Advisory Committee unanimously recommended that only the following adjustments be made in the form and scope of the *Directory*:

"1. Presidents and Past Presidents of the American Society for International Law, The American Society for Public Administration, and all regional affiliates of The American Political Science Association should have such offices listed in their personal biographical entries in the body of the *Directory*.

"2. The fields of interest (specialization) in the individual biographical entries should be represented by abbreviations rather than code numbers.

"The Advisory Committee unanimously feels that, while it would be desirable to include more than four books per author, financial limitations make this impossible to do.

"The Advisory Committee strongly recommends a printed rather than an IBM-processed publication.

"The Advisory Committee also expressed confidence in the basic usefulness of the *Directory* as planned by Dr. Bush and strongly recommends that it be published at the earliest possible date. For his unselfish work on the *Directory*, The Advisory Committee believes Dr. Bush has performed a great service for which the Association owes him a great debt."

The executive director pointed out that if this material already on hand for use in the *Directory* is kept up-to-date, it will be much easier to publish the next edition. Mr. Truman suggested that the staff be encouraged to keep this material up-to-date now, and Mr. Redford recommended that at its meeting next year the Council consider the publication of a new edition in 1955.

President Herring asked whether the Council would approve the action of the Executive Committee at its meeting on August 26, that steps be taken to see that a volume on election statistics is published. The project was designed during the year by a committee composed of: Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Alexander Heard, University of North Carolina; V. O. Key, Jr., Harvard University; Allen Manvel, Bureau of the Census; Richard M. Scammon, Department of State; Richard C. Spencer, Coe College; and David B. Truman, Columbia University. Mr. Truman suggested a few changes in the budget set up for the project. It was moved by Mr. Rossiter that the Council give the project its warm approval. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

The project designed by the Association's subcommittee on comparative public administration was reviewed. Mr. Greene moved that this report be referred to the Executive Committee for further exploration. The motion was seconded by Mr. Gaus and the motion carried.

Mr. Elsbree, the managing editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, reported that approximately two-thirds of the space in the *Review* is now devoted to articles. He expressed his appreciation to the members of the Board of Editors and to other

members of the Association for assistance in reading and evaluating manuscripts. The number of manuscripts received has been very high and the distribution with respect to different fields of the profession has been good. The editor noted that the cost of printing for the past year was somewhat higher than anticipated, due in part, however, to substantial increases in advertising and in the number of copies of the *REVIEW* ordered. He also noted that more and more tabular material is being included in the articles. Mr. Elsbree presented to the Council for reappointment the same Board of Editors: associate editors—V. O. Key, Jr., and James L. McCamy; other members of the Board—Taylor Cole, Henry Ehrmann, Harvey C. Mansfield, Herman Pritchett, and Francis O. Wilcox; It was moved by Mr. Rankin and seconded by Mr. Truman that all of them be reappointed. The motion was carried. The editor also noted that the following will continue as editorial associates: book review editor—Emmette S. Redford; news and notes editor—Albert L. Sturm; section bibliography editors—Franklin L. Burdette, William H. Roberts, H. Arthur Steiner, Francis G. Wilson, and Herbert A. Simon.

The Council adjourned at 12:10 P.M. for luncheon and reconvened at 1:45 P.M.

The Council considered the revised Constitution of the Association, as prepared by the Committee on Style. This committee was authorized at the Council meeting in Buffalo. Appointed by President Herring, it consisted of Harvey C. Mansfield, chairman, John D. Millett, President Herring, and Edward H. Litchfield. The revised Constitution was circulated to all department chairmen, suggestions were solicited, and at its meeting on August 26, 1953 the Executive Committee of the Association examined the three suggestions received from members, and endorsed the report of the Committee on Style for action by the Council, and for further recommendation of the Council to the Business Meeting of the Association. Mr. Litchfield pointed out the four areas in which the Council members had expressed uncertainty at the 1952 meeting. These have been amended in the present version to: (1) include the managing editor of the *REVIEW* as a member of the Executive Committee; (2) select the two appointed members on the Executive Committee from the elected or *ex officio* members of the Council; establish two new offices, secretary and

treasurer; reduce the number of elected Council members from 16 to 12 in order that the Council might be able to meet at least a month prior to the annual meeting to prepare the agenda for the regular Council meeting.

After some discussion as to a more appropriate title for the treasurer, the method of selecting a secretary and a treasurer, and the desirability of reducing the number of Council members, Mr. Redford moved that the number of elected members of the Council remain at 16. The motion was seconded by Mr. Fellman and carried.

Mr. Gaus suggested that under Article III, 5, last sentence, three words, "the annual meetings," be dropped, so that the sentence reads "All members, upon payment of such registration fee as the Council may approve, shall be entitled to attend and to participate in the Annual Business Meeting of the Association."

Mr. Aikin moved that the Council approve this draft of the Constitution with the two amendments mentioned above, and recommend its adoption at the Annual Business Meeting. President Herring presented the motion to the Council members and it was carried.

The President then introduced the subject of the Association's committees for consideration. He read the following general policy guide which was suggested by the Executive Committee at its meeting on August 26:

"1. Committees should be established when they are needed to: identify significant problems in need of further study; or, design research projects to be undertaken by the Association; or, obtain representative professional opinion in the conduct of its research projects.

"2. Administration of research and related projects is most effective when assigned to: a project director functioning with professional freedom and discretion under broad administrative direction of the Executive Director; or, the Governmental Affairs Institute as an operational adjunct of the Association; or, an educational institution or responsible research agency which is not a part of the Association, but which has clearly established competence in the field in question.

"3. In developing its future program and in conducting its specific central office activities, the Association should confine its efforts primarily to matters which: facilitate the research, teaching, or administrative work of in-

dividual political scientists or educational institutions; or, assist in the identification and development of new areas of political science; or, promote more effective communication within the profession; or, elevate the stature of political science and its acceptance in the world of scholarship and public affairs. Only when the nature or the immediacy of the problem, or the requirement of facilities is beyond the control of individuals and institutions, shall the Association undertake a substantive research project."

President Herring commented that if this policy were approved by the Council, the projects for design must be selected carefully in order to stay within the \$5,000 project design fund and to be certain that there were not many carried over from year to year in an unfinished state.

Mr. Aikin made a motion to accept the above statement as the Association's policy in establishing committees. The motion was seconded by Mr. Ferguson and carried.

The reports of the standing committees were reviewed briefly by President Herring. The report of the Committee on the Advancement of Political Science Teaching was discussed and it was decided that in light of the policy on committees just adopted, this committee should not be continued.

Mr. Jones, as a member of the Roosevelt Award panel this year, noted that there should be a more systematic way of seeing that all relevant books published each year are called to the attention of the awards panels, even if only by title. President Herring suggested that this suggestion, along with the recommendations made by Mr. Millett in his report, be transmitted to the new Committee on Awards to be appointed by Mr. Bunche. Mr. Redford felt that writing only to publishers for submission of books brought very inadequate results. It is difficult for publishers to determine to which panel to submit books. He added that the awards should be "for the best book of a given year," and not "for the best book submitted by publishers." It was agreed that the question would be referred to the Executive Committee for suggestions to be made to the new Committee on Awards.

The report of the Committee on Nominations was noted and accepted unanimously for submission to the Annual Business Meeting.

Mr. Greene expressed concern with the tendency to extend to universities security regulations similar to those of the federal

government. He asked whether the Association could make a statement or establish a point of view on this matter. Mr. Truman suggested that this was a proper subject for the Executive Committee to study. Mr. Bunche concurred that the subject merits further consideration. President Herring therefore asked that the subject be put on the Executive Committee's agenda.

The Council considered the resolution of the Western and the Pacific Northwest Political Science Associations that the American Political Science Association hold its annual meeting in 1956 and each fifth year thereafter in one of the eleven Western states. There was no doubt in the minds of the members as to the desirability of holding meetings in the West, but they felt it unwise to spell out an agreement to meet anywhere at any particular interval. Mr. McHenry was not inclined to offer a motion on this, but indicated that they will come back from time to time with warm invitations to brave the rigors of the West. President Herring expressed appreciation on behalf of the Association members for the warm hospitality from the West.

Mr. Greene raised the question as to the time of year of future meetings, and Mr. Litchfield reminded Council members that it was decided at the 1952 Annual Business Meeting to poll the membership after the 1953 meeting on this issue. The Council will then be polled as to the place of meeting in 1955.

The Executive Committee, at its August 26 meeting, nominated V. O. Key, Jr. as the Association's representative on the Social Science Research Council for a three-year term. President Herring presented this notion to the Council and it was carried unanimously.

The President presented the following resolution to the Council, which was adopted by unanimous vote:

"The Council of the American Political Science Association wishes to express its deep appreciation for the splendid collaboration of The Brookings Institution in the completion of the study, 'Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952.' The services of Dr. David were of utmost importance, and the continued support of the Institution's President, Dr. Robert D. Calkins, was of very great assistance. Without Brookings' assistance it would have been difficult to have achieved the quality of research which has now been obtained."

The following resolution, also presented to

the Council by President Herring, was adopted unanimously:

"Recognizing the tremendous growth of the political science profession in recent years, and the manifest need of a focal point for the profession's activities, the Council of The American Political Science Association wishes to express its approval and appreciation of the action of an anonymous fund in granting \$12,500 to the Association's affiliate, the Governmental Affairs Institute, as an initial contribution to a fund to be used for the purchase of a building to be known as 'The Political Science Building,' which would provide offices for this Association."

Mr. Litchfield read a letter from Rodney L. Mott, who is now in Australia on a Fulbright research grant, in which he indicated that Australia is trying to establish an Australian Political Studies Association and that he would be most appreciative of any encouragement The American Political Science Association could give. All members were most enthusiastic and it was agreed that a letter of encouragement would be written by the incoming President.

Mr. Odegard spoke for the Council of the Association in appreciation of the time, energy, imagination, intelligence, and personal sacrifice which the Executive Director had put into the establishment of the Washington Office of the Association.

The Council adjourned at 5:50 P.M.—
EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD, Executive Director.

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order at 4:45 P.M. in the Presidential Ball Room of the Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C., on Friday, September 11. President Pendleton Herring first outlined the order of business. Reports to the membership, which were available for distribution, were reviewed under three headings: finances, functions, and the structure of the Association. They had previously been discussed at all-day meetings of the Executive Committee on August 26 in New York City and at the meeting of the Council on September 9 in Washington, D. C.

President Herring paid tribute to the work of Mr. Edward H. Litchfield, who that day concluded his three-year term of service to the

Association, and announced that the Council had appointed Mr. John Gange, as executive director, and Mr. Kenneth Hechler, as associate director, to carry on the work of the office.

Mr. Litchfield summarized the financial report he had previously submitted to the Council. He pointed out that in the last three years the revenues have increased more than 100%; likewise, the endowment and trust fund has increased from approximately \$24,000 to nearly \$40,000. The size of the organization has increased more than 25%—from 5,002, three years ago, to 6,280 members now. The executive director emphasized that this improved position of the Association will now enable it to maintain its program out of current resources. He advised the meeting that the Council had adopted the 1953-54 budget of \$122,125.97, but that this estimate might be considerably exceeded if several likely possibilities of assistance materialized. In addition, the Council had instructed the incoming Treasurer to prepare a long-term plan for development of new financial resources and the investment of current endowment funds on a long-term basis.

President Herring commented that no definite plan could be worked out in advance for projects to be undertaken, but that opportunities must be taken when they arise. He then summarized a statement of seven basic functions now performed by the Association, which had been drafted by the executive director and approved by the Council. (See the Council Minutes.)

President Odegard then read a letter of appreciation from the four presidents of the Association who had worked with Mr. Litchfield as executive director, and Professor Holcombe presented a resolution to the same effect, which was adopted unanimously.

Mr. Hugh L. Elsbree, the managing editor of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, reported briefly. He had no new policies to propose but had attempted, during the year, to maintain previous policies and standards. He expressed appreciation to members of the Board of Editors for their assistance during the past year and announced their reappointment for the coming year, as approved by the Council on September 9.

President Herring turned to problems of structure within the Association's organization. The Executive Committee and Council at their meetings considered a clarification of policy with reference to committees, and the

executive director was asked to present their conclusions, as voted by the Council.

Mr. Litchfield read the general policy guide for the establishment of committees which was adopted by the Council on September 9, and added that the Council on that date decided to accept the reports of the existing subject matter committees and discharge these committees. (For the text, see the Council Minutes.)

President Herring reviewed the history of the Association's constitutional revision—the appointment of the Committee on Organization by President Gulick in 1951 and the decision of the Council on August 25, 1952, in Buffalo, to authorize President Herring to appoint a Committee on Style, consisting of Harvey C. Mansfield, chairman, John D. Millett, and Edward H. Litchfield, to reconcile the various proposals of Council members with the report of the Committee on Organization. After a meeting with President Herring a redraft of the Constitution was circulated to members of the Executive Committee, the Council, and chairman of departments of political science, in time for circulation and consideration in advance of the 1953 annual meeting. He noted two minor changes the Council had made on September 9, and reported the Council's recommendation that the Business Meeting approve the draft as so altered. Professor Quincy Wright moved that the Constitution as amended be adopted. The motion was seconded by Professor Dean McHenry and carried unanimously.

Mr. Litchfield read two resolutions adopted by the Council on September 9, expressing appreciation to The Brookings Institution for their collaboration in the completion of the study of Presidential Nominating Politics, and expressing approval and appreciation to an anonymous fund for the initial contribution to a Political Science Building Fund.

President Herring asked for the report of the Committee on Nominations. In the absence of Professor Joseph P. Harris, its chairman, Professor George Graham explained the procedure the Committee had used in selecting the nominees, and placed the following slate of officers in nomination: President-Elect—Charles McKinley, Reed College; Vice-Presidents—Taylor Cole, Duke University; J. A. C. Grant, University of California (Los Angeles); Claudius O. Johnson, State College of Washington; Secretary—Harvey C. Mansfield, The Ohio State University; Treasurer—Edward H.

Litchfield, Cornell University; new members of the Council for a two-year term—Manning J. Dauer, University of Florida; Earl Latham, Amherst College; Arnaud Leavelle, Stanford University; Dayton D. McKean, University of Colorado; J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College; C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago; Wallace S. Sayre, College of the City of New York; Dwight Waldo, University of California (Berkeley). Professor Denys P. Myers moved that the slate of officers presented by the Committee on Nominations be elected by a single ballot. The motion was seconded by John Manahan and carried.

President Herring turned the chair over to incoming President Bunche. President Bunche then invited President-Elect McKinley to join them on the platform. After brief remarks by the new president the 1953 Business Meeting adjourned at 6:20 P.M.

Approved: HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
Secretary

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 1953

ARTICLE I: NAME

This Association shall be known as The American Political Science Association.

ARTICLE II: OBJECTS

1. It shall be the purpose of this Association to encourage the study of Political Science, including Political Theory, Political Institutions, Politics, Public Law, Public Administration and International Relations.

2. The Association as such is non-partisan. It will not support political parties or candidates. It will not commit its members on questions of public policy nor take positions not immediately concerned with its direct purpose as stated above.

ARTICLE III: MEMBERSHIP

1. Annual Members. Any person sharing the objects of this Association may become a member upon payment of ten dollars and thereafter may remain such by paying the annual dues of ten dollars.

2. Life Members. Any person paying dues of two hundred fifty dollars in a lump sum, or in instalments spread over not more than ten years, shall become a Life Member of this Association, and thereafter be exempt from further dues.

3. Student Members. Any graduate or undergraduate student registered in a college or university may become a Student Member of this Association upon payment of four dollars and may remain such while he is so registered, by paying annual dues of four dollars.

4. Family Members. Another person in the family of a member may become a Family Member upon payment of two dollars, and may remain such as long as there is another Association member in the family, by paying annual dues of two dollars.

5. Privileges of Members. Each member, other than a Family Member, shall be entitled to a copy of each number of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW issued during his membership. All members, upon payment of such registration fee as the Council may approve, shall be entitled to attend and to participate in the Annual Business Meeting of the Association.

ARTICLE IV: OFFICERS

1. The officers of the Association shall be a President, a President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and sixteen elected members of a Council, all of whom shall be elective officers and who shall represent the Association in its corporate capacity. In addition there shall be an Executive Director of the Association, a Managing Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and such other appointive officers and committees as are hereinafter provided for.

2. The elective officers, together with the Executive Director, the Managing Editor and the Chairman of the Program Committee, shall constitute the Council of the Association. Ex-Presidents of the Association, and upon invitation of the President the chairman of any committee of the Association and nominees to the next year's Council, may attend meetings of the Council and participate in its discussions but have no vote.

3. The President, the President-Elect, the Executive Director, the Managing Editor, the Chairman of the Program Committee and two other Council members designated annually by the President, shall constitute the Executive Committee of the Council.

ARTICLE V: ELECTIVE OFFICERS

1. The elective officers, except the President, shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members of the Association attending the Annual Business Meeting, a quorum being present. The President-Elect shall auto-

matically succeed to the office of President upon the completion of the President's term, or upon the occurrence of one of the contingencies provided for in section 3 of this Article. The terms of elective officers, except members of the Council, shall extend for one year, viz., from the end of the program of one annual meeting to the end of the next. The terms of members of the Council shall extend for two years, similarly calculated, and one-half shall expire each year.

2. After each annual meeting the President shall appoint, with due regard to geographical distribution and the fields of professional interest, three members to a Nominating Committee of six, to serve for two-year terms; and he shall designate the chairman. The Committee may canvass the membership directly or indirectly for suggestions, and shall submit to the next Annual Business Meeting one nomination for each elective office to be filled, except the Presidency. These nominations shall be announced to the membership, by any convenient means, well in advance of the annual meeting. Additional nominations, sponsored by at least 10 members of the Association, may be offered from the floor at the Annual Business Meeting, upon 24 hours' advance notice to the Secretary.

3. In case of the death, resignation or inability of the President to perform the duties of his office, the President-Elect shall immediately succeed him and shall be president for the remainder of the term unless that is less than four months, in which case he shall serve out the unexpired term and one additional year.

In case of an interim vacancy in the office of President-Elect, the Nominating Committee shall forthwith proceed to nominate and the Council shall elect a new President-Elect to serve until the end of the next annual meeting. Actions to fill a vacancy may in case of need be taken by mail, telegraph or telephone, without a meeting. At the next Annual Business Meeting the Association shall confirm the Council's action by electing the President-Elect to the office of President, or instead may elect another member as President, or may take such other action as in its discretion the situation may require, to the end that there shall be in office at all times both a President and a President-Elect.

The Council may fill any interim vacancy in its elective membership until the end of the next annual meeting.

4. The elective officers, except the Secretary

and the Treasurer, shall be ineligible to succeed themselves in office. After a lapse of two years a former member of the Council may be elected to another term.

ARTICLE VI: APPOINTIVE OFFICERS

1. The Executive Director of the Association and the Managing Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW shall be appointed by the Council, after it hears the recommendation of the President. They shall have terms to be fixed in each case by the Council; and they shall be eligible for reappointment.

2. There shall be a Board of Editors of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW to assist the Managing Editor, and the Council may determine its size, method of appointment and tenure.

3. The Council, or the Executive Committee, may establish other offices, boards and committees, as the business of the Association may require, define their tasks and powers, and fix their terms and methods of appointment.

ARTICLE VII: MANAGEMENT OF ASSOCIATION AFFAIRS AND DUTIES OF OFFICERS

1. The highest authority for deciding the policies and managing the affairs of the Association is the membership of the Association duly assembled in the Annual Business Meeting, or in a special meeting duly called. It enacts and amends the Constitution, elects the elective officers, resolves policy questions brought to it, and may confirm, revise or repeal the action of the Council, the Executive Committee or any officer. One hundred members shall constitute a quorum of the Association, and a majority vote of the members in attendance shall control its decisions. The Association shall meet annually at a time and place designated by the Council. The Council and the officers shall make every effort to acquaint the members with the business of the Association and with the issues involved in the agenda of the Annual Business Meeting, and to provide sufficient time at business meetings for deliberations and decisions.

2. Subject to the foregoing, the Council shall be the governing body of the Association and have general charge and supervision of its business and interests in accordance with this Constitution. The Council shall meet once a year before the Annual Business Meeting, and oftener in its discretion or on call of the President. Nine members shall constitute a quorum and a majority vote of the members in attend-

ance shall control its decisions. The Council may call special meetings of the Association. It shall receive reports of all officers and committees; adopt the budget and appropriate money; and give its recommendations upon all questions (except the election of officers) to be presented to the Annual Business Meeting. It shall receive an annual audit of the Association's accounts. It may give direction to officers and committees, and adopt rules for the regulation of the Association's business. In the event of an emergency which prevents the holding of the Annual Business Meeting, the Council may exercise all the powers of the Association, including the election of officers.

3. Within limits prescribed by the Council, and consistently with this Constitution, the Executive Committee may exercise the powers of the Council when the Council or the Annual Business Meeting is not in session. It shall meet on call of the President, and he shall report its actions to the Council.

4. The President shall preside at business meetings of the Association, the Council and the Executive Committee. Except as may be otherwise provided, he shall appoint all committees of the Association. He shall see to it that the business of the Association is faithfully transacted.

5. The Secretary shall approve and have custody of the minutes of business meetings of the Council and of the Association; and he shall report the actions of the Council to the Annual Business Meeting.

6. The Treasurer shall review and approve the arrangements for the receipt, custody and disbursement of Association funds, and for keeping the Association's accounts. He shall arrange for the annual audit, and present the auditor's report to the Council. He shall report the Association's financial condition to the Annual Business Meeting. He shall review the Association's investments and make recommendations of investment policy to the Council. He shall seek to advance the interests of the Association in adding to its financial resources.

7. The Managing Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW shall edit and publish THE REVIEW, with the advice and assistance of the Board of Editors, and report its affairs to the Council.

8. The Executive Director shall be the chief executive officer of the Association and transact its business. He shall have charge of the central office of the Association. He shall formulate plans and policies for the ac-

complishment of the Association's objectives, and upon the approval of the Council or the Executive Committee shall be responsible for their administration. All appointive committees shall look to him for advice and assistance in their work. He shall have custody of the Association's funds, discharge its obligations and maintain its accounts. He shall make an annual report to the Council and consult with the President as questions of policy currently arise.

9. A Program Committee shall be responsible for preparing the professional program of the annual meetings of the Association. A Committee on Local Arrangements shall be responsible for assistance with accommodations and entertainment for members attending the annual meetings.

10. Other committees may be created, for stated periods and stipulated assignments. They shall report to the Council and thereupon be discharged. Unless specifically approved by the Association or the Council for that purpose, their reports shall not be deemed to state the views of the Association nor commit it in any way.

ARTICLE VIII: RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting. Notice of this provision shall be given to the members of the Association in advance of the annual meeting.

ARTICLE IX: AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this Constitution shall be proposed by the Council and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Association.

Ten members of the Association may propose amendments to this Constitution. Such proposed amendments shall be referred to the Council for consideration, and by them referred to the Association for its action thereon at the next Annual Business Meeting with such recommendations as the Council may see fit to make.

The quarterly meeting of the Southern California Political Science Association was held on July 24 in Los Angeles at the University of California. Professor Carl Brent Swisher, of the Johns Hopkins University and visiting professor during the summer session at the

Claremont Graduate School, spoke on the topic, "What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?"

The following officers were elected for 1953-54: president, Dean E. McHenry, University of California (Los Angeles); secretary-treasurer, Kenneth W. Grisingher, Pepperdine College; executive committee, Luther Lee, Jr., acting dean of the Claremont Graduate School; J. W. Robinson, Whittier College; Raymond McKelvey, Occidental College; Robert L. Morelan, Redlands College. The outgoing president and secretary-treasurer were, respectively, Carlton C. Rodee, University of Southern California, and R. F. Reath, Occidental College.

A Conference on Citizenship Participation in Politics was held at the University of California (Berkeley), in cooperation with the Citizenship Clearing House, on April 10-11, 1953. The Conference, organized under the direction of Professor Peter H. Odegard, chairman of the political science department, was attended by 110 participants on invitation. The Conference was addressed by Dr. Thomas H. Reed, consultant to the Citizenship Clearing House, Professor Dean McHenry, of the political science department, University of California (Los Angeles), and by Professor Robert Walker, of the department of political science, Stanford University. In addition to the three addresses, four panels discussed phases of the general question of how to improve education for political participation. The Conference brought together political science teachers from Northern California colleges and universities and representatives from state and local government, from the Democratic and Republican parties, and from a number of active civic groups.

A Conference on Ethics in Government was held at the University of California (Berkeley) on May 10-11, 1953, under the joint sponsorship of the School of Law and the department of political science. Thurman Arnold was the speaker at the opening session. Three seminar sessions were devoted to the following topics: "The Influence of Legislators on Ethical Standards in Government," "Ethical Standards in the Executive Agencies," and "Who Are Responsible for Improving Ethical Standards in Government?"

On June 19-20, 1953, a conference was held at the University of Michigan under the aus-

pices of the Institute of Public Administration in order to explore problems of cooperative research into comparative civil-military relations. The development of appropriate hypotheses and research methodology was considered for the comparative analysis of the United States with a number of countries including the USSR, Great Britain, Germany, and France. In attendance were Professor Louis Nemzer, department of political science, the Ohio State University; Professor Samuel Huntington, department of government, Harvard University; Dr. Kurt Lang, department of sociology, University of Chicago; Mr. Maury Feld, Bureau of Applied

Social Research, Columbia University, and, from the University of Michigan, Professor James K. Pollock, Professor Morris Janowitz, and Mrs. Elizabeth Marvick. Copies of the working papers for the conference, "The Professional Soldier and Political Power," are available on request to Morris Janowitz, University of Michigan.

The twelfth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will be held at the University of Iowa, April 29 through May 1. Program suggestions may be sent to David Fellman, University of Wisconsin, chairman of the program committee.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

After more than three years of activity, the Historical Division of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany was terminated on June 30, 1953. The Division was first headed by Professor Harold Zink of Ohio State University and then by Professor Roger H. Wells of Bryn Mawr College. The other American professional staff members were Elmer Plischke, Hubert G. Schmidt, Guy A. Lee, Rodney C. Loehr, Henry P. Pilgert, J. F. J. Gillen, Beryl R. McClaskey, and Anna E. Brauer. The Division completed thirty-eight monographs and documentary collections, most of which have been published. The monographs are in some cases administrative histories of United States and Allied agencies in Germany; in other instances, they are analyses of postwar German political, economic, and social problems and institutions. Further information about the publications may be obtained from G. Bernard Noble, chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, Washington, D. C., who planned and had general supervision of the project.

During the last few years, political philosophy has had a noticeable renaissance, not only in the form of scholarly research, but also in the form of increased teaching in the universities. This heightened interest has led to the establishment of an International Institute of Political Philosophy designed to bring together scholars with varying approaches to the problems of political philosophy and to provide an opportunity for them to exchange views and to profit from each other's studies.

The new Institute was created by eighty

founding members representing many countries. George Davy, Dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris, was named president in recognition of the distinguished tradition of French political philosophy. Vice-presidents were designated from seven countries as follows: P. Bastide, Jean Maritain, B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, J. Sarrailh, A. Siegfried (France); A. Babel (Switzerland); P. Calmon (Brazil); C. Friedrich (United States); S. de Madariaga (Spain); L. Sturzo (Italy); and P. van Zeeland (Belgium). Other members of the board of directors include: Raymond Aron, J. J. Chevallier Maxime-Leroy, M. Prelot, and J. Rueff (France); H. Kelsen and R. McKeon (United States); and F. Battaglia (Italy). R. Polin was made secretary general and A. Blondeau and Z. Zedryka were named deputy secretaries general. Members of the board of directors composing the executive committee are: G. Davy, president; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, executive vice-president; and R. Polin, secretary general. Headquarters of the Institute will be at the Sorbonne in Paris.

The Institute has taken for its first field of inquiry the concept of power, and, more narrowly, the concept of sovereignty, as well as the doctrine constructed to treat these problems. This inquiry will form the subject of the first meeting of the Assembly of the Institute and of the first volume of its *Annals*.—Raymond Polin.

The department of political science at Vassar College is sponsoring a series of lectures during the present academic year on the general theme, "Reflections on the Twentieth

Century Political Order." The speakers will include T. V. Smith, Herbert Agar, Richard H. Rovere, and Philip Jessup.

The political science department of the University of Wisconsin Extension Division offered an experimental correspondence course in American government during the fall. The course was given through several correspondence study centers in various parts of the state, where the students came periodically to hear a series of recorded lectures and to view several films supplementing the material contained in the textbook and outside readings. Lectures recorded by Professor David Fellman were the central feature of the new course.

The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh has granted \$94,000 to the Citizenship Clearing House, which is affiliated with the Law Center of New York University. The grant will make possible the expansion throughout the country of the Citizenship Clearing House program designed to encourage and train young college men and women for active participation in politics. Eight units have been established in various sections of the country to promote liaison between political parties and education units of each area. States or areas with local affiliates and their institutional headquarters are: Maine, Bowdoin College; Oregon, Willamette University; Connecticut, Wesleyan University; Minnesota, University of Minnesota; Missouri, Washington University; Kansas, University of Kansas; Michigan, Michigan State College; and Southern New York State, New York University.

The current Citizenship Clearing House expansion with autonomous regional units continues a nationwide program begun during the past year under an earlier grant from Falk Foundation funds. The program will include the sponsorship of three summer workshops—one in the Pacific Northwest, one in the Midwest, and one in the New England area. Young teachers of political science will be invited to study the more effective techniques for stimulating college graduates to active political participation. In addition, week-end conferences on the subject will be held in cooperation with local educational institutions of more than a dozen states. Conferees are to include college administrators, political leaders, and political scientists, who will study the means of attracting students into the political party of their

choice, on a nonvocational basis, following their graduation. The Falk grant will also enable the Citizenship Clearing House to provide consultative and field service to educational institutions interested in examining new methods of encouraging more realistic preparation for political participation.

Three \$4000 post-doctoral fellowships in statistics are being offered for 1954-55 by the University of Chicago. The purpose of these fellowships, which are open to holders of the doctor's degree or its equivalent in research accomplishment, is to acquaint established research workers in the biological, physical, and social sciences with the role of modern statistical analysis in the planning of experiments and other investigative programs, and in the analysis of empirical data. The development of the field of statistics has been so rapid that most current research falls far short of attainable standards, and these fellowships (which represent the fourth year of a five-year program supported by The Rockefeller Foundation) are intended to help reduce this lag by giving statistical training to scientists whose primary interests are in substantive fields rather than in statistics itself. The closing date for applications is February 15, 1954; instructions for applying may be obtained from the Committee on Statistics, University of Chicago, Chicago 37.

During the past summer, Professors Emile B. Ader and W. V. Holloway, of the University of Tulsa, were employed by the Stanolind Oil and Gas Company to participate in a civic education program dealing with problems of state and local government for employees of the organization.

William M. Beaney, assistant professor of politics at Princeton, devoted a part of the summer to field research in judicial administration, aided by a grant from the Princeton University Research Fund.

For his international contributions in the field of municipal government, Paul V. Betters, Executive Director of the United States Conference of Mayors, was recently decorated with the Legion of Honor (France) and the Commander's White Cross of the Order of the Lion (Finland).

Roy G. Blakey, of the University of Minnesota, has been requested by the University of Ankara and the U. S. State Department to

continue as professor of public finance with the University through 1953-54. This assignment involves also certain services to Turkish and United States ministries and agencies with which the University of Ankara cooperates.

Alfred G. Buehler, of the University of Pennsylvania, has been chairman of a tax study committee appointed by Pennsylvania's Governor Fine. On May 29, the committee presented to the Governor a 320-page report entitled "The Tax Problem." The report embodied the results of a comprehensive investigation of the tax situation in the State.

R. Taylor Cole, who has returned to his duties as professor of political science at Duke University after spending a year in Italy as Fulbright Professor, is one of thirteen scholars recently designated as James B. Duke Professors. The professorships were established when the Duke Endowment gave the University \$1,500,000 to begin an endowed professorship fund.

Robert H. Connery, of Duke University, served during the summer as consultant to the Secretary of the Navy in preparing the Secretary's annual report.

During the spring of 1952-53, William Ebenstein, professor of politics at Princeton University, spent eleven weeks as a Ford Fellow in Mexico and Central America doing research on recent institutional and ideological developments in the area.

Ernest S. Griffith, director of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, attended the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies at Aspen, Colorado, August 9-23, as a participant in round-table discussions on the theme, "The Promise of American Life."

Harold F. Gosnell was granted leave of absence by American University to study the Philippine national elections.

Earl Hanson, of the department of political science at Duke University, served during the past summer as director of the special Orientation School conducted by Duke University for Fulbright scholars from abroad. This was the third such program carried out by Duke and was attended by scholars from eighteen different nations.

Samuel Hendel, professor of government at the City College of New York, has been

awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship for further study of Russian government and politics and will spend the next academic year studying at the London School and at other European centers of learning.

John Herz, of the City College of New York, spent the summer in Germany and other parts of Europe on a research project for the Rand Corporation.

George A. Lanyi, of Oberlin College, spent the past summer on a State Department assignment in Germany as a specialist lecturing widely on topics related to American foreign policy and the United Nations.

Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University, was one of five American professors who spent the summer in Japan participating in the American Studies Seminar at the University of Tokyo. Besides conducting the seminar in American ideas and institutions, Professor Mason gave a public lecture entitled "Can Reason Conquer Fear?"

Robert S. Rankin, chairman of the department of political science at Duke University, was visiting professor at the summer session of Columbia University.

Edwin Rothman, a senior staff member of the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research, received the 1953 Certificate of Distinction of the Governmental Research Association for his *Report on the Philadelphia Municipal Pension Fund*. The award is made annually for the "most noteworthy piece of research prepared by a member of the Association."

Wallace S. Sayre, chairman of the department of government at the City College of New York, served during the summer as director of research of the special New York State Commission of the Government of New York City. In June, Professor Sayre participated in the management conference in Albuquerque sponsored by the University of New Mexico and the federal agencies with headquarters in Albuquerque.

Paul G. Steinbicker, chairman of the department of government at St. Louis University, was appointed by Governor Phil M. Donnelly as a member of the State Personnel Advisory Board for a term ending July 31, 1956.

Robert Strausz-Hupé was on leave of absence from the University of Pennsylvania for the first month of the fall term. He left for Europe on July 22, to visit Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey for purposes of observation and research. During October he presented a series of lectures on international relations at the University of Rome.

Samuel F. Thomas, of the City College of New York, served during the summer as research associate on the New York State Commission on the Government of New York City.

RESEARCH PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

A research program in international communication has been established in the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, under a grant from the Ford Foundation. The program will continue for three years and is designed to clarify the role of international communication in the making of major political decisions in different parts of the world. Most of the research carried on will be overseas field work. Studies are being planned in Western Europe, India, and Indonesia, along with some smaller projects on Italian and Middle Eastern material.

The director of the program is Ithiel de Sola Pool, formerly of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. The staff includes Daniel Lerner, also formerly at the Hoover Institute,

Harold Isaacs, and Raymond Bauer (who will for the present also continue part-time at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University).

The research program is following lines laid down in a report prepared by a planning committee, the chairman of which was Hans Speier of the Rand Corporation. Others on the committee included Harold Lasswell, Wallace Carroll, Paul Lazarsfeld, Jerome Bruner, and Edward Shils. The planning committee report suggested that the program emphasize elite communications which have been far less studied than the mass media. It also recommended that studies be continued over a reasonable period of time to examine the process of change in political opinion. Furthermore, it recommended that in each of the studies opinion survey methods and psychological experimental methods be coupled with the established methods of historical and political research so as to get the maximum value out of each approach.

The major studies now planned all follow a parallel design. Intellectuals, business-men, political leaders, and other elite strata will be studied to ascertain the sources of their information on some key current issue, how the information affects their attitudes, and then, in turn, how they attempt to bring pressure to bear to achieve the desired policy.—ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

B. R. Abernethy has returned to his post as professor of government at Texas Technological College from a two-year leave of absence, during which time he served as chairman of the Regional Wage Stabilization Board with headquarters in Dallas.

James F. Adams is on leave of absence from Texas Technological College to continue graduate work at the University of Chicago.

Albert L. Alford has been appointed instructor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Richard G. Axt, who formerly taught at Brandeis University, has joined the National Science Foundation as Study Director for Research at Nonprofit Institutions.

Moreley Ayearst, associate professor of government at New York University, is spend-

ing the current academic year in the British West Indies on a Fulbright grant for research on politics in the colonies. He is associated with the University College of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

William B. Ballis, professor of political science and chairman of the Russian area program at the University of Washington, is on leave of absence until the fall of 1954 to serve as American advisor to the Institute for the Study of the History and Institutions of the USSR, now located in Munich, Germany.

Ruth Baumann has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor on the extension staff of the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Walter F. Berns, who did work for the doctorate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of government at

Louisiana State University where he will offer courses in American government, American political theory, and political parties and elections.

George S. Blair, formerly of the University of Tennessee, has been added to the staff of the Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania, with the rank of assistant professor.

Burton Brazil, who recently completed his doctorate at Stanford University, has accepted an appointment to teach public administration at San Jose State College.

MacAlister Brown, formerly of Harvard University, has accepted an appointment in the department of government at Dartmouth College.

Vincent J. Brown resumed his duties as associate professor of government at Howard University in September after two years' leave of absence with the Office of Civilian Defense.

Ralph J. Bunche has accepted a visiting lectureship in the School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell for the current academic year.

Norman Burns will be a visiting lecturer during the second semester in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Edgar B. Cale, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, has been granted a leave of absence in order to take a position with the Foreign Operations Administration as Educational Director for Thailand.

Earl Campbell, professor of public administration at San Jose State College, is on sabbatical leave during 1953-54 and is studying in Europe.

Alford Carleton, president of Aleppo College, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) for the spring term, 1954.

C. W. Cassinelli, who received his doctorate from Harvard in June, has been appointed instructor in political science at Whitman College.

Waldo Chamberlin has been appointed acting chairman of the department of govern-

ment of Washington Square College, New York University, to fill the vacancy created by Professor Ray F. Harvey's assumption of new duties in the University.

Mary Margaret Clarke, lecturer in political science at Bryn Mawr College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science in the Graduate School of Fordham University.

Virginia G. Cook, who received her doctoral degree from Columbia earlier this year, and has had several years of experience with federal agencies, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Ohio State University.

Elmer E. Cornwell is one of the newly appointed instructors in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Dean Cresap has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at San Jose State College.

Harry R. Davis, assistant professor of government at Beloit College, resumed his regular duties in September after a year's leave of absence on a Ford Foundation grant, spent at Columbia University and at Union Theological Seminary.

John A. Davis, formerly on the faculty of Lincoln University, has been appointed associate professor of government at the City College of New York.

Emmett E. Dorsey, acting head of the department of government at Howard University, has been named chairman of the division of the social sciences at that institution.

John T. Dorsey, formerly of the TVA and the University of Alabama, has been appointed instructor of political science at Michigan State College.

Edwin M. Duerbeck has returned to the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, following a two-year tour of duty with the Navy which included one year as consultant to the Bureau of Ordnance on the Controlled Materials Plan and the other on the Staff of the Navy Management Engineer, Office of the Under-Secretary of the Navy.

John Paul Duncan resumed his regular duties in September as associate professor of

government at the University of Oklahoma after spending the preceding year on a Fulbright lectureship at Ibrahim University, Cairo, Egypt.

Clyde Eagleton has resigned as director of the Program of Studies in the United Nations and World Affairs at New York University in order to devote full time to teaching and research.

J. M. Edelman has returned to his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois after a year spent in Austria on a Fulbright fellowship.

Rupert Emerson, of Harvard University, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) for the spring term, 1954.

Wesley R. Fishel, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State College, returned in August after three months in the Far East, where he directed a special project for the Department of the Army.

R. Y. Fluno, associate professor of political science at Whitman College, has been designated chairman of the division of social sciences at that institution, effective September, 1953.

Guy Fox, associate professor of political science at Michigan State College, is the recipient of a Fulbright scholarship and is currently a visiting lecturer at Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan.

Sterling H. Fuller has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Texas Technological College.

Herbert Garfinkel has accepted an appointment in the department of government at Dartmouth College.

Charles E. Gilbert, of Northwestern University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Swarthmore College.

Merrill R. Goodall, recently returned from a two years' stay in India where he was a visiting professor at Delhi University and an adviser to the Prime Minister of Nepal, is now executive director of the India Program at Cornell University.

Henry Goodnow, formerly of Columbia University, has been added temporarily to the staff

of the Institute of Local and State Government at the University of Pennsylvania.

George A. Graham, of Princeton, is visiting professor of public administration at Columbia University during the winter session.

Ernst B. Haas has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at the University of California (Berkeley).

Charles B. Hagan returned in September to his position as professor of political science at the University of Illinois after spending a year as intelligence research officer in the United States Department of State.

Hugh M. Hall, who last year served as research associate and part-time instructor at Duke University, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of political science at that institution.

Charles Hamilton has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the College of the Ozarks.

Judd Harmon, who received the Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin in June, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Utah State Agricultural College.

Ray F. Harvey has been appointed director of the newly established University Office of the Budget of New York University. He will continue as head of the department of government in the Graduate School of Arts and Science, but has resigned as chairman of the department of government at Washington Square College.

Guy B. Hathorn has been appointed instructor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Waring Hopkins returned in September to his regular duties at Berea College after a leave of absence in Germany.

Horace V. Harrison has been appointed visiting assistant professor at Emory University for the academic year 1953-54.

Robert E. Hosack, chairman of political science in the department of social sciences at the University of Idaho, has been promoted to a full professorship.

Marian D. Irish has returned to her regular duties as head of the department of political

science at the Florida State University after a year's leave of absence at Harvard University on a fellowship from The Fund for Advancement of Education.

Norman Jacobson has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at the University of California (Berkeley).

William C. Johnstone, Jr., formerly Director of the Office of Educational Exchange, Department of State, and Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, International Information Administration, until his resignation last May, has been appointed visiting professor of American foreign relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. C., for the academic year 1953-54.

Louis G. Kahle has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Missouri.

Kazuo Kawai, a visiting lecturer for the past two years, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the Ohio State University to give courses in Far Eastern affairs. He spent the past summer in Tokyo.

S. M. Kennedy has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Texas Technological College.

Majid Khadduri is serving as a visiting lecturer in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia during the first semester.

Joseph A. Kitchin, on sabbatical leave from Queens College, New York, is spending the year 1953-54 in Bangkok, Thailand, on a Fulbright grant. He is lecturing in international relations and comparative government at Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities in Bangkok, and doing research in international relations and law in South and Southeast Asia.

Joseph G. LaPalombara, who recently returned from a year of research study in Italy, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Michigan State College.

Frederick H. Lawson, of Brasenose College, Oxford University, was a visiting professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) during the fall term.

Richard H. Leach resigned his position as

assistant professor in the department of social science at the Georgia Institute of Technology and, since June 15, has been serving as staff associate of the Southern Regional Education Board in Atlanta.

Luther J. Lee is on leave of absence from Pomona College during the first semester serving as acting dean of the Claremont Graduate School. During the second semester he will be on sabbatical leave.

Gertrude Leighton, assistant professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, has been awarded a Ford Foundation faculty fellowship for study and research in political science. She is on leave of absence during the current academic year.

George Lenczowski has been reappointed visiting associate professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) for 1953-54.

Albert Lepawsky, formerly of the University of Alabama, has been appointed professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley).

Edward G. Lewis has returned to his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois after a year spent in France on a Fulbright fellowship.

John D. Lewis has been designated chairman of the department of government at Oberlin College for a three-year term.

George A. Lipaky, assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley), is on leave of absence for 1953-54, and has been appointed a Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Leslie Lipson resumed his duties as professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) in September after a semester's leave of absence with UN-TAA in Brazil.

Gerard J. Mangone has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

George Manner, assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois, is on sabbatical leave for the year 1953-54 to engage in research in the field of international law at The Hague.

Robert E. Martin, associate professor of government at Howard University, is on leave during the current academic year to study under a Faculty fellowship from the Ford Foundation.

Donald R. Matthews has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor in the department of government at Smith College.

Conrad L. McBride, doctoral candidate at the University of California (Los Angeles), has been appointed to an instructorship for the current year at Pomona College.

Stuart H. McIntyre, formerly an instructor at Moravian College, joined the staff of the department of government at the University of Oklahoma at the beginning of the fall semester as an instructor.

Theodore McNelly has been appointed instructor of government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

Frank O. Miller, recently released from the Navy after service in the Far East, and now completing his doctoral dissertation at the University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at the Ohio State University.

Robert S. Milne, lecturer at the University of Bristol, England, has been appointed a visiting lecturer at the Ohio State University for the current academic year, to give an introductory course in political science and lectures on comparative government.

A. C. Murdaugh, Rear Admiral, USN (retired), has been appointed a visiting professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Lloyd D. Musolf, assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, taught in the Johns Hopkins University summer session.

F. W. Neuber, formerly instructor in political science at Whitman College, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at Central College, Iowa.

Mark Nuweld, recently of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, has accepted a position as instructor in political science at Western Reserve University and will develop the field of comparative government with special reference to the Soviet Union.

Gerhart Niemeyer has resigned his position in the Department of State to accept a position with the Council of Foreign Relations in New York.

William E. Oden is on leave of absence from Texas Technological College to continue graduate work at the University of Indiana.

Emory E. Olson retired as dean of the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California on September 1, 1953.

William C. Olson has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Pomona College.

Alan Burr Overstreet, associate professor of government at Smith College, has been appointed Director of the Smith College Junior Year for International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, for the year 1953-54.

Gene D. Overstreet, instructor in political science at Michigan State College, is in India studying Indian communism on a Ford Foundation grant.

Kimbrough Owen, who has been on leave for two years while serving as Director of Research of the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, has resumed his duties at Louisiana State University.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, has returned to his regular post after serving for a year as Visiting Fulbright Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of Delhi. In April and May, Professor Palmer participated in a Seminar in American Civilization, held in Darjeeling, India, which was organized by the United States Educational Foundation in India and partially financed by the Ford Foundation. Professor Palmer spent most of the summer in Europe, where he made a special study of the Council of Europe and other organizations of intra-European cooperation and of problems of coordination among various agencies of the United States government in the West European area.

Lawrence L. Pelletier, on leave as director of the Bureau for Municipal Research and as associate professor of government at Bowdoin College, has been appointed associate director of the Citizenship Clearing House, an

affiliate of the New York University Law Center.

Clara Penniman has joined the extension staff of the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Paul J. Piccard is serving as a visiting assistant professor of political science at the Florida State University during 1953-54.

C. Gordon Post, chairman of the department of political science at Vassar College, is studying in England during the present academic year. In his absence, Lloyd D. Musolf is acting as departmental chairman.

Nathaniel Preston, of Princeton University, is serving as a visiting instructor of political science at West Virginia University during 1953-54.

James Prothro has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at the Florida State University.

Rouhollah Ramazani has been appointed instructor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia for the second semester.

Henry Reining, Jr. became dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, on September 1, 1953.

James S. Roberts is serving as a full-time instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina during the current academic year.

Charles L. Robertson is one of the newly appointed instructors in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Edgar S. Robinson has been appointed to an assistant professorship on the faculty of the department of political science and public administration at the American University.

Victor Rosenblum, formerly lecturer in political science and recently with the Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C., has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley).

Robert A. Rupen, holder of a pre-doctoral Social Science Research Council fellowship in Germany during 1952-53, has been appointed lecturer in political science at Bryn Mawr College.

Frank M. Russell, who retired in June, 1953 from the University of California (Berkeley), has been reappointed professor of political science for 1953-54.

Dankwart A. Rustow, assistant professor of politics at Princeton, is on a year's leave in the Near East where he is engaged in a research project on political conditions in Turkey, the Arab countries, and Israel, under the auspices of Princeton's Program in Near Eastern Studies.

Jamal Sa'd is a visiting instructor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia during the first semester.

Robert Scalapino has returned to his position as associate professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley) after a year of travel and study in the Far East.

Joseph A. Schlesinger, formerly of Wesleyan University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at Michigan State College, effective in September, 1953.

Henry J. Schmandt, formerly of the University of Detroit, has joined the department of government at St. Louis University as assistant professor, to expand its offerings in the field of municipal government and administration.

Robert G. Scigliano assumed his new duties as instructor in political science at Michigan State College in September, 1953.

Andrew M. Scott, recently associated with the Mutual Security Agency, has accepted an appointment in the department of government at Dartmouth College.

Paul Seabury, of Columbia University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley).

Kalman H. Silvert resumed his teaching duties in the department of political science at Tulane University after a year's study in Guatemala.

Allan P. Sindler, who recently received his doctoral degree from Harvard University, has been appointed research associate in the department of political science at Duke University.

David G. Smith, of the Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Swarthmore College.

Allan A. Spitz, assistant in the Governmental Research Bureau at Michigan State College, returned in August after three months in the Far East, where he participated in a special project for the Department of the Army.

Sam L. Swagert has been advanced to a full professorship at San Jose State College.

Samuel W. Swenson, who served on the staff of the department of government at the University of Oklahoma for the past thirty-four years, retired in June, 1953.

Carl B. Swisher, professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins University, taught in the 1953 summer session at Claremont and received the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from his alma mater, Pomona College.

Carl F. Taeusch, secretary of the Graduate Curriculum in Public Administration, returned to his duties at St. Louis University in September, after a year at the University of Ankara, Turkey, lecturing under a Fulbright fellowship.

Kurt P. Tauber has been appointed instructor in political science for 1953-54 at the University of Buffalo.

Robert B. Thomson has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at the University of Maine.

Vincent Thursby has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the Florida State University.

Paul D. Tillett has been appointed instructor in politics at Princeton University.

Donald T. Toussaint has been appointed instructor of government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

Joseph O. Van Hook recently succeeded Elizabeth Peck (retired) as chairman of the department of history and political science at Berea College.

Hubertus J. van Mook, former Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, is a visiting professor in the School of Business

and Public Administration at Cornell University during the fall term.

William Vatcher has been advanced to an assistant professorship at San Jose State College.

Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, who is completing his work for the doctorate in the School of Advanced International Studies, has been appointed an instructor in the department of government at Indiana University.

John A. Vieg resumed his duties as chairman of the department of government at Pomona College in September after spending the past year in Norway on a Fulbright appointment.

Dwight Waldo has been promoted to a full professorship at the University of California (Berkeley), and has returned to his duties after a year's leave of absence in Washington and England. During the summer, he participated in the Fulbright program conference on American studies at Oxford University.

David D. Warren, formerly of the Department of State, has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Rhode Island for the year 1953-54.

Roger H. Wells, professor of political science and department chairman, has resumed his work at Bryn Mawr College after two years of service as chief of the Historical Division, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany.

William L. C. Wheaton, formerly chairman of the department of regional planning at Harvard, has resigned that position to accept an appointment as professor of city planning at the University of Pennsylvania.

Francis G. Wilson has been named chairman of the department of political science at the University of Illinois in accordance with the departmental policy of rotating the chairmanship.

Lloyd W. Woodruff has been promoted to an assistant professorship on the extension staff of the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Frank Wray, formerly of the University of Vermont, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor in the department of history and political science at Berea College.

Paul N. Ylvisaker has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at Swarthmore College.

Belle Zeller, professor of political science at

Brooklyn College, was appointed by Governor Dewey, on June 3, 1953, as a member of the State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York.

IN MEMORIAM

John Gilbert Heinberg, professor of political science and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Missouri, died July 5, 1953, at the age of fifty-one. The untimely death of Professor Heinberg occurred after a very brief illness at Lincoln, Nebraska, where he was serving on the summer session faculty of the University of Nebraska.

Professor Heinberg was a native of Jackson, Missouri. He received his A.B. and A.M. degrees from Washington University, St. Louis. It was there that he came under the stimulating instruction of the late Professor Walter J. Shepard and developed his interest in the field of political science. He continued his graduate studies at The Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government, Washington, D. C., receiving his Ph.D. degree in 1927. Except for a year's leave of absence in France during 1929-30 as a fellow of the Social Science Research Council, Professor Heinberg had served continuously as a member of the political science faculty at the University of Missouri since 1928. He became chairman of the department in 1949.

Both as teacher and as research scholar, he maintained a broad range of interests in the political science field. His major courses at the University of Missouri were comparative government, political theory, constitutional law, and the administration of justice. His research on the origins of majority rule explored a question about which there had been much speculation by political scientists but little scholarly inquiry. An article on this subject which he wrote for the *Review* attracted the attention of leading students in the field of theory, not only because of the light it shed

upon a basic concept but also because of the scholarly quality of the presentation. His later and more important work, however, was done in the field of European governments. His *Comparative Major European Governments* was published in 1937. The European government which intrigued him the most was the government of France. He made intensive studies of the personnel of French cabinets and from time to time published the results of his studies on this and other subjects relating to French government and politics. In more recent years, he had also turned his attention to the problem of criminal law enforcement in our American state governments, giving particular consideration to recent centralizing tendencies. With Professor Breckenridge of the University of Nebraska, one of his former students, he was co-author of a monograph entitled *Law Enforcement in Missouri*, published in the University of Missouri Studies in 1942. At the time of his death, Professor Heinberg was in the midst of a comprehensive research project covering the organization and powers of state police and highway patrol systems.

Professor Heinberg was a loyal member of the American Political Science Association, attending its meetings regularly, serving a term on the Council of the Association, and enjoying a wide circle of friends among its membership. His high standards of scholarship, his untiring devotion to his work, his conscientious efforts in behalf of his students and colleagues, his wise counsel, and his unfailingly congenial nature earned for him the abiding esteem and the deepest affection of all those whose good fortune it was to know him.
—MARTIN L. FAUST.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Suggestions Requested by Nominating Committee

The Nominating Committee of The American Political Science Association for 1954 is as follows: Charles B. Robson, chairman, University of North Carolina; Charles B. Hagan, University of Illinois; Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Howard R. Penniman, Department of State; Herman M. Somers, Haverford College; and E. S. Wengert, University of Oregon.

The officers to be elected at the next meeting of the Association are a president-elect, three vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer, and eight members of the Council. It may be noted that in the cases of the newly established offices of secretary and treasurer, the incumbents are eligible to succeed themselves. Members of the Association are invited to send suggestions of persons to be considered for nomination to the chairman of the Nominating Committee. All suggestions should be received by February 1, 1954.

Program for 1954 Annual Meeting

All members of the Association are invited to send suggestions on topics for the 1954 annual meeting program and comments on panel procedure to Stephen K. Bailey, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, chairman of the Program Committee.

Congressional Interns Program

Applications for the Congressional Interns Program, 1954-55, must be submitted to the appropriate chairman of the department of political science or dean of law school prior to February 1, 1954. In the event applicants are no longer enrolled at a college or university, applications should be submitted through the chairman of the political science department or dean of the institution formerly attended.

As in the case of last year's program, the Association is asking the chairman of each department of political science and the dean of each law school to recommend the *one* candi-

date deemed best qualified for this type of assignment. Such recommendations should reach the Association office by February 15, 1954, and the names of the successful applicants will be announced during April, 1954.

The primary purpose of the Congressional Interns Program is to provide stimulating field experience for younger political scientists who would not otherwise be able to spend such a period of time in Washington. Preference will be given to applicants in the age group 25 to 30. The following types of experience and training are suggestive rather than binding: (1) completion of doctorate in political science; or (2) completion of two years of graduate work in political science, plus one year of experience in politics, teaching, or public administration; or (3) undergraduate major in political science and a law degree; or (4) A.B. degree with honor average in political science and practical experience on a newspaper or with radio or television work (applicants accepted only if they are currently active in the field and will be able to obtain leave of absence).

The program will include an introductory period of work in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, followed by four months as a working staff member of a congressional committee, and four months as a working staff member in the office of a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. The program is expected to commence on November 1, 1954 and continue through July, 1955.

Reprints of REVIEW Articles

Beginning with this issue, reprints of articles appearing in the *Review* will no longer be obtainable at the Washington Office. As in the past, authors will be supplied with a substantial number of reprints.

Copies of reprints now on hand, which include nearly all articles published during the past three years, may be obtained for ten cents each, plus postage, from the Washington Office.

COPIES OF PANEL PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE 1953 ANNUAL MEETING

Copies of panel papers delivered at the 1953 annual meeting are available by writing to the Association Office, 1785 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Washington 6, D. C. The following rates apply alike to multiple copies of the same paper, or copies of different papers:

Single copy.....\$.50	25 copies.....\$ 7.50
3 copies..... 1.25	50 copies..... 12.50
5 copies..... 2.00	100 copies..... 20.00
10 copies..... 3.50	

These rates are higher than we would prefer to have them. Most of the papers were mimeographed in quantity just prior to the annual meeting, and as some of them did not come in until Labor Day weekend, the duplication of certain papers at overtime rates was quite expensive. The Association has had many requests for copies, indicating that the practice of mimeographing these papers for resale is favored. The purchase price represents no net profit to the Association, but will help to bring the annual meeting budget closer to balance.

Copies of the following papers are available:

- Birkhead, Guthrie S., "The Political Scientist as Reformer"
- Bollens, John C., "An Inquiry into the Content and Strategy of Reform"
- Bontecou, Eleanor, "President Eisenhower's Personnel Security Policy"
- Brecht, Arnold, "The Latent Place of God in Twentieth Century Political Theory"
- Cook, Howard A., "Keeping the Public Informed on Foreign Policy"
- de Sola Pool, Ithiel, "Oligarchy and Mobility in Political Parties"
- Dworkis, Martin B. "An Evaluation of the United Nations Program of Technical Assistance in Public Administration"
- Edelman, J. Murray, "Labor's Role in Foreign Policy: The Conditions of Influence"
- Einaudi, Mario, "Social Realities and the Study of Political Parties"
- Friedland, Louis L., "The Career System Revisited"
- Friedrich, Carl J., "The Historical Approach to Political Thought: A Re-Evaluation"
- Hall, Jerome, "Unification of Political and Legal Theory"
- Hinderaker, Ivan, "Political Effects of Demographic Change"
- Janowitz and Marvick, "Campaign Pressure and Political Consent in the 1952 Presidential Election"
- Johnson, Eldon L., "The Accountability of the British Nationalized Industries"
- Kampelman, Max M., "The Legislative Bureaucracy: Its Response to Political Change, 1953"
- Lerner, Daniel, "Communication Variables in the International Framework"
- Lukens, Matthias, "The Port Authority of New York: A Case Study of an Interstate Mechanism"
- Malik, Charles (Opening Address), "The Challenge to Political Scientists"
- Pauker, Guy J., "Trends in Asian Nationalism"
- Presthus, R. Vance, "Administration and Community Leadership: A Reappraisal of the Council-Manager Plan"
- Richards, Allen R., "Research and Local Government"
- Sayre, Wallace S., "Report of the Subcommittee on Comparative Public Administration"
- *Scalapino, Robert A., "Neutrality in Asia"
- Seidman, Harold, "The Government Corporation: Its Place in the Federal Structure"
- Sherman, Harvey, "United Nations Technical Assistance in Public Administration"

Shipman, George A., "Agricultural Policies at the Grass Roots—A Commentary upon Charles Hardin's *The Politics of Agriculture*"

Smithburg, Donald W., "Public Administration and the Behavioral Sciences"

*Somers, Herman M., "Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration"

Speier, Hans, "Foreign Policy and International Communication—A Case Study in German Rearmament"

*Spitz, David, "Law, Democracy and the Problem of Civil Disobedience"

Tickner, F. J., "The United States Program of Technical Assistance in Public Administration"

Towster, Julian, "The Soviet Union after Stalin: Leaders and Policies"

Waldo, Dwight, "The Status and Prospects of Administrative Theory"

White, Howard, "The Problem of Loyalty in American Political Thought"

Willbern, York, "Professionalisation in State and Local Government: Too Little or Too Much?"

Wolin, Sheldon, "The British Labor Party and Some Problems of Contemporary Socialism"

* To be published, in revised form, in a forthcoming issue of the Review.



INDEX TO VOLUME XLVII

- Abbas, Mekki. Books of, noticed..... 254
Acton, Lord. Books of, reviewed..... 865
Adams, John Clarke and Barile, Paolo.
The Implementation of the Italian
Constitution..... 61
Adkins, Nelson F. Books of, noticed..... 1205
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Davis, Kenneth
Culp. Reflections of a Law Professor
on Instruction and Research in Pub-
lic Administration..... 728
Book reviews on: Swenson, Rinehart
John. *Federal Administrative Law*... 880
AFRICA. Book notices..... 249, 904
Aiyar, K. Mahadeva. Books of, noticed... 903
Alexandrowicz, C. H. Books of, noted... 910
Books of, noticed..... 1196
Allen, David D. Books of, noticed..... 240
Allen, H. K. Books of, reviewed..... 884
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Constitution..... 1221
Forty-ninth Annual Meeting..... 1215
News and Notes..... 273, 609, 931, 1215
Obituaries..... 290, 291, 621, 946, 1235
Anderson, Jack. Books of, noticed..... 239
Anderson, William. Book reviews..... 862
Anschutz, R. P. Books of, noticed..... 921
Anshen, Ruth Nanda. Books of, noticed... 263
Appadorai, A. Books of, noticed..... 921
ARGENTINA. Book notes..... 1184
ASIA. Book notes..... 244
Book notices..... 913, 1186
AUSTRALIA. Overacker, Louise. Publica-
tions on Australia Useful to the Po-
litical Scientist: A Selective Survey. 844
Book reviews on: Overacker, Louise.
The Australian Party System..... 230
AUSTRIA. Book notices..... 255
Axt, Richard G. Books of, reviewed..... 884

Bailey, Helen Miller. Books of, noticed.. 571
Bailey, Stephen K. Books of, noticed.... 573
Bailey, Sydney D. Books of, noticed.... 1186
Ballantine, Joseph W. Books of, noticed. 589
Ballis, William B. Book notes..... 252
Barber, Hollis W. Books of, noticed..... 913
Bard, Erwin W. Book notes..... 900
Barghoorn, Frederick C. Book notes.... 920
Barile, Paolo and Adams, John Clarke.
The Implementation of the Italian
Constitution..... 61
Barrett, Edward L., Jr. Books of, re-
viewed..... 211
Bartley, Ernest R. Books of, noticed... 570, 573
Bassett, R. Books of, noticed..... 589

Bauer, Elizabeth Kelley. Books of, noted. 237
Bauer, John. Books of, noted..... 252
Baumgardt, David. Books of, noticed... 599
Bean, Louis. Book reviews..... 557
Beaney, W. M. Book notes..... 1176
Behrman, Jack N. Political Factors in
U. S. International Financial Co-
operation, 1945-1950..... 431
Belgian Commission on the Organization
of the Government. Books of, noticed. 903
BELGIUM. Book notices..... 248, 903
Bellar, E. A. Books of, noticed..... 599
Benson, George C. S. Book notes..... 238
Book reviews..... 884
Bentwich, Norman. Books of, noticed... 582
Berelson, Bernard. Books of, noticed.... 894
Berger, Morroe. Books of, noted..... 237
BERLIN. Book notices..... 902
Berman, Harold J. Books of, noticed. 904, 1188
Bernstein, Marver. Books of, noticed... 572
Beukema, Herman, *et al.* Books of, noticed 580
Bhansali, Shri M. D. Books of, noticed.. 247
Bibliographical Society of the Philippines.
Books of, noticed..... 1187
BIBLIOGRAPHY. Burdette, Franklin L.
Articles and Documents on Ameri-
can Government and Politics.....
..... 240, 574, 895, 1178
Miller, Beatrice D. A Selective Sur-
vey of Literature on Tibet..... 1135
Nuquist, Andrew E. Note on Ameri-
can Government Textbooks..... 567
Overacker, Louise. Publications on
Australia Useful to the Political Sci-
entist: A Selective Survey..... 844
Roberts, William H. Articles and
Documents on Foreign and Compar-
ative Government.... 249, 583, 905, 1188
Simon, Herbert A. Articles and Doc-
uments on Methodology and Re-
search in the Social Sciences.....
..... 269, 605, 927, 1210
Steiner, H. Arthur. Articles and Doc-
uments on International Law and
Relations..... 256, 591, 914, 1197
Wilson, Francis G. Articles and Doc-
uments on Political Theory.....
..... 264, 600, 921, 1205
Book notices.....
..... 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 600, 921
Book reviews on: International Political
Science Association and the Interna-
tional Studies Conference. *Interna-
tional Political Science Abstracts*... 563

- Books listed.....271, 607, 929, 1213
 Binkley, Wilfred E. Books of, noticed... 569
 BIOGRAPHY. Book notes.....262, 891
 Book notices..239, 583, 590, 894, 1178, 1186
 Book reviews on: Howe, Mark DeWolfe
 (ed.). *Holmes-Laski Letters*..... 858
 Martin, Kingsley. *Harold Laski (1898-1950)*.....1174
 Bishop, Hillman M. Books of, noticed... 573
 Blanksten, George I. Books of, noted....1184
 Bodenheimer, Edgar. Book reviews..... 879
 Bollens, John C. Books of, noticed..... 567
 Bonn , Alfred. Books of, noticed.....1187
 Bonnefous, Edouard. Books of, noted... 246
 Boorstin, David J. Books of, noticed....1178
 Bosworth, Karl A. The Politics of Management Improvement in the States. 84
 Boyd, George Adams. Books of, noticed. 239
 Brady, Alexander. Nationalism and Democracy in the British Commonwealth: Some General Trends.....1029
 — Books of, noticed..... 246
 Braibanti, Ralph J. D. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics... 666
 Book reviews..... 228
 Brandt, Conrad. Books of, noted..... 243
 BRAZIL. Book notices.....247, 255
 Breckenridge, A. C. Books of, noticed... 573
 Bretton, Henry L. The German Social Democratic Party and the International Situation..... 980
 BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. Brady, Alexander.
 Nationalism and Democracy in the British Commonwealth: Some General Trends.....1029
 Hall, H. Duncan. The British Commonwealth of Nations..... 997
 —, Wheare, K. C. and Brady, Alexander.
 The British Commonwealth: A Symposium..... 997
 Wheare, K. C. The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth....1016
 Book notes..... 909
 Book notices..... 246
 Browder, Robert Paul. Books of, noticed.1197
 Brown, Norman W. Books of, noticed... 913
 Bruce, Harold R. Books of, noticed..... 570
 Bryson, Lyman. Books of, noticed..... 921
 Bundy, McGeorge. Book notes..... 589
 Burdette, Franklin L. Articles and Documents on American Government and Politics.....240, 574, 895, 1178
 BURMA. Book notices..... 904
 Burnham, James. Books of, noted.....1194
 Burns, James MacGregor. Book notes... 236
 — Books of, noticed..... 572
 Butler, D. E. Books of, noticed..... 580
 Cabinet Secretariat (Karachi). Books of, noticed..... 247
 Cady, John F. Book notes.....244, 245
 Caldwell, John C. Books of, noted..... 589
 Caldwell, Lynton K. Technical Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia..... 494
 — Book notes.....1176
 Calkins, Fay. Books of, noticed..... 238
 Calvocoressi, Peter. Books of, noticed...1196
 Camacho, J. A. Books of, noticed..... 255
 Campbell, Angus, Gurin, Gerald and Miller, Warren E. Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952..... 359
 CANADA. Book notices.....1186
 Carlyle, Margaret. Books of, noticed...1196
 Carr, Robert K. Book reviews.....1169
 — Books of, noticed..... 572
 — Books of, reviewed..... 882
 Carter, Edward W. Books of, noticed... 570
 Cartwright, Dorwin. Books of, reviewed. 538
 Cassinelli, C. W. The Law of Oligarchy.. 773
 Castleberry, Donald M. Book notes.... 244
 Catlin, George. Book reviews.....217, 858
 Cavers, David F. The Developing Field of International Legal Studies.....1058
 Cawley, Elizabeth Hoon. Books of, noticed..... 239
 Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Books of, noticed... 567, 901
 Chamberlain, Lawrence H. Books of, reviewed..... 211
 Chang, Carsun. Books of, reviewed.....1164
 Cheever, Daniel S. Books of, reviewed... 223
 Childs, Richard S. Books of, noted..... 566
 CHINA. Book notes..... 243
 Book notices.....246, 904, 1188
 Book reviews on: Chang, Carsun. *The Third Force in China*.....1164
 FitzGerald, Charles Patrick. *Revolution in China*..... 226
 Christensen, A. N. Books of, noticed... 573
 Clagett, Helen L. Books of, noted.....1184
 Cline, Howard F. Books of, noticed....1196
 Coker, Francis W. Some Present-Day Critiques of Liberalism..... 1
 Colbert, Evelyn S. Books of, noted..... 244
 Cole, K. C. Book reviews..... 880
 Cole, Wayne S. Books of, noticed..... 913
 COLOMBIA. Caldwell, Lynton K. Techni-

- cal Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia..... 494
- Commission Appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Books of, noticed.....1195
- Commission on Financing Higher Education. Books of, reviewed..... 883
- Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici* (Rome). Books of, noticed..... 285
- COMMUNISM. Book notes.....243, 597, 920
- Book notices.....239, 255, 599, 1195
- Book reviews on: Korbel, Josef. *Tito's Communism*..... 225
- Possony, Stefan T. *A Century of Conflict*.....1166
- Ulam, Adam B. *Titoism and the Cominform*..... 225
- Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville. Books of, noticed..... 240
- COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT. Adams, John Clarke and Barile, Paolo. The Implementation of the Italian Constitution..... 61
- Brady, Alexander. Nationalism and Democracy in the British Commonwealth: Some General Trends.....1029
- Bretton, Henry L. The German Social Democratic Party and the International Situation..... 980
- Caldwell, Lynton K. Technical Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia..... 494
- Dull, Paul S. The Japanese General Election of 1952..... 199
- Friedrich, Carl J., *et al.* Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics..... 658
- Khadduri, Majid. The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics.... 511
- Lipson, Leslie. The Two-Party System in British Politics..... 337
- Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics. Seminar Report..... 641
- Wright, Gordon. Agrarian Syndicalism in Postwar France..... 402
- Articles and documents....249, 583, 905, 1188
- Book notes.....579, 900, 901, 1183, 1184
- Book notices.....246, 580, 581, 600
-901, 902, 903, 904, 1186, 1187, 1188
- Book reviews on: Chang, Carsun. *The Third Force in China*.....1164
- Einaudi, Mario and Goguel, François. *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*..... 232
- FitzGerald, Charles Patrick. *Revolution in China*..... 226
- Kahin, George McTurnan. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*.... 877
- Overacker, Louise. *The Australian Party System*..... 230
- Robson, William A. (ed.). *Problems of Nationalized Industry*..... 555
- Scalapino, Robert A. *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan*.....1162
- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Fellman, David. Constitutional Law in 1951-1952.. 126
- Pritchett, C. Herman. *Libertarian Motivations on the Vinson Court*.. 321
- Book Notes.....237, 1177
- Book notices.....567, 893
- Book reviews on: Crosskey, William W. *Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States*.....1152
- Cook, Thomas I. Book reviews..... 215
- and Moos, Malcolm. The American Idea of International Interest.. 28
- Cope, J. C. Books of, noticed..... 904
- Corry, J. A. Book reviews.....1171
- Coss, Clay, Books of, noticed..... 240
- Cottrell, Edwin A., *et al.* Books of, reviewed..... 559
- Countryman, Vern. Books of, reviewed.. 211
- Critchley, T. A. Books of, noted..... 579
- Cross, Harold L. Books of, noted.....1176
- Crosskey, William W. Books of, reviewed..1152
- Crossman, R. H. S. Books of, reviewed.. 217
- CUBA. Book notices..... 582
- Davey, Harold W. The Legislative Council Movement, 1933-1953..... 785
- David, Paul T. Purposes, Procedures, and Outcomes of the Cooperative Research Project on Conventional Delegations.....1116
- Davies, Wallace E. Books of, noticed.... 894
- Davis, Kenneth Culp. Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research in Public Administration. 728
- Deane, Herbert A. Books reviews.....1174
- Dearing, Mary R. Books of, noted..... 891
- Degras, Jane. Books of, noted..... 252
- De Grazia, Sebastian. Books of, noticed. 600
- De Huszar, George B. Books of, noticed. 893
- DENMARK. Book notices..... 248
- Department of State. Books of, noticed.. 590, 1196, 1197

- Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público* (Rio de Janeiro). Books of, noticed..... 247
- Diamant, Alfred. Book notes..... 1183
- Diebold, William, Jr. Books of; noted.... 588
- Dimock, Gladys O. Books of, noticed.... 571
- Dimock, Marshall E. Book reviews..... 555
- Books of, noticed..... 571, 894
- Direction de la Documentation* (Paris). Books of, noticed..... 902
- Director of Public Relations, Bihar. Books of, noticed..... 247
- Dixon, Robert G. Books of, noticed.... 573
- Dobby, E. H. G. Books of, noted..... 244
- Dodds, Harold W. Books of, reviewed.... 884
- Dodge, Guy Howard. Book notes..... 262
- Donnison, F. S. V. Books of, noticed.... 904
- Douglas, David C. Books of, noted.... 1185
- Douglas, Paul H. Books of, reviewed.... 548
- Driver, C. H. Book reviews..... 865
- DuBois, Josiah E. Books of, noticed.... 255
- Dull, Paul S. The Japanese General Election of 1952..... 199
- Durisch, Lawrence L. Book notes..... 565
- Duteil, H. J. Books of, noticed..... 894
- Dvorin, Eugene P. Books of, noticed.... 247
- Earle, Valerie A. Book notes..... 235
- East Africa High Commission. Books of, noticed..... 249
- Easton, David. Books of, reviewed..... 862
- Ebenstein, William. Books of, noticed.... 263
- ECONOMICS. Staats, Elmer B. The Government Sector of the American Economy..... 178
- ECUADOR. Book notices..... 247, 591, 599
- Egger, Rowland. Nature Over Art: No More Local Finance..... 461
- Book reviews..... 563
- EGYPT. Book notices..... 913
- Einaudi, Mario. Books of, reviewed.... 232
- ELECTION ANALYSES. Campbell, Angus, Gurin, Gerald and Miller, Warren E. Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952..... 359
- Hastings, Philip K. The Independent Voter in 1952: A Study of Pittsfield, Massachusetts..... 805
- La Palombara, Joseph G. The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation..... 676
- Scammon, Richard M. British By-Elections, 1952..... 533
- Book notes..... 565
- Book notices..... 580, 581, 903, 1186
- Book reviews on: Moos, Malcolm. Politics, Presidents, and Coattails..... 557
- Elliott, William Yandell. Books of, reviewed..... 870
- Emerson, Thomas I. Books of, noticed.. 893
- Engelbert, Ernest A. Book reviews.... 221
- Ernst, Morris L. Books of, noticed..... 239
- ESTONIA. Book notices..... 249
- ETHIOPIA. Book notices..... 249
- EUROPE. Holcombe, Arthur N. An American View of European Union..... 417
- The College of Europe..... 613
- Book notes..... 246
- Ewing, Cortez A. M. Books of, noted.... 565
- Fainsod, Merle. Book reviews..... 553
- Fairbank, John K. Books of, noted.... 243
- Fairman, Charles. Book notes..... 236
- Farrelly, David G. Book notes..... 1177
- Fasnacht, G. E. Books of, reviewed.... 865
- FEDERALISM
- Book notes..... 1176
- Federation of Malaya. Book notices.... 582
- Fellers, Bonner. Books of, noticed..... 914
- Fellman, David. Constitutional Law in 1951-1952..... 126
- Book notes..... 237
- Books of, noticed..... 573
- Fels, Rendigs. Book notes..... 586
- Ferguson, John H. Books of, noticed.. 569, 570
- Field, G. Lowell. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics... 669
- Book reviews..... 232
- Fifield, Russell H. Books of, noted.... 588
- Finer, Herman. Books of, noted..... 238
- Finer, S. E. Books of, noticed..... 1186
- Finkelstein, Louis. Books of, noticed.... 921
- FINLAND. Book notices..... 249
- Fischer, George. Books of, noted..... 246
- Fisher, Marguerite J. Books of, noted.. 597
- FitzGerald, Charles Patrick. Book reviews..... 1164
- Books of, reviewed..... 226
- Fleming, E. McClung. Books of, noticed. 239
- FORMOSA. Book notices..... 589
- FRANCE. Wright, Gordon. Agrarian Syndicalism in Postwar France..... 402
- Book notes..... 579, 1183
- Book notices..... 581, 902, 903
- Book reviews on: Einaudi, Mario and Goguel, François. Christian Democracy in Italy and France..... 232
- Friedrich, Carl J. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer

- Seminar on Comparative Politics.. 658
 — Book reviews..... 538
 Frischknecht, Reed L. The Democratiza-
 tion of Administration: The Farmer
 Committee System..... 704
 Frost, Lesley. Books of, noted..... 589
 Gale, Esson M. Books of, noticed..... 1188
 Gandilhon, René. Books of, noticed..... 1187
 Gay, Peter. Books of, noted..... 920
 Gee, Wilson. Books of, reviewed..... 538
 Gelber, Leonard. Books of, noticed..... 894
 Gellhorn, Walter. Books of, reviewed.... 211
 GERMANY. Bretton, Henry L. The Ger-
 man Social Democratic Party and the
 International Situation..... 980
 Book notices.....
 248, 255, 581, 589, 590, 901, 902, 1187
 Gewirth, Alan. Books of, reviewed..... 215
 Glaser, Kurt. Book notes..... 253
 Goguel, François. Books of, noted..... 579
 — Books of, reviewed..... 232
 GOLD COAST. Book notices..... 904
 Goldwin, Robert A. Books of, noticed... 255
 Gordon, Strathearn. Books of, noticed...
 904, 1186
 Gosnell, Harold F. Books of, noted..... 891
 Graham, George A. Books of, reviewed.. 548
 GREAT BRITAIN. Lipson, Leslie. The Two-
 Party System in British Politics... 337
 Seammon, Richard M. British By-
 Elections, 1952..... 533
 Book notes..... 579, 900
 Book notices..... 246, 580, 581, 904
 GREECE. Book notices..... 1187
 Greenaway, George W. Books of, noted. 1185
 Greene, Fred. Neutralization and the
 Balance of Power..... 1041
 Guggenheim, Paul. Books of, noticed... 912
 Gurian, Waldemar. Books of, noted... 920, 1194
 Gurin, Gerald, Miller, Warren E. and
 Campbell, Angus. Political Issues and
 the Vote: November, 1952..... 359
 Gurland, A. R. L. Books of, noticed..... 599
 Gyorgy, Andrew. Book reviews..... 225
 Habe, Hans. Books of, noticed..... 589
 Haber, David. Books of, noticed..... 893
 Hacker, Louis M. Books of, reviewed.... 884
 Hale, Robert L. Books of, noted..... 1177
 Hall, H. Duncan. The British Common-
 wealth of Nations..... 997
 Hamburger, Max. Books of, reviewed.... 546
 Hammaraskjold, Dag. The United Nations
 and the Political Scientist..... 975
 Hardin, Charles M. Books of, reviewed.. 221
 Hardy, D. DeWitt. Books of, reviewed.. 884
 Harrison, Horace V. Book notes..... 911
 Harter, D. Lincoln. Book notes..... 1194
 Hastings, Philip K. The Independent
 Voter in 1952: A Study of Pittsfield,
 Massachusetts..... 805
 Haviland, H. Field, Jr. Books of, reviewed
 223
 Hawkins, Conrad H. Books of, noticed.. 571
 Haynes, William Warren. Books of, noted 900
 Heindel, Richard H. UNESCO's Invita-
 tion to Its Member States Regarding
 the Social Sciences..... 614
 Hendel, Samuel. Books of, noticed..... 573
 Herring, Pendleton. On the Study of Gov-
 ernment..... 961
 HIGHER EDUCATION. Book reviews on: *Nature and Needs of Higher Education: The Report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education* and sup-
 porting monographs..... 883
 Hill, Chesney. Book notes..... 252
 Himmelfarb, Gertrude. Books of, re-
 viewed..... 865
 Hinshaw, David. Books of, noticed..... 249
 HISTORY. Book notes... 236, 261, 567, 891, 1158
 Book notices.....
 239, 246, 893, 894, 1178, 1185, 1187.
 Book reviews on: Webb, Walter Pres-
 cott. *The Great Frontier*..... 871
 Hofmeyr, Jan H. Books of, noticed..... 904
 Hofstadter, Richard. Books of, reviewed. 884
 Holcombe, Arthur N. An American View
 of European Union..... 417
 — The College of Europe..... 613
 Hollinshead, Byron S. Books of, reviewed 884
 Horkheimer, Max. Books of, noticed.... 600
 Horn, Robert A. Book reviews..... 882
 Hoskins, Halford L. Some Aspects of the
 Security Problem in the Middle East. 188
 Howe, Mark DeWolfe. Books of, reviewed 858
 Howse, Ernest Marshall. Books of, noted. 1202
 Hoxie, R. Gordon. Books of, noticed.... 567
 Hsu, Francis L. K. Books of, noticed... 1196
 Humphrey, Richard. Books of, reviewed. 543
 Hurst, Willard. Book reviews..... 220
 INDIA. Book notes..... 588, 910, 911
 Book notices..... 247, 591, 903, 1186
 INDONESIA. Book reviews on: Kahin,
 George McTurnan. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*..... 877
Institut für Staatslehre und Politik, e.v.,
Mainz. Books of, noticed..... 248
 Intergovernmental Relations. Book notes 235
 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORGAN-
 IZATION.

- Behrman, Jack N. Political Factors in U. S. International Financial Cooperation, 1945-1950..... 431
- Hall, H. Duncan. The British Commonwealth of Nations..... 997
- Holcombe, Arthur N. An American View of European Union..... 417
- Wheare, K. C. The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth..... 1016
- Book notes..... 246, 586, 909
- Book notices..... 254, 255, 590, 913, 1196
- Book reviews on: Northrop, F. S. C. *The Taming of the Nations*..... 1158
- Sharp, Walter R. *International Technical Assistance*..... 233
- INTERNATIONAL LAW. Cavers, David F. The Developing Field of International Legal Studies..... 1058
- Articles and documents..... 256, 591, 914, 1197
- Book notices..... 253, 912
- International Political Science Association. Books of, reviewed..... 563
- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Greene, Fred. Neutralization and the Balance of Power..... 1041
- Hoskins, Halford L. Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East..... 188
- Thompson, Kenneth W. Collective Security Reexamined..... 753
- Articles and documents..... 256, 591, 914, 1197
- Book notes..... 253, 585, 587, 588, 909, 910, 911, 1193, 1194
- Book notices..... 589, 912, 913, 1195, 1196, 1197
- Book reviews on: Northrop, F. S. C. *The Taming of the Nations*..... 1158
- Strauss-Hupé, Robert. *The Zone of Indifference*..... 874
- Toynbee, Arnold. *The World and the West*..... 1158
- International Studies Conference. Books of, reviewed..... 563
- International Studies Group, Brookings Institution. Books of, noticed..... 254
- ISRAEL. Book notices..... 249, 582, 1186
- ITALY. Adams, John Clarke and Barile, Paolo. The Implementation of the Italian Constitution..... 61
- La Palombara, Joseph G. The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation..... 676
- Book notices..... 255, 1187
- Book reviews on: Einaudi, Mario and Goguel, François. *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*..... 232
- Izzeddin, Nejla. Books of, noticed..... 1187
- Jackson, Elmore. Books of, noticed..... 253
- Jacob, Philip E. Books of, reviewed..... 1169
- Jaffa, Harry V. Book reviews..... 546
- JAMMU AND KASHMIR. Book notices..... 581
- Janeway, Eliot. Books of, noted..... 893
- Janowitz, Morris. Books of, noticed..... 894
- JAPAN. Dull, Paul S. The Japanese General Election of 1952..... 199
- Book notes..... 244
- Book reviews on: Scalapino, Robert A. *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan*..... 1162
- Johnson, Claudius O. Books of, noticed..... 569, 570, 571
- Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Books of, reviewed..... 549
- Jones, S. W. Books of, noticed..... 904
- Jones, Victor. Books of, noticed..... 573
- Jordan, E. Books of, noticed..... 263
- Kahin, George McTurnan. Books of, reviewed..... 877
- Kahle, Louis G. Book notes..... 1184
- Kalijarvi, Thorsten V. Books of, noticed..... 1196
- Kallenbach, Joseph E. Book notes..... 1177
- Karunakaran, K. P. Books of, noted..... 911
- Kaufmann, Walter H. Books of, noticed..... 901
- Kavanaugh, John. Books of, noticed..... 600
- Keith-Lucas, Alan. The Political Theory Implicit in Social Casework Theory..... 1076
- Kelsen, Hans. Books of, noticed..... 253
- Key, V. O., Jr. Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio..... 525
- Books of, noticed..... 239
- Khadduri, Majid. The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics..... 511
- Kieffer, John E. Books of, noticed..... 914
- Kipnis, Ira. Books of, noticed..... 239
- Kirk, Russell. Books of, reviewed..... 868
- Kirkpatrick, Evron M. Books of, noticed..... 573
- Knappen, Marshall. Book notes..... 909
- Kneier, Charles M. Book reviews..... 559
- Knowles, K. G. J. C. Books of, noticed..... 581
- Kohn, Hans. Books of, noted..... 1193
- Kolars, Walter. Books of, noticed..... 582
- Konstantinovskiy, Boris A. Books of, noticed..... 1188
- Korbel, Josef. Books of, reviewed..... 225
- KORNA. Book notes..... 589
- Book notices..... 254, 582
- Kruse, Fr. Vinding. Books of, reviewed..... 879

- LABOR. Book notices.....581, 590
 Laidler, Harry W. Book notes.....1202
 Lancaster, Lane W. Books of, noticed.... 573
 Lane, Robert E. Books of, noticed..... 574
 La Palombara, Joseph G. The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation..... 676
 Larrabee, Harold A. Books of, noticed... 263
 Lasswell, Harold D. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics..... 661
 Latham, Earl. Books of, noted..... 236
 LATIN AMERICA. Book notes.....1184
 Latourette, Kenneth Scott. Books of, reviewed..... 228
 LATVIA. Book notices..... 249
 Laves, Walter H. C. Increasing the Number of Americans Potentially Available for Foreign Assignments..... 798
 Lazare, Eugene L. Books of, noticed.... 571
 Leach, Jack Franklin. Books of, noted... 236
 Leavelle, Arnaud B. Book reviews..... 543
 Lecler, Joseph. Books of, noticed..... 263
 Lee, M. DuP., Jr. Books of, noticed..... 599
 LEGAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS. Book notices..... 567
 Book reviews on: Hamburger, Max. *Morals and Law*..... 546
 Kruse, Fr. Vinding. *The Community of the Future*..... 879
 Seagle, William. *Law*..... 220
 LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. Davey, Harold W. The Legislative Council Movement; 1933-1953..... 785
 Book notes..... 236
 Book reviews on: Barrett, Edward L., Jr. *The Tenney Committee*..... 211
 Carr, Robert K. *The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950*..... 882
 Chamberlain, Lawrence H. *Loyalty and Legislative Action*..... 211
 Countryman, Vern. *Un-American Activities in the State of Washington*... 211
 Gellhorn, Walter (ed.). *The States and Subversion*..... 211
 Leich, Harold H. The Hoover Commission's Personnel Recommendations—A Progress Report..... 100
 Leiserson, Avery. Notes on the Theory of Political Opinion Formation..... 171
 Leites, Nathan. Book reviews.....1166
 Lengyel, Emil. Books of, noticed..... 590
 Leonard, Larry L. Books of, noticed.... 912
 Levi, Werner. Books of, noted..... 588
 Levy, Marion J., Jr., Books of, noticed.. 263
 Lewin, Kurt. Books of, reviewed..... 538
 Lewis, A. R. Book notes.....1185
 Lewis, Edward G. Books of, noticed.... 573
 Li, Tien-yi. Books of, noted..... 588
 LIBYA. Book notices..... 903
 Lilienthal, David E. Books of, noticed.. 893
 Lipson, Leslie. The Two-Party System in British Politics..... 337
 Book notes..... 909
 LITHUANIA. Book notices..... 249
 Littlefield, Arthur W. Books of, noticed. 893
 Littlefield, Henry W. Books of, noticed.. 893
 London Institute of World Affairs. Books of, noticed..... 912
 Loth, David. Books of, noticed..... 239
 Loewenberg, Gerhard. Book notes.....1203
 Lynskey, Elizabeth M. Books of, noted..1195
 Maase, Arthur. Book reviews..... 206
 Macbride, Roger Lea. Books of, noticed. 894
 McCamy, James L. Book reviews..... 870
 McCloskey, Robert G. Book reviews....1152
 McCoy, Philbrick. Books of, noticed.... 567
 MacDonald, Christine. Books of, noticed.1186
 Macdonald, H. Malcolm. Books of, noticed..... 573
 McHenry, Dean E. Books of, noticed.... 569, 570
 MacIver, R. M. Books of, noticed..... 921
 McKeon, Richard. Books of, noticed.... 921
 Mah, N. Wing. Book notes..... 588
 MALAYA. Book notes..... 245
 Book notices..... 904
 Manning, Clarence A. Books of, noticed. 249
 Manning, Thomas G. Books of, noticed. 894
 Mansergh, Nicholas. Books of, noted... 909
 Mansfield, Harvey C. Book notes..... 893
 Marcy, Carl. A Note on Treaty Ratification.....1130
 Marjolin, Robert. Books of, noticed.... 913
 Mark, Irving. Books of, noticed..... 893
 Markham, F. M. H. Books of, noticed.. 599
 Marquard, Leo. Books of, noticed..... 581
 Marraro, Howard R. Books of, noticed.. 913
 Martin, Andrew. Books of, noted..... 585
 Martin, Kingsley. Books of, reviewed...1174
 Martin, Michael. Books of, noticed.... 894
 Marx, Daniel, Jr. Books of, noted..... 909
 Maximoff, G. P. Books of, noticed.....1204
 May, Ronald W. Books of, noticed..... 239
 Mayer, J. P. Books of, noticed.....1204
 Meisel, James H. Books of, reviewed.... 543
 Merrill, Horace Samuel. Books of, noticed..... 894

- METHODOLOGY.** Friedrich, Carl J., *et al.* Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics..... 658
Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics. Seminar Report..... 641
Articles and documents... 269, 605, 927, 1210
Book reviews on: Gee, Wilson. *Social Science Research Methods*..... 538
Lewin, Kurt and Cartwright, Dorwin. *Field Theory in Social Science*... 538
UNESCO. *Contemporary Political Science*..... 538
Micaud, Charles. Book notes..... 579
- MIDDLE EAST.** Hoskins, Halford L. Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East..... 188
Khadduri, Majid. The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics... 511
Book notices..... 254, 590, 1187
Miksche, F. O. Books of, noted..... 253
Miller, Beatrice D. A Selective Survey of Literature on Tibet..... 1135
Miller, Warren E. Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-1951..... 45
—, Campbell, Angus and Gurin, Gerald. Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952..... 359
Millett, John D. Books of, reviewed.... 884
Ministère de L'Intérieur (Paris). Books of, noticed..... 903
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Caracas). Books of, noticed..... 255
Monck, Bosworth. Books of, noted.... 579
Money-Kryle, R. E. Books of, reviewed. 561
Moos, Malcolm C. Books of, noticed... 569
— Books of, reviewed..... 557
— and Cook, Thomas I. The American Idea of International Interest... 28
Moraes, Frank. Books of, noticed..... 904
Morrison, Donald H. Books of, noticed.. 572
Morse, Jarvis M. Books of, noticed..... 239
Muhlen, Norbert. Books of, noticed.... 590
- MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.** Book notes... 566
Book notices..... 240, 1178
Book reviews on: Cottrell, Edwin A., *et al.* *Metropolitan Los Angeles*.... 559
Myer, Walter E. Book of, noticed..... 240
- National Municipal League. Books of, noticed..... 1178
- NATURAL RESOURCES.** Ostrom, Vincent. State Administration of Natural resources in the West.....
Book notes.....
Book notices.....
Book reviews on: Hardin, Charl *The Politics of Agriculture*.....
President's Materials Policy Commission. *Resources for Freedom*...
Nelson, Eastin. Book notes.....
News and Notes..... 273, 609
- NIGERIA.** Book notices.....
Nisbet, Robert A. Books of, noted.
Nixon, Herman C. Books of, notice
North, Robert C. Books of, noticed
Northrop, F. S. C. Books of, review
- Office of the U. S. High Commissioner Austria. Books of, noticed.....
Ogg, Frederic A. Books of, noticed. 569
Oliver, Robert T. Books of, noticed
Orlans, Harold. Books of, noticed..
Ostheimer, Richard H. Books of, rev
Ostrom, Vincent. State Administration of Natural Resources in the West
Overacker, Louise. Publications on Australia Useful to the Political Scientist: A Selective Survey.....
— Books of, reviewed.....
Owings, Donnell MacClure. Books of, noticed.....
- Padover, Saul K. Books of, noticed
- PAKISTAN.** Book notes.....
Palmer, Norman D. Book notes...
— Books of, noticed.....
Park, Richard L. Book notes.....
Parks, Robert W. Books of, noted.
Parks, Wallace. Book reviews.....
Peardon, Thomas P. Books of, notice
Peel, Roy V. Book notes.....
Peltason, Jack W. Book notes....
Books of, noticed.....
Penrose, E. F. Books of, noticed...
Perkins, Howard C. Books of, notice
- PHILIPPINES.** Book notices.....
Phillips, Orie L. Books of, noticed..
Pickles, Dorothy. Books of, noted..
Plischke, Elmer. Books of, noticed.
Policy Reports Secretary, Office of Executive Secretary (Berlin). Book noticed.....
- POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.** Book notices
- POLITICAL PARTIES.** Key, V. O., Jr. Township and County Office: Case of Ohio.....

- Book notices.....238, 239, 1178
- POLITICAL SCIENCE. Hammarskjöld, Dag.
The United Nations and the Political Scientist..... 975
Herring, Pendleton. On the Study of Government..... 961
Book reviews on: Easton, David. *The Political System*..... 862
- POLITICAL THEORY. Cassinelli, C. W. The Law of Oligarchy..... 773
Coker, Francis W. Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism..... 1
Keith-Lucas, Alan. The Political Theory Implicit in Social Casework Theory.....1076
Stourzh, Gerald. Reason and Power in Benjamin Franklin's Political Thought.....1092
Articles and documents..264, 600, 921, 1205
Book notes.....598, 1202, 1203
Book notices.....263, 567, 599, 894, 921, 1204, 1205
Book reviews on: Acton, Lord. *Essays on Church and State*..... 865
Fasnacht, G. E. *Acton's Political Philosophy*..... 865
Gewirth, Alan. *Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of Peace: Volume I, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy*..... 215
Himmelfarb, Gertrude. *Lord Acton*. 865
Humphrey, Richard. *George Sorel, Prophet Without Honor*..... 543
Kirk, Russell. *The Conservative Mind* 868
Meisel, James H. *The Genesis of Georges Sorel*..... 543
Ross, Alf. *Why Democracy?*.....1171
Voegelin, Eric. *The New Science of Politics*..... 542
- PORTUGAL. Book notices..... 582
Possony, Stefan T. Books of, reviewed..1166
Poston, Richard Waverly. Books of, noticed..... 600
Potter, David M. Book reviews..... 871
— Book of, noticed..... 894
Prendergast, William B. Notes on Military Voting in 1952..... 282
President's Materials Policy Commission.
Books of, reviewed..... 206
- PRESS. Book notes.....1176
Price, Don K. Book reviews..... 223
Pritchett, C. Herman. Libertarian Motivations on the Vinson Court..... 321
- PSYCHOLOGY. Book notices..... 600
Book reviews on: Money-Kyrle, R. E. *Psychoanalysis and Politics*..... 561
- PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Bosworth, Karl
A. The Politics of Management Improvement in the States..... 84
Frischknecht, Reed L. The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System..... 704
Leich, Harold H. The Hoover Commission's Personnel Recommendations—A Progress Report..... 100
Book notes..... 238
Book notices.....238, 893, 894, 904
Book reviews on: Redford, Emmette. *Administration of National Economic Control*..... 553
- PUBLIC FINANCE. Egger, Rowland. Nature Over Art: No More Local Finance..... 461
Book reviews on: Joint Committee on the Economic Report. *Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt*..... 549
- PUBLIC OPINION. Leiserson, Avery. Notes on the Theory of Political Opinion Formation..... 171
Book notices.....240, 894
- PUBLIC REGULATION. Book notes.....1177
Book notices.....239, 240, 894, 895
Book reviews on: Redford, Emmette. *Administration of National Economic Control*..... 553
- Rajhumar, N. V. Books of, noticed..... 247
Raup, Ruth. Books of, noted..... 235
Ray, P. Orman. Books of, noticed...569, 570
Redford, Emmette S. (ed.). Book Reviews, Notes, and Bibliography..... 205, 537, 843, 1134
Books of, reviewed..... 553
Reeve, W. D. Books of, noted..... 245
Reich, Jerome R. Books of, noticed.....1178
Reinhardt, Guenther. Books of, noticed. 255
Reischauer, Edwin O. Books of, noticed.1196
- RESEARCH. Cavers, David F. The Developing Field of International Legal Studies.....1058
David, Paul T. Purposes, Procedures, and Outcomes of the Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations.....1116
Davis, Kenneth Culp. Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research in Public Administration. 728
Friedrich, Carl J., et al. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative

- Politics..... 658
 Rourke, Francis E. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science..... 811
 Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics. Seminar Report..... 641
 Articles and documents... 269, 605, 927, 1210
 Reshetar, John S., Jr. Book notes..... 1193
 Riemer, Neal. Books of, noticed..... 574
 Rienow, Robert. Books of, noticed..... 600
 Roach, James R. Book reviews..... 230
 Roberts, William H. Articles and Documents on Foreign and Comparative Government..... 249, 583, 905, 1188
 Robson, William A. Books of, reviewed.. 555
 Rockwell, Landon G. Book reviews..... 211
 Rodde, Carlton C. Book reviews..... 561
 Rogers, Edward. Books of, noticed..... 599
 Rogers, Lindsay. Books of, reviewed... 884
 Rohlfing, Charles C. Books of, noticed.. 570
 Roosevelt, Nicholas. Books of, noticed.. 1178
 Ross, Alf. Books of, reviewed..... 1171
 Rossiter, Clinton. Book reviews..... 868
 Rossman, Kenneth R. Books of, noticed. 239
 Rourke, Francis E. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science..... 811
 — Books of, noted..... 235
 Runes, Dagobert D. Books of, noticed.. 904
 RUSSIA. Book notes..... 246, 252, 1194
 Book notices..... 582, 904, 1188

 SAAR. Book notices..... 902
 Sachs, E. S. Books of, noticed..... 581
 Salvadori, Massimo. Book notes..... 597
 Sansom, George B. Book reviews..... 1158
 Sayre, Wallace S. Book reviews..... 548
 — Books of, noticed..... 238
 Scalapino, Robert A. Books of, reviewed. 1162
 Scammon, Richard M. British By-Elections, 1952..... 533
 Schattschneider, E. E. Books of, noticed. 573
 Schechtman, Joseph B. Books of, noticed 254
 Schonfield, Hugh J. Books of, noticed... 913
 Schuck, Victoria. Book notes..... 891
 Schuman, Frederick L. Books of, noted.. 587
 — Books of, noticed..... 912
 Schwaab, Eugene L. Books of, noticed.. 893
 Schwartz, Benjamin. Books of, noted... 243
 Schwartz, Louis B. Books of, noticed.... 895
 Seagle, William. Books of, reviewed..... 220
 Selznick, Philip. Book notes..... 1195
 Sen, Ajit Kumar. Books of, noticed..... 263
 Sensabaugh, George F. Books of, noted.. 262
 Sharp, Walter R. Books of, reviewed.... 233
 Shields, Currin V. Book notes..... 598

 SIAM. Book notes..... 245
 Sibley, Mulford Q. Books of, reviewed... 1169
 Simon, Herbert A. Articles and Documents on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences.. 269, 605, 927, 1210
 — Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Councils Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics..... 664
 Smith, Lacey Baldwin. Books of, noticed. 1185
 Smith, O. Edmund, Jr. Books of, noted.. 911
 Smith, T. E. Books of, noted..... 245
 Smuckler, Ralph H. The Region of Isolationism..... 386
 SOUTH AFRICA. Book notices..... 581
 Snyder, Harold E. Books of, noticed... 913
 Snyder, Richard C. Books of, noticed... 572
 Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics. Seminar Report.. 641
 SOCIALISM. Book notes..... 920
 Book notices..... 239
 Book reviews on: Crossman, R. H. S. (ed.). *New Fabian Essays*..... 217
 Robson, William A. (ed.). *Problems of Nationalized Industry*..... 555
 Society of Friends. Book notices..... 600
 SOCIOLOGY. Book notices.... 590, 591, 599, 894
 Somary, Felix. Books of, noticed..... 246
 SOUTH AFRICA. Book notices..... 247, 904
 Spear, Percival. Books of, noticed..... 591
 Spencer, Floyd A. Books of, noticed..... 1187
 Spicer, Edward H. Books of, noticed.... 599
Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik (Berlin). Books of, noticed..... 902
 Staats, Elmer B. The Government Sector of the American Economy..... 178
 Stamp, L. Dudley. Books of, noticed.... 904
 Stanka, Rudolf. Books of, noticed..... 1204
 Stark, W. Books of, noticed..... 1178
 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Bosworth, Karl A. The Politics of Management Improvement in the States 84
 Davey, Harold W. The Legislative Council Movement, 1933-1953..... 785
 Egger, Rowland. Nature Over Art: No More Local Finance..... 461
 Ostrom, Vincent. State Administration of Natural Resources in the West 478
 Book notices..... 567
 Book reviews on: Barrett, Edward L., Jr. *The Tenny Committee*..... 211
 Chamberlain, Lawrence H. *Loyalty and Legislative Action*..... 211
 Countryman, Vern. *Un-American Activities in the State of Washington*. 211

- Gellhorn, Walter (ed.). *The States and Subversion*..... 211
- State Archives and Library (Jerusalem).
Books of, noticed..... 249
- Staveland, Ronald. Books of, noticed..... 921
- Stebbins, Richard P. Books of, noticed.. 254
- Steiner, George A. Books of, noticed.... 895
- Steiner, H. Arthur. Articles and Documents on International Law and Relations.....256, 591, 914, 1197
- Book notes.....243, 585
- Stokes, William S. Book notes.....1184
- Stourzh, Gerald. Reason and Power in Benjamin Franklin's Political Thought1092
- Stout, Hiram Miller. Book notes..... 579
- Books of, noticed..... 580
- Strauss, William L. Books of, noticed... 573
- Strausz-Hupé, Robert. Books of, reviewed..... 874
- Strong, Donald S. Book notes..... 565
- Study Group, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Books of, noticed.. 254
- Sturm, Albert Lee (ed.). News and Notes273, 609, 931, 1215
- Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Books of, reviewed..... 548
- SUDAN. Book notices..... 254
- Summers, Festus P. Books of, noticed... 894
- Svanidze, Budu. Books of, noticed..... 583
- Swarthout, John W. Books of, noticed 570, 573
- Swenson, Rinehart John. Books of, reviewed..... 880
- Swisher, Carl B. Books of, noticed..... 572
- Sydnor, Charles S. Books of, noted..... 567
- Talbot, David Abner. Books of, noticed. 249
- TEACHING. Cavers, David F. The Developing Field of International Legal Studies.....1058
- Davis, Kenneth Culp. Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research in Public Administration.. 728
- Laves, Walter H. C. Increasing the Number of Americans Potentially Available for Foreign Assignments.. 798
- Tetens, T. H. Books of, noticed..... 913
- Thayer, Philip W. Books of, noticed.... 913
- Thomas, Morgan. Book Reviews..... 549
- Thompson, Kenneth W. Collective Security Reexamined..... 753
- Book notes.....1194
- Thurber, Clarence E. Books of, noticed.. 238
- Thursby, Vincent V. Books of, noted....1176
- TIBET. Miller, Beatrice D. A Selective Survey of Literature on Tibet.....1135
- Tickner, F. J. Books of, noted..... 579
- Toynbee, Arnold. Books of, reviewed....1158
- Tunaya, Tarik Z. Books of, noted..... 901
- TURKEY. Book notes..... 901
- Ulam, Adam B. Books of, reviewed..... 225
- UNESCO. Heindel, Richard H. UNESCO's Invitation to Its Member States Regarding the Social Sciences..... 614
- Books of, reviewed..... 538
- UNITED NATIONS. Hammarskjöld, Dag. The United Nations and the Political Scientist..... 975
- Book notes..... 252
- Book notices.....253, 254
- UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. Behrman, Jack N. Political Factors in U. S. International Financial Cooperation, 1945-1950..... 431
- Cook, Thomas I. and Moos, Malcolm. The American Idea of International Interest..... 28
- Book notes.....588, 911, 1194
- Book notices.....
-254, 255, 589, 590, 912, 913, 914, 1196
- Book reviews on: Cheever, Daniel S. and Haviland, H. Field, Jr. *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers*..... 223
- Elliott, William Yandell. *United States Foreign Policy*..... 870
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951* 228
- UNITED STATES NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. David, Paul T. Research on the Presidential Nominating Process in 1952..... 283
- Frischknecht, Réed L. The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System..... 704
- Leich, Harold H. The Hoover Commission's Personnel Recommendations—A Progress Report..... 100
- Marcy, Carl A. Note on Treaty Ratification.....1130
- Miller, Warren E. Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-1951..... 45
- Nuquist, Andrew E. Note on American Government Textbooks..... 567
- Prendergast, William B. Notes on Military Voting in 1952..... 282
- Smuckler, Ralph H. The Region of Isolationism..... 386
- Staats, Elmer B. The Government

- Sector of the American Economy... 178
 Articles and documents... 240, 574, 895, 1178
 Book notes... 893
 Book notices... 569,
 ...570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 600, 894, 1178
 Book reviews on: Carr, Robert K. *The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1960*... 882
 Cheever, Daniel S. and Haviland, H. Field, Jr. *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers*... 223
 Douglas, Paul H. *Ethics in Government*... 548
 Graham, George A. *Morality in American Politics*... 548
 Hardin, Charles M. *The Politics of Agriculture*... 221
 Sibley, Mulford Q. and Jacob, Philip E. *Conscription of Conscience*... 1169
 Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. *Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government* (Hearings)... 548
 Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. *Ethical Standards in Government* (Report)... 548
 URUGUAY. Book notices... 582
 Vandembosch, Amry. Book reviews... 877
 Vanderbilt, Arthur T. Books of, noted... 1177
 Van Wagenen, Richard W. Books of, noticed... 254
 Varg, Paul A. Books of, noticed... 590
 VENEZUELA. Book notices... 255
 Venkatarangaiya, M. Books of, noticed... 1186
 Viereck, Peter. Books of, noted... 1203
 Vinacke, Harold M. Book reviews... 226
 Voegelin, Eric. Book notes... 261
 — Books of, reviewed... 542
 Von Der Heydte, Friedrich August Freiherr. Books of, noticed... 263
 Von Mises, Ludwig. Books of, noticed... 599
 Wagner, Fritz. Books of, noted... 261
 Waldo, Dwight. Comments on the Report of the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics... 673
 — Books of, noticed... 894
 Watkins, Frederick M. Book reviews... 874
 — Books of, noticed... 1204
 Watkins, James T., IV. Book notes... 587
 Webb, Walter Prescott. Books of, reviewed... 871
 Webb, Wilfred D. Books of, noticed... 573
 Weeks, O. Douglas. Book notes... 567
 Weidner, Edward W. Book notes... 566
 Wells, Henry A. Books of, noticed... 239
 Wengert, Norman L. Books of, noticed... 893
 WEST INDIES. Book notices... 581
 Wheare, K. C. *The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth*... 1016
 White, R. J. Books of, noticed... 599
 Wight, Martin. Books of, noticed... 246
 Willert, Arthur. Books of, noticed... 1197
 Williams, Francis. Books of, noticed... 1186
 Williams, John H. Books of, noticed... 591
 Williamson, René de Visme. Book notes... 920
 Wilson, Francis G. Articles and Documents on Political Theory... 264, 600, 921, 1205
 Book reviews... 542
 Winkler, Henry R. Books of, noticed... 254
 Wlt, Daniel. Books of, noticed... 901
 Woodruff, Douglas. Books of, reviewed... 865
 Wright, Gordon. *Agrarian Syndicalism in Postwar France*... 402
 Wyatt, Laurence. Books of, noted... 235
 Yanaga, Chitoshi. Book reviews... 1162
 YUGOSLAVIA. Book reviews on: Korbel, Josef. *Tito's Communism*... 225
 Ulam, Adam B. *Titoism and the Cominform*... 225
 Zimmern, Alfred. Books of, noticed... 1196
 Zink, Harold. Books of, noticed... 570, 1188
 Zinkin, Maurice. Books of, noticed... 913
 Znaniecki, Florian. Books of, noticed... 590

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND ENCYCLOPEDIA VOLUME

A detailed survey of the world's economy:
its needs and resources—and its potential

World Population and Production

By W. S. WOYTINSKY
and E. S. WOYTINSKY

At a time when industrialization is fast becoming universal, this gigantic work marshals the facts of social and economic forces and trends on a world-wide scale! The result is a prime source book, a basic reference vitally important to our future.

It covers population—past, present, and projected future—by countries and by continents; their consumption needs and patterns; their resources in men, materials and technology; data by country on farming, energy production, mineral reserves, manufacturing, with major economic trends projected. The material is completely documented and is illustrated with tables, graphs, charts and maps.

1340 pages of
two-column
text

497 tables

Nearly 200
maps and
illustrations

156 graphs

Durably bound
in buckram

Size: 7" x 10 1/4" x 2 7/8"

\$12.00

... check this list:

RECENT TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDIES

FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790-1950

By Murray R. Benedict \$5.00

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES

By W. S. Woytinsky & Assoc. \$7.50

RENEWING OUR CITIES

By Miles L. Colean \$2.50

DEFENSE AND THE DOLLAR

Federal Credit and Monetary Policies

By Albert G. Hart \$2.00

ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND DEFENSE

By Donald H. Wallace \$2.00

THE FEDERAL DEBT: Structure and Impact

By Charles C. Abbott \$4.00

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

330 West 42nd St., New York 36

**VAN NOSTRAND
FOR COLLEGE TEXTS**



**From Our Political Science Series
Edited By Dr. Franklin L. Burdette**

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BASIC DOCUMENTS

By ELMER PLISCHKE

This valuable new text, with approximately 230 key items, offers a new and refreshing approach to the study of major functional topics of international affairs. Facsimile reproduction of material enhances the reader's understanding of the "how" as well as the "what" and "why" of foreign relations—helps make of it a living, practical subject. Paper 208 pages (1953) \$2.95

GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA

By MIGUEL JORRIN

This important new book offers an understanding of the complexities of the phenomena of government in this increasingly important area. It gives an excellent description and interpretation of the political institutions and practices of the Republics of the South. Topical treatment of subject matter facilitates study. 385 pages (1953) \$4.50

PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

By WILLIAM G. TORPEY

This new text provides a realistic treatment of the processes, procedures and problems of personnel administration in the executive branches of federal, state and local governments. Book is filled with a wealth of actual existing problems, up-to-date concepts, and interesting historical accounts.

431 pages (1953) \$5.00

New 2nd Edition—Lancaster's

GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA

By LANE W. LANCASTER

Considerable changes have been made to bring this widely used book up-to-date. Special attention is given to the new federal financial aid programs. The influence of urban and industrial forces on rural life and thought bears an important part in the early chapters.

375 pages (1952) \$3.75



D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

PUBLISHERS SINCE 1848

250 FOURTH AVENUE

NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK